I.

APPEALS

Rule 40 – Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts

TITLE: Encarnacion v. Amigo

CASE NO.: 169793
DATE: September 15, 2006

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 169793             September 15, 2006

VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner,
vs.
NIEVES AMIGO, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
73857, ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan,
Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot No. 2121-B-1, consisting of 100
square meters and covered by TCT No. T-256650; and Lot No. 2121-B-2 consisting of 607 square
meters with TCT No. T-256651, located at District 1, National Hi-way, Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots
originally form part of Lot No. 2121, a single 707 square meter track of land owned by Rogelio
Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan on January 18, 1982. On March 21, 1985,
Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay. After the death of the latter in 1992, his widow,
Anita N. Magpantay executed an Affidavit of Waiver2 on April 11, 1995 waving her right over the
property in favor of her son-in-law, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter
caused the subdivision of the land into two lots3 and the issuance of titles in his name on July 18,
1996.4

Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the
property sometime in 1985 without the permission of the then owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Said
occupation by respondent continued even after TCT Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 were issue to
petitioner.

Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter5 dated Febuary 1, 2001 demanding that the
respondent vacate the subject property. As evidenced by the registry return receipt, the demand
letter was delivered by registered mail to the respondent on February 12, 2001. Notwithstanding
receipt of the demand letter, respondent still refused to vacate the subject property. Thereafter, on
March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint6 for ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for
restraining order with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Isabela which was docketed as CV-01-030.
In his Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a portion
of the subject land since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of
petitioner was tainted with irregularities.7

On October 24, 2001, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment, which reads:

WHERE[FO]RE, there being a preponderance of evidence, a JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION and against the defendant NIEVES
AMIGOE (sic) as follows:

a) ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of the parcels of land described in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 he is now occupying and surrender it to the
plaintiff;

b) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000)
as attorney's fees, and

c) ORDERING the defendant to pay rentals equivalent [to] P500.00 per month from February,
2001 until the portion of the land occupied by him is surrendered to the plaintiff.

COSTS against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.8

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case on the ground that as the
Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, this Court acquired no appellate
jurisdiction thereof. Costs against plaintiff-appellee.

SO ORDERED.9

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the Court
of Appeals which promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court.
The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby REMANDED to Branch 20, Regional
Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.11
Hence the present petition raising the sole issue:

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROPER ACTION IN
THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND NOT UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS DETERMINED BY
THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER.12

The petition lacks merit.

In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property are:

1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of
physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and
should be brought in the proper inferior court;

2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession,
which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has
lasted for more than one year; and

3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery of

ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court.13

Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that determines the proper action to be
filed for the recovery of the possession of the property in this case is the length of time of
dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of
any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person. These remedies afford the person deprived of the
possession to file at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.14 Thus, if the dispossession has
not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court acquires
jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper action
to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper Regional Trial Court.

After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we find that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in holding that the proper action in this case is accion publiciana; and
in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for
further proceedings.

Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines
the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.15 On its face, the complaint must show enough ground for the court to assume
jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.16

From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became the owner of the
property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the
complaint for ejectment on March 2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent
demanding that the latter vacate the premises remained unheeded. While it is true that the demand
letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the
complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year from last demand for complaints for
unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner became the owner of the subject lot in 1995
and has been since that time deprived possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the
petitioner's dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6
years have elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made
his cause of action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion
publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the Regional Trial
Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also
refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.17

Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that another person was occupying his
property way back in 1977 but the said owner only filed the complaint for ejectment in 1995, the
proper action would be one for accion publiciana and not one under the summary procedure on
ejectment. As explained by the Court:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners are indeed the owners of the subject
lot and were unlawfully deprived of their right of possession, they should present their claim
before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not
before the metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer or forcible
entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested
from another who had been in physical or material possession of the same for more than
one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment.18

Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that:

The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in 1985 but it was only on
March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when petitioner filed his ejectment case. The
respondent should have filed an accion publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the
RTC.

However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.

Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If
an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a
trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may
be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the
case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the
case shall be remanded for further proceedings.

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the
preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
 additional evidence in the interest of justice.

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the
Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no
longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no
longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence
presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings
and additional evidence in the interest of justice.19

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2005 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court
of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings, is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 32-42. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by
Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Jose C. Mendoza.
2
 Exhibit "C," records, p. 206.
3
 Lot No. 2121-B-1 covered by TCT No. T-256650 (Exhibit "F," records, p. 213) and Lot No. 2121-
B-2 covered by TCT No. T-256651 (Exhibit "G," records, p. 214).
4
 MTCC Decision, CA rollo, pp. 65-66.
5
 Annex "K" of the Complaint, records, p. 26.
6
 Records, pp. 1-5.
7
 Id. at 32-33.
8
 CA rollo, pp. 70. Penned by Judge Bernabe B. Mendoza.
9
 Id. at 31. Penned by Judge Henedino P. Eduarte.
10
 Id. at 6-15.
11
 Rollo, p. 41.
12
 Id. at 17.
13
 REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume 1, Sixth Revised Edition, pp. 767-768.
14
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Sec. 1.
15
 Herrera v. Bollos, 424 Phil. 851, 856 (2002).
16
 Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 540.
17
 Id. at 543.
18
 Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142276, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 755, 769.
19
 Rollo, pp. 38-40; emphasis supplied.
TITLE: Heirs of De La Rosa v. Calderon-Bargas
CASE NO.: 147939
DATE: July 6, 2007

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 147939             July 6, 2007

THE HEIRS OF CRISTETA DE LA ROSA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, HEIRS OF SESINANDO MILLARE, ROSALINA M. COSEP,
CARMELITA M. DAMASO, MERCEDES M. ESPIRITU, and FELICITA M. SAN FELIPE, respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August 9, 2000, and the
Resolution3 dated April 30, 2001, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 54750.

The Facts

The present petition stems from a forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction4 case decided
by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tanay, Rizal. Petitioners5 were declared to have illegally
entered the parcel of land denominated as Lot 3223, located at Malalim, San Guillermo, Morong,
Rizal. On August 26, 1998, the court rendered a Decision,6 the dispositive portion of which reads:

In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds and so holds that preponderance of evidence is
on the side of the plaintiffs. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate the subject
premises and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff.

2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs:

a. P 30,000.00 as attorney's fee plus P 500.00 per Court appearance.

b. Costs of suit.
 SO ORDERED.7

On October 5, 1998, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal8 from the aforesaid Decision. On November
20, 1998, the MTC rendered an Order9 directing the Clerk of Court to immediately transmit the
records of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within the required period.

On January 4, 1999, the RTC of Morong, Rizal furnished the parties with a Notice of Appealed
Case,10 the pertinent portion of which reads:

You are hereby notified that this court has received the original record of this case on appeal
from the Municipal Trial Court of Morong, Rizal consisting of Two Hundred Sixty-seven (267)
pages and has docketed the same.11

On March 31, 1999, private respondents12 filed a Motion for Dismissal of Appeal13 alleging that
petitioners had not filed the required memorandum despite the fact that they had only until January
29, 1999 within which to do so.

On April 19, 1999, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Dismissal of Appeal.14 Petitioners
averred that they had not received the Notice of Appealed Case dated January 4, 1999. They claimed
that they were sincere in their intention to prosecute their appeal and prayed that the Motion for
Dismissal of the Appeal be denied and that they be given until April 27, 1999 within which to submit
their memorandum.15

On April 14, 1999, prior to the filing by the petitioners of the Opposition to the Motion for Dismissal
of Appeal, the RTC issued an Order16 dismissing the case for failure of the petitioners to file the
required memorandum. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, this present case is ordered DISMISSED for failure to comply with Section 7 (b),
Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.17

On April 23, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 of the Order of the RTC. On June
25, 1999, the RTC issued an Order19 denying the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion to Admit
Memorandum of the petitioners. The pertinent portions of the Order read:

An examination of the return card of the notice of appealed case shows that it was received
by one of the staff of Atty. Metila on January 14, 1999. The Court says "one of the staff"
because the same signature appears/resembles the recipient of the Motion for Dismissal of
Appeal (Annex "B" of the Opposition) and the Pre-Trial Brief for the Plaintiffs (Annex "E" of
the Opposition). The similarity of the signatures is very apparent that it is hard to believe that
he did not receive the notice of appealed case; while the aforequoted pleadings of the
counsel for plaintiffs/appellees were received by counsel for defendants/appellants.

As correctly observed by counsel for plaintiffs/appellees, a Postman would not leave a

registered letter from the Court, unless it was properly signed by the addressee or his
representative. The Postman, as public official, is presumed to have regularly performed his
duty, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Likewise, it is the duty of counsel for defendants/appellants to prepare the memorandum

since he is the one who filed the present appeal. Hence, his failure to file the same is an
 inexcusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit. Consequently, the Motion to Admit Memorandum is likewise DENIED.

Meanwhile, the second paragraph of the Order dated April 14, 1999 is amended to read as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, this present appeal is ordered DISMISSED for failure to comply with
Section 7(B), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

"SO ORDERED."

So ordered.20

On September 7, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari21 before the CA. The petitioners
questioned the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to try and hear the case. They alleged that the
RTC of Morong, Rizal had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and over the
subject matter of the action due to the failure of the clerk of court to furnish them with the Notice of
Appealed Case.22 Petitioners proffer that they only became aware that their case was already with
the RTC of Morong when they received private respondents' Motion for Dismissal of the Appeal.23

On August 9, 2000, the CA issued a Decision24 denying the petition and affirming in toto the decision
of the trial court. The court decreed that failure to comply with Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court, is not jurisdictional. The letter of transmittal that was required to be sent to the parties was
just for purposes of certification to ensure the completeness of the records transmitted.25 An appeal
by a party by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of a notice of appeal in
due time as mandated by Section 9, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.26

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, the same was denied in a
Resolution27 dated April 30, 2001.

On May 21, 2001, petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the CA. Petitioners contend that compliance with the directives of
Sections 6 and 7, Rule 4028 of the Revised Rules of Court is mandatory and is important in order for
the appellate court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and over the subject
matter of the case. Petitioners claim that their receipt of the motion for dismissal of the appeal was
their first formal notification that the case was already within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Morong,
Rizal. They aver that the clerk of court of the MTC failed to furnish them a copy of the letter of
transmittal, while the clerk of court of the RTC failed to notify them of the receipt by the said court of
the complete record of Civil Case No. 1135. They insist that they have not received the notice of
appealed case dated January 4, 1999. Petitioners stress that the failure of the clerks of court of both
the MTC and the RTC to furnish them copies of the letter of transmittal and notice of appealed case
constituted a violation of their right to due process and that such failure on the part of the clerk of
court resulted in their failure to file the required memorandum on time.29 Furthermore, they question
private respondents' motion for dismissal of appeal on the ground that the time and date of hearing
thereof was not specified in the motion.

The Issues

Petitioners submit the following questions of law for resolution:

 I

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petitioners' Petition and Motion for
Reconsideration based on its erroneous interpretation of Section[s] 6 and 7 of Rule 40 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

II

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming RTC-Morong's dismissal of

petitioners' appeal on the sole basis of private respondents' improper, defective and invalid
motion for dismissal of appeal.30

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the ruling of the appellate court.

Petitioners are of the mistaken notion that receipt of the letter of transmittal and of the notice of
appealed case is the reckoning point for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over their appeal. This is
contrary to the clear provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, which states, in
part, that a party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the
notice of appeal in due time. The RTC acting as an appellate court acquired jurisdiction over the
case of the petitioners upon their filing of the notice of appeal on October 5, 1998. The filing of the
notice of appeal in due time and the payment of the appropriate fees by the petitioners perfected
their appeal in the RTC. As a necessary consequence thereof, the MTC was divested of jurisdiction
over their case.31 From the filing of the written notice of appeal, petitioners' appeal was perfected
without need of any further act, and, consequently, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case, both
over the record and over the subject of the case.32

The alleged failure of the clerks of court to furnish petitioners copies of the letter of transmittal and
Notice of Appealed Case that resulted in their inability to file their memorandum on time can no
longer be reviewed by this Court. The findings of facts of the RTC are deemed final and conclusive
as to this Court, especially when they are adopted and affirmed by the CA.33

On the second issue, petitioners question the motion for dismissal of appeal filed by private
respondents in the RTC as defective for failing to specify the exact date and time of the hearing of
the motion and for not containing the address of the petititioners.34

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that private respondents complied with the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 1535 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said motion contains
the required notice of hearing. The specific date and time of the hearing of the motion was left by
the respondents to the discretion of the court. We believe, and so hold, that private respondents
substantially complied with the provisions of the Rules of Court regarding litigated motions. What is
important is that petitioners were properly apprised that such motion was filed by private
respondents. The obligation to notify them when the hearing on the motion would be heard rests on
the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria_Martinez, Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 45.
2
 Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, with Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos,
Jr. and Romeo A. Brawner, concurring; rollo, pp. 18-23.
3
 Id. at 25.
4
 Entitled "Lope C. Mata, Heirs of Sesinando R. Millare (represented by Francisco R. Millare),
Rosalina M. Cosep, Carmelita M. Damaso (represented by Jun M. Damaso), Mercedes M.
Espiritu and Felicita M. San Felipe v. Cristeta Dela Rosa-Inguito and Pablo R. Inguito," docketed
as Civil Case No. 1135.
5
 Defendants in the MTC.
6
 Penned by Judge Leili Suarez Acebo; rollo, pp. 26-28. .
7
 Rollo, p. 28
8
 Id. at 29-30.
9
 Order issued by Judge Leili Suarez Acebo; CA rollo, p. 15.
10
 Issued by Gay S. Bigornia, Officer-in-Charge of the RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; id at 18.
11
 Id.
12
 Plaintiff-appellees in the RTC.
13
 CA rollo, pp. 19-21.
14
 Id. at 28-20.
15
 Id.
16
 Id. at 24.
17
 Issued by Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas; id.
18
 CA rollo, pp. 25-29.
19
 Rollo, pp. 41-43.
20
 Id. at 42-43.
21
 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 65.
22
 CA rollo, p. 5.
23
 Id.
24
 Rollo, pp. 18-23.
25
 Id. at 21.
26
 Id. at 21-22.
27
 Id. at 25.
28
 SEC. 6. Duty of the clerk of court. - Within fifteen (15) days from the perfection of the appeal,
the clerk of court or the branch clerk of court of the lower court shall transmit the original record
or the record on appeal, together with the transcript and exhibits. Which he shall certify as
complete, to the proper Regional Trial Court. A copy of his letter of transmittal of the records to
the appellate court shall be furnished the parties.

SEC. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. –

(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which
shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
appellant's memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file
a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so,
the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the
case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda as are filed.
29
 Id. at 134-145.
30
 Rollo, p. 4.
31
 Fortune Life and Gen. Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101374, July 30, 1993,
224 SCRA 829, 835.
32
 Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 253, 266 (1997).
33
 Hko Ah Pao v. Ting, G.R. No. 153476, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 551, 562.
34
 Rollo, p. 143.
35
 Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served
in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the
date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days
after the filing of the motion.

TITLE: Rodolfo Canlas v. Iluminada Tubil

CASE NO.: 184285
DATE: September 25, 2009

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 184285               September 25, 2009

RODOLFO "RUDY" CANLAS, VICTORIA CANLAS, FELICIDAD CANLAS and SPOUSES PABLO
CANLAS AND CHARITO CANLAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ILUMINADA TUBIL, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the June 12, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99736, which reversed the April 11, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 50, in Special Civil Case No. G-06-544, and ordered said
Regional Trial Court to decide the case on merits, pursuant to Section 8, par. 2 of Rule 40 of the
Rules of Court. The RTC affirmed the Decision3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guagua,
Pampanga, Branch 2, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3582 for unlawful detainer filed by respondent
Iluminada Tubil. Also assailed is the September 1, 2008 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals which
denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On June 9, 2004, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by respondent Iluminada Tubil against
petitioners Rodolfo Canlas, Victoria Canlas, Felicidad Canlas and spouses Pablo and Charito Canlas
before the MTC. The pertinent allegations read:

xxxx

3. That the plaintiff is the owner, together with the other heirs of her late husband Nicolas
Tubil who are their children, of a residential land located at San Juan, Betis, Guagua,
Pampanga, identified as Cadastral Lot No. 2420, with an area of 332 square meters, covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 11199 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, x x x;

xxxx

4. That before the aforesaid parcel of land was titled, it was declared for taxation purposes in
the name of plaintiff Iluminada Tubil in the Municipal Assessor’s Office of Guagua,
Pampanga, x x x;

xxxx

6. That sometime ago, the defendants Roldolfo ‘Rudy’ Canlas, Victoria Canlas and Felicidad
Canlas erected a house in the aforesaid land of the plaintiff, which they are presently
occupying as their residential house;

7. That likewise sometime ago defendants spouses Pablo Canlas and Charito Canlas
erected a house in the aforesaid land of the plaintiff, which they are presently occupying as
their residential house;

8. That the said houses of the defendants were erected in the aforesaid land and their stay
therein was by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, as well as co-heirs, considering that
defendants are plaintiff’s relatives;

9. That plaintiff and her co-heirs wish to use and dedicate the aforesaid parcel of land
fruitfully, demands were verbally made upon the defendants to vacate and remove their
house therefrom, but defendants just ignored the plea of plaintiff and co-heirs, and instead
failed and refused to remove the houses without any lawful and justifiable reason;

10. That in light of said refusal, the plaintiff referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent
defendants demand letters to vacate dated January 12, 2004, but inspite of receipt of the
same defendants failed and refused to vacate and remove their houses and continue to fail
and refuse to do so without lawful justification x x x;
 11. That this matter was ventilated with before the barangay government for conciliation,
mediation, arbitration and settlement prior to the filing of this case with this court, but no
settlement was arrived at inspite of the effort exerted by the barangay authorities and so a
certification to file action was issued by the Pangkat Chairman of Barangay San Juan, Betis,
Guagua, Pampanga x x x;5

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the MTC is without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and that the case was not prosecuted in the name of the real parties in interest.6

On September 14, 2004, the MTC denied the motion because the grounds relied upon were
evidentiary in nature which needed to be litigated.7

Thus, petitioners filed their answer where they denied the allegations in the complaint. They claimed
that together with their predecessors-in-interest, they had been in open, continuous, adverse, public
and uninterrupted possession of the land for more than 60 years; that respondent’s title which was
issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 03540 was dubious, spurious and of unlawful character and
nature; and that respondent’s cause of action was for an accion publiciana, which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the MTC.8

On October 23, 2006, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer
because respondent failed to show that the possession of the petitioners was by mere tolerance.

