LUCIA BERNABE, ET AL.

, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs. DOMINGO L. VERGARA, defendant-appellant

G.R. No. L-48652, September 16, 1942

Facts:

In civil case No. 5714, the heirs of the deceased Victoriano Zafra, Benito Apolonia and Dominga
Zafra, were involved in an action for partition of their inheritance. The plaintiffs were the heirs of
Benito and Apolonia Zafra, while the defendants were Dominga Zafra and her co-defendants,
Brigida Martinez, Amadeo Landicho, and Marcelina Landicho. Dominga Zafra pleaded a
counterclaim, alleging she had paid debts contracted by Apolonia Zafra, the deceased mother of
the plaintiffs. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs one-third of the common property and ordered
them to pay the debts of their deceased mother, Apolonia Zafra, in the amount of P350. The
Court assumed jurisdiction over the case and affirmed the judgment.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to render its judgment for the sum of money

Ruling:

The trial court had jurisdiction due to a counterclaim and the nature of the proceeding, which
involved liquidation and inheritance. The plaintiffs-appellees knew the trial court had jurisdiction,
but they did not raise any questions in their appeal. The Court impliedly passed upon the
question when it acted on the case and decided on its merits.

The question of jurisdiction in this case is not about the subject matter, but rather the issue or
persons of the parties. A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over cases involving P200 or
more, so the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction to render judgment in the
amount of P350. The question of whether there was a proper issue raised in the pleading is not
about jurisdiction over the subject matter but rather the issue.

The Court of Appeals cannot deprive the Court of Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction over the
case, as the question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial and not applicable. The case is ordered to
be returned for hearing and decision on merits.

Doctrine:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings belong.

A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over cases involving P200 or more.
 YUSUKE FUKUZUME, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 143647, November 11, 2005

Facts:

In July 1991, Javier Ng Yu, a businessman involved in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires,
met with Yusuke Fukuzume in Parañaque. Fukuzume claimed to be the authorized
representative of Furukawa Electric Corporation and sold excess aluminum conductor materials
not being used by NAPOCOR and Furukawa. Yu agreed to buy the wires but owed him a total
of ₱290,000. Fukuzume then gave Yu two certifications, one for ₱100,000.00 and the other for
₱34,000.00, which were dishonored. Yu deposited the checks, but Fukuzume refused to
acknowledge the certifications. Unable to retrieve the wires, Yu filed a complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

In November 1994, Fukuzume was charged with estafa, a crime committed by Fukuzume with
intent to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu. He made false representations and fraudulent
manifestations, causing Yu to give and deliver the total amount of ₱424,000.00. However,
Fukuzume failed to comply with his obligation to deliver the materials and used the money for
his own personal use, causing damage and prejudice to Yu.

Fukuzume was found guilty in a trial on October 21, 1996, and ordered to pay the complainant
₱424,000.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid.

In 1995, Fukuzume was arraigned and found guilty of estafa. The trial court found him guilty and
ordered him to suffer the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty years. Fukuzume filed an
appeal with the CA, which affirmed the trial court's findings but modified the penalty. The CA
decision modified the minimum penalty to six years and one day of prision mayor, not more than
twenty years of reclusion temporal. The judgment appealed was affirmed, except for the
modification in the prison term.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged

Ruling:

The crime of estafa was alleged in Makati, but the prosecution did not provide any evidence to
corroborate Yu's sworn statement or prove that any of the offense elements were committed in
Makati. The prosecution failed to establish that Yu made payments of ₱50,000 on July 12, 1991,
₱20,000 on July 22, 1991, ₱50,000 on October 14, 1991, and ₱170,000 on October 18, 1991, in
Makati. Furthermore, there was no proof to show that certifications purporting to prove
NAPOCOR has custody of the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized
by Furukawa to sell the wires were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati.

Yu's testimony established that all elements of the offense charged had been committed in
Parañaque, with Yu and Fukuzume meeting at the latter's house in Parañaque and falsely
pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires. The Office of the Solicitor General argued that
Fukuzume himself alleged in his affidavit that he received ₱50,000 from Yu at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati in an unspecified date. However, this affidavit is part of the
preliminary investigation records and may not be considered evidence.

