The History and Dynamics of Globalisation

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The History and Dynamics of

Globalisation
Yale H. Ferguson
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DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2014.873615
The History and Dynamics of Globalisation
YALE H. FERGUSON
Globalisation involves geographically wider transaction networks

and has multiple interrelated dimensions. The globalisation process
has geographical scope, volume and density of transactions, and a

direction and pace of change. Globalization has a long history,
and the local and the global have almost continuously interacted.
Most forward changes have been incremental, and there have
also been major reversals or almost complete system-breakdowns.
There are numerous drivers of globalization of different types, per-
sons, and groups with varying motives, and anonymous drivers
like technology, weather, and disease. The article devotes most
attention to a review of selected patterns and trends in contempo-
rary globalisation These are climate change; demographic trends,
income inequality, and migration; security concerns, technology,
and peacekeeping; competing ideologies; the global economy, equi-
ties, trade, banking reform, and tax havens; and shifting power
relationships among the United States, Europe, China, Japan, and
Emerging Markets.
“Globalisation” was a hot concept in the 1990s. Like “American Empire” in

the early 2000s, the term was used and abused by all sorts of commenta-
tors and then declined in popularity—to the point where it almost seems
a little antiquated today. My frequent co-author Richard W. Mansbach and
I, who began writing about the grave weaknesses of a state-centric con-
ception of international relations in the mid-1970s1 nonetheless thought it
prudent to title our 2012 book Globalization: The Return of Borders to a
Borderless World?2 Note bene, the question mark at the end of the subti-
tle. So much spoken or written about globalisation has either been media
hype or anti-globalisation propaganda, and scholars have tended to speak
past one another—sometimes deliberately, because they have their own
specializations and normative biases. In the Ferguson/Mansbach view, glob-
alisation involves geographically wider transaction networks and has multi-
ple often-interrelated dimensions: ecology, disease, demography, economics,
135
136 Y. H. Ferguson
technology, culture, politics, military, and society. These categories are not
the only possible ones and, indeed, to some extent overlap and also can
easily be subdivided.
At any given time with respect to one or more dimensions, the globali-
sation process has geographical scope, volume, and density of transactions,
and a direction and pace of change. Globalisation is, at once, both an empiri-
cal state and part of an evolutionary non-linear process with reference to one
or multiple dimensions. One may take a snapshot as the process advances,
stalls, retreats, or is somehow transformed. The direction of change may be
forward, nil, or reverse, and the pace may be slow, moderate, or rapid. Since
globalisation is an evolutionary process, it has a long history, beginning well
before anything approaching full “globality” was or is achieved. Indeed, if
full globality even in a single dimension is a requirement for the existence

of globalisation, one is hopelessly constrained. From a historical perspective,
“there can be simultaneous regional ‘world’ systems, each in a sense com-
prising its own world.”3 From the vantage point of an individual observer,
there has always been a “known world,” which may be extremely limited for
some isolated groups even in the twenty-first century and historically, for at
least some educated elites, was broader than their own regional system.
Looking back over the millennia, the globalisation process appears to
have been almost inexorable. That reasonable conclusion can be mislead-
ing in some respects. Most of the changes in a forward direction have been
incremental—a new trade connection here, an exploratory campaign or voy-
age there, a better sail, a stock market, the emergence of new religion or
political ideology, and so on. There have also been major reversals or almost
complete system breakdowns, for example, the end of the Bronze Age in
the Mediterranean, the final disintegration of the Roman Empire in the West,
the Chinese Ming Dynasty’s decision to turn back from external contacts,
the Great Depression of the 1930s. Sometimes, especially with hindsight, it
is difficult to distinguish between a breakdown and an advance in global-
isation. For instance, the First World War was a grave breakdown in every
sense of both words, but the war was a world war—not the first, which was
probably the Seven Year’s War of 1756–63. The Second World War proved
to be a powerful spur to the most innovative era to date in international
institution-building.
Historically, it is surely significant that despite major setbacks and full-
fledged breakdowns, globalisation as a process has never failed to resume.
Some actors in one or more dimension of activity have always taken up
at least some of the slack and got things moving again. The Phoenicians
sailed into the power vacuum left by the Bronze Age collapse. The Islamic
conquests and Chinese progress pushed ahead even as the last remnants
of the Roman Empire in the East—the Byzantines—faded into the sunset.
Right about the time the Mings decided to give up foreign adventuring,
the Europeans started their own voyages of—so-called—discovery. Listing
The History and Dynamics of Globalisation 137
the drivers of globalisation is no easy task because there are so many

of very different types; start, perhaps, with hunter-gatherers, families,
clans, tribes, kingdoms, empires, “Westphalian” states, alliances, international
organizations, and non-governmental organisations and international non-
governmental organisations. One can add religious organizations and such
economic entities as banks, financial firms, and multinational companies,
then individuals at any stage of history and the relatively anonymous drivers
like technology, weather, and disease. For example, “new research suggests
that the container has been more of a driver of globalisation than all trade
agreements in the past 50 years taken together.”4
The only significant intellectual argument my long-time friend and
Rutgers colleague Richard Langhorne and I have had was about his con-
tention that globalisation resulted primarily from technological improvements

