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VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., vs. LUKBAN, ET

AL., March 25, 1919
[ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO
LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents. March 25, 1919]

Facts: Justo Lukban, respondent and then Mayor of Manila, sent 170
women to Davao. The women were confined to their houses in the
district by the police from October 16 to October 25, 1918. The
vessels reached their destination at Davao only on October 29, 1918.
Lukban claims that the women were to be laborers and was received
by Feliciano Yñigo, a haciendero, Rafael Castillo, and Francisco Sales,
the governor of Davao. The women thought that they were being
transported to another police station, while Yñigo, the haciendero
from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to them as
laborers him were actually prostitutes. The families of the prostitutes
then filed charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of
Police, and Sales. They prayed for a writ for habeas corpus to a
member of the Supreme Court to be issued against the respondents
to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to
Mindanao against their will. The stipulation of the parties was made
to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to
Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the
application will be considered as including them. The SC granted the
writ, however, the mayor was not able to bring any of the women
before the court on the stipulated date.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the

women to Davao.

Ruling: No further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary.

The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and
SearchDiaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is
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found in contempt of court.

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Reason: The Court held that the respondent, Lukban had no

authority to commence such business agreement. He violated
certain laws based on his act of compelling these women to change
their domicile, encapsulated in Art. 211 which states: 1) any public
officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a
place more than two hundred kilometers distance from his domicile,
except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by
a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more
than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas; 2) any public
officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a
general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any
person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of
destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and
not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. The
respondent's intention to suppress the social evil was commendable,
however, his methods were unlawful.

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Oposa et. al. vs. Factoran et. al. July 30,

1993
[Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792]

Facts: The Respondent Judge, Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, the

Secretary of the DENR, was alleged to have had exercised a grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements which
the plaintiffs, Oposa et. al., representative to the minors and minors
who assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn, opposed as they complained that it violates
their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 192 creating the DENR to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
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1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the

1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. On the
defense of the respondents, they aver that failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary
and that their complaints are nothing but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity
as parens patriae." And such allegations do not reveal a valid cause of
action. Further, they claim that the complaint is a matter of a political
jurisdiction and not a subject matter for the court. The trial court
however dismissed the allegations of the petitioners, and thus the
case was brought before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the state policy concerning the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology has been violated,
amongst the other allegations.

Ruling: The instant Petition is hereby GRANTED by the court and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing
Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

Reason/Ratio Decidendi: Article II, of the 1987 Constitution explicitly

provides in Section 16 that "the State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature." It is the petitioners' right to
protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right
by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Wherefore when the
respondent-Judge granted the Timber License Agreements, it had
been on the violation of the said policy. Moreover, the TLA's are not
contracts and the non-impairment clause that the respondents used
as defense cannot be invoked.

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BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC

RESOURCES (BFAR) EMPLOYEES
UNION v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
169815, Aug. 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 134
Facts: The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Employees
Union requested for a Food Basket Allowance (FBA), with justifying
the request on the high cost of living, and also relying on the
Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System, which:
"includes the granting of incentives that will help employees
overcome present economic difficulties, boost their morale, and
further commitment and dedication to public service." On post-audit,
however, the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office
(COA-LAO) disallowed the grant of the FBA ruling that it had no legal
basis and violated the General Appropriations Act of 1999. The BFAR
moved for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the
disallowance, arguing that the grant would enhance the welfare and
productivity of the employees. COA-LAO denied the motion. The
petitioner appealed to the COA-LAO but denied the decision, and
likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the approval of the DA Undersecretary can

authorize the release of the FBA. Whether or not the disallowance is
unconstitutional as it contravened the fundamental principle of the
State enshrined under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987
Constitution.

Ruling: The petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the

Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office dated April 8,
2005 and August 5, 2005, respectively, in LAO-N-2005-119, are
AFFIRMED.

