72 THE TETRARCHY,

284–305
Udo Hartmann

The accession of Diocletian in 284 is used by modern scholars to mark the

start of a new historical period, late antiquity. However, at first Diocletian’s
proclamation looked rather like any other “normal” usurpation of the age of
soldier-emperors: just like his predecessors (Claudius Gothicus, Aurelian, and
Probus), Diocletian, whose real name was Diocles, was an Illyrian from a
modest background. Like them he had risen through the ranks of the army
to reach the equestrian order. In 284, he commanded the protectores domestici,
the imperial bodyguards. After he had eliminated his rival, Carinus, how-
ever, he embarked on a fundamental reform of the empire. His aim was
to solve the empire’s main structural problems—namely the numerous usur-
pations that had made imperial rule unstable and the insecurity on the
borders—by dividing the tasks between multiple emperors in a college of
rulers. Previous rulers in the third century, such as Valerian and Carus,
had moved in this direction, but only with close relatives; Diocletian,
who lacked sons, had to move beyond the family and then devise other
means to construct collegiality. In 285 Diocletian elevated the Illyrian soldier
Maximian to Caesar, and on April 1, 286 to Augustus. Diocletian now shared
the responsibility for the empire between himself and his co-ruler: Maximian,
with Hercules as his divine companion, administered the west, while Diocle-
tian himself, with Jupiter, the father of Hercules, as his divine aid, controlled
the east of the empire. In spring 293 this rule of two (dyarchy) expanded to
a rule of four (tetrarchy): each Augustus selected a Caesar, who served both
as a minor emperor and as a successor; in due course each was connected to
the senior emperor by marriage to their daughter. Galerius became Caesar

Translated by Katharina Umpfenbach.

The Encyclopedia of Ancient Battles, First Edition. Edited by Michael Whitby and Harry Sidebottom.
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
2 The Late Roman Empire

FIGURE 72.1 Porphyry statue of the tetrarchs, Venice, Basilica di San Marco. Red
porphyry. Byzantine, fourth century.
Source: Erich Lessing/Art Resource, NY.

in the east, Constantius in the west. Responsibilities for individual parts of

the empire and for specific border sections were allocated to the tetrarchs
without a formal division of the empire. Thereby all threatened borders
could be protected, while no usurper could prevail for long against this
group of rulers. On May 1, 305, Diocletian and Maximian resigned, and
the two Caesars were elevated to take over senior imperial status as Augusti,
each in turn designating new Caesars.
Although the tetrarchs led numerous campaigns to secure the borders, these
military actions had a rather defensive character. Major battles were therefore
rare. So it is no surprise that two of the four battles selected here took place
in the context of civil wars. None of these engagements is described at any length
in our sources.
 The Tetrarchy, 284–305 3

Diocletian against Carinus (284–285)1

The first major battle of the era was fought between the last soldier-emperor,
Carinus (r. 282–285), and Diocletian in 285. At the start of his reign, Carus
(r. 282–283) had made his two sons, Carinus and Numerian, co-rulers and heirs
by proclaiming them as Caesars. When he set out on a military campaign against
the Persians in spring 283, Carus appointed Carinus as Augustus, giving him
responsibility for the western part of the empire, while Numerian accompanied
him to the Orient. However, after the conquest of the Persian capital of Ctesiphon,
Carus died in July or August 283, allegedly struck by lightning, the weapon of Jupi-
ter, although suspicions have been aroused that the story of the lightning bolt
might conceal the involvement of Diocletian or of the praetorian prefect Aper.
Numerian, now also proclaimed Augustus, returned with the army to the west in
spring 284 but fell ill with an eye condition. The circumstances of his death in Asia
Minor are uncertain: his father-in-law, the praetorian prefect Aper, is reported to
have concealed his death until the smell of the corpse revealed the cover-up. Most
sources accuse Aper of murdering Numerian, but equally this may be a rumor
spread by Diocletian after he came to power in order to blacken Aper and justify
his immediate elimination; Numerian may indeed have died from his eye problems,
or may have been killed by someone other than Aper. In reality, Aper had no interest
in removing his son-in-law, since he was already controlling affairs behind the scenes
under Numerian. Moreover, he did not use Numerian’s death to usurp the title of
Augustus. After the announcement of Numerian’s death the army assembly ele-
vated Gaius Valerius Diocles as the new emperor at Nicomedia on November
20, 284. In front of this assembly, the Illyrian Diocles/Diocletian killed Aper with
his sword—allegedly because the latter had killed Numerian, but there can be no
doubt that he mainly wanted to dispose of a troublesome rival.
In Italy, Carinus now had to prepare for civil war. Diocletian in Asia Minor was
not the only threat, since the praetorian prefect Marcus Aurelius Sabinus Julianus
had also been proclaimed emperor in Pannonia. The usurper, who minted coins in
Siscia in Pannonia Superior to proclaim his new reign and pay his troops, was
defeated and killed by Carinus in early 285 near Verona. Carinus now turned
against Diocletian. The various names recorded for the consuls for the year 285
suggest that Diocletian may have been attempting to negotiate with Carinus, a
process in which the image of himself as the avenger of the murdered Numerian
would have been useful: the two ordinary consuls recognized at Rome were

