Leonardo M.

Lawas Jr

CASE DIGEST COL

III. CONFLICTS RULES ON STATUS AND CAPACITY

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

FACTS:

The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, and
Australian citizen, which the celebration was held in the Philippines. However, after 2
years of marriage, a divorce decree was issued by the Australian family court.
Subsequently, the respondent became an Australian citizen and married the petitioner
Grace Garcia, a Filipino, which celebration was held in the Philippines. However, after
few years from their marriage, the petitioner found out that the respondent had a
subsisting marriage with Editha.

The petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the

grounds of Bigamy. The respondent contends that the divorce decree that was issued by
the Australian family court is valid and his first marriage was validly dissolved. The
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from Australian family court while the
complaint filed by the petitioner was pending. The respondent filed for the complaint to
be dismissed on the grounds of no cause of action since their marriage was already
dissolved due to the divorce decree.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE: WON, the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to remarry petitioner?

RULING:

No. The respondent was not proven to be legally capacitated to remarry petitioner.

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

 "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent
may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law.

The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

The court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least,
to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD
SAN LUIS, Respondent.

FACTS:

During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, and one of
which is Rodolfo, herein petitioner. On August 11, 1963, Virginia died. Five years later,
on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on December 14, 1973.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, that was solemnized in USA. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets

and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court. On February 4, 1994, petitioner
Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.

Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

The Trial Court ruled that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines on the grounds that it did not
bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that par. 2 Art. 26 of the Family
Code cannot be applied retroactively because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo’s legitimate children. Hence, the court dismissed the letters of administration
filed by the respondent. However, the CA reversed the lower court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

1. WON, Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code apply in this case?

2. WON, the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
Administration?

RULING:

1.

The court held that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid
in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law.

Here, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
 With regards to the marriage between the respondent and Felicisimo that was
done in accordance with the laws in California USA, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.


2.

Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.

G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010

HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner,

vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner, an American citizen, and Respondent, a Filipino, were married

solemnized in Manila, Philippines in 1994. They had a daughter born 1995. However,
on 1999, the respondent filed a divorce decree at Illinois court, which the said court
dissolved their marriage, and awarded respondent with the sole custody of their
daughter.

In 2002, both petitioner and respondent executed in Manila an agreement to have

a joint custody with their daughter, which both partied chose Philippine courts as
exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. However, om 2004,
the Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent before RTC for an alleged
violation by the respondent regarding their Agreement. The respondent filed a
dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON, the divorce decree initiated by a Filipino spouse abroad is binding on the
foreign spouse in the Philippine court’s jurisdiction?

RULING:

Yes.

The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. It is true that

owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign
divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as
it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the
divorce.

G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ Respondents.

FACTS:

Foundling case

Jus sanguinis

RULING:
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention:

“A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of
birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the
rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found. “

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino.

There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in
a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.

To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or

an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi (intention to
remain) coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

IV. CONFLICTS RULES ON MARRIAGE AND ITS DISSOLUTION

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

FACTS:
 Fe D. Quita, herein petitioner, and Arturo Padlan, both Filipino citizens, were
married in the Philippines on 1941 and not blessed with children. On 1954, Fe obtained
a divorce decree in USA, and from thereon, had two subsequent marriages to different
men.

On 1972, Arturo died intestate. Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Bladina
Dandan claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo, and the alleged children of the
descendent opposed the petition. Petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of
heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate.

Petitioner contends that, she and Arturo had a null and void divorce decree since
they are both Filipino citizens. On the other hand, private respondent contends that the
divorce decree is valid and binding in the Philippines under the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Who between petitioner and private respondent may validly claim as the
spouse of the decedent?

RULING:

The right of petitioner to inherit as Arturo’s spouse must still be determined by

the trial court. The trial court failed to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship
when she obtained the divorce abroad. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth
of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as
the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.

On the other hand, private respondent’s claim to heirship was already resolved
by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship.

The case was remanded to the trial court.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

FACTS:

On 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III, herein respondent, married Lady Myros M.

Villanueva, (both Filipinos) solemnized in the Philippines, blessed with children. His
wife, Lady, left for USA together with their children, and later has been naturalized
American citizen.

Lady obtained a divorce decree in the USA, and likewise married an American
citizen solemnized in USA. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The court granted the petition of the respondent. However, OSG raises a pure
question of law. The OSG contends that the Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is only applicable to mixed marriages between an alien and a Filipino. OSG added
that the proper remedy is legal separation or annulment.

ISSUE: WON, respondent can remarry under Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code? (YES BUT RESPONDENT LACKS PROOF REGARDING THE FORMER WIFE
HAS BEEN NATURALIZED AND THE FOREIGN LAW)

RULING:

Under Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that:

“All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.”

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

However, in this case, the respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also
show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required
in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

FACTS:
 Petitioner, Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen, acquired a Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 2000. The petitioner married
respondent Daisylyn, a Filipina, in the Philippines. However, their relationship turned
sour when the petitioner caught the respondent having an affair with another man, the
petitioner filed a petition for divorce in Canada which the divorce decree took effect on
2006.

Subsequently, the petitioner found another woman to marry. Petitioner went to

the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. However, he found out that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.

Accordingly, the petitioner filed petition for judicial recognition of foreign

divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. However,
the court denied Gerbert’s petition on the grounds that he is not the proper party to
institute the petition since he is a Canadian citizen, and in addition, the Filipino spouse
can avail the remedy under Par. 2 Art. 28 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: WON, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree?

RULING:

No.

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.

An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse
is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by
his national law.

The purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

However, in this case, the foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a

right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction. The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
the petitioner. The divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

FACTS:

The respondent Marelyn Manalo, Filipino, was previously married to a Japanese

national, Yoshino Minoro, which was solemnized in the Philippines. However, after
several years, Manalo filed a divorce in Japan which issued a divorce decree dated 2011.
Manalo with her daughter, and Yoshino are living separately from each other.

Manalo (Filipino) filed a petition for cancellation of Entry of Marriage in the Civil
registry by virtue of a judgment of divorce Japanese court. However, this was
contradicted by the OSG.

