Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra and Bangladesh

Author(s): M. Rafiqul Islam

Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1985), pp. 211-221
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 ISSN 0022-3433 Journal of Peace Research,vol. 22, no. 3, 1985

SecessionistSelf-Determination:
Some Lessonsfrom Katanga,Biafraand Bangladesh
M. RAFIQUL ISLAM
Departmentof Law, Universityof Rajshahi

The existing world order is frequentlyinterruptedby secessionist claims. The present state-orientedsolidarity
for 'territorial integrity under all circumstances at any cost' has not succeeded in solving the problem.
It has now become imperative for the international community to formulate principles and guidelines
to cope with this problem. This paper examines three of the major separatistattempts since the Second World
War and the way the rest of the world community reacted to them. The failure of Katanga and Biafra
secessions and the success of the Bangladesh one were not isolated incidents. Rather these are probably
normative for future claims in the sense that some lessons worthy of imitation may be derived from these
experiences.Whilst the right to secession was denied in case of Katangaand Biafra, the Bangladesh situation
indicates that the world community is willing to recognise a limited and orderly right to secession as the
ultimate remedy under certain circumstances, particularly in extreme cases of the abuse and misuse of
territorialintegrity.Severalfactors distinguish the Bangladeshsituation from the other two cases. In addition
to a comparative study of these factors the paper develops certain common and influential criteria which
the world community may increasinglyrecognise in responding to a future seecssionist claim. This would in
turn assist the international community in its concern for the establishment of a legal order to deal with
post-colonial self-determinationclaims.

1. Introduction sionist attempts of the last twenty years and

The era of overseas colonialism has almos
come to an end throughthe growthand develop
ment of colonial self-determination. But the
attainment of decolonisation has not made
self-determination redundant in international
affairs. The problem that forced the world
community to recognise the right of colonial
people to self-determination still exists fol-
lowing decolonisation. But the focus has shifted
from overseas colonialism to neo-colonialism
in independent states. Claims to secessionist
self-determination in non-colonial situations
are growing alarmingly both in quantity and
intensity. At present, no region of the world is
free from such demands (Conner 1967; Buch-
heit 1978).Yetorderlyadherenceto secessionist
claims is rare, while bitter and destructive
wars seem to be the establishedpattern. In the
face of these problems, the need for the inter-
national community to formulate principles
and guidelinesto cope with this old problem in
a new context is quite evident. In this task,
it may be worthwhilenow to examine,with the
benefit of hindsight, three of the major seces-
the way the rest of the world community
responded to them.
The Bengaleesof East Pakistanwerethe first
to exercise secessionist self-determination
successfully among dissident groups in newly
independentstates that had emerged following
the process of decolonisation amongst plural
societies with illogical boundaries that had
been demarcated by colonial powers. The
emergence of Bangladesh as an independent
state in 1971 challenges, for the first time,
the proposition that self-determinationhas no
relevancebeyond colonial contexts. The earlier
attempts, notably those of the Katangese in
the Republicof Congo and the Biafrans in the
Federationof Nigeria,wereunsuccessful.As the
first successful exercise of post-colonial self-
determination, the Bangladesh experience
assumes paramount importance. The world
community response to the bid of Bangladesh
for separation was on the whole noticeably
warmerthan that given to Katangaand Biafra.
The central argument in this article is that
the success of the Bangladesh break-away

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212 Rafiqul Islam
movement and the failure of the Katanga
and Biafra ones, together with the response
of the world community to them, were not
isolated instances. Rather these are probably
normative for future claims in the sense that
some lessons worthy of imitation may be
derived from these experiences. The strength
and reasonablenessof Bangladesh'sclaim have
been generated from a number of factors
which may not be necessarily present in any
other similar claims. Quite apart from the
important fact that Bangladesh succeeded
where Katanga and Biafra failed, which
apparently has made all the difference, there
are several factors that distinguish the
Bangladesh situation from that of Katanga
and Biafra. These factors in general can be
consideredas influential determinantsto which
the world community will increasinglyadhere
in responding to a future separatist claim.
These factors may assist the international
community in its concern for the establish-
ment of a legal order to deal with post-colonial
self-determinationclaims.