Reason: Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16, all agencies are
prohibited from granting "[...] any other form of
incentives/allowances except those authorized via Administrative
Order by the Office of the President." In this case, no Administrative
Order has been issued, therefore the claim has no merit. Further,
State principles and policies enumerated in Article II of the 1987

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Constitution are the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of

action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

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GSIS vs GROUP MANAGEMENT CORP.

et. al. (JUNE 8, 2011)
GSIS vs GROUP MANAGEMENT CORP. et. al. (JUNE 8, 2011)

FACTS: This case revolves around the petitions of the Lapu-Lapu

Development & Housing Corporation (LLDHC), Group Management
Corporation (GMC) and the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS). The three entities consistently filed cases for the same
subject lots from April 30, 1980, until this case. The cases were filed
before both the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, where the subject lots are
situated in, and the RTC of Manila.

LLDHC entered into a Project and Loan Agreement with GSIS on

February 4, 1974, involving seventy-eight lots situated in Barrio,
Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City. GSIS agreed to a 25 million peso loan
with LLDHC, the owner of the lots. LLDHC failed to fulfill all of its
obligations regarding the lots, which included the real estate
mortgage in favor of GSIS, and so, GSIS closed the mortgage. Being
the only bidder in the public auction sale, GSIS won over the subject
lots, and in time secured its ownership over the lots with the transfer
certificate of titles issued to its name. GMC offered to purchase on
installment the subject lots with a collective area specified as 423,177
square meters from GSIS, with the amount of 1,100,000 pesos. GSIS
accepted the offer through a Deed of Conditional Sale on February
26, 1980. GMC then learned that the subject lots was only 298,504
square meters and requested GSIS to reduce the price according to
the actual proportion of the land. This proposal was approved with an
Amendment to the Deed of Conditional Sale, which reflected the
agreement of GSIS and GMC. LLDHC filed a complaint against GSIS
before the RTC of Manila on April 23, 1980 for Foreclosure with Writ

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of Mandatory Injunction, known as Civil Case No. R-82-3429. GMC

filed a complaint also against GSIS on November 3, 1989, known as
Civil Case No. 2203-L, for Specific Performance with Damages
before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. GSIS, in its defense, submitted a
COA Memorandum dated April 3, 1989 disallowing in audit the sale
of the subject to the court, stating that there were "apparent inherent
irregularities," and that GMC bought the property at a value much
lower than GSIS' purchasing price.

On February 24, 1992, with regard to Civil Case No. 2203-L, the RTC
of Lapu-Lapu City decided in favor of GMC, and that GSIS was to
execute order of the court pertaining to damages, and actions
needed to finalize the deed of absolute sale with GMC. On May 10,
1994, the RTC of Manila also rendered its judgment that, aside from
court orders, all claims and counterclaims by the parties against each
other are dismissed in Civil Case No. R-82-3429. LLDHC now used
the Manila RTC decision as a means to file a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2203-
L, named CA-GR SP No. 34696, which was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals. After this was a series of filing petitions to appeal the
judgment. Throughout the years, eventually, the three parties
approached the Supreme Court, where, in G.R. No. 167000, GSIS
seeks to reverse and set aside the decision made on November 25,
2004 and January 20, 2005, and to annul and set aside the March 1,
2004 and May 7 2004 orders from the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case
No. 2203-L. And in G.R. No. 169971, GMC seeks to reverse and set
aside the Decision made in September 23, 2005 and to annul and set
aside the March 11, 2004 Lapu-Lapu RTC decision.

Issues: Whether or not the decisions of the Manila RTC in Civil Case
No. R-82-3429 shall be executory, despite the decision of Lapu-Lapu
RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L. Whether or not the decision in CA GR
SP No. 84382 and GSIS Petition in 167000 are barred by Res
Judicata. Whether or not due process was given to the
parties/entities involved in the case. Whether or not GSIS can be
immune to acting out the orders of the court.

 Ruling: The petition in G.R. No. 167000 was denied by the court, and
the petition in G.R. No. 169971 is granted.

