The Khmer Rouge regime, known by the official name of Democratic Kampuchea,

ruled over Cambodia from 1975 to (nominally) 1979, when it was defeated by the
Vietnamese invasion of 1978. During these three years, Pol Pot and his acolytes
implemented a series of policies and reforms ideologically based around the principles
of Maoism, Marxism and Khmer ethno-nationalism. The Khmer Rouge’s goal was the
eradication of all Cambodian tradition and societal and cultural norms, along with the
creation of a new social order; an agrarian republic in which all traces of wealth, class,
inequality and individuality would disappear. To this end, Pol Pot began to impose a
number of radical measures that led to some of the more monstrous atrocities of the 20 th
century. These shall be analyzed and explained later on in this study.

To comprehend the violence that arose from the Khmer Rouge’s takeover, it is
essential to understand their motives, ideology and intentions; to delph into the rationale
of the massacres of Pol Pot’s rule it is necessary to study its beginnings, evolution and
development. Therefore, the structure, organization and political projects of the regime
are an important object of study in this analysis. Beforehand, however, it is necessary to
understand the state of mind of Khmer Rouge at the moment the war ended. After years
of incessant warfare, repression, strife and violence, the Khmer Rouge’s views had
radicalized both in action and thought; Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China acted as an
inspiration to Pol Pot and his followers, and centuries of de facto servitude of peasants
to urbanites had served to radicalize the first against the latter. The stage was set for a
radical and brutal transformation of the entirety of Cambodian society, through a brutal
and merciless repression that fanatically went about conducting its business and
implementing its policies.

After entering the city of Phnom Penh, the 17th of April, 1975, the Khmer Rouge
began to evacuate the city. Two million citizens were forced to leave the city without
prior warning; hospitals were emptied, and a generalized coerced march to the outside
of the city began. Thousands died at the hands of the soldiers, many pregnant women
gave birth on the way and many others died due to sickness or other ailments. The
objective of this was to use them as forced labor to begin the process of building the
agrarian socialist republic that the Khmer Rouge aimed to construct. A witness of this,
So Ry of Takeo, narrates this day in the following manner:

“The Khmer Rouge soldiers asked us to leave town. I said, “I cannot go because I am
pregnant and my husband is seriously injured.” They forcibly insisted that we had to
go. We were crying a lot because my husband could not walk. Then we found a horse
cart, so I carried my husband on to the cart. I tied the cart with my scarf, put the scarf
around my neck and towed it. We wanted to go to Takeo, but the soldiers forced us to
go forward on National Road 5. We passed Prek Kdam and stopped in order to cook
rice. After eating, they told us to go forward. I towed the cart until my groin became
inflamed. On the way, my husband was taken and killed. I cried a lot, but could do
nothing. Finally, I arrived at Chamkar Leu district, Kampong Cham province. One
month later, I gave birth to my daughter.”

Also, the soldiers’ desire for revenge had only grown through the previous war-ridden
years, as well as for all the grievances the peasantry had suffered at the hand of
Cambodia´s urban population. This led to an even greater massacre. In the words of one
Khmer Rouge soldier, “We were so angry when we came out of the forest, that we
would not have spared a baby in its cradle”. Foreigners and Cambodians alike sought
refuge at the French Embassy, but the occupiers forced the Cambodian refugees to come
out, while foreigners stayed trapped at the embassy for two weeks, before being taken to
the Thai border. High-ranking members of Lon Nol’s government were executed:
Minister Long Boret, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, and Lon Non, brother of Lon Nol,
among them.