2. Territorialanomaly
Both Katanga and Biafra were contiguous to
the rest of the territorieswhich acted in favour
of the federal armies. In each case, the federal
army was able to create a complete blockade
against the seceding part which cut off all
outside supplies. Consequently, the insurgent
forces of both Katanga and Biafra eventually
had to surrenderunconditionally.The national
security forces of the Congo took away more
and more contiguous territoryfrom the control
of the Katangan forces (Miller 1961, p. 1).2
The federal government of Nigeria was able
to impose a total economic blockade and
communications blackout on Biafra. Unaided
and outgunned, Biafra had to surrenderdue
to the blockadeof Biafranports by the Nigerian
naval units (Wiseberg 1974, p. 65; Nagar 1975,
pp. 322 f.).
The two wings of Pakistanwereseparatedby
more than a thousand miles of Indian territory.
This engendered insurmountable logistic
problems for national unity. Other decisive
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strains were inherent in this territorialsepara-
tion. From the very beginning, it was virtually
impossible to maintain any land connection
due to the Indo-Pakistanhostilities concerning
the partition. Immediatelybefore the outbreak
of the Bangladesh liberation war, air com-
munication over India was totally proscribed
following the hijacking, landing and burning
of an Indian plane in the Lahore airport of
Pakistan.' This intensified the problems
encountered by Pakistan in transporting
supplies across a hostile territory. Finally,
Pakistan could not continue this supply to
East Pakistan because of an effective blockade
in the Indian Ocean by the Indian navy. As
a result, the Pakistanarmy had to surrenderin
East Pakistan. It is difficult to find a state
today whose territoryis as non-contiguous as
that of Pakistan. This territorial anomaly
played a decisive role in the struggle of East
Pakistan for independence. This was clearly
one of the important factors which led many
members of the world community to support,
rather than oppose, the separation of East
Pakistan.
3. The majority determination
The regionalism that confronts most newly
independent multi-racial states arises from
minoritydifferences.Pakistanwas insteadfaced
with a majority problem. On the eve of the
declarationof independence,Katangaaccounted
for only 13 per cent of the entire population
of the Congo (Lemarchand 1962, p. 405). Of
56 million total population of Nigeria, Biafra
comprised only 13.5 million (Nixon 1972, pp.
480 f.; Anber 1957, p. 163), whereas East
Pakistan comprised the majority of the total
population of Pakistan.2Unlike the Congo and
Nigeria, the discrimination in Pakistan was
practised by a minority against a majority.
As against the minority determination in the
Congo and Nigeria, there had been a majority
determination in Pakistan. This factor indeed
helped in gaining international support and
sympathy in favourof Bangladesh.

4. Democraticstruggle
The Biafran secession enjoyed a great deal of
democratic support.3 Nonetheless it was led
by a militarygeneralwho employed skilled and
experienced indigenous armed forces. In fact,
Biafra had the best army in black Africa. The
Katangansecession was supportedby a Belgian
mining company and was backed by Belgian
troops almost from the very beginning. The
opposition to the Katangan claim was largely
baed on the judgment that the declaration of
independencedid not representthe true wishes
of the majority of the Katangese. It was
something engineered by outside vested
interests (Buchheit 1978, p. 152). As such,
the Katanga secession was considered intrin-
sically illegal by the majority of the UN
members.
In contrast, the Bangladesh secessionist war
was led by a political party which had won
an overwhelming election victory. The people
of East Pakistan took part in the war spon-
taneously and continued it for nine months.
It involved intensive indigenous mass partici-
pation. There was no reason for doubting the
popularity of the secession in general (Thant
1978, p. 422; Hossain 1977, p. 15). At each
stage of the eventsleading up to the separation,
the population held a firm identification with
independence. Being democratically elected,
the leadership of the Bangladesh movement
had a broadly based community support. With
this identification and cooperation between
the leadership and people, the Bangladesh
provisional government in exile managed
to launch an impressive campaign to invoke
world public opinion in favour of their cause.
Such a positive response by some members of
the world community to the plight of the
Bangladesh contributed significantly to the
birth of Bangladesh.
5. The impact of separation on the rest of the
territory
A crucial factor that the world community
presumablytook into account in opposing the
secession of Katanga and Biafra was the fear
that their separation would inflict disastrous
effects on the remainder of the Congo and
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Secessionist Self-Determination 213
Nigeria respectively.In spite of a small popula-
tion, Katanga was the most resource-rich
among the Congolese provinces.4It was quite
clear at the time of independenceof the Congo
that the very economic viability of the new
republic would be at stake without Katanga.