Ratio Decidendi: The decision of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No.
2203-L does not in any way affect the orders from the Manila RTC in
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Civil Case No. R-82-3429, since the former has been finalized on
January 28, 1995, while the latter became final on May 30, 1997.
Procedural due process was extended to all parties, that there was no
immediate dismissal of their cases before they were heard by the
respective courts, even if they have already had a rendered decision.
However, the Supreme Court also recognized the doctrine of "Finality
of Judgment," where the decisions, once final and executed cannot
be appealed, unless of circumstances that happen after the
finalization, void judgments, correction of clerical errors and nunc
pro tunc entries. The decision in CA GR SP No. 84382 and GSIS
Petition in 167000 are barred by Res Judicata, which is one of the
reasons why G.R. No. 167000 was denied. GSIS acted jure gestonis,
entering into a contract, and being solely liable for their
irresponsibility. They are not immune from acting out the orders of
the court.

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Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon

City and MMDA – July 18, 2006 (G.R. No.
177807) MMDA vs. Gancayco – May 10
2007 (G.R. No. 177933)
FACTS: The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio
Gancayco, City Government of Quezon City and the Metro Manila
Development Authority stemmed from a local ordinance pertaining
to Construction of Arcades, and the clearing of Public Obstructions.
Gaycanco owns a property, of which he was able to obtain a building
permit for a two-storey commercial building, which was situated
along EDSA, in an area which was designated as part of a
Business/Commercial Zone by the Quezon City Council. The Quezon
City Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which orders the
construction of Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance
was amended to not require the properties located at the Quezon
City - San Juan boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete -
Seattle Street to construct the arcades, moreover, Gancayco had
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been successful in his petition to have his property, already covered

by the amended ordinance, exempted from the ordinance. MMDA on
April 28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under Ordinance no.
2904, part of his property had to be demolished, if he did not clear
that part within 15 days, which Gancayco did not comply with, and so
the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or "wing walls." Gancayco
then filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the
demolition of his property, without due process and just
compensation, claiming that Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory
and selective. He sought the declaration of nullity of the ordinance
and payment for damages. MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot
seek nullification of an ordinance that he already violated, and that
the ordinance had the presumption of constitutionality, and it was
approved by the Quezon City Council, taking to note that the Mayor
signed the ordinance. The RTC, however, declared that the Ordinance
was unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. MMDA appealed to
the Court of Appeals, and the CA partly granted the appeal, with the
contention that the ordinance was to be modified; it was
constitutional because the intention of the ordinance was to uplift
the standard of living, and business in the commercial area, as well as
to protect the welfare of the general public passing by the area,
however the injunction against the enforcement and implementation
of the ordinance is lifted. With that decision, the MMDA and
Gancayco filed Motions for Reconsideration, which the CA denied, as
both parties have no new issues raised. Therefore they petitioned to
the Court.

 ISSUES: Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco's property can be

constituted as a public nuisance. Whether or not MMDA was in their
authority to demolish Gancayco's property.

 HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
court decided that the wing wall of Gancayco's building was not a
nuisance per se, as under Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, nuisance is defined as any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures of
endangers the health or safety of the others; (2) annoys or offends
the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4)
obstruct or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of

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property. A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per

accidens. A nuisance per se are those which affect the immediate
safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under
the undefined law of necessity. As Gaycanco was able to procure a
building permit to construct the building, it was implied that the city
engineer did not consider the building as such of a public nuisance,
or a threat to the safety of persons and property. The MMDA was
only to enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro Manila,
and was not supposed to act with Police Power as they were not
given the authority to do such by the constitution, nor was it
expressed by the DPWH when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore,
MMDA acted on its own when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s
property, and was solely liable for the damage.