1.Ideology

Before going into depth on the Khmer Rouge’s regime program and
development, it is necessary to understand their ideological background; the political
framework in which they operated. The Khmer Rouge combined a Maoist conception of
communism with a fervent Khmer nationalism, that aimed to restore Cambodia to the
international position they thought it deserved. Mao’s cultural revolution and Great
Leap Forward acted as examples to follow, as well as Ever Hoxha’s Albania. Th
regime’s main goal was the abolishment of all individual action and ambition in favor
of the state. Cities would be evacuated, and agricultural collectivism would be the main
form of economic organization in the country. The achievement of communism, Pol Pot
argued, could be achieved in this manner, thereby skipping many intermediary steps
essential in classical Marxist thought (industrialization, development of the
proletariat…). Peasants were understood to be the ‘base people’ of the state, while
urban citizens were seen as ‘new people’, who had to be reeducated or killed.
Reeducation was a basic component of Maoism: in order to become members of the
new communist society, they had to be ‘clenched’ of their old beliefs and attitudes and
transformed into willing members of the system. This process usually consisted on
forced agricultural labor, and in many instances ended in execution.

Along with Marxism, nationalism played a key role in Democratic Kampuchea’s

development. In fact, for many peasants who joined the guerrillas, it was their
adherence to tradition and custom that convinced them to do it; not Marxism, but rather
traditionalism and nationalism were at the root of peasant mobilization. This played a
substantial role in Cambodia’s relationship with the resto of the world, and with its
neighbors.

As to the regime’s vision of religion, its atheistic nature and nominal support of freedom
of worship did not translate into tolerance for theistic beliefs. These acted as causes of
state repression, as the Khmer Rouge saw them as an impediment to the development of
their ‘new society’.

The ideological framework of the Khmer Rouge, therefore, can be summarized into a
symbiosis of Maoist communism and Khmer nationalism, both skewed to their extreme
versions. To build a new, agrarian society based upon these principles, it was necessary
to establish a series of reforms whose nature was transformative, radical and violent.
Before analyzing said policies, however, the political framework in which they were
implemented must be explained; the creation, organization and structure of the state of
Democratic Kampuchea must be established, as in said process lie the fundamental
principles on which Pol Pot’s regime stood on.

2. Organisation

After the fall of Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge took control of the state of
Cambodia. Therefore, that is where one can de facto place the birth of Democratic
Kampuchea, the name given by the Communist Party of Kampuchea to the new state.
De jure, however, it was not officially declared as such until the 5th of January, 1976. In
he fall of 1975, Prince Sihadnouk had traveled internationally to gain recognition for the
new regime, of which he acted as Head of state until April of 1976, when he resigned
and was placed on house arrest. The day of its inauguration, the government (headed by
Pol Pot) unveiled and officialized the new state constitution. The Kampuchean People’s
Representative Assembly (KPRA) was created, as a legislative body whose 250
members were elected by the Standing committee of the KPC. In fact, it was this
organization (Angkar), that held real power. Pol Pot acted as its secretary, while Nuon
Chea was his deputy. The KPC was characterized by its secrecy, as well as its absolute
power in determining the economic, political and social path to be followed by the state.
The latter’s organic institutions were all subordinate to the party. As was the case in all
communist countries, it was the party’s leadership that held real power and control over
the state and its structure. Pol Pot had near total authority in dictating policy and action,
as the party was structured in a hierarchical disposition that consequently placed him
atop the entire power structure.

Territorially, Democratic Kampuchea was divided into six geographical zones, which at
the same time were divided in 32 total regions. Zones were governed by secretaries
named by the party. Most secretaries ( So Phim or Ney Sarann aka Ya, for example) were
purged or committed suicide (to avoid the first option). This shows the brutal nature of the
regime, and how the brutal political infighting and paranoia that surrounded the party had
dreadful consequences for many of its members; in a similar way, for example, that the
Cultural Revolution in China, in which many (perceived) dissidents were exiled, incarcerated or
murdered.

