Iped - 2

SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, PUNE
2ND INTERNAL ASSESSMENT
SUBJECT: INDIA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY & DEVELOPMENT
TOPIC: TRACING INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DIFFERENT

GOVERNMENTS
SUBMITTED BY:
BANDANA SAIKIA, 19010125405, DIVISION E
JOYSHREE ROY, 19010125423, DIVISION E
K. LAKSHMI PRAGNA, 19010125424, DIVISION E
DEYASHINI MONDAL, 19010125477, DIVISION E
HARSHITA JAIN, 19010125492, DIVISION E

INDEX
Abstract............................................................................................................................................4
Foreign Policy under Jawaharlal Nehru- By Bandana Saikia.........................................................5
Introduction..................................................................................................................................5
Tracing Nehru’s Legacy In Formulating Independent India’s Foreign Policy............................5
Policy Of Non-Alignment............................................................................................................7
Upholding Policy Of Anti-Colonialism, Anti-Imperialism And Anti-Racism............................8
Panchsheel Or Peaceful Coexistence...........................................................................................8
Contemporary Relevance Of Nehru’s Foreign Policy.................................................................9
Relevance of NAM today......................................................................................................10
Relevance of Panchsheel.......................................................................................................11
Foreign Policy Under Indira Gandhi- By Deyashini Mondal........................................................13
Background................................................................................................................................13
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1971...................................................................14
Simla Agreement, 1972.............................................................................................................14
Nuclear Test of 1974.................................................................................................................15
Further Implementations............................................................................................................16
Relevance in Present India.........................................................................................................17
Foreign Policy under Atal Bihari Vajpayee- By K. Lakshmi Pragna............................................18
Introduction................................................................................................................................18
Critical Analysis........................................................................................................................18
Nuclear Power.......................................................................................................................18
Strengthening and restructuring ties with USA.....................................................................19
Pursuit of dialogue with Pakistan and Kashmiri leadership..................................................19
Movement towards resolution of disputes with China..........................................................20
Extended Neighbourhood Policy: South Asia/ South East Asia...........................................20
Other Important International Ties........................................................................................21
Learning.....................................................................................................................................21
Relevance in Present Times.......................................................................................................22
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TRACING INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................22
Foreign Policy under Dr. Manmohan Singh- By Harshita Jain.....................................................24
Introduction................................................................................................................................24
Critical Analysis........................................................................................................................24
The Neighbouring Countries.................................................................................................26
The Manmohan Mantra.........................................................................................................27
The Geo-political position.....................................................................................................27
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................28
Indian Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi- By Joyshree Roy...................................................29
Image Building in the USA.......................................................................................................30
Hindutva in Modi’s Foreign Policy...........................................................................................30
Assertiveness in Foreign policies..............................................................................................31
Modi’s take on China.................................................................................................................31
India’s Security and trade policy...............................................................................................32
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................33
Overview........................................................................................................................................34
Bibliogrpahy..................................................................................................................................35
Research Papers.........................................................................................................................35
Online Resources.......................................................................................................................36
Books.........................................................................................................................................37
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ABSTRACT
Foreign policy is a supplement of the domestic policies aimed at protecting and advancing the
country’s national interests at the international platform. Factors like geographic location,
history, nation’s philosophy, available resources, changing goals and global and regional
challenges impact the foreign policy of a state. India's foreign policy is most fascinating in the
country's governance since Independence, particularly given the several twists and turns it has
endured. Prime Minister Nehru largely influenced India’s foreign policy since independence.
Following Nehru, Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, P. V.
Narasimha Rao, Gujral, Atal Behari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi have each
initiated measures signifying their unique contribution to the making and execution of foreign
policy in modern India. This paper discusses the foreign policy of various Prime Ministers and
its impact and relevance in today’s world.
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FOREIGN POLICY UNDER JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

BY BANDANA SAIKIA
INTRODUCTION
Jawaharlal Nehru is rightfully regarded as the architect of contemporary India. For his
involvement in nation building and dual position as Independent India's first Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister, he has been referred to be a democrat, socialist, humanist, and
visionary. Nehru was a product of the 'Indian Renaissance' of the 19th and early 20th
centuries, which was characterised by high Idealism. 1It is essential to record the turbulent
times in which Nehru lived and watched the world history of conflict and war unfold.
Foreign policy under Nehru was a multifaceted affair. While supporting the cause of global
peace and anti-colonialism, Nehru utilised foreign policy to protect and enhance India's
newly won independence, secure India's national interests, and build the self-reliance, self-
confidence, and pride of the Indian people.
TRACING NEHRU’S LEGACY IN FORMULATING INDEPENDENT INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
Jawaharlal Nehru's ideas and leadership are unparalleled among the primary sources of
India's foreign policy. Congress leaders allowed him to specialise in foreign affairs two
decades before India gained independence because of his preeminent leadership in domestic
politics; his full use of formal and informal leadership; his dual role as prime minister and
foreign minister; his function as a bridge from the past; and his expertise in addressing
international relationships in the context of widely valued concepts such as
nonviolence. 2Long before he encountered the difficulties and frustrations of executive
authority, Nehru had demonstrated a strong favourable predisposition towards foreign
politics for Independent India where he emphasized on upholding two of the major
foundational ideals of Independent India’s foreign policy i.e., anti-racism and anti-
colonialism.
1
Gautam Sen, THEORETICAL MOORINGS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: Nehru to Modi, India
International Centre Quarterly , AUTUMN 2016, Vol. 43, No. 2 (AUTUMN 2016), pp. 9-21.
2
Paul F Power, India’s Foreign Policy : The Age of Nehru, The Review of Politics , April., 1964, Vol. 26, No. 2
(Apr., 1964), pp. 257-286, Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on
behalf of Review of Politics.
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In February 1927, Nehru represented the Congress at the Brussels Congress of Oppressed
Nationalities, where he encountered a vast movement opposing colonialism. Anti-
imperialists from Africa gathered in America for the gathering and it was in this visit that
Nehru was driven by the idea of a nation which shall stand in opposition to racism and
colonialism 3. Additionally drawn to Marx's spirit and words, the advent of Marxist and
Leninist explanations of political life in Nehru's philosophy must be viewed in the context
of his revolutionary ideas. To Nehru, revolution meant cultural and social transformation
that would lead to the amelioration, if not the abolition, of illiteracy, poverty, and injustice.
In terms of the future, Nehru's view of revolution maintains that the human spirit, which he
sees in an existentialist light, would preserve its purity and triumph against superstition,
apathy, and tyranny 4.
Nehru advocated measures that benefited the nation while also including a good level of
idealism or liberal internationalism. 5Nehru sought to bring in a healthy amount of
pragmatism in his dealings with India's international affairs, much as he did in his economic
policies, which were agnostic to any ideological viewpoint. 6In Indian foreign policy, the
Nehru era was a period when moral concerns, originating primarily from a complicated and
exceptional man's political education, triumphed over a wide range of diplomatic,
intellectual, and strategic factors. His western education and experiences, as well as the
anglicized part of his home, had furnished him with the norms with which he assessed the
West by its own standards that distinguished his mature thought and rendered him less than
an integrated man. 7Under Nehru's leadership, India contributed to global efforts to build and
spread representative government and national self-respect through shared political ideas
and institutions with English-speaking democracies, symbolised by membership in the
Commonwealth, which republican India helped to transform.
3
Michele L. Louro, The Making of the League against Imperialism, 1927 from Part I - Mobilizing against Empire,
1927–1930.
4
Bipin Chandra, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Capitalist Class, 1936, Economic and Political Weekly.
5
Peu Ghosh, International Relations, 3rd ed. 2013, p.370.
6
JivantaSchoettli, Vision and Strategy in Indian Politics, Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies.
7
Paul F Power, India’s Foreign Policy : The Age of Nehru, The Review of Politics , April., 1964, Vol. 26, No. 2
(Apr., 1964), pp. 257-286, Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on
behalf of Review of Politics.
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POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT
Nehru's vision aimed to unite a group of country states that would, in theory, avoid getting
entrapped by the superpowers. Fundamentally, he sought an idealistic approach to
maintaining global peace, fairness, and parity among nation states, regardless of their
military or technical capabilities. Being a major reformer of the international order, Nehru’s
main concern was consolidating the Independence earned after years of struggle and
ensuring peace and economic development of India and many other nations that were
getting decolonized in rise of freedom struggle against colonialism. Nehru professed
distancing India from the two super blocs with the aim of ensuring development and
fighting social and economic evils. 8
Following World War II concluded, and the United Nations was established, two
superpowers emerged: the United States of America and Soviet Union, both hostile to the
other and surrounded by a number of small countries. It appeared to many nations
throughout the world at the time that these small, weak, and destitute states had no choice
but to join either of the two super blocs. 9 In this backdrop, the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) was formed at the Belgrade Conference in 1961 by its five founding members –
Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt,
Sukarno of Indonesia and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana where the NAM offered the newly
decolonised countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America a third and an alternative option
not to join either of the two alliances and enter a more flexible organisational structure
which is an anti-imperialist movement. The primary goal of Indian foreign policy, which was
to help colonial and ex-colonial nations in their fight against colonialism, was effectively
supported by non-alignment policy.10 Non-alignment policy effectively supported the
fundamental aim of Indian foreign policy, which was to assist colonial and ex-colonial states in
their battle against colonialism.11 Nehru emphasized on the fact that NAM is not a third power
block raised against the already existing two super blocs, rather it is an arena of peace. 12
By
upholding nonalignment, it enabled India to develop economic ties with countries on both sides
8
9
EşrefAksu, The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change, Published by Manchester
University Press, Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA, UK, p.3.
10
Bipin Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, India since Independence, 2008, p. 190.
11
Dr. V.K.R.V Rao, 'Nehru Legacy' p 36.
12
'Jawaharlel Nehru’s Speeches’, Vol.II, p 326, 1949 to 53.
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of the bloc as and when necessary. India received capital, technology, machines and food from
Western Countries in the US bloc and on the Soviet Union for building public sector industries &
manufacturing sophisticated military equipment and aircrafts. 13
UPHOLDING POLICY OF ANTI-COLONIALISM, ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND ANTI-RACISM
The origins of India's anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic politics may be traced back to her
own experience with British imperialism. The anti-imperialist& anti-colonialism sentiment
that grew throughout the Indian freedom movement, such as the Swadeshi Movement, Non-
Cooperation Movement, Civil Disobedience Movement, and Quit India Movement, found
expression in India's post-independence foreign policy posture. As a result, in the years after
independence, India showed sympathy with liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America& Nehru emphasized the NAM conference as well as the UN platform to advocate
for the people who were still subject to colonial authority. 14Nehru was opposed to 'Racial
Discrimination' in any form, as well as exploitation of one country by another, and he
defended the idea of independence for dependant people. In his Press Conference in Delhi in
1946, Nehru emphasized that in the sphere of foreign affairs, India will uphold the principle of
freedom for dependent peoples and will oppose ‘Racial Discrimination wherever it may occur.15
PANCHSHEEL OR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
Panchsheel is a significant characteristic and cardinal principle of Indian foreign