The RTC denied the petition of Manalo for lack of merit. However, the CA
overturned the decision of the lower court basing on Article 26 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: WON, the respondent can invoke par. 2 Art. 26 of the Family Code?
RULING:

Yes.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaks of "a divorce validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of
the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where

the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of
his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding
or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in
the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of
the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's
national law.

Blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause

unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are
equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.

In this case however, even though the respondent was able to present
documents, the latter still needs to prove Japanese law with regards to divorce. The
burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of
judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
V. CONFLICTS RULES ON CONTRACTS

G.R. No. L-2935 March 23, 1909

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

George Frank, through a respective of the Insular Government of the Philippine

Islands, entered a contract with the Plaintiff in Illinois USA. The said contract had a
provision in case of violation of its terms. However, the defendant left the service of the
plaintiff and refused to make further compliance with the terms of the contract. The
plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant. The latter contends that he was a
minor when he stepped in the Philippines since at that time the law of the latter is that
the age of majority for males is 23 y.o., despite being an adult during the signing of the
contract in Illinois.

The Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

ISSUE: WON, the law of the Philippines govern in this case with regards to the validity
of the contract?

RULING:

No. The Philippine law will not govern in this case.

At the time and place of the making of the contract in question the defendant had
full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing
upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law
of the place where the contract is made.

Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at
the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit,
admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place
where the suit is brought.
 Here, the defendant being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place
and time the contract was made, he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the place
where the contract is being enforced.

G.R. No. 140047 July 13, 2004

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE

CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 3-PLEX INTERNATIONAL, INC.; VICENTE P.
EUSEBIO; SOLEDAD C. EUSEBIO; EDUARDO E. SANTOS; ILUMINADA SANTOS;
AND FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., respondents.

FACTS:

a service contract entered into by a Filipino construction firm with the Iraqi
Government for the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical Center,
Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq. Petitioner Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation1 (hereinafter Philguarantee) sought reimbursement from the respondents
of the sum of money it paid to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait pursuant to a guarantee it issued
for respondent V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc. (VPECI).

ISSUE: What law should govern regarding the validity of contracts?

RULING:

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our

laws. The rule followed by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a
contract must be governed by the lex contractus or "proper law of the contract."

This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or
the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis). The law
selected may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with the
transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties.

Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most basic rule in most
legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract,
subject to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the
forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction.
 It must be noted that the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no
express choice of the law that would govern it. In the United States and Europe, the two
rules that now seem to have emerged as "kings of the hill" are (1) the parties may choose
the governing law; and (2) in the absence of such a choice, the applicable law is that of
the State that "has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties."
Another authority proposed that all matters relating to the time, place, and manner of
performance and valid excuses for non-performance are determined by the law of the
place of performance or lex loci solutionis, which is useful because it is undoubtedly
always connected to the contract in a significant way.

In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since
one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq.
Hence, the issue of whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be
determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not properly
pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as
the processual presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.

G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,

LTD., Petitioners,
vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.

FACTS:

On March 30, 1999, petitioner NIPPON entered into an Independent Contractor

Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently
residing in the Philippines wherein the said agreement provides that respondent was to
extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1, 1999. Nippon then
assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road
(STAR) Project in the Philippines. When the STAR project was near completion, the
DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000 for the
supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.

However, petitioner Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager informed that they

have no intention in renewing the ICA. The respondent through their lawyer requested
a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project, but the
petitioner is firm with its decision and refuse to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.

The respondent filed a civil case for specific performance against the petitioner.
The latter contending that the ICA was perfected in Japan and executed by and between
Japanese nationals written in Japanese language, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction wherein it can only be heard and tried in Japan following the principles
of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. Petitioner posit that local courts have no
substantial relationship to the parties following the state of the most significant
relationship rule in Private International Law.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss by the petitioner, likewise, the CA affirmed
the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON, the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for
specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by
foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
contractus ?

RULING:

No.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" or the law of
the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed."
It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the
law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly
or implicitly.

Under the "state of the most significant relationship rule," to ascertain what state
law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial
connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court
should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and
the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes
into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is
brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the
latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal
to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the
internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account
or apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and
controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to
recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short
of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by
foreign sovereigns.

[ G.R. No. 191310. April 11, 2018 ]

PRINCESS TALENT CENTER PRODUCTION, INC., AND/OR LUCHI SINGH
MOLDES, PETITIONERS, VS. DESIREE T. MASAGCA, RESPONDENT

FACTS:

Respondent, Masagca, entered a contract with the petitioner, PTCPI, a domestic

corporation, for a job in Korea as a singer in a club. Model Employment Contract for
Filipino Overseas Performing Artists (OPAS) To Korea (Employment Contract) was
executed on February 3, 2003 between respondent and petitioner PTCPI as the
Philippine agent of SAENCO, the Korean principal/promoter. However, when the
respondent got there in Korea, she worked not in accordance with the contract.
Subsequently, she went home in the Philippines. The respondent filed a case against the
petitioner for an illegal dismissal, and money claims.

ISSUE: WON, the petitioner is liable for the money claims despite the latter is merely an
agent to the employer of the complainant?

RULING:

Yes.

The second paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, reproduced below
for easier reference:
 The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency
for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall
be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers.

If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers

and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarity
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.

The aforequoted provision is plain and clear, the joint and several liability of the
principal/employer, recruitment/placement agency, and the corporate officers of the
latter, for the money claims and damages of an overseas Filipino worker is absolute and
without qualification. It is intended to give utmost protection to the overseas Filipino
worker, who may not have the resources to pursue her money claims and damages
against the foreign principal/employer in another country.

The overseas Filipino worker is given the right to seek recourse against the only
link in the country to the foreign principal/employer, i.e., the recruitment/placement
agency and its corporate officers. As a result, the liability of SAENCO, as
principal/employer, and petitioner PTCPI, as recruitment/placement agency, for the
monetary awards in favor of respondent, an illegally dismissed employee, is joint and
several. In turn, since petitioner PTCPI is a juridical entity, petitioner Moldes, as its
corporate officer, is herself jointly and solidarity liable with petitioner PTCPI for
respondent's monetary awards, regardless of whether she acted with malice or bad faith
in dealing with respondent.