The trial court's judgment of convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for
want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of
competent jurisdiction. The court's jurisdiction over the offense charged cannot be conferred
upon the court by the accused, as it is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the
court.

The petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 21888 are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146. Criminal Case No. 95-083 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Doctrine:

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
 RENATO CUDIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON. CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City, respondents.

G.R. No. 110315, January 16, 1998

Facts:
On June 28, 1989, Renato Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga, for possessing an
unlicensed revolver. He was detained and charged with illegally possessing firearms and
ammunition in Angeles City. The case was filed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which states that
the petitioner unlawfully and feloniously had one. 38 Cal. Revolver without a Serial Number and
six live ammunition. The case was assigned to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City.

Cudia was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the
parties’ attention to the fact that, contrary to the information, the petitioner had committed the
offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. The court re-raffled the case to a branch
assigned to criminal cases involving crimes outside the city.

On October 31, 1989, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga filed another case, Criminal Case
No. 11987, charging the petitioner with the same crime. The prosecutor motioned to dismiss the
information, arguing that the apprehension was made in Mabalacat, not Angeles City. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss. On May 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the
case, arguing that his continued prosecution would violate his right not to be put twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The appellate court dismissed the case, stating
that the petition could not have been convicted under the first information as it was defective.
The appeal was denied, and the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not Cudia is put in double jeopardy

Ruling:
The first jeopardy was not attached due to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City
being the wrong venue for hearing the case, as jurisdictional matters are essential. Branch 56
has jurisdiction to try offenses in Mabalacat, Pampanga.

The City Prosecutor of Angeles City was not authorized to file the first information about the
offense committed in Mabalacat, as per Presidential Decree No. 1275, which mandates
investigations into crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of penal laws within their jurisdictions,
including gathering sworn statements or oral evidence from witnesses.

The constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment is not
breached due to the City Prosecutor's lack of authority to file the first information, which
prevented the petitioner from being convicted.

The petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. SP. No. 24958 is
AFFIRMED, with no costs.

Doctrine:
 Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution states that no person can be twice punished for the
same offense.
 Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states that if an accused is convicted or
acquitted, it prevents another prosecution for the same offense.
 To use double jeopardy defense, a first jeopardy must be attached before the second,
terminated validly, and the second offense must be the same or include the offense
charged in the first information.
o In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is
necessary to prove the existence of the following:
(a) Court of competent jurisdiction
(b) Valid complaint or information
(c) Arraignment
(d) Valid plea
(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
 DURISOL PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ADRIANO R. OSORIO, Judge, RTC, Branch 171, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA FERTILIZERS, INC.,
POLAR MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SPOUSES ISABEL S. VILLARAMA and
CONRADO D. VILLARAMA, SPOUSES MARIBEL CABRALES and DANILO CABRALES,
ROLANDO ANG SEE, SPOUSES ALEXANDER GABRIEL and MARILOU GO GABRIEL and
REMEDIOS REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 121106, February 20, 2002

Facts:

The petition for review of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35069 dated January 20,
1995, dismissing petitioner Durisol Philippines, Inc.'s petition for annulment of judgment. Durisol
obtained industrial loans from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in 1962 and
1969, and executed a mortgage on two parcels of registered land in Polo (now Valenzuela),
Bulacan. After defaulting in the payment of the loans, DBP instituted a petition for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in 1970.

Durisol's president, Rene Knecht, borrowed two Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) to obtain
new titles in accordance with the approved subdivision plan of the properties. The foreclosure
sale was held, and DBP emerged as the highest bidder. On October 9, 1973, the corresponding
certificates of sale were issued to DBP. However, Durisol never returned the titles to the
properties, and DBP was unable to register the property in its name.

On February 25, 1977, DBP instituted a petition for surrender of the owner's duplicate titles
covering the foreclosed properties. The petitioner filed its answer, raising defenses that the
petition fails to state a cause of action, it had already paid its loans to DBP, it had a valid
adverse claim on the properties covered by the seven new titles, and that DBP's action was
barred by laches and estoppel.