policy. 16Nehru absorbed the philosophical spirit of India, liberal philosophy, and Marxist ideas,
yet he remained primarily a peace messiah. 'Panchsheel’ is the cornerstone of India's Foreign
Policy, as seen via the contents of nonalignment. The idea of Panchsheel' was given
philosophical form by Gautam Buddha, and it was then spread throughout Asia by Emperor
Ashoka through edicts& scriptures. 17
Respecting the historical ideals and principles, through
peaceful coexistence and international cooperation, Nehru aimed to strengthen the realm of
peace. The Sino-Indian Treaty on Tibet (1954), which included the ideals of coexistence in its
13
Bipin Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, India since Independence, 2008, p. 203.
14
15
‘Indian Annual Register! Vol. II. July-Deb.1946, p. 252.
16
17
DilipMohite, ‘Ideological Foundations of Nehru's Non- alignment, The Indian Journal of Political Science , Jan. -
March, 1992, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Jan.- Mar, 1992), pp. 24-38.
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preamble (Panchsheel), was therefore the first formal commitment on behalf of two nations to
live in peace that were enunciated by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister of
India Jawaharlal Nehru.18 The five principles included:
 Mutual Respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty
 Mutual Non-aggression
 Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs
 Equality and mutual benefit
 Peaceful coexistence
Panchsheel was the name given to these five foreign relations concepts. Although India and
China agreed to these principles when they signed a pact. However, the notion was that such a
strategy could and should be used to guide the conduct of international affairs and thus, was later
the subject of negotiated agreements between India and Vietnam. 19The Panchsheel further
became a driving force behind Asian and African campaigns for equality and independence
against colonial and imperialist countries' dominance, and it was approved by the United
Nations. Despite the fact that the UN Charter contains the Five Principles of Panchsheel that was
prepared a decade before the Panchsheel was coded, the then UN Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjold appropriately defined them as "reaffirmation of the United Nations' goals and
duties" and when the UN General Assembly unanimously accepted the resolution proposed by
Yugoslavia, Sweden, and India on December 11, 1957,Panchsheel gained broader acceptance. 20
Despite the Chinese treachery in the 1962 Sino-Indian crisis, India continues to believe in these
values in her interactions with her neighbours and other members of the world community. 21
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF NEHRU’S FOREIGN POLICY
The Foreign Policy period between India’s independence in 1947 to 1964 is known famously as
the Years of Nehru’s Idealism. Primarily, Nehru's assertion on vigorous criticism, the provision
of opportunities for resistance, the creation of a platform for extensive discussion on
international issues, the call to perceive and resolve problems that hold national attention as
18
19
Navtej Kaur , Nehru as Prophet of World Peace, The Indian Journal of Political Science , JAN. - MAR., 2008, Vol.
69, No. 1 (JAN - MAR., 2008), pp. 203-222.
20
K.R. Narayanan, The 50th Anniversary of Panchsheel, 3 Chinese J. INT'l L. 369 (2004).
21
PM Kamath, “Need to Correct Some Debilitating Features of Foreign Policy Making in India”, Indian Journal of
Asian Affairs , December 1997, Vol. 10, No. 2 (December 1997),pp. 17-30.
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ultimate, and the emergence of a basis for broad outlook are of greatest importance in the 21 st
century for India and the world in this epoch after globalisation.
RELEVANCE OF NAM TODAY

With the emergence of the new characteristics of the International Relations, the NAM cannot
practically and historically play the same role it played during the global tension of Cold War.
The end of the Cold War has replaced the “nuclear bombs” with “social bombs”, with poverty,
underdevelopment, cross border violence, and global terrorism topping the priority list, which
further calls out for a common strategy to adjust the terms of dialogue for global negotiations.
The Culture of Peace, cooperation, striving for a new and just world order will continue as long
as the world is based upon an inequitable international system.
As the world expects the advent of a new global world order in the post pandemic world, there is
a need for all international institutions to promote welfare alongside economic growth and
establish a new template of globalization based on fairness, equality and humankind. The new
cold war that might be not in military terms but in economic power, the tension between United
States and China has gained momentum even more after pandemic started. Under such
circumstances, it is vital to focus on independent international organisations such as NAM to
play a balancing world. However, it is equally important to take into consideration as to what
needs to be altered as the new world politics and problems demands new set of objectives and
goals and the ongoing pandemic has the potential to articulate its role in a changing world.
The increasing economic interdependence in the pandemic world in terms of requesting supply
of raw materials for vaccine manufacturing, pharmaceutical products by the developing and
under-development countries from the developed countries has led to the silent exploitation. For
instance, in terms of economic disparity and money-purchasing powers and this shall reflect a
formidable challenge for the global world to bring forth an immediate solution for the same.
NAM comprised mostly of developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, which has
suffered massive economic loss where they have been relying on international bodies, and
powerful countries to meet their health crisis, could regain momentum. NAM can chalk out an
immediate action plan by scrutinizing the super economies and its role in helping least
developing countries in their Covid crisis and formulate necessary policies to lower down cost
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interest and trade charges. Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the limitations of the existing
international system and on that ground; NAM can emerge as a new leading international
system. NAM would in the post pandemic world will help formulate new international policies
for its member countries to prioritize to build back better their economy and tackle the economic
crisis.
Thus, NAM requires revitalisation for it to accommodate the pandemic consequences and refine
foreign policies with its member counties. Covid-19 can allow India to take the lead in the
movement and assist the NAM in articulating a clear role in creating the post-COVID world. In
the midst of the US-China competition, the NAM may create a new path toward a fairer
international order that satisfies the development requirements of its 120 members. COVID-19
has showed us the limitations of the present international system and India would do well to act
on and bring to fulfilment of formulation a new globalisation blueprint fairness, equality, and
humanism in the post-COVID era. 22
RELEVANCE OF PANCHSHEEL
Panchsheel was framed by India and China as a way to improve bilateral ties. Its ideals are still
relevant today since Panchsheel can offer the conceptual framework for this emerging paradigm
of international engagement, allowing all nations to cooperate in the pursuit of peace and
prosperity while retaining their national identity, spirit, and character.In 2013, Former Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh presented a new Panchsheel. The first premise said that India's
development objectives would dictate how it interacted with the rest of the world. The second
openly acknowledged that its development possibilities are inextricably connected to the global
economy, both in present and in the future. The third premise claimed that by cooperating with
all major countries, India might expect to establish a favourable global economic and security
environment for itself. The fourth principle recognised that if a country wanted to play a bigger
role on the global stage, it needed to develop and maintain more regional cooperation. Finally,
the new Panchsheel emphasised the importance of India's ideals "of a pluralistic, secular, and
liberal democracy" as an example to other countries.
“Intervention by the PM at Video Conference of NAM Contact Group in response to COVID-19”, PMIndia News
22
Update, May 4, 2020, available at: https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/intervention-by-the-pm-at-video-

