It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous

political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.

The effect of constitution is on the date that its ratification was proclaimed

Interpretation of Constitution

VERBA LEGIS

RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA

UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT

MAXIM NOSCITUR A SOCIIS- if there is a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in

itself or equally susceptible of various meanings, the correct construction may be made
clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or
associated.

Amendment refers to a change that adds, reduces, deletes, without altering the basic
principle involved. IT GENERALLY AFFECTS ONLY THE SPECIFIC PROVISION BEING
AMENDED.

Quantitative (affects many provisions) and Qualitative test (Substance entirety is change)
on determining if it’s a revision;

Proposal to amend; ¾ of HR/Senate vote

Constitutional Convention; 2/3 vote or majority vote of all members of congress

Theory of Conventional Sovereignty

The Convention is inferior to the other departments

The Convention is co-equal to the other departments

People through the power of initiative – 12% of the total registered voters, 3% of each
legislative district

Limitation; No amendment in this manner shall be authorized within five years following
the ratification of this constitution no more often than once every five years thereafter;

Ratification; the proposed amendment shall become part of the constitution when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not earlier than 60 or less 90days after
the approval of the proposal of congress or the ConCom or after the certification by the
Comelec of the sufficient of the petition for initiative.

Self executing provision- sufficient rule itself

Non SEP general principle that needs the aid of the legislation

Constitutional right to hold a public office- it is merely a privilege subject to the

limitations set forth by the law.

Function of the government; Discretionary/ Ministerial

Laisse Fair Doctrine Free Enterprise

State; a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by

penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory acting through a government
functioning under a regime of law.
Phil is independent and sovereign state, its authority may be exercised over its entire
domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power.

Jus imperi- Public

Jus gestoni - Private

 "There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act
or acts jure gestionis. x x x Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the
inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in
pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit." The service contracts referred to by
private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts
over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

National Territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippine has sovereignty or
jurisdiction consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other submarine areas.

Archiplegaic Doctrine; Philippines is composed of many island connected to each other,

regardless of its breadth and dimension, forms part of the internal waters of our country.

Doctrine of Auto Limitation; States power to refrain from the exercise of its ilimmitable
competence, capacity for legal self determination, by its consent express or implied, submit
to a restriction of its sovereign rights.

Revolutionary Govt, the Universal declaration of human rights is still operating.

Cory govt; her RG is considered de jure, accepted by the people/international community.

GMA govt after erap- de jure considering erap’s resignation from office.

State Immunity- the State cannot be sued without its consent

Basis; there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the
right depends.

It can still be sued through its express and implied consent.

The defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not
seek to impose a charge or financial liablity against the state.

It also applies to the act persons charged in an agency so long they acted within the law
and did not abuse it.

Government is an agency or instrumentality through which the will of the state is

formulated, expressed and realized.

Traditionally, the functions of government have been classified into constituent, which are
mandatory for the Government to perform because they constitute the very bonds of
society, such as the maintenance of peace and order, regulation of property and property
rights, the administration of justice, etc; and ministrant, those intended to promote the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people, and which are merely optional for
Government to perform.

Dominium v. Imperium: Dominium refers to the capacity to own or acquire property,

including lands held by the State in its proprietary capacity; while Imperium is the
authority possessed by the State embraced in the concept of sovereignty.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but
only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending State. The cloak of protection is removed the moment the foreign agent is sued in
his individual capacity, as when he is sought to be made liable for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.

The United Nations, as well as its organs and specialized agencies, are likewise beyond
the jurisdiction of local courts

Suits against Government Agencies

Incorporated: If the charter provides that the agency can sue and be sued, then suit will
lie, including one for tort.

Unincorporated: Inquire into principal functions of the agency: i) If governmental: NO suit

without consent.

A suit against it is, therefore, a suit against the Bureau of Customs, an unincorporated
agency performing primarily governmental functions. [NOTE: Even in the exercise of
proprietary functions incidental to its primarily governmental functions, an unincorporated
agency still cannot be sued without its consent.

If proprietary: suit will lie because when the State engages in principally proprietary
functions, then it descends to the level of a private individual, and may, therefore, be
vulnerable to suit.

Suit against Public Officers. The doctrine of State immunity also applies to complaints
filed against officials of the State for acts performed by them in the discharge of their duties
within the scope of their authority.

Where the public official is sued in his personal capacity, the doctrine of state
immunity will not apply, even if the acts complained of were committed while the
public official was occupying a public position.

Implied consent examples

When the State commences litigation;

When the State enters into a business contract.

Scope of Consent; Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of
judgment against it.

But funds belonging to government corporations (whose charters provide that they can sue
and be sued) that are deposited with a bank are not exempt from garnishment.