The overwhelming concentration of wealth
within the boundariesof Katangahad obvious
political implications. Katanga wanted to
secede from the rest of the Congo with the
end purpose not to share its wealth with the
other parts. Hence a good deal of concern
for the future economic security of the Congo
may account for the world community's dis-
approval of the Katangasecession. In the case
of secession it has been argued that 'the
remaining state cannot be deprived of its
economic base' (Bowett 1966, p. 131; Suzuki
1976, pp. 824 ff.). Moreover, the recognition
of legitimacy in the Katanga secession would
have nourished similar claims in the Congo.
The post independence crisis in the Congo
witnessed the proliferation of rival govern-
ments in the various Congolese provinces.
Albert Kalonji, for example, declared the
independence of his 'Mining State', an area
adjacent to Katanga(Buchheit 1978, p. 148).
Similarly, the outside support for the pas-
sionate demands of Biafra was weak, presum-
ably because of the deep concern that its
separation would produce an adverse effect
on the viability of Nigeria. The economic
viability of Nigeria excluding Biafra was
never seriously in doubt. Biafran oil was not
indispensable to Nigeria as a whole. Yet
there could be no doubt that oil was one of
the major issues involved in opposing the
Biafran secession.5 The widespread apprehen-
sion that the Biafran secession might induce
a further general break up of the federation
into its ethnic components may largely account
for the international community opposition
to the claim. The Federationof Nigeria showed
all indications of being further beset by
separatist claims if the legality of the Biafran
secession were acknowledged (Buchheit 1978,
p. 148). The Nigerian elite had a firm commit-
ment to unity in the name of Pan-Africanism
and the fear of 'balkanisation'.They thought
214 Rafiqul Islam
that the disintegration of Nigeria would be
a fearful blow to their pride as citizens of
Africa's biggest state. Other African leaders
feared that the secession of Biafra would be
an ominous precedentfor any dissident section
of their own states (Post 1968, p. 34; Kamana
1974, p. 365).
Such ramificationswere less apparent in the
case of Bangladesh. East Pakistan was sub-
ordinate and West Pakistan was superiorin the
wealth process of Pakistan. The economic
factor playeda major role in fanning discontent
in the East. In contrast, both Katanga and
Biafrawereby no means disadvantagedregions.
They were more comparable to West Pakistan
in terms of their relative economic position.
Discontent in Katangaand Biafra was partially
linked to the possible decline in their relatively
high economic status and the benefits from
mineralsand oil that formed the basis of their
affluence. Both economically and politically,
East and West Pakistan were distinct units
with diverse features.The economic prosperity
and political stability of the West was by no
means dependent on the East. Just as the
separation of overseascolonies had no adverse
consequences on their metropolitanterritories,
the separation of East Pakistan had no such
impact on West Pakistan. From all conceivable
points of view, both wings showed signs of
being able to survive as separate entities.
One cannot deny, however, that there was
an established flow of goods and services
betweenEast and West Pakistan.WestPakistan
was dependent on East Pakistan in the
economic sector in that the former used to
get raw materials and foreign exchange from
the latter. As such, it may well be argued
that the separation of the East caused some
adverse effects on the economy of the West
(Hayward 1972, p. 14). But this dependency
was artificially created by the central govern-
ment's economic policy which was based on
an exploitative structure, clearly favouring
the West at the expense of the East (Nations
1971,Misra 1972,Morris-Jones1972).Probably
because of this reason the world community
at large, in supporting the bid of East Pakistan
for separation, did not accord much weight to
the dependencyof the West on the East.
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6. Defined territoryand homogeneity ofpeople
It is not possible to assert a claim to self-
determination without a definite territorial
base susceptibleof acquiringthe characteristics
of a state (Bassioani 1971,p. 36). Although the
Republic of Biafra had a government, it was
difficult to assert that it had a defined territory
or an identified population ((Ijalaye 1971,
p. 553). It was not all that clear whether the
Biafranssought independencefrom Nigeria for
the former Eastern Region or for the Ibos.
