Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Motion Land Owner and Tenant
Motion Land Owner and Tenant
I.
RIGHTS OF LANDOWNER AND TENANT ARE EQUALLY PROTECTED.
II.
Agricultural landholdings have long been an issue in our country, said
concern has been delegated to DAR. According to an article published by the latter,
OIC Secretary Rosalina Bistoyong told her top officials (as its marching order) “to
perform their respective assignments and to make them accountable for the
accomplishments and failures in DAR’s performances on land tenure service (LTS),
agrarian legal service (LTS), technical advisory support services (TASS), foreign-
assisted and special projects office (FASPO) and Finance and Administrative Service”.
Land Tenure Services is the very spirit of agrarian reform.
Land Tenure Services is operationalized either through land acquisition
and distribution (LAD) or leasehold operations. LAD involves the redistribution of
government and private agricultural lands to landless farmers and farm workers. It
secures farmers' tenure, promotes social equity, and provides them with necessary
productive resources needed to ensure their economic viability and
productivity. Leasehold operations, on the other hand, is the alternative non-land
transfer scheme. It covers all tenanted agricultural lands such those in the retained
areas, not yet acquired for distribution under CARP, and those which may be validly
covered under existing laws.
Under Leasehold Operation (1964-Dec. 31,2015), tenant-farmer enjoys full
control and management of the land. As payment for the use of land the leaseholder
pays the landowner on amount equivalent to 25% of his net harvest.
III
Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. - Any of the following shall be a
sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:
(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land himself personally
or through the employment of farm machinery and implements: Provided, however,
That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself or should fail to employ
mechanical farm implements for a period of one year after the dispossession of the
tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the land and damages for
any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession: Provided, further, That the
land-holder shall, at least one year but not more than two years prior to the date of
his petition to dispossess the tenant under this subsection, file notice with the court
and shall inform the tenant in wiring in a language or dialect known to the latter of
his intention to cultivate the land himself, either personally or through the
employment of mechanical implements, together with a certification of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that the land is suited for
mechanization: Provided, further, That the dispossessed tenant and the members of
his immediate household shall be preferred in the employment of necessary
laborers under the new set-up.
(b) When the current tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however,
That this subsection shall not apply when the tenant has substantially complied with
the contract or with the provisions of this Act.
(c) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's share:
Provided, however, That this shall not apply when the tenant's failure is caused by a
fortuitous event or force majeure.
(d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than that specified by
agreement of the parties.
(e) When a share-tenant fails to follow those proven farm practices which will
contribute towards the proper care of the land and increased agricultural
production.
(f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury to the land which will
impair its productive capacity.
NEGATIVE:
I
WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION AMONG LANDHOLDER-LESSOR
(e.g. lesser income / undercompensation)
II
In a research entitled “ lMPACT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ON
LANDOWNERS: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK” by
Gilberto Llanto and Clarence Dingcong published on August 1991 Philippine
Institute for Development Studies
The 1987 Constitution provides that the state shall promote
comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform " It requires the state to
provide incentives to landowners to encourage them to invest the proceeds of the
compensation for their lands under agrarian reform to promote mdustnalizatton,
employment creation, and pnvatlzation of public sector enterprises. It provides that
financial instruments used as payments for lands shall be honored as equity m
public enterprises where landowners chose to invest These constitutional provisions
are a major feature of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) signed
into law (Republic Act 6657) by President Corazon C Aqumo on 10/une 1988
Phfllpplne studies on agrarian reform have dealt largely with the agrarian reform
beneficiaries and the reform s effects on their welfare and production efficiency.
Very little work has been undertaken on the agrarian reform's other major actor the
landowner This is rather surprising in view of the important role expected of
landowners in promoting industrialization and employment
Payments for Landowner$ Under RA 66.57 Ll_nderthe'Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the landowner is compensated based on the cost of
acquisition of the land, its current value, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation,, tag declaration, and the assessment made by government assessors. This
multifactor formula has caused some problems. Foremost was the lack of systematic
and reliable data,base_,particularly on land sales, which make valuation initially
difficult. Also, it gave room for manipulation of land sales data, which led to
overvaluation of the land. Another problem was the rather complicated calculations
(which an ordinary agrarian reform officer finds difficult) inherent in the formula
(Comista !990). The compensation is paid in one of the following modes, atthe option
of the landowner: (a) a portion in cash (depending on the size of the land) and the
balance in government financial instruments negotiable at any time; (b) shares of
stocks in government-owned or controlled corpora "fiOns, LBP preferred shares,
physical assets, or other qualified investments in accordance with the guidelines set
by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC); (c) tax credits which can be
used against any tax liability; and (d) LBP bonds. Market interest rates for LBP bonds
are aligned with the 91, day Treasury Bill rates. Ten percent of the bonds' face value
matures every year, from the date of issuance until the tenth year. The bonds can be
used to purchase government assets to be privatized and as security for loans with
any government and other financial institutions. However, former landowners do
not seem to have enough incentives to try business ventures, apparently because
these bonds do not have strong secondary market. Besides, the 10 percent of the
bonds which matures every year is too small to use as capital. 10 Since the Aquino
administration's agrarian reform program was implemented only in 1988, it is
understandable that very few studies had been made on the landowner's utilization
of the compensation from CARL. Cornista et al. (1989) made such a study,
particularly of the utilization of compensation arising from the Voluntary Offer to
sell (vos) scheme. At the time of the study, 30 landowners throughout the country
have been fully or partially paid by the LBP under the VOS scheme. The study was
able to draw responses from 24 landowners. For the cash portion, 54 percent of the
landowner-respondents used it to pay loans to the LBP and the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP), to which the particular lands covered by the CARL have been
mortgaged for some time prior to the VOS. As for the bonds, the landowners either
allowed them to mature or converted them to cash at 96 percent of the face value.
The majority (58 percen0 kept their bonds to convert them to cash later, or to wait
for payment of the matured portion and of the interest. The rest (42 percent)
converted their bonds to cash for investment. The study concluded that the actual
utilization of the compensation (cash and bonds) indicated that the landowners
lacked interest in promoting rural-based industries or in creating additional
employment. Landowners who offered to sell small farms considered the proceeds
from the LBP too meager to invest in a new and viable business. In fact, they
considered the proceeds (regular payment and interest earnings) as substitute for
the income they should have earned had the land not been subjected to VOS. On the
other hand, landowners who sold large farms and opted to monetize their bonds
preferred to invest in income generating ventures. 5 Nonpreference for rural-based
industries may be due not only to the perceived high risk of such ventures but also to
insufficient knowledge of the available opportunities open to rural enterprises.
Further, government assistance to landowners on alternative investment
opportunities was deemed inadequate. _
The Cornista et al. study draws the following issues:
1. Lack of incentives for landowners to invest the proceeds from agrarian reform to
promote industrialization, generate employment, and facilitate the privatization of
public sector enterprises;
2. Inadequacy of the cash portion to induce the landowner to engage in industry;
3. Inadequacy of assistance given to landowners for alternative investment
opportunities; and
4. Delays in the payment of compensation.