in communication.5 I insisted that such improvements were a “necessary” but
not “sufficient” condition. I remember that he gave me a “poor you” look and
said we would simply have to go on disagreeing. To be honest, we are both
correct. Connections are fundamental, although it is what actors do with
those connections—and why—that are equally fundamental.
Actors are hard to separate from motives as drivers. For instance, Chanda
highlights the historical role of traders, preachers, adventurers, and warriors.
Obviously, traders were motivated by a desire for goods and associated
wealth, preachers were looking to spread their religion, adventurers were
out for—well—adventure, and warriors for the glory of conquest and associ-
ated bounty and potential economic benefits. Blurring these neat categories,
conquistadores were adventurers who were warrior agents of monarch and
empire, looking for precious metals and opportunities for trade, and march-
ing along with priests who were eager to stamp out alien faiths and save
heathen souls.
So much of the fledgling discipline of international relations has been
built on a state-centric vision that many analysts have missed not only
the crucial role of many other actors but also the fact that the “local”
and “the “global” of any time have continuously interacted. Paradoxically,
globalisation may span wider geographical space, but simultaneously make
for a “smaller,” more connected world, a phenomenon Rosenau described
as “distant proximities.”6 Of course, it can also increase the psychological
distance and potential for conflict between and among groups and individ-
uals. There actually are two closely related dynamics at work here. The
first, associated particularly with Sassen, is that the “global” has increas-
ingly “embedded” itself in the local, during Sassen’s analytical timespan from
“Medieval to Global Assemblages.” However, Rosenau, Ferguson/Mansbach,
Friedman, and Barber among others have stressed that the growing per-
meability of boundaries and the resultant challenge of the global almost
inevitably provokes a reaction from the local. Rosenau wrote of this dynamic
as fragmentation/integration—or “fragmegration”—we as “fusion/fission,
138 Y. H. Ferguson
Friedman “the Lexus and the Olive Tree,” and Barber as “Jihad vs McWorld.”
Part of the reaction against the global is genuinely local, not least in tradi-
tional societies where, for example, the universe of medieval Islam seems
threatened by modernity. A similar pushback is also observable in the efforts
of modern states to re-regulate banks and financial markets, curb offshore
tax evaders, and so on.
Actors and polities engaging with the external world have inevitably
altered their environment and often, as a consequence, have themselves
been transformed. States and the state system in Europe evolved as they did
in part because imperial expansion went hand in hand with state-building.
Also, tribal or extended-family and clan polities forcefully gathered into
empires eventually became states partly because their metropoles inadver-
tently brought them the subversive concepts of state sovereignty and national
self-determination. On the economic front, traders invented contracts to
share risk, larger companies, and better ships because commercial oppor-
tunities abroad could not be effectively exploited without them. Military
technology would obviously have developed far slower than it did with-
out foreign enemies, and banking if it had not financed governments and
their wars as well as commerce.
Globalisation today has come to engage—or at least affect, directly
or indirectly, sometimes under protest—practically all of humanity. It has
vastly increased the complexity that characterizes our contemporary world.
However, if one is to understand that complexity, it is crucial to appreci-
ate the role of history. Some global change has involved subtraction—for
example, the diminution of the importance of kings and other monarchs as
actors—and there has also been some genuine transformation, for example,
the increased speed of messaging or the prominence of multinational cor-
porations. But much of globalisation has been mainly addition, building on
political actors, forms, and ideas from much earlier historical eras. In our own
work, Mansbach and I have argued that the past is embedded in the present
fully as much as the global, which observation helps account for present-day
complexity as well as to explain why present-day global governance lags so
far behind the issues it so urgently needs to address.
Nothing is more fundamentally global than the physical condition of
Planet Earth, and most experts agree that climate change in the direction
of greater turbulence and global warming is continuing. At the same time,
global governance efforts to address the problem are, at best, stalled or even
retreating. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, entering into force in 2005, is essen-
tially dead. Canada withdrew in 2011, the United States signed but did not
ratify, and major developing world carbon emission polluters—most notably
China—refused to join. Now the United States, Canada, and others including
New Zealand, Japan, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine have all said they would
not consider supporting the old or any new Kyoto-style agreement unless
key developing countries accept meaningful emission curbs. The 2012 Doha
climate change conference’s call for a new global agreement by 2015 was
unconvincing.
The primary initiative concerning climate change has at least temporar-
ily returned to the state and interstate-regional level. Notably, two of the
previously most reluctant states and largest generators of greenhouse gases
now appear newly receptive to making modest reforms on a unilateral basis.
In the United States, President Barak Obama has announced a series of
steps to curb greenhouse-gas emissions 17 percent from 2005 levels by 2020,
mainly by stricter regulations and decreasing reliance on coal-fired power
plants. He and Chinese President Xi have agreed upon five new action ini-
tiatives, such as limiting emissions from heavy-duty vehicles. China also has
launched its first-ever carbon trading scheme in Shenzhen.
With the melting of polar ice caps, the “Great Game” is now truly afoot
in those heretofore virtually isolated regions, although a number of states
have long made claims to sovereignty over certain sections. There is certain
to be a rush to explore and exploit major resources in the area, as well as
an increase in tourism. Both the Northeast and Northwest Passages are soon
likely to be predictably ice-free for most of the year, ship traffic is increas-
ing, and over time this will have a significant impact on world trade and
existing sea-lanes. There will also be rising ocean waters and flooding, grave
threats from commercial activity to fragile polar ecosystems and wildlife, and
increased jurisdictional disputes among countries with perceived interests in
the polar regions. For instance, the United States and Canada already dis-
agree about whether the Northwest Passage is Canadian territorial waters or
an international strait. The Arctic Council in May 2013 granted observer status
to a number of interested Powers. Current members are Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States; observers
are China, India, Italy, Japan, and Singapore. The European Union [EU] has
applied for observer status, but its application awaits resolution of a dispute
with Canada over trade in seal products.7
The world’s total population today is circa 7 billion. More than one-
half live in urban areas, except in Asia, where that will likely be the case by
2020, and Africa, by 2050. China and India together account for about 38 per-
cent of global population. Projections are hazardous—witness the effect of
China’s one-child policy—but current estimates are that by 2050 global pop-
ulation will increase to 9.3 billion. India’s population is expected gradually
to overtake and surpass China’s. Urban areas should absorb all of the global
population increase, as well as substantial migration from the countryside.8
Once again, a notable case is China, which has unveiled a plan to move
250 million rural residents into newly built cities and towns by 2025.9
Income inequality remains high and in some countries, such as the
United States, increased during the recent global financial crisis. Today the
OECD estimates that the United States gini coefficient—the most widely-
accepted measure of income inequality—is 0.38, the 4th highest in the
140 Y. H. Ferguson
“developed” world trailing only Chile, Mexico, and Turkey.10 Today the top
one percent receives 20 percent of all national income.11 In 2011, the top
quintile accounted for 22.3 percent of total income versus 3.2 percent for
the bottom quintile.12 These statistics speak directly to some of the anger
evident in the American Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements, how-
ever much some of the former include right-wing Republicans who shelter
the rich from higher taxes.
The income inequality picture is also gloomy in China, although there
seems to have been a modest trickle-down effect at work. China’s officially
reported gini coefficient in 2012 was 0.474, well above the 0.4 level fre-
quently mentioned by analysts as signalling a potential for social unrest.
Many believe the China figure is actually considerably higher.13 Incomes in
China’s highest income quintile, mainly in urban areas, have recently grown
twice as fast as those of the lowest quintile. The better news is that growth
in the lower quintile has been greater than that in most other emerging
economies and has generated a rapid reduction in abject poverty.14
Indeed, one distinct and encouraging global trend has been a modest
reduction in poverty of those at the bottom of the scale. Of the world’s
7 billion inhabitants, 1.1 billion subsist below the international and pitifully
small standard of US$1.25 per day. To put this in perspective, the United
States poverty line is $63 a day for a family of four, and in the richer emerging
economies the standard is $4 a day. However, by the international standard,
there has been a remarkable reduction in poverty of almost 1 billion people
between 1990 and 2010. China alone has been responsible for three-quarters
of this improvement.15
Population growth rate almost everywhere in the developed world has
dropped and the general population is aging.16 Although disease is still ram-
pant, especially in Africa and among children, there have been amazing
health advances. The Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research reports
that “progress in lowering the risk of death at all ages has been so rapid since
1900 that life expectancy has risen faster than it did in the previous 200 mil-
lennia.” Primitive hunter-gatherers, “at age 30, had the same odds of dying as
a modern Swedish or Japanese man would face at 72.” The advances can be
attributed in large part to increases in agricultural productivity, cleaner water,
and antibiotics and vaccines.17 Of course, there is a continued threat of pan-
demics like HIV AIDS, SARS, and Avian Flu, aggravated by high mobility. Yet
better global communication has made much more possible early detection
and containment. Increased transnational data-sharing promises even greater
advances in medical knowledge and treatments. For example, in June 2013,
70 medical, research and advocacy organizations in 41 countries, including
National Institutes of Health, concluded an agreement to share information
and create new databases on genetic variations and health.18
Declining birth rates and increased life expectancy shift more burdens
on those of working age to maintain already stretched national welfare
systems. Widespread shortages of skilled and unskilled labour exacerbate

