The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:

www.emeraldinsight.com/0951-3558.htm

How can performance Performance

measurement
measurement systems empower systems
managers? An exploratory study
in state-owned enterprises 371
Received 7 August 2015
Martyna Swiatczak and Michèle Morner Revised 31 August 2015
Public Management and Leadership, Accepted 4 September 2015
German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer, Speyer, Germany, and
Nadine Finkbeiner
Reinhard-Mohn-Institute for Management and Corporate Governance,
Witten/Herdecke University, Witten, Germany

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate how performance measurement systems (PMSs)
might be designed in order to empower managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) towards an active
work role.
Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on a conceptual approach that combines
insights from prior research on performance measurement with that on dimensions of psychological
empowerment. An exploratory case study is used to further develop propositions for the design of an
empowering PMS. Data from in-depth interviews with six managers of diverse SOEs located within a
German city enables the tracing of underlying causal mechanisms.
Findings – PMSs that are designed according to the principles of goal clarity, balanced goal difficulty,
autonomy-enhancing measurement, and a broad goal scope can positively influence the four
dimensions of empowerment: meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact.
Practical implications – The study’s propositions can be used to enhance the governance of SOEs
through a particular design of PMSs. This research thus responds to the call for a new generation of
governance mechanisms within the complex setting of SOEs.
Originality/value – Current research on PMSs is extended through the construct of psychological
empowerment. Thus, an existing governance mechanism is further developed towards being more
effective for use in the context of SOEs.
Keywords Performance measurement, Germany, Psychological empowerment, State-owned enterprises
Paper type Research paper

Introduction
Defined as enterprises that are directly or indirectly, fully or to a significant part owned by
the state, municipalities, or other levels of public authorities (Friedmann and Garner, 1970;
Grossi et al., 2015; OECD, 2005), “state-owned enterprises” (SOEs) are today largely hybrids
of public and private ownership (Bruton et al., 2015; Koppell, 2007; Thynne, 1994).
Accordingly, they face potential agency conflicts due to multi-layered ownership and
control models (Calabrò and Torchia, 2011; Kankaanpää et al., 2014). Further, SOEs are
simultaneously confronted with typically public-sector goals, such as public value
creation, and characteristically private-sector goals such as profitability and competitive
International Journal of Public
advantage (Bruton et al., 2015; Grossi and Reichard, 2008; Vagliasindi, 2008). This implies Sector Management
multi-layered accountability arrangements towards members of society, administrations, Vol. 28 No. 4/5, 2015
pp. 371-403
professional groups, and political representatives (Bovens, 2007; Christensen and © Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0951-3558
Lægreid, 2015; Verschuere et al., 2006), the mere volume of which challenges the effective DOI 10.1108/IJPSM-08-2015-0142
IJPSM governance of SOEs. Consequently, two reform waves have tried to deliver adequate
28,4/5 governance mechanisms in order to address this complexity (Christensen and
Lægreid, 2007; Christensen, 2012; De Vries and Nemec, 2013).
First, “new public management” (NPM) introduced a governance mode that focuses
on granting SOEs additional autonomy while making public actors directly
accountable for performance outputs (Christensen and Lægreid, 2015; Hood, 1995;
372 Palermo et al., 2010). Output-based governance sets goals, measures performance, and
uses incentives to direct SOEs towards the efficient fulfilment of public tasks
(Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; Van Dooren, 2005; Frost and Morner, 2011; Pollitt and
Bouckaert, 2011). Thus, most NPM reforms are contingent on performance
measurement (van Dooren, 2005; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Performance
measurement systems (PMSs) are formal systems that set certain strategic outputs
and provide information about actual levels of performance (Franco-Santos et al., 2007;
Melnyk et al., 2014). Using them, public authorities aim to govern SOEs in the style of
the private sector. The concrete performance information use is manifold and takes
place in a next step; however, this paper focuses in particular on the measurement
perspective. The most widespread PMS is probably Kaplan and Norton’s (1992)
“balanced scorecard” with its strategic development (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2001),
but other formal and informal models also exist (e.g. Neely et al., 1995; Nudurupati et al.,
2011; Watts and McNair-Connolly, 2012). However, the measurement of managerial
performance in SOEs is particularly difficult (Aharoni, 1981; Bai and Xu, 2005) as it is a
highly complex setting, and international research still faces a research gap in this field
in general (Bruton et al., 2015) and in particular with regard to the measurement
perspective (for an exception, see Ramamurti, 1987).
Second, “post-new public management” (post-NPM) reforms attempted to
overcome the shortcomings of NPM reforms that did not succeed in significantly
increasing governance effectiveness (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). They enhanced
the governance repertoire with a wide variety of new approaches that put more focus
on shifting power back to political and administrative bodies and, at the same time,
providing the latter with governance frameworks to help them govern inter-
organizational actions more effectively (Christensen, 2012). Central to these
approaches is a greater emphasis on common values, the increased involvement of
SOEs, and the provision of general frameworks for self-governance in order to
improve cooperation vis-à-vis public goals (Ling, 2002; Nabatchi, 2010; Sørensen and
Triantafillou, 2009).
At first sight, post-NPM governance approaches seemingly contradict NPM-based,
output-centred governance ones. Some scholars, however, are calling for both
approaches to be acknowledged as supplements to rather than substitutes for
each other (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, 2011a; Christensen, 2012; Egeberg and
Trondal, 2009). According to this view, NPM does not need to be replaced (Pollitt, 2003)
but instead slowly enriched by post-NPM reforms, resulting in different governance
mechanisms coexisting alongside one another (Askim et al., 2014). This combination of
governance modes seems to be a satisfactory solution for complex governance settings
such as those of SOEs, as it enables flexible adaptation to changing governance needs
(Bruton et al., 2015; Christensen and Lægreid, 2010; Grandori, 1997, 2001a; Morner
and Misgeld, 2013). However, combining governance modes requires governance
mechanisms to be compatible (Lægreid et al., 2008; Schillemans, 2008; Sørensen and
Torfing, 2011; Verschuere et al., 2006). PMSs as typical output-based mechanisms are
likely to narrow managers’ views exclusively to the fulfilment of the respective goals
(Bhattacharyya, 2013; Jaworski and Young, 1992; Merchant, 1990), and are also even Performance
reported to be perversely used by public managers to support self-interests measurement
(Moynihan, 2008), whereas self-governance tries to broaden public managers’ views
towards an innovative and holistic fulfilment of public tasks (Sørensen and Torfing, 2012;
systems
Sørensen and Triantafillou, 2009). When it comes to whether or not PMSs are an effective
governance mechanism, research offers mixed conclusions (Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004;
Greiling, 2006) – which highlights the relevance of the question of how these systems 373
should be designed in order to produce the desirable outcomes.
PMSs do not have to narrow public managers’ views – they can also be designed to
broaden their views and thus to foster self-governance (see Walker et al., 2011). This is
the case if the systems do not hinder but empower managers to take an “active work
role”, one that allows them to grasp the complexity of public-task fulfilment and
intrinsically motivates them (Deci et al., 1989; Gómez-Miñambres, 2012; Spreitzer, 1995)
to contribute to the different aspects of public value. Therefore, in order to derive
adequate design parameters for PMSs, the present study introduces the concept of
“psychological empowerment” (Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Spreitzer, 1995; Thomas and
Velthouse, 1990), according to which, individuals can be empowered if they perceive their
work as being meaningful and themselves as being competent to fulfil it. Further, it must
be possible for them to shape their work in a self-determined manner and to influence it.
Empowerment is generally linked to improved organizational outcomes and performance
in the private (Arogundade and Arogundade, 2015; Drake et al., 2007; Haines and
St-Onge, 2012; Price et al., 2004) and public sector (Fernandez and Moldogaziev, 2013), but
has not yet been linked to SOE performance measurement. While a strong focus on
predefined performance measures under output-based governance usually decreases
managers’ empowerment by narrowing their sense of accountabilities, empowerment at
work builds up self-governance capacities (see Amundsen and Martinsen, 2015). Thus,
designing PMSs that are able to empower managers and thus self-governance is the key
to apposite performance management for SOEs in complex environments. Accordingly,
in this paper, the circumstances under which PMS can foster the psychological
empowerment of SOE managers are investigated.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section, the
psychological empowerment of managers as a driver of governance effectiveness in
the specific context of SOEs is identified, and the means by which empowerment can be
supported by a specific PMS design is outlined. Then, the case and research method
are introduced, and the empirical material is presented according to the study’s
theoretical framework. Finally, the research results are discussed, and their theoretical
and practical implications advanced.

The further development of PMSs: a theoretical perspective for the

governance of SOEs
An initial glance at the specific SOE governance context shows how, under NPM
and post-NPM reforms, different governance modes have attempted to increase the
effectiveness of SOE governance. The following sections further elaborate on the
specifics of SOEs, and conclude that combined governance structures are more
effective for SOEs as they respond better to their volatile governance needs and
different accountabilities. In order to combine both governance modes, this study
proposes aligning the underlying mechanisms. Such a combination requires PMSs that
simultaneously empower SOE managers towards self-governance, and this paper
outlines how these might be designed.
IJPSM The specifics of SOEs and their implications for PMSs
28,4/5 The governance context of SOEs is particularly complex. Not only is the number of
them steadily increasing in developing as well as developed countries in the wake
of the current de-privatization trend (Bruton et al., 2015; Christiansen, 2011;
(The) Economist, 2012; Ernst & Young, 2010; Florio, 2014; Kankaanpää et al., 2014;
Thynne, 2011), SOEs are also operating in diverse sectors, such as public utilities, social
374 care, or culture (Grossi and Reichard, 2008; OECD, 2005), and pursuing multiple goals
(Aharoni, 1981; Bruton et al., 2015; Vagliasindi, 2008). They further face the problem of
diverse and indirect owners, principals, and stakeholders (Aharoni, 1981; Estrin and
Pérotin, 1991; Kankaanpää et al., 2014). Accordingly, SOEs have to contend with
multiple accountabilities (Bovens, 2007; Christensen and Lægreid, 2015; Verschuere
et al., 2006), which means multiple obligations to justify their actions (Pollitt, 2003;
Schlenker et al., 1994).
First, SOEs are accountable to state or municipal administrative bodies that impose
financial or other forms of supervision on them. The increasing number of mixed
ownership solutions and the varying degrees of public control – from tight to loose
(Bruton et al., 2015; Flinders and Tonkiss, 2015) – are rendering this accountability
dimension (“administrative accountability”) even more complex. In addition, SOEs are
accountable to the ruling political parties – many of the representatives of which are
members of the respective supervisory boards – and their currently held political ideas
and voters (Estrin and Pérotin, 1991). In this sense, SOEs become part of political
conflict and power struggles (“political accountability”). Furthermore, SOEs operate in
a wide range of sectors and each company specializes in a certain professional field that
contains particular professional standards that are explicitly or implicitly binding for
all members (“professional accountability”). Society, too, is involved in the assessment
of goal achievement, and accordingly serves as an accountability mechanism, although
it cannot directly impose sanctions (Estrin and Pérotin, 1991); accountability here is
instead based on the implicit expectations of society and their relation to the state
(“social accountability”). Finally, SOEs are accountable for meeting certain legal
standards (“legal accountability”). A holistic approach to SOE governance
encompasses all of these accountability dimensions – and, to cope with the resulting
complexity, public authorities need adequate governance mechanisms. Connecting to
the literature in organizational theory, we define the governance of SOEs as “decision-
making processes coordinating interdependencies” (Frost and Morner, 2011, p. 22)
between all involved stakeholders in order to fulfil public tasks.
Output-based governance modes rely on private-sector governance mechanisms
(Bovens, 2007; Christensen and Lægreid, 2001; van Dooren et al., 2010), and therefore
originally do not capture diverse and indirect accountability dimensions. Thus, it might
be assumed that, in the specific context of SOEs, private-sector mechanisms, mainly
introduced through NPM reforms, are doomed to fail. Some studies, however, reveal a
positive relation between governance via goal setting and accountability in general
(Berman and Wang, 2000; Ho, 2006), and confirm that performance measurement may
also advance communication, organizational learning, and discussion (Mahama, 2006;
Melkers and Willoughby, 2001). However, the interrelations behind these findings have
not yet been sufficiently investigated, and broadly negative effects of governing SOEs
based on goals and outputs have also been reported (e.g. Bhattacharyya, 2013).
Accordingly, a strong orientation towards a limited set of predefined organizational goals
risks rendering SOEs unaware of their role in public-task fulfilment (Brunsson, 1989).
Instead of inciting managers into searching for new solutions (Boyne and O’Toole, 2006),
output-based governance can narrow their focus onto prior benchmarks and certain Performance
results (Sørensen, 2012). Instead of broadening their view of diverse sources of public measurement
value creation, it tends to narrow their focus onto predefined goals ( Jaworski and Young,
1992; Merchant, 1990) and may cause them to end up as “single-purpose organizations”
systems
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, p. 1060). In the context of SOEs, the most strident
shortcoming is that PMSs have primarily addressed managerial accountability towards
administrations, neglecting their multidimensional accountability structures, and have 375
thereby deprived them of political accountability through structural devolution
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2001; James and van Thiel, 2011). Palermo et al. (2010)
similarly reported the erosion of core organizational values and objectives through a
narrow focus on predefined performance measures.
Seeking to overcome, too, the disadvantages of a narrow output-based governance,
the post-NPM era introduced a wide variety of governance approaches, such as
“Neo-Weberianism” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), “joined-up government”, and “whole
of government” (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, 2011b; Stoker, 2006). Post-NPM is
about integration, coordination, and cooperation, and thus its governance mechanisms
seek to create a strong and unified sense of values and goals and to enhance the
eagerness of all parties involved to actively contribute to public-task fulfilment based
on self-governance modes (Frost and Morner, 2011; Sørensen and Triantafillou, 2009).
While shifting power back to public and political authorities, post-NPM approaches
create governance frameworks that foster decentralized steering and mutual
monitoring and enable the managers of SOEs to foster their problem-solving and
self-steering capacities (Sørensen and Triantafillou, 2009; Wälder and Morner, 2013).
At first sight, it may seem that output-based governance contradicts governance
mechanisms under post-NPM. Alternatively, some scholars regard a combination of
diverse governance modes as an opportunity rather than an illness (Christensen and
Lægreid, 2011a; Christensen, 2012). One argument for this perspective is that integrated
governance modes respond more flexibly to dynamic and complex governance settings
(Bruton et al., 2015; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; Egeberg and Trondal, 2009;
Grandori, 1997, 2001a). However, many governance modes are founded on partly
inconsistent mechanisms and principles (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011a).
In sum, NPM-based PMSs shape SOE managers’ perceptions about organizational
attributes in a way that hinders their active work orientation, as they are narrowed
within a set of predefined targets that only partly allows them to shape their work role
and context. Thus, such systems decrease managers’ empowerment (Conger and
Kanungo, 1988; Spreitzer, 1995; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Conversely, post-NPM
governance mechanisms broaden the view of SOE managers to encompass the
innovative and holistic fulfilment of public tasks (Sørensen and Torfing, 2012; Sørensen
and Triantafillou, 2009) and empower managers to accomplish self-set goals.
This paper therefore proposes SOE managers’ empowerment as a solution for the
integration of the introduced governance modes; the following section introduces the
concept of psychological empowerment and explains how PMS can be designed to
foster, rather than inhibit, SOE managers’ empowerment.

