EVS

PROJECT
1. SELECTION OF PROJECT TOPIC
A nuclear and radiation accident is defined by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) as "an event that has led to significant consequences
to people, the environment or the facility. Examples include lethal effects to
individuals, large radioactivity release to the environment, reactor core
melt."[6] The prime example of a "major nuclear accident" is one in which
a reactor core is damaged and significant amounts of radioactive
isotopes are released, such as in the Chernobyl disaster in 1986
and Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011.[7]
The impact of nuclear accidents has been a topic of debate since the
first nuclear reactors were constructed in 1954 and has been a key factor
in public concern about nuclear facilities.[8] Technical measures to reduce the
risk of accidents or to minimize the amount of radioactivity released to the
environment have been adopted, however human error remains, and "there
have been many accidents with varying impacts as well near misses and
incidents".[8][9] As of 2014, there have been more than 100 serious nuclear
accidents and incidents from the use of nuclear power. Fifty-seven accidents
or severe incidents have occurred since the Chernobyl disaster, and about
60% of all nuclear-related accidents/severe incidents have occurred in the
USA.[10] Serious nuclear power plant accidents include the Fukushima nuclear
disaster (2011), the Chernobyl disaster (1986), the Three Mile Island
accident (1979), and the SL-1 accident (1961).[11] Nuclear power accidents can
involve loss of life and large monetary costs for remediation work. [12]
Nuclear submarine accidents include the K-19 (1961), K-11 (1965), K-
27 (1968), K-140 (1968), K-429 (1970), K-222 (1980), and K-431 (1985)[11][13]
[14]
 accidents. Serious radiation incidents/accidents include the Kyshtym
disaster, the Windscale fire, the radiotherapy accident in Costa Rica,
[15]
 the radiotherapy accident in Zaragoza,[16] the radiation accident in
Morocco,[17] the Goiania accident,[18] the radiation accident in Mexico City,
the Samut Prakan radiation accident, and the Mayapuri radiological
accident in India.[19]
Between 16 July 1945 and 23 September 1992, the United States maintained
a program of vigorous nuclear weapons testing, with the exception of a
moratorium between November 1958 and September 1961. By official count,
a total of 1,054 nuclear tests and two nuclear attacks were conducted, with
over 100 of them taking place at sites in the Pacific Ocean, over 900 of them
at the Nevada Test Site, and ten on miscellaneous sites in the United States
(Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi, and New Mexico).[104] Until November 1962,
the vast majority of the U.S. tests were atmospheric (that is, above-
ground); after the acceptance of the Partial Test Ban Treaty all testing was
regulated underground, in order to prevent the dispersion of nuclear fallout.
The U.S. program of atmospheric nuclear testing exposed a number of the
population to the hazards of fallout. Estimating exact numbers, and the
exact consequences, of people exposed has been medically very difficult,
with the exception of the high exposures of Marshall Islanders and
Japanese fishers in the case of the Castle Bravo incident in 1954. A number
of groups of U.S. citizens — especially farmers and inhabitants of cities
downwind of the Nevada Test Site and U.S. military workers at various
tests — have sued for compensation and recognition of their exposure, many
successfully. The passage of the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of
1990 allowed for a systematic filing of compensation claims in relation to
testing as well as those employed at nuclear weapons facilities. As of June
2009 over $1.4 billion total has been given in compensation, with over $660
million going to "downwinders".

2. IMPORTANCE OF TOPIC
Radiation and radioactive materials are part of our environment. The
radiation in the environment comes from both cosmic radiation that
originates in outer space, and from radioactive materials that occur naturally
in the earth and in our own bodies. Together, these are known
as background radiation. Everyone is exposed to background radiation daily.
In addition, radiation and radioactive materials are produced by many human
activities. Radiation is produced by x-ray equipment and by particle
accelerators used in research and medicine. Radioactive materials are
produced in nuclear reactors and particle accelerators.