conference-of-nam-contact-group-in-response-to-covid-19/?comment=disable.
11 | P a g e
However, as time changes, its principles should meet the growing needs of the International
society and hence the five principles of Panchsheel now can be construed as:
- Regional cooperation and connectivity at global level

- Cooperative and mutually agreed dispute resolution over border and trade issues
- To create a beneficial global economic and security structure by engaging with
international nation players
- To lessen the border disputes with the help of high-level talks and resorting to peaceful
and mutually agreed settlement
- To bring the small and less sufficient nations into trust and co-exist peacefully.
Considering the situation in Post Pandemic world, it has become very crucial for the above
mentioned suggested altered Panchsheel principles to come into picture and have practical
dimensions. The pandemic amplified numerous concerns for small countries such as a shortage
of health workers, often exacerbated by border closures; limited bargaining power for affordable
access to medicines and vaccines; dependence on larger neighbouring countries for trade,
production and access to medicines and vaccines; and significant economic and financial
constraints. On such context it is the need of the hour that countries do cooperate and help them
in the times of crisis. The current government has definitely continued the legacy of Nehru’s
foreign policy as India sent maximum number of covid vaccine supplies to numerous countries
thereby upholding the newly emerged Panchsheel principles.
Further, it has now become essential that one nation definitely interferes in the internal matters of
other’s if there is a growing possibility of that nation harming the International Peace and Order
at an International Level by means of peaceful deliberations and talks at International Platforms
like UN to deliberate and discuss upon a means to combat such a harm.
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FOREIGN POLICY UNDER INDIRA GANDHI

BY DEYASHINI MONDAL
BACKGROUND
After Nehru, things started to change. The equilibrium gradually shifted for regionalism. Indian
foreign policy was guided by into channels of political authenticity, away from the heartfelt
dreams, visions of idealism which described Indian foreign policy during the Nehru time. This
change in direction was typified by Shastri's annihilation of the self-satisfied forecasts
whereupon Pakistan attacked India in Kashmir in September 1965. Indira Gandhi expanded the
substance and scope of this confident and realistic Indo-centric approach in the foreign policy of
India by developing India's innovative safeguard limits and giving an unmistakable message to
every one of India's neighbours that while India had no forceful or hegemonistic motives towards
them, India's reaction to any danger to its solidarity and regional integrity radiating from
Indira Gandhi from 1965–77 and again from 1980 until her death in 1984, attempted to control
both choices in the domestic and foreign policies. The worldwide demeanour had changed as the
USA–USSR Cold War had become steady, and neither Russians nor Americans felt the
requirement for mediators. Consequently, just the local region was open for move, which Indira
Gandhi took leading the initiative to bring Bangladesh its independence in 1971.23 Territorial
legislative issues turned into the primary focal point of Indian discretion trying to impact
occasions in Sri Lanka and Nepal, whose pressures could pour out over into domestic Indian
political issues. While the worldwide strategy started to continuously lose its radiance, its
intelligibility, its structure and, likewise, its significance, the expansive shapes of a territorial
approach started to arise—a policy that was more cognizant, more logical, more oriented and
more powerful.24
It was during Indira Gandhi's time that Pakistan was diminished in size, Bangladesh arose as an
autonomous and sovereign state in the East, Sikkim was attached and absorbed in India and a
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was shaped. Indira Gandhi didn't start this
23
Ifversen, Jan and ChristofferKølvraa. 2007. ‘European Neighbourhood Policy as Identity Politics’, paper
presented at the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada.
24
Menon, Shivshankar. 2007. ‘The Challenges Ahead for India’s Foreign Policy’, speech delivered at the Observer
Research Foundation, New Delhi.
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load of occasions, in spite of the fact that she assumed an essential part in their development.
India's objective was to stay the unchallenged 'local hegemon' in South Asia, with more
extensive world issues taking expository need.
INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP, 1971
A slant towards being supportive of Soviet had effectively set in during the Nehru time frame in
the act of non-alignment. The 1970s were with the end goal that internationally non-alignment
movement had turned into a power thoughtful to the Soviet Union. Cuba, as a part of the non-
alignment movement, even presented the possibility that the Soviet Union is a 'characteristic
partner' of the non-aligned countries. This he did at the 1979 NAM Summit held at Havana. The
preference became obvious in the Indo-Soviet relations during the period. Before the Bangladesh
battle of 1971, India marked a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union. Under the
deal, the two nations concurred on "quick mutual consultations" in case of either country
confronting a military danger and embrace proper compelling measures.25
The treaty communicated the Soviet Union's acknowledgment of India's strategy of non-
alignment. In any case, the deal was criticised by the US as a finish of India's non-alignment.
However, the deal was India's response to the changing worldwide scene. Starting around 1962
Pakistan and China had become a close acquaintance with one another against India on the
hypothesis that enemy’s enemy is a friend. The US was at that point close to Pakistan with the
alliances of military strengthening their relations. 26
SIMLA AGREEMENT, 1972
Starting in 1970, Pakistan confronted its greatest internal emergency. Bhutto's party arose a
victor in West Pakistan, while the Awami League drove by Sheik Mujib-ur Rahman moved
throughout East Pakistan. The Bengali populace of East Pakistan had casted a ballot to challenge
long periods of being treated as second citizens by the rulers situated in West Pakistan. The
Pakistani rulers were not ready to acknowledge the popularity-based decision. Nor were they
prepared to acknowledge the Awami League's interest for an alliance. All things being equal, in
Saran, Shyam. 2005. ‘India and its Neighbours’, speech delivered at India International Centre, New Delhi.
25
Wagner, Christian. 2005. ‘From Hard Power to Soft Power? Ideas, Interactions, Institutions and Images in India’s
26
South Asia Policy’, Working Paper 26, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics.
14 | P a g e
mid-1971, the Pakistani armed force captured Sheik Mujib and released a reign of fear on
individuals of East Pakistan.
All through 1971, India had to take the responsibility to bear the weight of around 80 lakh
refugees who escaped East Pakistan and took cover in the adjoining regions in India. India
protracted out moral and material help to the freedom battle in Bangladesh. India was blamed by
Pakistan of conspiracy to split the country.27
The Indo-Pakistan battle of 1971 was finished by consenting to the Simla Arrangement between
Gandhi and Bhutto. Under the arrangement both the nations "resolved to settle their differences
by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations." They additionally consented to regard each
other's public unity and regional integrity and not to help or energize any demonstrations, which
could influence the upkeep of harmony in the area. Aside from these outflows of idealistic
thought in substantial terms, Pakistan recaptured every one of its domains lost in West Pakistan
in the War and furthermore got opportunity for Prisoners of War taken in Bangladesh. POWs
were really delivered in 1973 after India got assent of Bangladesh. India acquired affirmations of
acceptable conduct, which Pakistan was unequipped for practically speaking.28
India, with its restricted assets, had started planning its development. Yet, clashes with
neighbours wrecked the five-year plans. The scant assets were redirected to the protection area
particularly after 1962, as India needed to leave on a tactical modernisation drive. The
Department of Defense Production was set up in November 1962 and the Department of Defense
Supplies in November 1965. The Third Plan (1961-66) was influenced and it was trailed by three
Annual Plans and the Fourth Plan could be started uniquely in 1969. India's protection use
expanded immensely after the conflicts.
NUCLEAR TEST OF 1974
Mrs. Gandhi will also be remembered for her resolve to lead the country down the path of
becoming a major power. Nehru was an idealist when it came to power. Mrs. Gandhi, on the
other hand, was realistic to a large extent. "If you peep into the future and nothing goes wrong—
27
Harshe, Rajan and K.M. Seethi (eds). 2005. Engaging With the World: Critical Reflections On Indian Foreign
Policy. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
28
Gujral, I.K. 1997. ‘Aspects of India’s Foreign Policy’, speech at the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies,
Colombo.
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wars and the like," Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha in 1954, "the obvious fourth country in the
world (after the United States, the Soviet Union, and China) is India." Gandhi, on the other hand,
put his ideals into practise. One of these acts was her conducting a nuclear test in Pokharan in
May 1974.
There has been domestic pressure on the Indian government to undertake nuclear tests since
China's nuclear tests in October 1964. Lal Bahadur Shastri, on the other hand, remained silent on
the demand. However, in May 1966, his External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, stated in the
Lok Sabha that India had the capability to obtain nuclear weapons in a reasonable amount of
time. In late 1964, Shastri, as Prime Minister, reportedly gave the Atomic Energy Commission
permission to proceed on the bomb design.29
Though it was reported to be a peaceful nuclear explosion, Indira Gandhi's test meant to
demonstrate India's nuclear capability (PNE). Her reasoning went like this. The US utilised its
nuclear-powered industry to intimidate India into not attacking West Pakistan during the
Bangladesh conflict in 1971. When President Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry
Kissinger, was in India earlier this year, he told Indian policymakers that if China intervenes in
the impending battle between India and Pakistan, India should not rely on the US. This was in
direct opposition to the Nixon Doctrine, which promised US protection if any non-nuclear
nation, in this case China, was threatened by a nuclear weapons state. As a result, Gandhi aspired
to make India self-sufficient in terms of security.30
FURTHER IMPLEMENTATIONS
The Maritime Boundary Agreement of 28th 1974 outlined the global maritime limit among India
and Sri Lanka which put Kachhativu on the Sri Lanka side of this limit. In any case, Kachchativu
stays the object of worry for India because of provocative episodes including Sri Lanka Naval
Patrols and unarmed Indian Fisherman.
In 1974, Indo-Nepal relations got stressed when Nepal responded strongly when Sikkim agreed
to India. In impact, the Indo-Nepal relations remained everything except friendly. Indo-Bhutan
Ashok, D., 2016. Foreign Policy of Indira Gandhi, 1966-1977 | AIDCSC. [online] Indiancommunities.org.
29
Basit, Quinn, Choong, Seah, Lee, Ganguly, Tripathi, Kumar, Erickson, Collins, Mackinnon, Lewis, Wasser,
30
Pettyjohn and Cook, 2017. Indira Gandhi’s Lesson for Modi. [online] Foreign Policy.
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relations stayed heartfelt since the time India closed an amended arrangement with Bhutan on 8
August 1949. At the point when Sikkim became placed as a part of Indian Union in 1976,
numerous nations, especially China, made a decent attempt to urge Bhutan to be careful with
India's plans. Yet, the ruler of Bhutan, Jigme Singha Wangchuck stayed faithful to India and felt
guaranteed of India's regard to the sovereign status of Bhutan.
RELEVANCE IN PRESENT INDIA
Indira's system was a milestone period for India's foreign policy concluding in India's foundation
as provincial force in South Asia. A portion of the significant accomplishments in her foreign
policy was to incorporate development of Bangladesh as a country (1971) and the declaration of
strength of Indian force in South Asia; standardization of relations with Pakistan by means of
Shimla Agreement (1972); further developing relations with China; limit and sea zone
settlements with Sri Lanka (1974& 1976); with Indonesia (1974) and Bangladesh (1974 by
tackling Berubari association issue); fellowship with Iran; consolidation of Sikkim as 22nd
province of Indian Union (1975); durable nuclear policy and atomic test. Yet, she didn't meet
with wanted accomplishment in her supportive of Arab strategy, enmity of ASEAN and
reprimanded a significant force Japan during her period.31
It is important to decipher from her contributions that the foreign policies pertaining to the
defence of the country were well-thought and implemented by her. The various treaties to keep
India free from being a war-prone country establishing its rightful position in South East Asia.
Yet she failed to bring about much needed radical socio-economic changes or establish economic
growth with social justice. Even though she was in power for a long tenure, she was not able to
develop the economy and could not establish greater social and economic equality.
31
Ganguly, S. and Pardesi, M., 2009. Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy. [online] Taylor & Francis.
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FOREIGN POLICY UNDER ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE

BY K. LAKSHMI PRAGNA
INTRODUCTION
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the 10th Prime Minister of India (from 19-03-1998 to 22-03-2004), played
a transformational role in key areas shaping India’s Foreign Policy. Therefore, any examination
of India’s foreign policy would be incomplete if the imprint left by the first non-congress foreign
minister and later a dynamic Prime Minister, is not studied. As the Minister of External Affairs
under Morarji Desai Cabinet, he became the first person to deliver a speech in Hindi at the
United Nations General Assembly. As the Prime Minister his decisions influenced India’s
relations with major powers.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Along with successful domestic policies such as Golden Quadrilateral, Fiscal Responsibility Act,
Public Sector Disinvestment, he pushed India’s national GDP above 8% and inflation below 4%
in 2004. Apart from economics a similar focus was also given to foreign policy. Its legacy is
identified through the following: -
NUCLEAR POWER
Though India’s first nuclear tests were conducted under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, her
successor, Mr.Rajiv Gandhi emphasised on nuclear disarmament. When India ignored its nuclear
power, the world especially China was amassing it. Vajpayee realised that the country lagged in
nuclear power and hence, under his leadership Pokhran II tests in 1998 were conducted. Due to
which China showed interest to collaborate with India in commercial terms. Though the aim was
to create deterrence against China, it provoked sanctions. It resulted in a three year long
destruction of diplomatic dialogue between India and USA.
Within a year of its nuclear tests, the government announced draft on nuclear doctrine and
subsequently created new institutions like National Security Advisory Board for managing
security challenges. The late Prime Minister articulated ‘no first policy’ for India’s nuclear
power. Jaswant Singh from India’s side tried to bring back the diplomatic ties between India and
USA.
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Vajpayee’s leadership committed to two important stabilizing measures- (i) an informal

moratorium on further nuclear tests and (ii) no first use policy which have become sacrosanct in
India’s thinking towards nuclear power. This shows the prudence and restraint in Vajpayee’s
realism.
STRENGTHENING AND RESTRUCTURING TIES WITH USA

Vajpayee strongly believed that India could challenge the opinion of the world, bear the near-
term costs and yet be elevated in nuclear power. He was a genius in judging India’s stand in
world politics through creative diplomacy.
Consequently, India became successful in re-establishing diplomatic ties with USA after 3 years
of sanction. A comprehensive document, ‘India Relations: A Vision for the 21 st century’ was
signed by two sides during the visit of President Bill Clinton in March, 2000. This formed the
foundation of robust ties between India and USA which later Manmohan Singh and Modi build
on. It impacted in creating various forums like US-Financial and Economic Forum; US-India
Commercial Dialogue; US-India Working Group on Trade; Us-India Science and Technology
Forum, etc.
PURSUIT OF DIALOGUE WITH PAKISTAN AND KASHMIRI LEADERSHIP