Empowering SOE managers: new requirements for PMSs

This paper defines the empowerment of SOE managers (including, depending on an SOE’s
legal form, CEOs as well as executive managers) as their psychological empowerment
(Spreitzer, 1995). In this sense, empowerment is the process that enhances managers’
perceptions of being able to carry out their work well (Conger and Kanungo, 1988;
IJPSM Seibert et al., 2004). This happens through enhancing their perception of: first, their work
28,4/5 being important, and thus meaningful; second, having the competence to perform their
work well; third, their freedom to choose how to carry out their work; and finally, their
work having an impact on the generation of public value. In this way, empowerment
incites them to actively contribute to public-task fulfilment.
With the aim of forming an empowering design for PMSs, the following sections
376 investigate how particular design features can foster all the dimensions of
empowerment (meaning of work, managers’ competence, their self-determination,
and the impact of their work). Figure 1 provides an ex-ante visual guide to the proposed
theoretical framework.
Performance measurement and the perceived meaning of managers’ work. “Meaning
of work” is defined as the value that an individual places on their work in relation to
their ideals or standards, and constitutes the first dimension in which psychological
empowerment is manifested (Spreitzer, 1995; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990).
A necessary prerequisite for an individual to assess this value lies in clear and
accurate information about the goals that their work requires. Providing this
information, however, is a complex process, involving more than the mere existence of
a PMS (van Dooren, 2005). Only if clear goals are established can managers use them to
assess their individual relative importance, to make better decisions, and to agree or
disagree with them (e.g. Aharoni, 1981; Behn, 2003; Gonzalez-Mule et al., 2014; Hood,
1995; Jung, 2012; Lindenberg and Foss, 2011; Locke, 1996; Sawyer, 1992). A technically
sound and effectively maintained PMS is furthermore a crucial factor for there to be
trust in the information provided (Berman and Wang, 2000; Taylor, 2011).
Furthermore, the communication of all goals relevant to the manager must also be
transparent so that SOE managers can assess the meaning of their work (Melnyk et al.,
2014). However, transparency – in particular, regarding politically imposed goals – is
often not provided. Politicians especially are often very reluctant to formulate and
document goals, as this carries the risk of the goals then being used against them or

Dimensions of empowerment
Clear and trustworthy
information
Goal clarity

Perceived meaning of
Transparency
managers’ work
Procedural fairness
Balanced goal

Exploratory use of
difficulty

performance measurement Managers’ perceived

competence
Controllability
Empowerment of
SOE managers towards
active work role
measurement

Enabling autonomy
Autonomy-
enhancing

through participation
Managers’ perceived self-
determination
Strategic information
provision
Figure 1.
Proposed theoretical
Integration of non-financial
framework of
Broad goal

performance measures
scope

Perceived impact of
empowerment-
managers’ work
friendly PMS design Sensitivity for multiple
perspectives of public value
otherwise attracting negative media attention (Behn, 2003; van Dooren, 2005; Ho, 2006). Performance
At the same time, political constraints have a negative impact on the objectivity of measurement
performance measurement within SOEs (O’Connor et al., 2006). Agreed-upon
transparency requirements can break this negative spiral.
systems
Managers’ evaluation of the meaning of their work is a highly individual process.
Thus, the provision of goals must be clear and transparent not only regarding content
but also in relation to goal holders (van Gestel et al., 2012; Latham and Locke, 2007; 377
Locke and Latham, 2002). Clear task allocation additionally enables identification with
their own work (Grant, 2008) and therefore the assessment of its meaning. However, for
the managers of SOEs, clear task allocation is particularly challenging due to the many
actors involved in public-task fulfilment (Kankaanpää et al., 2014). This complexity can
be eased, though, through higher levels of perceived procedural fairness in the goal-
setting process, which in turn increases the acceptance of task-allocation processes
(Hartmann and Slapničar, 2012; He and Lau, 2012).
In short, this paper argues that an effective approach in shaping PMSs towards
enhancing perceived meaning at work includes the resolute provision of clear and
trustworthy information about goals, an overarching transparency in goal setting that
also encompasses the documentation of political directions, and the provision of
information about goal allocation, which, in the complex setting of SOEs, can also be
fostered through procedural fairness.
Performance measurement and managers’ perceived competence. “Competence” is an
individual’s belief in their capability to perform activities at work with proficiency
(Bandura, 1982; Conger and Kanungo, 1987; Spreitzer, 1995), and represents the second
dimension in which empowerment is manifested. PMSs regularly evaluate this
competence, as they set targets to be reached, assess their achievement, and give
feedback on the results (Franco-Santos et al., 2007). In this role, PMSs influence how
managers perceive their own competencies, and thus a particular PMS design can
foster or destroy these perceptions. For instance, PMSs that include unattainable goals
have been proven to have a dysfunctional impact on efforts, task-related behaviour,
and motivational levels (Becker and Green, 1962; Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). The level of
the attainability of set goals has a curvilinear effect on performance (Bandura, 1986);
adaptive behaviour is shown when goals are tight but attainable, but the goals are
abandoned when considered unattainable (Sandelands et al., 1988). Since competence
refers to an individual’s beliefs about their own capabilities at work, the assessment of
the attainability or unattainability of goals represents a high practical burden, as
subjective assessments are relevant in this context (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). In order to
reduce uncertainties here, Hartmann (2005) found the application of multiple goals as
likely to improve task fulfilment in dynamic and uncertain contexts. Moreover, Dai
et al. (2013) recently showed that temporal landmarks increase goal-related behaviour.
Thus, the measurement of performance at certain times – for example, at the beginning
of a week, month, or year – can evoke a “fresh-start effect”. In addition, short-term
milestones allow the managers of SOEs to readjust their behaviours and self-images in
order to better achieve public goals. All of these mechanisms can foster an exploratory
use of performance measurement information (Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014)
and enhance single- and double-loop learning processes (Argyris and Schön, 1978;
Argyris, 1977), and therefore increase managers’ perceived competence.
Finally, perceptions of competence are closely linked to the controllability principle.
If SOE managers can control their goal achievement by controlling the actions leading
IJPSM to the achievement of these goals, and thus rendering performance possible, they
28,4/5 perceive themselves as competent. Also, particularly for SOEs, the acceptance of
measures by managers as realistic business goals has been revealed as a necessary
precondition for enabling performance (Bhattacharyya, 2013). However, despite being
widely acknowledged, this requirement is still not being fulfilled in many organizations
(Bhattacharyya, 2013; Burkert et al., 2011).
378 Overall, the exploratory use of performance measures integrating multiple measures
and milestones, as well as goal setting according to the controllability principle, can
foster managerial perceptions of competence.
Performance measurement and managers’ perceived self-determination. “Self-
determination” is an individual’s perception of the degree to which they have a
choice in initiating and performing work behaviours (Deci et al., 1989; Spreitzer, 1995),
and relates to the third dimension of psychological empowerment. Self-determination
takes place on a continuum between autonomous motivation, the perception of full
self-determination or controlled motivation, and the perception of being externally
determined and controlled (Gagné and Deci, 2005). PMSs are thus only able to empower
managers if they provide for the necessary autonomy (Krause, 2014).
Autonomy at work is always related to its counterpart, participation (Grant et al.,
2011; Hackman et al., 1975; Wilkinson and Dundon, 2011). In order to foster
self-determination, performance measurement has thus to enable high participative
involvement (Amabile, 1996). According to Kenis (1979), participative involvement in
the context of performance measurement “refers to the extent to which managers
participate in preparing […] and influence the […] goals of their responsibility centres”
(Kenis, 1979, p. 709). Performance measurement literature reveals increased participant
commitment, satisfaction, and motivation to improve set goals if participation
is enabled (Forde et al., 2006; Langevin and Mendoza, 2013; Locke, 1968; Strauss,
1998; Vroom, 1964; Wood and de Menezes, 2011), whereas assigned goals are
associated with resistance (Lee and Wei, 2011; London et al., 2004). Moreover,
opportunities to participate in goal setting further increase the willingness to contribute
to collective tasks (Lee and Wei, 2011) as well as to the social pressure to achieve
them (Groen et al., 2012).
In addition, managers of SOEs require strategic information as to where their
organization is heading in order to perceive that they have a choice in initiating
directive actions (Hall, 2011). Accordingly, the provision of strategic information
through PMSs increases managers’ self-determination (Chenhall, 2005; Hall, 2011).
Strategic information enables managers to independently make effective and efficient
decisions regarding methods, processes, and resources when performing public tasks.
Consequently, empowerment practices aimed at providing employees with job-related
knowledge improve internally perceived levels of performance (Fernandez and
Moldogaziev, 2011).
Thus, it is concluded that PMSs that embrace participation and provide strategic
information can foster self-determination.
Performance measurement and the perceived impact of managers’ work. “Impact of
work” constitutes the final dimension of empowerment, and reflects the degree to which
individuals believe that they can influence outcomes (Ashforth, 1989; Spreitzer, 1995).
Outcomes of SOEs are highly relevant for society through their wide-ranging effects on
citizens and private-sector industries (Grossi and Reichard, 2008; OECD, 2005). Thus, in
order to effect a positive change, managers of SOEs need to address multiple facets of
public value (Andersen et al., 2012; Meynhardt, 2009; Moore, 1995). However, when it Performance
comes to measuring SOE performance, research shows a tendency to reduce measurement
performance to some sort of financial dimension (Ramamurti, 1987), and thereby to
narrow the focus on managers’ possible impact. This kind of imbalance could have
systems
dysfunctional effects on managerial behaviour. As the specification of performance
measures determines the focus of managerial action (Bhattacharyya, 2013), an
imbalance towards financial measures is likely to lead to an overemphasis of 379
profitability or cost-reduction goals at the expense of a broad focus on public value.
Also, the inapt use of performance measures for managers’ self-interest has been
reported (Moynihan, 2008), with research showing managers of SOEs increasingly
displaying self-interest rationalities (Edeling et al., 2004). An SOE managerial business
philosophy that increasingly reflects the attitudes of private managers will result in the
neglect of public tasks, functions, and interests. This may be counteracted through the
integration of non-financial measures and taking a holistic approach to the assessment
of SOE managers’ contribution to public value.
A holistic approach within PMSs furthermore reflects multiple accountabilities
towards administrative, political, social, and professional groups (Bovens, 2007;
Pollitt, 2003; Schlenker et al., 1994). Although complex settings require complex
governance solutions, an approach comprising all accountability dimensions is also
seen as problematic. Ambiguities and conflicting goals that are likely to result from
the diverse accountabilities may lead to an unmanageable system ( Johnsen, 2001;
March and Olsen, 1995). However, if a PMS incorporates an awareness of these
problematic issues, this could encourage active communication and exchange
between SOEs, public authorities, and other stakeholders. This can be realized
through encouraging SOE managers to participate in administrative goal-setting
processes, occasionally inviting public authorities to advisory board meetings in
order to restrain non-transparent policy processes, and through defining benchmarks
(Amaratunga and Baldry, 2002; Askim et al., 2008) in order to enter into dialogue on
professional accountability with public bodies. So as to foster the perception of
socially imposed accountabilities, the public voice can be consulted in user boards, at
town meetings and public hearings, or through customer surveys (Sørensen and
Torfing, 2012), and the results integrated into the PMS, not only as quantitative
measures but also as qualitative statements (see Ferrari and Manzi, 2014). Ho (2006)
furthermore found that citizen involvement in performance measurement practices
increases the perceived usefulness of the data in the eyes of elected officials. Thus,
instead of targeting an inflated performance measurement approach that integrates
all accountability dimensions, the present study proposes a PMS that encourages
exchange and increases the comprehensibility of different accountabilities affecting
SOEs and managerial performance within.
In summary, PMSs that integrate non-financial measures to account for the
specificity of public-task provision and are sensitive to various public value
perspectives are more likely to increase SOE managers’ perceived impact.

