QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

FOR
PROPOSED AUGMENTATION IN LPG BULK STORAGE CAPACITY
AT LPG BOTTLING PLANT AT MEHATPUR, UNA,
HIMACHAL PRADESH

PREPARED BY
 ABBREVIATIONS

AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
IOCL Indian Oil Corporation Ltd
CCPS Centre of Chemical Process Safety
DNV Det Norske Veritas
ERDMP Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan
FBR Full Bore Rupture
HF Highly Flammable
HSD High Speed Diesel
HSE Health Safety and Environment
IR Individual Risk
IRPA Individual Risk per Annum
LFL Lower Flammability Level
LOC Loss of Containment
LPG Liquified Petroleum Gas
LSIR Location Specific Individual Risk
NR Not Reached
OGP International Association of Oil and Gas production
PHAST Process Hazard Analysis Software tool
PLL Potential Loss of Life
PNGRB Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
UFL Upper Flammability Level

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una

Contents
Definitions.................................................................................................................................. 5
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 7
1.1 Brief description of Nature, Size and Location of the project .................................... 9
1.2 Project Objective ....................................................................................................... 10
2 METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 11
2.1 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 11
2.2 QRA Approach .......................................................................................................... 11
2.2.1 Result Interpretation........................................................................................... 11
2.2.2 Risk Criteria ....................................................................................................... 12
2.3 Risk............................................................................................................................ 13
2.4 Individual Risk Criteria (IR) ..................................................................................... 13
2.5 Presentation of Risk Results...................................................................................... 13
2.5.1 Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) ......................................................... 13
2.5.2 Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA) ................................................................... 14
2.5.3 Potential Loss of Life (PLL) .............................................................................. 14
3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ........................................................................................ 15
3.1 Hazards associated with storage tanks ...................................................................... 15
3.2 Hazard Categories ..................................................................................................... 15
3.3 Hazardous Properties................................................................................................. 15
3.4 Scenarios ................................................................................................................... 16
3.4.1 List of identified Scenarios ................................................................................ 17
3.5 Population Data ......................................................................................................... 17
3.6 Ignition sources ......................................................................................................... 18
3.7 Climatic Conditions................................................................................................... 18
3.7.1 Meteorological Data........................................................................................... 18
3.7.2 Atmospheric Stability Classes ........................................................................... 19
4 EVENTS AND IGNITION PROBABILITY .................................................................. 20
4.1 Event Tree ................................................................................................................. 20
4.2 Consequential Events ................................................................................................ 21
4.2.1 Jet Fire................................................................................................................ 21
4.2.2 Pool Fire ............................................................................................................. 21

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 1

 4.2.3 Flammable Gas Dispersion / Flash Fire ............................................................. 22
4.2.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion.................................................................................... 22
4.2.5 BLEVE ............................................................................................................... 22
4.3 Ignition Probability ................................................................................................... 22
5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 24
5.1 Modes of failure ........................................................................................................ 24
5.2 Impact Criteria........................................................................................................... 25
5.2.1. Impact due to fire ................................................................................................... 25
5.2.2. Impact due to explosion/dispersion ........................................................................... 26
5.3 Initial Release Rates .................................................................................................. 26
5.4 Flammable Gas Dispersion ....................................................................................... 27
5.5 Radiation Distances due to Jet Fire ........................................................................... 29
5.6 Radiation Distances due to Pool Fire ........................................................................ 31
5.7 Overpressure Distances due to Explosion ................................................................ 32
5.8 Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) ................................................ 34
5.8.1 Fireball due to BLEVE in Road Tanker ............................................................ 34
6 LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION ........................................................................................ 35
6.1 Failure Frequencies ................................................................................................... 35
7 RISK ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................ 37
7.1 Risk Contours ............................................................................................................ 37
7.2 FN Curve ................................................................................................................... 39
7.3 IRPA and PLL ........................................................................................................... 39
7.4 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 40
7.5 Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 40
8 Dispersion Contours......................................................................................................... 42

List of Tables
Table 1: Project and Project Proponent Description .................................................................. 8
Table 2: Typical Pasquill Stability classes............................................................................... 19
Table 3: Ignition Probabilities as used in PHAST. .................................................................. 23
Table 4: Leak sizes considered ................................................................................................ 24
Table 5: Thermal Radiation Impact Criteria for Personnel ..................................................... 25
Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 2
Table 6: Thermal Radiation Impact Criteria for Equipment .................................................... 25
Table 7: Flammable (LFL) dispersion distances ..................................................................... 27
Table 8: Jet fire radiation distances ......................................................................................... 30
Table 9 Pool fire radiation distances .................................................................................. 32
Table 10 Overpressure Distances due to Explosion .............................................................. 32
Table 11 Fireball (BLEVE) distance for Road Tanker ........................................................... 34
Table 12:Estimated failure frequency ...................................................................................... 36

List of Figures
Figure 1: Connectivity Map ..................................................................................................... 10
Figure 2: Risk Acceptance Criteria .......................................................................................... 12
Figure 3: Event tree for Continuous release with rainout (from PHAST software) ................ 21
Figure 4 Risk Contour for LPG Bottling Plant, Una........................................................... 38
Figure 5 FN Curve for LPG Bottling Plant, Una ................................................................ 39
Figure 6 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Tanker ................................. 42
Figure 7 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Tanker...................................... 43
Figure 8 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Tanker .............................. 44
Figure 9 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Tanker.................................... 45
Figure 10 Overpressure distances due to BLEVE in Road Tanker .................................... 46
Figure 11 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from unloading arm
to inlet of LPG Bullet ............................................................................................................... 47
Figure 12 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from unloading arm to
inlet of LPG Bullet ................................................................................................................... 48
Figure 13 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from unloading arm
to inlet of LPG Bullet ............................................................................................................... 49
Figure 14 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from unloading arm to
inlet of LPG Bullet ................................................................................................................... 50
Figure 15 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from LPG Bullet to
Tanker passing through Compressors ...................................................................................... 51

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 3

Figure 16 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from LPG Bullet to
Tanker passing through Compressors ...................................................................................... 52
Figure 17 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from LPG Bullet to
Tanker passing through Compressors ...................................................................................... 53
Figure 18 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from LPG Bullet to
Tanker passing through Compressors ...................................................................................... 54
Figure 27 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from outlet of LPG
Bullets to suction of LPG pumps ............................................................................................ 55
Figure 28 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from outlet of LPG
Bullets to suction of LPG pumps ............................................................................................. 56
Figure 29 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from outlet of LPG
Bullets to suction of LPG pumps ............................................................................................ 57
Figure 30 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from outlet of LPG
Bullets to suction of LPG pumps ............................................................................................. 58
Figure 31 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from discharge of
LPG pumps to Carousals Filling gun (LPG Cylinder filling operation) ................................. 59
Figure 32 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from discharge of LPG
pumps to Carousals Filling gun (LPG Cylinder filling operation) ......................................... 60
Figure 33 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from discharge of
LPG pumps to Carousals Filling gun (LPG Cylinder filling operation) ................................ 61
Figure 34 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from discharge of LPG
pumps to Carousals Filling gun (LPG Cylinder filling operation) ......................................... 62