1
Sources: Aur. Vic. Caes. 39.9–12; Eutrop. 9.20; Epit. de Caes. 38.6–8; Hist. Aug. Carus 18.2; Zosimus
1.73 = John of Antioch fr. 163. See also Jer. Chron. a. 2301 p. 225b; Jord. Romana 295; George Syncellus
472.24–25. Modern discussions: Williams (1985) 32–38; Kuhoff (2001) 17–27; Kreucher (2008)
420–423; Altmayer (2014) 120–183. Cf. Festy (2002) 248–252 (with the unconvincing assumption
of a skirmish before the battle of Margus at Cornacum/Sotin near Vukovar, based only on the Arme-
nian version of the Chronicle of Eusebius, a. 2303, p. 227 Karst).
4 The Late Roman Empire

Carinus (consul for the third time) and his praetorian prefect Titus Claudius
Aurelius Aristobulus; by contrast, Diocletian appointed only one consul, Diocletia-
nus (his second appointment as consul), with the vacancy available for the recog-
nition of Carinus if a deal could be struck. But there is no other evidence for
negotiations designed to avoid a further round of civil war.

Margus (285)
From northern Italy Carinus moved against the eastern army, while Diocletian
marched west along the Via Militaris, which led from the Sea of Marmara, through
Adrianople and Serdica, to Naissus and the river Margus (Morava), then down-
stream toward Viminacium and Singidunum on the Danube. At the confluence
of the Morava and Danube, in Moesia Superior, the armies clashed in summer
285, near the river port of Margus (Orašje in Serbia), about ten kilometers west
of Viminacium (Kostolac). This major battle is only briefly mentioned in the his-
toriography, and no source provides details. When the two armies engaged, it is
clear that Carinus was victorious in the actual fighting, but he could not exploit his
military success as he was murdered by his officers near Viminacium shortly after-
ward. Even Eutropius, who claims that Diocletian defeated Carinus, admits that
Carinus’ army was superior. Apparently, Diocletian had managed to win followers
among Carinus’ officers, in particular Aristobulus, who not only retained his office
after the battle but also continued as Diocletian’s consular colleague for the remain-
der of 285. The sources report that the murder was inspired by jealousy: a tribune,
whose wife Carinus had allegedly seduced, was the murderer. This account, how-
ever, contributes to a prevailing negative image of Carinus in the senatorial histo-
riography as a voluptuous tyrant: he had indulged in luxury, committed many
crimes, killed innocent people, seduced the wives of soldiers and senators, and
finally been loathed by everyone. The truth of these stories is questionable, since
such gossip was probably created by the propaganda of the victorious Diocletian,
who now controlled the historical memory of events as well as the entire empire.
Diocletian was recognized by the Senate and probably visited the capital at the end
of the year 285.