longstanding tensions over immigration. Countries like the United States and
Germany, for instance, have a chronic need for more engineers and high-
tech workers, as well as agricultural labourers, those willing to do domestic
work, and even more menial tasks.19 Global migration, legal and illegal immi-
gration, and human trafficking persist at high levels. From 1990 to 2010,
migrants born in the South and living in the North increased by 85 percent,
more than twice as fast as the global migrant stock of 38 perrcent. As for the
South, in 2010, there were 3.2 million from Bangladesh in India, 2.4 million
from Afghanistan in Pakistan and 2 million in Iran, and 1.4 million Indians in
Saudi Arabia. The United States alone had some 12.2 million from Mexico,
2 million mainland Chinese, 1.9 million from the Philippines, and 1.6 million
from India. Germany had 2.8 million from Turkey. Nine out of 10 refugees
were in developing countries.20
The frequently exaggerated threat to native jobs and culture posed
by immigration has generated substantial political opposition. Highly vocal
right-wing nationalist parties made varied headway throughout the EU, and
immigration remains a hot-button issue in the United States. Today’s global
cities—like many hubs of trade and commerce in the ancient world—are
remarkably multicultural and multilingual. In the latest census, all London
boroughs other than the City of London reported that residents spoke over
100 primary languages. In England and Wales over 8 percent of residents
do not have English as their primary language, while 20 percent are unable
to speak English well. Polish is the most common foreign language, reflect-
ing the fact that more than one-half million Poles have arrived since Poland
joined the EU in 2004.21
Another pattern has been not-inconsiderable reverse migration. It is
ironic that just as the Obama Administration and Congress have been
wrestling over immigration reform, the flow from Mexico has come to at
least a temporary standstill or even reversed. This situation has been the
result of complex factors, including the weakened United States job market
especially in construction, more effective border enforcement and deporta-
tions, increased dangers involved in border crossings, a decline in Mexican
birth rates, and a rising Mexican economy.22 Poor economic conditions in the
EU and rapid economic growth in Turkey had a similar impact on Turkish
migration to the EU. Current changing economic conditions will no doubt
also have their effects.
Although the Cold War brought the world to the brink of nuclear holo-
caust, paradoxically it also constituted a “Long Peace”—the longest period
without a war between major Powers in modern world history. In fact, a full-
scale war between major Powers currently appears unlikely for two reasons:
the terrible cost of warfare with present-day conventional weapons, let alone
escalation to nuclear war; and the declining utility of actually “conquering”
territory. With few exceptions, resources can be accessed in our substantially
142 Y. H. Ferguson
globalised world without actually “possessing” them and having to “rule”

subject populations.
One optimistic hour in recent history followed the end of the Cold War
when the United Nations [UN] Security Council functioned as the founders
intended and united in support of the Gulf War that turned back Iraq’s inva-
sion of Kuwait. Great Power unanimity has now vanished and, indeed,
increasing tensions between the United States, Russia, and China almost
seem to herald another era of global realpolitik. It is not hard to construct
scenarios that could involve dangerous naval confrontations in the South
China Sea or general war with Great Power involvement in the Middle East.
Yet China has helped intermittently with North Korea and lately, surprisingly,
has agreed to participate in naval exercises with the United States and other
Powers in the Pacific.23

Global military expenditure in 2011 was over $1.7 trillion. The United
States spent $711 billion, China an estimated $143 billion, Russia $71.9 bil-
lion, Britain $62.7 billion, and France $62.5 billion. From another perspective,
the United States spent more than the total of the next nine countries in the
ranking, or only $13 billion less than their total adjusted for Purchasing Power
Parity. The United States world share of military expenditures was 41 percent,
and 4.7 percent of GNP; by comparison, China’s was 2 percent and Russia
3.9 percent of GNP. China’s military spending has expanded rapidly, albeit
from a relatively low base.24 Nuclear weapons are obviously here to stay,
and remaining questions are how existing ones will be managed and how
far nuclear proliferation will extend. Obama has repeated his earlier offer to
Russia to go beyond the cuts agreed in the 2010 New Start Treaty to leave
each country with circa 1000 nuclear weapons. Neither the Russian leader,
Vladimir Putin nor United States Senate Republicans, who would be voting
on any expansion of the treaty, greeted the proposal with any enthusiasm.
Meanwhile, on the front lines of nuclear proliferation, “rogue states” North
Korea and Iran are—at this writing—in a slightly more dovish stage, sug-
gesting they might be willing to reopen perennial talks about their nuclear
programmes. Iran has actually promised a slowdown.
Terrorism became a major global preoccupation, especially after the
September 2001 World Trade Center attacks. In troubled countries, embassies
have been targeted because of their symbolic role—and because few were
built to defend against concerted attack. However, most remarkable given
the apparently limitless potential for suicide bombers, snipers, and con-
certed attacks is how few major terrorist incidents have thus far occurred
in developed countries. That must be attributable to a combination of effec-
tive intelligence gathering, internal and trans-border policing, and possibly
to a relative dearth of true fanatics with a sociopathic bent. At this stage, the
earlier War on Terrorism seems to be steadily morphing into something anal-
ogous to that on organized crime. Interestingly, crimes against people and
property have been steeply declining across the developed world, owing
apparently to aging populations, better policing, and technological advances

from car immobilisers to CCTV.25 However, the present may only prove to
be an uneasy calm before the storm. With post-war fragmentation in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and increasing turmoil in the Middle East and Africa, the
world could be on the cusp of a veritable global paroxysm of terror. Or will
extremists be so busy killing one another they will have little time for others?
Current drone warfare aims mainly at “taking out” Al-Qaeda and other
terrorist leaders in places like western Pakistan and Yemen. The moral
dimension of drone warfare is highly controversial, partly because innocent
civilians are also casualties. Supporters of drones argue that such attacks are
far less destructive than the armed interventions that might otherwise be
necessary to deny terrorists safe havens. In any case, allegations that drone
attacks violate targeted countries’ sovereignty are spurious. International law

requires that a country asserting its sovereign rights must also be able to
secure its territory against agents engaged in active threats against the secu-
rity of other sovereign countries. Pakistan, for example, has been blatantly
and even wilfully deficient in this regard. Some 70 countries already have
some kind of drone technology and development of more sophisticated and
dangerous drones is proceeding apace. This is one new frontier of the global
arms race. Most drones thus far are unarmed surveillance models with lim-
ited range, unlike the United States-made Reaper that can carry 16 guided
missiles and remain in the air for 24 hours.26
Another new-technology dimension of global security threats is cyber
warfare, aimed not only at military assets but also economic and financial
targets and communication and social networks. Such attacks have been
growing at an alarming rate and seem certain to be an ever-more-significant
feature of formal military strategy and general transborder harassment in the
years ahead.
It is sad that the term “peacekeeping” has come to be associated
with the naïve hopes of the Dag Hammarskjöld UN-era, misguided lib-
eral interventionism, or—worse—propaganda designed to disguise military
action for nefarious purposes. Few are aware that today the UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations has 15 peacekeeping missions plus one
Afghanistan assistance mission in the field: one in the Western Hemisphere
in Haiti, eight in Africa, two in Europe—Cyprus and Kosovo—three in the
Middle East, and one in Asia—India/Pakistan. With the list of failed and fail-
ing states growing longer, there will be plenty of future opportunities for
external unilateral and multilateral intervention, although the debate contin-
ues about the degree to which this dampens conflict or itself becomes part of
the problem—by adding yet another actor to an already complex situation,
raising false hopes, or postponing inevitable confrontations.27
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, some predicted a “new world
order” in which democracy and capitalism would reign supreme. They
were correct about capitalism. Despite the 2008 financial crisis and deep
144 Y. H. Ferguson
recession, capitalism—perhaps narrowly—avoided a general collapse and