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 4

DEFINITIONS
1. Hazard- A substance or circumstance which may cause injury or damage due to
being explosive, flammable, poisonous, corrosive, oxidizing, or otherwise harmful
2. Failure - A system or component failure occurs when the delivered service deviates
from the intended service. The cause of a failure is a fault, which resides, temporarily
or permanently in the system or component.
3. Dispersion – The mixing and spreading of gases in air, causing clouds to grow is
known as dispersion.
4. Vapour cloud explosions - Vapour cloud explosions are only possible under
confined and congested area. TNO Multi-energy model has been adopted for
determining the explosion overpressures.
5. Pool fire - Pool fires are themselves considered as an escalated scenario. In the AGRP
facility, pool fires could only occur if the liquid leak remains unseen and gets in
contact with an ignition source. Such a condition will require a reasonable amount of
time to develop.
6. Jet Fire - Jet fires could occur from release of gas which is immediately ignited, or
which burns back from a flash fire after delayed ignition.
7. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion - BLEVE is defined as any sudden
loss of containment of a fluid above its normal boiling point at the moment of vessel
failure. A common cause of this type of event is fire engulfment of a vessel which
contains pressurized liquid, where the heating both raises the pressure in the vessels
and lowers the yield strength of the material. The BLEVE event can give rise to a
blast wave, to fragment projection and if a flammable fluid is involved, to either a
fireball, a flash fire or a vapour cloud explosion.
8. Design Pressure – It is the pressure for which the installation is designed; the
installation should be able to withstand this pressure.
9. Explosion - A sudden release of energy that causes a blast is an explosion.
10. Exposure - Concentration or intensity that reaches the target person, usually
expressed in terms of concentration or intensity and duration
11. Flashing - Part of a superheated liquid that evaporates rapidly due to a relatively rapid
depressurisation, until the resulting vapour/liquid mixture has cooled to below boiling
point at the end pressure. Superheat is the extra heat of a liquid made available by

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 5

 decreasing the liquid‘s temperature, for instance, by vaporisation, until the vapour
pressure equals that of the surroundings.
12. FN-curve - Log-log graph, where the x-axis represents the number of deaths, N, and
the y axis represents the cumulative frequency of the accidents, with the number of
deaths equal to N or more.
13. Frequency - The number of times an outcome is expected to occur in a given period
of time
14. Ignition source - A thing which is able to ignite a flammable cloud
15. Individual risk - the probability that in one year a person will become a victim of an
accident if the person remains permanently and unprotected in a certain location.
16. Loss of Containment event – An event resulting in the release of material to the
atmosphere.
17. Pasquill class - classification to qualify the stability of the atmosphere, indicated by a
letter ranging from A, for very unstable, to F, for stable.
18. Quantitative Risk Assessment - The process of hazard identification followed by a
numerical evaluation of effects of incidents, and consequences and probabilities, and
their combination into overall measures of risk.
19. Release - The discharge of a chemical from its containment, i.e. the process s and
storage equipment in which it is kept.
20. Risk contour - Line on a map connecting points having equal risk
21. Societal risk - The frequency (per year) that a group of at least a certain size will at
one time become victims of an accident.
22. Stability - Atmospheric stability; the extent to which vertical temperature gradients
promote or suppress turbulence in the atmosphere.

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 6

1 INTRODUCTION
M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) is a government of India enterprise with a Navratna
status, and a Fortune 500 and Forbes 2000 company. Incorporated as IOCL on 1st September,
1964 Indian Oil and its subsidiaries account for approximately 48% petroleum products market
share, 34% national refining capacity and 71% downstream sector pipelines capacity in India. It
is India‘s flagship national oil company and downstream petroleum major thus being India‘s
largest commercial enterprise. As the flagship national oil company in the downstream sector,
Indian Oil reaches precious petroleum products to millions of people every day through a
countrywide network of about 35,000 sales points. They are backed for supplies by 167 bulk
storage terminals and depots, 101 aviation fuel stations and 91 Indane (LPG) bottling plants.
Indian Oil's vast marketing infrastructure of petrol/diesel stations, Indane (LPG) distributorships,
SERVO lubricants and greases outlets and large volume consumer pumps are backed by bulk
storage terminals and installations, inland depots, aviation fuel stations, LPG bottling plants and
lube blending plants amongst others. The countrywide marketing operations are coordinated by
16 State Offices and over 100 decentralized administrative offices

IOCL is a premier public sector company in the Oil & Gas Sector and is engaged in the business
of refining and retailing of petroleum products including LPG in the country. It is the leading
Indian corporate in the Fortune 'Global 500' listing, ranked at the 83rd position in the year 2012.
IOCL is having about 91 LPG bottling plants, which serve every corner of the country. Indane
(the trade name of LPG of IOCL) is supplied to the consumers through a network of about 5,456
distributors (51.8% of the industry).The growth in demand of LPG for domestic purpose is
increasing at a rapid pace.

Bulk Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) is received in a bullet tanker – truck from IOCL Jalandhar
and Loni unloaded by using vapor compressors and stored in Mounded Bullets. The empty
cylinders are unloaded in the unloading shed and sent by means of conveyors to the carousel for
filling them with LPG. LPG is filled in cylinders of capacity 5 kg, 14.2 kg, 19.0 kg and 47.5 kg.
LPG from the storage area is pumped to the filling machine by means of LPG pumps for filling
the cylinders. After filling cylinders and subsequent checks, the filled cylinders are sent to the
filled cylinder shed and loaded on to the trucks for dispatch to the LPG distributors to use for
house hold and industrial purposes. The details of the Project and Proponents are as mentioned in
table given below –

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 Table 1: Project and Project Proponent Description
Name of Project Proposed augmentation in LPG Bulk Storage capacity at LPG
Bottling Plant at Mehatpur, Una, Himachal Pradesh by M/s
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.

Project Proponent M/s Indian Oil Corporation Limited

Name, contact number and M/s Indian Oil Corporation Limited

Shri Jyotiprakash Chakraborty
address of Project Proponent
Sr. Mgr(LPG-E), PSO
Indian Oil Corporation Limited,
Punjab State Office,
Indian Oil Bhavan, Plot No. 3A, Sector-19A,
Madhya Marg, Chandigarh - 160 019
Location of the Project Village : Raipur Sahoran
District : Una

Taluka : Una
State : Himachal Pradesh

Latitude : 31°23'43.72"N
Longitude : 76°19'40.43"E

Name, contact number and Environmental Consultants :

address of Consultant
M/s. Ultra-Tech Environmental Consultancy & Laboratory
(An ISO 9001-2008 Company, Accredited by NABET, Lab:
recognised by MOEF&CC, GoI)
Unit No. 206, 224, 225, Jai Commercial Complex,
Eastern Express Highway, Opp. Cadbury Factory,
Khopat, Thane (W) – 400601
Tel.: 91-22-25342776, 25380198, 25331438
Fax : 91-22-25429650
Email: sales@ultratech.in
Website : www.ultratech.in

Size of proposed project activity 13.17 ha (32.56 acres)

Plant Overview 1. LPG bottling plant

2. Distribute bulk products by road (by tank lorries )

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Category of Project i.e. ‗A‘ or Category ‗B‘
‗B‘

Proposed capacity/ area/ length/ Proposed expansion from 900 MT storage capacity of LPG to
tonnage to be handled/ command 2100 MT by installing 2 x 600 = 1200 MT of additional
area/ lease area/ number of wells Mounded LPG Bullets
to be drilled

1.1 Brief description of Nature, Size and Location of the project

The project activity is augmentation in LPG Bulk Storage capacity at LPG Bottling Plant at
Mehatpur, Una. As per the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification dated 14th
September, 2006 as amended, the proposed project falls under 'Type 6b - Isolated Storage and
Handling of Hazardous Chemicals’ (As per threshold planning quantity indicated in column 3 of
schedule 2 and 3 of MSIHC Rules 1989 amended 2000), which requires preparation of an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report.