3. Policies

No ideological or theoretical analysis can, however, explain and study the true
political nature of Democratic Kampuchea without studying the application of said
theory into action; to analyze how ideology framed the evolution of the regime, its
plans, economic goals and international diplomacy (or lack thereof, more accurately),
one has to deepen its observation of Pol Pot’s reforms as they were implemented, of his
economic plans as they were attempted and of his social transformations as they
evolved. Empirical observation of the KCP’s program can be more forthcoming about
its motives, ambitions and evolution than any theoretical approach.
 The foundation of Pol Pot’s plans was the Four-Year Plan (1977.1980) designed
by the party in 1976. Its main goal was the achievement of economic self-sufficiency
through an extraordinary expansion of agricultural production, especially with regards
to rice, the main and most abundant product in the region. Private property was
abolished, and the state forced its citizenry to live in a permanent communal state, in
which the commune owned a certain piece of land given to it by the state and had to
cultivate and work it themselves. Rice’s importance also increased due to its status as
the state’s most valuable asset in barter; the Khmer Rouge had abolished currency, and
demanded that all trade and transactions be conducted through barter. They designed a
nation-wide irrigation system so as to not depend on seasonal rains and achieve their
yearly objectives of three tons of rice per hectare. Production, however, never reached
these levels, as Cambodia was unable to muster the resources for such a goal after years
of war, misery and its own logistical impediments. Therefore, the little amount of rice
that was actually produced was delivered to factory workers, soldiers or exported to
China and other socialist countries. This contributed to thousands of deaths due to
malnutrition, famine and disease.

The Four-Year plan, in essence, failed due to its excessive ambition, Cambodia’s
underdeveloped agricultural infrastructures and its inability to produce at the level
required by the regime. Its consequences were hellish for most of the population, as
starvation grew, peasants were exploited and, especially the ‘new people’, citizens were
objected to a repressive zeal which made the regime lose most of its original popularity.

The other fundamental part of the regime’s program was the total reeducation of
the population. Pol Pot had announced, when the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodia,
that 1975 would be ‘Year Zero’, as a new society, and a new civilization, would be born
from the rule of Angkar. Not only would there be a regime change; not only would there
be a seismic cultural, economic and political change; the Cambodian population would
have to be subjected to a process of reeducation characteristic of totalitarian regimes.
Only, in the Cambodian case, it happened far more quickly, and even more violently
than in other cases. Husbands were separated from their wives, children were taken
away from their parents…Entire families were broken up to advance the agenda of
social destruction promulgated by the regime. As Kenneth Quinn argues, the first goal
of the Cambodian revolution was to destroy the old society and its social, economic,
political and cultural infrastructure so completely that it could not be reestablished
again. Such an evolution could only take place by fragmenting even the most basic
institutions of society, such as the family.

One of the most characteristic programs that the Khmer Rouge implemented was
the use of children as spies. They conceived children as being ‘pure’, without the stain
of corruption on them, and so they would form the basis onto which the new society had
to be built. The Khmer Rouge organized units, called Kang Chhlop, composed by
children and used to spy on the adult population. In practice, this provided the regime
with a constant flow of information about the behavior, actions and support for the
regime that adults had; ideologically, it fomented a break-up of traditional family
structures, pitting children against their elders in a similar manner to that of the Cultural
Revolution in China.

From 1975 to 1978, the regime stood firm, although from the beginning there
were signs that it was not bound to last: infighting among the party’s elites was
continuous, with purges being caused by bad harvests, political trickery, ambition or
paranoia. Rice production was not near the desired results of the KCP, which in turn had
a hurtful effect on the economy. While economic data from this period is difficult to
extract due to the secrecy of the Khmer Rouge, accounts from witnesses and foreign
diplomats about the living conditions of natives describe a down-trodden, starvation-
ridden environment in which the economy failed to meet the regime’s objectives and
repression was growing more common and widespread by the day. Still, the main cause
for the regime’s eventual and sudden downfall came not from internal dissent or
rebellion, but by the fledging nature of international affairs and the rivalry between
Cambodia and Vietnam.

