2nd LECTURE
PRIVATE ACTS AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS
Bill of Rights Set of prescriptions
setting forth the fundamental civil
and political rights of the
individual, and imposing
limitations on the powers of
government as a means of
securing the enjoyment of those
rights.
The bill of rights are self-executing
provision of our constitution. Dli na siya
kailangan ug existing law para mahimo
syang effective.
The Bill of rights is under Article III of the
1987 Constitution
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
DUE PROCESS – Section 1 is also
called the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE –
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws
Meaning of Person All persons, whether
citizens or aliens, without regard to any
differences of race, religion, color or
nationality, are protected under the due
process clause.
MEANING OF LIFE
The right to life is not merely a right to
the preservation of life but also to the
security of the limbs and organs of the
human body against any unlawful harm.
This constitutional guarantee includes
the right of an individual to pursue a
lawful calling or occupation; to express,
write or even paint his ideas for as long
as he does not unlawfully transgress the
rights of others; to exercise his freedom
of choice.
MEANING OF LIBERTY
It is not only the right of a citizen to be
free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the
term is deemed to embrace the right of
the citizen to be free in the engagement
of all his faculties; to be free to use them
in all lawful ways (Allegeyer vs.
Louisianna, 165 U.S. 578, January 6,
1897).
MEANING OF PROPERTY
It refers to things which are susceptible of
appropriation and which are already
possessed and found in the possession
of man (Suarez, 2016).
DUE PROCESS MEANS:
1. There shall be a law prescribed in
harmony with the general powers of
the legislature;
2. It shall be reasonable in its operation;
3. It shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and
4. It shall be applicable alike to all particular class, determine the
require the matters before
citizens of the State or to all of a intervention of it.
class. the state.
2. Jurisdiction
2. The means properly
employed are acquired over
reasonably the person of
PURPOSE THE DUE PROCESS necessary for the defendant
CLAUSE is a guaranty against any kind the and over
of abuse and arbitrariness, by anyone in accomplishmen property which
t of the purpose is the subject
any of the branches of government. More and not unduly matter of the
specifically, the purpose of the due oppressive proceeding.
upon
process clause is to: individuals. 3. Opportunity
to be heard.
1. Prevent undue encroachment against
the life, liberty and property of individuals. 4. Judgment
rendered upon
lawful hearing
2. Secure the individual from the arbitrary and based on
exercise of powers of government, evidence
adduced.
unrestrained by the established
principles of private rights and distributive
justice.
3. Protect property from confiscation by
legislative enactments from seizure, SECTION II - SEARCHES AND
forfeiture, and destruction without a trial SEIZURES. Also known as RIGHT
and conviction by the ordinary modes of AGAINST UNREASONABLE
judicial procedures. (Suarez, 2016) SEARCHES AND SEIZURE

KINDS OF DUE PROCESS SECTION 2. The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
1. Procedural Due Process; and
effects against unreasonable searches and
2. Substantive Due Process. seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
SUBSTANTIVE PROCEDURAL
except upon probable cause to be
DUE DUE determined personally by the judge after
PROCESS PROCESS examination under oath or affirmation of the
Purpose This serves as Serves as a complainant and the witnesses he may
a restriction on restriction on
the actions of produce, and particularly describing the
government’s judicial and place to be searched and the persons or
law and rule- quasi-judicial things to be seized.
making powers. agencies of the
government.