This EIA Report addresses the environmental impacts of the proposed project and proposes the
mitigation measures for the same. The report is prepared, based on the Standard Terms of
Reference (ToR) for EIA/EMP Report for Projects requiring Environmental Clearance (EC) for
Isolated Storage & Handling of Hazardous Chemicals project by Ministry of Environment &
Forests & Climate Change (MoEF&CC).

The Bottling plant is located at Una district in Himachal Pradesh. The total plot area of the LPG
Plant facility is approximately 13.17 hectare (32.56 acres). The proposed augmentation shall be
carried out within the premises of the Bottling Plant. The site is easily accessible by road. The
nearest railway station is Rai Mehatpur Railway Station at approximately 0.4 km. The nearest
airport is Chandigarh Airport at about 118 Km.

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 9

 Figure 1: Connectivity Map
1.2 Project Objective
Objective of the QRA study of Terminal is to –

1. Identify hazards associated with normal operation and handling of hydrocarbon at LPG
Bottling Plant, Una.
2. Estimate the risks associated with the project facilities.
3. Benchmark the risk against PNGRB risk acceptance criteria and demonstrate that the risk
is within ALARP or broadly acceptable region.
4. Prepare ERDMP as per PNGRB regulations based on risk assessment.

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 10

2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 Methodology
Methodology adopted for risk assessment of LPG Bottling Plant, Una is as per following
principle steps;

1. Hazard Identification – Identify types of hazards which have the potential to cause harm to
the fatalities such as hydrocarbon releases.
2. Development of accident events – For the purposes of modeling, each hazard identified is
further divided into scenarios or events e.g. Leaks, ruptures etc.;
3. Frequency Analysis – The frequency of occurrence (i.e. likelihood of occurrence within a
given period) of each accidental event occurring is estimated from historical data such as
OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory, Process Release Frequencies, Report no. 434-1 and
434-3, March 2010.
4. Consequence Modeling – The consequences (i.e. extent) arising from realization of these
accidental events such as Jet Fires, Explosions are calculated based on various models;
5. Risk Analysis – Based on the fatalities arising from the consequences and the frequency
determined for an accidental event, the risk from the hazard is determined in terms of
individual risk;
6. Risk Summation – Risks associated with these accidental events are integrated to quantify
the risk levels at the facility;
7. Benchmarking – The risks are benchmarked against Risk Acceptance Criteria to arrive at the
list of events associated with ―unacceptable‖ and ―acceptable‖ risks;
8. Risk Ranking – The dominant risk contributors in terms of their risk level from various
accidental events are summarized.

2.2 QRA Approach

2.2.1 Result Interpretation
The techniques used for risk prediction within the QRA have inherent uncertainties associated
with them due to the necessary simplifications required. In addition, QRA incorporates a certain
amount of subjective engineering judgment and the results are subjected to levels of uncertainty.
For this reason, the results should not be used as the sole basis for decision making and should
not drive deviations from sound engineering practice. The results should be used as a tool to aid
engineering judgment and, if used in this way, can provide valuable information during the
decision making process.

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 11

The QRA results are dependent on the assumptions made in the calculations, which are clearly
documented throughout the following sections of this report. Conservative assumptions have
been used, which helps to remove the requirement for detailed analysis of the uncertainty. The
results show the significant contributions to the overall risk and indicate where worthwhile gains
may be achieved if further enhancement of safety is deemed necessary.

2.2.2 Risk Criteria

PNGRB risk tolerability criterion in terms of Individual Risk (IR) is defined in the Section 10.2
of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006 (19 of 2006),Guidelines for
preparation of ERDMP, which is also applicable to IOCL facilities.

The maximum tolerable IR is 1.0 x 10-3 per year, whilst an IR of 1.0 x 10-5 per year is regarded
as broadly acceptable. An IR falling between these values is within the ALARP region of risk
acceptability and must be demonstrated to be as low as reasonably practicable.

These criteria are given here below –

IRPA Fundamental improvements needed.

Intolerable Only to be considered if there are no
alternatives and people are well informed
10-3/yr
Too high, significant effort required to
improve
10-4/yr
The ALARP or Tolerable
High, investigate alternatives
region (Risk is tolerated only)

10-5/yr
Low, consider cost-effective alternatives
Broadly Acceptable region
(no need for detailed working to 10-6/yr
demonstrate ALARP)
Negligible, maintain normal precautions

Figure 2: Risk Acceptance Criteria

The assessment and control of risk are essential requirements for a proactive HSE management
system. In order to make a valued judgment and to decide on what risks are acceptable, an easily
understood set of criteria should be set and followed rigorously. Risk criteria are required to
promote consistency in evaluating the results of relevant studies and to formulate a proactive
approach to incident prevention. The following sections sets out the basis for selecting the risk
Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 12
acceptance criteria and explains some of the techniques used to arrive at the quantitative
assessments made to understand the risk levels.

2.3 Risk
Risk is defined as the probability that within a fixed time period, usually one year, an unwanted
effect occurs. Consequently, risk is a dimensionless number. However, risk is often expressed in
units of frequency, ‗per year‘. Since failure frequencies are low, the probability that an unwanted
effect will occur within a fixed time period of one year is, practically speaking, equal to the
frequency of occurrence per year.

Risk is the unwanted consequences of an activity connected with the probability of occurrence.

2.4 Individual Risk Criteria (IR)

The tolerable risk level lies between the acceptable and unacceptable levels in which ALARP
must be demonstrated. Once a specific hazard is demonstrated by analysis to result in acceptable
risk there is no requirement, other than following normal precautions and SOPs defined by
company and statutes.

Workers would include IOCL employees and contractors. The public includes the general public,
visitors and any third party who is not directly involved in the IOCL work activities.

The tolerability criteria above should not be misinterpreted as the number of fatalities that IOCL
is prepared to accept in conducting operations. They must be used only in QRA context as a
statistical probability that equipment, systems and procedures fail and result in fatalities.

2.5 Presentation of Risk Results

2.5.1 Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR)
LSIR measures and expresses the risk exposure of personnel who are continuously present in a
particular area for the entire year (24x7x365). The risk exposure is calculated for all relevant
hazards and summed to give the overall risk of LPG Bottling Plant, Una.

In the fatality estimation, the consequences of each outcome due to a loss of containment are
represented by the probability of death for personnel continuously present in a particular area of
the plant when the event occurs. The LSIR can therefore be represented as:

LSIR = Σ (End event outcome frequency x Probability of fatality in area)

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 13

2.5.2 Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA)
IRPA takes into account the amount of time personnel spend at the plant and is defined as the
probability of an individual being killed by the accident scenario per unit time. IRPA from
process events is determined as follows:

IRPA = Σ (LSIR x Probability of personnel in area) x Presence factor

The presence factor is the actual time spent at the plant in a year.