Case setting and research method

This study’s theoretical implications are specified within an exploratory case study
approach. Forming the basis for the study, the next section portrays the case setting
and elaborates on the research method by providing insights into the collection and
analysis of the research data.
IJPSM Case setting
28,4/5 The entity of SOEs owned by a single city represents a fruitful object through which to
study the effectiveness of particular performance measurement practices, as it
comprises a large number of discrete units operating under almost identical public
governance conditions (see Przeworski and Teune, 1970). This paper’s case study was
located in a large German city in North Rhine-Westphalia hereafter referred to as
380 “Citee”. In 2014, Citee held more than 70 SOEs to a major, equal, or significant but
minor part. In particular, Citee had a majority ownership (more than 50 per cent) of
almost half of its enterprises, some equal ownership solutions (50 per cent ownership),
and minority ownerships (less than 50 per cent) of more than half of its enterprises.
Most of Citee’s SOEs were private limited companies (in German, Gesellschaften
mit beschränkter Haftung), together with a few public limited companies
(Aktiengesellschaften), and some limited partnerships with limited liability companies
as general partners (Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung & Compagnie
Kommanditgesellschaften). The enterprises operated in very diverse areas, ranging
from social activities (e.g. child and youth services) to more business-oriented activities
(e.g. public utilities, public transport). In order to govern its SOEs in line with its
municipal goals, Citee had established a central unit under its financial department
that, at the time of the study, comprised one ownership manager and five employees.
This unit was responsible for the facilitation of SOE governance; in particular, for
financial controlling, reporting, performance management, and overall SOE support.
Also, social, economic, cultural, and educational requirements needed to be balanced,
harmonized, and aligned to the city’s overall strategic goals (see Schwarting, 2004).
The governance of SOEs in Citee was subject to high financial pressure (Döhrn
et al., 2013) that resulted from structural changes and high unemployment rates
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit Statistik, 2015). Historically, coal had been the main
economic driving force in North Rhine-Westphalia (Döhrn et al., 2013). Due to a
turnaround in energy policies, though, unemployment in North Rhine-Westphalia was
very high (circa 760,000; Bundesagentur für Arbeit Statistik, 2015), representing more
than a quarter of the total for the whole of Germany (approximately 2,900,000;
Bundesagentur für Arbeit Statistik, 2015). Overall, the cities of North Rhine-Westphalia
had found themselves to be under economic and financial pressure. The sum of cash
loans in North Rhine-Westphalia was equivalent to half the cash loans granted in the
whole of Germany (Burth et al., 2013). Indebtedness and over-indebtedness were
accelerating. Thus, the principal focus of Citee’s ownership management lay in
austerity management.
Financial pressure had resulted in mainly output-based SOE governance in Citee,
with a strong focus on strict budgeting. Moreover, inconsistent approaches to
performance measurement and incentive schemes had led to a rethinking of the old
PMS. After an intense political decision-making process, in 2013, the city council
decided to restructure the performance measurement processes along with the
compensation schemes for their SOE managers. Alongside 60-80 per cent fixed pay, one
short-term and one long-term variable pay component (each 10-20 per cent) were
introduced. The short-term variable component was an annual bonus based on the
achievement of public service provision goals, whereas the long-term variable
component depended on predefined financial goals. The newly implemented adjusted
balanced scorecard (see Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996, 2001) reflected these two goal
sets: public service provision goals incorporated three perspectives – namely,
customer/citizen; cooperation within Citee; and development – that together constituted
50 per cent, while the fourth perspective; finance, served as a counterweight Performance
(to guarantee its practicability, each perspective of a balanced scorecard should entail measurement
at most three goals).
All contracts completed since the council decision have been settled under this
systems
scheme. This change process makes the case particularly interesting for the present
study. New performance measurement practices exist alongside old ones, revealing
functioning performance measurement practices, room for improvement, and potential 381
for conflict. For instance, the difficulty of balancing financial and service provision
goals became obvious within the case study. A strong focus on predefined and highly
ambitious financial goals questions the controllability of the set goals. In such
surroundings, high levels of pressure make the empowerment of COEs through
performance measurement unlikely. Taking this into account, the study scrutinized
which performance measurement mechanisms supported them in or restricted them
from actively contributing to public-task fulfilment. Thus, the actual workings of the
underlying causal mechanisms were traced (Blatter and Blume, 2008a, b; Blatter and
Haverland, 2012; George and Bennett, 2005; Haverland and Yanow, 2012). The richness
of the insights as well as the historical familiarity with the sequence of events that were
gained from the case study allowed for in-depth exploration of the causal processes.

Data collection
Initial contact was made with the ownership manager of Citee in April 2014 at a
conference during which he presented Citee’s new performance measurement and
management system. In order that the study’s authors could become more familiar with
the case and to confirm subsequent steps, a telephone conference was held. Next, the
case study was authorized by the municipal finance director, as well as by the mayor of
Citee. These steps were particularly important, as case accessibility is a primary
precondition for this kind of in-depth investigation. As this study sought to answer the
question of under which conditions PMSs can empower SOE managers, and as a
plurality of factors within the different empowerment dimensions is assumed to work
together to produce the desired outcome, the underlying case study approach
encompasses causal-process tracing (Blatter and Blume, 2008a, b; Blatter and
Haverland, 2012; George and Bennett, 2005). Furthermore, causal-process tracing as
a within-case approach explains the study’s single-case approach. The investigation
depended on gaining a comprehensive overview of the unfolding of all of the processes
that accompanied the introduction of the new PMS at Citee and the possibility of
gaining profound insights into the perceptions and motivations of important actors
(Blatter and Haverland, 2012).
Accordingly, during a preliminary meeting with the ownership manager at the
beginning of July 2014, key SOE managers were selected as interviewees. The main
selection criteria sought to strike a balance between SOEs from different sectors of
varying size and financial strength, and between SOEs in which CEOs were contracted
under the old as well as under the new performance measurement scheme. Theoretical
saturation defined the absolute number of the selected interviewees (Baker and
Edwards, 2012; Ullrich, 1999a, b). Real world occurrence established a natural limit to
this approach. For instance, no SOE manager of a small SOE existed who had been
contracted under the new PMS.
Table I summarizes the sample SOEs and the managers with whom interviews were
conducted, further to the initial interview with the ownership manager. As shown, a
balance was struck between SOEs with high, medium, and low impact, as measured by
IJPSM Managed Number of Capital Loss-/profit- PMS
28,4/5 SOEa employeesa,b stocka,c Sector making SOEd (new/old)

A W1,000 W10,000 Transport and public Loss New

utilities
B W1,000 50-1,000 Social services Profit New
C 500-1,000 50-1,000 Culture and sports Loss Old
382 D o500 1,000-10,000 Finance Profit Old
E 500-1,000 o50 Social services Profit Old
Table I. Notes: aSOE names, number of employees, and capital stock are categorized for confidentiality
Overview of reasons; bFull-time equivalents include trainees and temporary employees; cFinancial statements as of
interviewed SOE 31 December 2013; capital stock is stated in thousands of euros; dClassification as a loss-/profit-making
managers enterprise is according to earnings after tax, as listed in financial statements as of 31 December 2013

number of employees (SOE size) and capital stock (financial impact). Also, a diversity of
sectors and a balance between loss- and profit-making SOEs were taken into account.
Moreover, approximately half of the SOE managers chosen were employed under
the new performance management scheme and half were still under the old PMS. This
maximum variation enabled a diversity of empirical observations within the case study
(Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Miles and Huberman, 1994).
Altogether, six in-depth, face-to-face interviews were conducted in the third quarter
of 2014. All the interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed. The interviews
lasted approximately 50 minutes on average, with the shortest being 37 and the longest
100 minutes. The trustworthiness of the data were increased by tape-recording the
consent of all the interviewees. In addition, a transcript of their interview was sent to
every interviewee shortly afterwards unless explicitly rejected. The interviews were
open ended and geared towards ensuring a deeper understanding of all evolving
processes and the interviewees’ cognitions in reaction to the differing measurement
practices. Primarily, the interviewees were asked about their role in their respective
SOE, about their own goals and those they pursue within their enterprises, about
their perception of the governance mechanisms in place, and, in particular, about their
experiences with the PMS and their interactions with the municipal ownership
management. They were also encouraged to freely describe the way in which the new
system was introduced, its components, and the targets that the city is pursuing with it.
Follow-up questions focused on increasing the richness of the collected data (Rubin and
Rubin, 2012), and the interviewers used Hermanns’ (2004) stage directions for
interviewing to establish a positive atmosphere and concentrate on the real-life world
without losing sight of the research question. Additional case-relevant documents, such
as internal documentation, presentations, and council documents, were also collected
and expounded during the interviews.
This case study approach permitted a refinement of the explanatory framework of
how PMSs can empower SOE managers, as well as an understanding of a possible set
of causal mechanisms behind it as the collected data allowed for finely grained
empirical insights and the consideration of a broad and diverse set of explanatory
approaches (Blatter and Haverland, 2012).