Requisite 1. The interests 1. Impartial
of the public in court or tribunal
s general, as clothed with
distinguished judicial power to
from those of a hear and
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE REQUISITES OF A VALID SEARCH
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES WARRANT AND WARRANT OF ARREST:

1. It must be issued upon determination

of probable cause;
BASIS SEARCH WARRANT OF
WARRANT ARREST
2. The probable cause must be
As to determined by the judge himself and
authority, The It is not not by the applicant or any other
which
examines JUDGE necessary that person;
must the judge 3. In the determination of probable
personally should cause, the judge must examine,
examine in personally
the form of examine the under oath or affirmation, the
searching complainant complainant and such witnesses as
questions and his the latter may produce; and
and witnesses; the 4. The warrant issued must particularly
answers, in judge would describe the place to be searched
writing and simply
and persons and things to be seized
under oath, personally
the review the initial
complainan DETERMINATI
t and the ON OF THE NOTE: General warrant is not allowed. It
witnesses PROSECUTOR must be issued pursuant to a specific
he may to see if it is
offense (Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-
produce on supported by
facts substantial 19550, June 19, 1967)
personally evidence.
known to
them. GENERAL WARRANTS - Warrants of
Basis of The He merely
determinati determinati broad and general characterization or
determines the
on
on of probability, not sweeping descriptions which will
probable the certainty of authorize police officers to undertake a
cause guilt of the fishing expedition to seize and confiscate
depends to accused and, in any and all kinds of evidence or articles
a large so doing, he relating to an offense.
extent upon need not
the finding conduct a new
or opinion hearing
of the judge PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO SEIZURE
who
conducted 1. Property subject of the offense;
the 2. Stolen or embezzled property and
required other proceeds or fruits of the
examinatio offense; or
n of the 3. Property used or intended to be
applicant
and the used as means for the
witnesses commission of an offense.
NOTE: Seized items in violation of Art.
201 of the RPC, such as immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and
indecent shows, can be destroyed even
if the accused was acquitted. P.D. No.
969.
WHAT COURT WILL ISSUE?
✓ Court with the primary jurisdiction
in issuing search warrants
✓ The RTC where the criminal case
is pending or if no information has
yet been filed, in RTC in the area/s
contemplated.
EXCEPTION: An RTC not having
territorial jurisdiction over the place to be
searched, however, may issue a search
warrant where the filing of such is
necessitated and justified by compelling
considerations of urgency, subject, time,
and place.
QUESTION: LPG Dealers Association
and Total Gaz LPG Dealers Association
filed a lettercomplaint before the NBI-
IRO, requesting assistance in the
surveillance, investigation, apprehension
and prosecution of respondents for
alleged illegal trading of LPG products
and/or underfilling, possession and/or
sale of underfilled LPG products. The
NBI-IRO - through its agent De Jamil and
undercover NBI asset Antonio conducted
surveillance and test-buy operations and
thereafter they filed two Applications for
Search Warrantto conduct a search of
the Magsingal LPG refilling plant. Can
the personal knowledge of the witnesses
of the commission of the illegal trading
and underfilling of LPG products be a
basis for determining probable cause in
search warrant applications? A: YES. A
finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by
the accused. Probable cause demands
more than bare suspicion; it requires less
than evidence which would justify
conviction. The judge, in determining
probable cause, is to consider the totality
of the circumstances made known to him
and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and
must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard. Facts
discovered during surveillance - on the
basis of information and evidence
provided by petitioners - constitute
personal knowledge which could form the
basis for the issuance of a search
warrant (Petron LPG Dealers
Association v. Ang, G.R. No. 199371,
February 3, 2016).
PROBABLE CAUSE
Probable cause, as a condition for the
issuance of a search warrant, is such
reasons supported by facts and
circumstances as will warrant a cautious
man to believe that his action and the
means taken in prosecuting it are legally
just and proper.
- It requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a
reasonably prudent man to
believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects
sought in connection with that
offense are in the place to be
searched
- Such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of a
 warrant that in themselves are
sufficient to induce a cautious man
to rely on them and act in
pursuance thereof. The evidence
necessary to establish probable
cause is based only on the
likelihood, or probability, of guilt
Q: LPG Dealers Association and Total
Gaz LPG Dealers Association filed a
lettercomplaint before the NBI-IRO,
requesting assistance in the surveillance,
investigation, apprehension and
prosecution of respondents for alleged
illegal trading of LPG products and/or
underfilling, possession and/or sale of
underfilled LPG products. The NBI-IRO -
through its agent De Jamil and
undercover NBI asset Antonio conducted
surveillance and test-buy operations and
thereafter they filed two Applications for
Search Warrantto conduct a search of
the Magsingal LPG refilling plant. Can
the personal knowledge of the witnesses
of the commission of the illegal trading
and underfilling of LPG products be a
basis for determining probable cause in
search warrant applications?
