37 THE THIRD

MACEDONIAN WAR,
171–168 BC
Paul Erdkamp

One generation after Philip had been defeated, animosity flared up again between
Rome and Macedon, where Perseus meanwhile had succeeded to the throne. The
Senate was eager to declare war and get rid of the Macedonian monarchy, which it
saw as a destabilizing factor in Greek affairs: the Macedonian court had provided a
place of refuge for exiles from elsewhere in Greece; offers to reduce debts could be
represented as attempts to buy support from irresponsible elements; and attempts
to expand northward, away from the Greek world and Roman interests, were also
regarded with suspicion. In an attempt to win over Greek opinion, the Romans set
up an inscription at Delphi that publicized their complaints against Perseus. Having
declared war at the end of 172 BC, in March 171 Rome sent the consul Publius
Licinius Crassus with a large force across the Adriatic to Apollonia. While the
Roman fleet and allied warships from Pergamum were busy securing coastal cities
on the eastern coast of the Greek mainland, the consul marched through Epirus
toward Thessaly, where Perseus was ready for battle.

Callicinus (171)1
The prolonged period of peace meant that Perseus and his allies were able to mobi-
lize a large force of 43,000 men in total. His main strength consisted of 21,000 reg-
ular Macedonian pikemen and 5,000 elite royal troops. The Macedonian cavalry
consisted of 3,000 men, to which were added 1,000 Thracian horsemen. Next,
Perseus had access to 13,000 light infantry of various nationalities. Perseus had
trained his troops well, although the Macedonian phalangites had not fought as a
phalanx against a strong infantry formation since Cynoscephalae (see Chapter 35:
The Second Macedonian War, 200–197 BC). Licinius had landed with some 35,000
1
Source: Livy 42.57–60. Modern discussion: Hammond and Walbank (1988) 517–518.

The Encyclopedia of Ancient Battles, First Edition. Edited by Michael Whitby and Harry Sidebottom.
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
2 The Macedonian Age and the Rise of Rome

infantry, part of which he had left in Illyria, and 2,000 cavalry. In Thessaly he was
joined by more than 2,000 cavalry and some 5,500 infantry from his Greek allies.
The Romans had not fought a Hellenistic phalanx since Magnesia, almost two dec-
ades earlier (see Chapter 36: The War against Antiochus III, 191–188 BC). Some
experience, however, was provided by the mobilization of veterans of up to
50 years of age who volunteered for this war in the expectation of rich booty from
an eastern campaign.
Perseus was eager to force the Roman army to fight, and thus he moved with his
army to a short distance from the Roman camp. An encounter between horsemen
and light infantry from both sides ensued, and the Macedonians were victorious.
After offering battle in vain for several days, Perseus moved his army even closer to
the Roman camp and sent ahead his entire cavalry mixed with units of lightly
armed infantry, which took up position near a hill called Callicinus. Licinius left
his heavy infantry behind the wall that secured his camp but deployed his cavalry
and light troops in front of the wall. It is clear that the Roman consul did not want to
risk the core of his army—the Roman legions and their Italian counterparts—in a
full-scale engagement with the Macedonian phalanx. The horsemen and light infan-
try could more easily disengage and withdraw if necessary.
The Thracians assaulted the Italian cavalry on the Roman right wing with such
force that the latter were routed. The Roman center was also forced to withdraw
by an attack led by Perseus himself. Livy (42.59.4–5) narrates how the Thessalian
cavalry played a vital role by covering the withdrawal of the other units on the
Roman side. He also says that Perseus’ subordinate commanders had meanwhile
approached with the entire phalanx, but Perseus decided against a full-blown attack
on the Roman army, which was probably wise, as the terrain was uneven and
hence a disadvantage for the phalangites. Moreover, the Macedonian phalanx
was designed to fight battles, not to storm walls. Livy mentions that on the Roman
side 200 horsemen and at least 2,000 foot soldiers were killed; about 600 were taken
prisoner. Granted the normal imbalance of casualties in ancient warfare, it is
entirely possible that Perseus lost no more than 20 horsemen and 40 foot soldiers,
as Livy (42.60.1) claims.
After this limited setback, which had shown the strength of the Macedonian cav-
alry and light troops but had not really weakened Licinius’ army, the consul
devoted the rest of the year to taking towns in Boeotia and Thessaly, meanwhile
receiving provisions from overseas and local allies. In that year reinforcements also
arrived from the king of Numidia: 1,000 Numidian horsemen, valued for their
horsemanship; 22 elephants, which would be useful for causing panic among
the opponent’s horses; and 1,000 infantry. Roman morale, however, was low. Per-
seus’ troops occasionally attacked Roman foragers with success, but he was unable
to force them to engage in full battle on suitable terrain.
The campaigning season of 170 was taken up on the Roman side by unsuccessful
attempts to invade Macedon from Epirus and Thessaly. Most interestingly, when in
169 the new commander Quintus Marcius Philippus finally succeeded in passing
 The Third Macedonian War, 171–168 BC 3

the Macedonian strongholds in the Tempe Pass and entered Macedon, he soon
retreated to the border, because he feared supply problems if he were to continue
his march into the Macedonian heartland. The Roman army remained in the bor-
der area between Thessaly and Macedon during the following winter, with elab-
orate measures taken in order to transport provisions to the army there. Despite
these logistical achievements, for more than two years the Romans’ war effort had
been ineffective in dealing with their opponent.