VI. CONFLICTS RULES ON PROPERTY

G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933

ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle,

vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
FACTS:

The parcels of land located in the Philippines (conjugal property) covered by

certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs
and Eva Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto, California, on
November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death she and her husband were citizens of
the State of California and domiciled therein. The petitioner refused to pay taxes
(administration) by virtue of the Californian law.

However, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as

binding said decree of court of September 22,1930, and refused to register the transfer of
title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the
corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.

The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and
extent of the title citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent
of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the
laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of
article 10 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: WON, the law of California shall govern in this case by virtue of Par. 2 Art. 10 of
the Civil Code?

RULING:

Article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows:

“Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of

succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in
which it may be situated.”

We have concluded that if article 10 is applicable and the estate in question is

that of a deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in accordance
with the norms of the State of his domicile in the United States. The second paragraph
of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the
Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign
law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the
successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked
only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.

This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our

Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the
owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.”

The nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the
acquisition of the community lands here in question must be determined in accordance
with the lex rei sitae.

It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands,
vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands
covered by certificates of titles, from the date of their acquisition to the date of her
death.

The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was
transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls
within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code which levies a tax on inheritances.

G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive
Secretary, respondents.

FACTS:

Four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956. Petitioners seek to stop
the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It
is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage
done by the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public
dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case
because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs
applies.

ISSUE: WON, the respondents can invoke lex situs principle?

RULING:

No. The respondents cannot apply lex situs principle to the case at bar.

A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or
ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the
formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on
land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the
same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues are not
concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property
belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to
validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures
adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does
not apply.

G.R. No. 108292 September 10, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Presidential Commission on Good Government

[PCGG]), petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, JOSE L. AFRICA, MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, respondents.

FACTS:

RP (PCGG) sought nullification of approved and partially implemented

compromise agreement between Benedicto (a Marcos crony) and PCGG. In March 1990,
Republic vs Benedicto, New York court approved plea bargaining agreement.
California court also approved settlement & partial release of claims. PCGG contends
that Sandiganbayan erred in approving agreement contrary to law, morals etc.
Agreement is defective since it was not authenticated before the consular officials
abroad and w/o participation of witnesses and of the SolGen.

RULING:

While the rule of lex loci celebrationis generally governs forms and solemnities of
contracts under Article 17 of the Civil Code, the principle of lex rei sitae (lex
situs) generally applies with respect to formalities for the acquisition, encumbrance, and
alienation of real and personal property.

And relative to this precept on lex situs, Philippine substantive law is certainly
clear on the matter that contracts are obligatory, in whatever form they may have been
entered into, subject to the existence of all the essential requisites for their validity. The
fact that the compromise agreement was not authenticated before the consular officers
abroad, as well as the absence of witnesses, cannot be of much legal significance under
Philippine law inasmuch as the requirement under Article 1358(a) of the Civil Code,
that a contract intended to extinguish or transmit real rights over the immovables must
be in a public document is merely designed for greater efficacy or convenience.

Neither does the absence of the Solicitor General's participation render the
agreement invalid since under both Executive Order No. 2 and Executive Order No. 14-
A, it is the PCGG which has been "primarily charged" with the responsibility of
recovering illegally acquired or misappropriated assets.

G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014

ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent, Suzuki, a Japanese national, bought a condominium unit and

parking lot located in the Philippines, that was owned by Kang, a Korean national for
P2.8 million pesos. However, by the time respondent demanded Kang to deliver the
CCT’s, the latter failed due to the fact that the CCT’s was allegedly in the possession of
Perez, Orion’s Loans officer. The latter said that there is still an unpaid balance of P1.8
Million pesos from Kang and the unit and parking lot was sold to them by Kang by
dacion en pago. The respondent filed a complaint to both Orion and Suzuki. Orion
contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void.
Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the
consent of both spouses.

RULING:

It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject

to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is found in the very
nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country
and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of
gravity there.

Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by
what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a
title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained
or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and
transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances.

This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to
immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be
ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci
rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where
the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign
law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.

Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall
be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the
property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on
the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the
Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This
certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property
for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as
required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
VII. CONFLICTS RULES ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

FACTS:

The judicial administrator of the estate filed a scheme of partition that was left by
the decedent Joseph Brimo. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed
it. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws
of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article
10 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not
respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be

considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national
law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of
the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-

appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA
BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:

Testator C. O. Bohanan was a citizen of Nevada, which is his domicile and his
permanent residence, left a will with regards to his properties and shares. The executor
filed a project of partition in accordance with the provisions of the will Magdalena,
Filipino, his former wife, filed an opposition regarding her claims because she was not
included in the will, and her children with the testator which received a lesser share
which is 6,000 pesos each. In addition, Magdalena questions the validity of the will,
claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form
concede to them. Their children should receive two-thirds of the estate left by the
testator in accordance to the law of the forum.

The court held that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen,
allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion
of his estate to his wife.

RULING:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of

succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of
their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession
is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is
found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil
Code.)

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of

testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as
it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of
the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all
his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving
the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be,
as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

FACTS:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of Texas, USA. He had five (5) legitimate children from
his first wife whom he divorced, namely, Edward, George, Henry, Alexander and Anna.
Her second wife Violet who survived him had three (3) legitimate children, namely,
Edwin, Walter and Dorothy; and his three illegitimate children, namely, Amos Jr., Maria
Christina and Maria Palma.

Amos executed a will in the Philippines with regards to the distribution of his
estate to the legitimate and illegitimate heirs. Subsequently, Amos died a resident in
Texas, USA. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein according to the testator’s will. However, both Maria Christina and
Miriam Palma, filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground
that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.