Respondent appealed to the RTC which rendered its Decision on April 11, 2007 affirming in toto the
judgment of the MTC. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an
Order9 dated June 8, 2007.

Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which rendered the assailed
decision on June 12, 2008, which reversed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us SETTING
ASIDE the decision rendered by Branch 50 of the RTC in Guagua, Pampanga on April 11, 2007 in
Special Civil Case No. G-06-544 and ORDERING the said regional trial court branch to decide Special
Civil Case No. G-06-544 on the merits based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the
Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga in Civil Case No. 3582 and such memoranda as are filed
therewith, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice, pursuant to par. 2 of Section 8 of Rule 40 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its September 1,
2008 Resolution.11

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

x x x THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE
DECISION RENDERED BY BRANCH 50 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GUAGUA, PAMPANGA
ON APRIL 11, 2007 IN SPECIAL CIVIL CASE NO. G-06-544 AND IN ORDERING THE SAID COURT TO
DECIDE SPECIAL CIVIL CASE NO. G-06-544 ON THE MERITS BASED ON THE ENTIRE RECORD OF
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF GUAGUA, PAMPANGA IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 3582, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE ADMISSION OF AMENDED PLEADINGS AND ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECTION 8 OF RULE 40 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AS AMENDED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT BRANCH 50 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF GUAGUA, PAMPANGA DOES NOT HAVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3582 FILED IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF GUAGUA,
PAMPANGA ON JUNE 9, 2004.12

Petitioners contend that the RTC does not have original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case, thus, it cannot validly decide on the merits, as ordered by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to
paragraph 2 of Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. –

xxxx

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but
shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission
of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.

We note that when petitioners filed their motion to dismiss before the MTC, they claimed that it is
the RTC which has jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, in the instant petition for review,
petitioners changed their theory; they now claim that it is the MTC, and not the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over the subject matter since the dispossession was only for five months counted from
respondent’s last demand to the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC.

As a rule, a change of theory cannot be allowed.13 However, when the factual bases thereof would
not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly
meet the issue raised in the new theory,14 as in this case, the Court may give due course to the
petition and resolve the principal issues raised therein.

The issue to be resolved is which court, the MTC or the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
If it is an unlawful detainer case, the action was properly filed in the MTC. However, if the suit is one
for accion publiciana, original jurisdiction is with the RTC, which is mandated not to dismiss the
appeal but to decide the case on the merits pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.15 In ejectment cases, the complaint
should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint
must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.16

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal
but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.17

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the
date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.18

On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one
year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year
had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had
become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.

In Cabrera v. Getaruela,19 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In the instant case, respondent’s allegations in the complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful
detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction on the MTC over the subject matter. Respondent alleged
that she was the owner of the land as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 111999 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga; that the land had been declared for taxation purposes and she had
been paying the taxes thereon; that petitioners’ entry and construction of their houses were tolerated
as they are relatives; and that she sent on January 12, 2004 a letter demanding that petitioners
vacate the property but they failed and refused to do so. The complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed on June 9, 2004, or within one year from the time the last demand to vacate was made.

It is settled that as long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer,
the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved
during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court - after
acquiring jurisdiction - may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.20 1avvphi1

The ruling cited by the Court of Appeals in Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,21 i.e., that jurisdictional
facts must appear on the face of the complaint for ejectment such that when the complaint fails to
faithfully aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how
entry was effected, or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria in the proper regional trial court,22 finds no application in the
instant case. In Sarmiento, the complaint did not characterize the entry into the land as legal or
illegal. It was also not alleged that dispossession was effected through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry, nor was there a contract, express or implied,
as would qualify the case as unlawful detainer.23 Contrarily, the complaint in this case specifically
alleged that possession of the petitioners was by tolerance. The rule is that possession by tolerance
is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and
the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.24 In Sarmiento, the claim that
possession of the land was by tolerance was a mere afterthought, raised only in subsequent
pleadings but not in the complaint.25

The requirement that the complaint should aver jurisdictional facts, like when and how entry on the
land was made by the defendants, applies only when at issue is the timeliness of the filing of the
complaint before the MTC and not when the jurisdiction of the MTC is assailed as being one for
accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC. Thus, in Javelosa v. Court of Appeals,26 it was held that:

The ruling in the Sarona case cited by petitioner i.e., that a complaint for unlawful detainer should
allege when and how entry on the land was made by the defendant, finds no application to the case
at bar. In Sarona, the main issue was the timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the MTC. In
forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of defendant’s actual entry on
the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of the last demand to vacate. Hence, to determine
whether the case was filed on time, there was a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint was
one for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In light of these considerations, the Court ruled that since
the main distinction between the two actions is when and how defendant entered the land, the
determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint. Thus, in Sarona, the jurisdiction of the MTC
over the complaint was never in issue for whether the complaint was one for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, the MTC had jurisdiction over it. The case at bar is different for at issue is the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the unlawful detainer case for petitioner (defendant therein) asserts that
the case is one for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.

In the instant case, the timeliness of the filing of the complaint is not at issue as the dispossession
of the property by the respondent has not lasted for more than one year. Thus, the ruling of the RTC
that the length of time she was dispossessed of the property is almost 36 years, which made her
cause of action beyond the ambit of unlawful detainer and became one for accion publiciana,27 lacks
legal and factual basis.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to bring an action in the proper inferior
court for unlawful detainer within one year, after such unlawful withholding of possession, counted
from the date of the last demand.28 The records show that respondent sent the demand to vacate
the property to the petitioners on January 24, 2004 and filed the complaint for unlawful detainer on
June 9, 2004, which is well within the one-year period.

Having ruled that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3582, it thus properly exercised
its discretion in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer for failure of the respondent to prove
tolerance by sufficient evidence. Consquently, Section 8 (2nd par.) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court
which ordains the Regional Trial Court not to dismiss the cases appealed to it from the metropolitan
or municipal trial court which tried the same albeit without jurisdiction, but to decide the said case
on the merits, finds no application here.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 12, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 99736 ordering the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 50 to decide
Special Civil Case No. G-06-544, as well as its September 1, 2008 Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The October 23, 2006 Decision of the MTC of
Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 2, dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer for failure of
respondent to show that petitioners’ possession of the subject property was by mere tolerance is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
 Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 24-27; penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican and concurred in by Associate
Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Ramon R. Garcia.
2
 Id. at 57-64; penned by Judge Gregorio J. Pimentel, Jr.
3
 Id. at 48-56; penned by Judge Eda P. Dizon-Era.
4
 Id. at 38-39.
5
 Id. at 40-43.
6
 Records (1), pp. 34-37.
7
 Id. at 70-72.
8
 Id. at 76-77.
9
 Id. at 65-66.
10
 Id. at 37.
11
 Id. at 39.
12
 Id. at 8.
13
 Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159270, August 22,
2005, 467 SCRA 569, 584.
14
 Quasha Ancheta Peña and Nolasco Law Office v. LCN Construction Corporation, G.R. No.
174873, August 26, 2008.
15
 Domalsin v. Valenciano, G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 114, 133.
16
 Id. at 133-134.
17
 Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 369, 376.
18
 Id.
19
 G.R. No. 164213, April 21, 2009.
20
 Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 611 (2005).
21
 G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 108.
22
 Id. at 117.
23
 Id. at 115.
24
 Heirs of Rafael Magpily v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 167748, November 8, 2005, 474 SCRA 366, 378.
25
 Supra note 20 at 115.
26
 333 Phil. 331, 340 (1996).
27
 Rollo, p. 62.
28
 Heirs of Fernando Vinzons v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 146, 152 (1999).

TITLE: Spouses Badillo v. Tayag

CASE NO.: 143976
DATE: April 3, 2003

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 143976            April 3, 2003

Spouses OSCAR and HAYDEE BADILLO, petitioners,

vs.
Hon. ARTURO G. TAYAG as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Malolos,
Bulacan; and the NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 145846 April 3, 2003

Spouses OSCAR and HAYDEE BADILLO, petitioners,

vs.
Hon. BASILIO A. GABO JR. as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malolos,
Bulacan; and the NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The National Housing Authority (NHA), a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt
from paying appellate docket fees when it sues or is sued in relation to its governmental function of
providing mass housing. It is likewise exempt from filing a supersedeas bond that will stay the
execution of a forcible entry case. In order to have some bases for fixing the reasonable amount of
rent in a forcible entry case, courts must rely on the evidence presented by the parties.

The Case

Before us are two (2) consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside two rulings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The first one is the
July 19, 2000 Order1 issued by Branch 79 in Case No. P-410-M-2000, annulling both the May 23, 2000
Order2 and the May 30, 2000 Writ of Execution3 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan. The dispositive portion of this assailed RTC Order reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the [O]rder of the [t]riaI [c]ourt dated May 23, 2000 is hereby annulled.

"The [W]rit of [E]xecution issued by the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose
del Monte Bulacan is also annulled.

"Prohibiting the [t]rial [c]ourt from enforcing the [W]rit; and commanding the Municipal Trial
Court to transmit the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan together with
the Money Order of [t]wo hundred [p]esos Annex ‘I’ and ‘1-2’ as appellate docket fee and the
alleged Supersedeas Bond per [Annex] ‘A’, ‘A-1’, ‘A-2’ to ‘A-3’ of the OPPOSITION TO MOTION
TO CLARIFY (with manifestation) filed by Petitioner NHA received by this [C]ourt on July 17,
2000 although dated July 14, 2000."4

The second ruling being contested is the October 23, 2000 Decision5 of Branch 11 in Civil Case No.
512-M-2000, which modified the February 1, 2000 Decision6 of the MTC of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. The challenged RTC Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as defendants are ordered
to vacate plaintiffs’ property and return the possession thereof to the latter and to pay
plaintiffs, jointly and severally P20,000.00 for attorney’s fees and P20,000.00 for litigation
expenses and to pay the costs are concerned."7

Since the parties were the same and the issues related, the two Petitions were consolidated by this
Court in its Resolution of October 17, 2001.8

The Facts

Petitioners are plaintiffs in a forcible entry/ejectment case docketed as Civil Case No. 263-94 in the
MTC of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, entitled "Spouses Oscar and Haydee Badillo v. Triad
Construction and Development Corporation and National Housing Authority." In its February 1, 2000
Decision,9 the MTC ordered the NHA to vacate the disputed land; to return possession thereof to
petitioners; to pay rental for its use and occupation at the rate of P10 per square meter per month;
and to shoulder the attorney’s fees, the litigation expenses and the costs of suit.

The disputed parcel of land was part of the Bagong Silang Resettlement Project (BSRP) of the NHA.
The NHA contended that the property was part of the Tala Estate and was among the 598 hectares
reserved by the government for its housing resettlement site, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation
No. 843 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971.

In June 1994, the NHA offered for bidding the development of certain portions of the BSRP. It
eventually contracted with the Triad Construction and Development Corporation ("Triad") for the
development of parts of the site. These were then developed and subdivided into smaller lots that
were allocated, awarded and distributed by the NHA to qualified beneficiaries.

On the other hand, petitioners claimed that they were the owners and exclusive possessors of a
portion of the land that had been awarded by the NHA to Triad. They argued that the NHA intruded
on, occupied and developed their property despite their protests.

Upon receipt of the February 1, 2000 Decision of the MTC, the NHA filed a Notice of Appeal10 with
the same court on February 24, 2000. The NHA, however, did not pay the appellate docket fees
within the reglementary period. Consequently, petitioners filed with that court a Motion for the
immediate issuance of a writ of execution and demolition.11 They contended that because of the
NHA’s failure to pay the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period, the MTC Decision
became final.

After a hearing on the Motion, the MTC promulgated an Order on May 23, 2000, authorizing the
issuance of a writ of execution in favor of petitioners:

"For failure of the National Housing Authority to comply with the requirements laid down
under Section 5 of Rule 40 as regards the payment of docket fee and for its failure to comply
with Section 19 of Rule 70 in regard to the payment of the supersedeas bond, the execution
of the judgment rendered in this case has become a ministerial duty of the court in view of
the mandatory nature of said requirements.

"Let therefore, a writ of execution be issued immediately against the defendants."12

Thereafter, the Writ of Execution13 was actually issued by the MTC on May 30, 2000. Pursuant
thereto, the sheriff14 served a Notice of Garnishment of NHA’s funds in the Landbank of the
Philippines. The bank, however, refused to release the garnished amount.

On June 9, 2000, the NHA filed a Motion to set aside the Writ of Execution and the Notice of
Garnishment.15 The Motion was, however, denied by the MTC in its June 23, 2000 Order.16

The NHA paid the appellate dockets fees only on June 29, 2000 -- four months late. It
simultaneously filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Injunction17 before the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan, assailing the MTC’s May 23, 2000 Order and May 30, 2000 Writ of Execution.

Acting on the NHA Petition, RTC Executive Judge Danio A. Manalastas issued a 72-hour Temporary
Restraining Order.18 Thereafter, the case was assigned to RTC Branch 79, which issued the first
assailed July 19, 2000 Order annulling the Writ. After declaring that the NHA had been able to perfect
its appeal on time, the RTC ordered the MTC to transmit the records of the case for appropriate
appellate proceedings.

Upon transmittal of the records from the MTC, the case was raffled to RTC Branch 11, which issued
the second assailed October 23, 2000 Decision. This Decision was appealed by the NHA to the Court
of Appeals (CA). The appeal, docketed as CA-GR No. 61981, is still pending resolution.

Rulings of the RTC

The NHA was able to perfect its appeal on time despite its nonpayment of appellate docket fees,
according to the ruling of RTC Branch 79. The NHA as a government-owned corporation was
presumed to be always solvent and thus exempt from filing a supersedeas bond, which would stay
the immediate execution of a forcible entry case. With the perfection of the appeal, the MTC lost
jurisdiction to issue and enforce the Writ of Execution.

Partly affirming the MTC, RTC Branch 11 held that petitioners were entitled to the right of
possession of the property and to the award of damages, but that the grant of rental was baseless.

Hence, this recourse.19

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

"Whether or not the Order of Respondent Judge Gabo deleting the payment of rentals for the
use and occupation of the lot in question is in accordance with law and existing
jurisprudence on the matter"20

II

"Whether or not NHA perfected its appeal to the RTC Bulacan despite failure to pay the
docket/appeal fee within the 15 day period provided for in Section 5, Rule 40 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure

III

"Whether or not the NHA being a government corporation is exempt from the posting of the
supersedeas bond to stay execution as provided for in Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure

IV

"Whether or not RTC Bulacan was correct in annulling the Order dated May 23, 2000; the Writ
of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment issued by MTC, Bulacan" 21

These issues can be more clearly restated thus:

(1) Is the failure of the NHA to pay the appellate docket fee within the fifteen-day
reglementary period a ground to dismiss its appeal?

(2) Is the NHA exempt from filing the supersedeas bond in order to stay the execution of the
MTC judgment?

(3) Was it proper for RTC Branch 11 to delete the rentals awarded by the MTC?

Ruling of the Court

The Petitions are unmeritorious.

First Issue:
 Payment of Appellate Docket Fees

Created by virtue of PD No. 757,22 the NHA is a government-owned and controlled corporation with
an original charter. As a general rule, however, such corporations -- with or without independent
charters -- are required to pay legal fees under Section 21 of Rule 141 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:

"SEC. 21. Government Exempt. - The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities, are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local
governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent
charters are not exempt from paying such fees."23

On the other hand, the NHA contends that it is exempt from paying all kinds of fees and charges,
because it performs governmental functions. It cites Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico,24 which
holds that the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government-owned and controlled corporation, is
exempt from paying docket fees whenever it files a suit in relation to its governmental functions.