2.5.3 Potential Loss of Life (PLL)

The PLL is a measure of risk to a group of personnel as a whole and is an average rate of
fatalities at the plant. The PLL can be established using the following equation –

PLL = Σ (IRPA) x Number of personnel in worker group

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 14

3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
A substance or circumstance which may cause injury or damage due to being explosive,
flammable, poisonous, corrosive, oxidizing, or otherwise harmful is defined as hazard.

3.1 Hazards associated with storage tanks

As per UK HSE‘s guideline HSG176, the main hazards associated with the storage and handling
of flammable liquids are fire and explosion, involving either the liquid or the vapour given off
from it. Fires and explosions are likely to occur when vapour or liquid is released accidentally or
deliberately into areas where there may be an ignition source, or when an ignition source is
introduced into an area where there may be flammable atmospheres.

Common causes of such incidents include,

1. Inadequate design and installation of equipment;

2. Inadequate inspection and maintenance;
3. Failure or malfunction of equipment;
4. Lack of awareness of the properties of flammable liquids;
5. Operator error, due to lack of training;
6. Exposure to heat from a nearby fire;
7. Inadequate control of ignition sources;
8. Electrostatic discharges;
9. Heating materials above their auto-ignition temperature;
10. Dismantling or disposing of equipment containing flammable liquids;

Hot work on or close to flammable liquid vessels

3.2 Hazard Categories

In order to identify hazards posed by the facility, it is very important to identify the type of
hazards posed by the materials being handled. IOCL handles and stores LPG.

All these are flammable and pose fire and explosion risk. As there is no toxic material being
handled at facility, there is no toxic risk envisaged

3.3 Hazardous Properties

Combustion of hazardous substance occurs when flammable vapours released from the surface of
the substance ignite. The amount of flammable vapour given off from a hazardous substance, and
therefore the extent of the fire or explosion hazard, depends largely on the temperature of the
substance, how much of the surface area is exposed, how long it is exposed for, and the air
Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 15
movement over the surface. The hazard also depends on the physical properties of the substance
such as flashpoint, auto-ignition temperature, viscosity, and the upper and lower explosion limits.

These are the various materials are handled in the facility & have been taken into Quantitative
Risk Assessment.

Properties LPG HSD

Flash Point(°C) < -60 > 35°C

LFL 1.8 % (V) 0.4 %

UFL 8.5 % (V) 5%

2.007 at 21.1
Vapour Pressure 0.5 mm of Hg
°C (70.0 °F)

-0.5 (31.1 °F)

Boiling point (°C) at 1,013.25 110 °C to375°C
hPa

Relative density of gas

2 to 3 3 to 5
or vapourto air

Physical State Gas Liquid

Auto Ignition temp(°C) 287°C 230°Cto250°C

3.4 Scenarios
Considering hazardous properties and facility, following scenarios have been considered for
consequence and risk assessment –

As per OGP – Risk Assessment Directory, for each of scenario four leak sizes are considered

for release from Piping,

1. Small leak – Leak size 5 mm (representative size of 1 to 10mm)

2. Medium Leak – Leak size 25 mm (representative size of 10mm to 50mm)
3. Large Leak – Leak size 100 mm (representative size of 50 to 150mm)
4. Full Bore Rupture (FBR)

In case of release from storage, following leak sizes are considered:

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 16

 1. Small leak – Leak size 5 mm (representative size of 1 to 10mm)
2. Medium Leak – Leak size 25 mm (representative size of 10mm to 50mm)
3. Large Leak – Leak size 100 mm (representative size of 50 to 150mm)
4. Catastrophic Rupture

Note: In the present facility, mounded bullets are submerged so there is negligible possibility
of bullet leakage or rupture. HSD is also stored underground, so negligible possibility of
leakage or rupture

3.4.1 List of identified Scenarios

SN Section Number Section Description

1 IS1 Road Tanker

2 IS2 Piping from unloading arm to inlet of LPG Bullet

Piping from LPG Bullet to Tanker passing through

3
IS3 Compressors

4 IS4 Piping from outlet of LPG Bullets to suction of LPG pumps

Piping from discharge of LPG pumps to Carousals Filling

5
IS5 gun (LPG Cylinder filling operation)

IS6 Diesel Tank Transfer pump discharge line

6

3.5 Population Data

Plant operations are carried out only during day time in general shift.

The distribution of personnel in the IOCL Una LPG storage bottling plant is shown in Table
given herebelow

General
SN Location I shift II shift III shift Total
shift

1 Bullet Area 0 0 0 0 0

2 Pump House 1 1 0 0 2

3 TT Gantry 5 5 0 0 10

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 17

 General
SN Location I shift II shift III shift Total
shift

Valve Changing
4 1 1 0 0 2
shed

5 Filling Shed 15 15 2 0 32

6 Storage Shed 1 1 0 0 2

7 Unloading Shed 7 7 1 0 15

8 Loading Shed 7 7 0 0 14

9 MCC 1 1 0 2 4

10 Retesting Shed 0 0 0 21 21

Admin Building
11 0 0 0 10 10
Area

12 Planning Room 2 2 0 0 4

13 Security Cabin 3 3 3 1 10

Total 43 43 6 34 126

3.6 Ignition sources

Ignition sources are strictly controlled in the LPG bottling plant area. All electrical equipment
and fittings are flame-proof type. No vehicle is allowed inside the premises without approved
spark arrestor in the engine exhaust.

The following sources of ignition are considered in the risk analysis.

1. Substation
2. Diesel generator
3. LT yard/ Transformer
4. Canteen

3.7 Climatic Conditions

3.7.1 Meteorological Data
The consequences of released flammable material are largely dependent on the prevailing
weather conditions. For the assessment of major scenarios involving release of flammable
material, the most important meteorological parameters are those that affect the atmospheric
Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 18
dispersion of the escaping material. The crucial variables are wind direction, wind speed,
atmospheric stability and temperature. Rainfall does not have any direct bearing on the results of
the risk analysis; however, it can have beneficial effects by absorption / washout of released
materials. Actual behavior of any release would largely depend on prevailing weather condition
at the time of release.

3.7.2 Atmospheric Stability Classes

The tendency of the atmosphere to resist or enhance vertical motion and thus turbulence is
termed as stability. Stability is related to both the change of temperature with height (the lapse
rate) driven by the boundary layer energy budget, and wind speed together with surface
characteristics (roughness)

A neutral atmosphere neither enhances nor inhibits mechanical turbulence. An unstable

atmosphere enhances turbulence, whereas a stable atmosphere inhibits mechanical turbulence.

Stability classes are defined for different meteorological situations, characterised by wind speed
and solar radiation (during the day) and cloud cover during the night. The so called Pasquill-
Turner stability classes dispersion estimates include six (6) stability classes as below:

A – Very Unstable B – Unstable C – Slightly Unstable

D – Neutral E – Stable F – Very Stable

The typical stability classes for various wind speed and radiation levels during entire day are
presented in table below:

Table 2: Typical Pasquill Stability classes

Wind Day : Solar Radiation Night : cloud Cover
Speed Think < Overcast >
(m/s) Strong Moderate Slight Moderate
40% 80%
<2 A A-B B - - D
2-3 A-B B C E F D
3-5 B B-C C D E D
5-6 C C-D D D D D
>6 C D D D D D
The wind speed and Pasquill Stability class data used for the study is summarized below:

Wind Speed Stability class

2m/s F
5 m/s D
Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 19
4 EVENTS AND IGNITION PROBABILITY
4.1 Event Tree
PHAST has an in-built event tree for determining the outcomes which are based on two types of
releases namely continuous and instantaneous. Leaks are considered to be continuous releases
whereas, ruptures are considered to be instantaneous releases.