Data analysis
The empirical data from the interviews were transcribed and analysed directly after the
interview phase (Miles and Huberman, 1994) using MAXQDA 11 software (Flick, 2014;
Paulus et al., 2014). In order to ensure confidentiality, a numerical order was assigned Performance
to the interviewees (Manager I, Manager II, etc.). The data analysis process included measurement
re-listening to the recordings as well as reading and re-reading the transcript, on the
one hand (Windeck et al., 2013), and the coding and re-coding process on the other.
systems
The entire analysis followed the “four eyes” principle. The very first step of the coding
process sought to discover the structural aspects to the data, and, to this end, used open
coding (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). During this stage, repeatedly reverting back and 383
forth between empirical data and the broad theoretical basis facilitated the derivation
of the theoretical framework described above. In particular, after grouping
the discovered codes, there were received as the main in vivo codes, on the one
hand, ones such as “procedural fairness”, “controllability”, “participation”, or “diverse
accountabilities” that could be grouped alongside the concept of psychological
empowerment, and, on the other, a prevalent “goal congruence” code that reflected the
research question. “Goal congruence” was identified as the main purpose of PMS and
defined as transforming individual goals into organizational or collective goals
(Anthony and Govindarajan, 2014; Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas, 2013; Locke and
Latham, 2002; Locke, 1996). However, despite being the main purpose of PMS, the
introduction of these systems is evidently not always recognized by managers as being
empowering. Moreover, at this stage of the analysis, even dysfunctional effects were
detected, in that managers’ existent orientation towards public service provision goals
had been distorted by a strong focus solely on financial goals. Indeed, this key aspect of
the first open-coding step led to the specification of the research question, which asks
how PMSs can be designed in order to empower managers towards public goal
fulfilment rather than diminishing their existing foci on public service fulfilment.
Once the real world-driven research question had been specified, an understanding
of the entire landscape had been gained, and the theoretical basis in the described
iterative process built up, the three-step coding approach laid down by Miles and
Huberman (1994) (see Windeck et al., 2013) was followed. Then, the in vivo codes were
further grouped and developed according to the study’s theoretical framework
(“theoretical coding”), and a “start list” was created around the four dimensions of
psychological empowerment. These served as the main coding families, which were
then enriched with subcodes. As a last step, this start list was revised during the data
analysis, its structure checked, and selective coding used to further elaborate the
study’s case (see also Glaser, 1992).
Once again, the researchers were constantly moving back and forth from the empirical
to the theoretical dimensions of the analysis (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). This single-case
study thus relies on abduction as a combination of inductive and deductive research
strategies (see Goretzki et al., 2013; Järvenpää, 2009). Given the complex background of
SOEs and the interplay of diverse mechanisms, abduction was identified as an appropriate
method for constantly refining the theoretical framework. Rather than striving for
generalization, the study aimed at a “possibilistic generalization” (Blatter and Haverland,
2012, p. 31), in order to gather in-depth knowledge about a possible combination of causal
conditions that might lead to managers’ empowerment through PMS.

Empowering SOE managers through effective PMSs

In the following section, in order to discover how managers’ empowerment works in the
study’s case setting, theoretical interpretations are enriched with empirical material.
The study’s findings are then summarized and discussed with respect to design
principles for empowering PMS.
IJPSM Findings: towards empowerment through performance measurement in Citee
28,4/5 This case study highlights the key design aspects of Citee’s newly introduced PMS,
investigates how it is perceived by SOE managers, and traces how particular aspects of
it empower or fail to empower these managers towards an active work role. For each
dimension of empowerment – meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact –
the observed design parameters are identified and discussed.
384 Enhancing the perceived meaning of managers’ work through goal clarity. Clear and
trustworthy goals, transparent information provision, and unambiguous and fair task
allocation are crucial prerequisites for managers when it comes to assessing the
meaning of their work. However, when asked about their roles, their personal goals,
and the goals that they pursue within their enterprises, most managers in Citee did not
refer to the dimensions provided by the introduced balanced scorecard – these being
(1) customer/citizen, (2) cooperation within Citee, and (3) development. Most answers
related to the specifics of the managed enterprises, although the stated goals could
just as well have been subsumed under the city’s general balanced scorecard
dimensions (1)-(3). This highlighted the potential for bringing forward individually
adapted balanced scorecards under a citywide balanced scorecard umbrella in order to
increase identification.
One exception to the rather restrained awareness of the PMS was managers’ vivid
identification with the financial balanced scorecard perspective. Financial and
economic goals were widely perceived as clear and transparent. Although the executive
managers of Citee’s SOEs were under severe financial pressure, they regarded their
financial and economic plans as neutral and given. One manager stated, “Whether
that’s good or bad, I still have the objectivity” (Manager V; 105), and he felt assured as
he was able to “deduce what the level of [his] goal attainment should be” (Manager V;
105). In accordance with the financial balanced scorecard perspective, the social
desirability of commonly working on halting the city’s accelerating indebtedness was
stressed. As the financial goal perspective was then overarching, it had been
communicated by the ownership management much more extensively, and differences
in acknowledging the financial perspective as opposed to the public service provision
dimensions could be traced to these major differences in their communication.
Besides illustrating how PMSs can enhance the perceived meaning of work, the case
study demonstrated that the mere existence of such systems does not guarantee clear
goal allocation, and does not even mean that all parties involved are aware of their
existence. Thus, one manager denied the existence of an overall balanced scorecard:
There is an internal, balanced scorecard [for my SOE], there is no approved balanced
scorecard with the city of [Citee] (Manager V; 53).
In fact, the balanced scorecard implementation process in Citee had not been completed
at the time of the present investigation. Furthermore, the implementation plans had not
been adequately communicated. Such consequences of a lack of information show that
the necessity for goal clarity and transparency starts long before the use of a PMS. To
drive forward the implementation process, trust in the system has first to be
established. In the case study, some managers adhered closely to official internal
documents when answering questions or follow-ups concerning the balanced scorecard
dimensions. They were unfamiliar with the system and showed discomfort in using it.
Accordingly, several scholars point to measurement system maturity as being a key
driver of purposeful performance information use (Kroll, 2015; Padovani et al., 2010).
 In addition to the provision of clear and trustworthy performance information, Performance
meaning also requires an overarching transparency in goal formulation. Transparent measurement
goals can establish a formal and institutional basis that is able to serve as a solid
starting point in complex settings. In Citee, internal transparency was widely reported
systems
and executive managers experienced goal formulation as a “well-described system
accessible on the Internet” (Manager IV; 57). In some cases, though, Citee had provided
very detailed information (e.g. “multi-page documents”; Manager IV; 57), which was 385
mostly experienced as overwhelming.
Citee also had in place a council information system that was used as an online
platform for communicating most of the decisions taken by the council to the public.
SOE managers were informed of the new performance measurement and incentive
system through this communication channel, too, once it had been approved by
the council, and they stressed unequivocally that all managers should actively seek out
this information and be “familiar with the system” (Manager III; 96). However, the
interviewees stated that transparency in political directives was not being actively
fostered in Citee, which reflects other research that sees a political reluctance to provide
clear goals (Behn, 2003; van Dooren, 2005; Ho, 2006). Managers in Citee were constantly
in search of political developments and directives, resulting in insufficient information
flows. Although this task is largely considered a routine duty, the importance of an
additional, two-way, and more personal exchange with all involved parties was
stressed and proposed as a solution:
Therefore I do think that the city has a legitimate interest to look at in this way, especially
the financial areas, and, I think, when it comes to the detail and content, then, for example,
the technical committees, too, are likely to be interested. That something happens, for example
[…], when we describe goals in child and youth work that we want to increase the number
of visitors. This could also be interesting for the youth welfare committee (Manager VI; 48).
Finally, the new performance measurement approach was generally perceived as being
fair. At the executive management level, tasks were allocated in a complex process,
partly through the work content itself, through political directives, and through the
supervisory board. The study’s findings demonstrate that, in this complex setting, the
establishment of governance mechanisms perceived as procedurally fair is a supportive
element. Procedural fairness can, in addition, enhance the significance of tasks and thus
their meaning to an individual. Executive managers in Citee regarded the new system
as one that standardizes procedures formerly contracted on a rather opaque and
individual basis. This change from individuality towards uniformity was realized as a
path towards more justice:
So I’m primarily assuming, of course, that you want to have justice throughout the companies
(Manager V; 84).

Enhancing managers’ perceived competence through balanced goal difficulty. PMSs

clarify managers’ goals and provide necessary information on their attainment, and
thus have the potential to enhance managers’ perceived competence – as long as
managers are able to accomplish these goals. In the study, goal difficulty was
omnipresent in Citee as it battled the twin pressures of indebtedness and over-
indebtedness. Accordingly, the pressure to constantly reduce staff numbers and costs
was weighing heavily on Citee and its SOEs. “The main objectives of the region” were
associated with “exorbitant targets” (Manager III; 84), a perspective that further
IJPSM increased executive managers’ perception of goal difficulty as a feeling of having
28,4/5 “no choice but to operate with these strict requirements, including with regard to
the subsidiaries” (Manager III; 84). Surprisingly then, in general, SOE managers
perceived the very high financial goals as reasonable, and stressed that they should be
commonly pursued.
Indeed, challenging financial goals were, in some cases, reported as being
386 motivating, as they demanded high levels of competence from the managers in order to
progressively come up with innovative solutions. Several managers reported at length
that they were actively searching for innovative solutions to halt the financial burden.
For instance, some had started to cooperate in new fields with other SOEs, or had found
new markets for their services outside of the city:
So, one of the main reasons why we have been able to work so cost-effectively in recent years
has been collaborations with other institutes in the city (Manager I; 35).
We also meet with […] let’s call them “third parties” […] “external third parties”, and also do
business with them – Stadtwerke [X], for example. That’s not [Citee]; I also do business with
them outside the city. And we want to increase this further (Manager II; 63).
Thus, supporting previous research (Walker et al., 2011; Wynen et al., 2014), this study
observed that clear performance targets may even induce management innovation.
However, these interrelations are complex and depend on various contextual factors.
Wynen et al. (2014) found that size and an organization’s budget restrict innovation.
This is reflected in the present work’s empirical data: only managers of SOEs with
higher capital stocks (independently of whether they were loss- or profit-making SOEs)
were actively reporting innovative behaviour.
Further, at some point, the motivating effect of high targets tilts into demotivation
and frustration, supporting a curvilinear effect of goal attainability on performance
(Bandura, 1986):
[…] we could happily expand that, because we would then benefit ourselves from the
exploitation of this company […] then I would have to cut down on what I stand for
(Manager I, 53).
The burden of increasingly unattainable goals at the peak of the curve was just starting
to become visible, as interviewees were forecasting their results for the following periods.
An “enormous need for maintenance” (Manager V; 79) was reported throughout one
interview, and was strongly perceived due to an obsolete infrastructure having to be
replaced in the coming years. In this respect, SOEs were judged to be “operating at the
edge” (Manager II: 81) and the budgetary outlook was generally negative:
So, for this year, the goals are certainly achievable. In perspective, the financial targets in
particular are no longer be achievable. Unless I bring together the issues of quality and
financial impact. We have a declining dividend, we have the city of [Citee] facing tougher
budgetary constraints (Manager V; 79).
In this study’s theoretical framework, an exploratory approach to performance
measurement was introduced that encompasses balanced goal difficulty and various
controllable goals to enhance managers’ perceptions of their own competence.
Congruently, most of the interviewees in Citee stressed the importance of a generally
balanced approach to goal setting:
The main point would be to ensure a balance (Manager V; 119).
Counteracting the increasing unattainability of financial goals, managers drew Performance
attention to the formally balanced design of the new PMS, which, aside from financial measurement
goals, also entailed three public service provision goal dimensions. This is in line with
the proposition advanced in the theoretical discussion, above, for the use of a variety of
systems
goals. Thus, a variety of goals also acknowledged by public authorities – and not just
gathered together pro forma – can help to balance out the negative experience of
underachievement, regardless of whether the managers are responsible for this 387
underachievement or not.
Another possibility proposed by the managers for an improved reflection of their
competencies was the adaption of goals to the specific needs of their enterprise. This
possibility particularly appealed to the respective managers – even during the interviews,
some were already starting to outline possible adaptions. Almost all of the executive
managers refrained from “a one-size-fits-all for all companies” (Manager V; 87) approach.
This became particularly obvious when discussing the potential of conflicting
goals reported as fairly probable in the balanced scorecard approach, and which
diminished not only managers’ motivation but also an acceptance of the system. The
study’s theoretical model does not take into account conflicting goals. In the case of Citee,
though, the conflict between financial and public service provision goals was very
noticeable. Because of the prevailing financial issues, financial goals were accorded a
higher value, which was perceived as being negative and prompted managers to call for a
balanced approach:
So we don’t want it to fail because of that, but the problem [is] that public service provision
and financial goals should have bite, we’ll need to work on this so that there is also mutual
acceptance (Manager III; 78).
Well, as already stated, overall, there should be a balance of the [balanced scorecard] elements,
in other words, no 50:50 distribution. […] Finally, the financial and qualitative goals should be
linked (Manager V; 91).
Closely linked to conflicting goals is the concept of controllability and a requirement
that “results should definitely be filtered to determine which components can be
influenced” (Manager V; 91). Conflict automatically renders a set of goals unachievable,
as one perspective contradicts another. In addition, as highlighted by the research,
the controllability of particular goals in Citee was also not guaranteed, as shown by the
next quote:
If I, during a population explosion, have growing numbers, then I can boast about it, but I
cannot help it. And in 15 years, we will all be dealing with declining numbers, and if the
utilization figures then decline, then you still can’t do anything about it. So they then also
naturally need some kind of evaluation, but the utilization figures are still essentially
meaningful for measuring success (Manager IV; 43).
The disregard of the controllability principle in Citee is in line with that reported
by other researchers (Bhattacharyya, 2013; Burkert et al., 2011) and points to
structural problems requiring further investigation. A possible solution, proposed
by one of the interviewed managers, might be the transparent publication of the
degrees of goal achievement, which might also help with goal controllability
throughout the year.
Enhancing managers’ perceived self-determination through autonomy-enhancing
measurement. Goal-setting processes were primarily directed by the managers and
IJPSM supervisory boards in Citee. Thereby, the executive managers of Citee’s SOEs were
28,4/5 able to influence the goal-setting process and, thus, directly influence their goals:
I can influence it. I had a constructive discussion with the chairman of the board, during
which we sorted things out. I think we both felt this afterwards and that things will stay
sorted. He didn’t lay down the law or say, ‘Take it or leave it’, and he didn’t accept anything I
said which was pie in the sky or old hat. And that was fine. Essentially, we discussed one of
388 my proposals (Manager IV; 69).
This is in line with research that shows a tendency to use bottom-up approaches
for the internal use of such systems (Torres et al., 2011). The possibility of influencing
goal-setting processes also mirrors the present study’s underlying supposition that
PMSs that embrace participation and provide strategic information can foster
self-determination. However, public service provision goals, in particular, were reported
as being defined in a participative process that was limited for financial goals, as
financial goals were strictly predefined in view of Citee’s poor financial situation:
I have more room for action – naturally […] in a narrow corridor [with respect to] the financial
targets (Manager V; 82).
With regard to financial goals, a top-down approach was used in Citee, although
interviewees perceived this as undesirable:
There is a kind of a tendency to talk the system to death, which at some point leads to it being
out of control, including as far as discussion is concerned (Manager III; 76).
This strictness in financial goal setting limited the SOE managers’ scope of action, and
sometimes rendered them incapable of acting. Managers were therefore calling for a
system that, in a top-down approach, defined the general dimensions of performance to
be measured, but, at the same time, offered room for participation in the setting of
concrete measures.
With respect to strategic information provision, no evidence was found of the use
of performance measurement information for the communication of strategic goals.
This strategic perspective, which, from a theoretical perspective, is crucial in terms of
enabling managers to direct enterprises actively towards common public goals, was
lacking in Citee. Some managers believed that the lack of strategic information
provided by Citee and its administrative bodies was placing obstacles in their way:
[What goals the city is pursuing] escapes me at the moment (Manager I; 23).