Resolving Kashmir conflict was a priority in Vajpayee’s foreign policy. He coined the slogan
‘Insaniyat, Jamhuriyat, Kashmiriyat’ meaning ‘Humanism, Democracy and Kashmir’s age old
legacy of amity’. He always emphasised that a nation can choose its friends but not its
neighbours. He believed conflict can be solved through brotherhood and took a bus to Lahore
and signed Lahore Declaration which proposed several measures to restore confidence and
normalise relations. It formed the 2nd agreement to avoid nuclear conflict after the Non-
Aggressive Agreement signed between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto. But when Nawaj
Sharif was deposed by Parvej Musharraf through a militant coup, the Lahore declaration had no
importance. Indian gestures were not reciprocated properly resulting in failure of Agra Summit
and eruption of Kargil War in 1999. Even after the war Musharraf was invited to India in July
2001 to resume bilateral talks but this did not produce any positive outcome due to his
uncompromising attitude towards Kashmir. Inspite of the terror attacks and war, Prime Minister
again travelled to Islamabad in 2004 for SAARC Summit.
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Under the leadership of Manmohan Singh we observe the government tried to imitate Vajpayee’s
initiative with regard to Kashmir.
MOVEMENT TOWARDS RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES WITH CHINA

Prime Minister’s path-breaking visit to Beijing and creation of special representative mechanism
to solve border dispute played a crucial role in building confidence between the two nations. The
special representation initiated 20 rounds of talks to resolve over 4000 km long boundary. Wen
Jiabao’s invite to Vajpayee in 2003 became a milestone in the relationship of two countries
which led to signing of ‘Declaration of Principles for Relations and Comprehensive
Cooperation’. The signing of declaration led to recognition of Sikkim as Indian state by China
and Tibet as part of China by India.
EXTENDED NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: SOUTH ASIA/ SOUTH EAST ASIA

Previous government’s policy suffered in – (i) Using good neighbourliness as cliché and (ii)
Adoption of superior and imperious tone. Vajpayee had a clear policy towards the south Asian
counterparts. He focused on extending friendships even with smaller nations without calculating
their powers or philosophies. He also tried to clear suspicion, misunderstanding and remove fear
of interference. Though the ‘Look East’ policy was created by PV Narsimha Rao, Vajpayee
included it with energy and widening of India-ASEAN linkages. Thus, the policy now included
connectivity, maritime security, etc., along with trade.
This impacted in signing up of trade and commercial agreements with Vietnam and Indonesia.
Also, he succeeded in establishing close ties with ASEAN. Subsequently, the first India-EU
summit happened in June 2000 in Lisbon.
The concept of neighbourhood under Vajpayee’s governance can be understood as the

geographical proximity of a nation, development within which can have a serious implication for
Indian security. Hence, India’s strategic frontiers extended from Central Asia (north) to East
Asia and Persian Gulf (west) to Southeast Asia (east). The late Prime Minister developed and
reflected goodwill gestures even to the extended neighbours. His approach included the policy of
‘carrot and stick’ along with friendly diplomatic acts. Modi government under its ‘Act East’
policy adopted Vajpayee’s view of extended neighbourhood and successfully pushed it forward.
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OTHER IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL TIES

Russia
Vajpayee could bring friendship Vladimir Putin of Russia in 2000 which impacted in signing of
agreement to supply defence equipment. This Indo-Russia annual summit is held alternatively in
two countries. Also, it resulted in Moslow Declaration which opened the cooperation among the
spheres of trade and security.
Iran
Then President Khatami visited Delhi as chief guest on Republic Day. Ties in terms of security
and trade were opened.
IBSA
Through the Brasilia Declaration in 2003, IBSA Dialogue Forum opened. It led to a trilateral
developmental initiative among India, Brazil and South Africa as an objective to promote south-
south cooperation and exchange.
LEARNING
The most important learning is to know when to rush for quest of power and when to slow down
to avoid overreach. Vajpayee is considered a natural grand strategist as he showed this delicate
balance under three interrelated events (becoming nuclear power state, during kargil war and
outreach to China soon after). Vajpayee’s realism was committed with restraint and balance
which crafted a pragmatic foreign policy template for India that has relevance till today. India’s
conduct during Kargil is the testament to its strategic restraint. The prime minister clearly
articulated, “India will not cede any territory or accept a ceasefire unless Pakistan’s forces had
vacated the peaks of Kargil”. At the same time, a firm instruction to the Indian Armed Forces
were circulated not to breach the Line of Control (LoC). This means careful manoeuvring by
IAF. India could get a favourable international intercession during this time due to non-breaching
of LoC. Despite the wars, he never forgot the larger responsibility brought on by India on
possession of nuclear weapons.
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Another important lesson to learn is the way Vajpayee dealt with China. He was well aware of
challenges of Chinese power which was in fact the pre-eminent reason for India’s nuclear test as
he conveyed to US President Bill Clinton in a (leaked) private letter. At the same time initiating
relations with China to improve trade and commerce as well as reducing the border tension.
There is certain discomfort between India-US relations due to India’s ties with Russia and Iran,
but if Vajpayee could form Indo-US ties despite differences then the present Modi government
can surely resolve The United States of America’s discomfort.
RELEVANCE IN PRESENT TIMES
 Vajpayee had a clear goal which are not only far-sighted but are also essential even today
for peace, stability and prosperity of India and its neighbours.
 His notion to ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbhakam’ – world being one family remains a regular
aspect of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s public addresses overseas. Example- Speech
in Quad; UNGA, etc. The same is also acted during the humanitarian assistance even
today. Example- Operation Maitri during 2015 Nepal earthquake.
 Since 2014 relations with China altered between overt displays of friendship and
muscular positioning. Approach of Vajpayee’s de-emphasizing border issue for overall
growth still serves as a template despite Doklam standoff last year or present tensions
around Line of Actual Control.
 His legacy reminds India’s needs to focus on its interests and means to secure them
during dynamic churn of politics in the world.
 The present situation of tense relationships with Islamabad and a restive state of Kashmir
valley since 2016, Vajpayee’s method of dialogue among the leaders of India, Pakistan
and Kashmir is one of the possibilities to resolve the conflict.
CONCLUSION
Even today despite border tensions with Pakistan and China, India has not wavered its ‘no first
use’ policy. This serves as a vindication of Vajpayee’s words that India’s nuclear arsenal would
never be ‘weapons of aggression’. His legacy thus, stands in institutionalizing India’s national
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security decision making and propelling the country to the forefront on the global stage. He is
credited to expand India’s international relations by employing creative diplomacy.
The eye-catcher in his foreign policy is the ‘clear-headedness’. His foreign policy was a mixture
of idealism and realism with a balance of pragmatism. Finally, to reshape India’s regional
strategic environment, it surely must revisit Vajpayee’s wisdom.
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FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DR. MANMOHAN SINGH

