15 FOURTH-CENTURY BC

GREEK WARS
Matthew Trundle

The King’s Peace of 386 had appeared to secure Sparta’s hegemony over the
Greek world (see Chapter 14: The Corinthian War, 395–387 BC; Map 14.1), but
in the following decade the determination to enforce its will over insubordinate
allies (such as Mantinea and Thebes), install its friends in power in Phlius, and
extend its authority to Olynthus in the north had aroused considerable resentment.
The final straw was the failure of the opportunistic raid by the Spartan Sphodrias on
the Piraeus. This had been launched shortly after the Thebans had expelled the
Spartan garrison from their acropolis (see Chapter 17: Campaigns of Thebes,
379–362 BC) and was intended to exploit the fact that, although the Athenians
had embarked on the reconstruction of their Long Walls after the Battle of Cnidus
(see Chapter 14: The Corinthian War, 395–387 BC), the defenses of the port of
Piraeus still lacked gates. What made the raid so shocking was that an official
Spartan embassy was in Athens at the time, completely unaware that this maverick
action was about to be undertaken; the Spartan envoys’ assurances (while protest-
ing their ignorance of the raid) that Sphodrias would be appropriately punished
back home were negated when King Agesilaus used his influence to have Sphodrias
acquitted. In this situation Athens began to formalize a series of individual alliances
that had been expanding over the past three or four years, organizing its relation-
ships with other Greek states, especially across the Aegean islands, into a league
that is known as the Second Athenian League. Its main purpose, proclaimed in
the Aristoteles decree of 377, was to uphold the autonomy of the Greek states,
an initiative that was fully compatible with the terms of the King’s Peace but
was clearly aimed at curbing the sorts of actions that the Spartans had been under-
taking as the hegemon (leader) of the Peace.

The Encyclopedia of Ancient Battles, First Edition. Edited by Michael Whitby and Harry Sidebottom.
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
2 The Classical Greek World

Naxos (376)1
In response to this new situation, the Spartans decided to challenge the Athenians at
sea in 376. Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.60–61) describes how the Spartans’ confidence at sea
led them to send out a fleet to establish a blockade to starve out the Athenians and
to confirm the naval supremacy that would permit Spartan forces to be transported
to Boeotia by any route they chose. Athens would effectively be in a state of siege.
On Boedromion 6 (i.e. in August or September 376) (Plut. Phoc. 6; Polyaen. Strat.
3.11.2), the Spartan admiral Pollis learned that a large fleet of grain ships would pass
close to Naxos on its way to Athens. The Athenians secured the safe passage of the
grain to the Piraeus but realized they needed to break the Spartan threat to their
supply lines. They therefore sent Chabrias with their fleet to secure Naxos, which
he began to invest.
After the Athenians had failed to take the city by storm, the Spartan Pollis arrived
in the port of Naxos. A naval battle followed, the first in which the Athenians had
engaged their fellow Greeks independently since the Second Peloponnesian War:
65 Spartan ships opposed 83 Athenian, a reflection of the confidence among the
Spartans and a reversal of the balance of naval power of the fifth century. Pollis
led the right wing of the Spartan line and fell upon the Athenian left, killing its
commander Cedon and sinking his flagship. Chabrias saw the Spartan success
and led across his own ships to restore the situation. The Athenian commander
successfully sank several enemy vessels and the Spartan fleet fled, but Chabrias
refrained from pursuit, conscious of the need to rescue survivors and bury the
dead. Diodorus claims he might have destroyed the whole Spartan fleet if he
had pursued it, but that he was mindful of the punishment inflicted on the generals
after Arginusae in 406 for their failure to rescue Athenian crews in the water. The
Athenians had lost 18 triremes, the Spartans 24. Diodorus (15.35.2) notes this was
the first Athenian victory since the Second Peloponnesian War, reminding readers
that it was a Persian fleet that had won at Cnidus, despite a strong Athenian pres-
ence there. Xenophon, who provides a very brief account of the battle, notes that as
a result grain began to flow into Athens once again.

“Tearless” Battle (368)2

After the crushing defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra (371) and the establishment of
independent communities among the Arcadians through the Theban invasion of
the Peloponnese (see Chapter 17: Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC), the Spartans
attempted to reassert themselves over their erstwhile dependents in Arcadia. King
1
Sources: Xen. Hell. 5.4.60–61; Diod. Sic. 15.34.3–35.2; Plut. Phoc. 6; Polyaen. Strat. 3.11.2. Modern
discussions: Seager (1994) 173; Rhodes (2006) 196.
2
Source: Xen. Hell. 7.1.28–32.
 Fourth-Century BC Greek Wars 3