Pydna (168)2
During the winter of 169–168, Perseus fortified a position near Mount Olympus,
which controlled the entry into Macedon. However, Lucius Aemilius Paulus, who
had taken over command in Greece, managed at the beginning of the summer to
circumvent the Macedonian positions with some of his troops. The king feared
being trapped with his forces and withdrew into Macedon, where he took up posi-
tion on the level ground near the coastal city of Pydna.
As the Romans approached, Perseus’ army took up battle positions, with the
phalanx in double formation (probably 32 ranks deep) and the cavalry and light
infantry covering the flanks, but the Roman consul refused to engage because
his troops were exhausted from the long march, and he ordered them to build
a camp. The Roman camp was located on a steep ridge on uneven ground—in
other words, in a position unassailable to the Macedonian troops. As the two
armies camped near each other in front of Pydna, an eclipse of the moon occurred,
which can be dated to the night of June 21, 168. According to our sources, the men
on both sides saw this as predicting the fall of the Macedonian king, which gave
confidence to the Romans and discouraged the Macedonians.
At the end of the following afternoon, preliminary skirmishing developed into a
full-scale battle. In the center of the Macedonian formation was the regular pha-
lanx, 16 ranks deep, supported on its sides by the Macedonian elite forces
and Thracian and other allies. On its wings were the cavalry and light infantry.
Macedonian pikemen were at their most successful when moving as a body into
their opponent’s formation, and in this case Aemilius’ heavy infantry was at first
pushed back helplessly by the Macedonian charge. Many casualties were caused
on the Roman side by the pikes, which pierced shields and body armor and made
it impossible for the other side to fight their assailants effectively. The first line of
the Roman formation was thus cut to pieces, and the Romans and their allies had
no other option but to draw back. However, the advance of the Macedonian
phalanx was uneven and inevitably there now appeared cracks in its wide front,
thus opening up the previously invulnerable phalanx to assault by the Roman
2
Source: Livy 44.40.4–44.42.9; Plut. Aem. 18–21. Modern discussion: Hammond and Walbank (1988)
552–557.
4 The Macedonian Age and the Rise of Rome

troops. Hence, Aemilius ordered his troops to loosen their formation, fight in smal-
ler units, and concentrate their attack on precisely those points where the Mace-
donian line had broken. As the Roman and Italian heavy infantry entered the
gaps in the phalanx, they were able to attack the individual pikemen and thus
destroy the cohesion on which the phalanx’s effectiveness depended. The Roman
heavy infantry was much better equipped for man-to-man combat than the phalan-
gites, who had to drop their pikes to be able to defend themselves but whose dag-
gers and light shields were no match for the Roman swords and large, heavy
scutum. The elite troops of Perseus held their formation and fought to their death,
but the majority of the king’s troops fled. Meanwhile the Numidian elephants, in
combination with allied cavalry, were sent against the Macedonians’ left wing. The
Macedonian horses, unfamiliar with elephants, fled in panic, together with the
lightly armed troops on that side.
Our sources variously report that casualties on the Macedonian side numbered
more than 25,000 or about 20,000, while 11,000 were taken prisoner. Such losses
may or may not be true, although the victory was certainly definitive. However, in
view of the fact that the Roman victory had followed a phase of battle in which the
Macedonians clearly had the upper hand, it is unbelievable that no more than 100
men (one source says 80) on the Roman side were killed.
The Macedonian king fled, but some time later he and his family were captured,
to be relocated to Italy and genteel captivity at Alba Fucens, where he died two
years later. His kingdom had meanwhile been divided into four separate states
ruled by pro-Roman oligarchies; there were very strict regulations about the ability
of the states to interact with one another. The eclipse of the moon had rightly
predicted that the Macedonian kingdom would cease to exist.
Other parts of the Greek world fared little better. Aemilius led his soldiers, who
were upset by his refusal to permit the expected pillaging in Macedon, into Epirus,
where the inhabitants were tricked into assembling their wealth for easy collection:
not satisfied with the movable property, the Romans enslaved 150,000
inhabitants—and still the soldiers were dissatisfied. In the Aetolian and Achaean
Leagues several hundred leading figures were taken to Italy as hostages for future
good behavior, including in the case of the Achaeans the future historian Polybius,
who had commanded the league cavalry during the war. Groups favorable to the
Romans were left in charge of affairs. Rhodes and Pergamum, which had benefited
considerably from previous Roman campaigns against kings, now found them-
selves being put under pressure. Rhodes in particular was suspect, since it had
attempted to broker a peace agreement between Rome and Perseus shortly before
Pydna, and its envoys were in Rome waiting to address the Senate when news of
the decisive victory arrived. The Rhodians were required to identify and punish
those whom they regarded as anti-Roman in a desperate bid to regain Roman
favor, and the Romans still reduced the power of their navy, a move that would
have unfortunate consequences as far as the suppression of piracy was concerned
and that established Delos as a free port to rival the commercial attractions of
 The Third Macedonian War, 171–168 BC 5

Rhodes. Outside Alexandria, which the Seleucid king Antiochus IV was threatening
to capture after a very successful invasion, the Roman envoy Gaius Popilius Laenas
presented a senatorial instruction for Antiochus to withdraw at once; when
Antiochus appeared inclined to hesitate, Popilius drew a circle in the sand around
him and demanded a response before he stepped outside, a humiliation that Anti-
ochus had no choice but to accept.

Reference

Hammond, N. G. L., and F. Walbank (1988), A History of Macedonia, vol. 3: 336–167 BC.
Oxford.