It was held that funds of a municipality (although it is an incorporated agency whose

charter provides that it can sue and be sued) are public in character and may not be
garnished unless there is a corresponding appropriation ordinance duly passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan.

Law- the system of rules that a particular country or community recognizes as regulating
the actions of its members and may enforce by the imposition of penalties.

Statute- written will of legislature solemnly expressed according to form necessary to

constitute it as the law of the state.

Steps how does a bill becomes a law;

First; a bill will be introduced to the Speaker of the House for its first reading by its title
and number.

Second; after the first reading, it will be referred by the speaker to the appropriate
committee for study, they will conduct hearings and call all the necessary parties involved
to get their reactions and feelings on the proposed bill.

After public hearing, the committee will decide on its favor or not or there should be a
substitute bill to be considered. (if not favor, the bill is dead.

Third; upon favorable action of the said committee, the bill is returned to the congress for
the schedule of the second reading on its entirety, it is set for open debates for proposed
amendments and insertion of the other members.

Fourth; after the approval of bill for second readings and at least 3 days before its final
passage, the bill is printed and distributed to all the members of congress unless the
president certifies in writing as to the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill to
meet a public calamity or emergency.

Fifth; the bill is then calendared for the third and final reading, majority of quorum 51% is
needed to pass the bill

Sixth; after the third and final reading in the house where the bill is originated, it will go to
the Senate, meaning it will go on another three readings on separate days

In case of conflict, a bicameral conference committee is created which can introduce

amendments to suit both houses of Congress. This is also known as the compromise bill.

If the president vetoed the said bill, by vote of 2/3 of the original house where it is
originated is needed for it to become a law.

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

ERGA OMNES; an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in
the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all
States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection;

Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing
of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the
basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of
general international law others are conferred by international instruments of a universal
or quasi-universal character.

Vinuya, et al. vs. Executive Secretary : Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General

Assembly resolutions calling for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong
policy arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of states does not yet support the
present existence of an obligation to prosecute international crimes. Of course a customary
duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot find enough evidence to reasonably assert its
existence. To the extent that any state practice in this area is widespread, it is in the
practice of granting amnesties, immunity, selective prosecution, or de facto impunity to
those who commit crimes against humanity.

JUS COGENS; is the higher and founding set of rules of the international legal system.
These rules are compulsory and bind all states, as they override any other principles of
international law.

It is classified on two concepts:

JUS DISPOSITIVUM: it allows to ignore certain set of legal rules by prevailing the consent
of the contractual party (between two states);

JUS STRICTUM: This pays no attention to the contracting parties (two states) regarding
derogation of higher international set of rules including the jus cogen labels in our modern
day:

a. Prohibition on agreement of USE OF FORCE to invade other countries or maritime

piracy;
b. Prohibition of international crimes and atrocity like genocide, crimes against
humanity, war atrocities and rules prohibiting human rights violations on the likes of
slavery trade and internal convention between states on cooperating against human
trafficking and human torture;

The concept of jus cogens is based on international acceptance of fundamental and

superior values which is similar to the notion of public order in domestic legal systems. As
a result, an international convention that conflicts with jus cogens rules is considered void
and posits no legal value. However, in our modern day, jus cogens has no definite standard
and continues to evolve through the test of time.

Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus

exists on its substance, beyond a tiny core of principles and rules. (Vinuya case
ruling)

Concept of EX AEQOU ET BONO

By what is fair and good” or “notwithstanding the law” – a doctrine of equity *Used in
the sense of considerations of fairness, reasonableness, and policy often necessary for the
sensible application of the more settled rules of law (Brownlie, 2008).

International and national law;

*Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of

the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinio juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in
the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.

Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009- While the Philippines is not
yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the
specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance
as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice
has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now
a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the
law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws
and the international conventions that bind us.

SOURCES: *A U.N. Declaration is, according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and
solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting
importance are being enunciated." Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’ against
‘non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the international
community."

STATES:

The Province of North Cotabato, et al. vs. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008.

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing
the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed
conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has
been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate
balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President
may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the
Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same
Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process
effectively.

*Where a party to an agreement is just an entity within a state, no binding

international law obligation is created notwithstanding that said agreement includes
foreign dignitaries as signatories and that its signing was witnessed by
representatives of foreign nations. Thus, the Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and
the MILF is not an internationally binding agreement nor does it constitute a unilateral
declaration on the part of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines because the
commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States and not complying thereto
would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Liban, et al. vs Gordon, et al., G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.