We agree. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations25 declares

that the provision of mass housing is a governmental function:

"Coming now to the case at bar, We note that since 1941 when the National Housing
Commission (predecessor of PHHC, which is now known as the National Housing Authority
[NHA] was created, the Philippine government has pursued a mass housing and resettlement
program to meet the needs of Filipinos for decent housing. The agency tasked with
implementing such governmental program was the PHHC. These can be gleaned from the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 648, the charter of said agency.

"We rule that the PHHC is a governmental institution performing governmental functions.

"This is not the first time We are ruling on the proper characterization of housing as an
activity of the government. In the 1985 case of National Housing Corporation v. Juco and the
NLRC (No. L-64313, January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172), We ruled that housing is a
governmental function."

While it has not always been easy to distinguish governmental from proprietary functions, the
Court’s declaration in the Decision quoted above is not without basis. Indeed, the characterization of
governmental functions has veered away from the traditional constituent-ministrant classification
that has become unrealistic, if not obsolete.26 Justice Isagani A. Cruz avers: "[I]t is now obligatory
upon the State itself to promote social justice,27 to provide adequate social services to promote a
rising standard of living,28 to afford protection to labor to formulate and implement urban and
agrarian reform programs, and to adopt other measures intended to ensure the dignity, welfare and
security of its citizens. x x x. These functions, while traditionally regarded as merely ministrant and
optional, have been made compulsory by the Constitution."29

In addition, the NHA is mandated by PD No. 757 to develop and implement a comprehensive,
integrated housing program30 for the greatest number of people.31 Thus, to be able to perform its
governmental functions, the housing agency is vested with sovereign powers. Such powers include,
among others, the exercise of the right of eminent domain or the right to acquire by purchase
privately owned lands for purposes of housing development, resettlement, and related services and
facilities.32

Furthermore, under the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, the NHA, in cooperation with
other government units and agencies, is mandated to identify and acquire lands for socialized
housing for the underprivileged and the homeless.33

Notably, it was in its performance of this governmental function to provide mass housing that the
NHA was sued by petitioners.

Perfection of the Appeal

We agree with the RTC that, insofar as appeals from the MTC to the RTC are concerned, the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure do not mandate the dismissal of an appeal as a consequence of the
nonpayment of the required fee.

Martinez v. Court of Appeals34 holds that in such appeals, "the failure to pay the appellate docket
fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, the dismissal being discretionary
on the part of the appellate court." While that case was governed by Sections 2035 and 2336 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court on January 11, 1983 to implement the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981 (BP Blg. 129), the present Rules lead to a similar conclusion.

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, parties perfect an appeal from the judgment of the MTC to
the RTC by filing a notice of appeal within the fifteen day reglementary period, as provided under
Section 4 of Rule 40 and Section 9 of Rule 41:

Rule 40 --

"SEC. 4. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – The perfection of the appeal and the effect
thereof shall be governed by the provisions of section 9, Rule 41.

Rule 41--

"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. - A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected as to him upon filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

xxx           xxx           xxx

"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection
of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other party."

Fontanar v. Bonsubre37 is a case in point. It holds that in appeals from the MTC to the RTC, failure to
pay the appellate docket fee within the fifteen-day reglementary period bestows on the appellate
court a directory, not a mandatory, power to dismiss an appeal. The Court ratiocinated as follows:

"x x x [T]his Court restated the importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal as an
essential part of our judicial system and advised the courts to proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of a right to appeal with the instruction that every party-litigant should
be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition if his cause, freed
from the constraints of technicalities. Rightly so, for the payment of the appellate docket fee
is not a requirement for the protection of the prevailing party, and non-compliance therewith
within the time prescribed causes no substantial prejudice to anyone."

On the other hand, the cases cited by petitioners involve appeals -- not from the MTC to the RTC --
but from the RTC to the CA and from the CA to the SC, for which the payment of appellate fees is
indeed mandatory according to the Rules.38 We quote Manalili v. Arsenio and De Leon:39

"Appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. Corollary to this principle is that the
appeal must be exercised strictly in accordance with provisions set by law. x x x

"x x x [T]he payment of the appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure. It is an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed
from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all."40

In the instant cases, when the NHA filed a Notice of Appeal on February 22, 2000 -- two days before
the appeal period lapsed – it perfected its appeal and the MTC thereby lost its jurisdiction. The MTC
therefore acted without jurisdiction in issuing the May 23, 2000 Order and the May 30, 2000 Writ of
Execution.

Second Issue:

The Filing of a Supersedeas Bond

There is a rationale for requiring a losing party to file a supersedeas bond in order to stay the
immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case. Such bond is required to assure the
payment of damages to the winning party in case the appeal is found frivolous.

In the present cases, the posting of a supersedeas bond is not necessary to stay the execution of
the MTC Order. When a case involves provable rents or damages incurred by a government-owned
or controlled corporation, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines. When the State
litigates, it is not required to put up a bond for damages or even an appeal bond -- either directly or
indirectly through its authorized officers -- because it is presumed to be always solvent.41

Thus, it would be unnecessary to ask the NHA to file a bond because to do so would be to indirectly
require the government to submit the bond. And the State is not required to file a bond for the
obvious reason that it is capable of paying its obligation.42 In any event, the NHA has already paid the
appellate docket fees and filed the supersedeas bond as ordered by the RTC, albeit late.

Third Issue:

The Award of Rentals

Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals,43 petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial notice of the
reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in order to determine the amount of rent that
may be awarded to them. In that case, however, this Court relied on the CA’s factual findings, which
were based on the evidence presented before the trial court. In determining reasonable rent, the RTC
therein took account of the following factors: 1) the realty assessment of the land, 2) the increase in
realty taxes, and 3) the prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity. Clearly, the trial court relied, not on
mere judicial notice, but on the evidence presented before it.

Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed
property. However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of
rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. As
we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its action
on the evidence adduced by the parties.
In Herrera v. Bollos,44 the trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry case.
Reversing the RTC, this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not
by mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence:

"x x x. A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may
take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Before
taking such judicial notice, the court must ‘allow the parties to be heard thereon.’ Hence,
there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without
supporting evidence.45

In the instant cases, the RTC has already declared that there is no evidence on record to support the
MTC’s award of rent. We find no cogent reason to disturb this pronouncement.

Finally, the belated prayer of the NHA for the dismissal of the forcible entry case cannot be granted,
because it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, not to this Court. As a mere respondent in these
appealed cases, the NHA is not entitled to any affirmative relief. Besides, we would not want to
preempt the CA’s action on the said appeal.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 See pp. 24-39 of the rollo in GR No. 143976; penned by Judge Arturo G. Tayag.
2
 Id., p. 51.
3
 Id., pp. 52-54.
4
 Assailed RTC Order, p. 16; page 39 of the rollo in GR No. 143973.
5
 Penned by Judge Basilio Gabo Jr.; see pp. 17-19 of the rollo in GR No. 145846.
6
 Written by Judge Aznar D. Lindayag; pp. 20-30 of the rollo in GR No. 145846.
7
 Id., p. 19.
8
 October 17, 2001 Resolution; id., p. 111.
9
 GR No. 143976; rollo, pp. 40-50.
10
 Records, Vol. II, pp. 280-281.
11
 Id., pp. 292-294.
12
 GR No. 143976; rollo, p. 51.
13
 Id., pp. 52-54.
14
 Benjamin C. Hao; id., p. 55.
15
 Records, Vol. II, pp. 364-367.
16
 GR No. 143976; rollo, pp. 59-60.
17
 Records, Vol. III, pp. 1-32.
18
 Dated June 29, 2000; records, Vol. III, pp. 64-65.
19
 This case was deemed submitted for decision on December 18, 2001, upon receipt by this
Court of respondents’ Memorandum signed by Mario P. Escobar, Ma. Magdalena T. de Leon-
Siacon and Jose M. Manuel Jr. of the Legal Department of the NHA. Petitioners’ Memorandum,
signed by Walter T. Young, was received by this Court on November 26, 2001.
20
 See Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 5; GR No. 145846; rollo, p. 116. Original in upper case.
21
 See Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 6-7; GR No. 143976; rollo, pp. 131-132. Original in upper
case.
22
 Entitled "Creating the National Housing Authority and Dissolving the Existing Housing
Agencies, Defining Its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes";
dated July 31, 1975.
23
 Resolution Amending Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court, issued in AM No. 00-2-01-
SC.
24
 351 SCRA 280, February 6, 2001.
25
 150 SCRA 296, May 29, 1987, per Cortes, J.
26
 People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, 150 SCRA 296,
May 29, 1987.
27
 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 10. "The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development."
28
 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 9. "The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation, free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living, and an improved quality of life for all."
29
 I. Cruz, Philippine Political Law (1998), pp. 21-22.
30
 "SECTION 1. Housing Program. Pursuant to the mandate of the New Constitution, there shall
be developed a comprehensive and integrated housing program which shall embrace, among
others, housing development and resettlement, sources and schemes of financing, and
delineation of government and private sector participation x x x."
"SEC 2. Creation of the National Housing Authority. There is hereby created a government
corporation to be known as the National Housing Authority, hereinafter referred to as ‘Authority,’
to develop and implement the housing program above-mentioned. x x x."
31
 "SEC 3. Purposes and Objectives. The Authority shall have the following purposes and
objectives:
(a) To provide and maintain adequate housing for the greatest possible number of people;
(b) To undertake housing, development, resettlement or other activities as would enhance the
provision of housing to every Filipino;
(c) To harness and promote private participation in housing ventures in terms of capital
expenditures, land expertise, financing and other facilities for the sustained growth of the
housing industry."
32
 "SEC 6. Powers and Functions of the Authority. The Authority shall have the following powers
and functions to be exercised by the Board in accordance with the established national human
settlements plan prepared by the Human Settlements Commission:
xxx           xxx           xxx
(d) Exercise the right of eminent domain or acquire by purchase privately owned lands for
purposes of housing development, resettlement and related services and facilities; x x x."
33
 See Sections 8, 9 and 12 of RA No. 7279.
34
 358 SCRA 38, May 21, 2001, per Mendoza, J., citing Fontanar v. Bonsubre, 145 SCRA 663,
November 25, 1986; and Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, 136 SCRA 669,
May 31, 1985.
35
 "SEC. 20. Procedure for taking appeal.- An appeal from the metropolitan trial courts, municipal
trial courts or municipal circuit trial courts to the regional ‘trial courts, and from the regional trial
courts to the Intermediate Appellate Court in actions or proceedings originally filed in the former
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or order
appealed from."
36
 "SEC. 23. Perfection of appeal.- In cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal
shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party."
37
 Supra.
38
 The payment of appellate fees within the 15-day reglementary period is mandatory for the
perfection of all appeal to the CA from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction under Section 8, Rule 42; an appeal from the CA to the Supreme Court is
governed by Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
39
 GR No. 140858, November 27, 2001.
40
 Id., pp. 6-7, per Panganiban, J.
41
 Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328, April 30, 1957.
42
 Ibid.
43
 272 SCRA 141, May 5, 1997.
44
 GR No. 138258, January 18, 2002.
45
 Id., p. 8; per Pardo, J.

Rule 41 - Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts

TITLE: Neypes v. Court of Appeals

CASE NO.: 141524
DATE: September 14, 2005

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA
AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and
Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank
of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and
Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various
motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the
respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the
motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N.
Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their
failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the
substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that
could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del
Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be
determined only after trial.1

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss
on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare
allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal
on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late.5 This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.6

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this
was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well
within the reglementary period for appeal.7

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day
period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was
the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further:

Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal
within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-
compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and
executory.8

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by
the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors
allegedly committed by the appellate court:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N.
ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE
PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS’
APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF
THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID
THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS "FINAL
ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE
[FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998
INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED
BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE
CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY
IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE
SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.9

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed
their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely
a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the
Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.10 The period to appeal is fixed by
both statute and procedural rules. BP 129,11 as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in
habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice
of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
(emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations
of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.12

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which
dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed
when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal ¾ the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the
July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13 the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of
dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days
of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed
― for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his
complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial
court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal
of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.14 where we
again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final order
which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the
decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners
did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the
trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.15 It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1)
day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners,
however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of
the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial
court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the
notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases,16 premised on the long-settled
doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional.17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts
must become final at some definite time fixed by law.18

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing
with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an
appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or
order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein
provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing
received notice of the denial of said motion.19 (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129,
however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the amendment was to shorten the
period of appeal21 and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required
strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of
notices of appeal,22 and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of

Libmanan,23 however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the
rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts
to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should
be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the
constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do
certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by
the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not
been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the
Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to
undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare
cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to
prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.25

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.26 It has the sole prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the
speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42,27 4328 and 45,29 the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or
more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 30

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15
days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence,
the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days
from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still
applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify
any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of
"final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order")
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after
the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well
within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.34

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC35 since the
Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

WECONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Acting Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
 Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 "Exh. B," Records, p. 37.
2
 "Exh. E," Records, p. 47.
3
 "Exh. G," Records, pp. 56-57.
4
 "Exh. H," Records, p. 58.
5
 "Exh. I," Records, pp. 61-62. The trial court received the notice of appeal dated July 27, 1998 on
July 31, 1998. According to the court, it was eight days late, counted from July 23, 1998, which
was the last day to file the notice since petitioners had one (1) day left to file it.
6
 "Exh. K," Records, pp. 67-69.
7
 Rollo, p. 41.
8
 Penned by Justice Roberto A. Barrios and concurred in by Justices Godardo O. Jacinto and
Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the 16th Division.
9
 Rollo, p. 12.
10
 M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Zenaida Villanueva, G.R. No. 136477, November 10, 2004.
11
 The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
12
 Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. (ITC) et al. v. Philippine Tourism Authority, et al., G.R. No. 135630,
26 September 2000, 341 SCRA 90.
13
 G.R. No. 145911, July 7, 2004.
14
 G.R. No. 129980, September 20, 2004.
15
 Supra.
16
 Bank of America v. Gerochi, G.R. No. 73210, 10 February 1994, 230 SCRA 9; Dayrit v. Philippine
Bank of Communications, 435 Phil. 120 (2002); Gallego v. Spouses Galang, G.R. No. 130228,
July 27, 2004.
17
 BPI Data Systems Corp. v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324
Phil. 267 (1996).
18
 Borre v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57204, 14 March 1988, 158 SCRA 561.
19
 Appeals from the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and the Social Security Commission to
the Court of Appeals.
20
 Created by virtue of Executive Order No. 611.
21
 MR. MILLORA: Mr. Speaker, although I am a Member of the committee I have been granted
permission to ask questions about some unresolved matters and I would like to begin with the
period of appeal.
Under Section 39, Mr. Speaker, the period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen days. This is very good because
it will shorten the period to appeal. Under our rules today, the period to appeal is 30 days. x x x
(February 2, 1981, Record of the Batasan, Volume IV, p. 2004.)
22
 Ramos v. Bagasao, No. L-51552, 28 February 1980, 96 SCRA 395; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-31303-04, 31 May 1978, 83 SCRA 453; Olacao v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 81390, 29 August 1989, 177 SCRA 38.
23
 No. L-27197, 28 April 1980, 97 SCRA 138.
24
 345 Phil. 678 (1997).
25
 Allied Banking Corp. and Pacita Uy v. Spouses Eserjose, G.R. No 161776, October 22, 2004.
26
 Article VIII, Section 5 (5), 1987 Constitution.
27
 Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals.
28
 Appeals from (the Court of Tax Appeals and) Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals.
RA 9282 elevated the Court of Tax Appeals to the level of a collegiate court with special
jurisdiction.
29
 Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
30
 Rule 22, Section 1. How to compute time ― In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act
or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date
of performance included x x x. (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
31
 Before the effectivity of RA 9282 (AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
OF TAX APPEALS [CTA], ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH
SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP) on March 30, 2004, decisions or
rulings of the CTA were appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. With the passage of the new law, Section 19 thereof provides that a party
adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Procedure.
32
 As far as Rule 65 (Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition) is concerned, Section 3
thereof, as amended by SC Adm. Memo. No. 00-2-03, states that no extension of time shall be
granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.
33
 Katindig v. People, 74 Phil. 45 (1942) as cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition
(1995).
34
 Rules of procedure may be applied retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 289 [2001] as cited in Agpalo,
Statutory Construction, 1995 Edition, p. 294)
35
 No. L-75000, 27 February 1987,148 SCRA 280.