The event tree takes in to account factors affecting consequence of a release such as;

1. Material properties such as

a. Flammability / toxicity

b. Flash point

c. Phase of material

d. Density of material

2. Ambient conditions

3. Availability of Immediate / Delayed ignition

Based on these the event trees used in PHAST Risk are given here below –

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 20

 Figure 3: Event tree for Continuous release with rainout (from PHAST software)

4.2 Consequential Events

4.2.1 Jet Fire
A jet fire occurs following the ignition and combustion of pressurized flammable fluid
continuously released from a pipe or orifice, which burns close to its release plane. The high heat
intensity poses a hazard to personnel and causes damage to unprotected equipment due to direct
flame impingement, causing it to fail within several minutes. Jet flames dissipate thermal
radiation, away from the flame‘s visible boundaries and transmit heat energy that could be
hazardous to life and property.

4.2.2 Pool Fire

The released flammable material which is a liquid stored below its normal boiling point, will
collect in a pool. The geometry of the pool will be dictated by the surroundings. If the liquid is
stored under pressure above its normal boiling point, then a fraction of the liquid will flash into
vapour and the remaining portion will form a pool in the vicinity of the release point. Once
Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 21
sustained combustion is achieved, liquid fires quickly reach steady state burning. The heat
release rate is a function of the liquid surface area exposed to air. An unconfined spill will tend
to have thin fuel depth (typically less than 5 mm) which will result in slower burning rates. A
confined spill is limited by the boundaries (e.g. a dyke area) and the depth of the resulting pool is
greater than that for an unconfined spill. Pool fires are less directional and so may affect a larger
area although it is mostly influenced by wind conditions. They will also cause structural failure of
equipment although the time taken is longer than jet fires.

4.2.3 Flammable Gas Dispersion / Flash Fire

Flash Fire occurs when a vapour cloud of flammable material burns. The cloud is typically
ignited on the edge and burns towards the release point. The duration of flash fire is very short
(seconds), but it may continue as Jet fire if the release continues. The overpressures generated by
the combustion are not considered significant in terms of damage potential to persons, equipment
or structures. The major hazard from flash fire is direct flame impingement. Typically, the burn
zone is defined as the area the vapour cloud covers out to the LFL. Even where the concentration
may be above the UFL, turbulent induced combustion mixes the material with air and results in
flash fire.

4.2.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion

Vapour cloud explosion is the result of flammable materials in the atmosphere, a subsequent
dispersion phase, and after some delay an ignition of the vapour cloud. Turbulence is the
governing factor in blast generation, which could intensify combustion to the level that
will result in an explosion. Obstacles in the path of vapour cloud or when the cloud finds
a confined area often create turbulence. Insignificant level of confinement will result in a
flash fire. The VCE will result in overpressures.

It may be noted that VCEs have been responsible for very serious accidents involving
severe property damage and loss of lives.

4.2.5 BLEVE
A boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) is an explosion caused by the
rupture of a vessel containing a pressurized liquid that has reached temperatures above
its boiling point.

4.3 Ignition Probability

There are 2 main types of ignitions, namely:

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 22

 1. Immediate ignition — Ignition following rapidly after the release is initiated, prior to
personnel being able to escape from the area; and

2. Delayed ignition — Gas cloud drifting over an ignition source and depending on the
ignition delay, personnel may be able to escape before fire or explosion occurs.

PHAST has systematic approach for deciding ignition probabilities depending upon type of
release, phase of material released, reactivity and release rate. These have been used for the
purpose of the study.

Table 3: Ignition Probabilities as used in PHAST.

Type and Size of Release Type of Material Released
K0 K1 K2 K3 K4
Gas; liquid: Tfl< 0oC liquid: liquid: liquid: liquid
Continuous Instantaneous Reactivity: Reactivity:
Tfl< Tfl< Tfl< Tfl>
High, Average, 21oC 55oC 100oC 100oC
Low
Unknown
< 10 kg/s < 1000 kg 0.2 0.02 0.065 0.01 0 0
1000 - 10,000
10 - 100 kg/s 0.5 0.04 0.065 0.01 0 0
kg
> 100 kg/s > 10,000 kg 0.7 0.09 0.065 0.01 0 0

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 23

5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Consequence analysis is carried out to determine the extent of spread (dispersion) by accidental
release which may lead to jet fire or explosion resulting into generating heat radiation,
overpressures, explosion impact etc.

5.1 Modes of failure

Loss of containment from the system can lead to undesired consequences such as fire or
explosion. The consequencial effects may vary depending on the leak sizes or rupture.
Following table shows various leak sizes along with their significance.

Table 4: Leak sizes considered

Leak Sizes
Leak Representative
Remarks
Description Hole Diameter
Small
5 mm Represents leaks from flange joints and pump seals.
(0 – 10 mm)
Medium Represents release due to failure of small bore piping
25 mm
(10 – 50 mm) (instrument tapping, drain connection etc.).

Large Represents release due to failure of large section of

100 mm equipment or piping (e.g. damage due to external
(50 – 150 mm) impact, failure of flexible pipe/ hose).
Represents release due to failure of large section of
Rupture >150mm equipment or piping equivalent to its rupture / full
bore release.
Above leak sizes are taken from Centre of Chemical Process Safety(CCPS) AIChE

CCPS QRA guidelines, chapter 2 – Consequence analysis, also mentions about leak duration. It
says that the Department of Transportation (1980) LNG Federal Safety Standards specified 10-
min leak duration; other studies (Rijnmond Public Authority, 1982) have used 3 min if there is a
leak detection system combined with remotely actuated isolation valves. Other analysts use a
shorter duration. Actual release duration may depend on the detection and reaction time for
automatic isolation devices and response time of the operators for manual isolation. The rate of
valve closure in longer pipes can influence the response time. Due to the water hammer effect,
designers may limit the rate of closure in liquid pipelines.

Considering this and isolated facility of IOCL, we have considered 10min discharge duration as a
conservative approach.

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 24

5.2 Impact Criteria
An impact criterion relates the modeling of the hazard effects to the resultant consequences to
personnel and asset, and determines the nature and detail of results required from the simulation.

The impact criteria for personnel and equipment on IOCL are summarised in the following sub-
sections.

5.2.1. Impact due to fire

Following table defines the impact of thermal radiation on personnel. The thermal radiation
levels listed includes solar radiation of 1 kW/m2.