This case involves the Motion for Reconsideration & Clarification filed by Senator Richard
Gordon:

In the Decision, the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when
he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as the office of the PNRC
Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter insofar
as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and consequently ruled that the PNRC
should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is one of the National Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, which, together with the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and the IFRC and RCS, make up the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement (the Movement). They constitute a worldwide humanitarian
movement. The PNRC works closely with the ICRC and has been involved in
humanitarian activities in the Philippines since 1982. Among others, these activities in
the country include: 1. Giving protection and assistance to civilians displaced or
otherwise affected by armed clashes between the government and armed opposition
groups, primarily in Mindanao; 2. Working to minimize the effects of armed
hostilities and violence on the population; 3. Visiting detainees; and 4. Promoting
awareness of international humanitarian law in the public and private sectors.
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of
their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services
including disaster relief and health and social programmes. A National Society
partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected component of the Red Cross
movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the First Geneva Convention, especially in
times of armed conflict. These provisions require that the staff of a National Society
shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. Such protection is not ordinarily
afforded by an international treaty to ordinary private entities or even non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). This sui generis character is also emphasized by the Fourth Geneva
Convention which holds that an Occupying Power cannot require any change in the
personnel or structure of a National Society. National societies are therefore organizations
that are directly regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary
private entities, including NGOs. x x x. No other organisation belongs to a world-wide
Movement in which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and
duties in helping each other. This is considered to be the essence of the Fundamental
Principle of Universality. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that
R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22,
1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been
questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court
now. The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the
PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention
of 27 July 1929. The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, can neither "be classified as an instrumentality of the State,
so as not to lose its character of neutrality" as well as its independence, nor strictly
as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is
treated as an auxiliary of the State. Based on the above, the sui generis status of the
PNRC is now sufficiently established. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a
subsidiary thereof, so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed
to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator
(Gordon), such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a "private
corporation" within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must
be organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto
A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

Simbolon vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009.

This case involves the question of custody for Lance Corporal Smith who was found guilty
of raping a Filipina. By virtue of Romulo-Kenney Agreement on December 22, 2006, the
accused was detained under the supervision of the United States of America granting
access to Philippine authorities on the said place for the assurance that USA is in
compliance of VFA. This case also answers the constitutionality of Visiting Forces
Agreement between RP and US.
The validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) - The Joint RP-US military exercises for
the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the
provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed
upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing
agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. Accordingly, as an implementing
agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA
to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the
Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US
has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a
treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of
our Constitution.

The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact
that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence "allowed under"
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been
ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no
violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence. The VFA being a
valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to
abide by its terms and provisions.

Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No.
153675, April 19, 2007.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor
its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that
in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which
the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to
apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

b) Procedure *An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in
Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that
a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

Deportation is defined as an administrative means in which a foreigner who is sojourning

or residing in a foreign country is removed or deported to his own country after being
adjudged by competent authority to be in violation of immigration laws or has been
declared a clear and present danger to the tranquility of the community where he is. The
power to deport a foreigner is an inherent and exclusive authority of the foreign country in
which he is in.

With reference to international agreements, "every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."[2] Pacta sunt servanda is
related to good faith, while pacta sunt servanda does not equate with good faith. This
entitles states to require that obligations be respected and to rely upon the obligations
being respected. This good faith basis of treaties implies that a party to the treaty cannot
invoke provisions of its municipal (domestic) law as justification for a failure to perform.
However, with regards to the Vienna Convention and the UNIDROIT Principles it should be
kept in mind that these are heavily influenced by civil law jurisdictions. To derive from
these sources that pacta sunt servanda includes the principle of good faith is therefore
incorrect.

The only limit to pacta sunt servanda are the peremptory norms of general international
law, called jus cogens (compelling law). The legal principle clausula rebus sic stantibus,
part of customary international law, also allows for treaty obligations to be unfulfilled due
to a compelling change in circumstances.

In public international law, clausula rebus sic stantibus (Latin for "things thus standing")
is the legal doctrine allowing for treaties to become inapplicable because of a fundamental
change of circumstances. It is essentially an "escape clause" that makes an exception to
the general rule of pacta sunt servanda (promises must be kept). This doctrine is part of
customary international law.

Because the doctrine poses a risk to the security of treaties as its scope is relatively
unconfined, it requires great care as to the conditions in which it may be invoked.

IX. Law on Public Officers

VFP vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006.

This Court has defined the power of control as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former to that of the latter." 13 The power of supervision, on
the other hand, means "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.

*The delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government is the
most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
Such portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, must
attach to the office for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.

In the case at bar, the functions of petitioner corporation enshrined in Section 4 of Rep. Act
No. 264031 should most certainly fall within the category of sovereign functions. The
protection of the interests of war veterans is not only meant to promote social
justice, but is also intended to reward patriotism. All of the functions in Section 4
concern the well-being of war veterans, our countrymen who risked their lives and
lost their limbs in fighting for and defending our nation. It would be injustice of
catastrophic proportions to say that it is beyond sovereignty’s power to reward the
people who defended her.