A: YES. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction. The judge,
in determining probable cause, is to
consider the totality of the circumstances
made known to him and not by a fixed
and rigid formula, and must employ a
flexible, totality of the circumstances
standard. FACTS DISCOVERED
DURING SURVEILLANCE - on the basis
of information and evidence provided by
petitioners - constitute personal
knowledge which could form the basis for
the issuance of a search warrant (Petron
LPG Dealers Association v. Ang, G.R.
No. 199371, February 3, 2016).
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
1. The person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he
had just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and
2. Such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.
NOTE: Initial hearsay information or tips
from confidential informants could very
well serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant, if followed up personally
by the recipient and validated. Looking at
the records, it is clear that Padilla and his
companions were able to personally
verify the tip of their informant. The
evidence on record clearly shows that the
applicant and witnesses were able to
verify the information obtained from their
confidential source. The evidence
likewise shows that there was probable
cause for the issuance of a search
warrant. Thus, the requirement of
personal knowledge of the applicant and
witnesses was clearly satisfied in this
case (Microsoft Corporation v. Samir
Farajallah, G.R. No. 205800, September
10, 2014).
MERE “RELIABLE INFORMATION”
WILL NOT SATISFY THE “PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE” REQUIREMENT
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction,
applied with a great degree of
consistency, is that “reliable information”
alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition,
that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he “has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.”
In the leading case of People v. Burgos,
this Court held that “the officer arresting
a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an
offense must have personal knowledge
of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his
view.” In Burgos, the authorities obtained
information that the accused had forcibly
recruited one Cesar Masamlok as
member of the New People’s Army,
threatening the latter with a firearm. Upon
finding the accused, the arresting team
searched his house and discovered a
gun as well as purportedly subversive
documents (People v. Tudtud, G.R. No.
144037, September 26, 2003).
SEARCHING QUESTIONS
Examination by the investigating judge of
the complainant and the latter’s
witnesses in writing and under oath or
affirmation, to determine whether there is
a reasonable ground to believe that an
offense has been committed and whether
the accused is probably guilty thereof so
that a warrant of arrest may be issued
and he may be held liable for trial.
A police officer cannot amplify or
modify what has been set out in the
warrant
Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires a search
warrant to particularly describe the place
to be searched; otherwise it would open
the door to abuse of the search process,
and grant to officers executing the search
that discretion which the Constitution has
precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the
place to be searched may properly be
done only by the judge, and only in the
warrant itself; it cannot be left to the
discretion of the police officers
conducting the search. It is neither fair
nor licit to allow police officers to search
a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place
actually searched —although not that
specified in the warrant — is exactly what
they had in view when they applied for
the warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence. What is material in
determining the validity of a search is the
place stated in the warrant itself, not what
applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted
to the court issuing the warrant (People
v. CA, 291 SCRA 400, June 26, 1998).
QUESTION : Nenita and Julienne were
graduating high school students at St.
Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City.
While changing into their swimsuits for a
beach party they were about to attend,
Julia and Julienne, along with several 1. Visual search is made of moving
others, took digital pictures of themselves vehicles at checkpoints;
clad only in their undergarments. These 2. Search is an incident to a valid
pictures were then uploaded by Angela arrest;
on her Facebook profile. Back at the a. NOTE: An officer making
school, Escudero, a computer teacher at an arrest may take from the
STC’s high school department, learned person: a. Any money or
from her students that some seniors at property found upon his
STC posted pictures online, depicting person which was used in
themselves from the waist up, dressed the commission of the
only in brassieres.Escudero reported the offense b. Was the fruit
matter and, through one of her student’s thereof c. Which might
Facebook page, showed the photos to furnish the prisoner with
Tigol, STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for the means of committing
appropriate action. Were unlawful means violence or escaping d.