TITLE: Trans International v. Court of Appeals

CASE NO.: 128421
DATE: January 26, 1998

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 128421 January 26, 1998

TRANS INTERNATIONAL, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS; NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION; PERLA A. SEGOVIA and GILBERTO
PASTORAL, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review by way of certiorari is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
which set aside the order of the trial court and directed the latter to give due course to the notice
of appeal of respondents. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied
on January 31, 1997.2

The facts which gave rise to the instant petition are as follows;

Petitioner Trans International filed a complaint for damages against respondent National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR for brevity) and two of its principal officers arising from the rescission of a
contract for the supply and delivery of woodpoles before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20960.

On May 22, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision sustaining the claim of petitioner
corporation. 3 It awarded to petitioner the following amounts: $1,325,703.65 representing the
amount of profit which it could have enjoyed had the contract been observed; $10,000.00 for
expenses incurred by petitioner's local agent in the preparation and execution of the contract;
P932,102.53 representing the combined premium paid by petitioner for the bidder's bond,
performance bond and surety bond; and P200,000.00 as attorney's fees.

A copy of the aforesaid decision was received by respondents on June 6, 1996. On June 19, 1996,
respondents filed their motion for reconsideration alleging in the main that certain facts were
overlooked, ignored or wrongly appreciated by the trial court.4 An opposition to said motion was
filed by petitioner on July 11, 1996. 5 On August 2, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the
motion for reconsideration.6 A copy of the aforesaid order was personally delivered to respondent
NAPOCOR'S office on August 23, 1996 (Friday) and was received by Ronald T. Lapuz, a clerk
assigned at the office of the VP-General Counsel.

Considering that it was almost 5:00 p.m., Lapuz placed the said order inside the drawer of his table.
However, on August 26 and 27, 1996 (Monday and Tuesday, respectively) said clerk was unable to
report for work due to an illness he suffered as a result of the extraction of his three front teeth.
Said order was retrieved from his drawer only in the afternoon of the 27th and was immediately
forwarded to the secretary of Atty. Wilfredo J. Collado, counsel for the respondents. At 3:10 p.m.
that same day, respondents thru counsel filed their notice of appeal. 7
On August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for execution before the trial court contending that its
decision dated May 22, 1996 had become final and executory since respondents failed to make a
timely appeal and praying for the issuance of an order granting the writ of execution. 8 On the other
hand, respondents filed an opposition thereto alleging therein that the cause of their failure to
make a timely appeal was due to unforeseeable oversight and accident on the part of their
employee who was unable to report for work because of illness.9 On September 9, 1996 petitioner
filed a reply to said opposition.10 On September 11, 1996 respondents' counsel filed a supplemental
opposition to the motion for execution attaching thereto the affidavit of Lapuz. 11 Finally, on
September 18, 1996, respondents filed their rejoinder to said reply. 12

On September 13, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying respondents notice of appeal and
granting the motion for execution filed by petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances having been considered, this Court is

constrained to DENY defendants' NOTICE OF APPEAL for having been filed out of
time.

Consequently, plaintiff's motion for execution of the Court's decision dated May 22,
1996 is hereby

GRANTED, let a Writ of Execution be issued the same to be enforced by deputy

sheriff Efren V. Cachero.

SO ORDERED. 13

On September 20, 1996, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
questioning the validity of the issuance of the aforesaid order on the ground that the denial of their
notice of appeal was on the basis of a mere technicality and that the writ of execution should not
have been issued since there are strong considerations which militate the strict application of the
rules on procedure. 14 Petitioner corporation filed its comment to the petition dated September 25,
1996 claiming that the event which happened in respondents' office does not amount to an honest
mistake nor an unavoidable accident that would legally excuse their neglect.15

On October 21, 1996, the respondent Court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED DUE COURSE. The assailed order dated
September 13, 1996 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent court is ordered to
give due course to petitioners' appeal.

SO ORDERED.

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner corporation was denied for lack of merit, hence,
a recourse to this court on a petition for review by way of a petition for certiorari.16

Petitioner avers that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess in jurisdiction when it gave due course to the petition of respondents considering their
admission that the notice of appeal was belatedly filed before the trial court. Since the ground
submitted by respondents for their late filing does not constitute excusable neglect then the
respondent court allegedly grievously erred in admitting the same. Furthermore, petitioner argues
that appeal is not a natural right and is merely a statutory privilege which must be exercised within
and in the manner provided by law. Failure to do so is fatal and the right of appeal would be lost.

Respondents, while admitting that the appeal was filed out of time, maintain that the rules on
appeal should not be construed in such a manner as to give way to its rigid application without
even considering the circumstances which led to the belated filing of the notice of appeal. In fact,
it is argued, this Court has on several occasions, recognized the need to relax the stringent rules
on appeal on reasons of equity and substantial justice.

We find for the respondent.

The general rule holds that the appellate jurisdiction of the courts is conferred by law, and roust be
exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions thereof and such jurisdiction is
acquired by the appellate court over the subject matter and parties by the perfection of the
appeal.17 The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules.
finding to do so, the right to appeal is lost. 18 In fact, it has been long recognized that strict
compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for
the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.19

Nonetheless, this court has on several occasions relaxed this strict requirement. In the case
of Toledo, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 20 we allowed the filing of an appeal where
a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. Thus, for a party to
seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its
appeal, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave
miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant the Court's suspension of the
rules. 21 Indeed, the court is confronted with the need to balance stringent application of technical
rules vis-a-vis strong policy considerations of substantial significance to relax said rules based on
equity and justice.

The case at bench squarely meets the requisites postulated by the aforequoted rule. If
respondents' right to appeal would be curtailed by the mere expediency of holding that they had
belatedly filed their notice of appeal, then this Court as the final arbiter of justice would be
deserting its avowed objective, that is to dispense justice based on the merits of the case and not
on a mere technicality. Needless to say, the peculiar circumstances attendant in this case strongly
demands a review of the decision of the trial court. As aptly observed by the respondent court, to
wit:

In this case, the one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal was due to an
unforeseen illness of the receiving clerk Ronald Lapuz in the office of the General
Counsel of petitioner NAPOCOR. As stated in the affidavit of said clerk, which was
presented to the trial court, he received a copy of the Order of respondent judge
dated August 2, 1996 at 4:54 p.m., Friday, August 23, 1996; since it was already
almost 5:00 p.m., he placed the said order inside the drawer of his table together
with some other documents, intending to deliver it to the handling lawyer, Atty.
Collado, who had given him instructions to deliver immediately to his secretary any
order on the case; he was unable to report for work the following Monday because
of severe pain in the front jaw as a result of the extraction of three front teeth, and
was absent for two days, August 26 and 27, when the Order was retrieved on
August 27th, the notice of appeal was promptly filed in the afternoon, at 3:10 p.m.,
of the same day.

The delay was properly explained and sufficiently justified; considerations of

 substantial justice and equity strongly argue against a rigid enforcement of the
technical rules of procedure, considering not only that the delay was only for one
day, and the petitioners have pleaded an unforeseeable oversight and illness on the
part of the receiving clerk, as an excuse. More important, the decision sought to be
appealed from awarded an enormous sum in the amount of P37,554,414.99, by way
of damages arising from the rescission of the contract with private respondents,
and legal and factual bases for the awards, and the 12% interest thereon, are being
questioned, on the ground among others, that the amount awarded for unrealized
profits ($1,325,703.68) was bigger than the amount prayed for in the complaint
($788,700.00) [See Motion for Reconsideration, Annex "C" of Petition], to insist that
the one-day delay in filing the appeal despite the plausible reason adduced therefor
is a "fatal mistake" due alone to the negligence of counsel is to insist on a rigid
application of the rules, which as repeatedly enunciated by the Supreme court,
should help secure, not override substantial justice. 22

Verily, the respondent court's pronouncement cannot be more emphatic in view of the instances
wherein we allowed the filing of an appeal in certain cases where a narrow and stringent
application of the rules would have denied it. Indeed, the allowance thereof would fully serve the
demands of substantial justice in the exercise of the Court's equity jurisdiction. Thus, in Castro
vs. Court of Appeals, 23 and reiterated in the case of Velasco vs. Gayapa, Jr. 24, the Court stressed
the importance and objective of appeal, to wit:

An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. We have advised the courts to
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal (National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority vs. Municipality of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138)
and instructed that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities (A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590).

The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The
rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice.
(Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120) Therefore, we ruled in Republic vs.
Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453) that a six-day delay in the perfection of appeal
does not warrant a dismissal. And again in Ramos vs. Bagasao, (96 SCRA 395), this
Court held that the delay of four (4) days in filing the notice of appeal and a motion
for extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused on the basis of
equity.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. 25

Time and again, we have consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to
override substantial justice. 26 In Segunda Santiago and Valerio Flores vs. Pablo Valenzuela and
Moises Pardo27, the court ruled that:

The court may extend the time or allow the perfection of the appeal beyond the
prescribed period if it be satisfactorily shown that there is justifiable reason, such
as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, or similar supervening
casualty, without fault of the appellant, which the court may deem sufficient reason
for relieving him from the consequences of his failure to comply strictly with the
law. In such case the appeal is deemed taken and perfected on time, and the
 appellate court acquires appellate jurisdiction.

In essence, the court is convinced that the test for substantial justice and equity considerations
have been adequately met by respondents to overcome the one day delay in the perfection of their
appeal. Considering the factual and legal milieu obtaining in the case at bench, the petition must
be denied.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by the Honorable Associate Justice Minerva Santiago-Reyes, Chairman, Eleventh

Division, Court of Appeals and concurred by Honorable Justices Ramon U. Mabutas, Jr., and
Santiago J. Valdez, Jr.
2 Order, pp. 40-42, Rollo.
3 Decision, pp. 43-71, ibid.
4 Annex "D", pp. 72-82, ibid.
5 Annex "E", pp. 83-86, ibid.
6 Order, pp. 87-88, ibid.
7 p. 126, Rollo.
8 pp. 89-90, ibid.
9 pp. 90-94, ibid.
10 pp. 100-103, ibid.
11 pp. 95-99, ibid.
12 pp. 104-107, ibid.
13 Order, pp. 108-110, ibid.
14 Petition, pp. 111-127, ibid.
15 Comment, pp. 126-132, ibid.
16 Petition, pp. 3-27, rollo.
17 Santiago and Flores vs. Valenzuela and Pardo, L-670, April 30, 1947, 78 Phil 397; University of
the Philippines vs. CSC, G.R. No. 108740 December 1, 1993, 228 SCRA 537.
18 Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99357, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 537.
19 Alvero vs. De la Rosa, etc., et al., 76 Phil. 428 (1946).
20 L-65211, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 579.
21 Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, L-11621, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 304; Workmen's Insurance Co., Inc.
vs. Augusto, et al., L-31060, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 123.
22 Decision of the Court of Appeals, supra.
23 No. L-47410, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 782.
24 No. L-58651, July 30, 1987, 152 SCRA 440.
25 Rodrigues vs. Court of Appeals, No. 37522, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 262.
26 A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-35560, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 590,
Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-43511, July 28, 1976, 72 SCRA 120.
27 supra.
TITLE: Ricardo Silverio, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
CASE NO.: 178933
DATE: September 16, 2009

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 178933               September 16, 2009

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the May 4, 2007
Resolution1 and July 6, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764, entitled
Nelia S. Silverio-Dee and Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (impleaded as necessary party) v. Reinato G. Quilala,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 57, Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Edmundo
S. Silverio, represented by Nestor Dela Merced II, and Sheriff Villamor R. Villegas.

The assailed resolution granted private respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order against public respondent Judge Quilala. On the other hand, the assailed decision
set aside the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007 and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007
while directing the respondent lower court to give due course to the appeal of herein private
respondent.

The Facts

The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio.
After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629 entitled In Re: Estate of
the Late Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al. pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC).

On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to
remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On November 22, 2004,
Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.
On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr.
as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.

On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.

On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person
to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz
Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court.3

Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order4 affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005
and denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also
authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as
administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate
the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order.

Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8, 2005.

On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 15, 20055 of the
Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005, which was
received by private respondent on December 22, 2005.

Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 20056 also recalled its previous order granting
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and
reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.

From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 31, 2006. In the same order, the RTC also
allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to partially
settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due thereon. Among the properties
authorized to be sold was the one located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.7

Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5,
20068 from the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal dated January 20,
20069 was filed on January 23, 2006.

Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution10 against the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground that the
Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3, Rule
41 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order11 denying the appeal on the ground that it was not
perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the
enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises of
the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of execution was later issued
on April 17, 200712 and a Notice to Vacate13 was issued on April 19, 2007 ordering private respondent
to leave the premises of the subject property within ten (10) days.

Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for TRO
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated May 2, 200714 with the CA.
On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period
provided by the Rules of Court applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated by this Court in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals15 as reiterated in Sumaway v. Union Bank.16

Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition of private
respondent. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE.
Accordingly, the Order, dated April 2, 2007, the writ of execution, dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice
to Vacate, dated April 19, 2007, are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Further, the court a quo is hereby
directed to give due course to the appeal of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

-A-

The Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 (Annex G of Annex C) and the Order dated December 12,
2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41;

-B-

The respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of or excess of jurisdiction, in deliberately failing to decide that the basis of the occupancy of Nelia S.
Silverio-Dee are fraudulent documents, without any authority from the Intestate Court;

-C-

The respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing precipitately the temporary restraining order (TRO) in its
Resolution dated May 4, 2007 (Annex A-1);

-D-

The respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Order dated April 2, 2007, the Writ of Execution dated
April 17, 2007, and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 because the respondent Silverio-Dee’s
occupancy of the Intestate property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City (Annex N
of Annex C) will prevent the sale authorized by the Order dated October 31, 2006 to secure funds for
the payment of taxes due which are now high and rapidly increasing payment of which must not be
enjoined.17

The Court’s Ruling

This petition is meritorious.

The May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC Is an Interlocutory Order, Not Subject to an Appeal
To recapitulate, the relevant facts to the instant issue are as follows:

On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the
premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy
of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was
denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent on
December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed
her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006. 1avvphi1

Thus, in denying due course to the Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its Order dated April 2, 2007,
ruled:

Verily, the appeal taken by the movant Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court dated
December 12, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration is misplaced as no appeal may be taken
from the order denying the motion for reconsideration (see Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in relation to Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court). Furthermore, assuming
that what said movant had appealed is the final Order dated May 31, 2005, still, the appeal cannot be
given due course as the Record on Appeal had been filed beyond the thirty-day period to appeal (see
Section 3 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)

WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Nelia Silverio is hereby DENIED due course.

Let a writ of execution issue to enforce the Order dated May 31, 2005 against Nelia Silverio-Dee
requiring her to vacate the premises at No. 3 Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, the denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s
appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec.
1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s Record on Appeal was filed
beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.

Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 41
APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

xxxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated
December 12, 2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31,
2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that
private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and should have filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead.

The CA, however, ruled that the filing of the Notice of Appeal in this case was proper saying that the
appeal pertained to the earlier Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005. The CA, citing Apuyan v.
Haldeman,18 argued that an order denying a motion for reconsideration may be appealed as such
order is the "final order" which disposes of the case. In that case, we stated:

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., We held, thus:

… [T]his Court finds that the proscription against appealing from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration refers to an interlocutory order, and not to a final order or judgment. That that was
the intention of the above-quoted rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR, 39 SCRA 455 (1971),
cited in above-quoted portion of the decision in Republic, in which this Court held that an order
denying a motion to dismiss an action is interlocutory, hence, not appealable.

The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order is to
prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to
assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal.
The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order and assign such
interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.

The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an
interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or
settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than
to execute the order.

Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.

The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12, 1999 Order denying his Omnibus
Motion—Motion for Reconsideration should thus be deemed to refer to the January 17, 1999 Order
which declared him non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.

If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration is applied to any
order, then there would have been no need to specifically mention in both above-quoted sections of
the Rules "final orders or judgments" as subject to appeal. In other words, from the entire provisions
of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that what is proscribed is to appeal from a denial of a
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the question posed is whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an interlocutory order.

On this aspect, the CA ruled that the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 was a final order, to wit:

We note that the Order, dated December 12, 2005, is an offshoot of the Omnibus Order, dated May
31, 2005. In the Omnibus Order, the court a quo ruled that the petitioner, as an heir of the late Beatriz
S. Silverio, had no right to use and occupy the property in question despite authority given to her by
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. when it said, thus:
x x x In the first place, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee cannot occupy the property in Intsia, Forbes Park,
admittedly belonging to the conjugal estate and subject to their proceedings without authority of the
Court. Based on the pretenses of Nelia Silverio-Dee in her memorandum, it is clear that she would
use and maintain the premises in the concept of a distributee. Under her perception, Section 1 Rule
90 of the Revised Rules of Court is violated. x x x

xxxx

For the property at Intsia, Forbes Park cannot be occupied or appropriated by, nor distributed to
Nelia S. Silverio-Dee, since no distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
mentioned in the aforestated Rule is made. In fact, the said property may still be sold to pay the
taxes and/or other obligations owned by the estate, which will be difficult to do if she is allowed to
stay in the property.