#public nuisance #case digest #mmda #gancayco

#public obstruction

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VELASCO VS. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.,

ET. AL. -  AUGUST 6, 1971 (G.R. NO. L-
18390)
FACTS: Pedro J. Velasco, the appellant, complained that MERALCO,
the appellee company, created a nuisance, as defined in Art. 694 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, in form of noise from their
substation which was in the same street, next to Velasco's
property/residence, which the appellant also uses for his Medical
Practice as a physician. The claim cannot be proven solely by
testimony however, as the testimonies given by the locals do not
corroborate with each other, or were subjective. To get a more
accurate proof, under instructions from the Director of Health, Dr.
Jesus Almonte, noted as an impartial party, used a sound level meter
and other instruments within the compound of the plaintiff-appellant
to get a reading on the decibels or sound meter. It was observed that
the readings range from 46-80 decibels, depending on the time and
place. The appellee company also took sound level samplings, with
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Mamerto Buenafe conducting the reading within and near the

vicinity of the substation, whose readings range from 42-76 decibels.
The readings were compared to Technical charts, which listed the
decibels of areas from an average home: 40, to the noisiest spot of
Niagara Falls: 92. Thus, the readings from the impartial party
appeared more reliable. The court concluded that the evidence
pointed the noise levels to be of actionable nuisance, and that the
appellant is entitled to relief, as there was a possibility that it had
effect on the appellant's health. Appellee company contended that
the appellant should not have a ground to complain because of: 1)
the intensity inside Velasco's house was on 46 to 47 decibels; 2) the
sound level at the North General Hospital, where silence was
observed, was higher that his residence and did not take action; 3)
MERALCO had received no complaint in its 50 years of operations
until the case.

 ISSUES: Whether or not the substation constituted a public

nuisance. Whether or not Velasco had the right to claim for damages.

  HELD: The court held that the substation constituted a public

nuisance in form of noise, of which they made reference and
consideration with cases in the U.S. regarding what level of noise
would constitute as public nuisance as defined in Art. 694 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The court also contended that the damage
claims by the plaintiff-appellant was exaggerated, taking into
consideration that 1) the appellant did not make all the possible
measures, for example to perhaps lease the property to others, 2) as
for his health, it was observed that only Velasco, among the other
locals seem to have the ailments as he listed, and therefore lowered it
to a more justifiable amount of 20,000 pesos in damages and 5,000
pesos in attorney's fees, payable by the appellee. They also ordered
that the appellee should take measures in lowering the noise within
90 days.

#publicnuisance #meralco #noise #casedigest

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TIMONER VS. PEOPLE ET. AL. -

NOVEMBER 25, 1983 (G.R. NO. L-62050)
FACTS: Jose Timoner, the petitioner, was convicted by the Municipal
Court of Daet with the crime of Grave Coercion, as penalized under
Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, because of the complaint by
Pascual Dayaon, Lourdes Rabustillos and others. Timoner, then
Mayor of Daet, together with two uniformed policemen, Samuel
Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, was acting on the
recommendation of Dra. Allegre, the Municipal Health Officer, to
close among other structures that were along the sidewalk, the
barbershop of Dayaon and store of Rabustillos. Timoner filed a
complaint in the CFI of Camarines Norte against Rebustillos and
others for judicial abatement of their stalls, alleged that the stalls
constituted public nuisances as well as per se. The petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which was the Intermediate
Appellate Court then, however, the CA affirmed in full the judgment
of the trial court. Petitioner claimed that their actions was done in
abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful
authority.

 ISSUES: Whether or not Timoner committed Grave Coercion.

Whether or not the structures among the sidewalk are constituted as
public nuisances, and nuisances per se. Whether or not Timoner was
within his authority to close the structures.

HELD: The petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged. He did not
commit Grave Coercon as the elements of Grave Coercion required
that he acted not under the authority of the law. As the then Mayor of
the City, Timoner had the authority to act on behalf of the
recommendation and his constituents' right to public order and
safety, and that such stalls along the sidewalk affected the
community and general public, as it is in a public place, and was
annoying to all who come within its sphere. The Supreme Court did
contend that the barbershop did constitute a public nuisance, as
defined under Article 694 and 695 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Furthermore, it had been recommended for closure by
the Municipal Health Officer.

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#public nuisance #timoner #timoner v people #mayor

#case digest

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