BY HARSHITA JAIN
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Manmohan Singh’s vision was not only India’s economic growth but such growth which
would improve the life of its citizens. He was the 14th Prime Minister of India, some call him the
accidental Prime Minister, and first ever Indian PM after Nehru to get elected after completing a
5-year term at the office. His tenure as a PM started from 2004 and he bid farewell in 2014.
From 1991to 1996, he held the post of one of the best Finance Minister India had ever seen. He
brought much needed economic reforms and also abolished the ‘License Raj system’. As a
Finance Minister he changed the socialist economic system to a capitalist economic system,
commenced the privatization process of the public sector companies, smoothened the pathway
for FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). In this paper, the Foreign Policy under PM Manmohan
Singh will be analysed in detail. It can be seen that he continued the foreign policy of his
predecessor, P.V. Narasimha Rao and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, which was pragmatic in nature.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The first aspect of Dr. Manmohan Singh’s Foreign Policy as a Prime Minister consists of ‘The
Manmohan Doctrine’ and at the heart of this doctrine lies Economic Growth which is the only
thing he knows the best. He believed that a weak country will be at disadvantage in international
relations and understood that the economic growth, that he loves to advocate, will become
India’s leverage.
Manmohan doctrine has four pillars or principles. First is ‘Energy’, the PM believed that Energy
was the barrier for India to rise. The logic behind the same is that India imports oil and gas
mostly from West Asia for approximately 70% of its energy needs. 32 According to him, this
needs to be diversified since it’s ‘too much of dependence’ and finds solution in nuclear power.
He wanted India to grow in solar, coal technology and hydrogen fuel cells. India signed the
famous nuclear power deal with the US, one of the most appreciated Foreign Policy decision in
Singh’s time. I personally believe that this ideology was important since dependence on a single
32
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Manmohan Doctrine, H.T., Mar 05, 2006.
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source can be harmful for a country’s growth since betrayal is a possibility. Take for instance the
relations of Cuba and Soviet Union. Cuba was dependent on Soviet Union for economic, military
and political elements. Cuba started sugar exports but failed to develop a diversified and self-
reliant economy. When there was a collapse of Soviet Union, Cuba’s GDP went down to 35%
and the exports went down by 80% including fall of domestic industries. This economic crisis in
Cuba started in 1991 and was called the Special Period which can be compared to the Great
Economic Depression.33 It is also said that ‘one shouldn’t keep all eggs in one basket’ since
everything could be lost. I would also like to draw a relevant parallel to how the British Royals
never travel together in one plane since in case of emergencies at least one family member could
be saved and could continue the family lineage.
Second is America, as Singh believed that India and US are inseparable although at different
occasions, he has denied to be pro-American. India’s growth elements are technology and
service and can’t stay in place without US. He also believes that China’s system of economy
isn’t ideal for a democracy which can be seen by the way they treat their labour. However, I
believe that the treatment of India’s labour class is no different than China or any other country
even after the enactment of NREGA in 2005. In India, the labour even works below the
minimum wage since they are desperate to provide at least one meal for their family. At that
time, George Bush was determined to aid India and an increase of 10% looked easier when the
World’s superpower i.e., US was backing you.
The third is East Asia, during Singh’s tenure, Asia Pacific (APAC) was rich in economy and
India had weak relations with it. He said that ‘India needed to do more than look east’, he knew
that this area was the peak of advantage for the country and used ASEAN-India relations as a
stepping stone. However, there was one more problem i.e., FDI and Tariff barriers which were
gradually eased and countries like Indonesia, Australia, Japan, Thailand took interest while
China was as it is.
The last dot that connected this doctrine was South Asia which has always been weak. Pakistan
and India didn’t have any chemistry and moreover, Singh insisted that he remain in office for
one tenure before deciding the Kashmir issue which didn’t settle well with Pervez Musharraf. At
33
Kosmas Tsokhas, The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence on the Soviet Union, 9 JSTOR, 319-362 (1980).
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the time, the same was the condition with neighbours like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka. The
PM’s famous and silent ‘fall-back policy’ says that India will stay quiet until and unless the
neighbouring countries don’t get in the path of Singh’s 10% answer. I don’t fully agree with this
fall-back policy of PM Manmohan Singh. He was more supportive in nature and the current PM
is assertive. During Singh’s time India looked meek and had a defensive strategy while currently
India has both defensive and offensive strategy. I am not a supporter of violence but the way
Modi tackled the attacks by, our neighbours, Pakistan was one instance where every Indian
citizen applauded him. Similarly, after the 2008 Mumbai attacks relations of India and Pakistan
were bitter than ever, but Singh was softer with Pakistan than Modi.
However, Singh has seen stability with Pakistan even though Pakistan didn’t address the
Mumbai attacks and Singh in 2008 confirmed that he and Musharraf had made peace with
respect to Kashmir.34 I believe that this shows, Singh was successful in securing peace in long-
term using his soft approach.
THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

China tops the list when it comes to tensed relations with India and is at a same standing as
Pakistan. During 2006, Hu Jintao, China’s President, made a visit to India to improve relations
between the countries. Reopening of Nathula Pass in Sikkim, which was closed for more than
40 years, was used a springboard to mend the relations. In 2008, Singh also visited China and
made the neighbour, India’s largest trade associate but it favoured China a lot. After Singh was
re-elected, in 2013, China and India had a 3-week long argument near LAC situated between
Aksai Chin and Ladakh. It ended when China withdrew troops and India destroyed their bunkers.
Another point to be noted which is significant is that during SAARC, China was an observer and
India didn’t allow China to become a member even when other countries allowed it. Manmohan
Singh’s diplomatic skills are the ones to be appreciated since it helped India to be at advantage
when the ‘Sino-Indian Border Defence Cooperation Agreement’ was finalised during Singh’s
visit to China in 2013. The objective of this agreement was to reduce conflicts from surprise
movements in the tensed areas.
34
Sarah Graham, Manmohan Singh’s Legacy: Foreign Policy, Lowy Institute, May 19, (2014).
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The African Countries had participated with India in the ‘Indian-African Summit of 2008’. The
objective of the same was to enhance diplomatic relations and increase trade and commerce.
Singh also tried to enhance relations with Europe like Germany, United Kingdoms and France.
The next Country is Japan. Singh initiated the ‘India-Japan Strategic Global Partnership’ as
part of India’s Foreign Policy and strengthen relations with Japan which I believe was to
establish the principle stating improvement in relations with Asia-pacific. India was the ‘largest
regional donor’ for Afghanistan and initiated developmental programmes. In 2003, India and
Israel have invested in each other’s countries. Israel wanted to become India’s Defence alliance
and leave behind Russia.
THE MANMOHAN MANTRA

The Manmohan Mantra is summarised as- firstly, the developmental concerns of India affect the
relations with US, Russia and Asian Countries. The most significant objective of India’s FP is to
create an environment which nurtures the wellbeing of India. Secondly, economy of India should
have a chemistry with the world economy to make Indians realise their potential. This I believe
is a small hint by Singh to become a self-reliant country which currently, PM Modi is an
advocate for. Thirdly, at that time, India wanted to focus on maintaining stable relations with
world superpowers to create a secure environment and achieve global economy. Fourthly, India
requires, even now, ‘regional cooperation and connectivity’.35 Lastly, Singh wanted to say that
India’s FP isn’t determined only by its interests but most importantly by its values which are
very close to Indians. It had and wanted to inspire the people and their countries around the
globe.
THE GEO-POLITICAL POSITION

Singh was able to carry out the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement and visited US to
make India and US enter into cooperation in Civil Nuclear Energy and the NSG waiver 36. US
agreed for civil nuclear cooperation and India separated the civil and military facilities to place
the civil facilities under IAEA and let the organisation inspect the reactors in exchange of India
35
India Writes Network, A Free and Prosperous India: Five Principles of Foreign Policy, Ministry of External
Affairs, GOI, Nov 05, (2013), https://mea.gov.in/articles-in-indianmedia.htm?
dtl/22430/A+Free+and+Prosperous+India+Five+Principles+of+Foreign+Policy.
36
Ankit Panda, Did India’s ‘Manmohan Doctrine’ Succeed, The Diplomat, Nov 06, (2013),
https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/did-indias-manmohan-doctrine-succeed/.
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utilising America’s Nuclear Technology and fuel. India was recognised as ‘de-facto nuclear
state’. However, this decision led to chaos in the domestic level since ‘Left’ withdrew support
from Singh but Samajwadi Party came to the rescue. It was believed that this deal would help
India be included in the global nuclear arena. The agreement was finally signed in 2008 after
plenty of negotiations.
The trilateral agreement also called the ‘India-Myanmar-Thailand Agreement’ was the
Highway project started in 2005 and was important to improve connectivity across borders
which was one of the principles under the Manmohan Mantra.
CONCLUSION
The current India has developed to be confident and self-reliant. However, this was not only the
efforts of PM Modi. I believe that changing a country with as diverse cultures, habits and citizens
as India is a long and gradual process. Every Prime Minister in their own capacity has
contributed to India and made it what it is today. Manmohan Singh might be called the
accidental, silent and weakest Prime Minister, but he has had successful and not so successful
policies for India which will go down in history and his successors will learn from it. I would
like to conclude by mentioning that Manmohan Singh’s Foreign Policy promising but wasn’t
able to live up to the expectations.
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INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NARENDRA MODI