Moreover, the alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the
property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null
and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an
Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). In fact,
the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as
well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). With this in mind, it is
without an iota of doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has
absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of
administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator to
possess and manage the property for the purpose of settling the estate’s legitimate obligations.

In the belated Memorandum of Nelia Silverio-Dee, she enclosed a statement of the expenses she
incurred pertaining to the house renovation covering the period from May 26, 2004 to February 28,
2005 in the total amount of Php12,434,749.55, which supports this Court’s conclusion that she is
already the final distributee of the property. Repairs of such magnitude require notice, hearing of the
parties and approval of the Court under the Rules. Without following this process, the acts of Nelia
Silverio-Dee are absolutely without legal sanction.

To our mind, the court a quo’s ruling clearly constitutes a final determination of the rights of the
petitioner as the appealing party. As such, the Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2002 (the predecessor
of the Order dated December 12, 2002) is a final order; hence, the same may be appealed, for the
said matter is clearly declared by the rules as appealable and the proscription does not
apply.19 (Emphasis supplied.)

An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order, was defined in Tan v. Republic:20

A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case
completely but leaves something to be decided upon. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal
of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory
order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory
order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that
certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.21
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground
that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park,
Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of
distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind
that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate,
such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, we
succinctly ruled:

Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts
of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the
whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective
share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants,
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.

Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has
not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over
such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.22 (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part of an
estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule
84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to the
heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of
the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other
expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court.

Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included
therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may take
possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court.

In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from
Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real
interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the
May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an
appeal.1avvphi1

Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed.23

The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary
period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case.
This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order
of the RTC.
Therefore, there is no longer any need to consider the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the May 4, 2007 Resolution and July 6, 2007 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
98764 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thus, the Decision dated April 2, 2007 of the RTC denying due
course to the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee; the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007; and the Notice
to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 are hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*

Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Additional member as per August 3, 2009 raffle.

1
 Rollo, pp. 59-67. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag and concurred in by Associate
Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
2
 Id. at 69-84. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
3
 Id. at 121-125.
4
 Id. at 133-157.
5
 Id. at 158-163.
6
 Id. at 166-171.
7
 Id. at 35.
8
 Id. at 172-174.
9
 Id. at 175-262.
10
 Id. at 263-266.
11
 Id. at 114-115.
12
 Id. at 116-117.
13
 Id. at 118.
14
 Id. at 85-276.
15
 G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.
16
 G.R. No. 142534, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 99.
17
 Rollo, p. 38.
18
 G.R. No. 129980, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 402, 418-419.
19
 Rollo, pp. 77-80.
20
 G.R. No. 170740, May 25, 2007, 523 SCRA 203, 210-211.
21
 1 F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 540 (8th revised ed.).
22
 G.R. No. 114151, September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 536, 548-549.
23
 Rules of Court, Rule 50, Sec. 2.

TITLE: Sps. Lebin v. Vilma S. Mirasol

CASE NO.: 164255
DATE: September 7, 2011

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 164255               September 7, 2011

SPOUSES ELBE LEBIN and ERLINDA LEBIN, Petitioners,

vs.
VILMA S. MIRASOL, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO, BRANCH XXVII, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is mandatory and
jurisdictional.

The Case

In Special Proceedings No. 1307 involving the settlement of the estate of the late L.J. Hodges, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, in Iloilo City, issued an order dated May 3, 1995 (ruling that a
property of the estate sold to the petitioners be divided in two equal portions between the petitioners
and the respondent).1 On March 2, 1998, the RTC affirmed the order dated May 3, 1995.2 The
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and, later on, a record on appeal, but the respondents moved to
dismiss their appeal on June 15, 2000 on the ground of tardiness of the record on appeal. The RTC
granted the motion to dismiss on February 1, 2002. On March 13, 2002, the petitioners moved for
reconsideration of the dismissal,3 but the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on May 21,
2004.4 Thus, on June 23, 2004, the petitioners directly appealed to the Court, assailing the orders of
February 1, 2002 and May 21, 2004.

Antecedents

In January 1985, the petitioners relayed their offer to the administrator of the Estate of L.J. Hodges
to purchase for ₱22,560.00 Lot 18, Block 7 of 971 (Lot 18), an asset of the Estate situated on D.B.
Ledesma Interior, Jaro, Iloilo City. They made a deposit of ₱4,512.00, the equivalent of 20% of the
offer.5 On August 1, 1985, the administrator sought judicial approval of the offer,6 stating to the RTC
that petitioner Erlinda Lebin was the actual occupant of Lot 18.7 The RTC commissioned one Atty.
Tabares to conduct an ocular inspection of Lot 18 to ascertain if Erlinda Lebin was really the
occupant. In his report, Atty. Tabares confirmed that Erlinda Lebin was the only occupant of Lot
18.8 Accordingly, on August 28, 1985, the RTC granted the administrator’s motion for approval of the
offer.9

In the meanwhile, respondent Vilma S. Mirasol (Mirasol) also offered to purchase the lot containing
an area of 188 square meters where her house stood. The lot was initially identified as Lot No. 4,
Block 7 of 971 (Lot 4), but a later survey revealed that her house was actually standing on Lot 18, not
Lot 4.10 Learning on November 11, 1985 of the approval of the petitioners’ offer to purchase Lot 18,
therefore, Mirasol filed on December 6, 1985 a petition for relief from the order dated August 28,
1985.11

On December 17, 1987, pending resolution of the petition for relief, the petitioners paid the last
installment for Lot 18, and moved for the execution of the deed of sale.12 Apparently, the motion was
not acted upon by the RTC.

At last, on May 3, 1995, the RTC resolved the petition for relief, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Court, under the auspices of equity and justice tempered with humanitarian
reasons, hereby declare each of the offeror-claimants after complying with their respective
obligation with the estate, should there be any, to be the owner where their respective houses stand,
and therefore, DIRECTS and ENJOINS for the following matters to be undertaken:

For the Administrator of the L.J. Hodges Estate:

1) To assist both offeror-claimants in effecting a Relocation Survey Plan and cause the equal
partition of the subject lot herein between the said offeror-claimant;
 2) To execute the corresponding deed of sale over the aforecited subject lot in favor of the
herein offeror-claimants --- Erlinda Lebin and Vilma S. Mirasol purposely to expedite the
issuance of respective title; and ---

3) To exact payment from either or both offeror-claimants should there be any deficiency,
and/or to refund payment should there be any excess payment from either or both offeror-
claimants.

SO ORDERED.13

On May 23, 1995, the petitioners moved for reconsideration and/or new trial.14 On March 2, 1998, the
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the petitioners.15 Thus, on March 27,
1998, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal in the RTC.16 Allegedly, on May 5, 1998, they also filed a
record on appeal.17 On January 25, 1999, they presented an ex parte motion to approve the record on
appeal.18 On June 15, 2000, Mirasol filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, insisting that the record on
appeal had been filed late.19 The RTC granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on February 1,
2002.20 The petitioners moved for reconsideration on March 13, 2002,21 but the RTC denied their
motion for reconsideration on May 21, 2004.22

Hence, the petitioners appealed via petition for review on certiorari filed on June 23, 2004, to seek
the review and reversal of the orders of the RTC dated February 1, 2002 and May 21, 2004.

Issues

1. Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal for their failure to timely
file a record on appeal; and

2. Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error in adjudging that Lot 18 be sold to both
the petitioners and Mirasol in equal portions.

Ruling

The petition for review lacks merit.

RTC did not err in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal

for their failure to timely file a record on appeal

Among the innovations introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 12923 is the elimination of the record on
appeal in most cases, retaining the record on appeal only for appeals in special proceedings and in
other cases in which the Rules of Court allows multiple appeals. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 has incorporated this innovation, to wit:

Section 39. Appeals. - The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided however, That in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from.

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be
transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the
contents thereof.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. (emphasis supplied)

In early 1990, the Supreme Court issued its resolution in Murillo v. Consul24 to clarify and fortify a
judicial policy against misdirected or erroneous appeals, stating:

At present then, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua, there is no way by which judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to
the Supreme Court except by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended. The proposition is clearly
stated in the Interim Rules: "Appeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari
which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

On the other hand, it is not possible to take an appeal by certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Appeals
to that Court from the Regional Trial Courts are perfected in two (2) ways, both of which are entirely
distinct from an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. They are:

a) by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error - where judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; and

b) by petition for review - where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.

The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, and as already stated, shall point out the error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is taken by
merely filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment, except in special
proceedings or cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which event the period of appeal is 30
days and a record on appeal is necessary.

There is therefore no longer any common method of appeal in civil cases to the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals. The present procedures for appealing to either court – and, it may be added,
the process of ventilation of the appeal – are distinct from each other. To repeat, appeals to this
court cannot now be made by petition for review or by notice of appeals (and, in certain instances, by
record on appeal), but only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As was stressed by this
Court as early as 1980, in Buenbrazo v. Marave, 101 SCRA 848, all "the members of the bench and
bar" are charged with knowledge, not only that "since the enactment of Republic Act No. 8031 in
1969," the review of the decision of the Court of First Instance in a case exclusively cognizable by
the inferior court xxx cannot be made in an ordinary appeal or by record on appeal," but also that
appeal by record on appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court was abolished
by Republic Act No. 5440 which, as already stated, took effect on September 9, 1968. Similarly, in
Santos, Jr., v. C.A., 152 SCRA 378, this Court declared that "Republic Act No. 5440 had long
superseded Rule 41 and Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court on direct appeals from the court of
first instance to the Supreme Court in civil and criminal cases, x x and that "direct appeals to this
Court from the trial court on questions of law had to be through the filing of a petition for review on
certiorari, wherein this Court could either give due course to the proposed appeal or deny it outright
to prevent the clogging of its docket with unmeritorious and dilatory appeals."

In fine, if an appeal is essayed to either court by the wrong procedure, the only course of action open
is to dismiss the appeal. In other words, if an appeal is attempted from a judgment of a Regional
Trial Court by notice of appeal, that appeal can and should never go to this Court, regardless of any
statement in the notice that the court of choice is the Supreme Court; and more than once has this
Court admonished a Trial Judge and/or his Clerk of Court, as well as the attorney taking the appeal,
for causing the records to be sent up to this Court in such a case. Again, if an appeal by notice of
appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and in the latter Court, the
appellant raises naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
And finally, it may be stressed once more, it is only through petitions for review on certiorari that the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may properly be invoked.

There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to the
other, much less for tolerating continued ignorance of the law on appeals. It thus behooves every
attorney seeking review and reversal of a judgment or order promulgated against his client, to
determine clearly the errors he believes may be ascribed to the judgment or order, whether of fact or
of law; then to ascertain which court properly has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to observe
scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with keen awareness that any error or
imprecision in compliance therewith may well be fatal to his client's cause.25 (emphasis supplied)

An offshoot of Murillo v. Consul is the inclusion in the 1997 revision of the rules of civil procedure,
effective July 1, 1997, of a provision that forthrightly delineated the modes of appealing an adverse
judgment or final order. The provision is Section 2 of Rule 41, viz:

Section 2. Modes of appeal.—

(a) Ordinary appeal.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules
so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari.— In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45. (n) (emphasis supplied)

The changes and clarifications recognize that appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right,
but merely statutory, and the implication of its statutory character is that the party who intends to
appeal must always comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals, or else the right of
appeal may be lost or squandered.

As the foregoing rules further indicate, a judgment or final order in special proceedings is appealed
by record on appeal. A judgment or final order determining and terminating a particular part is
usually appealable, because it completely disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding, unless
otherwise declared by the Rules of Court.26 The ostensible reason for requiring a record on appeal
instead of only a notice of appeal is the multi-part nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each
part susceptible of being finally determined and terminated independently of the other parts. An
appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the elevation of the original records to the
appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial court in its further proceedings regarding the other
parts of the case. In contrast, the record on appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of
the case because the original records remain with the trial court even as it affords to the appellate
court the full opportunity to review and decide the appealed matter.

Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court underscores the multi-part nature of special proceedings by
enumerating the particular judgments and final orders already subject of appeal by any interested
party despite other parts of the proceedings being still untried or unresolved, to wit:

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person,
or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the
rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of
a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of
the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.

The petitioners’ appeal comes under item (e) of Section 1, supra, due to the final order of May 3,
1995 issued in the settlement of the estate of L.J. Hodges being "a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing." In order to elevate a part of the records sufficient for
appellate review without the RTC being deprived of the original records, the remedy was to file a
record on appeal to be approved by the RTC.

The elimination of the record on appeal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 made feasible the
shortening of the period of appeal from the original 30 days to only 15 days from notice of the
judgment or final order. Section 3,27 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, retains the original 30 days as the
period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal to take into consideration the need for the trial
court to approve the record on appeal. Within that 30-day period a party aggrieved by a judgment or
final order issued in special proceedings should perfect an appeal by filing both a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of appeal and a record on
appeal upon the adverse party within the period;28 in addition, the appealing party shall pay within the
period for taking an appeal to the clerk of the court that rendered the appealed judgment or final
order the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.29 A violation of these
requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by record on appeal,30 or the non-payment of the
full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of the trial court31 may be
a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.
Did the petitioners comply with the requirements for perfecting their appeal?

The petitioners received the assailed May 3, 1995 order of the RTC on May 15, 1995. They filed a
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on May 24, 1995. On March 23, 1998, they were served
with the order dated March 2, 1998 (denying their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial).
Although they filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 1998, they submitted the record on appeal only
on May 5, 1998. Undoubtedly, they filed the record on appeal 43 days from March 23, 1998, the date
they received the denial of their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. They should have filed
the record on appeal within 30 days from their notice of the judgment. Their appeal was not
perfected, therefore, because their filing of the record on appeal happened beyond the end of their
period for the perfection of their appeal.

The petitioners’ filing of the motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the order of May 3, 1995 interrupted
the running of the period of 30 days; hence, their period to appeal started to run from May 15, 1995,
the date they received the order of May 3, 1995. They filed their motion for reconsideration on May
24, 1995. By then, nine days out of their 30-day period to appeal already elapsed. They received a
copy of the order dated March 2, 1998 on March 23, 1998. Thus, the period to appeal resumed from
March 23, 1998 and ended 21 days later, or on April 13, 1998. Yet, they filed their record on appeal
only on May 5, 1998, or 22 days beyond the end of their reglementary period. Although, by that time,
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure had meanwhile taken effect (July 1, 1997), their period of appeal
remained 30 days. It is stressed that under the 1997 revisions, the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration interrupted the running of the period of appeal, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, viz:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
(emphasis supplied)

Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court empowers the RTC as the trial court, motu proprio or on
motion, to dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.32 For that reason, the RTC rightly granted
Mirasol’s motion to dismiss the record on appeal.

Nonetheless, the petitioners propose to be excused from the requirement of filing a record on
appeal, arguing that "(t)o require a (r)ecord on (a)ppeal here is to reproduce the more than eighteen
(18) volumes of records here which is quite impossible to do" and that "most of these records, (sic)
have nothing to do with the present controversy."33 Also, they state that their counsel was "of the
honest belief and impression" that "the same was not really necessary because the nature of the
controversy xxx is civil and not an intestate one."34

The petitioners’ submissions are frail and facetious.

In order to come up with the record on appeal, the petitioners were not expected to reproduce over
18 volumes of the records, for their record on appeal would have included only the records of the
trial court which the appellate court would be asked to pass upon.35 Section 6, Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which meanwhile became applicable to them, specified what the record on
appeal should contain, thusly:
Section 6. Record on appeal; form and contents thereof. - The full names of all the parties to the
proceedings shall be stated in the caption of the record on appeal and it shall include the judgment
or final order from which the appeal is taken and, in chronological order, copies of only such
pleadings, petitions, motions and all interlocutory orders as are related to the appealed judgment or
final order for the proper understanding of the issue involved, together with such data as will show
that the appeal was perfected on time. If an issue of fact is to be raised on appeal, the record on
appeal shall include by reference all the evidence, testimonial and documentary, taken upon the
issue involved. The reference shall specify the documentary evidence by the exhibit numbers or
letters by which it was identified when admitted or offered at the hearing, and the testimonial
evidence by the names of the corresponding witnesses. If the whole testimonial and documentary
evidence in the case is to be included, a statement to that effect will be sufficient without
mentioning the names of the witnesses or the numbers or letters of exhibits. Every record on appeal
exceeding twenty (20) pages must contain a subject index. (6a)

The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, and should be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by law.36 The statutory nature of the right to appeal requires the one who avails himself of
it to strictly comply with the statutes or rules that are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. In the absence of highly
exceptional circumstances warranting their relaxation, like when the loftier demands of substantial
justice and equity require the relaxation,37 or when there are other special and meritorious
circumstances and issues,38 such statutes or rules should remain inviolable.39

In like manner, the perfection of an appeal within the period laid down by law is mandatory and
jurisdictional, because the failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules of
Court causes the judgment or final order to become final as to preclude the appellate court from
acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment or final order.40 The failure of the petitioners and
their counsel to file their record on appeal on time rendered the orders of the RTC final and
unappealable. Thereby, the appellate court lost the jurisdiction to review the challenged orders, and
the petitioners were precluded from assailing the orders.