The trial court rendered summary judgment, ordering Durisol to surrender the seven certificates
of title within five days. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which contained an
alternative prayer to record in the titles its adverse claim representing the amount of
improvements it introduced on the property. The lower court denied the motion for having been
filed out of time and for lack of notice of hearing.

Durisol then filed a motion for execution, which was granted. An alias writ of execution was
issued against petitioner's president, Rene Knecht, but the latter refused to comply with the
order to surrender the titles. An Order was issued on April 4, 1990, directing the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the seven titles and issue new ones in lieu thereof. More than four
years later, on September 2, 1994, Durisol instituted a petition to annul the trial court's decision,
alleging for the first time that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.

DBP filed a petition under Section 107 of the Property Registration Decree after the petitioner's
president refused to surrender seven title certificates of title.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of new duplicate
owner’s certificate of title

(2) Whether or not petitioner was estopped from challenging the court’s lack of jurisdiction

Ruling:

The term "court" refers to Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, as per Section 2
of the Property Registration Decree. The petitioner cannot raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction
after actively participating in the case. A judgment for alleged lack of jurisdiction cannot be
considered void if the party who has the right to challenge it failed to do so at the first instance.
In the case at bar, the petitioner did not raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction in its answer to
respondent DBP's petition for surrender of owner's duplicate certificate. Instead, they raised
affirmative defenses of failure to state a cause of action and payment.

The petitioner actively participated in the proceedings, both in the trial court and appellate court.
In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner defended the decision without arguing for the trial
court's lack of jurisdiction. The case was elevated to the IAC and remanded to the trial court, but
the petitioner did not allege lack of jurisdiction. In its motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's order for new certificates of title, the petitioner failed to raise the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The issue of lack of jurisdiction was first raised two decades after the case was at
bar.

Rule 47, Section 3 mandates that a petition for annulment of judgment due to lack of jurisdiction
must be filed before it is barred by laches or estoppel, implying that jurisdiction over a case can
be raised at any stage of proceedings, assuming laches or estoppel has not been supervened.

The Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) removed the distinction between the CFI acting as
a land registration court with limited jurisdiction and an ordinary court exercising general
jurisdiction. This change simplified registration proceedings by granting trial courts authority to
act on applications for "original registration" and all petitions filed after original registration of
title.

The petition has been DENIED and the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 35069,
dated January 20, 1995, has been UPHELD in its entirety.

Doctrine:

Estoppel by laches allows a claimant to exercise a right due to delay, misleading the court and
opposing party of its waiver.

Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the ground of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. (Rule 47, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court

Lack of jurisdiction refers to the court's inability to take cognizance of a petition due to the law's
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, has general jurisdiction over all cases
not specifically provided for by law. However, it also has limited jurisdiction over cadastral and
land registration cases, including proceedings involving title to real property and land
registration issues. The court has jurisdiction over all actions involving land possession, except
for forcible entry and illegal detainer.

In cases where a registered owner's title is divested due to an involuntary instrument or refusal
to surrender a duplicate certificate, the party in interest can file a court petition to force the
surrender to the Register of Deeds. The court may order the owner or person withholding the
duplicate certificate to surrender the certificate and enter a new certificate or memorandum
upon surrender. If the person withholding the certificate is unresponsive or cannot deliver the
outstanding certificate, the court may order the annulment and issuance of a new certificate of
title.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORINO A. SAVELLANO
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIX, and EDUARDO
OLIVERIS Y INOCENCIO

G.R. No. L-39951, September 9, 1982

Facts:

Respondent Victorino A. Savellano then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissed Criminal Case No. 17765 for seduction and ordered the Fiscal to file the case
with the "proper" court. law library

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the
case of seduction

Doctrines:

Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code provides:  chanrobles virtual law library

ART. 338. Simple seduction. -The seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of
good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of
deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor.

while Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act, as amended provides:  chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 87. Original jurisdiction to try criminal case. -Municipal judges and judges of city
courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:  chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

(c) Except violations of election laws all other offenses in which the penalty provided by
law is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICTORINO A. SAVELLANO Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIX,
and EDUARDO OLIVERIS Y INOCENCIO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-39951, September 9, 1982

Facts:

The Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with preliminary injunction, preventing the Municipal Court of Parañaque from
proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. L-35936 for simple seduction.

