ARTICLE 12.

(EXEMPTING CIRCUMTANCES)

Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.

The following are exempt from criminal liability:

Exempting circumstances are those grounds for exemption from punishment because there is
absence in the agent of the crime that would make the act voluntary or negligent.

In exempting circumstance, there is lacking or complete absence of either:

1. freedom of action
2. intelligence or intent or
3. negligence

that will make the act voluntary or negligent. Acts committed without voluntariness or negligence is
exempting.

There is a crime here but no criminal liability arises. Thus, the accused is exempt from criminal
liability.

Burden of proof to prove the exempting circumstances is on the defense.

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines
as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

PRESUMPTION OF SANITY and BURDEN OF PROOF

The law presumes that every person is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity bears the burden to prove that he was completely deprived of reason when he committed
the crime charged. 

Note that the proof of an accused's insanity must "relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. (People vs.
Dionisio Roy, G.R. NO. 225604, July 23, 2018)

BASIS OF EXEMPTION -

An imbecile or insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted during a
lucid interval. "[It] requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act,  i.e. that the
accused be deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that
there be complete absence of the power to discern. (People vs. Dionisio Roy, G.R. NO. 225604,
July 23, 2018)
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a
criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as
an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this
point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of
its execution. To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to
receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and
after that time. Direct testimony is not required. Neither are specific acts of derangement
essential to establish insanity as a defense. Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing,
suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts.

A person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to
determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People vs.
Roger Racal, G.R No. 224886, Sept. 4, 2017, Second Division)

WHO is IMBECILE and INSANE?

IMBECILE is one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of
children between 2 to seven years old. He is deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime.

INSANE is one who is mentally ill and suffering a form of psychosis, homicidal attack or dementia
praecox known as Schizoprenia. A person suffering a mental defect or irresistible impulse. He is
deprived of power of his will that will enable him to prevent himself from doing his act. To be insane,
there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence or total deprivation of the freedom of the will.

Crazy is not the same as insane. A crazy person is one who acts unnatural or out of ordinary. He
may behave in a crazy but not necessarily insane.

DISTINCTION OF IMBICILITY from INSANITY:

An imbecile is exempt in all cases from criminal liability. There is no lucid interval in imbecility unlike
in insanity. But an INSANE person is only exempt if at the time of the commission of the crime, he
was insane or deprived of intelligence or freedom of the will. If an insane is not in the lucid interval
(he acted without intelligence during the period) when he commits the crime, he is exempt.

The exemption her is insanity at the time of the commission of the crime and not at the time of the
trial. In the latter case, the hearing will only be suspended.

CASES COVERED and NOT COVERED BY INSANITY:

1. Epilepsy is a chronic nervous disease characterized by fits occurring at intervals, attended by

convulsive motions of the muscles and loss of consciousness. It is exempting.
2. Pedophilia is not insanity. A sexual disorder where the subject has a strong, recurrent,
uncontrollable sexual and physical fantasies about children which he tries to fulfill, especially
when there are no people around.
 3. Feeblemindedness is not imbecility. He could still distinguish right from wrong.
4. Amnesia – not a proof of mental condition which is exempting.
5. Somnambulism – or sleepwalking. His acts are not voluntary since he does not have
intelligence and intent when he committed the crime.
6. Kleptomania - irresistible impulse to take other’s property, maybe considered in the defense
of insanity as long as he lost the power of his will.

COMMITMENT OF INSANE PERSON:

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission
of the same court.

When insanity is used as a defense, the burden is on the defense as the appellant has to prove that
the perpetrator is insane immediately before the commission of the crime or at the moment  of its
execution. There should be proof that the accused acted without discernment.

JURISPRUDENCE:

On November 26, 2002 at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente Ringor was staying with his two-
year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor, at the terrace of their house located at Villanueva, San
Manuel, Isabela.

Suddenly, Roger Ringor Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente with a long bolo (panabas)
without any reason. While Vicente was able to escape Umawid's blows, the latter nevertheless hit
Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing her instant death. Upon seeing Maureen
bloodied, Umawid walked away. Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house which was only five
meters away from Vicente's house where his nephew, Jeffrey Mercado, was sleeping. Awaken by the
sudden noise, Jeffrey went outside only to see his uncle rushing to attack him with his panabas.

Jeffrey, along with his sister and cousin, rushed inside the house to seek for safety.
However, Umawid was able to prevent Jeffrey from closing the door and the former barge into the
house. Jeffrey crouched and covered his head with his arms to shield him from Umawid's impending
attacks.

Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the latter's
fingers. Umawid only stopped upon seeing Jeffrey, who was then pretending to be dead, leaning on
the wall and blood-stained.

In court, Umawid set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however, take the witness stand to
attest the same. Instead, he presented the testimonies of Dr. Arthur M. Quincina and Dr. Leonor
Andres Juliana to support his claim. Dr. Quincina testifies that he evaluated Umawid's psychiatric
condition in May 2002, February 2003, and on March 2003 and found that the latter was evident of
psychotic symptoms.
However, he could not tell with certainty whether Umawid was psychotic at the time of the
commission of the crimes.

On the other hand, Dr. Juliana failed to testify on Umawid's mental stare since she merely referred
the latter to another doctor for further evaluation.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is exempted from criminal liability due to insanity?

Ruling:

No. Under Article 12 of the RPC: Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liabity - The
following are exempt from criminal liability:

 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused

invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not
guilty because of insanity.

The presumption is in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the
burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence.

Considering the case, the evidence must relate to the time immediately before or during
the commission of the offense/s with which one is charged.

Also, to support the defense of insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full
and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.