II

RTC committed no reversible error in allocating

Lot 18 in equal portions to both petitioners and respondent

The non-perfection of the appeal by the petitioners notwithstanding, the Court declares that the RTC
did not err in allocating the parcel of land equally to the parties if only to serve and enforce a
standing policy in the settlement of the large estate of the late L.J. Hodges to prefer actual
occupants in the disposition of estate assets. The policy was entirely within the power of the RTC to
adopt and enforce as the probate court.

As stated in the administrator’s motion for approval of the offer, the approval of the offer to
purchase would be conditioned upon whether the petitioners were the only actual occupants. The
condition was designed to avoid the dislocation of actual occupants, and was the reason why the
RTC dispatched Atty. Tabares to determine who actually occupied the property before approving the
motion. It turned out that the report of Atty. Tabares about the petitioners being the only occupants
was mistaken, because the house of Mirasol, who had meanwhile also offered to purchase the
portion where her house stood, happened to be within the same lot subject of the petitioners’ offer
to purchase. The confusion arose from the misdescription of Mirasol’s portion as Lot 4, instead of
Lot 18.41
1âwphi1
Under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may authorize the sale, mortgage, or encumbrance of
assets of the estate.  The approval of the sale in question, and the modification of the disposition of
1avvphi1

property of the Estate of L.J. Hodges were made pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 89, to wit:

Section 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons; Disposal of
proceeds. - When it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate will be
beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon
application of the executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees
who are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole
or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of administration;
but such authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such
sale, the proceeds shall be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions.
[emphasis supplied]

Without doubt, the disposal of estate property required judicial approval before it could be
executed.42 Implicit in the requirement for judicial approval was that the probate court could rescind
or nullify the disposition of a property under administration that was effected without its
authority.43 This power included the authority to nullify or modify its approval of the sale of the
property of the estate to conform to the law or to the standing policies set and fixed for the purpose,
where the invalidation or modification derived from the falsity of the factual basis of the disposition,
or from any other factual mistake, or from the concealment of a material fact by a party.
Consequently, the probate court’s modification of its approval of the petitioners’ offer to purchase
was well within the power of the RTC to nullify or modify after it was found to be contrary to the
condition for the approval. Thereby, the RTC’s ruling, being sound and judicious, constituted neither
abuse of discretion nor excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review, and AFFIRM the final orders dated May 3, 1995 and
March 2, 1998.

The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 12-13.
2
 Id., p. 17.
3
 Id., pp. 26-27.
4
 Id., pp. 28-29.
5
 Id., pp. 39.
6
 Id., pp. 30-31.
7
 Id., p. 31.
8
 Id., pp. 32-33
9
 Id., p. 32.
10
 Id., p. 36.
11
 Id., pp. 32-35.
12
 Id., pp. 37-38.
13
 Id., pp. 12-13.
14
 Id., pp. 14-16.
15
 Id., p. 17.
16
 Id., p. 18.
17
 Id., p. 20.
18
 Id., p. 19.
19
 Id., pp. 20-22.
20
 Id., pp. 24-25.
21
 Id., pp. 26-27.
22
 Id., pp. 28-29.
23
 Entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for other
Purposes.
24
 Undk. No. 9748, February 27, 1990; 183 SCRA xi, which became the basis for the guidelines
set forth in Circular No. 2-90 issued by the Supreme Court on March 9, 1990.
25
 Id., pp. xv-xviii.
26
 According to Section 1, first paragraph, Rule 41, Rules of Court: "An appeal may be taken from
a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable."
27
 Section 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order.
28
 Section 2(a) and Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court.
29
 Section 4, Rule 41, Rules of Court.
30
 Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 1(a), Rule 50, Rules of Court.
31
 Section 1(a) and (c), Rule 50, Rules of Court.
32
 Section 13. Dismissal of appeal. – Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record
on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the
appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period.
33
 Id., p. 8.
34
 Id.
35
 Bersamin, Appeal and Review in the Philippines, Central Professional Books, Inc., 2nd Edition,
p. 136; citing 3 Am Jur 215.
36
 Borlongan v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 167234, September 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 405, 411-412;
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106956, January 27,
1994, 229 SCRA 560.
37
 Remulla v. Manlongat, G.R. No. 148189, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 226, 233; Yutingco v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137264, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 85, 91; Tan Tiac Chiong v. Cosico,
A.M. No. CA-02-33, July 21, 2002, 385 SCRA 509, 515; Olacao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81390, August
29, 1989, 177 SCRA 38, 49.
38
 Equitable PCI Bank v. Ku, G.R. No. 142950, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 309, 316; De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103276, April 11, 1996, 256 SCRA 171, 177; Orata v.Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73471, May 8, 1990, 185 SCRA 148, 152.
39
 Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121013, July 16, 1998 292 SCRA 587, 593-595.
40
 Ko v. Philippine National Bank, G. R. Nos. 169131-132, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 298; Air
France Philippines v. Leachon, G.R. No. 134113, October 12, 2005, 472 SCRA 439; Remulla v.
Manlongat, G.R. No. 148189, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 226, 233; Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127275, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 442, 448; Yao
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132426, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 202; Dayrit v. Philippine Bank
of Communications, G.R. No. 140316, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 117, 125; Bishop of
Tuguegarao v. Director of Lands, 34 Phil 623 (1916); Estate of Cordoba and Zarate v. Alabado,
34 Phil. 920 (1916); Bermudez v. Director of Lands, 36 Phil. 774 (1917).
41
 Id., p. 36.
42
 Acebedo v Abesamis, G.R. No. 102380, January 18, 1993, 217 SCRA 186, 193.
43
 Dillena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77660, July 28, 1988, 163 SCRA 630, 637.

TITLE: Tiong Bi, Inc. v. Philippine Health Insurance

Corporation
CASE NO.: G.R. No. 229106
DATE: February 20, 2019
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

February 20, 2019

G.R. No. 229106

TIONG BI, INC. [Owner of Bacolod Our Lady of Mercy Specialty Hospital], Petitioner
vs.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Resolutions dated August 10, 20162 and January 12, 20173 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 144704, denying Tiong Bi, Inc.'s (petitioner) Extremely Urgent Motion for Immediate Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order.

The instant petition is rooted from charges of "Padding of Claims" and "Misrepresentation by
Furnishing False and Incorrect Information" against petitioner before respondent Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth). These charges, in turn, stemmed from similar charges against
two PhilHealth-accredited eye surgeons, who used petitioner's facilities and the services of its staff
to attend to the needs of said physicians.4

Briefly, the charges of fraudulent benefit claims include padding of prescriptions and recommending
of medicines and supplies such as oxygen and intravenous fluids not needed by the patients nor
actually provided by the hospital or the doctors.5

In a Decision dated August 1, 2008, PhilHealth's Arbitration Department dismissed the charges
against the two doctors for lack of merit. This Decision was affirmed by the PhilHealth Board.6

On the other hand, in PhilHealth Board Resolution No. 2040, S. 2016 dated February 24, 2016,
PhilHealth affirmed with modification the July 30, 2010 Decision of Arbiter Darwin G. De Leon,
finding petitioner guilty, for the second time, of a fraudulent offense. In accordance with the Revised
Internal Rules of the PhilHealth Board on Appealed Administrative Cases, the reduced penalty of six
months and one day suspension of accreditation and a fine of P10,000.00 for each count of Padding
of Claims for a total of PI 70,000.00 were imposed upon petitioner. It was further ordered that the
restitution for any payment made by PhilHealth for the claim/s subject of the case be made by
petitioner or be charged and deducted from the proceeds of any pending or future claims of
petitioner with PhilHealth. Lastly, petitioner was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.7

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the said PhilHealth Resolution before the CA through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner likewise filed therein an Extremely Urgent
Motion for Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Petitioner basically argues
that the PhilHealth Resolution was erroneous for allegedly being based on a wrong case, which was
said to be heard by a different arbiter. Also, petitioner insists that the charges against the two
doctors were dismissed for lack of merit, the charges against it which were grounded upon the
same set of facts should likewise be dismissed.8

As for the motion for issuance of TRO, petitioner cited the general concepts of public interest, public
health, and safety to support its claim of irreparable injury and urgency. Specifically, petitioner
averred that it is one of the biggest health providers in Negros and the threatened closure of its
hospital by virtue of the subject PhilHealth Resolution would impede the health measures it can
provide to contain certain epidemic in the country. According to petitioner, the flawed PhilHealth
Resolution put in grave peril the safety, life and health of the patients confined in its hospital.9

In its August 10, 2016 Resolution,10 the CA denied petitioner's motion for issuance of TRO, finding no
actual existing right to be protected on the part of the petitioner nor the possibility of irreparable
injury.

In its January 12, 2017 Resolution,11 the CA likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the August 10, 2016 Resolution.

Notably, the main case remains to be pending with the CA for resolution.

Petitioner now comes before this Court through the instant petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the pretext that it is grounded on pure questions of law. Specifically,
petitioner contends that the CA erred in refusing to issue an injunctive writ, endangering, thus, public
safety and exposing the public to the hazard and risk of a health crisis. Reiterating its argument in its
pending appeals before the CA, petitioner argues that the threatened closure of its hospital would
put the safety, life, and health of its confined patients to grave peril. Further, petitioner avers that
closing a major health service provider such as petitioner's hospital, in a region with few hospitals,
would create a crisis.

Petitioner also assails in the instant petition the subject PhilHealth Resolution, pointing out that it
was based on a wrong case; that it has no factual and legal bases; and that it was based merely on
surmises, guesswork, and assumptions, among others.

We resolve.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the petitioner resorted to an improper remedy before this
Court. Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the same Rules expressly provides that no appeal may be taken from
an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final judgment or order, is one that
does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. Petitioner
resorted to a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to question the
denial of its motion for issuance of an injunctive relief. An order granting or denying an application
for a TRO or a preliminary injunction is interlocutory in nature and, thus, unappealable. The proper
remedy is to file a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition under Rule 65 of the same Rules.12

Furthermore, a close reading of the arguments raised by the petitioner would readily show that they
are factual in nature. While petitioner is ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in
denying its motion for TRO, it basically seeks to enjoin the implementation of the PhilHealth
Resolution questioned before the CA for allegedly being unfounded and erroneous. Undoubtedly,
such endeavor would require an examination of evidence. Petitioner is questioning before this Court
the exact same PhilHealth Resolution being questioned before the CA at present and on the same
grounds raised therein. It is basic that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court may
raise only questions of law. This Court is not a trier of facts and we are not duty-bound to re-examine
evidence especially when the court a quo had not yet even ruled on the merits of the main case.13 To
rule otherwise would effectively preempt the proceedings before the CA.

The present petition may, thus, be dismissed outright for being an improper remedy.14

At any rate, even if we treat this case as a petition under Rule 65, it shall still fail for lack of merit.

The grant or denial of a TRO or an injunctive writ rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves
findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Verily, the exercise of judicial
discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of
discretion.15

The only issue, therefore, that confronts us is limited to the matter of whether the CA's denial of
petitioner's motion for issuance of TRO was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

In the issuance or denial of an injunctive writ, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.16

In this case, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in denying the
issuance of a TRO. 1âшphi1

To be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioner must show that (1) there exists a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be
enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.17

As correctly ruled by the CA, essential for the grant of the injunctive relief is the existence of an
urgent necessity to prevent serious damage. A TRO is issued only if the matter is of such extreme
urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately.
Parenthetically, the burden is on the petitioner to show in the application that there is meritorious
ground for the issuance of the TRO in its favor.18 In this case, we are one with the CA in finding that
the petitioner failed to discharge such burden.

To support its claim of urgency and irreparable injury, petitioner sweepingly concluded that-the
penalty imposed by the subject PhilHealth Resolution would prejudice not only its current patients
but also the public in general as they will be deprived of one of the few health providers in the region
if the penalty will be implemented.

This argument deserves scant consideration.

As stated, petitioner is not the only health service provider in the region. Hence, the suspension of its
PhilHealth accreditation and the imposition of fine against it will not, in any way, hamper the delivery
of health care services to the public, contrary to what the petitioner would want to impress to this
Court. More importantly, it should be stressed that the subject PhilHealth Resolution merely imposes
a fine and the suspension of the hospital's PhilHealth accreditation not the closure of the hospital.
Hence, neither will petitioner's health care services be forestalled by the implementation of the
penalty sought to be restrained. If at all, it is merely the members' benefits which may temporarily be
hampered when the penalty is implemented. Such damage, if any, is easily quantifiable and, as such,
cannot be considered as "grave and irreparable injury" as contemplated under the law. The Court
in Heirs of Melencio Yu v. Court of Appeals,19 citing Social Security Commission v. Bayona20 explained
the concept of irreparable damage or injury as follows:

Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where
there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. "An
irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and
continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by
conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement." x x x

Here, the only possible injury which may be perceived is easily subject to mathematical computation.

In sum, this Court finds no reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the
CA in denying the motion for the issuance of the TRO. What is more, the prevailing rule is that the
courts should avoid resorting to interlocutory injunctive reliefs that would in effect preempt the
resolution of the main case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated August 10,
2016 and January 12, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144704 are AFFIRMED. The
Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resolve CA-G.R. SP No. 144704 with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Hernando,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*
Additional Member per S.O. No. 2630 dated December 18, 2018.

1
 Rollo, pp. 11-78.
2
 Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, with Associate Justices Franchito N.
Diamante and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring; id. at 102-104.
3
 Id. at 123-124.
4
 Id. at 16.
5
 Id. at 23.
6
 Id. at 19-20.
7
 Id. at 26-30.
8
 Id. at 30-31.
9
 Id.
10
 Supra note 2.
11
 Supra note 3.
12
 Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas, 684 Phil. 283,
291 (2012).
13
 See Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corp., 799 Phil. 47,
58-59 (2016).
14
 Ortega v. Social Security Commission, 578 Phil. 338, 346 (2008).
15
 Barbieto v. Court of Appeals, 619 Phil. 819, 835 (2009).
16
 AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc., G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017.
17
 Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas, supra note 12, at
292.
18
 Brizuela v. Dingle, 576 Phil. 611, 622 (2008).
19
 717 Phil. 284, 301 (2013).
20
 115 Phil. 106, 110-111 (1962).

TITLE: Spouses Fernandez v. Smart Communications,

Inc.
CASE NO.: G.R. No. 212885
DATE: July 17, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

July 17, 2019

G.R. No. 212885

SPOUSES NOLASCO FERNANDEZ and MARICRIS FERNANDEZ, Petitioners

vs.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Respondent

DECISION

REYES, A. JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the December
2, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113832. The challenged ruling
reversed the November 11, 2009 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 62,
which dismissed the complaint against petitioners Nolasco Fernandez (Nolasco) and Maricris
Fernandez (Maricris) as co-defendants in Civil Case No. 09-199.