Since ‘Year One’, Democratic Kampuchea had shut itself from the outside
world, maintaining relations only with China and, to an extent, North Korea. Its
relationship with its neighbors, especially Vietnam, was a difficult one. The nationalistic
nature of the Khmer Rouge was traduced into a desire for reestablishing the ancient
Angkor Empire, which occupied most of the territory of Indochina. This clashed with
Vietnam’s hegemonistic tendencies, that had only intensified since the end of its war in
1973. In 1977, Kampuchea’s head of state Khieu Samphan broke off diplomatic
relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, arguing:
“The number one enemy is not US imperialism, but Vietnam, ready to swallow up
Cambodia”

At the same time, the Khmer Rouge had been provoking skirmishes on the
border between these two countries since 1975, with the objective of acquiring more
and more territory as well as checking Vietnamese ambitions in the region. Anti-
Vietnamese nationalism also provided a motivation for guerrillas to enter into
progressively more violent offensives along the border, chief among them the Ba Chuc
Massacre. This confrontation was also caused by the larger international rivalry between
China and the USSR, both at odds with one another since the 50’s due to their
geopolitical conflict of interests in Asia and their confronting ambition for being the
leader of the communist world. Cambodia was supported by China, while Vietnam was
aided economically and politically by the USSR. Therefore, this conflict can also be
explained as a derivative of the China-USSR political dispute. Still, one can’t ignore the
largely local and regional causes of this conflict; Cambodia’s desire to achieve a
hegemonic position (held by Vietnam at that moment) in Indochina, due to both
nationalist and economic (more land to plant crops, especially rice, and therefore
achieve a greater amount of production) reasons, combined with Vietnam’s geopolitical
objective of remaining in its position of supremacy in regards to its neighbors.

Finally, on Christmas Day, 1978, Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia to begin

what would be a successful invasion and occupation of Democratic Kampuchea, taking
Phnom Penh the 7th of January, and declaring the formation of the People’s Republic of
Kampuchea. The KCP’s leaders fled first to the western portion of the country, and later
on to Thailand. The invasion was swift, as Cambodia´s depleted and scarce military
forces could not face up to the well-organized, well-trained Vietnamese army.
International response was also quick, with Prince Sihanouk appealing to the UN for
action against the invasion; China and the US (due to its enmity with the USSR and
Vietnam) led another 5 countries into drafting a resolution that called for a ceasefire and
the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. While in the next few months a
series of summits, conflicts and diplomatic incidents launched the region into war again,
the Khmer Rouge were no longer in power. And they would never be in power again.
Their end had been quick and complete, falling apart in over just one month as
Vietnamese soldiers occupied the entirety of the territory they once had controlled. The
locals were mostly either indifferent or supportive, as the strenuous and continuous
exploitation at the hands at the regime had not particularly endeared it to them.

Three years and seven months. That’s how much the Khmer Rouge maintained
power in Cambodia. A regime based on violence, repression and fanatic nationalism,
which managed to perpetrate one the most horrifying genocides in history. A product of
years and years of warfare, division, foreign intervention, urban-rural confrontation and
radicalization. The Khmer Rouge guerrillas achieved power through its ability to
channel both traditionalist sentiment along with a communist program based on Mao’s
ideals and policies. No regime went as far into implementing its policies, into
transforming society in a radical, total and totalitarian way. Its example serves as a
warning of the dangers that ethnic nationalism can entrail, as well as how easy it is for
political and educated elites to manipulate the anger and vengeful sentiments of large
swathes of the population to further their ideological goals. Pol Pot’s rule represents,
perhaps more than most totalitarian regimes, what Isaiah Berlin said in his work ‘Two
concepts of Liberty’:

“One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the
altars of the great historical ideals – justice or progress or the happiness of future
generations, or the sacred mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even
liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of individuals for the freedom of society. This
is the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the
mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in the
simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution.”

Una creencia, más que ninguna otra, es responsable del holocausto de los individuos en los
altares de los grandes ideales históricos: la justicia, el progreso, la felicidad de las futuras
generaciones, la sagrada misión o emancipación de una nación, raza o clase, o incluso la
libertad misma, que exige el sacrificio de los individuos para la libertad de la sociedad. Esta
creencia es la de que en alguna parte, en el pasado o en el futuro, en la revelación divina o en
la mente de algún pensador individual, en los pronunciamientos de la historia o de la ciencia, o
en el simple corazón de algún hombre bueno no corrompido, hay una solución final.

4.International context
5. Vietnamese intervention

6. Conclusion