The court ruled in favor of the executor final account, report, and project of
partition on basing on Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

The petitioner invoked par. 3 of Article 17 of the Civil Code which states
“Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country”, as an exception of Article 16 of the Civil Code.”
ISSUE: WON, the will executed in the Philippines shall be governed by Philippine law?

RULING:

NO.

Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of
Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be
applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

FACTS:

Lorenzo Lorente married Paula Llorente in the Philippines. Thereafter, Lorenzo

went to US and was admitted as its citizen. After a few years, Lorenzo went back to the
Philippines to visit his wife Paula, but to his surprise, the latter was pregnant with
another man. Lorenzo filed a divorce in California which issued a divorce decree.

After a few years, Lorenzo married Alicia in the Philippines and had 3 children.
Lorenzo made a will in favor of Alicia and their children, which assigned Alicia as the
executor. Upon Lorenzo’s death, Paula filed a petition that she was Lorenzo’s surviving
spouse and should be entitled for the property left by the testator.

The RTC ruled in favor of Paula and declared that the divorce decree was not
recognizable before Philippine law.
 Alicia filed an appeal to CA and modified the decision of the lower court that
Alicia a co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired with the decedent during
their 25 years of cohabitation.

Hence, the appeal.

RULING:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by
her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes,
since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity."44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.

VIII. CONFLICTS RULES ON TORTS AND CRIMES

G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:

On the 2nd of December 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of

animals named Standard commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila,
Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 677 heads of
cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable means for securing the
animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died
while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275
of the Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed
because neither was it said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked
would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under Philippine laws,
like the ship involved.

ISSUE: WON, the Philippine Court has jurisdiction over an offense committed on board
a foreign ship while the territorial waters of the Philippines?

RULING:

YES.

No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes committed in a

foreign ship on the high seas, but the moment it entered into territorial waters, it
automatically would be subject to the jurisdiction of the country. The offense, assuming
that it originated in Formosa, which the Philippines would have no jurisdiction,
continued until it reached Philippine territory which is already under jurisdiction of the
Philippines.

Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. The
Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that merchant vessels of one
country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade would subject themselves
to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain.

Defendant is thereby found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

G.R. No. L-69044 May 29, 1987

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY
CORPORATION, respondents.

No. 71478 May 29, 1987

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE NISSHIN FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE CO., and DOWA FIRE & MARINE
INSURANCE CO., LTD., respondents.

FACTS:

(G.R. No. L-69044): a vessel operated by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., loaded
at Kobe, Japan for transportation to Manila, 5000 pieces of calorized lance pipes in 28
packages consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and 7 cases of spare parts
consigned to Central Textile Mills, Inc.; both sets of goods were insured with
Development Insurance and Surety Corp.

(G.R. No. 71478): the same vessel took on board 128 cartons of garment fabrics and
accessories, in 2 containers, consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corporation, and two cases
of surveying instruments consigned to Aman Enterprises and General Merchandise

The vessel caught fire and sank, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo.

ISSUE: Which law should govern? (Philippine law)

RULING:

The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the
liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. As the
cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of
Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code.

However, in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of
common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. Thus,
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), a special law, is suppletory to the
provisions of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 122308 July 8, 1997

PURITA S. MAPA, CARMINA S. MAPA and CORNELIO P. MAPA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-WORLD AIRLINES INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Plaintiffs Cornelio P. Mapa and Purita S. Mapa entered into contract of air
transportation with defendant TWA which the former purchased tickets from the latter
in Thailand, and the said TWA tickets are for Los Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-
Chicago. The domicile and principal place of business of carrier TWA is Kansas City,
Missouri, USA.

Subsequently, plaintiffs Purita and Carmina S. Mapa departed for Boston, taking
a connecting flight on TWA's carrier, checking in seven (7) pieces of luggage at the
TWA counter in the JFK Airport. However, upon arriving in Boston, plaintiffs Purita
and Carmina proceeded to the carousel to claim their baggages and found only three
out of the seven they checked in. The total value of the lost items amounted to
$11,283.79.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages before the RTC. The TWA invoked
lack of jurisdiction under the WARSAW Convention which the action could only be
brought either in Bangkok where the contract was entered into, or in Boston which was
the place of destination, or in Kansas City which is the carrier's domicile and principal
place of business.

The RTC ruled in favor of TWA and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Hence the petition.

ISSUE: WON, the case falls under WARSAW Convention?

RULING:

NO.

Under Art. 28(1) of the WARSAW Convetion, a complaint for damages against
an air carrier can be instituted only in any of the following places/courts:

(1) The court of the domicile of the carrier;

 (2) The court of its principal place of business;

(3) The court where it has a place of business through which

the contract had been made;

(4) The court of the place of destination.

There are then two categories of international transportation, viz., (1) that where
the place of departure and the place of destination are situated within the territories of
two High Contracting Parties (signatories to the WARSAW Convention) regardless of
whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment; and (2) that
where the place of departure and the place of destination are within the territory of a
single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory
subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power, even though the
power is not a party of the Convention.

Here, the tickets purchased by the petitioners are for Los Angeles-New York-
Boston-St. Louis-Chicago which shows not an international transportation and not in
the purview of WARSAW Convention. The only way to bring the contracts between
Purita and Carmina Mapa, on the one hand, and TWA, on the other, within the first
category of "international transportation" is to link them with, or to make them an
integral part of, the Manila-Los Angeles travel of Purita and Carmina through PAL
aircraft.

It must be underscored that the first category of international transportation under

the Warsaw Convention is based on "the contract made by the parties." TWA does not
claim that the Manila-Los Angeles contracts of transportation which brought Purita and
Carmina to Los Angeles were also its contracts. It does not deny the assertion of the
petitioners that those contracts were independent of the TWA tickets issued in Bangkok,
Thailand. No evidence was offered that TWA and PAL had an agreement concerning
transportation of passengers from points of departures not served with aircrafts of one
or the other.

The TWA is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines with

a physical office therein and therefore the case can be tried in the Philippines.

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation,l oaded with barrels of kerosene, regular
gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates including the
accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and
completely took over the vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where
the cargoes were unloaded transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused
Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the captive vessel returned to the Philippines.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all the accused were charged with
qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine
Waters). They were subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal.

Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and
punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done
or executed outside of Philippine waters (Singapore) and territory, stripping the
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence

ISSUE: WON, the Philippines has jurisdiction over Cheong?

RULING:

Yes.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine
waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in
Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree
No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine
waters.
IX. CONFLICTS RULES ON CORPORATION AND PARTNERSHIP

G.R. No. L-63557 October 28, 1983

LINGNER & FISHER GMBH, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE JR. and
PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL LABORATORIES, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

DMW was a firm in West Germany manufacturing PRODUCTS (probably

chemicals) under the trademarks FISSAN, etc. Private respondent Philippine Chemical
Laboratories, Inc. (PHILCHEM, for brevity) is a local company which apparently also
manufactures and sells chemicals. DMW and PHILCHEM executed a so-called Agency
AGREEMENT the basic provision of which was that PHILCHEM would be the
exclusive importer of the PRODUCTS into the Philippines. The benefit to PHILCHEM
would be the profits realized from re-sale in this country of imported PRODUCTS.

Subsequently, the DMW interests were acquired by LINGNER & FISHER GMBH
LINGNER (LINGNER) which was a subsidiary of BEECHAM which had an office in
the Philippines. Subsequently, the Agreement has been terminated since no new
agreement have been signed on the termination date.

PHILCHEM presented a claim to LINGNER for P1,055,000.00 under the

ROYALTY CLAUSE. Since no settlement have been made, PHILCHEM filed a
complaint against BEECHAM. However, the summons cannot be issued on BEECHAM
since the latter was neither a company registered in the Philippines, nor resident at the
given address in Metro Manila.

PHILCHEM then filed an amended complaint, this time making LINGNER and
BEECHAM as the defendants, leading that summons could be served on the Law Firm
as an agent of the defendants.

The Law Firm submitted a special appearance in the case on behalf of LINGNER,
and, also on behalf of LINGNER, moved for dismissal on the grounds (a) that LINGNER
was not a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines and hence could not be
sued locally, and, (b) that LINGNER could not be served with summons through the
Law Firm.

The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondent and denied the motion to
dismiss by the petitioner. The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: WON, the petitioner can be sued in the Philippine Court?

RULING:

Yes.

Whether LINGNER is or is not doing business in the Philippines will not matter
because the parties had expressly stipulated in the AGREEMENT that all controversies
based on the AGREEMENT "shall fall under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts". In
other words, there was a covenant on venue to the effect that LINGNER can be sued by
PHILCHEM before Philippine Courts in regards to a controversy related to the
AGREEMENT.

Before service of process can be effected upon a foreign corporation and

jurisdiction over the same may be acquired, it is best that alias summons on LINGNER be
issued, in this case under the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14, in relation to Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, which recognizes the principle that venue can be agreed upon by the
parties. If a local plaintiff and a foreign corporation have agreed on Philippine venue,
summons by publication can be made on the foreign corporation under the principle of
liberal construction of the rules to promote just determination of actions.

G.R. No. 102223 August 22, 1996

COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., ASPAC MULTI-TRADE,

INC., (formerly ASPAC-ITEC PHILIPPINES, INC.) and FRANCISCO S.
AGUIRRE, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ITEC INTERNATIONAL, INC., and ITEC,
INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners CMDI and ASPAC, are both domestic corporations, while petitioner
Francisco S. Aguirre is their President and majority stockholder. Private respondents
ITEC, are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Alabama, United States of America, not licensed to do business in the Philippines.

ITEC entered into a contract with petitioner ASPAC which the former engaged
the latter as its "exclusive representative" in the Philippines for the sale of ITEC's
products.

Subsequently, ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC

allegedly violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements.

ITEC filed legal charges against the petitioners of using knowledge and
information of ITEC's products specifications to develop their own line of equipment
and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITEC's own, and offering
them to ITEC's former customer.

On the other hand, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC license.

The court denied the motion to dismiss. The CA likewise affirmed the lower
court’s decision.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: WON, the Foreign Corporation, unlicensed doing business in the Philippines,
can sue a domestic corporation before Philippine Courts in this case?

RULING:

YES.

Generally, a "foreign corporation" has no legal existence within the state in which
it is foreign. This proceeds from the principle that juridical existence of a corporation is
confined within the territory of the state under whose laws it was incorporated and
organized, and it has no legal status beyond such territory. Such foreign corporation
may be excluded by any other state from doing business within its limits, or conditions
may be imposed on the exercise of such privileges. Before a foreign corporation can
transact business in this country, it must first obtain a license to transact business in the
Philippines, and a certificate from the appropriate government agency. If it transacts
business in the Philippines without such a license, it shall not be permitted to maintain
or intervene in any action, suit, or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of
the Philippines, but it may be sued on any valid cause of action recognized under
Philippine laws.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has not altogether prohibited foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines from suing or maintaining an
action in Philippine Courts. What it seeks to prevent is a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines without a licensed from gaining access to Philippine Courts.

The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in
the Philippines be licensed to do so and that they appoint an agent for service of process
is to subject the foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction
of its courts. The object is not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single
acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without
taking steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts. The implication
of the law is that it was never the purpose of the legislature to exclude a foreign
corporation which happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the
Philippines, and thus, in effect, to permit persons to avoid their contracts made with
such foreign corporations

A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine

Courts although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity
who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a
party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having
acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine of
estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic
corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate
entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity: The principle will be
applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking
advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has
received the benefits of the contract.

G.R. No. 118843 February 6, 1997

ERIKS PTE. LTD., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and DELFIN F. ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Eriks PTE. LTD. is a non-resident foreign corp. engaged in the
manufacture and sale of elements used in sealing pumps, valves and pipes for
industrial purpose, etc.

From January 17, 1989 to August 16, 1989, Private respondent Delfin, doing
business under the name of DERLENE EB CONTROLS CENTER / EB KARMINE
COMMERCIAL, ordered and received from petitioner various elements that have been
used by the former for their business.