Archidamus with the Spartans, supported by their remaining allies and forces sent
by Dionysius of Syracuse under the command of Cissidas, invaded Arcadia in 368.
Xenophon’s account (Hell. 7.1.28–32) omits the fact that the foundation of the great
city of the Arcadians at Megalopolis was the cause of the invasion (Diod. Sic.
15.72.4). The Spartans took Caryae and then set about investing Parrhasia. The
Arcadians and their Argive allies hastened to lift the siege.
Archidamus now withdrew, while Cissidas announced that his allotted time of
service had ended. Therefore he headed south toward Sparta with the Celts under
his command, but his march was impeded by some Messenians who occupied the
road toward Laconia. Learning of his plight, Archidamus led the Spartans to assist
him, but they now faced the Arcadian and Argive armies at the intersection of roads
leading to Eutresia and Melea. The Spartans at once drew up for battle. Archidamus
gave a speech in which he expressed his hopes that this battle would erase the
shame of the Spartans’ previous defeat at Leuctra and show how great the Spartans
were; thunder and lightning accompanied its climax, a good omen as the Spartan
right wing came close to a sanctuary and statue of Heracles. When Archidamus led
the charge, only a few Arcadians stood their ground and these were struck down
immediately; those who had fled fell initially to the charging Spartans and then the
pursuing Celts of Cissidas. Many Arcadians died, but not a single Spartan was
killed, with the result that this became known as the “Tearless” Battle. When news
of this victory, the first after a series of defeats, reached Sparta, all who heard it,
including King Agesilaus, the Gerousia (Spartan council), and the people wept
in their joy.
The Spartan position in the Peloponnese continued to be challenged by the
Boeotians, and even the death of the charismatic Theban leader Epaminondas at
Mantinea in 362 (see Chapter 17: Campaigns of Thebes, 379–362 BC) did not restore
Spartan hegemony. Further north the Thebans had attempted to reduce the power
of the tyrants of Pherae and bring the cities of Thessaly under their authority, ulti-
mately without success. Meanwhile the Athenians, whose Second League had
succeeded in its defensive aim of preventing the Spartans from dominating the
Greek world, tried to regain elements of their fifth-century empire such as
Amphipolis and Samos.

Peparethus (361)3

In 361, the tyrant Alexander of Pherae sent raiding ships to the Cyclades, taking
some cities by storm and capturing many people. He put a force of mercenaries
on the island of Peparethus, which is located in Thessaly just to the north of Scyros
(Diod. Sic. 15.95.1–2). The Athenians under Leosthenes attempted to assist
Peparethus, but, while blockading Alexander’s troops, they found themselves
3
Source: Diod. Sic. 15.95.1–3.
4 The Classical Greek World

attacked. The tyrant won a surprising victory, capturing five Athenian triremes and
one of Peparethus’ and taking no fewer than 600 captives in the process. The Athe-
nians condemned Leosthenes for this failure and dispatched Chares to rectify the
situation. Chares, however, chose to sail to Corcyra and, according to Diodorus
(15.95.3), stirred up trouble there, bringing Athens into much disrepute.

Chios (357)4

The second Athenian maritime league, founded in 378/377, had increasingly led to
suspicion among Athens’ allies that the Athenians held ambitions of enslaving them
as they had in the fifth century. In 357 this suspicion turned into outright war. The
so-called Social War (357–355) saw Athens’ erstwhile allies including Byzantium,
Chios, Cos, and Rhodes revolt and challenge Athenian power in the Aegean.
The first action of the war saw the Athenians send Chabrias and Chares to Chios.
Here they found contingents from each of the allied cities and even troops from
Mausolus, tyrant of Caria, ready to support the Chians. The Athenians besieged
the city, Chares commanding the land forces and Chabrias the navy. Chares failed
to take the city by assault from the ground, while Chabrias got the worst of a naval
engagement. As he sailed toward the Chian harbor his ship was rammed head on.
His fellow Athenians withdrew before their ships might suffer the same fate, but
he, we are told, stood his ground and died on board his ship. This was the first of
several reverses for the Athenians in this war.

Embata (356)5

Diodorus (16.21.1–3) tells us that in the second year of the Social War (356) the
Athenians dispatched Iphicrates and Timotheus as generals in command of 60 ships
to join Chares and his 60 ships against the allied navies of the Byzantines, Chians,
Rhodians, and people of Cos, which amounted to 100 vessels. The allies ravaged
Athenian territories in the Aegean including Imbros and Lemnos and even besieged
the island of Samos. The Athenian generals planned to attack Byzantium, presum-
ably to draw off the siege. The Chians accordingly abandoned Samos and headed to
the Hellespont to assist the Byzantines. Diodorus tells us that Chares wished to
fight a great naval engagement but that the weather intervened. In addition,
both Iphicrates and Timotheus refused to fight in heavy seas. Chares had
them indicted in the assembly (and fined), but other sources actually state that a

4
Sources: Diod. Sic. 16.7.3–4; Nep. Cha. 4; Plut. Phoc. 6.1; Dem. C. Lept. 80.
5
Sources: Diod. Sic. 16.21.1–3; Nep. Tim. 3.
 Fourth-Century BC Greek Wars 5

battle did begin, calling it the Battle of Embata (near Erythrae and not in the Hel-
lespont); many ships were lost according to Nepos (Tim. 3), but the battle ended
abruptly when the weather became too rough.

References

Rhodes, P. J. (2006), A History of the Classical Greek World 478–323 BC. Oxford and Malden.
Seager, R. (1994), “The King’s Peace and the Second Athenian Confederacy,” in D. M.
Lewis, J. Boardman, S. Hornblower, and M. Ostwald, eds., Cambridge Ancient History
VI, 156–186. Cambridge.