The independence of Biafra was declared on
behalf of all its inhabitants and not just on
behalf of the Ibos.6This did not accord exactly
with the way their case was presented. Their
actual cause of grievances was the discrimi-
natory policies of the federal government
against the Ibos, especially the extensivekilling
of the Ibos in 1966. These actions had con-
vinced them that the only safeguard for their
property, livelihood and very lives was a
separate state of their own. The Ibos claimed
the Eastern Region as their territory.But it did
not include all Ibos, who werescatteredin other
regions of Nigeria. It was not made clear
whetherthe Ibos residingoutside of the Eastern
Region would have a right to join the Republic
of Biafra once independent. Furthermore,the
Eastern Region was not ethnically homo-
geneous territory. It contained many non-
Ibos.7 And it could not be taken for granted
that all the Eastern non-Ibos had chosen to
identify themselveswith the Ibo cause however
reasonableand sympatheticit was. The Eastern
non-Ibos possibly did not share the apprehen-
sions of the Ibos. As a result, it was not certain
that the Eastern non-Ibos would have opted
for secession along with the Ibos had they been
accorded a free choice. In fact, grievanceswere
voiced by the Eastern non-Ibos in the past.
While some spokesmen for the non-Ibos
accepted certain assurances and reforms by
the Biafran government, other spokesmen
rejectedthem as inadequate(Panter-Brick1968,
p. 264).
The uncertainfate of a largenumberof non-
Ibos in a predominantly Ibo state militated
against the Ibo cause for separation. Hence
like Nigeria, Biafra also had a wide variety

of peoples. Therefore,the case for the secession
of Biafra and the case for maintaining the
territorialintegrityof Nigeria were of the same
order.Both Nigeria and Biaframight be said to
face the same problemof securingfrom diverse
peoples acceptance of a common central
authority. Obviously Nigeria had failed to
solve the problem.The solution of this problem
for Biafra, with so many heterogeneous
elements, might not have been any easier.
Similarly, a survey of the objections raised
in the UN to the Katanga secession reveals
that the forum had grave doubts about the
'selfhood' of the people of Katanga for the
purpose of self-determination. Whether the
population in question possessed enough
ethnic or historical identity to substantiate
a claim to being 'a people' was too difficult
to established in view of their tribal and
regional diversities. Katanga was the province
where European settlers were the most
numerous. Motivated by the sudden opening
of apparently unlimited economic oppor-
tunities many non-Katangan peoples also
migratedthere (Lemarchand1962, p. 406).
In contrast, the Bengalees of East Pakistan
constituted a compact and homogeneous
group residing in a well-defined territory.
They were not scattered in any other parts of
Pakistan. They were the indigenous people of
the land who havecontinuously been inhabiting
the same territory since time immemorial.
This established a legitimate historic link
between the people and their territory. In
consequence, the Bengalees constituted an
appropriate 'selfhood' for the determination
of their own destiny.8
7. The time gap
The timing of a break-away claim from an
existingstate has a directbearingon the reason-
ableness of the claim. Since Pakistan, Nigeria
and the Congo were federal states, let us con-
sider the case of a federation. The formation
of a federation presupposescertain consensual
obligations or undertakings assumed by the
component units to make the federal unit
workable. In other words, once constituent
units enter into a federation, it is obligatory
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Secessionist Self-Determination 215
for them to act in good faith and reasonably
in performingtheir assumed obligations within
the federal framework.This act of association
cannot be construed to mean, however, that
once a component unit has associateditself with
a federation it has forfeited its right to opt
out under any circumstances.If the conditions
of association are not respected, the purposes
of association may be nullified; if a particular
unit is deliberately discriminated against,
that unit, it is submitted, has every right to
step out of the federation.Forthough a contract
once made requiresfaithful adherence,a change
in circumstancesafter the making of the con-
tract permits a modification or abrogation
of its terms.9 This principle remains in force
still in law and seems to allow the regeneration
of the right of a unit to secede from the federa-
tion should the political conditions radically
change.
This is not to say that a component unit
should remain with a federationmerely for the
attainment of its own purposes. Rather the
act of association requires a unit to make
sincere and constructive efforts to give a fair
trial to make the federation a workable unit.
A constituent unit should try to accommodate
its own rights and interests by bringing con-
flicting views into harmony with its own. But
it is difficult to explain why an identified
federal unit which once associated with a
federationmust remainthere without any right
of recourse, even if it is persistently and
deliberatelydiscriminatedagainst by the federal
official policy.
This time gap between the independence of
parent states and the date of the proclamation
of independence of seceding provinces was an
important factor that the world community
took into account in opposing the claims of
Katanga and Biafra. Both Katanga and Biafra
attempted to secede without giving any fair
trial to make their larger units workable.