Constantius against the British usurper Allectus (293–296)2

The only usurpation against the college of the four rulers that was successful for a
significant period occurred in Britain, where—protected by its position as an
island—a secessionist “Britannic empire” was established for one decade. Early
2
Sources: Pan. Lat. 8.6–7; 8.12–20; 6.5.4–6.1; 10.11.7–12.8; Aur. Vic. Caes. 39.20–21; 39.39–42;
Eutrop. 9.21; 9.22.2; Orosius 7.25.6. Modern discussions: Williams (1985) 71–75; Casey (1994)
esp. 127–139; Kuhoff (2001) 59–60, 65–71, 87–91, 136–142, 155–164; Birley (2005) 371–393.
 The Tetrarchy, 284–305 5

in his reign Maximian had charged the Menapian officer Marcus Aurelius
Maus(aeus) Carausius with protecting the English Channel and eastern British
coastline from Frankish and Saxon pirates. As commander of the fleet, praefectus
classis, Carausius was indeed successful against the Germans, but he apparently
did not deliver the resulting booty to the imperial treasury. Fearing punishment,
he had himself declared emperor, possibly in late 286 or in winter 287–288; Britain
and the parts of northwest Gaul around Bononia/Gesoriacum (Boulogne-sur-Mer)
accepted his rule. The usurper refrained from aggressive expansion or launching a
civil war against Maximian, and toward his subjects in Britain Carausius would
have appeared as an “ordinary” Roman emperor. On coins and in inscriptions
he used the normal imperial title Imperator Caesar Augustus pius felix invictus, and
he proclaimed himself consul on four occasions. He obviously hoped to be recog-
nized as an emperor by the other two Augusti, and he even called himself frater
(brother) of Diocletian and Maximian on coins that he had struck with the portraits
of the three Augusti. It remains unclear whether there actually was a temporary
truce between the tetrarchs and Carausius or whether Carausius merely invented
this agreement in order to emphasize the legitimacy of his rule vis-à-vis his subjects.
A first fleet sent to Britain by Maximian in 289 failed, but in spring and summer
293 the new Caesar, Constantius, successfully besieged Boulogne and reconquered
the whole coast of Gaul. At the end of 293 Carausius was murdered in Britain by his
senior financial officer, Allectus. The background is unknown, but the loss of Gaul
may have weakened Carausius’ position; Allectus was declared Augustus of seces-
sionist Britain.
After a delay caused by fighting against German tribes near the mouth of the
Rhine, Constantius Caesar perceived an opportunity to terminate the “Britannic
empire.” After lengthy preparations, he launched the invasion, probably in autumn
296, while Maximian safeguarded the Rhine. The longest account of the campaign
is provided by a Gallic orator who pronounced a panegyric to Constantius in 297 or
298; this describes the campaign against Allectus’ troops, who are branded a “mob
of pirates” and barbaric bandits in some detail, but unfortunately the panegyrist’s
rhetorically embellished descriptions contain few concrete facts. Constantius
divided his naval invasion force into two groups: the first part, with the main army
under the praetorian prefect Julius Asclepiodotus, set off from the mouth of the
river Seine over the Channel toward the English south coast. Near Vectis (Isle
of Wight), the ships managed to evade the fleet of Allectus in the fog and land their
troops. After burning the landing craft, the army moved toward Londinium
(London). The other naval contingent sailed in stormy weather from the harbor
of Boulogne toward the mouth of the river Thames but lost its way in a fog.
Allectus had assembled his main fleet, whose strength is widely acclaimed on
coins, in a harbor on England’s southeastern coast across from Boulogne, perhaps
in Dubris (Dover), the base of the Britannic fleet, and he probably expected the
attack of Constantius in this area. The failure to prevent Asclepiodotus’ army from
landing further west near the Isle of Wight forced Allectus to move west to
6 The Late Roman Empire