The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Criminal Case No. 17765 for seduction and
ordered the Fiscal to file the case with the "proper" court. The Supreme Court ruled that
jurisdiction over a simple seduction case lies with the Court of First Instance, not with the inferior
court. The petition was granted.

The Tribunal has heard two cases regarding jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions for simple
seduction. In G.R. No. L-38579, Judge Pedro A. Revilla ruled that the crime is within the
municipal court's jurisdiction, dismissing a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. In
G.R. No. L-39951, Judge Victorino A. Savellano dismissed Criminal Case No. 17765 for
seduction and ordered the Fiscal to file the case with the "proper" court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the case of
seduction

Doctrine:

In criminal prosecutions, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the extent of the penalty
imposed by law, along with other obligations, based on the allegations in the complaint or
information. This jurisdiction is not determined by the punishment for the offender after trial or
the result of the evidence presented during the trial. Instead, it is determined by the extent of the
penalty imposed by the law, along with other legal obligations, based on the facts as recited in
the complaint or information. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information
is filed, it is retained regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that
charged in the information or the subsequent happenings of events.

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the current state of facts at the time it is invoked.
Once jurisdiction is attached to the person and subject matter of a litigation, subsequent events,
despite potentially preventing jurisdiction in the first instance, will not oust it.

The doctrine of stare decisis, which allows lower courts to stand by decisions without disturbing
settled matters, is particularly valuable when a doctrine should be re-examined but applied.
MILA G. PANGILINAN, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 117363, December 17, 1999

Facts:
Pangilinan was charged with estafa.
On June 15, 1984, in Tanay, Rizal, Philippines, Pangilinan instructed a 15-year-old girl,
Luzviminda SJ Elnar, to obtain a stereo component, headphone, electrical jack, and record
tapes worth P17,450.00. The accused falsely claimed that the father of Luzviminda instructed
her to test the stereo components in a turntable. The accused then willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously took advantage of the girl's inexperience and feelings to induce her to give the
stereo components and electrical parts to her spouses Rolando and Soledad Elnar. The
accused was not authorized to test the components, and once in possession, she took them
away, causing damage and prejudice to the Elnars.

Arraigned: Regional Trial Court of Morong Rizal

Sentence: Imprisonment of One (1) year, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days of
Prision Correccional, as minimum to Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11)
days of Prision Correccional as maximum and pay Elnar with Php 17, 000.00.

Further to pay the complainant Soledad Elnar the amount of P17,000.00

Issue: Whether the conviction of the accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court
under an information falling with the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial court valid?

Ruling:
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code punishes violations with imprisonment ranging from one
month to six months. The petitioner's offense falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court, as per Section 32 of B.P. 129. The Municipal Trial Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment or fines exceeding four years and two
months, except for damage to property through criminal negligence. The case was settled by
the averments in the information, and the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case.

A party cannot invoke a court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief against an opponent and
then repudiate or question that jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction is not important in such
cases, as the party is barred from such conduct due to public policy reasons, not because the
court's judgment or order is valid.

The principle of estoppel operates on jurisdiction, depending on whether the lower court had
jurisdiction. Parties can assail jurisdiction on appeal, as it must exist as a matter of law and
cannot be conferred by consent or estoppel.

Petition was granted and set aside the ruling of RTC because it had no jurisdiction over
the case.

Doctrine:
In order to find estafa with abuse of confidence under subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art.
315, the following elements must be present: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;

2. That there be misrepresentation or conversion of such money or property by the

offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;

3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;

and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.

VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 167764, October 9, 2009

Petitioners: Vicente Foz Jr. and Danny Fajardo

Crime: Libel

Violation: Article 353 and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code,
Sentence: An indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine
of P1,000.00 each

Court: RTC of Iloilo City

Issue:

a. Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City has jurisdiction over the crime of libel

Ruling:

The court's jurisdiction over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and the offense must have occurred within the court's territorial jurisdiction. The
RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case, and the decision convicting petitioners of
libel should be set aside for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to filing with a competent court.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of
the publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the
province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the...
province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only showed that Iloilo was the
place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish... that the said
publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the... court.
Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case
under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this
case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime... of libel should be set aside for
want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.
the petition is GRANTED. The Decision... of the Court of Appeals... are SET ASIDE

Doctrine:

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 

In cases of written defamations, criminal and civil actions for damages must be filed with the first
instance court of the province or city where the libelous article was printed or first published. If
one of the offended parties is a public officer with office in Manila, the action should be filed in
the City of Manila or the province where the article was printed. If the offended party is a private
individual, the action should be filed in the province or city where they resided at the time of the
offense.
 Shell and Petron v Romars International Gases Corp
G.R. No. 189669, July 23, 2015

Facts:

RIGC was charged for illegal refilling, distribution, and/or sale of LPG products
under the name of Shell and Petron (violation of IPC or RA 8293, and RA 623). The NBI
investigated the case and found that some of the tanks were delivered in Edrich
Enterprises in Iriga City. The NBI filed for two separate Applications for Search Warrant
with RTC-Naga.

RIGC filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant for the following grounds: a)
there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of
the test-buy to the date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders
seized were not owned by respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises
is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. They also filed an Appearance with
Motion for Consideration, contending that the NBI should have applied for search
warrant in RTC-Iriga, which has territorial jurisdiction over Edrich Enterprises.

Issue: W/N RTC-Naga has jurisdiction to issue search warrants when the crime was
committed beyond it’s territorial jurisdiction.

Held: RTC-Naga has jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search warrant
for a criminal activity in Iriga. It is not a criminal action, and thus the rule that venue is
jurisdictional does not apply. Moreover, RIGC failed to include the issue of jurisdiction
at the first instance in its motion to quash, as such, the motion is denied.

Why the SC denied the motion to quash the SW on the ground of jurisdiction:

The Court would take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash
in two cases (according to the omnibus motion rule), one of which is if the issue was
one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, an application for a search
warrant is not a criminal action, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not
apply thereto. Therefore, the Court denied the motion since it was not raised in the
MTQ, and the court cannot take cognizance of the issue raised in the MR because it is
not an issue pertaining to/questioning jurisdiction.

The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise,
said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take
cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are:

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;

existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and
bar by prior judgment (res judicata) or by statute of limitations.
It must be noted in Section 2(b), Rule 126, the application for search warrant in this
case should have stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the
RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed and also
the place where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a
mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed
in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of
the crime.

A search warrant is
- an order in writing
- issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
- signed by a judge
- directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court
- in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery
- a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because
of a public necessity
- the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto
o the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts.

HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G. R.

No. 195002, SECOND DIVISION, January 25, 2012, SERENO, J.
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of
the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.
The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any
stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
85 by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner
and form prescribed by law. It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require
a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.Section 15 (a)
of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to
existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred."
This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and
appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would
cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another
place.This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints,
coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense
in the charges against him.
FACTS: Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-
and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The
bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private
complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the
transfer of the title in the latter's name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the
property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorney's fees, P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax, P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses. Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who
issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos.
00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the
BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her
that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions.
Elizabeth demanded the return of the money. To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in
favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the
amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. When
the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the
reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands,
appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him. On 29 October
2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), both of Makati City. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 86
During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of
"Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City,
petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case. On 8 January 2007, the RTC
rendered a Decisionfinding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph
(b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration,which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008. On
25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision affirming that
of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that an accused has to present
evidence in support of the defense of lack of jurisdiction even if such lack of jurisdiction appears
in the evidence of the prosecution. (YES)
RULING: On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that P150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City.
Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22
December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo
City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the
money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were
situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the
disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time
when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by EquitablePCI Bank in its De la Rosa-
Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any
of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed
to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to
present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the
prosecution evidence. In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue
of the place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures. The trial
court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to where it
was committed. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 87 In his Motion for
Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over
the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon
which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture. The instant case is thus an
exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts. The overarching
consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court
cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited
territory. In Isip v. People, this Court explained: The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over
the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is
so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss
the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) In a criminal case, the prosecution must
not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused
and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, the
prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article
315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. That the offense
was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows: That on or about the
23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Ordinarily, this
statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the
Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the
offense was committed. Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was
presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in
Makati City. Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1)
that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money
or property by the offender, DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 88 or denial
on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. There is
nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecutionthat points to where the offense,
or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that
there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed. Although the
prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati,
such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution
evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in
Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court
lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at
any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and
is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. It has been consistently held by
this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense
of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of
proper venue.Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000
provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not
compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime
was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other
evidence in another place.This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to
distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to
present his defense in the charges against him. There being no showing that the offense was
committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

[G.R. No. L-20687. April 30, 1966.]