Katanga attempted to secede within ten days
after the independence of the Congo. Katanga
also made an abortiveattempt at independence
in June 1960, two days before the scheduled
date for Congo's independence (Gerard-Libois
1966, p. 272; Hoskyns 1965, p. 81). It therefore
216 Rafiqul Islam
cannot be claimed that Katangahad the inten-
tion of trying to make the Republic of Congo
workable by harmonising its own interests
and expectations with those of the other
provinces.
Similarly, Biafra declared its independence
in May 1967, more than six yearsafter Nigerian
independence. It did not make an adequate
prior attempt to negotiate with the federal
government for a peaceful political accommo-
dation within the framework of Nigeria. Of
these six years, Nigeria had civilian rule for five
years which was ousted in January 1966 by a
military coup led by Biafran officers. In July
1966Biafranofficers weredeposed by a counter-
coup led by Northern officers (Sircar 1969;
Nwankwo 1973).The Easternerswere unwilling
to accept the Northernauthority.No reasonable
effort to reconcile the situation was made by
the leaders of the Eastern Region and the
federal military government.'0 Meanwhile,
the mass slaying of Ibos occurredin the North.
After a series of bloody conflicts, the Eastern
Region proclaimedindependence in May 1967.
It is therefore patent that the Biafrans partici-
pated in the power process of Nigeria.
In contrast,the participationof East Pakistan
in the power processof Pakistan,whetherat the
centralor regionallevel,was erodedimmediately
after independencein 1947.The agitation of the
Bengalees against political impotence, power-
lessness and alienation was replied to by the
'languageof weapons' (Choudury 1973;Sayeed
1972). The army's prejudice against, and the
bureaucracy'smistrust of, democracy coupled
with the industrialists' vested interests in the
status quo - all three exclusively West Paki-
stani - brought together three most powerful
elements in the politics of Pakistan that
deprived East Pakistan of equal rights. The
demand of East Pakistan did not arise with the
division of India in 1947. Rather it mounted
only after a considerable period of 24 years,
duringwhich East Pakistanhad understandably
experienced the costs and benefits of the
union. Despite its subservient position ever
since the birth of Pakistan, East Pakistan
maintained effective links with the West. It
tried to make the larger Pakistan a workable
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political unit. Successiveand ceaseless political
negotiations to devise ways and means for the
accommodation of equal rights and protection
of interests within a united Pakistan were
embarked upon and continued until the last
moment of the army crack-down at Dacca in
March 1971.In the face of this situation it may
be asserted that East Pakistan exhausted all
reasonable means to make the Federation of
Pakistan workable.All efforts of East Pakistan
at reconciliation, to remain within united
Pakistan with autonomous status, were in vain.
The military dictatorship was determined
to continue its reign of terror, nullifying the
slightestchance of East Pakistan'sequal rights.
Under these circumstances,the people of East
Pakistanfound no other alternativebut to foster
the disintegrationof Pakistan.
Given the prevailing situation in 1971, the
separationof East Pakistan appearedto be the
only palatable option left for the international
community to minimise, if not eradicate
altogether, the continuing political unrest
and insecurity in the subcontinent ever since
the 1947 partition. An independent East
Pakistan, with the extermination of the root
cause, namely, West Pakistani domination,
would probably improve East-West Pakistan
relations in the future. There was also no
reason to surmise that an independent East
Pakistan would be likely to cause regional
instability. Although the crisis inflicted some
adverse impacts on regional order at that
juncture, the prospects were promising for
lasting peace and security." The world com-
munity perhaps thought that a compact and
viable independent East Pakistan was more
promising for the maintenance of regional
and global order than a sprawling united
Pakistan with an irreconcilablyheterogeneous
population that was incapable of orderly
government and vulnerable to protracted
civil war with internationalrepercussions.
8. The magnitude of suffering
The demand for security was the ultimate
rationale behind the secession, which was the
cumulative outcome of group awareness of
present and future security. The political sub-

jugation and economic exploitation of Katanga
and Biafra were far less than that of East
Pakistan. In fact, there could be no comparison
with the East Pakistan situation in terms of the
gravity of suffering. There was no question of
exploitation in the case of Katanga, as it was
in a superior economic position in the Congo.