Table 5: Thermal Radiation Impact Criteria for Personnel

Thermal Radiation Effect Description
Maximum radiant heat intensity at any location where personnel
1.6 kW/m2
with appropriate clothing can be continuously exposed.
Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where emergency
4 kW/m2 actions lasting 2 to 3 minutes can be required by personnel
without shielding but with appropriate clothing.
Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where emergency
12.5 kW/m2 actions lasting up to 30 seconds can be required by personnel
without shielding but with appropriate clothing.
Limiting thermal radiation intensity for escape actions lasting a
37.5 kW/m2 few seconds. Significant chance of fatality for extended
exposure.
Table 6: Thermal Radiation Impact Criteria for Equipment
Thermal Radiation Effect Description
4 kW/m2 Glass breakage (30 minute exposure)
Piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastic (>30 minute
12.5 to 15 kW/m2
exposure)
18 to 20 kW/m2 Cable insulation degrades (>30 minute exposure)
10 or 20 kW/m2 Ignition of fuel oil (120 or 40 seconds, respectively)
Unpiloted ignition of wood, steel deformation (>30 minute
25 to 32 kW/m2
exposure)
Process equipment and structural damage (including storage
35 to 37.5 kW/m2
tanks) (>30 minute exposure)
100 kW/m2 Steel structure collapse (>30 minute exposure)

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 25

The damage effects are different for different scenarios considered. In order to appreciate the
damage effects produced by various scenarios, it will be appropriate to discuss the physiological/
physical effects of the accidental loss of containment event.

5.2.2. Impact due to explosion/dispersion

A Vapour cloud Explosion (VCE) results when a flammable vapor is released, its mixture
with air will form a flammable vapour cloud. If ignited, the flame speed may accelerate to
high velocities and produce significant blast overexposure.

The damage effects due to 30mbar, 100mbar & 300mbar are reported in terms of distance
from the overpressure source.

In case of vapour cloud explosion, two physical effects may occur:

 A flash fire over the whole length of the explosive gas cloud;
 A blast wave, with typical peak overpressures circular around ignition source.
Table7: Damage Due To Overpressures
Peak Overpressure, bar Damage Type

0.83 Total destruction

Heavy damage, nearly complete destruction of
0.30
houses
0.27 Cladding of light industrial building ruptures
Steel frame buildings distorted and pulled from
0.2
foundations
0.16 Lower limit of serious structural damage
0.14 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
0.027 Limited minor structural damage
0.01 Typical pressure of glass breakage
5.3 Initial Release Rates
LOC at the facility may be modeled using a representative hole size or by fixing the release rate
for a given scenario. In this assessment, the former method was used as the hole size is a major
factor in influencing the characteristics of a release and determines the initial hydrocarbon mass
release rate as well as release duration.

Based on the hole sizes, material properties and operating / storage conditions, the corresponding
initial release rates for fire modeling are obtained from PHAST.

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 26

Material flash rates were used for dispersion in case of releases as there is no gaseous material
being handled. The release rate decreases with time as the equipment depressurizes. This
reduction depends mainly on the inventory and the action taken to isolate the leak and blow-
down the equipment.

5.4 Flammable Gas Dispersion

The significance of these distances is that the cloud will ignite if it were to get source of ignition
within UFL and LFL zone. Following table gives the LFL and UFL dispersion distances for
various leak sizes under different weather conditions.

The resultant flammable dispersion distances are given in the table below,

Table 7: Flammable (LFL) dispersion distances

Flammable distances in m
SN Scenario Scenario Description Leak Size
ID in mm Conc. 2F 5D

UFL 1.63 1.59

5 LFL 6.80 5.41
LFL Frac 13.56 7.98
UFL 7.96 7.41
25 LFL 54.84 50.07
1 IS1 Road Tanker
LFL Frac 128.54 103.22
UFL 40.09 39.54
100 LFL 237.14 289.97
LFL Frac 498.62 448.14
Catastrophic UFL 67.35 66.87

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 27

 Flammable distances in m
SN Scenario Scenario Description Leak Size
ID in mm Conc. 2F 5D
Rupture LFL 381.49 470.09
LFL Frac 560.09 651.52
UFL 1.63 1.59
5 LFL 6.80 5.41
LFL Frac 13.56 7.98
UFL 7.96 7.41
25 LFL 54.84 50.07
Piping from unloading
arm to inlet of LPG LFL Frac 128.54 103.22
2 IS2
Bullet UFL 40.09 39.54
100 LFL 252.23 301.19
LFL Frac 374.86 427.13
UFL 67.35 66.87
FBR LFL 298.15 369.46
LFL Frac 419.34 484.34
UFL 1.82 1.78
5 LFL 7.62 6.00
LFL Frac 16.21 9.50
UFL 8.93 8.28
Piping from LPG 25 LFL 63.16 59.54
Bullet to Tanker LFL Frac 143.71 119.19
3 IS3
passing through UFL 46.26 45.71
Compressors 100 LFL 265.70 328.13
LFL Frac 386.23 444.55
UFL 47.13 46.59
FBR LFL 267.27 333.56
LFL Frac 388.04 446.38
LFL Frac 891.12 1127.6
0
UFL 1.68 1.65
5 LFL 7.06 5.58
LFL Frac 14.32 8.39
UFL 8.27 7.65
25 LFL 57.16 53.10
Piping from outlet of
LPG Bullets to suction LFL Frac 133.15 107.83
IS4
4 of LPG pumps UFL 41.81 41.12
100 LFL 241.28 301.08
LFL Frac 351.49 399.75
UFL 127.14 126.97
FBR LFL 335.22 421.79

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 28

 Flammable distances in m
SN Scenario Scenario Description Leak Size
ID in mm Conc. 2F 5D

LFL Frac 441.25 516.45

UFL 0.24 0.24
5 LFL 1.17 1.09
LFL Frac 2.14 1.82
Piping from discharge UFL 1.13 1.14
of LPG pumps to 25 LFL 5.58 4.81
Carousals Filling gun LFL Frac 10.23 7.46
IS5
(LPG Cylinder filling UFL 4.47 4.41
5 operation) 100 LFL 27.66 25.52
LFL Frac 67.29 68.46
UFL 6.79 6.64
FBR LFL 47.56 47.15
LFL Frac 113.36 122.90

Notes:

NR: Not Reached

FBR: Full Bore Rupture

5.5 Radiation Distances due to Jet Fire

A jet or spray fire is a turbulent diffusion flame resulting from the combustion of a fuel
continuously released with some significant momentum in a particular direction or directions.
The properties of jet fires depend on the fuel composition, release conditions, release rate, release
geometry, direction and ambient wind conditions.

Radiation due to jet fire are given in the table below –

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 29

 Table 8: Jet fire radiation distances
Jet Fire distances in m
SN Scenario Scenario Leak Size
Radiation
ID Description in mm 2F 5D
kw/m2
4 15.53 13.44
5 12.5 12.41 10.23
37.5 10.43 8.21
4 67.72 58.90
1 IS1 Road Tanker 25 12.5 53.84 44.82
37.5 45.53 36.45
4 235.82 204.96
100 12.5 185.28 154.72
37.5 155.24 124.88
4 9.59 10.71
5 12.5 NR 6.24
37.5 NR NR
4 44.94 39.29
25 12.5 21.15 23.66
Piping from
unloading arm to 37.5 NR 11.00
2 IS2
inlet of LPG Bullet 4 135.78 116.29
100 12.5 61.45 69.88
37.5 NR 25.16
4 10.86 11.83
5 12.5 NR 6.91
37.5 NR NR
4 49.47 42.99
Piping from LPG 25 12.5 23.13 25.96
3 IS3 Bullet to Tanker
passing through 37.5 NR 11.50
Compressors 4 149.04 127.61
100 12.5 66.70 76.16
37.5 NR 25.75