Today, radiation is a common and valuable tool in medicine, research and

industry. It is used in medicine to diagnose illnesses, and in high doses, to
treat diseases such as cancer. Also, high doses of radiation are used to kill
harmful bacteria in food and to extend the shelf life of fresh produce.
Radiation produces heat that is used to generate electricity in nuclear power
reactors. Radioactive materials are used in a number of consumer products,
such as smoke detectors and exit signs, and for many other research and
industrial purposes.

Nuclear power plants use fissile materials to produce energy in the form of
heat, which is converted to electricity by conventional generating plant.
Radioactive materials are produced as a by-product of this process. Whilst
radioactive materials can have beneficial uses, such as in cancer therapy,
they are generally harmful to health. Their use, and the process by which
they are produced, must be strictly regulated to ensure nuclear safety.

The main objective of nuclear safety is the achievement of proper operating

conditions and the prevention or mitigation of accident consequences,
resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from
undue radiation hazards.

The scope of nuclear safety and its regulation covers the whole 'nuclear fuel
cycle'. The nuclear fuel cycle includes the extraction and enrichment of
radioactive ores, the production of nuclear fuels, the transport and use of
fuel in the operation of nuclear power plants, the reprocessing of spent fuel
to recover reusable materials for more fuel, and the storage of nuclear
waste. Apart from the management of fuel, nuclear safety particularly
covers the design, construction, operation and decommissioning of all nuclear
installations such as nuclear power plants and waste storage facilities.
Ensuring nuclear safety also requires the availability of suitably qualified
staff, the establishment of an effective safety culture in the workforce,
the funding of research into operational and safety issues and an appropriate
focus on security. The work of nuclear regulators covers all these aspects.
 3. OBJECTIVE OF PROJECT WORK
The three primary objectives of nuclear safety systems as defined by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are to shut down the reactor, maintain it
in a shutdown condition, and prevent the release of radioactive material
during events and accidents.[50] These objectives are accomplished using a
variety of equipment, which is part of different systems, of which each
performs specific functions.

The objectives of radiation protection are to minimize the health effects

due to radiation. Before formulating the appropriate countermeasures, we
have to understand the biological effects of ionizing radiation.

Biological effects of radiation are mainly classified into "Tissue Reactions

(Deterministic effects)" and "Stochastic effects". For the former, a
threshold level of absorbed dose exists, above which the radiation will bring
detrimental effect to the health. For the stochastic effect, a threshold
does not exist, but the probability of having detrimental effect is
proportional to the dose absorbed.

Based on the characteristics of the above biological effects, aims of

radiation protection are to:

1. avoid the deterministic effects; and

2. lower the probability of stochastic effects to an acceptable level.

4. project work methodology

Methodologies should present a new experimental or computational method,
test or procedure. The method described may either be completely new, or
may offer a better version of an existing method. The article must describe
a demonstrable advance on what is currently available. The method needs to
have been well tested and ideally, but not necessarily, used in a way that
proves its value.
Radiation Oncology strongly encourages that all datasets on which the
conclusions of the paper rely should be available to readers. We encourage
authors to ensure that their datasets are either deposited in publicly
available repositories (where available and appropriate) or presented in the
main manuscript or additional supporting files whenever possible. Please see
Springer Nature’s information on recommended repositories. Where a widely
established research community expectation for data archiving in public
repositories exists, submission to a community-endorsed, public repository is
mandatory. A list of data where deposition is required, with the appropriate
repositories, can be found on the Editorial Policies Page.
 Authors who need help depositing and curating data may wish to
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Nature’s Research Data Support provides data deposition and curation
to help authors follow good practice in sharing and archiving of
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 Background: the context and purpose of the study
 Methods: how the study was performed and statistical tests used
 Results: the main findings
 Conclusions: brief summary and potential implications
 Trial registration: If your article reports the results of a health care
intervention on human participants, it must be registered in an
appropriate registry and the registration number and date of
registration should be in stated in this section. If it was not
registered prospectively (before enrollment of the first participant),
you should include the words 'retrospectively registered'. See
our editorial policies for more information on trial registration
Methods