Although thereoccurredhuman rightsviolation
during the Biafran crisis, the discrimination
of the Ibos by the Nigerian federalgovernment
commenced only one year preceding the de-
claration of independence of Biafra, whereas
the Bengalees of East Pakistan suffered a
prolonged internal colonialism which was in
all dimensions parallel with, if not more severe
than, the classical colonial system. The
problem of physical security had been a
central consideration in East Pakistan. The
proclamation of independence of Bangladesh
reflected a number of convictions held by the
leaders of Bangladesh, namely that the Yahya
regime of Pakistan launched 'an unjust and
treacherouswar', committed numerous acts of
genocide and unprecedented tortures on the
civilian and unarmed people, and that these
repressivemeasures made it impossible for the
elected representativesof the people to meet
and frame a constitution and to form a re-
presentativegovernment.12
The humanitarian deprivations of the
Bengalees within Pakistan are known in detail
to the world. At the time of separation of
East Pakistan, numerous human rights viola-
tions were being committed by the Pakistan
army. The Bengalees became the principal
target of a planned mass slaughter.13Con-
fronted with this genocidal operation, the
Bengalees asserted secession as a last resort
of restoringsecurity.They fostered the disinte-
gration of Pakistan in response to conditions
that had long been deteriorating.The Bengalees
were convinced that they could not live in
Pakistan without risking their lives and proper-
ties. This plight of the Bengalees indeed
assisted significantly in earning international
support for their cause.
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Secessionist Self-Determination 217
9. The involvement of outside powers and
internationalreactions
The Western powers, in particular the US,
played a crucial role in combating the Katanga
secession under the cloak of the UN peace-
keeping forces (Buchheit 1978, p. 151). The
African elites also challenged the secession
and launched an organised opposition through
the UN. Both the General Assembly and the
Security Council assisted the Congolese
government in maintaining law and order and
national integrity and directed the Secretary-
General to take action including the use of
force, if necessary,to bring about an end to the
conflict.14 Similarly, the pro-Western federal
government of Nigeria received substantial
foreign militaryand diplomatic assistancefrom
major powers. The UK had a sentimental
attachment to its own creation. Both the UK
and the US were determined to protect the
territorialintegrity of Nigeria, which they had
been accustomed to regard as their supporter
and as a good influence in African affairs.
The USSR also came out in strong support of
the goal of Nigerian unity and supplied the
federal government with its weapons require-
ments.15
In this respect, Biafra was most unlucky.
Oil companies declined to back Biafra. They
initially made payments to Biafra which they
subsequently stopped. The French belatedly
began shipping arms to Biafra through Gabon
and the Ivory Coast. The Portuguesepermitted
Biafra to buy arms and recruit mercenaries
in Lisbon and gave free access to Tome,
where planes carrying arms couldS.o refuel en
route to the enclave. But the French and
Portuguese military aid to Biafra proved in-
effective due to the Nigerian marine blockade
of Biafran ports (Wiseberg 1974, p. 66).
Neither the UN nor the OAU supported the
Biafran claim. The Republic of Biafra,
recognised by five states,'6 was reabsorbed
into Nigeria. In a number of resolutions, the
OAU condemned secession in any member
states (Nayar 1975, pp. 326-30). Expressingthe
UN attitude towards the Biafran secession,
Secretary-GeneralU Thant said (in January
1970):
218 Rafiqul Islam
As far as the question of secession of a particular
section of a Member State is concerned, the United
Nations' attitude is unequivocal. As an international
organization, the United Nations has never accepted
and does not accept and I do not believe it will ever
accept the principle of secession of a part of its
Member State (UN Monthly Chronicle, 1970,
no. 2, p. 2).
In contrast, the Western powers which
supported and assisted Pakistan could not
eradicate the influence of the Soviet bloc.
Finally, the difference in the success of East
Pakistan can be explained by the assistance
renderedby a relativelypowerful neighbouring
country - India - which adopted a policy
whose impact on the events in East Pakistan
was decisive. In the first phase, India granted
sanctuary to the East Pakistani refugees and
political asylum to the newly formed Bangla-
desh provisional government members. India
allowedthe Bangladeshprovisionalgovernment
to use Indian radio services for broadcasts
intended for Bangladesh and to recruit and
train guerrilla forces on Indian soil. In the
second phase, India adopted various measures
of direct and indirect assistance to the
Bangladesh insurgent forces, including in-
creasingly active military assistance to fight
the Pakistanarmy in East Pakistan.In the final
phase, the Indian army invaded East Pakistan
by a massive land and air attack in support
of the Bangladesh liberation forces and East
Pakistan was thus physicallyoverpowered.