oppose them. In a major battle, the army of Allectus, which according to the pan-
egyrist mainly consisted of Frankish mercenaries, was beaten and the usurper killed
by the soldiers of Asclepiodotus. The panegyrist, who does not mention the name
of Asclepiodotus, paints a colorful picture of the battle: horrified by the enemy, the
“pirate” had fought irrationally against the Roman troops without considering his
vast preparations or forming all of his army into a line of battle, surrounded only by
his closest co-conspirators and his barbarian mercenaries. As a consequence, hardly
any Romans lost their lives. Instead the bodies of the slain barbarians, and of those
who imitated the barbarians in their dress and hair style, covered the battlefield.
Among the corpses lay the dead vexillarius latrocinii, the “standard bearer of the
bandits,” the usurper Allectus, who had taken off his imperial robe.
This rhetorical description depicts the battle as a struggle between the Roman
troops of Constantius on one side and pirates, brigands, and Frankish barbarians on
the other, in order to conceal the fact that it was a civil war between Allectus and
the tetrarchs. For the panegyrist those Roman enemies that fell on the other side
were not “real Romans” but only barbarized soldiers who dressed like Franks and
dyed their hair red. Other details of the battle description also merit little trust, such
as the allegedly unplanned actions of the overpowered “robber” Allectus and his
inability to marshal a battle formation. Allectus was probably defeated largely
because he could not use his most powerful weapon: his fleet. He had been waiting
for the fleet of Constantus to arrive from Boulogne so as to prevent their landing
but was then taken by surprise when Asclepiodotus successfully landed on the
southern coast. His troops, hastily assembled from British legions and Frankish
auxiliaries, were undoubtedly inferior compared to the battle-hardened army of
Constantius. The sources do not provide explicit evidence on where the battle
had taken place. The localization of the battlefield near Silchester (Calleva Atreba-
tum) in Hampshire often found in the literature thus remains a matter of pure spec-
ulation. We can only say that the two armies met somewhere between the coast
near the Isle of Wight and London.
The second part of the fleet finally landed in the Thames estuary, defeated the
Franks of Allectus stationed in Londinium, and brought the city under the tet-
rarchs’ control. Victory over Allectus was already won when the Caesar finally
appeared on the island and entered Londinium as a liberator. A gold medallion
with a value of ten aurei (RIC 6: 167, Treveri No. 34) (see Figure 72.2) shows
Constantius’ arrival in Londinium and praises the restoration of Britain. The Cae-
sar, on horseback with a lance, is welcomed by the personification of the city of
Londinium, which kneels in front of the gates. The reverse legend celebrates Con-
stantius as “restorer of the eternal light,” redditor lucis aeternae. A ship under the
horse of the Caesar represents the major military achievement of crossing the Oce-
anus. An amnesty secured the reintegration of Britain into the empire. There are no
reports of trials against the supporters of Carausius and Allectus. After he had
secured Britain with fortifications and carried out an administrative reform, the
Caesar left the island.
 The Tetrarchy, 284–305 7

FIGURE 72.2 Gold medallion of Constantius Caesar (found near Arras), minted in Trier
(RIC 6: 167, Treveri No. 34). The reverse reads: “REDDITOR LVCIS AETERNAE | LON |
PTR” (mint-mark below the main design).
Source: HIP/Art Resource, NY.

The Persian War of Galerius (296–298)3

After the last major invasion of Shapur I (in 260) and the counteroffensives of the
Palmyrene general Odaenathus (in 262–263 and 267), relations between Rome and
Persia remained mostly peaceful. In 287 or 288, Diocletian even concluded a peace
agreement with the King of Kings Vahram II, who had to deal with internal oppo-
nents. In 293 Shapur’s son Narseh prevailed in a usurpation against Vahram III, son
of Vahram II and great-nephew of Narseh. In his inscription at Paikuli the new ruler
of Persia, Narseh, emphasized the friendship between the two empires, but there-
after he soon returned to the offensive policy of his father toward the Roman east.
Like Shapur, Narseh primarily aimed at occupying northern Mesopotamia and seiz-
ing full control of Armenia, the Persian part of which he had ruled as “Great King of
Armenia” before his accession to the throne of Persia. His goal was probably also to

3
Sources: Lact. De mort. pers. 9.5–8; Aur. Vic. Caes. 39.33–36; Eutrop. 9.24–25; Festus 14.6, 25; Amm.
Marc. 14.11.10; 22.4.8; 23.5.11; Ps.-P’awstos Buzand 3.21; Peter the Patrician fr. 13–14; Malalas 12.39;
Theophanes a. 5793; Zonaras 12.31; Moses Khorenats’i Hist. Arm. 2.79–82. See also Jer. Chron. a. 2318
p. 227f; Hist. Aug. Carus 9.1–3; Orosius 7.25.9–11; Jord. Get. 110; Ps.-Joshua 7 (Nisibis under Roman
rule in 297–298). Modern discussions: Williams (1985) 78–87; Kuhoff (2001) 166–184; Wiesehöfer
(2007); Winter and Dignas (2007) 28–32, 84–88, 122–130; Leadbetter (2009) 88–97; Mosig-Walburg
(2009) 91–148 (with to some extent other reconstructions of the events); Weber (2010) (on king
Narseh); Maksymiuk (2015), 48–47. See also Garsoïan (1989) 486 (on Osχay); Kettenhofen (2008)
484–489 (on Armenia).
8 The Late Roman Empire