Like the holding of the National Centennial Celebrations, the functions of the VFP are
executive functions, designed to implement not just the provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640,
but also, and more importantly, the Constitutional mandate for the State to provide
immediate and adequate care, benefits and other forms of assistance to war veterans and
veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans.
B. Modes of acquiring title to public office

Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271,
October 18, 2011.

*Does the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in ARMM violate the
Constitution? – No. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution which pertinently states that the President shall appoint all other officers of
the government whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Since the
President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from R.A. No. 10153, it falls under this
group of officials that the President can appoint. Thus, the assailed law rests on clear
constitutional basis.

Appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization
period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress can
make.

DOCTRINE OF HOLD OVER PRINCIPLE- A public officer whose term has expired or
services have been terminated is allowed to continue holding his office until his successor
is appointed or chosen and had qualified.

RATIONALE: Public interest.  It is to prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time
when a successor may be chosen and inducted into office.

NOTE: its shall only be applied where the law provides for it, if the law is silent, the hold
over is valid provided the said law does not expressly or impliedly prohibited the same.

*Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three
year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. Congress cannot extend their term
through a law allowing officials to serve in a holdover capacity.

C. Modes and kinds of appointment

Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 130657, April 1, 2002.

*An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointee, whose term
had expired by virtue of inaction by the Commission on Appointments, may be reappointed
to the same position without violating the Constitutional provision prohibiting an officer
whose term has expired from being reappointed.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent" 36 , this
provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees
can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This
is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every
provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.

The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution - on the nomination of
officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments - did not provide for
ad interim appointments. The original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do
away with ad interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session
throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the
need to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the Constitution
thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad
interim appointments. 

D. Eligibility and qualification requirements

CSC vs. de la Cruz, G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004.

*The reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the date of

issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC

But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent failed to meet the experience
requirement to qualify for the contested position, we are still inclined to uphold the
appellate courts approval of respondents appointment. Petitioner itself has, on several
occasions, allowed the appointment of personnel who were initially lacking in experience
but subsequently obtained the same.

In Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 97-0191 dated January 9, 1997, it ruled
thus:

A careful evaluation of the qualifications of Josue reveals that he meets the education,
training and eligibility requirements of the position. Considering that Josue has already in
his favor three (3) years and eight (8) months experience as Senior Inspector up to the
present, he has substantially satisfied the four (4) years experience required for the
appointment as Chief Inspector.

G. Rights of public officers

*The right to self-organization accorded to government employees shall not carry with it the
right to engage in any form of prohibited concerted activity or mass action causing or
intending to cause work stoppage or service disruption, albeit of temporary nature. –
Section 4, CSC Resolution No. 021316, 2002.

H. Liabilities of public officers

Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corp., G.R. No. 141309, December 23, 2008.

*An individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act
or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or
injury to the former. The presence of bad faith is not necessary.

*Two Kinds of Duties in Determining Liability:

(a) Owing to the Public in General – It is non-actionable. There is damnum absque

injuria or damage without injury. The remedy is not judicial but political exercised by the
people through suffrages, i.e. duty of a Senator to enact laws. – Exception: When an
individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by the
public officer of the public duty. –

(b) Owing to Particular Individual – Its improper performance or non-performance will

give rise to a cause of action in his favor for any injury sustained by him, i.e. duty of a
sheriff to enforce a writ of execution.

In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-

performance of a duty, it must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is
involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, [t]he liability of a
public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and is co-extensive with
his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that
one he can incur no liability.[13]

Stated differently, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an
individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even
though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. In such a case,
there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a
public duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no
duty to him as an individual.[14] The remedy in this case is not judicial but political

In the instant case, what is involved is a public officers duty owing to the public in general.
The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken
to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the
requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Court of Appeals,[24] we declared as having fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuance.[25] A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-
legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are
compliant with the requirements of valid administrative regulations.But it is a duty owed
not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would be affected, directly or
indirectly, by the administrative rule.

Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages against the
petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account
of the non-performance by petitioner of the public duty. A careful reading of the complaint
filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained
by the respondent. The phrase financial and business difficulties [26] mentioned in the
complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a particular
injury. In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took
nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax
assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93.

With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful
act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the
respondent. Without such delict or tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to
state a cause of action, because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.

Office of the President vs. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, September 14, 2011.

*Administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. First,
there is a difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure
observed and sanctions imposed. Second, there is the principle that a single act may offend
against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give
rise to criminal as well as administrative liability. Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal
case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 by the Ombudsman does not foreclose administrative
action.

The dismissal of the criminal case against

Respondent does not bar the finding

of administrative liability

Even if the Court were to overlook this procedural lapse, Cataquiz argument would still fail.
The Ombudsman Resolution dated November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the
charges against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned
from the Resolution, the charges referred to by the Ombudsman were for respondents
alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds
and fraud against the public treasury.[36]

It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. [37] Obviously,
administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. [38] In the case
of People v. Sandiganbayan,[39]the Court elaborated on the difference between
administrative and criminal liability:

Reyes vs. Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc., G.R. No. 154499, February 27, 2004

*Neither the principle of command responsibility (in military or police structural

dynamics), nor the doctrine of respondeat superior (in quasi delicts) applies in the law of
public officers. The negligence of the subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior in the
absence of evidence of the latter’s own negligence.

The immunity of public officers from liability for the non-feasances, negligence or omissions
of duty of their official subordinates and even for the latters misfeasances or positive
wrongs rests, according to Mechem, upon obvious considerations of public policy, the
necessities of the public service and the perplexities and embarrassments of a contrary
doctrine.[15] These official subordinates, he notes further, are themselves public officers
though of an inferior grade, and therefore directly liable in the cases in which any public
officer is liable, for their own misdeeds or defaults.[16]

Significantly, Mechem’s disquisition provides the mooring of the Administrative Code of

1987 which provides that a head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly
liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his
subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or
misconduct complained of.

It is noteworthy again that petitioners alleged role in the disclosure of information is not
anchored on any concrete piece of evidence. That explains the RBSMIs effort to cast liability
vicariously on the petitioners by a superficial resort to the principle of command
responsibility which this Court did not reject. But neither the principle itself which is an
accepted notion in military or police structural dynamics or its counterpart of respondent
superior in the law on quasi-delicts[11] would be relevant in this case, involving as it does the
actual performance in office of the petitioners and given the fact that petitioners are high
ranking officers of the countrys central monetary authority. Indeed, as such officers,
petitioners cannot be expected to monitor the activities of their subalterns. In Arias v.
Sandiganbayan,[12] this Court held that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable
extent on the good faith of their subordinates. The case specifically involved the liability of
the head of office in the preparation of bids, purchase of supplies and contract negotiations
done by his subordinates. In the same fashion, petitioners in this case owing to their high
ranks cannot be expected to acquaint themselves with such minutiae as the flow of files
and documents which leave their desks. Myriad details such as those are, by office
practice, left to subalterns and minor employees. Delegation of function is part of sound
management.
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of
Noriel H. Rodriguez; Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805 &
G.R. No. 193160, November 15, 2011.

Exception: The President, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily
possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of
the command responsibility doctrine.

 Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command

responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining
the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any
transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. 

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it

should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is
accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be
appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As
intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability
on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.

 In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in

order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively
implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application,
the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors
it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. 

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation
by the appropriate government agency. 

As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the

actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way,
by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative
liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain
responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility

in amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-
chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:

a.                 the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused

as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b.                 the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be
or had been committed; and
c.                  the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. [84]

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, [85] necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a 
superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.  

Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the
doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be
committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others
within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission. [89] Knowledge of
the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are
widespread within the government officials area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been
repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
immediate staff or office personnel are involved. [90]

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military.

Berona vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142456, July 27 2004.

Petitioners contend that the Sandiganbayan has no legal basis to suspend them because
they are presently occupying positions different from those under which the Information
charged them. We have long settled this issue. In Libanan v. Sandiganbayan,[8] the
petitioner similarly claimed that the order of suspension, based on his indictment as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, could no longer attach to him, as he was already the
duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. Rejecting his thesis, the
Court explained:

In Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, this Court rejected a similar argument advanced by Governor

Deloso who, at the time of issuance of the suspension order, was already occupying the
office of governor and not the position of municipal mayor that he held previously when
charged with having violated the Anti-Graft Law. Prior to Deloso, in Bayot
v. Sandiganbayan, the suspension of then Cavite Mayor Bayot was also sustained even as
he was charged for acts committed as government auditor of the Commission on Audit.

The Court reiterated this doctrine in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan[9] in this wise:

The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid

information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or
temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service. It applies to a
Public High School Principal; a Municipal Mayor; a Governor; a Congressman; a
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) non-career Project Manager; a
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The term
office in Section 13 of the law applies to any office which the officer might currently be
holding and not necessarily the particular office in relation to which he is
charged. (Emphasis supplied)

Suspension pendente lite prevents the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance
while in office

Petitioners other contention that there is no longer any danger that petitioners would
intimidate prosecution witnesses since two of the latters witnesses had already completed
their testimonies in court is also untenable. Equally futile is their claim that Dr. Beroas
suspension would deprive his constituents in the Municipality of Pilar the services and
leadership of their highest elected municipal official to the greater detriment of public
service.