many of its institutions are now once again turning a tidy profit. The post-
Cold War pundits were generally wrong about democracy’s prospects. Today
long-established democracies in the United States and Europe are suffer-
ing a continuing legitimacy crisis, with extended periods of policy deadlock
and most politicians held in low public esteem. In Russia, Hungary,28 and
Turkey,29 there has been a distinct “authoritarian creep.” In some countries
like Venezuela, Iran, and Zimbabwe, elections have involved such grave con-
straints that democracy has hardly been served. In much of the Middle East,
hopes for a flowering of democracy following the “Arab Spring” have been
cruelly dashed. Indian democracy and development prospects seem bogged
down in a morass of parties, factions, castes, and sects. Pakistan is in such a
political mess that it is almost a failed state.

The only remaining nominal Marxist-Leninist governments today are
China, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam and—arguably—North Korea. In China an aging
authoritarian regime has thus far been supported primarily by a phenome-
nal economic boom. The regime trumpets the superiority of “Asian values”
and a Maoist socialist tradition. Yet the “China dream” to date has been all
about nationalism, unrelenting political repression, state capitalism, endemic
corruption, and successful neo-mercantilist policies. China has gained
tremendously from contemporary globalisation. However, as Chinese leaders
are keenly aware, China is also a potential powder keg of social unrest that
can explode should the economy stop growing at an impressive rate.
Perhaps what is being witnessed globally today is not so much
the march of democracy, authoritarianism, or Asian values as what The
Economist labelled “The March of Protest.” That magazine’s perceptive
29 June–5 July 2013 cover featured representative figures from four different
periods: 1848 Europe, 1968 America and Europe, the 1989 Soviet Empire, and
2013 everywhere. The fourth figure is a woman holding a smartphone, and
in the background are scores of protesters, some waving placards labelled
Cairo, Istanbul, and Rio. Why the sudden increase in protests? The short
answer is that in most countries, the weak global economic recovery has yet
to generate enough jobs, narrow the widening income gap, and meet rising
middle class expectations. The longer answer stressed by Mansbach and me
is that national policy-makers—constrained by their sovereign boundaries—
have seen their capacity to shape their citizens’ welfare diminish in the
face of global economic currents and events far beyond their jurisdiction
and control. Despite some limited re-regulation after the financial crisis,
the gap between formal authority and effective authority has never been
greater. Meanwhile, the information revolution and modern communications
technology have made mass publics ever harder for governments to “fool”
and better equipped to organize protests. Yet China has “pioneered” in both
censoring the internet and using it, within bounds, as a “safety valve” for
public discontent.30
What, then, are the major global ideological divisions today? Samuel
Huntington predicted in 1998 that they would be “civilisations,” which argu-
ment seemed to be prescient after the 2001 World Trade Center attacks
and the rising prominence of Islam and China. He also envisaged a divide
between “The West and the Rest.” Huntington’s critics rightly pointed out
that most of the civilisations he identified had both unclear boundaries
and numerous internal fault-lines, some of which—not least in Islam—were
perhaps even more prone to produce violent confrontations. Discussions
like these highlight two perennial problems: fashioning clear concepts and
assessing the relative importance of the whole and its parts. In terms of
comparative politics, the main contemporary ideological contest is between
democracy and authoritarianism. However, there obviously are so many dif-
ferent forms of both. Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, and Hungary’s
Victor Orban may have been elected, but all have authoritarian leanings. And
how far should one credit “Asian values” claims, especially where they over-
lap with a Marxist legacy in China and Vietnam? As for the global economy,
the clearest ideological division in many capitalist countries—exacerbated by
the latest financial crisis—continues to be the old feud between Keynesians
and monetarists over the role of government stimulus programmes, the need
for balanced budgets, concern about inflation, and regulation of business
and finance.
Overall, the global economy appears to be slowly recovering from
the worst downturn since the 1930s Depression. Conditions in particular
regions and countries vary enormously but everywhere there is a sense of
fragility and potential volatility that could yet result in another major cri-
sis. General forecasts like those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
are uncertain at best.31 Its director, Christine Lagarde, sees the world in
three groups—some countries doing well, some improving, and others still
in trouble. But which countries? Chief economist Olivier Blanchard subse-
quently announced that the IMF’s global growth forecast was 3.3 percent
in 2013 and 4 percent in 2014. At that time, emerging market and devel-
oping economies were booming, while the United States was recovering
much better—1.9 percent forecasted growth in 2013 and 3 percent in 2014—
than the Eurozone—minus 0.3 percent and 1.1 percent, respectively. Lagarde
noted that public debt levels in the United Sstates and especially Japan
remained too high, although she warned against public spending cuts that
might dampen recovery. By contrast, by September 2013, several key emerg-
ing economies experienced a downturn, while the Eurozone showed some
improvement. Germany, perhaps France, and even the United Kingdom just
outside the Eurozone seem to be gradually coming out of recession.32
In March 2013 New York’s Dow Jones share index reached a record
high, signalling—as one report had it—“Wall Street is Back.”33 Then, for a
time at least, the equity boom became almost a global phenomenon, spurred
primarily by aggressive stimulus programmes from the United States Federal
146 Y. H. Ferguson
Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan. “Quantitative easing”
involved central banks buying government bonds and pumping huge sums
of money into their respective economies, while keeping interest rates low.34
Contrary to fiscal conservative predictions, inflation did not increase, and
the logical place for pent-up capital to flow was into equities. However,
equities began to retreat during summer 2013, responding to Federal Reserve
comments that better conditions might soon allow it to “taper” its pump-
priming. Investors assumed that rising interest rates might not be far behind.
There was a sudden capital flight from numerous emerging market countries
to established economies and a slide in the formers’ currency values and
stock prices.35
After decades of generally rising volumes, global trade actually shrank
in 2009 and has been slow to recover. Growth of only 2 percent in 2012 was
the second-worst statistic since records started in 1981. The World Trade
Organization [WTO] forecasts that growth will be 3.3 percent in 2013 and
5 percent next year. The average over the past two decades has been
5.3 percent.36 China has become the world’s largest single exporter, and
in 2012 for the first time the global south produced more than the north.37
Remarkably, there was only a relatively minor increase in trade protectionism
during the financial crisis.
Global trade negotiations that began under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade [GATT] and the most-favoured-nation principle after the
Second World War produced substantial progress in reducing tariffs and
non-tariff barriers to trade. GATT’s successor, the WTO with 159 members,
has more powers to identify unfair trading practices and can authorize the
imposition of countervailing duties against offending countries. WTO trade
dispute settlement mechanisms have played an increasingly constructive role.
Far less successful have been Doha Round talks, which began in 2001 and
have been essentially suspended since 2005. Developing countries refused
to make any more concessions until their complaints about more effective
access to developed country markets were adequately addressed. The WTO’s
long-serving director-general, Pascal Lamy, retired in 2013 to be succeeded
by Brazil’s Roberto Azevedo. With the Doha process widely considered to be
moribund, WTO members have most recently concentrated on streamlining
customs rules and procedures—“trade facilitation.”
With global trade negotiations stalled, attention has shifted to pro-
posals for new “mega-regional” pacts. The first is a Trans-Atlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership [TTIP] between the EU and the United States,
a grouping representing about half of the global economy. The second
is a Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP] that aims to involve the United States
and at least 11 other countries, including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam38 —
together accounting for two-fifths of the world economy and one-third
of all trade.39 Both of these agreements are supposed to incorporate
“21st century” provisions on labour standards, environment, intellectual