In view of these events, it may well be argued
that Bangladesh succeeded due to the victory
of Indian armed forces over those of Pakistan,
and that a secessionist attempt is recognised
only if it turns out to be successful. In other
words, nothings succeeds like success. Never-
theless, other factors referred to clearly con-
tributed to obtain international support and
assistance in favour of Bangladesh. It was
probablydue to these factors that the unilateral
intervention of India retained considerable
validity (Islam 1983, p. 171). Resort to force
by India against Pakistan infringed Articles
2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter. During the
Indo-Pakistanwar in December 1971there was
overwhelmingsupport in the UN for an imme-
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
diate cease-fire. But India was neither con-
demned nor even criticised for its action in the
UN. The majority of the UN membersseemed
reconciled to India's use of force. Presumably
because of these factors, Bangladesh was
rapidly and widely recognisedand was granted
membershipin the UN.17On the other hand, in
the event that these factors are missing or are
not sufficiently influential, such a situation
is likelyto militateagainst gaining international
support and aid in favourof a secessionist war,
as probably happened in the case of Katanga
and Biafra.
International reactions towards the Bang-
ladesh situation were indeed somewhat dif-
ferent. In April 1971, a UN spokesman
announced that 'the Secretary-Generalis very
much concerned about the loss of life and
human sufferingresultingfrom the recentdevel-
opments in East Pakistan'. In July 1971, the
Secretary-Generalsent a memorandum to the
president of the Security Council which
mentioned the conflict between the territorial
integrity of Pakistan and self-determination
of its people. Due to the complexityand gravity
of the situation and its far reaching con-
sequences in the maintenance of regional
peace and security, as reasoned in the memo-
randum, the Secretary-Generaladopted 'the
unusual step of reporting to the President
of the Security Council'. In August 1971, the
Secretary-Generalpublicly expressed his deep
concern about the trial of Mujib, the leader
of the Bangladesh liberation war, by a special
military tribunal. He had received and was
still receiving almost every day expressions of
serious concern from representativesof govern-
ments about the situation in East Pakistan.
Finally he expressed that the verdict of the
trial 'will inevitably have repercussionsoutside
the borders of Pakistan (UN Doco S/10410,
1971, p. 5). The Secretary-Generalemphasised
the importance of the crisis once again in his
1971Annual Report to the General Assembly.
At a meeting of the ECOSOC, charges of
human rights violation were brought against
Pakistan. Twenty-two non-governmental
organisations having consultative status with
the ECOSOC sent a statementto the Secretary-
 Secessionist Self-Determination 219

General calling upon the Sub-Commission on ternal assistance and support may only be
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection permissible as a last resort in enabling
of Minorities of the UN Commission on them to exercise their right. A claim,
Human Rights to expressdeep concern and to fully sponsored or engineered and sub-
examine all available information regarding stantially aided by an outside power
the alleged transgression of human rights in throughout, as was the case of Katanga,
East Pakistan. It was recommended that the should not generally gain international
Commission should take measures to protect support and sympathy.
the fundamental freedoms of the Bangladesh 3. Claims to secession based on gross
and that a special committee be appointed human rights abrogation and the lack of
under the ECOSOC resolution 1503 to review physical security may be permissible.The
the situation (UN Doc. E/CN. 4, p. 46). A excessivevalue deprivationof an identified
meeting of the International Commission of group of people within a state over a con-
Jurists in September 1971adopted a resolution siderableperiod of time may leave no room
urging 'the creation of an international for the internationalcommunity to restore
commission to investigateviolations of human conditions of human existence short of
rights in the Pakistanconflict' (Nauda 1972). separation.
4. Separation as an ultimate goal may be
10. Conclusion preferredby the world community when it
A comparison of the secession of Bangladesh is more promising for the sustenance of
with that of Katanga and Biafra reveals that enduring peace and order.
the internationalresponse towards Bangladesh 5. A 'self' that demands secession must
by and large was favourable and that this possess minimum and reasonable political
contributed significantly to the birth of stability and an economic prospect of
Bangladesh. In contrast to the developments becoming a viable and responsible entity
in Katanga and Biafra, the extraordinarycir- in the world community.