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 30

 Jet Fire distances in m
SN Scenario Scenario Leak Size
Radiation
ID Description in mm 2F 5D
kw/m2
4 9.96 11.08
5 12.5 NR 6.45
37.5 NR NR
4 46.28 40.39
Piping from outlet 25 12.5 21.75 24.35
of LPG Bullets to 37.5 NR 11.18
4 IS4
suction of LPG 4 139.70 119.64
pumps 100 12.5 63.03 71.76
37.5 NR 25.40
12.5 123.22 143.57
37.5 7.49 42.02
4 NR NR
5 12.5 NR NR
37.5 NR NR
Piping from 4 4.00 7.36
discharge of LPG 25 12.5 NR NR
pumps to Carousals 37.5 NR NR
5 IS5
Filling gun (LPG 4 20.81 28.19
Cylinder filling 100 12.5 NR 9.77
operation)
37.5 NR NR

Notes:

NR: Not Reached

FBR: Full Bore Rupture

5.6 Radiation Distances due to Pool Fire

A pool fire involves a horizontal, upward-facing, combustible fuel. When spilled, the
Flammable/combustible liquid may form a pool of any shape and thickness, and may be
controlled by the confinement of the area geometry such as a dyke or curbing. Once ignited, a
pool fire spreads rapidly over the surface of the liquid spill area.

When a spilled liquid is ignited, a pool fire develops. Provided that an ample supply of
oxygen is available, the amount of surface area of the given liquid becomes the defining
parameter. The diameter of the pool fire depends upon the release mode, release quantity (or
rate), and burning rate. Liquid pool fires with a given amount of fuel can burn for long

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 31

periods of time if they have a small surface area or for short periods of time over a large spill
area.

Following table gives radiation distances for pool fire scenario where it is assumed that the
dyke will contain leaked material and would not allow it to flow beyond the restricted bund
area.

Table 9 Pool fire radiation distances

Leak Pool fire distances in m
Scenario
SN Scenario Description Size in Radiation
ID 2F 5D
mm kw/m2
4 32.22 35.69
5 12.5 19.77 24.85
37.5 11.21 11.97
4 36.20 39.19
Diesel Tank Transfer pump
1 IS6 25 12.5 23.76 28.35
line
37.5 15.20 15.47
4 38.50 41.48
FBR 12.5 26.05 30.64
37.5 17.49 17.76
NR: Not Reached

FBR: Full Bore Rupture

The above results show that the pool fire radiation distances are in case of Diesel Transfer
pump which goes up to 40 m for 4kW/m2 radiation for 5D wind Condition.

5.7 Overpressure Distances due to Explosion

Table 10 Overpressure Distances due to Explosion

Maximum Distance (m) at
Leak Overpressure Level
Scenario
SN Description of scenario Size in
ID Overpress
mm 2F 5D
ure in bar

0.02068 10.79 10.79

5mm 0.1379 2.72 2.72
0.2068 2.13 2.13
1 IS1 Road Tanker 0.02068 32.37 32.37
25mm 0.1379 8.15 8.15
0.2068 6.38 6.38
100mm 0.02068 97.12 97.12

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 32

 Maximum Distance (m) at
Leak Overpressure Level
Scenario
SN Description of scenario Size in
ID Overpress
mm 2F 5D
ure in bar

0.1379 24.46 24.46

0.2068 19.14 19.14
0.02068 291.36 291.36
Cat Rup 0.1379 73.37 73.37
0.2068 57.41 57.41
0.02068 2.28 2.23
5mm 0.1379 2.02 1.98
0.2068 0.64 0.63
0.02068 6.83 6.69
25mm 0.1379 6.07 5.95
Piping from unloading 0.2068 1.92 1.88
2 IS2 arm to inlet of LPG
Bullet 0.02068 13.66 13.39
100mm 0.1379 12.14 11.89
0.2068 3.83 3.76
0.02068 68.3 66.94
FBR 0.1379 36.41 35.68
0.2068 11.5 11.27
0.02068 4.55 4.46
5mm 0.1379 4.05 3.96
0.2068 1.28 1.25
0.02068 13.66 13.39
25mm 0.1379 12.14 11.89
Piping from LPG Bullet 0.2068 3.83 3.76
3 IS3 to Tanker passing
through Compressors 0.02068 27.32 26.77
100mm 0.1379 24.27 23.79
0.2068 7.67 7.52
0.02068 136.6 133.87
FBR 0.1379 72.81 71.36
0.2068 23.01 22.55
0.02068 5.46 5.35
5mm 0.1379 4.85 4.76
Piping from outlet of 0.2068 1.53 1.5
4 IS4 LPG Bullets to suction
of LPG pumps 0.02068 16.39 16.06
25mm 0.1379 14.56 14.27
0.2068 4.6 4.51
Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 33
 Maximum Distance (m) at
Leak Overpressure Level
Scenario
SN Description of scenario Size in
ID Overpress
mm 2F 5D
ure in bar

0.02068 32.78 32.13

100mm 0.1379 29.13 28.54
0.2068 9.2 9.02
0.02068 163.92 160.65
FBR 0.1379 87.38 85.63
0.2068 27.61 27.06
0.02068 2.73 2.68
5mm 0.1379 2.43 2.38
0.2068 0.77 0.75
0.02068 8.2 8.03
Piping from discharge 25mm 0.1379 7.28 7.14
of LPG pumps to
5 IS5 Carousals Filling gun 0.2068 2.3 2.25
(LPG Cylinder filling 0.02068 16.39 16.06
operation) 100mm 0.1379 14.56 14.27
0.2068 4.6 4.51
0.02068 81.96 80.32
FBR 0.1379 43.69 42.81
0.2068 13.8 13.53
Notes:

NR: Not Reached

FBR: Full Bore Rupture
Cat Rup: Catastrophic Rupture
5.8 Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE)
A boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) is an explosion caused by the rupture
of a vessel containing a pressurized liquid above its boiling point.

5.8.1 Fireball due to BLEVE in Road Tanker

Table 11 Fireball (BLEVE) distance for Road Tanker
Maximum Distance for BLEVE (Fireball)
Scenario
Radiation kw/m2 2F 5D
4 376.46 376.46
Road Tanker (IS1) 12.5 187.47 187.47
37.5 NR NR

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 34

6 LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
Frequency analysis was conducted for each of the release scenarios identified based on the
number of potential leak sources contained within each isolatable section. Leaks may occur
from various components such as tanks, pumps, pipes, valves and flanges. Each component
has a generic historical leak frequency per single item such as a leak frequency per flange-
year or per meter of pipe per year. Generic failure data for equipment and piping items is
derived from historical leak frequency data compiled by the International Association of Oil
& Gas Producers (OGP). For components other than Tanks, Report No. 434 – 1 – Process
Release Frequencies dtd March 2010 has been used and for storage tanks, Report No. 434 – 3
– Storage incident frequencies dtd March 2010 has been referred to.

6.1 Failure Frequencies

This scenario is considered only for Underground Storage mounded vessels. Under section 2
of Report No. 434 – 3 the failure frequency of Underground/submerged Storage mounded
vessels is 1.1 × 10-7/avg year.

For other scenarios, the failure frequency has been estimated using parts count approach. The
total leak frequency for any scenario is estimated by counting the number of each type of
component in the section. This process is called ―Parts Count‖. The generic leak frequencies
are then multiplied by the number of corresponding components in each isolatable section to
obtain the overall leak frequency for that section.