These reasons cannot override the mandatory character of Section 13. The possibility that
the accused would intimidate witnesses or hamper their prosecution is just one of the
grounds for preventive suspension. Another is to prevent the accused from committing
further acts of malfeasance while in office. Thus, we held in Bolastig v.
Sandiganbayan[10] that -

x x x, the fact that petitioners preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of
the services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for
reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who
has likewise been elected by them, will act as governor. Indeed, even the Constitution
authorizes the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of Congress found
guilty of disorderly behavior, thus rejecting the view expressed in one case that members of
the legislature could not be suspended because in the case of suspension, unlike in the
case of removal, the seat remains filled but the constituents are deprived of representation.

The period imposed by the Sandiganbayan is also in accord with our previous rulings
limiting to 90 days the period of preventive suspension under Section 13. [11]

Section 13 reinforces the principle that a public office is a public trust. Its purpose is to
prevent the accused public officer from hampering his prosecution by intimidating or
influencing witnesses, tampering with documentary evidence, or committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office.Petitioners last feeble argument that the prosecution evidence is
weak misses the point. They lose sight of the fact that preventive suspension is not a
penalty. The accused public officers whose culpability remains to be proven are still entitled
to the constitutional presumption of innocence. [12] The presence or absence of the elements
of the crime is evidentiary in nature which the court will pass on after a full-blown trial on
the merits.

Adolvino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009.

Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of

office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?

*The preventive suspension of an elective local official is not an interruption of the 3-term
limit rule.

From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term
voluntary renunciation, the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps that an
elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary
renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the three-term limit
rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision, we note further that
Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the negative formulation of the first branch
of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that it suggests.

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances
surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a
high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which
cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. We
view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation with this firm mindset.

rom all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an elective official
from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to
office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time,
however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of
Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective
officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using voluntary
renunciation as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand,
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does
not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the
office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his
office for a reason provided by law.

To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is
to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by
equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of
term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist,
voluntary or involuntary some of them personal and some of them by operation of law that
may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office
in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability
through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some
involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his
office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different
because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such
interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term
under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this
rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the
course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-
term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective
interruption is

To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-

imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt
an elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos
certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC
effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less
than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001.

*The order of suspension prescribed by the R.A. No. 3019 is distinct from the suspension
imposed by the Congress to discipline its own ranks under Article VI, Section 16(3) of the
Constitution. The former is not a penalty but a preventive measure whereas the latter is a
punitive measure imposed by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, upon an erring member.

house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure

that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the
case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino
Paredes, Jr., vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., [18] the Court affirmed the order of suspension of
Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the
encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The Court ruled:

x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with
the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject
to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in
Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.

*Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he
has been charged, it applies to any office which he may be holding.

CSC vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011;

*Back salaries are payable to an officer illegally dismissed or otherwise unjustly deprived of
his office, the right to recover accruing from the date of deprivation. The claim for back
salaries must be coupled with a claim for reinstatement and subject to the prescriptive
period of 1 year. In order, however, to fall under this exception, two conditions must be
complied with: (a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges; and (b) his
suspension must be unjustified. For the period of his preventive suspension pending
investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries.

This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries since it does
not expressly provide for back salaries during this period; our established rulings hold that
back salaries may not be awarded for the period of preventive suspension[16] as the law
itself authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond question.

The above situation should be distinguished from the case of an employee who was
dismissed from the service after conviction of a crime and who was ordered
reinstated after being granted pardon. We held that he was not entitled to back salaries
since he was not illegally dismissed nor acquitted of the charge against him.

Incidentally, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, [36] if the public official or
employee is acquitted of the criminal charge/s specified in the law, he is entitled to
reinstatement and the back salaries withheld during his suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries during the
period he was suspended from work, following his dismissal until his reinstatement to his
former position. The records show that the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty
against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found, there was no corrupt motive
showing malice on the part of the respondent in making the complained utterance.
Likewise, the CSC found that the charge of dishonesty was well refuted by the respondents
evidence showing that he rendered overtime work on the days in question.

We fully respect the factual findings of the CSC especially since the CA affirmed these
factual findings. However, on the legal issue of the respondents entitlement to back
salaries, we are fully in accord with the CAs conclusion that the two conditions to justify
the award of back salaries exist in the present case.