cumstances of East Pakistan within the Fede- 6. Separation may not be supported where
ration of Pakistanwereundoubtedlyinfluential it would place too grievous an economic
factors in the decisions of many members of burden upon the area remaining. The
the world community to support and recognise viability of the remainder is taken into
the independence of Bangladesh. In general account in a decision to support or oppose
terms, these factors may be expressed as a break-awaydemand.
follows:
However,this is not to assertthat the absence
1. The desire to determine their own destiny of variousfactorsreferredto which differentiate
by a homogeneous and distinct group of the Bangladeshsituation from that of Katanga
people residing in a well-defined territory and Biafra necessarilydefeats a right to seces-
constitutes an appropriate 'selfhood' and sion. Rather these differences are mainly
established a prima facie case for the intended to show how these factors acted
exercise of secessionist self-determination. favourably,contributingvariouslyto the success
The greaterthe degree of 'homogeneity' of of the bid of East Pakistan for independence
people and 'compactness' of areas, the as the Republic of Bangladesh. The mere
firmer is the basis of 'selfhood'. success or failure of a secessionist claim ought
2. To be effective, a secessionist claim must perhaps not to be the test of its juridical
be undertaken by the group of people legitimacy or illegitimacy. Nevertheless, the
constituting 'self', and it must first exhaust correlation between the legitimacy and success
all peaceful means. These people may then of a secessionist claim in the existing inter-
resortto even coercivemeans in the eventof national legal ordermay be expressedas follows:
forcible denial, to obtain their right. Ex-

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
220 Rafiqul Islam
If a claim to separatistself-determinationis legitimate
it will be popular; if it is popular it will finally
succeed; therefore, if a claim to self-determination
is successful it was (is) legitimate (Buchheit 1978,
p. 44).
Given the present internationallegal system
in which a separatist claim, like a revolution,
acquires recognition and legitimacy only if it
succeeds, these factors may be deemed to have
assisted in one way or the other in acquiring
recognition and legitimacy for Bangladesh in
internationallaw.
NOTES
1. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 24 April
- 1 May 1971,p. 24561.
2. The population of East Pakistan was 65.7% at the
time of independence in 1947 and 540%according to
the 1961census. See Chowdhury 1972, p. 2.
3. InternationalLegalMaterials 1967,vol. 6, pp. 679-80.
4. For a data-based study, see Lemarchand 1962.
See also Franck& Carey 1963and Chen 1976, p. 259.
5. Nigeria has the greatest known petroleum reserves
located in the costal areas in the Eastern Region,
cf. Nixon 1972, p. 489.
6. See International Legal Materials 1967, vol. 6,
pp. 665ff.
7. Of a population of 13.5 million, the lbos con-
stituted about 6470o,Efik and Ibibio about 17%,
Annang 5.5%, Ijaw and Ogoni 7.5%o,Ekoi, Yalla,and
Ukelle 3.4% and others 2.6%. See Nixon 1972, p. 480;
Umozurike 1972, p. 260.
8. Of the 75 million population of East Pakistan,
non-Bengalees comprised less than 1%. For a dis-
cussion of the 'selfhood' of the Bengalees, see Inter-
national Commission of Jurists 1972.
9. This principle is known as 'rebus sic stantibus'
by which a fundamental change of circumstances
may be invoked by a party as a ground for ter-
minating a treaty. See Schwarzenberger 1960, p.
158; Lissitzyn 1967, p. 895.
10. The only meeting at Aburi on 4-5 Jan. 1967 was
too inadequate to make any headway.
11. Secession claims do not 'automatically justify
buttressing the existing order, for it may indicate
a genuine associational desire and help transform
an unstable situation into a more equitable new
order',cf. 'The Logic of Secession', YaleLaw Journal
1980, vol. 89, p. 820.
12. For the text of the UDI of Bangladesh, see Inter-
national Legal Materials 1972, vol. 11,p. 119.
13. For an account see Salzberg 1973 and International
Commission of Jurists 1972.
14. Cf. Goodrich et. al. 1969, p. 72; SC Res. 169 of
1961;Tridnade 1976, p. 739.
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15. Cf. New York University Journal of International
Law & Politics, 1969, vol. 2, p. 416.
16. Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Zambia and
Haiti. France also indirectly recognised the secession
of Biafra, cf. Ijalaye 1971,p. 551.
17. Within four months of its emergence, Bangladesh
was recognised by over fifty states. The US was
the 55th state to recognise Bangladesh, on 4 April
1972. Bangladesh was admitted to the UN in
September 1974.
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