MAXIMINO VALDEPENAS, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Jose F. Aguirre for Petitioner.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General A.A. Narra &
Solicitor O.R. Ramirez for Respondent.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF ACCUSED, HOW ACQUIRED;

WAIVER OF OBJECTION TO COURT’S JURISDICTION; CASE AT BAR. — Jurisdiction over
the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant. or
his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case at bar, petitioner was brought before
the bar of justice first, before the justice of the peace court, then before the court of first
instance, later before the Court of Appeals, thereafter back before said court of first instance.
and then, again, before the Court of Appeals, and never, within the period of six years that had
transpired until the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, had he questioned the judicial
authority of any of these three courts over his person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived
whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have
submitted himself to the Court’s jurisdiction. What is more, his behavior and every single one of
the steps taken by him before said courts — particularly the motions therein filed by him —
implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to
exercise the authority thereof over his person.

1. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OVER CRIME OF ABDUCTION WITH CONSENT. — It is

well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action — in this case
the crime of abduction with consent — is and may be conferred only by law; that
the jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court,
may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense; and that,
under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of
abduction with consent.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR THE EXERCISE
OF JURISDICTION. — The third paragraph of Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code
does not determine the jurisdiction of the courts over the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness. It could not affect said jurisdiction,
because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised
Penal Code, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors
pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required in said Art.
344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of
the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed
"out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public
trial" (Samilin v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil., 298, 304.)

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ABDUCTION INCLUDES

ABDUCTION WITH CONSENT. — The complaint for forcible abduction includes
abduction with consent. The spirit of Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code is that
the assent of the offended party and her mother to undergo the scandal of the
public trial for forcible abduction necessarily connotes, also, their willingness to
face the scandal attendant to a public trial for abduction with consent.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIRGINITY AS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT OF ABDUCTION

WITH CONSENT. — The virginity mentioned in Art 343 of the Revised Penal Code
as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should not be
understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of abduction of a
virtuous woman of good reputation (U.S. v. Casten, 34 Phil., 808, 811-812),
because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but
the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of
one of its members." (U. S. v. Alvarez, 1 Phil., 351; U. S. v. Reyes, 20 Phil.,
510; U.S. v. Reyes, 28 Phil., 352.)

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE INCLUDES CHASTITY. —

The presumption of innocence includes also that of morality and decency, and,
as a consequence, of chastity. (6 Moran, pp. 28-29. 1963 Edition, citing cases.)

Issue: WON the Court of First Instance of Cagayan has jurisdiction over the
person of the accused

Crime: Abduction with consent

Sentence: indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3) months and twenty-five
(25) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law,
to indemnify Ester Ulsano in the sum of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Facts: In 1956, Ester Ulsano and her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, filed a criminal
complaint against Maximino Valdepenas for forcible abduction with rape. The court of
first instance found probable cause and sentenced Valdepenas to rape. The Court of
Appeals modified the decision and convicted Valdepenas of abduction with consent. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, contesting the Court of
Appeals' finding that the complainant was below 18 years old at the time of the
occurrence. The court of first instance reaffirmed the decision, and the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration based on the lower court's jurisdiction over the appellant's
person and the crime. The court found no merit in this pretense.