property, government procurement, and state-owned enterprises.40 A third
possible agreement, less ambitious than the other two and still at a very
early stage is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership [RCEP] that
would group the ten ASEAN countries with Australia, China, India, Japan,
New Zealand, and South Korea. China’s “involvement in the RCEP makes
the two pacts look like rivals.” The United States “is trying to design a trade
regime which China will eventually have to join—rather than getting to set
its own rules as its clout increases.”41
TTIP and TPP negotiations are proceeding at an unusually rapid pace,
but no guarantee exists that either pact will ever come to fruition. There
remain numerous areas of serious disagreement and demands for excep-
tions for individual countries. For TTIP, one perennial controversy is mutual
market access for agricultural products, further complicated by subsidies
and genetically modified foods. Moreover, the Obama Administration has
been vigorously resisting European demands to include financial services
regulation, fearing erosion of its own Dodd-Frank regulations and efforts to
impose them on other jurisdictions. France has partially secured a “cultural”
exception, limiting importation of foreign movies. television programmes,
and other media. Europeans also have been insisting on privacy safeguards
against snooping by United States security agencies.42 TPP faces perhaps
even greater obstacles. Malaysia, in particular, has had its frictions with global
capitalism since the earlier Asian financial crisis. The United States will have
to reduce tariffs and quotas for sugar, dairy products, catfish, footwear, and
textiles. Japan is determined to continue protecting rice, beef, pork, sugar,
and dairy products. Vietnam does not like rules restricting its capacity to buy
yarn for textiles from non-member states like China. Australia is troubled by
dispute settlement procedures that would limit its control of multinational
investment. And so on.43
The uncertain outlook for global trade is more optimistic than reform of
the global financial system. Apart from emergency bail-outs, the initial con-
versations at G8 and G20 were mostly about correcting “global imbalances”
and threatened “currency wars.” Concerns were expressed about the effects
of United States “quantitative easing,” the longstanding undervaluation of
the Chinese renminbi—now slowly appreciating44 —and Japan’s Abe govern-
ment’s drastic stimulus policies to weaken the yen and shock the Japanese
economy back into growth. IMF reform agreed to in 2010—to double the
IMF’s quota, shift six percentage points to the developing countries, and
transfer two of the existing 24 IMF directorships from European to develop-
ing countries—remains unratified by the United States, the very country that
spearheaded the reforms.45
Nor, as yet, has there been convincing progress on banking reform.
In the United States, three years after the Dodd-Frank bill reforms were
adopted, “critical parts . . . remain unenforced as an alphabet soup of federal
148 Y. H. Ferguson
agencies wrangle over how to adopt it.” These include, “the Volker rule
prohibiting banks from risking institutional money in certain speculative
investments” and curbs on banks that are “too big to fail.” Congress is
considering other proposals that would increase the amount of capital the
largest banks are required to carry.”46 The Basel group, which includes rep-
resentatives from 27 financial centres, will require from 2018 that all banks
impose a 3 percent leverage capital ratio regardless of risk factors in their
operations.47
Germany has determinedly blocked a “full” EU banking union. The
European Central Banks’ willingness to buy government bonds helped save
the Euro from potential collapse. However, national “stress tests” of banks
have been widely regarded as inadequate, as is the European Stability
Mechanism [ESM], which has been empowered to recapitalise banks directly

in case of urgent need up to a total of 60 billion euros. The key prob-
lem is that the ESM is required to raise an additional two Euros for each
euro it uses for recapitalisation and is probably too small, in any event, to
cope with bank losses in any new major crisis.48 EU finance ministers have
agreed on a plan—awaiting European Parliament approval—to ensure that
from 2018 shareholders and creditors will have to accept significant losses
in the event banks fail. Savers with account of 100,000 euros or less would
be protected.49 EU plans to curb bankers’ bonuses infuriated the British gov-
ernment. Many larger banks have returned to profitability after the financial
crisis, and bankers’ bonuses, somewhat lower on average, have recovered
reasonably well. Of course, many banks, for instance, in China, remain
beyond the reach of international regulators and are anything but trans-
parent in their operations. In fact, trans-border capital flows are now only
$4.6 trillion in 2012 versus $11.8 trillion in 2007. Bank regulators have been
encouraging large banks to shed assets while continuing to supply credit to
domestic markets—“patriotic deleveraging.”50 Nevertheless, in most domestic
markets, a relative shortage of credit continues to prevail.
Britain, France, and Germany have led a G20 offensive aimed at
clamping down on corporate tax avoidance. Many corporations purposely
book their revenues in tax haven or low taxation countries and use
laws against double taxation to their advantage. For instance, Valeant
Pharmaceuticals, headquartered in Canada, books much of their revenue
in Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.51 Other large compa-
nies, like Amazon, Google, Starbucks, and Facebook also have come under
scrutiny. Meanwhile, Britain’s overseas territories and crown dependencies
have signed an agreement pledging to control tax evasion. The United
States has finally succeeded in agreeing with Switzerland that Swiss banks
will be encouraged to reveal details of their cross-border business, secure
non-prosecution agreements, and pay fines as required.52
The United States economy was the first hit by the financial crisis and
has been the first to begin recovery. American economic growth in the
second quarter of 2013 was revised upward to an annual rate of 2.5 percent.53
The country’s trade gap in June 2013 was the narrowest since October 2009.
Exports increased to an all-time high and imports fell.54 Washington’s budget
deficit is also declining far faster than expected, to an estimated four percent
of GDP in 2013, 3.4 percent in 2014, and 2.1 percent in 2015.55 Another major
boost has been a shale oil revolution. According to the International Energy
Agency, the United States will account for one-third of all new oil supplies
over the next five years, change from the world’s leading importer of oil to
a net exporter, overtake Russia as the world’s largest gas producer by 2015,
and become “all but self-sufficient” in its energy needs by about 2035.56
Nevertheless, unemployment is still high—7.4 percent in July 201357 —and
partisan gridlock in Congress continues. The influence of right-wing Tea
Party conservatives appears to be waning, but whether a bipartisan middle