Enhancing the perceived impact of managers’ work through a broad goal scope.
Managers in Citee did not display the increasingly self-interest-centred behaviour
predicted by the research (Edeling et al., 2004). Instead, they saw themselves as
public servants and mediators between political expectations, public needs, and
economic interests:
You know, whether I now have 10 or 12 thousand more or less, I can truly say to you that that
for me is no motivation. […] Because they pay us well. We have everything we want. Yes. So
someone, who, what do I know, is motivated by one, or maybe two or three months’ salary, if
that is their only motivation, then all I can say is that such people are in the wrong place
(Manager I; 53).
Also the research did not unequivocally confirm a shift in public managers’ behaviour
towards a style more in line with the private sector for all countries (see Xu-hong, 2004),
which supports the view of prior research that involvement in meaningful public Performance
service provision is an important incentive for public managers, compared to private- measurement
sector managers (Rainey, 1982). In general, managers in Citee did acknowledge their
multidimensional accountabilities and wished to have a dialogue with all involved
systems
parties. Correspondingly, Kroll (2015) identified stakeholder involvement as the second
most important factor for enhancing the use of performance measurement information.
To encompass the broad impact that SOEs have on society in general, the present 389
study found that PMSs should sensitize managers to and enhance dialogue concerning
all accountability dimensions. Examples of diverse dimensions not yet included in
Citee’s PMS but of crucial importance for the fulfilment of SOEs’ tasks were reported in
many of the interviews. These examples were presented according to the introduced
administrative, political, professional, and social accountability dimensions. Enhancing
sensitivity to these accountability dimensions within goal setting should increase
managers’ obligation to justify their actions towards all groups and not just
administrative bodies (Pollitt, 2003; Schlenker et al., 1994).
With respect to administrative accountability, Citee had laid down financial
requirements that managers must fulfil; thus “[…] to work economically as possible for
the city” (Manager II; 25) was at the core of SOEs administrative accountability:
So that’s the main thing; you know how bleak our budget is, I think soon we will become over-
indebted. I think the capital will soon be exhausted, I no longer remember exactly, but I think
by the end of the year at any rate (Manager II; 25).
With respect to political accountability, Citee exhibited a high level of involvement in
its owned enterprises. The city council in particular had a significant influence over
executive managers’ decisions:
There’s a market master who maintains order in the market, i.e. they check whether the
market regulations set for us by the board are being complied with (Manager II; 9).
But the ruling political parties, too, influenced the goals of the SOEs, with their political
ideas shaped by the expectations of their voters. This also encompassed, for example,
youth policy, with “talks [being] held with the youth welfare office” (Manager VI; 21).
Furthermore, every company specialized in a certain professional field containing
specific professional standards and benchmarks, and, consequently, “prescribed rules
and regulations” (Manager IV; 7) were important and formed part of day-to-day work.
The regulations were diverse, and ranged from broader, local area transport plans to
more detailed ones:
We have a local area transport plan which prescribes certain quality standards for the public
transport network. At the same time, we have set as part of Green Capital targets for the split
model – a gradual increase by 2035 from the current 19% to 25% (Manager V; 5).

With regard to socially imposed goals, this study proposes that the public voice should
become visible within set goals and performance standards. Related suggestions in the
literature include user boards, town meetings, public hearings, and customer surveys
(Sørensen and Torfing, 2012) as ways of integrating the public voice into PMSs. However,
social goals have, up until now, been absent from the goal-setting processes in Citee,
although non-profit enterprises in particular were very much aware of their social
accountabilities. They also recognized the social aims involved; for example, “[What]
we pursue is the provision of cultural necessities for the region” (Manager I; 20).
IJPSM The case of Citee furthermore illustrates that a holistic approach to all accountability
28,4/5 dimensions is crucial, as interdependencies exist with other empowerment components.
However, ambiguities resulting from diverse accountabilities could lead to an
unmanageable system and dysfunctionality ( Johnson, 2001; March and Olsen, 1995).
In Citee, in cases in which social accountability or professional accountability was
strongly perceived but administrative accountability was not (due to a lack of strategic
390 information), the perception of goal clarity was diminished, as financial goals lost their
substantiality without the necessary strategic background, leading to dramatic financial
grievances, even in cases where past financial results had been universally outstanding:
Everyone knows – and I am checking the actual numbers right now – that next year we
will have a deficit of 6.3; the following year, 7.2; the following year, 8.1; then 8.7, and then
9.9 million (Manager I; 75).
In perspective, the financial targets in particular are no longer achievable […], I have
an enormous need for maintenance, which has also not been displaced by the city
(Manager V; 79).
However, where all accountability dimensions were holistically perceived, weaknesses
in the PMS, such as unattainable performance goals, did not have such dramatic
consequences:
We will reach our targets but we are operating at the edge (Manager II: 81).

Discussion
In exploring the underlying case, this study has shown how PMSs that are designed in
accordance with the concept of psychological empowerment are able to foster
managers’ active work role and thus support the effective governance of SOEs. An
empowerment-friendly performance measurement design was proposed in accordance
with the four dimensions in which psychological empowerment is manifested: meaning,
competence, self-determination, and impact (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990).
Considering each dimension in turn, first, the meaning of SOE managers’ work can
be fostered through the provision of clear goals within a PMS. Goal clarity necessitates
that the goals imposed by administrative as well as political bodies be transparent.
Only in this way can a formal and institutional basis be established from which SOE
managers can form a clear view of the value that they place on their work in relation to
their own ideals or standards. However, a PMS needs to become established itself for it
to be perceived as clear and useful for assessing the meaning of one’s work. As was
shown in the case of Citee, this process can be additionally supported through
extensive communication, and, within this communication performance, priorities can
be established. Goal transparency can be fostered through a two-way exchange with
politicians (who are commonly reluctant to formulate and set transparent goals), while
procedural fairness can be fostered through transparent goal allocation. All of these
aspects helped the managers of Citee’s SOEs view their work as meaningful. In this
context, it is also helpful to use information systems as communication channels,
especially between SOE managers, administrative bodies, and politicians (Behn, 2003;
van Dooren, 2005; Ho, 2006), and communication channels can thus support reliable
documentation. With regard to the multiple accountabilities that SOEs face, procedural
fairness in a PMS can further support the active work role of managers as it increases
their acceptance of goal-allocation processes. The case study showed that PMSs that
standardize performance measurement procedures for all SOE managers through
higher acceptance of goals also increase the perceived value of their work and thus the Performance
meaning they attribute to their own work. measurement
Second, high degrees of perceived competence are crucial for empowering
managers. However, public managers are largely confronted with difficult and
systems
conflicting goals due to their manifold accountabilities, and goal difficulty has a
curvilinear effect on managers’ perceived competence. In Citee, increased motivation
and – particularly in financially strong SOEs – increased managerial innovation 391
capacities were shown when goals were demanding, but, as soon as these veered
towards unattainability and unreasonableness, managers became frustrated and
demotivated. Thus, exploratory use of a PMS can help maintain goals at the difficult
but attainable level. From what was observed at Citee, such exploratory use is possible,
as a PMS integrates a multiplicity of goals, keeps track of goal achievement in a
transparent way, sets milestones, and enables the adaptation of measures to the
specific needs of the SOE. Such an exploratory approach can provide a basis for the
managers’ personal development and thus can enhance managers’ perception of their
own competences.
Third, participation in goal-setting processes fosters managers’ perceived
self-determination. With respect to financial austerity, such participative processes
were limited for financial goals at Citee. Nevertheless, the case study revealed that the
detailed formulation of goals and measures is a way of enhancing managers’ perceived
self-determination and thus empowering them. In addition, the provision of strategic
information through PMSs was found to have untapped potential.
Fourth, a holistic view of goals can reveal the impact of a manager’s work to an
SOE manager. In this respect, it was interesting to observe that managers at Citee
largely saw themselves as public servants and acknowledged their multiple
accountabilities. Thus, they wished to have a PMS that took into account all the
accountabilities that SOE managers face as well as the goals resulting therefrom,
thereby enhancing any dialogue. This broadened view on goals is a crucial element of
a reconsidered PMS, but is limited, as it entails potential dysfunctionality and
unmanageability ( Johnson, 2001; March and Olsen, 1995). Thus, rather than
integrating all accountability dimensions as particular measures into a PMS, SOE
managers’ participation in administrative goal-setting processes, the occasional
invitation of public authorities to advisory board meetings, the use of other
professionals’ benchmarks, as well as listening to the public voice can all help to
broaden goals without making them unmanageable.
Each of the presented performance measurement elements considers and supports
one empowerment dimension. In this way, empowerment becomes a means for
enhancing the active work role of SOE managers and the governance of SOEs in general.