The methods section should include:

 the aim, design and setting of the study

 the characteristics of participants or description of materials

 a clear description of all processes, interventions and comparisons.
Generic drug names should generally be used. When proprietary brands
are used in research, include the brand names in parentheses
  the type of statistical analysis used, including a power calculation if
appropriate

The methodology is devised by coupling different codes. The study of

weather conditions as part of the data of the site will determine the relative
concentrations of radionuclides in the air using ARCON96. The activity in
the air is characterized depending on the source and release sequence
specified in NUREG-1465 by RADTRAD code, which provides results of the
inner cloud source term contribution. Known activities and energy spectra
are inferred using ORIGEN-S, which are used as input for the models of the
outer cloud, filters and containment generated with MCNP5. The sum of the
different contributions must meet the conditions of habitability specified by
the CSN (Spanish Nuclear Regulatory Body) (TEDE <50 mSv and equivalent
dose to the thyroid <500 mSv within 30 days following the accident doses) so
that the dose is optimized by varying parameters including CAGE location,
flow filtering need for recirculation, thicknesses and compositions of the
walls, etc. The results for the most penalizing area meet the established
criteria, and therefore the CAGE building design based on the methodology
presented is radiologically validated.

 Determination of dose due to inner radioactive cloud (within the

CAGE).
 Determination of dose due to the presence of the radioactive cloud
outside the CAGE.
 Determination of dose due to accumulation of radionuclides in the
filters.
 Determination of dose due to proximity to the containment.