will re-emerge in Washington is a key question for the future global influence
of the United States.
The gloomiest predictions have not as yet come to pass in the EU
and Eurozone, but there are few current grounds for rejoicing. A com-
plete breakdown appears to have been avoided: France, Spain, and the
Netherlands have now been given more years to meet their deficit reduc-
tion targets; Greece has not defaulted or withdrawn from the Euro; Latvia is
joining the Eurozone in January; and Ireland is emerging from its bailout.58
Germany is recovering steadily, although its export-oriented economic model
may be gradually running out of road59 and, in any case, is now oriented
mainly toward Asia and the United States.60 France is also slowly improving.
Elsewhere the picture is far less optimistic. Economic output has contin-
ued to shrink in Spain, Italy, and Greece, albeit at a somewhat slower
pace. Eurozone unemployment by June 2013 was 12.1 percent, but the
month before was 27.6 percent in Greece and 26.3 percent in Spain. Most
debilitating has been youth unemployment—again in May 2013—in Greece
62.9 percent, Spain 56.1 percent, and Croatia 55.4 percent.61
The EU project as a whole has suffered severely from the region’s gen-
eral economic turmoil and lack of a credible EU joint foreign policy, as
the latest divisions over Syria have highlighted. The longest running soap
opera in Europe has been the British question of its future role in the EU.
Conservative prime minister, David Cameron, has pledged to hold a ref-
erendum on British EU membership, and a February 2013 poll found that
50 percent of responders would vote “out,” 33 percent “in,” and 17 percent
would not vote either way.62 A May 2013 Pew Research Center poll also
showed a profound decline in pro-EU sentiment. In France, an EU pillar,
merely 41 percent had a favourable view; only Greeks and Italians, also tra-
ditionally pro-EU, had a more negative opinion. All said, it is well to recall
that at several important crossroads in the EU’s evolution, there has been
general despair and in every such situation member states have ultimately
strengthened the overall association.
150 Y. H. Ferguson
In May 2013, the OECD forecast (adjusted for price differences) that
China will overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy in
2016,63 much sooner than 2030 mentioned by other forecasts. That remains
to be seen, and those of us who remember all the hype decades ago about
the twenty-first century belonging to Japan may perhaps be excused for
experiencing a sense of déjà vu.
China’s ruling elite must be concerned about the inherent fragility
of its political, economic, and social systems. One might argue that phe-
nomenal growth rates have been the primary glue holding the system
together, which task will continue to be challenging even if China man-
ages to maintain its somewhat slower annual target of 7.5 percent. China’s
authoritarian/bureaucratic leaders rule over a geographically vast and pop-
ulous country, with remarkably diverse regions, restive minorities, and a

historical tradition of centralisation/decentralisation. President Xi and oth-
ers have publicly acknowledged the urgent need for “reform,” curbs on
corruption, and greater “democracy”—in unspecified form—to counter grow-
ing discontent among the party faithful as well as an increasingly attentive,
“wired,” and impatient public. Yet any significant reforms will no doubt be
stoutly resisted by vested interests, and there is ever looming the shadow
of what happened to the former Soviet Union when sudden major changes
resulted in near-collapse.
Chinese economic growth has been accompanied by dangerous infla-
tion, a property “bubble” fuelled in part by too easy credit, and general
“overheating”; and lately there has been a global-recession-induced slow-
down especially in exports. Other concerns include labour shortages, the
related need to relocate industries from coastal regions to the interior, an
inadequate transportation infrastructure to move goods from the interior to
the coast, and rising labour costs that threaten competitiveness. Some com-
mentators maintain that China’s state-owned enterprises and banks are too
big to manage, and the entire financial system—including that funding local
government and real estate—is much too opaque, which facilitates corrup-
tion. There are both improvements and increasing gaps in national income
distribution. China’s labour supply has started to shrink, partly because of the
delayed effects of the one-child policy, and educated professionals are leav-
ing the country in record numbers. Cities are badly overcrowded, teeming
with inadequately documented and accommodated immigrants, and experi-
encing horrific levels of air pollution. Chinese experts have begun to concede
that their country’s economy today is too reliant on exports, that it has an
undesirably high domestic savings rate, that foreign exchange reserves have
tended to be embarrassingly high, and that policy-makers need to encourage
more domestic consumption and pursue further investment opportunities
abroad. In any event, although it may be the only choice, transitioning to a
lower-growth model is inherently risky.64
Japan made phenomenal economic strides after the Second World

War. Many predicted Japan would be the world’s leading economy in
the twenty-first century and commended its economic model and related
national values to others. However, in the 1990s Japan’s growth slowed
dramatically, public debt soared, deflation set in, property and financial
asset values fell, and the country lost its competitive edge in global mar-
kets. Japan’s economy today is still the third largest in the world by nominal
GDP, but the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2011 giant earthquake were
further shocks and the public debt burden is well over 200% of GDP.65
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose Liberal Democratic Party recently
increased its majority, has embarked on a bold policy strategy of “three
arrows” to pull his country out of the economic doldrums. The first is mon-
etary policy, deliberately depressing the yen and establishing a two percent
target for consumer price inflation. The second is fiscal stimulus policy, fol-
lowed in due course by higher taxes to reduce deficit spending. The third is
a variety of structural reforms to increase labour flexibility and a determined
effort to succeed in negotiations to join the proposed TPP.66 Whether these
policies will work is still very much an open question. Initial results were
encouraging, as the economy expanded at 3.8 percent in the first quarter
2013 but then declined to 2.6 percent in the second quarter.67
High initial growth rates in the BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India, China—and
other emerging countries, with improvement in the United States, helped
fuel equity prices and general optimism about a steady global recovery.
Then in 2013 the economies of several key players began to slow.68 This
occurred partly because of structural factors in individual countries, but also
because the United States Federal Reserve and other central banks started
to discuss phasing out quantitative easing. In Russia, a decline in investment
and household spending, plus lower commodity sales—including natural
gas—threatened to push the economy into recession.69 The Indian econ-
omy’s growth rate fell to 4.4 percent in the quarter ending in June 2013,
manufacturing output contracted sharply, and the rupee tumbled to historic
lows against the dollar.70 In Indonesia, second quarter growth slowed to
5.8 percent, inflation was 8.6 percent, and financial markets lost one-fifth
of their value.71 Brazil’s growth rate has also been slowed by a wave of
political protests and a decline in Chinese commodity purchases: the real
dropped to 1.53 to the dollar—from 2.42 in mid-2011; Standard & Poor’s
outlook turned negative on Brazil’s sovereign rating; and joblessness, infla-
tion, and the current accounts deficit are all climbing.72 Heretofore booming
Mexico also slumped 0.7 percent in the second quarter owing to a down-
turn in construction, mining, and exports.73 Turkey’s economic growth fell
to 2.2 percent in 2012—from 8.8 percent in 2011—foreign investment is
down, inflation is up, and the lira has declined to new lows against the
dollar.
152 Y. H. Ferguson
CONCLUSION
Globalisation is a complex phenomenon with multiple dimensions, compli-

cated dynamics, and a long history. But there are just two further general
observations. First, a central question for the future is whether the shift away
from a global emphasis on military security that seemed to begin at the end
of the Cold War will continue. United States hegemony is weaker, Europe
is struggling, the Middle East is in turmoil, China’s rise is real—although
often exaggerated—and relations with Russia have soured. Will an increas-
ingly multipolar world perforce be a more dangerous one of old-fashioned
realpolitik strategies and power-balancing? Second, nothing is more reflective
of globalisation’s inherent complexity and inter-connectedness than today’s
world economy, where relatively small developments in a single country