The transfer of good were perfected in Singapore. Subsequently, demands were

made by petitioner upon private respondent to settle his account, but the latter failed to
do so.

The petitioner filed a complaint before RTC for the recovery of money. However,
the complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the petitioner has no legal capacity to
sue. The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner corporation may maintain an action in Philippine courts

considering that it has no license to do business in the country?

RULING:

NO.

The Corporation Code provides:

Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. — No foreign corporation

transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors
or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit
or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines;
but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine
courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized
under Philippine laws.

The aforementioned provision prohibits, not merely absence of the prescribed

license, but it also bars a foreign corporation "doing business" in the Philippines without
such license access to our courts. A foreign corporation without such license is not ipso
facto incapacitated from bringing an action. A license is necessary only if it is "transacting
or doing business in the country.

What is determinative of "doing business" is not really the number or the

quantity of the transactions, but more importantly, the intention of an entity to continue
the body of its business in the country. The number and quantity are merely evidence of
such intention. The phrase "isolated transaction" has a definite and fixed meaning, i.e. a
transaction or series of transactions set apart from the common business of a foreign
enterprise in the sense that there is no intention to engage in a progressive pursuit of
the purpose and object of the business organization. Whether a foreign corporation is
"doing business" does not necessarily depend upon the frequency of its transactions, but
more upon the nature and character of the transactions.

G.R. No. 185582 February 29, 2012

TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford) is a corporation duly organized and existing

under the laws of the Philippines while Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI) is a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Due to circumstances not
mentioned in the case, Kingford withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly,
reneged on their obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the
International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United States and
won the case against respondent. To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed a Petition
for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the
RTC of Makati City. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner
lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but
which collects royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign
arbitral award?

RULING:

YES.

Special law (ADR) prevails over the General law (Corporation Code). The
Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization and
regulation of private corporations. As between a general and special law, the latter
shall prevail - generalia specialibus non derogant.

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing
party in an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may raise
only those grounds that were enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention.
Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party
seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.

When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and,
as in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract,
by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of
the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the
implementation of the result.

On the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected

not because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic
Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question.

X. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

G.R. No. L-45193 April 5, 1939

EMILIE ELMIRA RENEE BOUDARD, RAYMOND ANTONIN BOUDARD,

GINETTE ROSE ADELAIDE BOUDARD and MONIQUE VICTOIRE
BOUDARD, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
STEWART EDDIE TAIT, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

The appellant Emilie Elmira Renee Boudard, in her capacity as widow of Marie
Theodore Jerome Boudard and as guardian of her coappellants, her children born
during her marriage with the deceased, obtained a judgment in their favor from the
civil division of the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China, on June 27,
1934, for the sum of 40,000 piastras, equivalent, according to the rate of exchange at the
time of the rendition of the judgment, to P56,905.77, Philippine currency, plus interest
the amount or rate of which is not given. The judgment was rendered against Stewart
Eddie Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial before
said court.
ISSUE: WON, the foreign judgment shall be executed here the Philippines?

RULING:

NO.

The appellants failed to show that the proceedings against the appellee in the
Court of Hanoi were in accordance with the laws of France then in force; and as to the
second point, it appears that said documents are not of the nature mentioned in sections
304 and 305 of Act No. 190. They are not copies of the judicial record of the proceedings
against the appellee in the Court of Hanoi, duly certified by the proper authorities
there, whose signatures should be authenticated by the Consul or some consular agent
of the United States in said country. To comply with the rule, the best evidence of
foreign judicial proceedings is a certified copy of the same with all the formalities
required in said sections 304 and 305 for only thus can one be absolutely sure of the
authenticity of the record.

In addition, the appellee was not duly tried or even summoned in conformity
with the law. The rule in matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a
foreign country, regarding payment of money, are only effective against a party if
summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings.

The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, so as

to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state
which renders the judgment. Notice sent outside the state to a nonresident is
unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery.
There must be actual service within the State of notice upon him or upon someone
authorized to accept service for him. A personal judgment rendered against a
nonresident, who has neither been served with process nor appeared in the suit, is
without validity. The mere transaction of business in a state by nonresident natural
persons does not imply consent to be bound by the process of its courts.

The process of a court has no extraterritorial effect, and no jurisdiction is

acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the
state. Nor has a judgment of a court of a foreign country against a resident of his
country having no property in such foreign country based on process served here, any
effect here against either the defendant personally or his property situated here.

Process issuing from the courts of one state or country cannot run into another,
and although a nonresident defendant may have been personally served with such
process in the state or country of his domicile, it will not give such jurisdiction as to
authorize a personal judgment against him.
 It cannot be said that the decision rendered by the Court of Hanoi should be
conclusive to such an extent that it cannot be contested, for it merely constitutes, from
the viewpoint of our laws, prima facie evidence of the justness of appellants' claim, and,
as such, naturally admits proof to the contrary.

The effect of a judgment of any other tribunal of a foreign country, having

jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment, is as follows:

1. In case of a judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing;

2. In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a

right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (Sec. 311 of Act No. 190.)

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (NORTHWEST), a corporation

organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in the
RTC- Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against private
respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc., (SHARP), a corporation incorporated under
Philippine laws.

Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through its Japan branch, entered into an
International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the
latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales
made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff on
March 25, 1980 sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted
proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages.

A writ of summons was issued by Tokyo District Court but the attempt to serve
the summons was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a person in the office
that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to receive court processes was in
Manila. After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo
District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at the
head office of the defendant in Manila.

Defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons.
Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing which
the Tokyo Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff was
unable to execute the court’s decision in Japan, and subsequently filed a suit for
enforcement of foreign judgment before the RTC.

The court dismissed the case for the Philippine court’s has no jurisdiction over
the foreign judgment since the foreign judgment is null and void because the action is in
personam and the defendant needs to be served summons personally in Japan (in his
territory) in order for the Japanese Court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant.

The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation
doing business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the
Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve
summons in Japan had failed?