used by STC in gathering information Which might be used as
about the photo? evidence in the trial of the
case
ANSWER : NO. Even assuming that the
3. Search of passengers made in
photos in issue are visible only to the
airports;
sanctioned students’ Facebook friends,
4. When things seized are within
respondent STC can hardly be taken to
plain view of a searching party
task for the perceived privacy invasion
(Plain View Doctrine);
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends
5. Stop and frisk (precedes an
who showed the pictures to Tigol.
arrest);
Respondents were mere recipients of
6. When there is a valid express
what were posted. They did not resort to
waiver made voluntarily and
any unlawful means of gathering the
intelligently;
information as it was voluntarily given to
a. NOTE: Consent to a
them by persons who had legitimate
search is not to be lightly
access to the said posts. Clearly, the
inferred, but shown by
fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
clear and convincing
minors. Curiously enough, however,
evidence. Consent must
neither the minors nor their parents
also be voluntary in order to
imputed any violation of privacy against
validate an otherwise
the students who showed the images to
illegal search; that is, the
Escudero (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s
consent must be
College, G.R. No. 202666, September
unequivocal, specific,
29, 2014).
intelligently given, and
uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES [Caballes v CA, 373 SCRA
Instances of a valid warrantless search 221 (2002)]. (2015 Bar) In
 this case, petitioner was
merely "ordered" to take
out the contents of his
pocket (Alcaraz v. People,
G.R. No. 199042,
November 17, 2014).
7. Customs search; and
8. Exigent and emergency
circumstances (People v. De
Gracia, 233 SCRA 716, July 6,
1994).
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
Under the plain view doctrine, objects
falling in the "plain view" of an officer,
who has a right to be in the position to
have that view, are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence. It applies
when the following requisites concur: (J-
I-A)
1. The law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a
particular area;
2. The discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and
3. It is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully
make an initial intrusion or properly be in
a position from which he can particularly
view the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to
eye and hand, and its discovery
inadvertent (Fajardo v. People, G.R. No.
190889, January 10, 2011).
NOTE: Plain View Doctrine cannot be
applied where there was no evidence in
plain view of law enforcers serving the
search warrant (United Laboratories, Inc.
v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005).
QUESTION: Kwino, a drug pusher was
entrapped in a buy bust operation. He led
the police officers to the house of Carlo
Ray, his supposed associate and his
house was searched. A cardboard box
with bricks of marijuana inside was found
in her residence. However, Carlo Ray’s
warrantless arrest was declared illegal by
the court. It follows that the search of his
person and home and the subsequent
seizure of the marked bills and marijuana
cannot be deemed legal as an incident to
her arrest. Was the marijuana in the
cardboard box in plain view during the
search, making the warrantless seizure
valid and acceptable in evidence?
ANSWER: NO. The law enforcement
officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area.
In the course of such lawful intrusion, he
came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The
object must be open to eye and hand and
its discovery inadvertent. It is clear that
an object is in plain view if the object itself
is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty
arises when the object is inside a closed
container. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself
is not in plain view and therefore cannot
be seized without a warrant. However, if
the package proclaims its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents
are in plain view and may be seized
(People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299,
January 22, 1999).
STOP-AND-FRISK SEARCH
Limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons. Probable cause is
not required but a genuine reason must
exist in light of a police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions
to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed
(Malacat v. CA, G.R. No. 123595,
December 12, 1997).
CHECKPOINTS
Searches conducted in checkpoints are
lawful, provided the checkpoint complies
with the following requisites:
1. The establishment of checkpoint
must be pronounced;
2. It must be stationary, not roaming;
and
3. The search must be limited to
visual search and must not be an
intrusive search.