make up for the Roman success in 283 in which Carus was able to capture Persia’s
capital, Ctesiphon. Yet Lactantius exaggerates when he claims that Narseh aimed to
become master of the whole Roman Orient, since such wide-reaching goals are
unlikely. With his offensive, Narseh was possibly also responding to the greater
military presence of the Romans in the east. Diocletian had expanded border for-
tifications in Syria along the Strata Diocletiana as well as at Circesium and fought a
war against the Saracen Arabs in 290, thereby showing an enhanced and menacing
presence on the eastern frontier; there is, however, no reliable evidence for an
imminent large Persian campaign by Diocletian.
In 296 Narseh opened his campaign with the occupation of the part of Armenia
that the Romans considered to be their client kingdom. But it remains doubtful
whether Narseh drove a Roman client king named Tiridates out of western
Armenia, as is often claimed. The information in later Armenian historiography
(Moses Khorenats’i Hist. Arm. 2.82) that the Romans appointed a king named Trdat
in the third year of Diocletian’s rule (i.e. 286–287) cannot be trusted. Furthermore,
it cannot be proved that this ruler is identical to the king Trdat mentioned in
Narseh’s inscription at Paikuli (l. 44). After subjugating Armenia, Narseh pro-
ceeded to attack Mesopotamia and apparently occupied parts of it.

Callinicum (297)
Diocletian, who was on the Danube, sent his Caesar Galerius against the Persians in
the spring of 297. Galerius moved from Syria across the Euphrates but was beaten
by Narseh and a numerically superior force on the plains between Carrhae and
Callinicum. He then had to withdraw to Syria; there is one report that Narseh pur-
sued him, but this is unlikely. Diocletian was naturally not pleased to learn of this
defeat. He moved to Syria, where he met Galerius outside Antioch. The encounter
is portrayed in many sources as a public humiliation for the Caesar, who was forced
to walk in his imperial robes in front of Diocletian’s carriage, but it is more prob-
able that the ceremony simply reflected and publicized the imperial hierarchy in
operation.

Armenia Major (298)

In 298, however, Galerius campaigned with much more success. Diocletian had
been engaged in Egypt fighting rebels since the summer or autumn of 297, but
Galerius advanced with a newly assembled army of 25,000 soldiers; this included
veterans and fresh recruits; reinforcements from Illyria, Moesia, and Dacia
Ripensis; and Gothic auxilia that Diocletian had brought to the east from beyond
the Danube. Galerius planned to proceed from Armenia against the Persians, as the
route over the mountains was probably regarded as safer than the route through
northern Mesopotamia. However, after traversing Armenia Minor, Galerius met
Narseh’s army in Armenia Major, where the Persian king had moved with all
 The Tetrarchy, 284–305 9