Conclusion
Previous studies have tried to determine whether PMSs lead to better outcomes in the
public context, with mixed results (Greiling, 2006). Some scholars have analysed
the factors that foster the use of the provided information (e.g. Ammons and Rivenbark,
2008; Kroll, 2015), while others have begun to examine how PMSs should be designed –
as opposed to whether or not they should be implemented – to produce the desired
effects (e.g. Padovani et al., 2010). However, to the present paper’s authors’ knowledge,
no study has been carried out within the specific context of SOEs. This study
therefore investigated how PMSs might be designed to increase the governance
effectiveness of SOEs.
IJPSM It found that, for the complex settings of SOEs, effective governance solutions require
28,4/5 compatible governance mechanisms, as combined governance solutions can adapt more
flexibly to the changing needs of SOE governance and respond better to historically
developed, coexisting governance mechanisms (Bruton et al., 2015; Christensen and
Lægreid, 2007; Grandori, 1997, 2001b). Instead of outlining the contradictory elements of
coexisting governance mechanisms, this study searched for possibilities for further
392 developing existing ones. In particular, it was investigated how a PMS, as the basis on
which most NPM governance mechanisms are built, can be combined with self-steering
governance mechanisms. When it comes to public value, it is important that SOE
managers take an active role in achieving public goals rather than merely pursuing their
own interests. Empowerment at work supports this, as it leads to increased task
motivation (Hall, 2008; Spreitzer, 1995). Thus, we further developed a model PMS
according to the dimensions of psychological empowerment (Conger and Kanungo, 1988;
Hall, 2011; Seibert et al., 2004; Spreitzer, 1995; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990), and
proposed an empowerment-friendly performance measurement design.
The study sought to discover under which conditions PMSs can empower SOE
managers, and hence, assuming a plurality of causal factors within the different
dimensions of empowerment, causal-process tracing was chosen (Blatter and Blume,
2008a, b; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; George and Bennett, 2005) for the “Citee” single-
case evaluation. The underlying causal mechanisms of the study’s theoretically
deduced concept thus were traced. Based on in-depth interviews with the executive
managers and the CEOs of various German SOEs within the “Citee” case city, the study
found that a clear, transparent, and fairly designed PMS, along with a balanced
approach to goal difficulty and the provision of strategic information through
performance measurement practices, positively influences all four cognitions in which
empowerment is rooted (meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact). It was
shown that these practices, together with a broad view and discussion of the manifold
SOE goals, could empower SOE managers. Consistent with these findings, an
“empowerment-friendly” performance measurement design was presented and the
implications for governance research in the post-NPM decade were outlined. This
facilitated the modelling of a theoretically derived, empowering PMS, enhancing the
framework with concrete propositions for its arrangement.

Theoretical and practical implications

This paper makes several contributions to performance measurement research in
public management. It extends prior studies that have observed that a particular
design of PMS can empower managers and employees (Hall, 2008; Taylor, 2013).
Principally, it proposes a holistic concept for an empowerment-friendly PMS. As other
researchers have shown, empowering managers increases their focused attention,
provokes greater effort and persistence during tasks, improves task strategies, and
enhances their performance (Hall, 2008; Pinder, 1998; Taylor, 2013). Used in the design
of PMSs, all of these benefits can facilitate the governance of SOEs.
Furthermore, the study’s findings contradict research streams that assume that
output-based governance mechanisms and self-governance mechanisms are
incompatible (Fimreite and Lægreid, 2009; Sørensen, 2012). Instead, this paper calls for
a complementary approach, and shows how elements of empowerment help to construct
PMSs that empower managers towards an active work role. Thus, it follows recent
literature that takes a holistic view of governance mechanisms (Christensen and Lægreid,
2007, 2010; Christensen, 2012; Egeberg and Trondal, 2009). From this standpoint,
combined governance mechanisms offer an effective solution to complex governance Performance
settings, as they can flexibly adapt to constantly changing and layering governance measurement
needs (Christensen and Lægreid, 2010; Grandori, 1997, 2001a; Morner and Misgeld, 2013).
Finally, this paper contributes to existing research in that it links the proposed
systems
empowerment-friendly PMS to contextual factors – namely, the highly complex and
volatile setting of SOEs that face multiple and diverse accountabilities.
The case study reveals how PMSs can be designed: first, according to the principles 393
of goal clarity, transparency, and procedural fairness to foster managers’ perceived
meaning of work; second, to ensure exploratory use of performance information and
the controllability of performance targets, both of which foster managers’ perceived
levels of competence; third, to enable participation and provide strategic information in
order to enhance managers’ perception of self-determination; and fourth, to integrate
multiple dimensions of public value creation and non-financial measures in order to
increase the perceived impact of managers’ work. Therefore, administrative bodies,
ownership managers, and municipal finance officers are advised to re-think existing
governance structures in order to empower managers through effectively designed
PMSs and prevent them from following their own interests. Previous studies have
described public managers as increasingly turning towards their self-interests and
neglecting their public tasks (Edeling et al., 2004). The present case study, however,
observed SOE managers as highly and intrinsically motivated by the higher level
public services that their enterprises are providing. Practitioners in the field of public
administration might beneficially act on this paper’s findings by placing a stronger
emphasis on all the dimensions of empowerment (namely, competence, self-
determination, and impact) as central regulators of performance measurement
practices in order to enhance present levels of public service motivation.

Limitations
This study focused on performance measurement practices. From a content-related point
of view, however, it is also important to assess the reasons why performance information
is being measured. For the public sector, strategic decision making, learning, controlling,
and budgeting as well as sanctioning and rewarding are revealed as purposeful reasons
for measuring performance information (Behn, 2003; Van Dooren et al., 2010; Kroll, 2015;
Moynihan, 2009). Accordingly, Van Veen-Dirks (2010) concluded that, depending on their
use, PMSs could be adapted. In the present case, the significant underlying performance
information use concerned the effective governance of SOEs. However, different
recommendations might be derived for other purposes.
Also, the context of the study’s findings was restricted to a German setting, which
provides opportunities for further research in other countries. Likewise, Citee was a
specific example, facing as it was the dilemma of extreme financial pressure (Döhrn
et al., 2013; Schwarting, 2004). However, the study’s findings might lead to different
empowering goals and structural conclusions in other municipal settings.
Moreover, a qualitative methodology was used to trace the underlying causal
mechanisms that could lead to managers’ empowerment through PMSs. In particular, the
relative meaning of empowerment with respect to governance effectiveness should be
tested, and the actual dearth of influence on self-governance elaborated. Through the
study’s purposive sampling (Table I), insights were gained into a diverse spectrum of
public tasks and accountabilities. However, as with other qualitative studies,
generalizations cannot be derived from it. The objective of process tracing is to refine
theory rather than generalize it (Blatter and Blume, 2008a, b; Blatter and Haverland, 2012;
IJPSM George and Bennett, 2005). Examining the applicability of this study’s refined results
28,4/5 within comparative case studies could be a possible next research step, and would help to
situate these results in a more general context. For instance, focusing on and elucidating
specific governance mechanisms vis-à-vis the specific business activities of SOEs,
executive managers’ positions, and/or SOEs’ legal forms could offer additional criteria for
further research on the design of empowering PMSs. Lastly, further quantitative research
394 is needed to support the current study’s framework. Nevertheless, this study and its
findings mark a starting point for the exploration of how PMSs as the foundation of
output-based NPM governance can be designed to simultaneously empower those whose
performance is being measured.