rattle markets around the world. The sheer number of transactions and
the pace of change are breath-taking and clearly distinguish contemporary
globalisation from earlier eras.
NOTES
1. Richard W. Mansbach, Yale H. Ferguson, and Donald E. Lampert, The Web of World Politics:
Nonstate Actors in the Global System (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1976).
2. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, Globalization: The Return of Borders to a Borderless
World? (NY, 2012).
3. Richard L. Smith, Premodern Trade in World History (London, 2009), 6.
4. “Free Exchange: The Humble Hero,” Economist (18 May 2013), 82.
5. See Richard Langhorne, The Coming of Globalization (NY, 2001).
6. James N. Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization (Princeton, NJ, 2003).
7. See Helyett Richard Harris, The Northwest Passage: Issues Related to a Changing Arctic, (PhD
Dissertation, Rutgers University-Newark, August 2013).
8. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division: http://esa.un.
org/unup/pdf/WUP2011_Highlights.pdf.
9. Ian Johnson, “China’s Great Uprising: Moving 250,000,000 into Cities,” New York Times
(15 June 2013): www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/world/asia/chinas-great-uprooting-moving-250-million-
into-cities.html?pagewanted=all.
10. www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2013-en/03/02/01/index.html?itemId=/content/ chapter/
factbook-2013-25-en.
11. Elise Gould, “The Top One Percent Take Home 20 Percent of America’s Income,” Economic
Policy Institute (18 July 2013): http://www.epi.org/publication/top-1-earners-home-20-americas-income/.
12. www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/. Table HO2AR_2011.xis/
13. “Gini Out of the Bottle,” Economist (26 January 2013): http://www.economist.com/
news/china/21570749-gini-out-bottle.
14. http://www.oecd.org/globalrelations/keypartners/50146214.pdf.
15. “Towards the End of Poverty,” Economist (1 June 2013), pp. 11–12, 22–24.
16. http://www.photius.com/rankings/population/population_growth_rate_2012_0.html.
17. Norma Cohen, “Scientists Claim 72 is the New 30,” Financial Times (25 February 2013): www.
ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/16f44f3e-7d24-11e2-adb6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2aPrip4qC.
18. Gina Kolata, “Accord Aims to Create Global Trove of Genetic Data,” New York Times
(5 June 2013): www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/health/global-partners-agree-on-sharing-trove-of-genetic-
data.html?pagewanted=all.
19. See, for example, Judy Dempsey, “Short of Skilled Hands, Germany Looks South,” New York
Times (27 May 2013): http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/world/europe/28iht-letter28.html.
20. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Divison, Popula-
tion Facts, Number 2012/3: www.un.org/esa/population/publications/popfacts/popfacts_2012-3_South-
South_migration.pdf.
21. Hannah Kuchler, Kate Allen, and Martha Stabe, “Census Reveals Rise of Multilingualism,”
Financial Times (30 January 2013): www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a1b0f45c-6ac7-11e2-9871-00144feab49a.
html#axzz2aPrip4qC.
22. Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico Falls to
Zero—and Perhaps Less, Pew Research Hispanic Center (3 May 2012): www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/
net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/. See also “Secure Enough,” Economist (22 June
2013), 43–44.
23. Ian Bremmer and David Gordon, “Powers on the Mend,” New York Times (10 April 2013):
www.nytimes.com/2013/04/11/opinion/global/powers-on-the-mend.html.
24. www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex_15/the-15-countries-with-the-hi
ghest-military-expenditure-in-2011-table.
25. “The Curious Case of the Fall in Crime,” Economist (20 July 2013), 9.
26. Kristin Roberts, “When the Whole World Has Drones,” National Journal (21 March 2013): www.
nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321.
27. See, for example, William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World
of Endless Conflict (NY, 2001).
28. See “Black Sheep in the Crimson Dome,” Economist (8 June 2013), 56–57.
29. See “Mr. Erdogan’s Authoritarian Creep,” Economist (6 August 2013): www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/5fe674f6-fe98-11e2-b9b0-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2ccvaNf00.
30. For a perceptive report on the rapidly evolving and essentially unpredictable role of the internet
and social media in China, see “A Giant Cage” Economist (6 April 2013).
31. See Robin Harding, “Lagarde Warns Over Three-Speed World,” Financial Times, 10 April 2013:
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3865e31c-a1fa-11e2-8971-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition =intl#axzz 2ccvaNf00.
Also Chris Giles, “IMF Cuts 2013 Global Economic Outlook,” Financial Times (16 April 2013): www.
ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/03c36652-a66e-11e2-885b-00144feabdc0.html.
32. Cf. Nathaniel Popper, “Old Economies Rise as Emerging Markets’ Growth Falters,” New York
Times (14 August 2013): www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/business/global/old-economies-rise-as-emerging-
markets-growth-falters.html?pagewanted=all; David Jolly, “Eurozone Economy Shows Further Signs of
Growth,” New York Times (22 August 2013): www.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/business/global/euro-zone-
economy-shows-further-signs-of-growth.html.
33. “Wall Street Is Back,” Economist (11 May 2013), 11.
34. Puneet Pat Singh, “What Is Driving the Global Stock Market Rally,” BBC News: Business (7 March
2013). For updated version, see www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21696467.
35. Keith Bradsher, “Currencies Drop as Dollars Flee Asia,” New York Times (22 August 2013): www.
nytimes.com/2013/08/23/business/global/currencies-drop-as-dollars-flee-asia. html?pagewanted=all.
36. “WTO Cuts 2013 Trade Growth Forecast,” BBC News: Business (10 April 2013): www.bbc.co.
uk/news/business-22093304.
37. Shawn Donnan, “World Trade Organisation’s Pascal Lamy Defends Doha Talks
Round,” Financial Times (18 July 2013): www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5d9b5b78-efaf-11e2-8229-00144
feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2d6xwYSeD.
38. See Executive Office of the President, Office of the United States Trade Representative, “The
United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership” (November 2011): www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/
fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership.
39. Banyan, “Trade, Partnership, and Politics,” Economist (24 August 2012), 40.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. See James Politi, “US Trade Chief Vows to Fight for Farmers,” Financial Times (19 March 2013):
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b257fbe0-90b8-11e2-862b-00144feabdc0.html# axzz2d6xwYSeD; idem., “White
House Set for Wall Street Clash over Trade Talks, Financial Times (7 July 2013): www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/
0/2dfccce6-e58f-11e2-ad1a-00144 feabdc0.html#axzz2d6xwYSeD.
43. Information in this paragraph from Banyan, “Trade, Partnership.”
44. See Yale H. Ferguson, “The Renminbi-US Dollar Relationship: Politics and Economics of a
Diminishing Issue,” in Thomas Oatley, Handbook of the International Political Economy of Monetary
Relations (Northhampton, MA, forthcoming).
154 Y. H. Ferguson
45. Robin Harding, “Pressure Mounts on US over IMF Reform,” Financial Times (11 March 2013):
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3e6b2cf4-8a26-11e2-bf79-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition =intl#axzz2ddyyydUt.
46. Michael D. Shear and Peter Eavis, “Obama Presses for Action on Bank Rules,” New York Times
(19 August 2013): www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/business/obama-presses-for-action-on-bank-rules.html.
47. See Brooke Masters, “Basel Presses Ahead with Plans to Limit Bank Borrowing,” Financial Times
(26 June 2013): www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d91a21e-de29-11e2-9b47-00144feab7de.html.; Brooke Masters and
Chris Giles, “Banks Face New Set of Capital Rules,” Financial Times (2 September 2013: www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/f5b56a22-13e8-11e3-9289-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2ddyyydUt.
48. See Wolfgang Münchau, “The EU Will Regret Terminating a Banking Union,” Financial Times
(30 June 2013): www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4d433ec6-de93-11e2-b990-00144feab 7de.html#axzz2ddyyydUt.;
“Blight of the Living Dead,” Economist (13 July 2013), 10.
49. Alex Barker, “EU Reaches Deal on Failed Banks,” Financial Times (27 June 2013): www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/9d667e18-debb-11e2-b990-00144feab7de.html#axzz2ddyyydUt.
50. “Twilight of the Gods,” Special Report: International Banking, Economist (11 May 2013),
especially “We Happy Few: Why Scale Matters,” 13–15.
51. “Shop ‘til You Drop,” Economist (1 June 2013), 67.
52. James Shotter, “US and Switzerland Reach Tax Evasion Accord,” Financial Times (29 August
2013): www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ffe4da00-10e1-11e3-b291-00144feabdc0.html #axzz2ddyyydUt.
53. “U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis: www.bea.gov/newsreleases/
national/gdp/2013/gdp2q13_2nd.htm.
54. Anjli Raval and James Politi, “US Trade Gap at Narrowest Since 2009,” Financial Times (6 August
2013): www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6c07b454-fe9b-11e2-b9b0-00144feabdc0. html#axzz2ddyyydUt.
55. James Politi, “US Budget Deficit Falls Faster Than Expected,” Financial Times (14 May 2013):
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/440b78b6-bcb8-11e2-9519-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=#axzz2ddyyydUt.
56. “US Shale Oil Supply Shock Rocks Global Power Balance,” BBC News: Business (14 May 2013):
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22524597.
57. www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/unemployment-rate.
58. Charlemagne, “Back to School,” Economist (31 August 2013), 47.
59. Sebastian Dullien, “The German Miracle Is Now Running Out of Road,” Financial
Times (29 August 2013): www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/11d74b2c-1096-11e3-b291-00144feabdc0.
html?siteedition=intl#axzz2ddyyydUt.
60. Jack Ewing, “No Bounce for Europe in Rebound by Germany,” New York
Times (3 September 2013): www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/11d74b2c-1096-11e3-b291-00144feabdc0.html?
siteedition=intl#axzz2ddyyydUt.
61. European Economic Commission: Eurostat. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_
explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics.
62. Jim Pickard, “Only One in Three Wants UK to Stay in EU,” Financial Times (17 February 2013):
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cb2057fc-7917-11e2-b4df-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition= intl#axzz2ddyyydUt.
63. Simon Rabinovitch, “China Forecast to Overtake US by 2016,” Financial Times (22 March 2013):
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a3f5794-92b3-11e2-9593-00144feabdc0.html? siteedition=intl#axzz2ddyyydUt.
64. Cf. Martin Wolf, “Why China’s Economy Might Topple,” Financial Times (2 April 2013): http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e854f8a8-9aed-11e2-97ad-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2 TAkX1C6e; Paul Krugman,
“Hitting China’s Wall,” New York Times (18 July 2013): http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/opinion/
krugman-hitting-chinas-wall.html; Pranab Bardhan, “The Slowing of Two Economic Giants,” New York
Times (14 July 2013): http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/opinion/the-slowing-of-two-economic-giants.
html?page wanted=all. For a more optimistic view, see Philip Ehrmann, “Forget the Naysayers, China
Isn’t Broken,” Financial Times (3 May 2013): http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/52ce9ca8-b320-11e2-95b3-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2TAkX1C6e.
65. OECD, Economic Survey of Japan 2013: www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/japan-2013.htm.
66. See William W. Grimes, “Will Abenomics Restore Japanese Growth?,” NBER Analysis Brief
(25 June 2013): www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=286#.Uij2T44yk2w.
67. “Japan’s Economic Growth Slower Than Expected at 2.6%,” Guardian (12 August 2013): www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/japan-economic-growth-slower-expected.
68. See “When Giants Slow Down,” Economist (27 July 2013), 22–24.
69. Scott Rose and Olga Tanas, “Russian Economy Unexpectedly Slows as Recession
Specter Returns,” Bloomberg (9 August 2013): www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-09/russian-economy-
unexpectedly-slows-to-weakest-pace-since-2009.html. See also Guy Chazan and Neil Buckley, “A Cap
on Gazprom’s Ambitions,” Financial Times, 5 June 2013. www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/75027894-cd24-11e2-