The calculated frequencies are given here below –

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 35

 Table 12:Estimated failure frequency

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 36

7 RISK ANALYSIS
This section deals with the risk assessment of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant installed at Una. The
risk of LPG Bottling Plant, Una is calculated based on consequences, parts count, failure
frequency, ignition sources etc.

A Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) is used to determine the risk caused by the use,
handling, transport and storage of hazardous substances. The results of the QRA are, for
example, used to assess the acceptability of the risk in relation to the benefits of the activity,
to evaluate new developments on and off-site, to estimate the benefit of risk-reducing
countermeasures and to determine zoning distances around an activity for land-use planning.
QRAs are used to demonstrate the risk caused by the activity and to provide the competent
authorities with relevant information to enable decisions on the acceptability of risk related to
developments on site, or around the establishment or transport route.

7.1 Risk Contours

Location specific individual risk (LSIR) is a measure of the risk exposure of an individual
who is continuously present at a particular location for the whole year.

This is a graphical representation of the risk estimated. Individual risk estimated for LPG
Bottling Plant, Una is superimposed on layout and has illustrated below,

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 37

 0.00 0.20 0.40
km

Figure 4: Risk Contour for LPG Bottling Plant, Una

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 38

It can be seen that the risk level of 1E-04/avg year is surrounded to the LPG Bulltes and LPG
Compressore area.

Above figure shows the risk impact of the entire facility. It can be seen easily that though the
risk contour goes beyond the facility is 10E-07/avg year, there is no other populated facility
which will get affected.

7.2 FN Curve
The FN Curve shows the frequency (F) with which events cause N or more fatalities. F-N
curve for risk posed by LPG Bottling Plant, Una on public surrounding is given here below.
The risk is well within ALARP limits

Figure 5: FN Curve for LPG Bottling Plant, Una

7.3 IRPA and PLL

Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA) and Potential Loss of Life (PLL) are estimated based on
the LSIR at the locations. Figure above shows that the risk at the office building is less than
1E-07/avg year. Therefore the IRPA and PLL also fall under broadly acceptable region.

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 39

7.4 Conclusion
The risk analysis shows that the risk is below 1E-04/avg year. After benchmarking the risk
against PNGRB‘s Individual Risk Acceptance criteria, the risk is within ALARP or Tolerable
Region – (Risk is tolerated only – High, investigate alternatives)region which means that
normal precautions shall be maintained.

However, in case of emergency there should be availability of the fire fighting system to
control fire and also the vehicles to escape from hazardous area.

7.5 Recommendations
The facility handles storage and handling of LPG which is highly inflammable in nature.
Considering the hazard associated with storage and handling of LPG, state-of-art safety and
security system has to be conceived to eliminate the hazard.

 LPG detection system provided at LPG handling area shall be tested to initiate an alarm at
its installed location at regular intervals to check its operability.
 A regular scheduled plant inspection shall be done for excess flow check valve in the road
tankers and the excess flow check valves on the liquid transfer line to avoid escape LPG
during loading/ unloading operations. OISD-135 on ―Inspection of Loading and
Unloading Hoses‖ for petroleum products shall be followed for inspection and
maintenance of loading/ unloading hoses.
 Use of mechanical equipment & tools that easily generate sparks in operation should be
prohibited.
 Attention should be given to avoid possible sources of ignition. Ensure strict
implementation of ‗NO SMOKING‘ and ‗NO MOBILE‘ at the facility to minimize
ignition chances. The vehicles entering inside the plant should be ensured to be fitted with
flame arrestors.
 It is to be ensured that all the employees are thoroughly trained in emergency procedures.
This will include recognition of alarm signals (initial alarm, emergency, evacuation) and
personal action on instruction to evacuate.
 Operating personnel should be adequately trained.
 Work permit system must be implemented mandatorily for hazardous work in the plant.
 Safety manual and Public awareness manual needs to be prepared and distributed to all
employees and nearby public.
 Water sprinkler arrangement should be always in working condition at the pumps area
Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 40
 compressor area etc.
 Entire storage and handling facility should be covered under fire hydrant and monitor
loop.
 Small leaks could occur frequently during routine operations like pump seal failure,
sample point valve or drain valve left open, flange leak etc. They should be attended to
immediately as they could escalate.
 Periodic preventive maintenance of pumps, valves, flanges, nozzles, flame arrestors,
breather valves etc. must be done.
 Inspection and testing of the major equipments e.g. LPG storage, LPG pumps and
compressors etc. should be done at regular intervals for ensuring their health and
condition monitoring.
 Safety as a consideration; ensure the facility must be automated in order to avoid delays
in mitigating the risks unlike in manual operations.
 Loading/unloading operations should be done with proper earthing/bonding.
 Security circuit containing fusible plugs to detect heat/fire and thereby closing ROVs in
case of fire
 Emergency push buttons should be provided in LPG control room and also in field at safe
location for manual actuation of emergency shutdown interlock by the operator.
 The DG sets must be periodically tested on load to ensure that it remains always in
operating condition.
 Ensure selection of electrical/lighting equipment‘s based on HAC (hazardous area
classification).
 Cathodic protection should be provided for mounded storage vessels on the external
surface.
 In order to reduce the frequency of failures and consequent risk, codes, rules and
standards framed e.g. OISD 144, SMPV rules (Unfired), gas cylinder rules etc. should be
strictly followed with respect to construction of new facilities.

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 41

8 DISPERSION CONTOURS

Figure 6 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Tanker

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 42

 Figure 7 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Tanker

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 43

 Figure 8 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Tanker

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 44

 Figure 9 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Tanker

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 45

 Figure 10 Overpressure distances due to BLEVE in Road Tanker

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 46

 Figure 11 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from unloading
arm to inlet of LPG Bullet

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 47

Figure 12 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from unloading arm
to inlet of LPG Bullet

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 48

Figure 13 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from unloading
arm to inlet of LPG Bullet

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 49

 Figure 14 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from unloading
arm to inlet of LPG Bullet

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 50

Figure 15 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from LPG Bullet
to Tanker passing through Compressors

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 51

Figure 16 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from LPG Bullet to
Tanker passing through Compressors

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 52

Figure 17 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from LPG Bullet
to Tanker passing through Compressors

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 53

Figure 18 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from LPG Bullet to
Tanker passing through Compressors

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 54

 Figure 19 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from outlet of
LPG Bullets to suction of LPG pumps

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 55

 Figure 20 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from outlet of LPG
Bullets to suction of LPG pumps

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 56

 Figure 21 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from outlet of
LPG Bullets to suction of LPG pumps

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 57

Figure 22 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from outlet of LPG
Bullets to suction of LPG pumps

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 58

Figure 23 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from discharge of
LPG pumps to Carousals Filling gun (LPG Cylinder filling operation)

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 59

 Figure 24 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 25 mm leak at Piping from discharge of
LPG pumps to Carousals Filling gun (LPG Cylinder filling operation)

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 60

 Figure 25 Flash fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from discharge
of LPG pumps to Carousals Filling gun (LPG Cylinder filling operation)

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 61

 Figure 26 Jet fire dispersion contour due to 100 mm leak at Piping from discharge of
LPG pumps to Carousals Filling gun (LPG Cylinder filling operation)

Quantitative Risk Assessment Report of IOCL LPG Bottling Plant, Una 62