5. observation
Nuclear accident dosimetry system in JAERI consists of three pieces
of natural uranium doped glass (size 10 x 10 x 1 in mm), pieces of
slightly enriched uranium doped glass, two pieces of thorium doped glass and
a sulphur disc (20 g). After irradiation, the glass is etched in NaOH solution
and fission tracks on the surface of glass are counted. Neutron spectrum in
nuclear accident is assumed to be shown as the square root of E exp (-aE)
for fast neutrons and En for intermediate neutrons. The unknown
parameters a and n are determined using the detectors.
This detector system has been tested on the critical assembly at Vinca
(1973) and HPRR at ORNL (1968), and estimated doses were agreed with
that of other laboratories. But this system has not been tested in a field
of fast neutron reactor whose fast neutron spectrum parameter is more
than 2. As the effective cross sections of Th and S for neutrons from fast
neutron reactor are very small, NP237 is added to our system. The new
detector system will be exposed in the field of FCA (Fast neutron Critical
Assembly) at JAERI and VIPER at AWRE in England.
Nuclear accidents can expose large populations to dangerous levels
of radioactivity, triggering enormous liabilities for the firm responsible. Caps
on nuclear liability are common throughout the world. The United States,
under the Price–Anderson Act, has a two-tier system of indemnification: a
first tier of commercial insurance ($300 million per reactor) plus a second
pooled tier (maximum of $83.9 million per reactor) funded by retroactive
assessments on all reactors in case any reactor has an accident. Japanese
nuclear operators must provide financial security of $520 million; damages
above that amount will be paid by the government. In China, the limit is
roughly $36 million. In Ukraine, it is roughly $70 million.
International efforts to standardize liability under the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage would establish minimum
liability coverage worldwide, although for many countries this would also
constitute the maximum. Under the convention, operators would directly
face a first tier of liability. A country fund would provide secondary
coverage. Because country payments rely on a sovereign guaranty rather than
a prefunded instrument such as a trust fund, they may be at some risk.
Aggregate coverage under the U.S. system is estimated at roughly $9.2
billion per accident, although most of this is paid out over nearly 9 years by
utilities, so the present value of the coverage is substantially lower. Liability
levels established under the convention would provide less than $900 million
per accident. Loss statistics from the Insurance Services Office and from
the Disaster Insurance Information Office provide some context. Since
1950, there have been approximately 20 hurricanes with adjusted damages in
excess of the convention cap, and both Hurricane Andrew and
the Northridge earthquake had damages that exceeded the Price–Anderson
cap even before adjusting retroactive premiums to present values.
Subsidies arise when government caps fall below expected damages from an
incident and caps under both Price–Anderson and the convention are likely to
do so. Damages above that level are, in effect, shifted to the state or to the
affected population. Heyes estimated that the subsidy to reactors under
Price–Anderson ranges between 2 and 3 cents per kilowatt-hour, a value that
would roughly double the operating costs of nuclear plants. In addition, there
are incremental subsidies associated with indemnification for nuclear
contractors and government-owned facilities. Because other countries have
lower liability caps and weaker inspection regimes, they likely have higher
liability subsidies as well.
Accidents, or incidents, or events, or transients have occurred and occur
within the framework of each industrial sector created by the human
civilization, noticeably in the transport sector, as well as in the space (e.g.,
meteorites), the atmospheric (e.g., tornados, flooding), and the ground or the
ocean (e.g., earthquake) environments where we live. In a variety of
situations energy and momentum exchanges occur involving single- and
multiphase fluids where the knowledge and the expertise in thermal-
hydraulics can be exploited to enlighten the events or to take mitigation
measures.
The first step in this chapter is to move down from industry or nature-
related accidents into nuclear technology accidents. Before entering nuclear
technology one may note, for instance, that the French Government database
for accident called ARIA (i.e., see ARIA, 2016) includes more than 40,000
(forty thousands) industrial accidents and has links with a dozen additional
databases. Furthermore, the International Disaster Database EM-DAT (i.e.,
see EM-DAT, 2016) considers natural and industrial disasters, and natural
hazards are classified in the US National Geophysical Data Center (i.e.,
see NGDC, 2016).
Then, the objective for this section is to provide boundaries for the
description of the selected nuclear technology accidents, at the same time
giving ideas about, (a) how broad can be the field of investigation of
accidents in nuclear technology and (b) how narrow is the sector for those
accidents.
When considering nuclear accidents it seems worthwhile to distinguish among
the following (more than 10) categories:
Military, explosive weapon
Military, radiation
Military, power reactor, e.g., submarine, or air carrier reactor (peace
or war mission)
 Military, industrial installations/activities necessary for or supporting
any of the above, e.g., mining, enrichment, transportation
Civil, research reactors, RR
Civil, NPP (operation)
Civil, nuclear fuel fabrication
Civil, nuclear fuel reprocessing
Civil, nuclear fuel waste
Civil, industrial installations and activities (including researches)
necessary for or supporting any of the above, e.g., mining, enrichment,
transportation (including illicit trafficking), construction, or
dismantling stages for NPP
Civil, medical applications.

6. analysis of data

The data on links between radiation exposure and cancer are mostly based on
populations receiving high level exposures. Much of this information comes
from survivors of the atomic bombs in Japan and people who have received
radiation for medical tests and therapy. Cancers associated with high-dose
exposure (greater than 50,000 mrem, or 500 mSv—500 times the NRC limit
to the public) include leukemia, breast, bladder, colon, liver, lung, esophagus,
ovarian, multiple myeloma and stomach cancers.
The time between radiation exposure and the detection of cancer is known
as the latent period. This period can be many years. It is often not possible
to tell exactly what causes any cancer. In fact, the National Cancer
Institute says other chemical and physical hazards and lifestyle factors
(e.g., smoking, alcohol consumption and diet) make a significant contribution
to many of these same diseases.

The data show high doses of radiation may cause cancers. But there are no
data to establish a firm link between cancer and doses below about 10,000
mrem (100 mSv – 100 times the NRC limit).

Even so, the regulations assume any amount of radiation may pose some risk.
They aim to minimize doses to radiation workers and the public. The
international community bases standards for radiation protection on
something called the linear, no-threshold model. The idea is that risk
increases as the dose increases. And there is no threshold below which
radiation doses are safe. This model is a conservative basis for both
international and NRC radiation dose standards. This means the model may
overestimate risk.