 
The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of
(violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log
out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming overtime pay despite his failure to render
overtime work) that he was charged with.

The second condition was met as the respondents committed offense merits neither
dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand.

In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed by the
CMWD until his reinstatement to his former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive
suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending
investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries per our ruling in Hon.
Gloria.

In Hon. Gloria, involving the same factual situation as Bangalisan, the CA awarded the

public school teachers back salaries - for the period beyond the allowable period of
preventive suspension - since they were ultimately exonerated. In affirming the CA, the
Court distinguished preventive suspension from suspension pending appeal for the purpose
of determining the extent of an employees entitlement to back salaries. The Court ruled
that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, there are two kinds of preventive suspension of
civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending investigation[62] and (ii) preventive
suspension pending appeal;[63] compensation is due only for the period of preventive
suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated. [64] Citing Floyd
R. Mechem's A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers,[65] Hon. Gloria ruled:

Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In
addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of
Appeals itself similarly states that "payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1]
when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the
charges which caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.
[66]
 (emphases and underscoring ours)

*The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to
back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him.

Constantino-David vs. Pangandaman-Gania, G.R. No. 156039, August 14, 2003.

*The reinstated employee cannot be faulted for inability to work or to render any service
from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time of reinstatement. The policy of “no
work, no pay” cannot be applied for such distressing state of affairs was not of his own
making or liking. Verily, to withhold back salaries and benefits during his illegal
dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure for
those in the civil service.

I. Immunity of public officers

*Where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his

personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he

occupied a public position, the doctrine of state immunity is not applicable. – Lansang vs.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000.

*A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during

the latter’s tenure. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any

other trespasser. The intent of the framers of the Constitution is clear that the immunity of

the President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. - In the
Matterof the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H.
Rodriguez; Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805 & G.R. No.
193160, November 15, 2011.

J. De facto officers

K. Termination of official relation

*Abandonment may also result from acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal. –

Canonizado vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, February 15, 2001.

*Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. –

Office of the President vs. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, September 14, 2011.

*Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition

thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of one’s

position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the

purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass
the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. – United Claimant Association of
NEA, et al. vs. National Electrification Administration, et al., G.R. No. 187107,
January 31, 2012.

L. The Civil Service

1. Scope

*Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision

over all courts and judicial personnel. No other branch of government may intrude into this

power. Complaints must be brought before the Office of the Court Administrator. – Ampong

vs. CSC, G.R. No. 167916, August 26, 2008.

2. Appointments to the civil service

*Career service officers enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution

and the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, which provides that no officer or employee

in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law

and after due process. . . Nevertheless, the right to security of tenure is not tantamount to

immunity from dismissal. – Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 165399,
May 30, 2011.

3. Personnel actions

*While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the

employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward

his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would

in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in

the Civil Service. – Republic vs. Pacheco, G.R. No. 178021, January 31, 2012.

*The security of tenure of employees in the career executive service pertains only to rank

and not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. – Ignacio vs. CSC,

G.R. No. 163573, July 27, 2005.

*Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employee’s

security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987,

and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. - Republic vs. Pacheco, G.R. No.

178021, January 31, 2012.

*Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact

relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. On the other hand,

misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action, is a

forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent
and not mere error in judgment. More particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public
officer. – Japson vs. CSC, G.R. No. 189479, April 12, 2011.

M. Accountability of public officers

1. Impeachment

*Not more than one impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official

within a period of one year. - An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be

decided by the Senate while an impeachment proceeding is one that is initiated in the

House of Representatives. For purposes of applying the one-year bar rule, the proceeding
is “initiated” or begins when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on

Justice for action. - Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, et al. G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003.

*Judicial Review of Impeachment – In the case of Francisco, et al. vs. House of

Representatives, et al. G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, the Court resolved to pass

upon the constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment, citing the expanded

definition of its judicial power under Sec. 1 of Article VIII as its authority in so doing.

2. Ombudsman (Sections 5 to 14, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to

R.A. No. 6770, or otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989.")

a) Functions

*The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and

prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within

the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but those within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts
as well. - Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105965-70, March 20, 2001.

*Includes the power to place under preventive suspension public officers and employees

pending investigation. - Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII, G.R. No. 180326, January 17,
2012.

*The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against an erring public

officer if the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed because he was

forced to resign. However, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to

the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.

Nonetheless, he can still be prosecuted under an administrative complaint despite his

resignation if he did so either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to

preempt the imminent filing of one. - Office of the Ombudsman vs. Uldarico P. Andutan,
Jr., G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011.

*It is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative

sanctions. - Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII, G.R. No. 180326, January 17, 2012.