References
Aharoni, Y. (1981), “Performance evaluation of state-owned enterprises: a process perspective”,
Management Science, Vol. 27 No. 11, pp. 1340-1347.
Amabile, T.M. (1996), Creativity in Context: Update to “The Social Psychology of Creativity”,
Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
Amaratunga, D. and Baldry, D. (2002), “Moving from performance measurement to performance
management”, Facilities, Vol. 20 Nos 5/6, pp. 217-223.
Ammons, D.N. and Rivenbark, W.C. (2008), “Factors influencing the use of performance data to
improve municipal services: evidence from the North Carolina benchmarking project”,
Public Administration, Vol. 68 No. 2, pp. 304-318.
Amundsen, S. and Martinsen, Ø.L. (2015), “Linking empowering leadership to job satisfaction,
work effort, and creativity: the role of self-leadership and psychological empowerment”,
Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 304-323.
Andersen, L.B., Jørgensen, T.B., Kjeldsen, A.M., Pedersen, L.H. and Vrangbæk, K. (2012), “Public
value dimensions: developing and testing a multi-dimensional classification”, International
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 35 No. 11, pp. 715-728.
Anthony, R.N. and Govindarajan, V. (2014), Management Control Systems, 1st European ed.,
McGraw-Hill Education, Boston, MA.
Argyris, C. (1977), “Organizational learning and management information systems”, Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Vol. 2 No. 2, pp. 113-123.
Argyris, C. and Schön, D.A. (1978), Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective,
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
Arogundade, O.T. and Arogundade, A.B. (2015), “Psychological empowerment in the workplace:
implications for employees’ career satisfaction”, North American Journal of Psychology,
Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 27-36.
Ashforth, B.E. (1989), “The experience of powerlessness in organizations”, Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 43 No. 2, pp. 207-242.
Askim, J., Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2014), “Performance management and accountability
of welfare state agencies: the cases of Norwegian hospital, welfare and immigration
administration”, Working Paper No. 08-2014, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies,
Uni Research Rokkan Centre, Bergen, October.
Askim, J., Johnsen, A. and Christophersen, K.-A. (2008), “Factors behind organizational learning
from benchmarking: experiences from Norwegian municipal benchmarking networks”,
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 297-320.
Bai, C.E. and Xu, L.C. (2005), “Incentives for CEOs with multitasks: evidence from Chinese
state-owned enterprises”, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 517-539.
Baker, S.E. and Edwards, R. (2012), “How many qualitative interviews is enough? Expert voices Performance
and early career reflections nn sampling and cases in qualitative research”, Review paper,
ESRC National Centre for Research Methods, NCRM, Southampton.
measurement
Bandura, A. (1982), “Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency”, American Psychologist, Vol. 37
systems
No. 2, pp. 122-147.
Bandura, A. (1986), Social Foundations of Thought and Action, Prentice Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, NJ. 395
Becker, S. and Green, D. (1962), “Budgeting and employee behavior”, Journal of Business, Vol. 35
No. 4, pp. 392-402.
Behn, R.D. (2003), “Why measure performance? Different purposes require different measures”,
Public Administration Review, Vol. 63 No. 5, pp. 586-606.
Berman, E. and Wang, X. (2000), “Performance measurement in US counties: capacity for reform”,
Public Administration Review, Vol. 60 No. 5, pp. 409-420.
Bhattacharyya, D.K. (2013), “Performance-related pay: evidence-based studies in Indian central
public sector enterprises”, Compensation & Benefits Review, Vol. 45 No. 4, pp. 215-222.
Blatter, J. and Blume, T. (2008a), “Co-variation and causal process tracing revisited: clarifying
new directions for causal inference and generalization in case study methodology”,
Qualitative Methods (Newsletter of the Qualitative and Multi-Method Research Section of the
American Political Science Association), Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 29-34.
Blatter, J. and Blume, T. (2008b), “In search of co-variance, causal mechanisms or congruence?
Towards a plural understanding of case studies”, Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 14
No. 2, pp. 315-356.
Blatter, J. and Haverland, M. (2012), Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in Small-N
Research, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY.
Bouckaert, G. and Halligan, J. (2008), Managing Performance: International Comparisons,
Routledge, London.
Bovens, M. (2007), “Analysing and assessing accountability: a conceptual framework”, European
Law Journal, Vol. 13 No. 4, pp. 447-468.
Boyne, G.A. and O’Toole, L.J. (2006), Public Service Performance: Perspectives on Measurement
and Management, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Brunsson, N. (1989), The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions, and Actions in
Organizations, Wiley, Chichester.
Bruton, G.D., Peng, M.W., Ahlstrom, D., Stan, C. and Xu, K. (2015), “State-owned enterprises
around the world as hybrid organizations”, Academy of Management Perspectives, Vol. 29
No. 1, pp. 92-114.
Bundesagentur für Arbeit Statistik (2015), Arbeitslose nach Gemeinden: Jahreszahlen 2014
(in German), Federal Employment Agency, Nuremberg.
Burkert, M., Fischer, F.M. and Schäffer, U. (2011), “Application of the controllability principle and
managerial performance: the role of role perceptions”, Management Accounting Research,
Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 143-159.
Burth, A., Geißler, R., Gnädinger, M. and Hilgers, D. (2013), “Kommunaler Finanzreport 2013:
Einnahmen, Ausgaben und Verschuldung im Ländervergleich (in German)”, Bertelsmann
Foundation, Gütersloh, available at: www.kommunaler-finanzreport.de/kommunaler-
finanzreport-2013.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015).
Calabrò, A. and Torchia, M. (2011), “Conflicts of interest and governance mechanisms in
Italian local public utilities”, International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 34 No. 7,
pp. 447-460.
IJPSM Cavalluzzo, K.S. and Ittner, C.D. (2004), “Implementing performance measurement innovations:
evidence from government”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 29 Nos 3-4, pp. 243-267.
28,4/5
Chenhall, R.H. (2005), “Integrative strategic performance measurement systems, strategic
alignment of manufacturing, learning and strategic outcomes: an exploratory study”,
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 30 No. 5, pp. 395-422.
Christensen, T. (2012), “Post-NPM and changing public governance”, Meiji Journal of Political
396 Science and Economics, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 1-11.
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2001), New Public Management. The Transformation of Ideas
and Practice, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot.
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2007), “The whole-of-government approach to public sector
reform”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 67 No. 6, pp. 1059-1066.
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2010), “Increased complexity in public sector organizations: the
challenges of combining NPM and post-NPM”, in Lægreid, P. and Verhoest, K. (Eds),
Governance of Public Sector Organizations: Proliferation, Autonomy and Performance,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 255-278.
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2011a), “Complexity and hybrid public administration – theoretical
and empirical challenges”, Public Organization Review, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 407-423.
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2011b), “Post-NPM reforms: whole of government approaches as
a new trend”, in Groeneveld, S. and van de Walle, S. (Eds), New Steering Concepts in Public
Management, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 11-24.
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2015), “Performance and accountability – a theoretical
discussion and an empirical assessment”, Public Organization Review: A Global Journal,
Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 207-225.
Christiansen, H. (2011), “The size and composition of the SOE sector in OECD countries”,
Working Paper No. 5, OECD Publishing, OECD Corporate Governance, Paris.
Conger, J. and Kanungo, R. (1987), “Toward a behavioral theory of charismatic leadership in
organizational settings”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 637-647.
Conger, J.A. and Kanungo, R.N. (1988), “The empowerment process: integrating theory and
practice”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 471-482.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1975), Beyond Boredom and Anxiety, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990), Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, Harper, New York, NY.
Cugueró-Escofet, N. and Rosanas, J.M. (2013), “The just design and use of management control
systems as requirements for goal congruence”, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 24
No. 1, pp. 23-40.
Dai, H., Milkman, K. and Riis, J. (2013), “The fresh start effect: temporal landmarks motivate
aspirational behavior”, Management Science, Vol. 60 No. 10, pp. 2563-2582.
De Vries, M. and Nemec, J. (2013), “Public sector reform: an overview of recent literature and
research on NPM and alternative paths”, International Journal of Public Sector
Management, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 4-16.
Deci, E.L., Connell, J.P. and Ryan, R.M. (1989), “Self-determination in a work organization”,
Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 74 No. 4, pp. 580-590.
Döhrn, R., Kitlinski, T. and Barabas, G. (2013), “Konjunktur in Nordrhein-Westfalen: Wirtschaft
wächst langsamer als in Deutschland insgesamt”, RWI Konjunkturberichte, Vol. 64 No. 4,
pp. 15-22.
Drake, A.R., Wong, J. and Salter, S.B. (2007), “Empowerment, motivation, and performance:
examining the impact of feedback and incentives on nonmanagement employees”,
Behavioral Research in Accounting, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 71-89.
Dubois, A. and Gadde, L.E. (2002), “Systemic combining: an abductive approach to case Performance
research”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 55 No. 7, pp. 553-560.
measurement
(The) Economist (2012), “The visible hand”, Special Report: State capitalism, 21 January, pp. 1-3. systems
Edeling, T., Reichard, C., Richter, P. and Brandt, S. (2004), “Kommunale Betriebe in Deutschland:
Ergebnisse einer empirischen Analyse der Beteiligungen deutscher Städte der GK 1-4:
Abschlußbericht” (in German), KGSt, Cologne.
Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2009), “Political leadership and bureaucratic autonomy: effects of 397
agencification”, Governance, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 673-688.
Ernst & Young (2010), “Government as best in class shareholder: featuring the point of view of
12,000 citizens in 24 countries”, available at: www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/
Government_as_is_best_class_shareholder/$FILE/Government%20as%20in%20best%
20class%20shareholder_FINAL.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015).
Estrin, S. and Pérotin, V. (1991), “Does ownership always matter?”, International Journal of
Industrial Organization, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 55-72.
Fernandez, S. and Moldogaziev, T. (2011), “Empowering public sector employees to improve
performance: does it work?”, The American Review of Public Administration, Vol. 41 No. 1,
pp. 23-47.
Fernandez, S. and Moldogaziev, T. (2013), “Using employee empowerment to encourage
innovative behavior in the public sector”, Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 155-187.
Ferrari, P.A. and Manzi, G. (2014), “Citizens evaluate public services: a critical overview of
statistical methods for analysing user satisfaction”, Journal of Economic Policy Reform,
Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 236-252.
Fimreite, A.L. and Lægreid, P. (2009), “Reorganizing the welfare state administration:
partnership, networks and accountability”, Public Management Review, Vol. 11 No. 3,
pp. 281-297.
Flick, U. (2014), An Introduction to Qualitative Research, 5th ed., Sage, London.
Flinders, M. and Tonkiss, K. (2015), “From ‘poor parenting’ to micro-management: coalition
governance and the sponsorship of arm’s-length bodies in the United Kingdom, 2010-13”,
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 19 June. doi: 10.1177/0020852314564311.
Florio, M. (2014), “Contemporary public enterprises: innovation, accountability, governance”,
Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 201-208.
Forde, C., Slater, G. and Spencer, D.A. (2006), “It’s the taking part that counts? Participation,
performance and external labour market conditions”, Relations Industrielles/Industrial
Relations, Vol. 61 No. 2, pp. 296-320.
Franco-Santos, M., Kennerley, M., Micheli, P., Martinez, V., Mason, S., Marr, B., Gray, D. and
Neely, A. (2007), “Towards a definition of a business performance measurement system”,
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 27 No. 8, pp. 784-801.
Friedmann, W.G. and Garner, J.F. (1970), Government Enterprise: A Comparative Study,
Stevens, London.
Frost, J. and Morner, M. (2011), “Governing collective action. Revisiting the theory of the firm”, Paper
Presented at “2nd International Conference on Humanizing the Firm and the Management
Profession: Towards a New Theory of the Firm, IESE Business School, Barcelona, 27-28 June.
Gagné, M. and Deci, E.L. (2005), “Self-determination theory and work motivation”, Journal of
Organizational Behavior, Vol. 26 No. 4, pp. 331-362.
George, A.L. and Bennett, A. (2005), Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
IJPSM Glaser, B.G. (1992), Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergence vs Forcing, Sociology Press,
Mill Valley, CA.
28,4/5
Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A. (1967), The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Aldine Publishing
Company, Hawthorne, NY.
Gómez-Miñambres, J. (2012), “Motivation through goal setting”, Journal of Economic Psychology,
Vol. 33 No. 6, pp. 1223-1239.
398 Gonzalez-Mule, E., Courtright, S.H., DeGeest, D., Seong, J.-Y. and Hong, D.-S. (2014), “Channeled
autonomy: the joint effects of autonomy and feedback on team performance through
organizational goal clarity”, Journal of Management, 27 May, pp. 1-16. doi:10.1177/
0149206314535443.
Goretzki, L., Strauss, E. and Weber, J. (2013), “An institutional perspective on the changes in
management accountants’ professional role”, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 24
No. 1, pp. 41-63.
Grandori, A. (1997), “Governance structures, coordination mechanisms and cognitive models”,
Journal of Management & Governance, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 29-47.
Grandori, A. (2001a), “Neither hierarchy nor identity: knowledge-governance mechanisms and
the theory of the firm”, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 5 Nos 3-4, pp. 381-399.
Grandori, A. (2001b), Organization and Economic Behavior, Routledge, London.
Grant, A.M. (2008), “The significance of task significance: job performance effects, relational
mechanisms, and boundary conditions”, The Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 93 No. 1,
pp. 108-124.
Grant, A.M., Fried, Y. and Juillerat, T. (2011), “Work matters: job design in classic and contemporary
perspectives”, in Zedeck, S. (Ed.), APA Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology,
Vol. 1, American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, pp. 417-453.
Greiling, D. (2006), “Performance measurement: a remedy for increasing the efficiency of public
services?”, International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, Vol. 55
No. 6, pp. 448-465.
Groen, B.A.C., Wouters, M.J.F. and Wilderom, C.P.M. (2012), “Why do employees take more
initiatives to improve their performance after co-developing performance measures? A field
study”, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 120-141.
Grossi, G. and Reichard, C. (2008), “Municipal corporatization in Germany and Italy”, Public
Management Review, Vol. 10 No. 5, pp. 597-617.
Grossi, G., Papenfuss, U. and Tremblay, M.-S. (2015), “Corporate governance and accountability
of state-owned enterprises: relevance for science and society and interdisciplinary research
perspectives”, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 28 Nos 4/5.
Hackman, R.J., Oldham, G.R., Janson, R. and Purdy, K. (1975), “A new strategy for job
enrichment”, California Management Review, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 57-71.
Haines, V.Y. and St-Onge, S. (2012), “Performance management effectiveness: practices or context?”,
The International Journal of Human Resource Management, Vol. 23 No. 6, pp. 1158-1175.
Hall, M. (2008), “The effect of comprehensive performance measurement systems on role clarity,
psychological empowerment and managerial performance”, Accounting, Organizations and
Society, Vol. 33 Nos 2-3, pp. 141-163.
Hall, M. (2011), “Do comprehensive performance measurement systems help or hinder
managers’ mental model development?”, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 22 No. 2,
pp. 68-83.
Hartmann, F. (2005), “The effects of tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty on the
appropriateness of accounting performance measures”, Abacus, Vol. 41 No. 3, pp. 241-264.
Hartmann, F. and Slapničar, S. (2012), “The perceived fairness of performance evaluation: the role Performance