Ruling:
The offended woman and her mother have filed a complaint for forcible abduction, which
has been ongoing for ten years. The petitioner claims that the complaint was for
abduction with consent, which is included in the former. The mother's assent to a public
trial for forcible abduction implies their willingness to face the scandal of a public trial for
abduction with consent. The complaint alleges that the offended party is a virgin and that
she is over 12 and under 18 years old. The court ruled that the offense of abduction with
consent should not be understood in its material sense, as the essence of the offense is
the outrage to the family and the alarm caused by the disappearance of one of its
members. The complaint alleges that the petitioner unlawfully took Ester Ulsano by force
and violence against her will, taking advantage of her mother's absence. This implies
that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas and single, leading to the presumption
that she is a virgin. The decision is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximino
Valdepenas.
 Tung Ho Steel v. Ting Guan, G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014

Facts: Tung Ho, a foreign corporation, filed a dispute with Ting Guan Trading Corp., a
domestic Philippine corporation, over a contract of sale for heavy metal scrap iron and
steel. The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho, ordering actual damages, arbitration costs, and
legal expenses. Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for recognition and
enforcement of the award, but Ting Guan dismissed the case due to Tung Ho's lack of
capacity and prematurity.

Issue:
This case presents to us the following issues: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1) Whether the present petition is barred by res judicata; and

2) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan,
specifically:

a) Whether Tejero was the proper person to receive the summons; and
b) Whether Ting Guan made a voluntary appearance before the trial court.

Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious.

I. The Court is not precluded from ruling on the jurisdictional issue raised in
the petition

A. The petition is not barred by res judicata

Res judicata  refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. 19 For res judicata  to
apply, the final judgment must be on the merits of the case which means that the court
has unequivocally determined the parties� rights and obligations with respect to the
causes of action and the subject matter of the case. 20

Contrary to Ting Guanï’s position, our ruling in G.R. No. 176110 does not operate as res
judicata on Tung Ho’s appeal; G.R. No. 176110 did not conclusively rule on all issues
raised by the parties in this case so that this Court would now be barred from taking
cognizance of Tung Ho�s petition. Our disposition in G.R. No. 176110 only dwelt on
technical or collateral aspects of the case, and not on its merits. Specifically, we did not
rule on whether Tung Ho may enforce the foreign arbitral award against Ting Guan in
that case.

B. The appellate court cannot be ousted of jurisdiction until it finally disposes

of the case

The court’s jurisdiction, once attached, cannot be ousted until it finally disposes of the
case. When a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the case is
retained.21 A judge is competent to act on the case while its incidents remain pending
for his disposition.

The CA was not ousted of its jurisdiction with the promulgation of G.R. No. 176110. The
July 5, 2006 decision has not yet become final and executory for the reason that there
remained a pending incident before the CA � the resolution of Tung Ho�s motion
for reconsideration � when this Court promulgated G.R. No. 176110.� In this latter
case, on the other hand, we only resolved procedural issues that are divorced from the
present jurisdictional question before us. Thus, what became immutable in G.R. No.
176110 was the ruling that Tung Ho�s complaint is not dismissible on grounds of
prematurity, nullity of the foreign arbitral award, improper venue, and the foreign
arbitral award�s repugnance to local public policy.� This leads us to the conclusion
that in the absence of any ruling on the merits on the issue of jurisdiction, res
judicata on this point could not have set in.

C. Tung Ho�s timely filing of a motion for reconsideration and of a petition

for review on  certiorari prevented the July 5, 2006 decision from attaining
finality

Furthermore, under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Tung Ho may file a
petition for review on certiorari before the Court within (15) days from the denial of its
motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. Tung Ho�s
timely filing of a motion for reconsideration before the CA and of a Rule 45 petition
before this Court prevented the July 5, 2006 CA decision from attaining finality. For this
Court to deny Tung Ho�s petition would result in an anomalous situation where a
party litigant is penalized and deprived of his fair opportunity to appeal the case by
faithfully complying with the Rules of Court.

II. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan

A. Tejero was not the proper person to receive the summons�

Nonetheless, we see no reason to disturb the lower courts� finding that Tejero was
not a corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the proper person to receive the
summons under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of
facts; we cannot re�examine, review or re�evaluate the evidence and the factual
review made by the lower courts. In the absence of compelling reasons, we will not
deviate from the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding on
this Court.22

B.� Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court�

However, we cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the appellate court reached,
given the established facts.23 To our mind, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the
trial court in view of the procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary
appearance is equivalent to service of summons. 24

The present case has been complicated by its unique development, as the Court of Appeals
(CA) initially resolved and denied Ting Guan's partial motion for reconsideration, leading to Tung
Ho's petition for review on certiorari. The CA denied Ting Guan's petition, leading to the entry of
judgment that improvidently followed. The entry of judgment was stayed, and Tung Ho's
meritorious petition was foreclosed. Unfair and unjustified injury to Tung Ho was caused by the
fact that the Ting Guan petition did not question the full merits of the CA decision. The case is
for the enforcement of an arbitral award involving millions of pesos, and Tung Ho properly and
timely availed of the remedies available under the Rules of Court. The entry of judgment in G.R.
No. 176110 in the Supreme Court on January 8, 2008, the CA decision which the Court affirmed
was effectively not yet final. The Court would not be in error if it applied its ruling in the case of
Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. and Macondray Farms, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
where the Court ruled that an entry of judgment may be recalled or lifted motu proprio when it is
clear that the decision assailed has not yet become final under the rules. The entry of judgment
relative to the January 30, 1985 resolution on March 18, 1985, was premature and inefficacious.
An entry of judgment does not make the judgment so entered final and executory when it is not
so in truth. The court's decision to reverse and set aside the entry of final judgment was proper
and consistent with the inherent power of every court to amend and control its process and
orders to make them conformable to law and justice.
CASE DIGEST: Tijam v Sibonghanoy, G.R.
No. L-21450, April 15, 1968
Facts:
In June of 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was passed. Exactly a month after
its passage, or in July 1948, the Sps Tijam commenced a civil case in the CFI
Cebu against the Sps. Sibonghanoy to recover a debt worth P1908.

Thereafter, on the basis of the prayer in the complaint, a writ of attachment

was issued by the court against properties of the defendants. However, the
same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and
the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.

The CFI ruled in favor of the Sps. Tijam and issued a writ of execution against
the defendants and Manila Surety, respectively. Manila Surety objected to the
lack of demand and sought affirmative relief by requesting that its liability be
lifted. The writ was initially denied, but after proper demand, it was eventually
granted.

Manila Surety moved to quash due to lack of required summary hearing but
such was denied

In 1962, or 14 years later, Manila Surety appealed in the CA. CA affirmed CFI
decision.

The following year, Manila Surety then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the CFI Cebu did not acquire jurisdiction over the case as RA 296 placed
actions where the demand does not exceed P2000 (without interest) in the
inferior courts, not the CFI.

Issue: Whether the CFI Cebu acquired jurisdiction over the case in light of
RA 296

Ruling:
The SC ruled in the affirmative.

Although RA 296 had already removed actions for recovery where the
demand is lower than P2000 from the jurisdiction of the CFI, the issue was
never raised until an adverse decision 15 years later, thus allowing for
jurisdiction through estoppel/laches.

According to the Supreme Court, the facts and circumstances necessitates

the application of estoppel and laches because:
1. The jurisdictional issue was only raised after an adverse decision was
reached in the CA.

2. They filed affirmative relief in the RTC and CA, especially when it sought
to be relieved of liability.

The Court accorded jurisdiction by estoppel, emphasizing the principle of

laches.

Laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of

time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

Summary of Principles:

1.   Laches as an exception to the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-

matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings

The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings.

However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, a

party may be barred by laches from invoking this plea for the first time on
appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active
participation of said party invoking the plea.

2.   Estoppel

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways

and for different reasons. Thus we speak of:

a.   estoppel in pais,

b.   estoppel by deed or by record, and

c.   estoppel by laches.

3.   Nature of Laches

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
4.   Basis of Laches.

The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public

policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.

5.  A party cannot invoke the court’s jurisdiction and then deny it to
escape a penalty.

It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.

Upon this same principle is what we said in the three cases mentioned in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963, supra, to the effect that we
frown upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

6.   Separate judgment is not necessary to hold surety liable on the

bond.

There is no need for a separate action or judgment against the surety in order
to hold it liable on the bond. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per
Section 12 of Rule 59 “to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment
he may recover in the action,” and stands “in place of the property so
released.”

Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the
execution is “returned unsatisfied” (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the
liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to
satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of
execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.