*The Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) has endowed the Office of

the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually
freefrom legislative, executive or judicial intervention. The Supreme Court consistently
refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and

independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion

of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service. - Loquias vs. Office of the

Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000.

*As a guaranty of its independence, the Ombudsman has the power to appoint all officials

and employees in his office, except his deputies. This power necessarily includes the
powerof settling, prescribing, and administering the standards for the officials and
personnel of the Office. - Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, G.R. No. 162215, July 30,
2007.

*The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials,

whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. On the other hand, in
imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the
Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are
joined), it would be enough that:

1. There is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or

acts complained of;

2. The evidence of culpability is strong;

3. The gravity of the offense so warrants; or

4. The continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a

threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. - Jose C. Miranda
vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 154098, July 27, 2005.

b) Judicial review in administrative proceedings

*The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives, and decisions of the Office of

the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the

orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non

administrative cases. Rule 43 - Office of the Ombudsman vs. Heirs of Vda. De Ventura,
G.R. No. 151800, November 5, 2009.

*Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary

cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure. It bears stressing that when Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 was declared

as unconstitutional, the provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under

Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken

into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a
remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. - Kuizon vs.
Desierto, G.R. Nos. 140619-24, March 9, 2001.

c) Judicial review in penal proceedings

*Republic Act No. 6770 does not provide for the remedy of appeal from decisions of the

Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases. The aggrieved party may instead

avail himself of the original petition for certiorari when the circumstances would warrant

the use thereof.

The remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding

probable cause, or lack thereof, in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when

tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with the

Supreme Court and not with the Court of Appeals. - Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No.
156160, December 9, 2004.

3. Sandiganbayan

4. Ill-gotten wealth

N. Term limits

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

However, the Court held that facial invalidation or an “on-its-face” invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate. It stated that doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools to test "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or
American First Amendment cases. They cannot apply “when what is involved is a criminal
statute”. With respect to such statute, the rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute
is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it
might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional.' According to the Court, “vagueness challenges in
the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated
only 'as applied' to a particular defendant”.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject

to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject
broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. 7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not
encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of
vandalism,8 the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in
this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act
has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s
computer systems and private documents.

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded
on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be
carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v.
Commission on Elections,65 "we must view these statements of the Court on the
inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as
appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to
penal statutes not involving free speech."

But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge
to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under
the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness
of the statute.

The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from
speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills
him into silence.

G.R. No. L-30828 October 22, 1971

GREGORIO B. MORALEJA, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. LORENZO RELOVA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I,
and CESAR A. MENDOZA, respondents.

The question of law raised in the petition is whether or not the acceptance by respondent
Mendoza of an appointment to the position of Technical Assistant to the Vice-Governor of
Batangas Province constitutes either a disqualification from the office in dispute or an
abandonment of his protest against the election of petitioner.

In any event, this Court held more than a decade ago that ineligibility of the protestant is
not a defense in an election contest not only because it is incongruous with the only issue
therein, which is who obtained the higher number of votes, but is also premature,
inasmuch as such issue may be raised only after the candidate has been proclaimed and
the protestant is not proclaimed until after he has been declared winner by the court, apart
from the fact that if a protest is dismissed only because the protestant is ineligible, the
result would be that protestee would be in office though in fact he received fewer votes than
the former.

As to the contention that by accepting such appointment as Technical Assistant, Protestant

has abandoned his protest, all that need be said is that once the court has acquired
jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands that the true
winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties, so much so that there
can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases. (Francisco,
How to Try Election Cases, p. 163, citing Civilio v. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689.) In the same
manner that the acceptance by the protestee of an appointment to another position is not a
ground for dismissal of the protest (Philippine Law on Elections by Martin, 1970 ed., pp.
258-259, citing Calvo v. Maramba, G.R. No. L-13206, January 7, 1918) like the resignation
of the protestee from the contested office (Angeles v. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595), simply
because it is of public interest that the real winner be known, neither can the acceptance of
a more or less temporary employment, such as that of a technical assistant of the Vice-
Governor, which is a primarily confidential position, be considered as inconsistent with
protestant's determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter
of who is the real choice of the electorate. In such instances, the plight of protestant may be
viewed in the same light as that of an employee who has been illegally dismissed and who,
to find means to support himself and family while he prosecutes his case for reinstatement,
accepts a temporary employment elsewhere. Such employee is not deemed to have
abandoned the position he seeks to recover. (Tan v. Gimenez, et al., G.R. No. L-12525,
February 19, 1960, 107 Phil. 17; Potot v. Bagano, G-R. No. L-2456, January 25, 1949, 82
Phil. 679.) Of course, the case of a protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a
regular office could be different, but We are not ruling on it here.