Everything Online, Inc. (EOL) is a corporation that offers internet services nationwide through
franchisees. 3 Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART), on the other hand, is a mobile phone service
provider.4 Petitioners Nolasco and Maricris were the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Member of
the Board of Directors of EOL, respectively. 5

As alleged in the Amended Complaint,6 EOL sought SMART sometime in 2006 to provide the mobile
communication requirements for its expansion. Series of meetings ensued between the parties
where it was determined that EOL would be needing approximately 2,000 post-paid lines with
corresponding cell phone units. Nineteen (19) of these lines shall be under the corporate account of
EOL while the rest of the lines and phones shall be distributed to EOL's franchisees. 7 In view of this,
EOL's corporate president Salustiano G. Samaco III (Samaco III), signed on separate occasions, two
(2) Corporate Service Applications (SAF) for the 2,000 postpaid lines with corresponding cell phone
units. He also signed Letters of Undertaking8 to cover for the 1,119 phone lines issued by SMART to
EOL thus far. Paragraph 8 of these Letters of Undertaking read:

8. The President and each one of the directors and officers of the corporation shall be held solidarily
liable in their personal capacity with the SUBSCRIBER for all charges for the use of the SMART
Celfones (sic) units acquired by the said SUBSCRIBER.9

In September 2006, EOL demanded the release of the remaining phone lines to cover its initial order
of 2,000 units. SMART informed EOL that before it approved further phone line applications, the
parties should restate and clarify the agreements between them, to which EOL agreed. 10 In a letter
dated September 13, 2006 (Letter Agreement), SMART specified the terms of the agreement over
the 1,119 phone lines it already issued in favor of EOL. 11 In addition to the Letter Agreement, EOL
executed an Undertaking 12 (EOL Undertaking) where it affirmed its availment of 1,119 SMART cell
phones and services. EOL also agreed to assume full responsibility for the charges incurred on the
use of all these units. The pertinent portion of the EOL Undertaking signed by Samaco III and
petitioner Nolasco provides:

xxxx

3. Everything Online, Inc. agrees that it shall be fully responsible for the settlement of whatever
charges to be incurred under the above mobile numbers and shall fully comply with the terms and
conditions pertaining to the Smart Corporate Service Application Form and other related
Subscription Contracts. Likewise, Everything Online, Inc. shall bind itself to be continuously
responsible regardless of assignment and movements of its designated users until such time that
the units are validly transferred, after the expiration of the lock-in period, after twenty four (24)
months for nineteen (19) lines at Plan 1200 and after thirty six (36) months for one thousand one
hundred (1,100) lines at Plan 500, respectively.

xxxx

9. The President and each one of the directors and officers of Everything Online, Inc. shall be held
solidarity liable in their personal capacity with the franchisee or assignee for all charges for the
use of the SMART cellphone units acquired by Everything Online, Inc. 13 (Emphases supplied)

SMART averred that after the execution of the EOL Undertaking, its credit and collection department
sent, by email, phone bills to EOL that had been previously returned to SMART. These bills were for
the collection of the monthly payment due on the lines that were supposedly given to EOL's
franchisees. However, EOL allegedly refused to receive the bills, stating that it was not liable for the
payment of bills of phone lines assigned to franchisees. 14

On October 13, 2006, SMART notified EOL that its collectibles already amounted to at least
₱18,000,000.00 representing the costs of cell phone units and the plans usage. EOL officers were
also reminded that under the EOL Undertaking and the Letter A6rreements, it is bound to pay the
bills of the franchisees, whether the phones were in the possession of the franchisees or not. 15

On July 27, 2007, a meeting was purportedly held between the parties where EOL proposed to
update the payments for 304 accounts of its franchisees and it would update and amend the
monthly plan for the other 765 accounts. EOL then issued Banco De Oro Check No. 1003473 dated
August 3, 2007 for ₱394,064.62 in favor of SMART as partial payment and as a sign of good faith.
However, the BDO check was dishonored upon presentment clue to insufficiency of funds. 16

On November 8, 2007, SMART sent EOL a notice of final demand for the payment of the outstanding
amount of ₱17,506,740.55. Despite receipt of the demand letter, EOL failed to pay the amount due.
On January 2, 2008, another demand letter for ₱20,662,073.45 17 was sent by SMART to EOL. No
payment was made by EOL. SMART claimed that the total due from EOL already amounted to
₱39,770,810.87 as of October 31, 2008. 18

SMART failed to collect from EOL despite repeated demands. Thus, on April 1, 2009, an Amended
Complaint 19 with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment was filed by SMART before the
RTC of Makati, Branch 62 for Collection of Sum of Money docketed as Civil Case No. 09- 199 against
EOL and all its directors and officers including petitioners Nolasco and Maricris.

On April 20, 2009, the trial court gave due course to the application for the issuance of a writ of
attachment and ordered the posting of an attachment bond in the amount of ₱39,770,810.87.20

On June 15, 2009, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss With a Very

Urgent Motion to Lift and Discharge Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued against
them.21 Petitioners averred that they are not the real party in interest in the case.22 Maricris claimed
that the only allegation holding the directors and officers personally and solidarily liable with EOL
was the alleged provisions in the Letter Agreements23 and EOL Undertaking.24 The Letter Agreements
and EOL Undertaking failed to show that she expressly agreed to be bound by the provisions
contained therein. Accordingly, the complaint against her must be dismissed. 25

With respect to Nolasco, petitioners argued that while his signature appears in the EOL Undertaking,
it is not a sufficient ground to implead him in the complaint together with EOL. It was SMART that
drafted the EOL Undertaking and Nolasco's participation is limited to the affixing of his signature
thereon after EOL's President has already signed it. Nolasco signed in good faith and without the
opportunity to read the contents of the same. Be that as it may, Nolasco is not the real party in
interest in this case because he was no longer an Officer/Director of EOL at the time the complaint
was filed as their entire share was already assigned to one of EOL's directors. 26

The RTC Ruling

On November 11, 2009, the RTC issued an Order27 granting the motions to dismiss. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the defendant individuals' separate Motion to Dismiss being impressed with
merit, the Court GRANTS the same. The Complaint against the named individuals is hereby
ordered DISMISSED. Defendant Everything Online, Inc., is ordered to file its responsive pleading
within the non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice hereof. Consequently, the writs of
attachment as well as collateral papers issued in pursuance to the writ in so far as they involve
properties belonging to the named defendant individuals are hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED. 28 (Emphasis in the original)

EOL29 and SMART30 filed separate motions for partial reconsideration but these were denied by the
trial court in its February 22, 2010 Order. 31
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the R
TC, SMART elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. 32

Ruling of the CA

On December 2, 2013, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision33 partly grating the respondent's
petition for certiorari. The appellate court found grave abuse on the part of the trial court in
dismissing the complaint against individual defendants. The CA ruled that there was overwhelming
evidence indicating that Samaco III and Spouses Fernandez expressly bound themselves to be
solidarily liable with EOL to SMART. The CA decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the
assailed Orders are hereby MODIFIED to REINSTATE the complaint against private individual
respondents Salustiano Samaco III and spouses Nolasco and Maricris Fernandez being corporate
officers of private respondent Everything Online Inc.

SO ORDERED. 34 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but, their Motion was denied by the CA in its
Resolution35 dated June 4, 2014, leading the petitioners to file the instant recourse anchored on the
following grounds:

-A-

THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 SHOULD NOT BE THE PROPER REMEDY AGAINST
A FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH
62.

-B-

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH 62 DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AGAINST PETITIONERS.36

The petition essentially presents the following issues for the Court's resolution: (l) whether or not an
order of dismissal of the complaint should be assailed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and
(2) whether or not there was a ground to dismiss complaint for a collection of sum of money against
petitioners as corporate officer and director.

Ruling of the Court

Before going into the substance of the petition, the Court shall first resolve the procedural question
the petitioners raised.
1awp++i1

Petitioners' argument that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a wrong remedy and should
have been dismissed by the CA fails to persuade.

Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari may be filed when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. An act of
a court or tribunal is considered committed with grave abuse of discretion if it is whimsical, arbitrary,
or capricious amounting to "an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."37

An order of dismissal of the complaint is a final order that is subject to appeal. 38 Section 1, Rule 41
of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. - Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.

The same provision also provides that no appeal may be taken from the following:

(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;

(b) An interlocutory order;

(c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;

(e) An order of execution;

(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the
court allows an appeal therefrom; or

(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice. (Emphasis supplied)

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. 39

Here, the RTC Order40 granting the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners is a final order because it
terminates the proceedings against them. However, the final order falls within exception (f) of the
Rule since the case involves several defendants, and the complaint for sum of money against EOL is
still pending. There being no appeal, "or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law, the remedy
of a special civil action for certiorari is proper as there is a need to promptly relieve the aggrieved
party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal."41

Having settled procedural matters, for resolution is the substantive issue of whether or not there
was a ground to dismiss complaint for a collection of sum of money against petitioners as
corporate officer and director.

The Court finds the petition partly meritorious.

Petitioners asseverated in their motion to dismiss that the complaint fails to state a cause of action
because it was brought against defendants who are not the real parties in interest.
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 42 Thus, "[a]ny decision rendered against a person who is
not a real party in interest in the case cannot be executed."43 Consequently, a "complaint filed against
such a person should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action."44

As provided in Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, et al.:45

A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the
complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. (Emphasis supplied)

A judicious examination of the Amended Complaint46 shows that petitioners were impleaded in the
instant action based on the provisions of the Letter Agreement47 and EOL Undertaking,48 which
purportedly bound them to be solidarily liable with the corporation in its obligation with SMART. In
effect, the Amended Complaint seeks to pierce the veil of corporate fiction against Nolasco and
Maricris in their capacities as corporate officer and director of EOL.

It is basic in corporation law that a corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may
be connected. 49 Inferred from a corporation's separate personality is that "consent by a corporation
through its representatives is not consent of the representative, personally."50 The corporate
obligations, incurred through official acts of its representatives, are its own. Corollarily, a stockholder,
director, or representative does not become a party to a contract just because a corporation
executed a contract through that stockholder, director, or representative. 51

As a general rule, a corporation's representatives are not bound by the terms of the contract
executed by the corporation. "They are not personally liable for obligations and liabilities incurred on
or in behalf of the corporation. "52

There are instances, however, when the distinction between personalities of directors, officers, and
representatives, and of the corporation, are disregarded. This is piercing the veil of corporate
fiction. 53 The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is a legal precept that allows a
corporation's separate personality to be disregarded under certain circumstances, so that a
corporation and its stockholders or members, or a corporation and another related corporation could
be treated as a single entity. It is meant to apply only in situations where the separate corporate
personality of a corporation is being abused or being used for wrongful purposes. 54

The piercing of the corporate veil must be done with caution. 55 To justify the piercing of the veil of
corporate fiction, "it must be shown by clear and convincing proof that the separate: and distinct
personality of the corporation was purposefully employed to evade a legitimate and binding
commitment and perpetuate a fraud or like wrongdoings."56

A corporate director, trustee, or officer is to be held solidarily liable with the corporation in the
following instances:

1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation: (a) vote for or
assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation; (b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in
directing the corporate affairs; (c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation,
its stockholders or members, and other persons;

2. When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having
knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto;

3) When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself
personally and solidarily liable with the Corporation; or

4) When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally liable for his
corporate action. 57

These instances have not been shown in the case of petitioner Maricris. While the Amended
Complaint alleged that EOL fraudulently refused to pay the amount due, nothing in the said pleading
or its annexes would show the basis of Maricris' alleged fraudulent act that warrants piercing the
corporate veil. No explanation or narration of facts was presented pointing to the circumstances
constituting fraud which must be stated with particularity, thus rendering the allegation of fraud
simply an unfounded conclusion of law. Without specific averments, "the complaint presents no
basis upon which the court should act, or for the defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer and
must, perforce, be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action."58

In the determination of sufficiency of a cause of action for purposes of resolving a motion to

dismiss, the court must decide, "hypothetically admitting the factual allegations in a complaint,
whether it can grant the prayer in the complaint."59

The Court pronounced in Guillermo, et al. v. Philippine Information Agency, et al.,60 that:

It is well to point out that the plaintiffs cause of action should not merely be "stated" but, importantly,
the statement thereof should be "sufficient." This is why the elementary test in a motion to dismiss
on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief
demanded. As a corollary, it has been held that only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or
evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of applying the test. This is consistent with Section 1,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that the complaint need only allege the ultimate facts or
the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if they cannot be
stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. Since the inquiry is into
the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations, it follows that the analysis should be
confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.61

By merely stating a legal conclusion, the Amended Complaint presented no sufficient allegation
against petitioner Maricris upon which the Court could grant the relief prayed for. The trial court
correctly dismissed the complaint against Maricris on the ground of failure to state cause of action.

This is not the case with petitioner Nolasco. Nolasco, as CEO, signed the EOL Undertaking
purportedly binding himself to be "held solidarily liable in his personal capacity with the franchisee or
assignee for all charges for the use of SMART cell phone units acquired by Everything Online, Inc."
Such allegation proffers hypothetically admitted ultimate facts, which would warrant an action for a
collection for sum of money based on the provision of the EOL Undertaking.62

Again, in filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, a defendant
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.63 Since allegations of evidentiary
facts and conclusions of law are normally omitted in pleadings, "the hypothetical admission extends
only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint, as well as inferences fairly
deductible therefrom."64

The following is clearly stipulated in Item 9 of the EOL Undertaking signed by Nolasco, viz.:

9. The President and each one of the directors and officers of Everything Online, Inc. shall be held
solidarity liable in their personal capacity with the franchisee or assignee for all charges for the
use of the SMART cellphone units acquired by Everything Online, Inc.65

Verily, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint against petitioner Nolasco. The allegations in
the complaint, regarding the possible personal liability of petitioner Nolasco based on Item 9 of EOL
Undertaking,66 sufficiently stated a cause of action. The question of whether petitioner Nolasco is a
real party-in-interest who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, would be better threshed
out in a full-blown trial. Indeed, in cases that call for the piercing of the corporate veil, "parties who
are normally treated as distinct individuals should be made to participate in the proceedings in order
to determine if such distinction should be disregarded and, if so, to determine the extent of their
liabilities."67

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The December 2, 2013
Decision of Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113832 is hereby MODIFIED to the extent that the
complaint against petitioner Maricris Fernandez is dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen (Acting Chairperson), Gesmundo, Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*
 Designated additional Member, per raffle dated January 3. 2019.
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (retired), with Associate Justices Fernanda
Lampas Peralta and Francisco P. Acosta (retired) concurring: rollo. pp. 24-46.
2
 Id. at 90-94.
3
 Id. at 52.
4
 Id. at 53
5
 Id. at 52.
6
 Id. at 50-72.
7
 Id. at 53.
8
 Signed on June 22. 2006 and August 9. 2006. respectively; id. at 242-243.
9
 Id.
10
 Id. at 57.
11
 Id.
12
 Id. at 231-241.
13
 Id. at 239.
14
 Id. at 61.
15
 Id. at 62.
16
 Id. at 64.
17
 Id.
18
 Id. at 65.
19
 Id. at 50-72.
20
 Id. at 334.
21
 Id. at 78-89.
22
 Id. at 79-80.
23
 Id. at 242-243.
24
 Id. at 231-241.
25
 Id. at 79-82.
26
 Id. at 82-84.
27
 Id. at 90-94.
28
 Id. at 94.
29
 Id. at 111-113. See Order dated February 22, 2010.
30
 Id. at 95-105.
31
 Id. at 111-113.
32
 Id. at 114-139.
33
 Id. at 24-46.
34
 Id. at 45.
35
 Id. at 48-49.
36
 Id. at 12.
37
 Feliciano S. Pasok, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Rex Y. Dua, G.R. No. 218413,
June 6. 2018, citing Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, 707 Phil. 172, 186 (2013).
38
 Editha S. Medina, Raymond A. Dalandan, and Clemente A. Dalandan, as their Attorney-in-Fact v.
Sps. Nicomedes and Brigida Lozada, G.R. No. 185303. August 1, 2018.
39
 Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
40
 Rollo, pp. 90-94.
41
 Id. at 95.
42
 Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
43
 Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 193138, August 20. 2018,
citing Aguila, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 257 (1999)
44
 Aniceto G Saludo, Jr. v. Philippine National Bank, supra.
45
 745 Phil. 172. 180 (2014).
46
 Rollo, pp. 50-72.
47
 Id. at 242-243.
48
 Id. at 231-241.
49
 Zaragoza v. Tan, G.R. No. 225544, December 4, 2017, 847 SCRA 437,449.
50
 Lanuza, Jr., et al. v. BF Corporation, et al., 744Phil. 612,635 (2014).
51
 Id.
52
 Id.
53
 University of Mindanao, Inc v. Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas, et al., 776 Phil. 401, 439 (2016).
54
 Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Montenejo, G.R. No. 184819, November 29, 2017, 847
SCRA 1, 26-27.
55
 California Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Advanced Technology System, Inc., 809 Phil. 425,
432 (2017).
56
 Kukan International Corporation v. Hon. Amor Reyes, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, and Romero M. Morales, doing business under the
name and style "RM Morales Trophies and Plaques," 646 Phil. 216. 237 (2010).
57
 Heirs of Fe Tan Uy v. International Exchange Bank, 703 Phil. 477, 485-486(2013).
58
 Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank Phils.) v. Funai Phils. Corp., et al., 763 Phil. 245.
261 (2015).
59
 Guillermo, et al. v. Philippine Information Agency, et al., 807 Phil. 555, 557 (2017).
60
 Guillermo, et al. v. Philippine Information Agency, et al., supra.
61
 Id. at 566-567, citing Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, et al., 745 Phil. 171, 180 (2014).
62
 Rollo. pp. 50-72.
63
 Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Fredeluces, et al., 785 Phil. 411. 437 (2016).
64
 Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank Phils.) v. Funai Phils, Corp., et al., supra note 58,
at 261.
65
 Rollo. p. 239. Emphasis supplied.
66
 Id. at 50-72.
67
 Lanuza, Jr., et al. v. BF Corporation, et al., supra note 50, at 641.

TITLE: Yap, et al. v. Heirs of Pantalan, et al.