NOTE: Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Between the inherent right of
the State to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an
individual’s right against warrantless
search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
A checkpoint is akin to a stop-and-frisk
situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of suspicious
individuals or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officers
seek to obtain more information
(Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988,
September 29, 1989).
Motorists and their vehicles passing
through checkpoints may also be
stopped and extensively searched
While, as a rule, motorists and their
vehicles passing through checkpoints
may only be subjected to a routine
inspection, vehicles may be stopped and
extensively searched when there is
probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief among those at the
checkpoints that either the motorist is a
law offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of
some offense (People v. Vinecario, G.R.
No. 141137, January 20, 2004).
CHECKPOINT RULES UNDER LTO
CODE (R.A. 4136)
There is, to stress, nothing in R.A. 4136
that authorized the checkpoint-manning
policemen to order petitioner and his
companions to get out of the vehicle for a
vehicle and body search. And it bears to
emphasize that there was no reasonable
suspicion of the occurrence of a crime
that would allow what jurisprudence
refers to as a "stop and frisk" action. As
SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only
reason why they asked petitioner to get
out of the vehicle was not because he
has committed a crime, but because of
their intention to invite him to Station 9 so
he could rest before he resumes driving.
But instead of a tactful invitation, the
apprehending officers, in an act
indicative of overstepping of their duties,
dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle
and, in the process of subduing him,
pointed a gun and punched him on the
face. None of the police officers, to note,
categorically denied the petitioner’s
allegation about being physically hurt
before being brought to the Ospital ng
Maynila to be tested for intoxication.
What the policemen claimed was that it
took the three (3) of them to subdue the
fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions
were done in excess of their authority
granted under R.A. 4136 (Sydeco v.
People, G.R. No. 202692, November 12,
2014).
QUESTION: Star was a lady frisker
whose duty is to frisk departing
passengers, employees, and crew and
check for weapons, bombs, prohibited
drugs, contraband goods, and
explosives. When she frisked Rochelle, a
boarding passenger, she felt something
hard on Rochelle’s abdominal area which
was later found to be three packs of
shabu. Can Rochelle invoke a violation of
the search and seizure clause?
ANSWER: NO. Persons may lose the
protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation
of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at
the nation’s airport (People v. Leila
Johnson, G.R. No.138881, December
18, 2000).
Question : Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Chairperson Karina Constantino-
David received an anonymous letter
alleging that the chief of CSC’s Legal
Division, Ricky Pollo, is acting as a
lawyer of an accused government
employee who has a pending case in the
CSC. Consequently, a team with IT
background was formed to back up all
the files in the computers found in the
Legal Division. Pollo was not present
during the backing-up and was only
informed through text message. It was
then found that most of the files sourced
from the computer used by Pollo were
pleadings and letters connected with
pending cases in CSC and other
tribunals. He was found guilty of
dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and violation of R.A. 6713
and penalized him with dismissal. Were
the searching and copying of Pollo’s
computer files a violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and
seizures?
ANSWER: NO. First, Pollo failed to prove
that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office
or government-issued computer which
contained his personal files. The CSC
had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no
expectation of privacy in anything they
create, store, send or receive on the
office computers, and that the CSC may
monitor the use of the computer
resources using both automated and
human means. This implies that onthe-
spot inspections may be done to ensure
that the computer resources were used
only for such legitimate business
purposes. Second, the search of
petitioner’s computer files was
conducted in connection with
investigation of work-related misconduct
prompted by an anonymous
lettercomplaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies
in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the
MamamayanMuna Hindi Mamaya Na
division is supposedly “lawyering” for
individuals with pending cases in the
CSC. A search by a government
employer of an employee’s office is
justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it
will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct (Pollo
v. David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18,
2011).
Question: Luz was flagged down by
PO3Alteza for driving a motorcycle
without a helmet. Alteza invited Luz to
their sub-station and while issuing a
citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, Alteza was alerted by the
latter’s uneasy movement and asked him
to put out the contents of the pocket of
his jacket. It was revealed that Luz was
in possession of prohibited drugs. Can
the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop
be considered a formal arrest?