his baggage and his court. Galerius himself and two horsemen are said to have
reconnoitered the enemy’s dispositions, after which the Roman troops suddenly
attacked the Persian camp, defeated the unprepared Persians, and drove Narseh
to flight. There is talk of a great massacre inflicted by the Romans on the Persians,
who had come to the battle in countless formations.
Where exactly this surprise attack took place is not known, since Roman sources
only give the general location of Armenia Major. There is more precision in the
admittedly confused account in the Armenian Epic Histories attributed to Ps.-P’aw-
stos Buzand, which reports a campaign by Narseh into Armenia and the counter-
attack of an unnamed “king of the Greeks”; this event is chronologically misplaced
at some time in the mid-fourth century, between Constantine and Valens. Accord-
ing to this account, the emperor marched to Armenia, left his army at the Roman
legionary base of Satala (Sadak), and went on a spying mission to the Persian camp
disguised as a farmer, together with two Armenians. This camp is located in the
village of Osχay (Oskha), in the district of Basean on the upper Araxes river to
the southeast of Karin (the later Theodosiopolis, modern Erzerum). After spying
on the Persians, the emperor returned and at daybreak attacked the Persian camp
with his army. The Romans killed all the men, captured the queen and her ladies,
and secured the royal treasures. Only Narseh managed to escape.
Although Galerius is not mentioned, this account clearly is the Armenian version
of the western reports of Galerius’ victory, decorated with colorful details and
placed in the wrong context: the two Roman horsemen are converted into Arme-
nians, and Galerius even goes to the Persians’ camp to spy on their strength. The
use of Satala as a base by the Romans is plausible, and from there Galerius is likely
to have moved toward Armenia Major. It is uncertain, however, where exactly the
Epic Histories located the battlefield. The village of Osχay is not attested elsewhere.
So the site of the battle cannot be located, and even the indication that it was near
Erzerum is not reliable, since this would entail a long-distance reconnaissance by
Galerius followed by an equally long unobserved march to attack the Persian camp.
The location of the camp is more likely to be found near Satala in the western part
of Armenia Major.
It might even be doubted that there was a pitched battle, since a surprise attack
on the Persian camp might have produced the same results; at any rate no details
are known about the encounter. Galerius captured the royal treasury along with
Narseh’s family and harem, and many nobles were made prisoners. Arsane, the
main wife of Narseh, and probably also the other members of the royal family were
brought to Antioch. Narseh managed to escape and was probably pursued by
Galerius as far as the borders of Media, though some Roman sources fancifully
claim that he went much further, even to the borders of India; Narseh then had
to withdraw to Persia. Western sources naturally exaggerated Galerius’ success,
asserting that he would have conquered a new province if Diocletian had not
stopped him. An advance over Media and Adiabene to Ctesiphon, the Persian res-
idence, as suggested by several scholars, is also unlikely. But the Persians probably
10 The Late Roman Empire

did vacate northern Mesopotamia, since, after crushing the Egyptian uprising in
spring 298, Diocletian had rushed to the eastern frontier and restored Roman rule
in Mesopotamia, which had been lost following Narseh’s occupation. Here he
received his victorious Caesar in the summer, and Nisibis returned to Roman
control.
In the second half of 298 Narseh started peace negotiations with Diocletian and
Galerius, who were based in Nisibis. The Iranian negotiator Apharban asked Galer-
ius for the return of Narseh’s children and wives, referring to the equality of the
two realms. After consultation, Diocletian and Galerius sent Sicorius Probus as
ambassador to Persia, and he negotiated the details with Narseh in a palace by
the river Asprudis in Media: the Romans were in a position to dictate conditions,
and a favorable peace was concluded in late 298. The Tigris was established as the
border between the two empires, though certain regiones Transtigritanae (areas
across the Tigris) between Mesopotamia and Armenia (Arzanene, Carduene, Ingi-
lene, Sophene, and Zabdicene) became client states under Roman control; the for-
tress Zintha marked the border between Armenia and Media (i.e. between the
Roman sphere of influence and the Sasanid empire); Armenia and Iberia were
recognized as Roman client kingdoms; and the Roman city of Nisibis was agreed
as the only trading place. Once peace was concluded, Narseh’s family members
were returned.
The campaign of Galerius and the peace of Nisibis were great successes for the
Romans: the Tigris frontier and the Roman client kingdoms of Armenia and Iberia
were now formally recognized. By the end of the third century, the Romans had
prevailed in the power struggle between the two great empires for control of
Armenia and northern Mesopotamia, at least for the moment. The victory of
Galerius over the Persians was celebrated at his residence in Thessalonica on a tri-
umphal arch that still exists today. Galerius and Diocletian could now proudly call
themselves Persicus maximus II, Armenicus maximus, Medicus maximus, and Adiabe-
nicus maximus, as they had restored safety on the eastern frontier and secured the
primacy of Rome. The peace remained until the age of Constantine and Shapur II.

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Further reading

Barnes, T. D. (1982), The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine. Cambridge.

Johne, K.-P., ed. (2008), Die Zeit der Soldatenkaiser. Berlin.
Rees, R. (2004), Diocletian and the Tetrarchy. Edinburgh.