90e8-00144feab7de.html?siteedition =intl#axzz2ddyyydUt.
70. Amy Kazmin, “Manufacturing Slump Casts Further Shadow over the Indian Economy,”
Financial Times (2 September 2013): www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/97e54fa0-13a9-11e3-9289-00144feabdc0.
html?siteedition=intl#axzz2ddyyydUt. See also “The Reckoning,” Economist (24 August 2013), 63.
71. “Slipping,” Economist” (24 August 2013), 37.
72. “Different Kettles of Fish,” Economist (24 August 2013), 35–36.
73. Ibid.
Yale H. Ferguson is Professorial Fellow, graduate Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers University-
Newark, and Emeritus Professor of Global and International Affairs. From 2002-2008, he was DGA
Co-Director with Richard Langhorne, whom he met during visiting fellowships at the University
of Cambridge (1987/1991) and later helped recruit to Rutgers as founding Director of the Center
for Global Change and Governance (then DGA). He has published over 60 articles/book chapters
and 12 books, including (with R.W. Mansbach) Globalization: The Return of Borders to a Borderless
World?; A World of Polities; Remapping Global Politics; The Elusive Quest Continues; Polities; and
The Web of World Politics.

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The History and Dynamics of Globalisation

Globalisation involves geographically wider transaction networks

has geographical scope, volume and density of transactions, and a

“Globalisation” was a hot concept in the 1990s. Like “American Empire” in

full globality even in a single dimension is a requirement for the existence

the drivers of globalisation is no easy task because there are so many

tention that globalisation resulted primarily from technological improvements

systems. Widespread shortages of skilled and unskilled labour exacerbate

globalised world without actually “possessing” them and having to “rule”

Powers in the Pacific.23

apparently to aging populations, better policing, and technological advances

attacks violate targeted countries’ sovereignty are spurious. International law

recession, capitalism—perhaps narrowly—avoided a general collapse and

political mess that it is almost a failed state.

“21st century” provisions on labour standards, environment, intellectual

Mechanism [ESM], which has been empowered to recapitalise banks directly

Party conservatives appears to be waning, but whether a bipartisan middle

ulous country, with remarkably diverse regions, restive minorities, and a

Japan made phenomenal economic strides after the Second World

Globalisation is a complex phenomenon with multiple dimensions, compli-

world economy, where relatively small developments in a single country

on Gazprom’s Ambitions,” Financial Times, 5 June 2013. www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/75027894-cd24-11e2-

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