BY JOYSHREE ROY
Many of the time, Shri Narendra Modi’s foreign policy, was criticized by saying, the policy puts,
Modi first and Indian second. Scholars find the policies are a clear continuity of the policies seen
under UPA and NDA government, said by TCA Rangachari, a former Indian ambassador to
Germany and France "Foreign policies don't change that rapidly. I believe that Modi's foreign
policy has been a continuation from his predecessors”. 37But, as we all know, a foreign policy of
any country is always aligned with its past, in other words, a foreign policy of a country does not
have a sharp change to it, but it does have some slight changes, with the continuity of its past
agendas.
When the Modi government came into power many scholars suggested that, in a large country
like India, the shift in foreign policy would not change drastically. On the other hand, some
scholars have seen the drastic change in foreign policy as soon as he became the PM of India. 38
The Modi Doctrine of foreign policy is a new idea which, focused on building India’s regional
power through, economic diplomacy, where India becomes a rule-maker rather than a rule-taker.
39
Modi as the new PM did not have any experience in foreign policy, though he is good with the
economy and visited south Asian countries like Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan,
Thailand, as the CM of Gujarat, for different events for his state. Even as a partner of Vibrant
Gujarat Global Investor’s Summit, he got Japan and Canada by his side. 40
After becoming the PM his image building in the international forum was the main concern,
referencing the 2002 Gujarat riots of Godhra, where many Muslims along with Hindu pilgrims
returning from Ayodhya were killed, which gave out a negative image of him as a CM. Thus,
37
Manasi Gopalakrishnan, Mahesh Jha, How PM Modi changed the face of Indian foreign policy, DW News,
06.05.2019, https://www.dw.com/en/how-pm-modi-changed-the-face-of-indian-foreign-policy/a-48618235.
38
TANDON, AAKRITI. 2016a. “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities and the Emergence of a Modi Doctrine.” Strategic
Analysis 40: 349–56; CHAULIA, SREERAM. 2016. Modi Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of India’s Prime Minister.
New Delhi: Bloombury.
39
CHELLANEY, BRAMHA. 2014. “Deconstructing the Modi Foreign Policy.” Hindu, December 4.,
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/deconstructing-the-modi-foreignpolicy/article6658904.ece.
40
DP Bhattacharya, Narendra Modi have been to US before Godhra riots, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, May 26, 2014,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/narendra-modi-have-been-to-us-before-godhra-
riots/articleshow/35612011.cms.
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seeing this, the USA in 2005, banned Modi for not giving him a visa, for his controversial human
rights record.
The building of his foreign policy started in 2014, immediately after the BJP’s win in the
parliamentary poll. To mention good relations with India’s neighbour, he invited the ex-president
of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, and the ex-PM of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, in his Oath-taking
ceremony.
IMAGE BUILDING IN THE USA
Modi visited the USA in 2014 after the USA lifted the ban, he talks with Former President
Barack Obama and addressed Indians living in New York City, in Madison Square Garden,
where his oratory skills and the confidence that he has in India’s future was reflected by this
speech, gave him utmost popularity internationally. This was the stepping stone of India’s
fruitful relationship with the USA till now. Therefore, USA and India, has signed several treaties
and deals on defense and Trade and undertaken joint military exercises. The India-USA Nuclear
deal of 1998, which was initiated by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, was made operational by the Modi
government. India’s foreign policy also combined the USA as the strategic partner, for security
perspective, India signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the
Communication and Information on Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), and Basic
Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA)for Geo-Spatial Cooperation.
Modi visited Berlin and Paris in 2015, and equally charmed the European Union. In France, he
talked with Former French President Francois Hollande, and break a deal to sell, 36 Rafale
fighter jets. However, India seems to drift away from Russia, his long-time ally but maintaining a
cordial relation.
HINDUTVA IN MODI’S FOREIGN POLICY
The concept of Hindutva, in a guiding philosophy in the framework of the BJP’s or the Modi’s
Foreign Policy, which is in association with the idea of Rashtriya Swayam sevak Sangh (RSS),
which showcases the Hindu idea on society, politics, and economics. Thus, Hindustava, plays a
passive role in the foreign policy, keeping in mind its religious aggression point, in international
relations.
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Before we see the foreign policy of India in a new light, it is important to examine the range of
Hindutva, in context with the state, nation, and the international forums. We need to understand
that the idea of Hindutva is not a sheer realization of the role of Hindu believes in conflict with
modernity. But the very idea of religion incoherent for the last 100 years. It is similar to the
concept of Realism, where a pessimistic reading is done on human nature, which focuses on
maximizing national power. Thus, it is a politically- motivated reflection on Hindu culture in
terms of the nation-state.
The way the Hindutva projects is by coercive signalling and Brinkmanship, where the
government, provokes another country for war, then it is taken back with diplomacy, where
many of times, the military power is used for projection. We can see these kinds of strategies in
Modi’s foreign policy, in relation to China and Pakistan, like Pathankot, Uri, Gurdaspur, and
Pulwama. Therefore, Hindutva fuels the violence of political modernity through, diplomacy and
nationalism, e.g. the Citizenship Amendment Act or the National Registration of Citizen. 41
ASSERTIVENESS IN FOREIGN POLICIES
India has a history of its differences with its neighbouring countries, Pakistan and China. India
sees its neighbours as one of the security threats and challenges. India’s take on this has been,
constant for some time. But it has been noted that PM has worked diplomatically on this issue,
but has failed to befriend its neighbour. For example, the Surgical Strike, that India has against
Pakistan. Where suspected militant hideouts were searched and attacked. The relation between
India and Pakistan is going downhill after the 26/11 attack, but in 2014, the PM extended a
friendly hand to Pakistan, but it was again destroyed by a militant attack by Pakistan in Kashmir.
The Surgical Strike was praised by the national media, on the other hand, the strike was bashed
because of a war-like situation by the International media. This was to convey to Pakistan India
is ready to talk about the militancy issue, concerning if Pakistan withdraws its support to the
militants.
MODI’S TAKE ON CHINA
The foreign policy or the international diplomacy of India didn’t seem to amuse China and has
failed to build a relationship between the two countries. In 2018, at a summit in Wuhan, the PM
AmeyaPratap Singh, Hindutva’s Realism in Modi’s Foreign Policy, THEDIPLOMAT, January 01, 2021,
41
https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/hindutvas-realism-in-modis-foreign-policy/.
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of India met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, which was considered as a stepping stone in
Indo-China relations.
India saw a setback in the relations with China when initially China Refuses, to support New
Delhi’s in UN, for the designation of Masood Azhar, the head of Jaish-e-Mohammad, a terrorist
group. Eventually, Beijing lifted its objection. India was obstructed by China, in entering the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and was criticized Modi’s Visit to India’s Arunachal Pradesh,
as China claims its territory on that land and call it the Southern part of Tibet, India’s belief in
principals has come crumbling toward Chain’s evil, has been evident in 1962, Indo-China War
and the 1987s Sumdorong Chu Standoff.
Though India and China have a notable history of disagreement, both have continued to increase
bilateral trade and expand and strengthen border control, as China has always neglected the issue
of Border Security with India. China’s BRI is a concern for many South Asian countries, looking
at it, capturing formula of lands. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a concern, as many countries
are in-depth because of it, Hambantota port for example has been given on a lease for 99 years,
in Sri Lanka, if this continues, then it will be not hard for China to occupy the territories, just like
Taiwan.
INDIA’S SECURITY AND TRADE POLICY
Modi saw a dream of connecting; South East Asia to India, with an idea of better Infrastructure,
regional institutions, and trade, India’s ‘Look East policy of 1992 and 2003 was replaced by ‘Act
East, as a result, the relationship between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries got stronger, and in 2018 all the leaders of ASEAN were invited as chief guest, on the
Republic Day. It is considered to be one of Modi’s master strikes, to engage with the South
Asian neighbour, to build economic and security relations, which can be a good way to garland
China. India saw an opportunity to engage in Indo-Pacific Policy, it was first discussed by the
Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, in his speech in 2007, in India’s Parliament. Thus, the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue or the QUAD security architecture came up in 2017, which was signed by
India, Australia, Japan, and the USA, which was criticized for keeping an eye on China; as a
result, India became vocal on the rules and regulation of the maritime security, thus developing
Maritime partnership in the West Indian Ocean, with France and in the South China Sea with
Indonesia. Along with India, Indonesia has built the Sabang port, in Malacca strait.
32 | P a g e
The engagement with West Asia Under Modi’s leadership is considered a remarkable
achievement, the policy was made by Dr. Manmohan Singh in 2005, to boost cooperation with
the Islamic and Gulf countries. Modi, with his personality and diplomacy, has achieved a good
relation with the rulers and the leaders of the gulf countries.
India under Modi has also developed a trustworthy relation with Africa by India–Africa Forum
Summit (IAFS) and by the years more and more countries are joining in.
CONCLUSION
The leadership under Modi is drifting toward the USA, which is somehow harming the
relationship of India with its old friend, Russia, and Iran. Chinas influence has created a
worrying situation for India. After the pandemic, China shows up with EU-China
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment which strengthens its position further. Thus, it is the
need of the hour, that India tackles its foreign policy with caution.
Surprisingly, during the pandemic, China was the only major country, whose economy was
growing faster i.e., 2020-2021. China has also announced its 3 rdaircraft carrier’s launch, which is
a significant addition to the domination of the Indo-Pacific Ocean. The relations of Sino-Indian
are also not up to the mark. On the other hand, Russia loses interest in India and is more
interested in the growing Russia-China Axis.
Also, the equation of the Middle East is turning, the USA which is a friendly country to India has
brook rapprochement between the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan; and Israel.
It’s a high time India needs support from the US, Japan, Australia, besides European leaders such
as France, Germany, and the UK along with its neighbouring countries to tackle China, where
the Indo- pacific region has to be in the center.
33 | P a g e
OVERVIEW
For a variety of reasons, India's foreign policy has changed dramatically in the years since
independence. The end of the Cold War and the rise of the United States as the sole superpower
is one example of a change in the international environment. Second, in the twenty-first century,
domestic changes have occurred, with one-party governments being replaced by coalition
governments. Third, the personalities of the PMs have shifted as a result.
The current government, led by Narendra Modi, is undergoing a paradigm shift in terms of
foreign policy, which is inextricably related to national security concerns. Even his adversaries
must appreciate Modi's outreach to the Indian Diasporas, his digital connectivity with individuals
all over the world, and his use of technology to build a buzz around his character, as well as his
physical energy to work 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It's too early to judge whether
Modi's worldviews can be labeled or whether his foreign policymaking efforts have a theoretical
foundation.
34 | P a g e
BIBLIOGRPAHY
RESEARCH PAPERS
 Dilip Mohite, ‘Ideological Foundations of Nehru's Non- alignment, The Indian Journal of
Political Science, Jan. - March, 1992, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Jan.- Mar, 1992), pp. 24-38.
 Gautam Sen, THEORETICAL MOORINGS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICYMAKING:
Nehru to Modi, India International Centre Quarterly, AUTUMN 2016, Vol. 43, No. 2
(AUTUMN 2016), pp. 9-21.
 K.R. Narayanan, The 50th Anniversary of Panchsheel, 3 Chinese J. INT'l L. 369 (2004).
 Michele L. Louro, The Making of the League against Imperialism, 1927 from Part I -
Mobilizing against Empire, 1927–1930.
 Navtej Kaur, Nehru as Prophet of World Peace, The Indian Journal of Political Science, JAN.
- MAR., 2008, Vol. 69, No. 1 (JAN - MAR., 2008), pp. 203-222.
 Paul F Power, India’s Foreign Policy: The Age of Nehru, The Review of Politics, April.,
1964, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr., 1964), pp. 257-286, Published by: Cambridge University Press
for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics.
 Paul F Power, India’s Foreign Policy: The Age of Nehru, The Review of Politics, April.,
1964, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr., 1964), pp. 257-286, Published by: Cambridge University Press
for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics.
 PM Kamath, “Need to Correct Some Debilitating Features of Foreign Policy Making in
India”, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, December 1997, Vol. 10, No. 2 (December 1997),
pp. 17-30.
 Ifversen, Jan and ChristofferKølvraa. 2007. ‘European Neighbourhood Policy as Identity
Politics’, paper presented at the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal,
Canada.
 Menon, Shivshankar. 2007. ‘The Challenges Ahead for India’s Foreign Policy’, speech
delivered at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
 Saran, Shyam. 2005. ‘India and its Neighbours’, speech delivered at India International
Centre, New Delhi.
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 Wagner, Christian. 2005. ‘From Hard Power to Soft Power? Ideas, Interactions, Institutions
and Images in India’s South Asia Policy’, Working Paper 26, Heidelberg Papers in South
Asian and Comparative Politics.
 Gujral, I.K. 1997. ‘Aspects of India’s Foreign Policy’, speech at the Bandaranaike Centre for
International Studies, Colombo.
 Harshe, Rajan and K.M. Seethi (eds). 2005. Engaging with the World: Critical Reflections
On Indian Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
 Ashok, D., 2016. Foreign Policy of Indira Gandhi, 1966-1977 | AIDCSC. [online]
Indiancommunities.org.
 Basit, Quinn, Choong, Seah, Lee, Ganguly, Tripathi, Kumar, Erickson, Collins, Mackinnon,
Lewis, Wasser, Pettyjohn and Cook, 2017. Indira Gandhi’s Lesson for Modi. [online]
Foreign Policy.
 Ganguly, S. and Pardesi, M., 2009. Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy. [online]
Taylor & Francis.
 Kosmas Tsokhas, The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence on the Soviet Union, 9
JSTOR, 319-362 (1980).
ONLINE RESOURCES
 https://southasianvoices.org/resetting-india-foreign-policy-lessons-vajpayee/
 https://thewire.in/diplomacy/vajpayees-foreign-policy-legacy
 http://dcac.du.ac.in/documents/EResource/2020/Metrial/422CihnnitaBaruah2.pdf
 https://www.hindustantimes.com/
 https://mea.gov.in/articles-in-indianmedia.htm?
dtl/22430/A+Free+and+Prosperous+India+Five+Principles+of+Foreign+Policy.
 https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/did-indias-manmohan-doctrine-succeed/.
 https://www.jstor.org/
 https://www.thehindu.com/
 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
 https://www.lowyinstitute.org/
36 | P a g e
 https://www.dw.com/en/how-pm-modi-changed-the-face-of-indian-foreign-policy/a-
48618235
 https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/deconstructing-the-modi-foreign
policy/article6658904.ece.
 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/narendra-modi-have-been-to-
us-before-godhra-riots/articleshow/35612011.cms.
 https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/hindutvas-realism-in-modis-foreign-policy/
 https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/intervention-by-the-pm-at-video-conference-
of-nam-contact-group-in-response-to-covid-19/?comment=disable.
BOOKS
 TANDON, AAKRITI, “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities and the Emergence of a Modi
Doctrine.” Strategic Analysis 40: 349–56;
 CHAULIA, SREERAM. 2016. Modi Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of India’s Prime
Minister. New Delhi: Bloomsbury.
 Bipin Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India since Independence,
published by Penguin Books India, 2008.
 Peu Ghosh, International Relations, published by PHI Learning Pvt. Ltd., 2013.
 ErsefAksu, The United Nations, Intra-State peacekeeping and normative change, published
by Manchester University Press, 2003.
37 | P a g e