RULING:

YES.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from

which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the
regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. The judgment
may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of

overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the judgment
rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of
such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the
extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was not
only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore acquire
jurisdiction over it.
 It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the
service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of
the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on
SHARP.

It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is
invalid, in which SHARP haven’t proved.

In the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of
identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked.
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the
Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business
in the Philippines.

In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four
duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the
light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and,
as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to
have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process.

Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court

was valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

G.R. No. 128803 September 25, 1998

ASIAVEST LIMITED, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO HERAS, respondents.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras
praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by
the Hong Kong Court Judgment.
 The defendant admits the existence of the judgment as well as its amendment,
but not necessarily the authenticity or validity thereof. One of the defendant’s witness
was Mr. Lousich, an expert on the laws of Hong Kong, as a representative of the law
office of the defendant's counsel who made a verification of the record of the case filed
by the plaintiff in Hong Kong against the defendant, as well as the procedure in serving
Court processes in Hong Kong.

The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be
recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the
legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment. The Court of Appeals rendered its
decision reversing the decision of the trial court and dismissing ASIAVEST's complaint
without prejudice. It underscored the fact that a foreign judgment does not of itself have
any extraterritorial application.

ISSUE: Whether the HK judgment is enforceable in the Philippines in this case?

RULING:

NO.

There is nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the specific law
of Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in actions in rem or in personam,
and where the defendant is either a resident or nonresident of Hong Kong. In view of
the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this particular issue, the presumption of
identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall come into play. It
will thus be presumed that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine
law.

In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not

voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons
within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This
method of service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he
is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore
cannot validly try and decide the case against him. Extraterritorial service will not
apply because the suit against him was in personam.

In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was in personam,
since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor.
Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him
was, indisputably, one in personam, summons should have been personally served on
him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid
and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that
the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines
for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 110263 July 20, 2001

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized

under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction
Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws

Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known
as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High
Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, for the recovery of the performance bond it had put
up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and
the nonpayment of the loan.

The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of

the petitioner and against the private respondent.

Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent

under the judgment, petitioner initiated on September 5, 1988 the complaint before
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court
of Malaya.

The RTC dismissed the complaint due to jurisdiction issue. The CA affirmed the
lower court’s decision.

Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: WON, the judgment of High Court of Malaya is enforceable in the Philippines
in this case?
RULING:

YES

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from

which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity
of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section
50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time
the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a
judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed
by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court,
whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in
the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign
judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the
burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.

In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money
judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered through Vinayak
Prabhakar Pradhan as the sole witness which he is in active practice of the law
profession in Malaysia, and provided documentary evidence. Having thus proven,
through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment,
said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the
party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise.

On the other hand, Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden
that fell upon it - to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied
upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.
G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, Respondents

FACTS:

Petitioners Mijares, et al., all of whom suffered human rights violations during
the Marcos era have chosen to do battle with the Marcos estate. They obtained a
final judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos. The US
District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, awarded the plaintiff class a
total of amount of roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. dollars in compensatory and
exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District
Court of Hawaii.

This final judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. As a consequence

to the enforcement, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, paying Php 410.00 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, Section 7(b)
where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. However,
the Estate of Marcos filed a motion to dismiss alleging the non-payment of the correct
filing fees. The Marcos Estate cited the Supreme Circular No. 7 pertaining to the
proper computation and payment of docket fees. The Regional Trial Court of
Makati dismissed complaint filed by the petitioners stating that the subject matter
was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign
court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee
was 472 Million Philippine pesos, in order that they be able to enforce a judgment
awarded them by a foreign court.

ISSUE: WON, the foreign judgment shall be recognized in the Philippines?

RULING:

YES

The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions
that may vary in different countries.
 SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as
follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence

of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in

rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed
conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign
judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign
judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of
jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the
enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction
to properly determine its efficacy.

It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to

enforce a foreign judgment, even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case
of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to properly determine its
efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity.

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement
thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they
do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees
those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements:
the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for
recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or
jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. The Philippine legal system
has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an
action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid
enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines.

Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it

emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed
by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well
as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is
not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the
Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any,
of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent

Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. Marinay met another Japanese,
Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
 Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in
Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and
Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their relationship. Fujiki then
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan declaring her marriage
in Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.

Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment before the RTC. However, the trial court dismissed the petition
maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality file the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy?

RULING:

Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a

foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact
of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Section 1 of the said rule provides for who may file such petition, to wit: Sec. 1:

Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.

In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. Thus, he has the legal personality to file the petition.

PETITION GRANTED.
G.R. No. 167052

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
EDGARDO V. GUEVARA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent, as a president of a stock brokerage firm PHILSEC (owned by Ayala

International Finance), was tasked to resolve the outstanding loans of Ventura Ducat.
The debtor proposed to settle his debts by an exchange of his assets. It was agreed that
his property in Harris County, Texas, which was believed to be around $2.9 mil, will be
the object of the exchange.

William Craig, a former owner of the property was the one who conducted the
appraisal of its fair market value which he estimated to be $3.365 mil. The agreement
was executed in Makati, Philippines; however, the ATHONA holdings had difficulty to
sell the property because the actual price is lower than expected. Due to that, ATHONA
did not pay the balance of the purchase price for the property and PHILSEC and AIFL
refused to release Ducat’s stock portfolio, claiming that they were defrauded into
believing with the appraised value. 1488, Inc. before the U.S. District Court sued
PHILSEC, AIFL, and ATHONA while the latter group filed counterclaims against 1488,
Inc., Daic, Craig, Ducat, and respondent seeking to recover damages and excess
payment, or the rescission of sale.

The U.S. District Court dropped respondent as counter-defendant for lack of

evidence. Respondent then moved to sanction petitioner (PHILSEC, now BPI Securities
Corp. – the petitioner) based on Rule 11 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
the said case, the Court concluded that the counterclaims against respondent are
frivolous and brought against him simply to humiliate and embarrass him, thus
directing PHILSEC and AILF to pay $49,450.