of uncertainty”, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 17-33.
measurement
Haverland, M. and Yanow, D. (2012), “A hitchhiker’s guide to the public administration research
universe: surviving conversations on methodologies and methods”, Public Administration
systems
Review, Vol. 72 No. 3, pp. 401-408.
He, J. and Lau, C. (2012), “Does the reliance on nonfinancial measures for performance evaluation
enhance managers’ perceptions of procedural fairness?”, Studies in Managerial and 399
Financial Accounting, Vol. 25 No. 2012, pp. 363-388.
Hermanns, H. (2004), “Interviewing as an activity”, in Flick, U., Kardorff, E.v. and Steinke, I. (Eds),
A Companion to Qualitative Research, Sage, London, pp. 209-213.
Ho, A.T.-K. (2006), “Accounting for the value of performance measurement from the perspective
of Midwestern mayors”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 16
No. 2, pp. 217-237.
Hood, C. (1995), “The ‘new public management’ in the 1980s: variations on a theme”, Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Vol. 20 Nos 2-3, pp. 93-109.
James, O. and van Thiel, S. (2011), “Structural devolution to agencies”, in Christensen, T. and
Lægreid, P. (Eds), The Ashgate Companion to New Public Management, Ashgate
Publishing, Farnham, pp. 209-222.
Järvenpää, M. (2009), “The institutional pillars of management accounting function”, Journal of
Accounting & Organizational Change, Vol. 5 No. 4, pp. 444-471.
Jaworski, B.J. and Young, S.M. (1992), “Dysfunctional behavior and management control:
an empirical study of marketing managers”, Accounting, Organizations and Society,
Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 17-35.
Johnsen, Å. (2001), “Balanced scorecard: theoretical perspectives and public management
implications”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 16 No. 6, pp. 319-330.
Jung, C.S. (2012), “Why are goals important in the public sector? Exploring the benefits of goal
clarity for reducing turnover intention”, Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 209-234.
Kankaanpää, J., Oulasvirta, L. and Wacker, J. (2014), “Steering and monitoring model of state-owned
enterprises”, International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 37 No. 7, pp. 409-423.
Kaplan, R.S. and Norton, D.P. (1992), “The balanced scorecard: measures that drive performance”,
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 70 No. 1, pp. 71-79.
Kaplan, R.S. and Norton, D.P. (1996), The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action,
Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
Kaplan, R.S. and Norton, D.P. (2001), The Strategy-Focused Organization: How Balanced
Scorecard Companies Thrive in the New Business Environment, Harvard Business School
Press, Boston, MA.
Kenis, I. (1979), “Effects of budgetary goal characteristics on managerial attitudes and
performance”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 54 No. 4, pp. 707-721.
Koppell, J.G.S. (2007), “Political control for China’s state-owned enterprises: lessons from
America’s experience with hybrid organizations”, Governance: An International Journal of
Policy and Administration, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 255-278.
Krause, T. (2014), “Contingencies of factual management autonomy in corporatized enterprises:
a social exchange perspective”, Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the European
Group for Public Administration (EGPA), Speyer, 10-12 September.
Kroll, A. (2015), “Drivers of performance information use: systematic literature review and
directions for future research”, Public Performance & Management Review, Vol. 38 No. 3,
pp. 459-486.
IJPSM Lægreid, P., Verhoest, K. and Jann, W. (2008), “The governance, autonomy and coordination of
public sector organizations”, Public Organization Review, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 93-96.
28,4/5
Langevin, P. and Mendoza, C. (2013), “How can management control system fairness reduce
managers’ unethical behaviours?”, European Management Journal, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 209-222.
Latham, G.P. and Locke, E.A. (2007), “New developments in and directions for goal-setting
research”, European Psychologist, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 290-300.
400 Lee, J. and Wei, F. (2011), “The mediating effect of psychological empowerment on the
relationship between participative goal setting and team outcomes – a study in China”, The
International Journal of Human Resource Management, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 279-295.
Lindenberg, S. and Foss, N.J. (2011), “Managing joint production motivation: the role of goal
framing and governance mechanisms”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 36 No. 3,
pp. 500-525.
Ling, T. (2002), “Delivering joined-up government in the UK: dimensions, issues and problems”,
Public Administration, Vol. 80 No. 4, pp. 615-642.
Locke, E.A. (1968), “Toward a theory of task motivation and incentives”, Organizational Behavior
and Human Performance, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 157-189.
Locke, E.A. (1996), “Motivation through conscious goal setting”, Applied and Preventive
Psychology, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 117-124.
Locke, E.A. and Latham, G.P. (2002), “Building a practically useful theory of goal setting and task
motivation: a 35-year odyssey”, American Psychologist, Vol. 75 No. 9, pp. 705-717.
London, M., Mone, E.M. and Scott, J.C. (2004), “Performance management and assessment:
methods for improved rater accuracy and employee goal setting”, Human Resource
Management, Vol. 43 No. 4, pp. 319-336.
Mahama, H. (2006), “Management control systems, cooperation and performance in strategic
supply relationships: a survey in the mines”, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 17
No. 3, pp. 315-339.
March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1995), Democratic Governance, The Free Press, New York, NY.
Melkers, J.E. and Willoughby, K.G. (2001), “Budgeters’ views of state performance-budgeting
systems: distinctions across branches”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 61 No. 1, pp. 54-64.
Melnyk, S., Bititci, U., Platts, K., Tobias, J. and Andersen, B. (2014), “Is performance measurement
and management fit for the future?”, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 25 No. 2,
pp. 173-186.
Merchant, K.A. (1990), “The effects of financial controls on data manipulation and management
myopia”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 297-313.
Meynhardt, T. (2009), “Public value inside: what is public value creation?”, International Journal
of Public Administration, Vol. 32 Nos 3-4, pp. 192-219.
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1994), Qualitative Data Analysis, 2nd ed., Sage Publications,
London.
Moore, M.H. (1995), Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Morner, M. and Misgeld, M. (2013), “Governing wicked problems: The role of self-organizing
governance in fostering the problem-solving capabilities of public sector organizations”,
Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the European Group for Public Administration
(EGPA), Edinburgh, 11-13 September.
Moynihan, D.P. (2008), The Dynamics of Performance Management: Constructing Information
and Reform, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC.
Moynihan, D.P. (2009), “Through a glass, darkly”, Public Performance & Management Review, Performance
Vol. 32 No. 4, pp. 592-603.
measurement
Nabatchi, T. (2010), “Addressing the citizenship and democratic deficits: the potential of systems
deliberative democracy for public administration”, The American Review of Public
Administration, Vol. 40 No. 4, pp. 376-399.
Neely, A., Gregory, M. and Platts, K. (1995), “Performance measurement system design:
a literature review and research agenda”, International Journal of Operations & Production 401
Management, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 80-116.
Nudurupati, S.S., Bititci, U.S., Kumar, V. and Chan, F.T.S. (2011), “State of the art literature
review on performance measurement”, Computers & Industrial Engineering, Vol. 60 No. 2,
pp. 279-290.
O’Connor, N.G., Deng, J. and Luo, Y. (2006), “Political constraints, organization design and
performance measurement in China’s state-owned enterprises”, Accounting, Organizations
and Society, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 157-177.
OECD (2005), OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, OECD
Publishing, Paris.
Padovani, E., Yetano, A. and Orelli, R.L. (2010), “Municipal performance measurement and
management in practice: which factors matter”, Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 34
No. 4, pp. 591-635.
Palermo, O.A., Cohen, L., Loan-Clarke, J. and Mellahi, K. (2010), “Implications of new public
management and modernization on control: the case of an English regional probation service”,
International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 23 No. 6, pp. 535-548.
Paulus, T.M., Lester, J.N. and Dempster, P.G. (2014), Digital Tools for Qualitative Research,
Sage, London.
Pinder, C.G. (1998), Work Motivation in Organizational Behavior, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle
River, NJ.
Pollitt, C. (2003), The Essential Public Manager, Open University Press, Maidenhead.
Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2011), Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis – New
Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State, 3rd ed., Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Price, A.D.F., Bryman, A. and Dainty, A.R.J. (2004), “Empowering as a strategy for improving
construction performance”, Leadership and Management in Engineering, Vol. 4 No. 1,
pp. 27-37.
Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. (1970), The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, Wiley InterScience,
New York, NY.
Rainey, H.G. (1982), “Reward preferences among public and private managers: in search of the
service ethic”, The American Review of Public Administration, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 288-302.
Ramamurti, R. (1987), “Performance evaluation of state-owned enterprises in theory and
practice”, Management Science, Vol. 33 No. 7, pp. 876-893.
Rubin, H.J. and Rubin, I.S. (2012), Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, Sage,
Thousand Oaks, CA.
Sandelands, L.E., Brockner, J. and Glynn, M.A. (1988), “If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again:
effects of persistence-performance contingencies, ego involvement, and self-esteem on task
persistence”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 73 No. 2, pp. 208-216.
Sawyer, J.E. (1992), “Goal and process clarity: specification of multiple constructs of role
ambiguity and a structural equation model of their antecedents and consequences”, Journal
of Applied Psychology, Vol. 77 No. 2, pp. 130-142.
IJPSM Schillemans, T. (2008), “Accountability in the shadow of hierarchy: the horizontal accountability
of agencies”, Public Organization Review, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 175-194.
28,4/5
Schlenker, B.R., Britt, T.W., Pennington, J., Murphy, R. and Doherty, K. (1994), “The triangle
model of responsibility”, Psychological Review, Vol. 101 No. 4, pp. 632-352.
Schwarting, G. (2004), “Beteiligungsmanagement und-controlling in der Kommunalverwaltung –
Einige wenig beachtete Aspekte”, Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Vol. 56
402 No. 4, pp. 342-354.
Seibert, S.E., Silver, S.R. and Randolph, W.A. (2004), “Taking empowerment to the next level:
a multiple-level model of empowerment, performance, and satisfaction”, Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 47 No. 3, pp. 332-349.
Sørensen, E. (2012), “Measuring the accountability of collaborative innovation”, The Innovation
Journal, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 1-18.
Sørensen, E. and Torfing, J. (2011), “Enhancing collaborative innovation in the public sector”,
Administration & Society, Vol. 43 No. 8, pp. 842-868.
Sørensen, E. and Torfing, J. (2012), “Introduction collaborative innovation in the public sector”,
The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 1-14.
Sørensen, E. and Triantafillou, P. (Eds) (2009), The Politics of Self-Governance, Ashgate
Publishing, Farnham.
Speklé, R.F. and Verbeeten, F.H.M. (2014), “The use of performance measurement systems in the
public sector: effects on performance”, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 25 No. 2,
pp. 131-146.
Spreitzer, G.M. (1995), “Psychological empowerment in the workplace: dimensions, measurement
and validation”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 38 No. 5, pp. 1442-1465.
Stoker, G. (2006), “Public value management: a new narrative for networked governance?”,
American Review of Public Administration, Vol. 36 No. 1, pp. 41-57.
Strauss, G. (1998), “An overview”, in Heller, F., Pusić, E., Strauss, G. and Wilpert, B. (Eds),
Organisational Participation: Myth and Reality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 8-39.
Taylor, J. (2011), ““Strengthening the link between performance measurement and decision
making”, Public Administration, Vol. 89 No. 3, pp. 860-878.
Taylor, J. (2013), “Goal setting in the Australian public service: effects on psychological
empowerment and organizational citizenship behavior”, Public Administration Review,
Vol. 73 No. 3, pp. 453-464.
Thomas, K.W. and Velthouse, B.A. (1990), “Cognitive elements of empowerment”, Academy of
Management Review, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 666-681.
Thynne, I. (1994), “The incorporated company as an instrument of government: a quest for a
comparative understanding”, Governance, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 59-82.
Thynne, I. (2011), “Ownership as an instrument of policy and understanding in the public sphere:
trends and research agenda”, Policy Studies, Vol. 32 No. 3, pp. 183-197.
Torres, L., Pina, V. and Yetano, A. (2011), “Performance measurement in Spanish local
governments: a cross-case comparison study”, Public Administration, Vol. 89 No. 3,
pp. 1081-1109.
Ullrich, C.G. (1999a), “Deutungsmusteranalyse und diskursives Interview: Leitfadenkonstruktion,
Interviewführung und Typenbildung”, Mannheimer Zentrum fü r Europä i sche
Sozialforschung (MZES), Mannheim.
Ullrich, C.G. (1999b), “Deutungsmusteranalyse und diskursives interview”, Zeitschrift für
Soziologie, Vol. 28 No. 6, pp. 429-447.
vagliasindi, M. (2008), “Governance arrangements for state owned enterprises”, Policy Research, Performance
Working Paper No. 4542, The World Bank, Washington, DC, March.
measurement
van Dooren, W. (2005), “What makes organisations measure? Hypotheses on the causes
and conditions for performance measurement”, Financial Accountability & Management,
systems
Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 363-383.
van Dooren, W., Bouckaert, G. and Halligan, J. (2010), Performance Management in the Public
Sector, Routledge, London. 403
van Gestel, K., Voets, J. and Verhoest, K. (2012), “How governance of complex PPPS affects
performance”, Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 140-188.
van Veen-Dirks, P. (2010), “Different uses of performance measures: the evaluation versus reward of
production managers”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 141-164.
Verschuere, B., Verhoest, K., Meyers, F. and Peters, B.G. (2006), “Accountability and accountability
arrangements in public agencies”, in Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (Eds), Autonomy
and Regulation: Coping With Agencies in the Modern State, Edward Elgar, Northampton,
pp. 268-298.
Vroom, V.H. (1964), Work and Motivation, Wiley & Sons, New York, NY.
Wälder, N. and Morner, M. (2013), “Competence building in multinational companies: how to
establish an ‘organizational ambiente’ for cooperation (2358)”, Paper Presented at the 13th
EURAM (European Academy of Management) Conference, Istanbul, 26-29 June.
Walker, R.M., Damanpour, F. and Devece, C.A. (2011), “Management innovation and
organizational performance: the mediating effect of performance management”, Journal
of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 367-386.
Watts, T. and McNair-Connolly, C.J. (2012), “New performance measurement and management
control systems”, Journal of Applied Accounting Research, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 226-241.
Wilkinson, A. and Dundon, T. (2011), “Direct employee participation”, in Wilkinson, A. (Ed.), Oxford
Handbook of Participation in Organizations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 167-185.
Windeck, D., Weber, J. and Strauss, E. (2013), “Enrolling managers to accept the business partner:
the role of boundary objects”, Journal of Management & Governance, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 1-37.
Wood, S. and de Menezes, L.M. (2011), “High involvement management, high-performance work
systems and well-being”, The International Journal of Human Resource Management,
Vol. 22 No. 7, pp. 1586-1610.
Wynen, J., Verhoest, K., Ongaro, E. and van Thiel, S. (2014), “Innovation-oriented culture in the
public sector: do managerial autonomy and result control lead to innovation?”, Public
Management Review, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 45-66.
Xu-hong, L. (2004), “A self-serving agent or a steward: a cross-cultural analysis of the role of
executives in state-owned enterprises”, Journal of Fudan University, Vol. 3, available at: https://
scholar.google.de/scholar?hl=de&q=Q8+self-serving+agent+or+a+steward%3A+a+cross-
cultural+analysis+of+the+role+of+executives+in+state-owned+enterprises&btnG=&lr=
(accessed 3 August 2015).

Corresponding author
Martyna Swiatczak can be contacted at: swiatczak@uni-speyer.de

For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com