CASE NO.: G.R. No. 199783
DATE: April 10, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

April 10, 2019

G.R. No. 199783

FRANCISCO B. YAP, substituted by his heirs namely: FRANCISCO M. YAP, JR. (now represented by
CAROL URSUA YAP, FRANCISCO YAP III, CHRISTINE YAP and CARL YAP), MANUEL M. YAP,
CARLOS M. YAP, ENERLITA M. YAP-SARENAS, FERDINAND TE YAP, RACHEL ANN TE YAP, ROMEO
TE YAP, JR., AND AURELIA TE-YAP, Petitioners
vs.
HEIRS OF PANTALAN (MORO), namely: NASERON PANTALAN (MORO) deceased, represented by
his widow, ROHAINE LUMA-AN PANTALAN and their children, RABIOLE PANTALAN, ALIMUDIN
PANTALAN, MIRAMULIN PANTALAN-COMPANIA, and SAHAR PANTALAN, QUELIMA* PANTALAN-
BANGAL, VIRGINIA LICUANAN-SUSON, VIRGILIO LICUANAN, VICTOR LICUANAN deceased,
represented by his wife, CAROLINA R. LICUANAN and the OFFICE OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS,
MATI, DAVAO ORIENTAL, Respondents

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Resolutions dated May 9, 20112 and November 24, 20113 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan De Oro
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03990-MIN.
This case is rooted from claims over a parcel of land originally owned by Pantalan (Moro). In June
1990, said parcel of land was adjudged with finality to be owned by respondents Virginia Licuanan-
Suson, Virgilio P. Licuanan, and Victor P. Licuanan (collectively, the Licuanans) in a case for
Reconveyance, Nullity of Title, Damages, Attorney's Fees, Etc., docketed as Civil Case No. 1555 filed
by the Licuanans against the Heirs of Pantalan (Moro).4

Yap, however, also claims ownership thereof, having allegedly acquired the same by sale from
respondent Heirs of Pantalan (Moro), through a "private deed of sale" prepared and notarized by Atty.
Teodoro D. Nano, Jr. (Atty. Nano).5 Hence, in June 2008, Yap filed this Complaint for Specific
Performance, Reconveyance, Nullity of Titles, Damages, Attorney's Fees, Receivership, with
Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order,6 which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 232- 08 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lupon, Davao Oriental, Branch 32,
against the Heirs of Pantalan (Moro), the Licuanans, and Atty. Nano.

The Licuanans filed motions for extension of time7 to file a responsive pleading. On August 27, 2008,
however, the Licuanans filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the Complaint.

In the said Motion, the Licuanans argued that the Complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
forum shopping, alleging that Yap failed to disclose in his Verification and Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping that he had previously filed a Complaint-In-Intervention in Civil Case No. 1555,
which was denied for being filed out of time.9

The Motion to Dismiss also pointed out that Yap failed to disclose that he had previously filed an
action for Quieting of Titles, Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining
Order and Appointment of Receivership, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 104 before the RTC
of Lupon, Davao Oriental, Branch 32, back in April 2001. The said case involved the same parties and
issues, which was dismissed on the ground of bar by prior judgment or res judicata. Such dismissal
was affirmed by the CA in its Resolution dated December 18, 2006, as well as by this Court in a
Resolution 10 dated January 23, 2008. Hence, the Licuanans argued that the Complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of res judicata as well.11

Lastly, the Licuanans argued that Yap was guilty of laches as he never took the necessary steps to
enforce his claimed right over the subject property until after the Licuanans enforced theirs. Yap
never took physical possession of the subject property nor did he demand delivery of the same from
the Heirs of Pantalan (Moro). Neither did he seek to register the alleged sale nor did he file an
adverse claim therefor.12

The Heirs of Pantalan (Moro) and Atty. Nano, on the other hand, did not file any responsive
pleading.13 Thus, Yap filed a Motion to Declare Defendants [Heirs of Pantalan (Moro)] and [Atty. Nano]
In Default.14

In an Order15 dated June 25, 2010, the RTC granted the Licuanan's Motion to Dismiss, thus:

WHEREFORE, the above-entitled complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.16

Yap's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the RTC's Order17 dated November 24, 2010,
the dispositive thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, [Yap's] Motion For Reconsideration is denied.

SO ORDERED.18

Aggrieved, Yap sought refuge from the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari19 under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court dated January 20, 2011, questioning the RTC's grant of the Motion to Dismiss.

The CA, however, dismissed the said petition in its assailed May 9, 2011 Resolution on the ground
that a petition for certiorari was not proper considering that the questioned RTC Orders were final
orders issued in the exercise of the RTC's original jurisdiction. Hence, the CA ruled that the proper
remedy was an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The CA found that Yap filed the
petition merely because he lost his right to appeal. The CA disposed as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.20

In its November 24, 2011 assailed Resolution,21 the CA denied Yap's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition.

In the main, Yap seeks this Court's liberality to make an exception to the rule that certiorari may not
be used as a substitute for a lost appeal. Insisting that he has a meritorious case, Yap argues that a
strict application of the procedural rules would result to a miscarriage of justice. Yap also puts the
blame to his counsel for resorting to a wrong remedy and argues that he should not be bound by his
counsel's negligence or mistake.

We deny the Petition.

We do not find error on the part of the CA in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being a wrong
remedy, nor do we find cogent reason to exercise leniency in applying the procedural rules in this
case.

The assailed RTC Orders before the CA were clearly final orders issued by the RTC in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction, which may be reviewed by an ordinary appeal. Sections 1 and 2(a), Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court provide:

SEC. 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

xxxx

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. x x x

Section 3, Rule 41 of the same Rules, provides that such appeal should be taken within 15 days from
the notice of the final order appealed from.  In this case, no such appeal was filed within the
1âшphi1
reglementary period. Instead, Yap, through counsel, filed a petition for certiorari, which was filed
outside the 15-day period for the filing of an appeal.

Nothing is more settled than the rule that certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an
appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. 22 While it is true
that we have applied a liberal application of the rules of procedure in a number of cases, we have
always stressed that this can be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.23 "To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-
compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition
would defeat the administration of substantial justice."24 It should be emphasized that in this case,
Yap did not proffer any reasonable cause to justify its failure to avail of the proper remedy before the
CA except for his defensive argument of laying the blame to his counsel's mistake or negligence and
his invocation of this Court's exercise of liberality in order to accord him his day in court. Indeed, Yap
has not been forthright about his procedural blunder. Time and again, we have ruled that utter
disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.25

At any rate, the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is not a
mere technicality, but is jurisdictional in that, non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal
and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. 26 Considering, therefore, that Yap
failed to file a timely appeal from the RTC Orders, and consequently, resorted to a wrong mode of
appeal before the CA, said RTC Orders already became final and executory.

Neither can Yap simply put the blame on his counsel for having lost his remedy under the rules. It is
an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence, or mistakes of the counsel bind the client. A departure
from this ruling would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault
or negligence to support the client's case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by operation
of law.27 This Court has laid down the only exception to the said rule and that is, where the lawyer's
gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law.
We do not find such exception to be applicable herein.

There was no deprivation of due process in this case, contrary to Yap's contention. It must be
remembered that, as found by the RTC, Yap had previously filed Civil Case No. 104, a case for
Quieting of Titles, Damages, and Appointment of Receivership, among others, against the same
respondents in this case and involving the same subject property. This case was heard by the trial
court and even reached this Court. Thus, Yap could not validly argue that he was not accorded the
opportunity to be heard. Unfortunately for Yap, however, said case was also dismissed by the trial
court on the ground of res judicata, which dismissal was affirmed with finality by the CA and
eventually, by this Court in its Resolution dated January 23, 2008, in G.R. No. 180015. Curiously,
unlike with Civil Case No. 1555, Yap never alleged any objection to the RTC's findings that Civil Case
No. 104 has already settled the issues raised by Yap in the present Complaint. In fact, this Court
cannot ignore Yap's evasiveness in failing to disclose the existence of Civil Case No. 104 in his
certificate against forum shopping in Civil Case No. 232-08, and in discussing the circumstances
thereof in the case at bar. Hence, this Court is constrained to uphold the RTC's ruling on the matter.

We also note that this is not the first time that Yap blamed his counsel for his procedural blunders.
Yap also put the blame on his counsel for the dismissal of his complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case
No. 1555.28

For these reasons, we find no cogent reason to subscribe to Yap's plea for this Court to exercise
liberality in applying the above-cited well-settled principles in his case. To recapitulate, Yap availed of
the remedy of a complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 1555 but lost it for failing to file it on time.
This failure was blamed on his counsel. Undaunted, Yap proceeded to file a separate case (Civil
Case No. 104) to assert his right over the subject property, which was dismissed with finality by this
Court. A few months after the finality of Civil Case No. 104, Yap filed this Complaint (Civil Case No.
232-08) for the same cause. This was also dismissed by the RTC and Yap failed to avail of the
proper mode of review to the CA to question said dismissal. For this failure, Yap made no
explanation but merely resorted to laying the blame on his counsel's mistake or negligence again.

This Court cannot allow a party to abuse the remedies made available by the law. "Litigation must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final the issue or the cause involved therein should be laid
to rest. This doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental consideration of public
policy and sound practice."29 It is in the best interest of justice that this court write finis to this
litigation.30

There is, thus, no necessity to belabor on the other issues raised in this Petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated May
9, 2011 and November 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03990-MIN are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Caguioa, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., on leave.

Footnotes

*
 Also referred to as "Quelina" in some parts of the rollo.
1
 Rollo, pp. 23-67.
2
 Penned by Associate Justice Melchor Q.C. Sadang, with Associate Justices Edgardo A.
Camello and Edgardo T. Lloren, concurring; id. at 159- 162.
3
 Id. at 219-222.
4
 Id. at 85-86.
5
 Id. at 41-44.
6
 Id. at 81-91.
7
 Id. at 92, 94, 96-98.
8
 Id. at 100-121.
9
 Id. at 101-104.
10
 G.R. No. 180015.
11
 Id. at 104-112.
12
 Id. at 112-116.
13
 Id. at 35.
14
 Id. at 122-124.
15
 Id. at 125-129.
16
 Id. at 129.
17
 Id. at 130-132.
18
 Id. at 132.
19
 Id. at 134-158.
20
 Id. at 162.
21
 Id. at 219-222.
22
 Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, 716 Phil. 500, 513 (2013).
23
 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 789 Phil. 577, 583 (2016).
24
 Building Care Corp./Leopard Security & Investigation Agency v. Macaraeg, 700 Phil. 749, 755
(2012).
25
 Id. at 756.
26
 Id. at 757.
27
 Id. at 756.
28
 Rollo, p. 60.
29
 Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 764 Phil. 53, 66 (2015).
30
 De Leon v. Public Estates Authority. 640 Phil. 594,612 (2010)

Rule 42 – Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals

TITLE: Ross Rica Sales Center Inc. vs Ong

CASE NO.: 132197
DATE: August 16, 2005

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 132197 August 16, 2005

ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG, Respondent.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

In a Decision1 dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of Appeals overturned the
decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City,
ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This
petition for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court of Appeals’ Decision.

The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint,
petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise acknowledged
respondent Elizabeth Ong’s ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26 January 1995, Atty.
Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing them of
its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter.
But respondents refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so
petitioners alleged.

Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the lands
from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title
consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint filed
on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty.2 Per record,
this case is still pending resolution.

Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the decision ordering
respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof to
petitioners.

On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the MTC’s decision in its
entirety.

On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the following day, they filed a
motion for reconsideration.

On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due course to respondents’
notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997,3 and
granted petitioners’ motion for immediate execution pending appeal.

In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as a Petition for
Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no
contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful
detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.

Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has already become final
and executory at the time the petition for review was filed; (ii) whether the allegations in the
complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC; and, (iii) whether
petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of the subject premises.

We resolve the first argument to be without merit.

The following sequence of events is undisputed:

(1) On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision affirming the judgment of the MTC.

(2) On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned decision.

(3) On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.

(4) On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision.

(5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration.

(6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned 23 June 1997 Order.

(7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an additional period
of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for Review.

(8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review.

Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period for appeal.
They theorize that the period started running on 28 April 1995, the date of receipt of the RTC
decision, and ended on 13 May 1997. According to them, this reglementary period could not have
been interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion for Reconsideration because of the filing
one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong
mode of appeal, expressly manifested their intention to file a petition for review to either the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court.4

Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of Appeal which was given
due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent stand such as filing a Motion for
Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which started running
from the date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May 1997.

Respondents, in their Comment,5 submit that the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997 was
improper, and as such did not produce any legal effect. Therefore, the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration immediately on the following day cured this defect. The RTC refused to subscribe
respondents’ position. It justified the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the
respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The Order dated 23 June 1997 stated:

On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8, 1997.

Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration.

Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby approves, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.

The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is GRANTED.6 (Emphasis in
the original.)

Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it took cognizance
of respondents’ position and reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily mean that the RTC was
correct when it declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of
Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter mode was?

Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and
other lawful fees, depositing the amount of ₱500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial
Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen
(15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should
have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal
of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee’s brief. Applying this rule
contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal
of the defective Notice of Appeal.

Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again
from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time
to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional
period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.

Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz7 that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot
be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the
two cases are different.

De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and
an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal.

In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal
from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if
no appeal was interposed.

Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether the Complaint satisfies
the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC.

The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and disposed of the
same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the
lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the
parties as would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals.

The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations:

....

3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the Register of
Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City and Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer Certificate of Titles are
hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively and made an integral part hereof;

4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots;

5. That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her husband and
co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the house constructed on said lots;

6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a letter
informing them or their intent to use said lots and demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30
days from receipt of said letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made an
integral part thereof;

7. That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots,
thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use
of their lots;

8. That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, plaintiffs have
suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in the amount of ₱10,000.00 a month

. . . .8

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.9

Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners’ possession was originally
lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express
or implied contract.

The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify
the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter.

In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals,10 it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was
unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is
equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law.11

Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of
defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or
implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.12 In Rosanna B. Barba v.
Court of Appeals,13 we held that a simple allegation

that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.

Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:

. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus,
unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of
their lots;14
is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.

In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots covered
by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the
former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to
respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving
petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an
unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.

Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v.
Panis.15 But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 7016 of the Rules of Court. The case
doesid not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co
Tiamco v. Diaz17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus:

. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are
summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly
as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided.18

Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case involving the
annulment of deed of sale and title over said property. Petitioners know better than to question this
in an ejectment proceeding, which brings us to the nature of the action in this case.

Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being an accion
reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that petitioners were constantly claiming ownership
over the lands in the guise of filing an action for ejectment. In their Comment,19 respondents maintain
that they occupy the subject lots as the legal owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are seeking
recovery of possession under a claim of ownership which is tantamount to recovery of possession
based on alleged title to the lands, and therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the RTC, so
respondents conclude.

This contention is not tenable.

The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs
from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de
jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an
action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is
generally unessential.20

Neither the allegation in petitioners’ complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by
respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the
province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means
of claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the
fact of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of respondents’ present
ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements for a case of unlawful
detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only
sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim
ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the
ejectment case.

Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion
would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not
therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction.21 This Court in Ganadin

v. Ramos22 stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter
if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for declaration of nullity of
deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will
not abate the ejectment case.

In Drilon v. Gaurana,23 this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the
same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its
jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while
there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for
annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the
same.24

In Oronce v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously filed a
separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or
equitable mortgage in the same

Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded
by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the
issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a
necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only
issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is,
possession de facto and not possession de jure.

The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez26 when it ruled:

We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over the lot in
dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, although the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment
case is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action
is brought seasonably before the proper forum.

The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack.

In Apostol v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court had the occasion to clarify this:

. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that
purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be
assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the
right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an
action for unlawful detainer.28

With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss the third
assignment of error which is related to the second issue.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 January 1998
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24
April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

Rollo, pp. 24-32; Penned by Acting Presiding Justice Fidel P. Purisima, (later named Associate
1 

Justice of the Supreme Court), concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo P. Galvez and B.A.
Adefuin-De la Cruz.
2 
Docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2356 for Declaration of Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificates
of Titles as Null and Void ab initio and Quieting of Title, Damages and Attorney’s Fees.
3 
A motion for execution pending appeal was also granted in the same Order. Rollo, p. 13.
4 
Id. at 12.
5 
Id. at 61-84.
6 
Id. at 12-13.
7 
312 Phil. 158 (1995).
8 
Id. at 86-88.
9 
Caniza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997); Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v.
Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, 410 SCRA 484, 10 September 2003.
10 
333 Phil. 331 (1996).
11 
Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, 10 May 1994, 232 SCRA 372; Pangilinan v.
Aguilar, 150 Phil. 166 (1972); Virgilio v. Jimenez, 394 Phil. 877 (2000).
12 
Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9 at 339.
13 
426 Phil. 598 (2002).
14 
Rollo, p. 87.
15 
315 Phil. 238 (1995).
16 
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
17 
75 Phil. 672 (1946).
18 
Id. at 686.
19 
Rollo, p. 73.
20 
Fige v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107951, 30 June 1994, 233 SCRA 586.
21 
Ching v. Malaya, G.R. No. L-56449, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 412.
22 
L-23547, 11 September 1980, 99 SCRA 613.
23 
G.R. No. L-35482 30 April 1987, 149 SCRA 342.
24 
Feliciano v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 499 (1998).
25 
331 Phil. 616 (1998).
26 
G.R. No. 152978, 4 March 2005, citing Balanon-Anicete v. Balanon, G.R. Nos. 150820-21, 30
April 2003, 402 SCRA 514; Co v. Militar, G.R. No. 149912, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 455.
27 
G.R. No. 125375, 17 June 2004, 432 SCRA 351.
28 
Id. at 359.