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SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, PUNE

2ND INTERNAL ASSESSMENT

SUBJECT: INDIA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY & DEVELOPMENT

TOPIC: TRACING INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DIFFERENT

BANDANA SAIKIA, 19010125405, DIVISION E

JOYSHREE ROY, 19010125423, DIVISION E

K. LAKSHMI PRAGNA, 19010125424, DIVISION E

DEYASHINI MONDAL, 19010125477, DIVISION E

HARSHITA JAIN, 19010125492, DIVISION E

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

TRACING NEHRU’S LEGACY IN FORMULATING INDEPENDENT INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

UPHOLDING POLICY OF ANTI-COLONIALISM, ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND ANTI-RACISM

PANCHSHEEL OR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Panchsheel is a significant characteristic and cardinal principle of Indian foreign

RELEVANCE OF NAM TODAY

Update, May 4, 2020, available at: https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/intervention-by-the-pm-at-video-

- Regional cooperation and connectivity at global level

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER INDIRA GANDHI

INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP, 1971

SIMLA AGREEMENT, 1972

NUCLEAR TEST OF 1974

RELEVANCE IN PRESENT INDIA

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE

Vajpayee’s leadership committed to two important stabilizing measures- (i) an informal

STRENGTHENING AND RESTRUCTURING TIES WITH USA

PURSUIT OF DIALOGUE WITH PAKISTAN AND KASHMIRI LEADERSHIP

MOVEMENT TOWARDS RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES WITH CHINA

EXTENDED NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: SOUTH ASIA/ SOUTH EAST ASIA

The concept of neighbourhood under Vajpayee’s governance can be understood as the

OTHER IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL TIES

RELEVANCE IN PRESENT TIMES

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DR. MANMOHAN SINGH

THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

THE MANMOHAN MANTRA

THE GEO-POLITICAL POSITION

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NARENDRA MODI

IMAGE BUILDING IN THE USA

HINDUTVA IN MODI’S FOREIGN POLICY

ASSERTIVENESS IN FOREIGN POLICIES

MODI’S TAKE ON CHINA

INDIA’S SECURITY AND TRADE POLICY

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