Upon appeal, The U.S. Court of Appeals found no basis of fraud, thus dismissing
the claim, but vacated the award of Rule 11 sanctions in favor of respondent for being
rendered without due process, and remanded such issue to the U.S. District Court.
 However, the U.S. District Court reinstated its previous judgment on the ground
that the basis of the original suit was unfounded. Still, petitioner continued to refuse
compliance with the order of the U.S. District Court and this prompted respondent to
file an action for enforcement in the RTC of Makati. The same allegations were
presented by petitioner, that the U.S District court rendered a decision upon a clear
mistake of law or fact and in violation of its right to due process. The RTC favored the
respondent which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the U.S. District Court is unenforceable in
Philippine Jurisdiction on the ground that it committed a clear mistake of law and fact.

RULING:

Foreign decisions are enforceable in Philippine Jurisdiction by virtue of general

accepted principles of international law and the incorporations clause of the
Constitution even though there is no procedure for the enforcement thereof. However,
the Supreme Court provides for its rules in Section 48, Rule 39 Rules of Court stating
that in case of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render it: upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title; while, if
against a person, it is a presumptive evidence of a right between the parties. In either
case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of

overcoming the presumption of its validity. The rules are silent to what initiatory
procedure must be undertaken but there is no question that a civil action is an
appropriate measure since it is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence
a vindication of a right prescinding either from a “conclusive judgment upon title” or
the “presumptive evidence of a right.”

However, due to the policy of preclusion, Philippine courts cannot substitute

their own judgment to what was rendered under the jurisdiction of another state.
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact and can only be
repelled by them on grounds external to its merits.

Since the fact of the foreign final order in this case is not dispute, the
presumptive validity of the order by the U.S. District Court stands enforceable. Any
purported mistake petitioner attributes to the U.S. District Court in the latter’s issuance
of the Order would merely constitute an error of judgment in the exercise of its
legitimate jurisdiction, which could have been corrected by a timely appeal before the
U.S. Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 192285 JULY 11, 2018

MATEO ENCARNACION (Deceased), substituted by his heirs, namely: ELSA

DEPLIANENCARNACION, et al, Petitioners
vs.
THOMAS JOHNSON, Respondent

FACTS:

On October 6, 2000, respondent filed an action for breach of contract with prayer
for damages and costs against spouses Narvin Edwarson (Narvin) and Mary Mitchie
Edwarson (also known as Mary Encarnacion; hereinafter shall be referred to as Mary),
Mateo's daughter, before the Vancouver Registry of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia, Canada. Respondent alleged that Narvin and Mary convinced him to invest
his money and personal property in a vehicle leasing company owned by the couple,
which turned out to be a fraudulent business scheme. The couple neither deposited the
promised profits into his account nor gave an accounting or explanation as to where his
funds went.

The Supreme Court of British Columbia gave due course to respondent's action
and ordered summons to be served upon Narvin and Mary. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court of British Columbia issued a Mareva injunction7 and authorized respondent,
among others, to obtain orders in foreign jurisdictions which would permit its
enforcement in those jurisdictions. Thereafter, the Supreme Court of British Columbia
issued a Default Judgment finding Narvin and Mary liable to respondent in the amount
of C$380,43l.00 with interest in the amount of C$18,385.56, C$1,198.04 as cost, and for
damages to be determined. On June 29, 2001, it ordered Narvin and Mary to each pay
respondent the sum of C$25,000.00 as aggravated damages.

Respondent filed an action for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment

with prayer for the recognition of the Mareva injunction before RTC. The court issued
an order restraining Narvin and Mary from disposing or encumbering their assets, as
well as those belonging, and those belonging to Mateo. Thereafter, the RTC ordered the
service of summonses by publication upon Narvin and Mary. Despite publication,
Narvin and Mary still failed to file their answer. Accordingly, on December 1, 2003, the
R TC declared them in default, and subsequently rendered a judgment in default in
accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The
properties then waere auction.

Mateo filed a petition for annulment of judgment for the reason that he is the
owner of 18 properties levied in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003; that he was not made a
party to the case; and that the inclusion of his properties in the levy and execution sale
were made without notice to him.

The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC over the action of recognition
of foreign judgment.

ISSUE: Whether an action for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy of a third-
party claimant of properties levied and sold under execution sale?

RULING:

NO

Petitioners failed to show their standing to file the petition.

The proper party to file a petition for annulment of judgment or final order need
not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. Nevertheless, it is essential that he
is able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he is adversely affected by the
judgment. A person not adversely affected by a decision in the civil action or
proceeding cannot bring an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court. The exception is if he is a successor in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action, or if the action or proceeding is in rem, in which case the
judgment is binding against him.

Here, the action sought to be annulled is a recognition of foreign judgment in a

collection case rendered by the Supreme Court of British Columbia filed by respondent
against Narvin and Mary. Under Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title."

We have previously held that Philippine courts exercise limited review on

foreign judgments and are not allowed to delve into its merits. Thus, the action for
recognition of foreign judgment does not require the relitigation of the case under a
Philippine court. Once admitted and proven in a Philippine court, a foreign judgment
can only be repelled by the parties and their successors in interest by subsequent title on
grounds external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Consequently, the right being enforced
in the action is the subject of the collection case, which is a personal one against the
couple and their successors in interest.

Considering the foregoing, Mateo is not a party who could be adversely

affected by the outcome of Civil Case No. 110-0-2003. To begin with, he was not an
indispensable party to the action for recognition whose interest in the controversy is
such that a final decree will necessarily affect his rights, as he was not the judgment
debtor in the action. Neither is Mateo a real party in interest in Civil Case No. 110-0-
2003, as aptly noted by the CA, having already transferred his interest in the properties
to Mary. Lastly, he is not a successor in interest of Narvin and Mary.

Mateo and petitioners were affected only in far as the alleged properties of Mateo
were levied and sold at the public auction-which came after the judgment in Civil Case
No. 110-0-2003. Mateo himself admitted this when he initially filed the petition.
Therefore, Mateo and his heirs cannot raise the alleged irregularities in the action for
recognition of foreign judgment; he may only question the propriety of the levy and
sale of their alleged properties.