High radiation doses (greater than 50,000 mrem, or 500 mSv) tend to kill
cells. Low doses may damage or alter a cell's genetic code, or DNA. High
doses can kill so many cells that tissues and organs are damaged immediately.
This in turn may cause a rapid body response often called Acute Radiation
Syndrome. The higher the radiation dose, the sooner the effects of
radiation will appear, and the higher the probability of death.

Many atomic bomb survivors in 1945 and emergency workers at the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident experienced this syndrome. Among
plant workers and firefighters at Chernobyl, 134 received high radiation
doses – 80,000 to 1,600,000 mrem (800 to 16,000 mSv) – and suffered from
acute radiation sickness. Of these, 28 died within the first three months
from their radiation injuries. Two workers died within hours of the accident
from non-radiological injuries.

Because radiation affects people in different ways, it is not possible to say

what dose is going to be fatal. Experts believe that 50 percent of people
would die within thirty days after receiving a whole body dose of 350,000 to
500,000 mrem (3,500 to 5,000 mSv) over a period ranging from a few
minutes to a few hours. Health outcomes would vary depending on how
healthy the person is before the exposure and the medical care they receive.
If the exposure affects only parts of the body, such as the hands, effects
will likely be more localized, such as skin burns.

Low doses spread out over a long period would not cause an immediate
problem. The effects of doses less than 10,000 mrem (100 mSv) over many
years, if any, would occur at the cell level. Such changes may not be seen for
many years or even decades after exposure.

Genetic effects and cancer are the primary health concerns from radiation
exposure. Cancer would be about five times more likely than a genetic
effect. Genetic effects might include chromosome changes, stillbirths,
congenital abnormalities, and infant and childhood mortality. These effects
can result from a mutation in the cells of an exposed person that are passed
on to their children. These effects may appear almost immediately if the
damaged genes are dominant. Or they may appear several generations later
if the genes are recessive.

While scientists have observed genetic effects in lab animals given very high
doses of radiation, no evidence of genetic effects has been seen in the
children born to Japanese atomic bomb survivors.

NRC regulations strictly limit the amount of radiation that can be emitted by
a nuclear facility, such as a nuclear power plant. A 1991 study by the National
Cancer Institute, "Cancer in Populations Living Near Nuclear Facilities,"
concluded that there was no increased risk of death from cancer for people
living in counties adjacent to U.S. nuclear facilities.

7. RESULT AND CONCLUSION

The idea of fallout and nuclear hazards are more commonly associated with
nuclear weapons and nuclear war.  But low-level radiation can be the lingering
killer in the shadows causing death slowly with less dramatic effects then a
bright flash and tall mushroom cloud.  This danger is as close as Wisconsin
were one nuclear reactor is currently producing power in Kewaunee on the
Lake Michigan coast.
            The notion of  living within the influence of a nuclear facility is
measured on a global scale not just  regional or local.  If a nuclear incident
happened in Europe the possibility of receiving fallout is substantially high. 
Meaning everyone lives within the influence of a nuclear facility.  Though the
health effects maybe greater concentrated the closer one lives near that
facility, the world will also be affected.

            The health effects associated with low-level radiation are acute
childhood leukemia, leukemia, brain and spinal tumors, terminal and non
terminal cancer, chromosome damage, low birth weights, still birth and
morel.  The idea of a "safe level" of low-level radiation is in my opinion is a
myth.  Though used medically limits are set on the amount of x-rays and the
length of radiation treatment one may receive.  The body to a small extent
can repair some damage caused by radiation in short frequencies but can only
repair the damage cause for so long (Michell, 311–318).  The effects of living
near a nuclear facility can be dangerous and deadly and can affect the local,
regional, national and international communities.   

The results of our research of current radiation levels around Japan’s

Fukushimadaiichi nuclear plant leads us to several conclusions about the
effects on people who receive contact with nuclear radiation.