ANSWER : NO. The time he was waiting
for Alteza to write his citation ticket may
be characterized as waiting time. Luz
could not be said to have been under
arrest. There was no intention on the part
of Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his
liberty, or take him into custody. In fact,
Alteza himself testified that it was only for
the sake of convenience that they were
waiting at the sub-station (Luz v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788,
February 29,2012).
Question: A search was conducted on
March 3, 1986. During which the
Philippines has no Constitution. The
Constabulary raiding team searched the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano by virtue of
a search warrant and thereafter seized
some items not included in the warrant.
Dimaano questioned the search for being
violative of the Constitution. Can she
invoke her right against unreasonable
searches and seizures during the
interregnum?
ANSWER: YES. The Bill of Rights under
the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during the interregnum. Be that as it may,
under Art. 17(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the revolutionary government had the
duty to insure that no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence. Art. 17(2)
provides that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property. Although the
signatories to the Declaration did not
intend it as a legally binding document,
being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the
state. The revolutionary government did
not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration during the interregnum. It
was also obligated under international
law to observe the rights of individuals
under the Declaration (Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July
21, 2003).
QUESTION: While sleeping in his room,
Kel was arrested by virtue of a warrant of
arrest and he was dragged out of the
room. Thereafter, some police officers
ransacked the locked cabinet inside the
room where they found a firearm and
ammunition. Are the warrantless search
and seizure of the firearm and
ammunition justified as an incident to a
lawful arrest?
ANSWER: NO. The scope of the
warrantless search is not without
limitations. A valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his
immediate control. The purpose of the
exception is to protect the arresting
officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within
reach. In this case, search was made in
the locked cabinet which cannot be said
to have been within Kel's immediate
control. Thus, the search exceeded the
bounds of what may be considered as an
incident to a lawful arrest (Valeroso v.
CA, G.R. No. 164815, September 3,
2009).
QUESTION: A buy-bust operation was
conducted in DM’s store. Police Officer
CA Tandoc posed as a buyer and bought
marijuana from DM. After the exchange
of marked money and marijuana, Tandoc
arrested DM without a warrant. The other
police officer searched the store and
seized a plastic container containing six
marijuana stocks. Thereafter, DM was
charged with selling marijuana. Is the
warrantless seizure of marijuana legal?
ANSWER: YES. The search being an
incident to a lawful arrest, it needed no
warrant for its validity. The accused
having been caught in flagrante delicto,
the arresting officers were duty bound to
apprehend her immediately. The
warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a lawful arrest, may extend to
include the premises under the
immediate control of the accused. The
accused may not successfully invoke the
right against a warrantless search, even
as regards the plastic container with
dried marijuana leaves found on the table
in his store (People v. Salazar, G.R. No.
98060, January 27, 1997).
SEC. 19 OF THE CYBERCRIME LAW
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Sec. 19 empowers the Department of
Justice to restrict or block access to
computer data when a computer data is
prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of the Cybercrime Law. The
Department of Justice order cannot be a
substitute for judicial search warrant. The
Government, in effect, seizes and places
the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. Not only
does Sec. 19 preclude any judicial
intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to
determine the validity of restrictions on
speech for the content of the computer
data can also constitute speech. Sec. 19
merely requires that the data to be
blocked be found prima facie in violation
of any provision of the cybercrime law. It
does not take into consideration any of
the three tests: the dangerous tendency
doctrine, the balancing of interest test
and the clear and present danger rule.
Therefore, Sec. 19 is unconstitutional
(Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 11, 2014).

WAIVER OF UNLAWFUL ARRESTS

AND ILLEGAL SEARCHES
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is
not a waiver of an illegal search.
Records have established that both the
arrest and the search were made without
a warrant. While the accused has already
waived his right to contest the legality of
his arrest, he is not deemed to have
equally waived his right to contest the
legality of the search (Alcaraz v. People,
G.R. No. 199042, November 17, 2014)