In this case, Umawid relied solely on the defense of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to support his claim

of insanity. However, Dr. Quincina only examined Umawid six months before he committed the crime
and three months and four months thereafter. Her findings as she admitted did not include Umawid's
mental disposition immediately before or during the commission of the crimes.

Also, given that Dr. Juliana failed to testify in favor of the accused, Umawid's defense of insanity
remained unsubstiantiated, hence, he was properly adjudged by the RTC and CA as criminally liable .
(PEOPLE vs. ROGER RINGOR UMAWID, G.R. NO. 208719, June 9, 2014)

INSANITY: HOW TO CLAIM AS AN

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
(By Atty. Florante A. Zagada)

Insanity is an exempting circumstance affecting the criminal liability of a person. But it does not
necessarily follow that just because a person is insane, he is already not criminally liable for the law
sets parameters in order to successfully claim this defense.
In the decision hereunder, the Supreme Court explains how this can be invoked as a successful
defense in criminal prosecution.
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Roa is known to have suffered mental disorder prior to his commission of the crime charged. Roa was
reportedly struck in the head by some teenagers before and due to the use of illegal drugs, Roa
became talkative and was observed to be "always talking to himself" and "complaining of a
headache."

Since then Roa had a psychotic episode and was brought to the mental hospital where he underwent
treatment for schizophrenia for several years. His doctor prescribed antipsychotic medication to him
but Roa discontinued taking the same due to financial concerns. Roa then could not sleep, eat and
was known to have walked at far distance by himself in his place.
On one oceassion, Roa was unusually silent, refused to take a bath and even quarreled with his
mother when prompted to do so. Later that day, Roa sitted on the sidecar of a trimobile parked
nearby.

When Eliseo passed by the trimobile, he was approached from behind by Roa who suddenly stabbed
him on the left lower back with a bolo locally known as ginunting with an approximate length of 8 to
12 inches. Taken aback, Eliseo exclaimed "Tara man, " before falling to the ground. Chased by both
Edgar and Rico, Roa immediately fled and took refuge inside the house of his uncle, Camilo.

Shortly thereafter, SPO1 Manzano called on Roa to surrender. Upon his voluntary surrender and turn
over of the jungle knife he was holding to the police officers, accused was brought to the Police
Station for investigation and detention. In the meantime, Eliseo was brought to the Health Center
where he was pronounced dead of Hypovolemia secondary to multiple stab wounds.

After his arrest, Roa when arraigned for murder in court pleaded not guilty and while he admitted
having stabbed the deceased, but he interposed the defense of insanity.

The RTC and Court of Appeals convicted him and both did not accept the defense of insanity.

ISSUE: Is Roa guilty for the death of Eliseo? Can the defense of Insanity be appreciated in his favor?

RULING: Roa cannot invoke INSANITY to exempt him from criminal liability based on the facts of
the case

INSANE CANNOT BE PUNISHED.

Under the law, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The
insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed
with the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human
actions laudable or culpable.

INSANE HAS NO FREE ACT OF WILL.

Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane
accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is
served by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no
control over his behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future.
THERE IS STRINGENT CRITERION TO BE EXEMPTING.

But in the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there
is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.

INSANITY AS A CONDITION OF MIND CAN BE JUDGED BY BEHAVIOR.

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the
usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.

ESTABLISHING INSANITY REQUIRES TESTIMONY OF ONE ACQUAINTED TO HIM SUCH AS

PSYCHIATRIST.

Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness
who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that
the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous
with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.

INSANITY: CONFESSION AND AVOIDANCE AND MUST PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.

In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea of insanity is in the
nature of confession and avoidance. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if
found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt,
because the accused had already admitted committing the crime. This Court had also consistently
ruled that for the plea of insanity to prosper, the accused must present clear and convincing evidence
to support the claim.

Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a successful defense.
It is an exception rather than the rule on the human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity as an
exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The
testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.

INSANITY MUST RELATE TO TIME BEFORE AND DURING THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED.

Taken against this standard, the testimonies presented by accused- appellant unfortunately fail to
pass muster. The testimony of doctor concerns his psychiatric evaluation of the accused about five
years after the crime was committed. His mental condition five years after the crime was committed
is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether he was also insane when he committed the offense.
Besides the testimony that the accused was also diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2001, it is worth
noting that the testimony of Dr. Laguidao as to the 2001 diagnosis of the accused is pure hearsay, as
she had no personal participation in such diagnosis. Even assuming that that portion of her testimony
is admissible, and even assuming that it is credible, her testimony merely provides basis for accused-
appellant's mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, and not immediately prior to or simultaneous to the
commission of the offense in 2007. The testimony also fails to shed on accused-appellant's mental
condition immediately prior to, during, and immediately after accused-appellant stabbed the victim
without any apparent provocation.
Lastly, Roa was not suffering from physical defect at the time of the commission of the crime. He
surprised the victim when he attacked from behind. Second, Roa's attempt to flee from the scene of
the crime after stabbing the victim indicates that he knew that what he just committed was wrong.
And third, when the police officers called out to accused-appellant to surrender, he voluntarily came
out of the house where he was hiding and voluntarily turned himself over to them.
“PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT. [ G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017 ]Third Division, Ponente. J.
Velasco)

2. A person under nine years of age.

3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with
the provisions of article 80 of this Code.

When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformity with
the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and
custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education;
otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in
said article 80.

MINORITY

This is now amended by R.A. 9344 known as Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.

WHO ARE THE CHILDREN? “Child” refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years. (Sec.
4 (e))

CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN:

(A) “CHILD AT RISK - refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of committing
criminal offenses because of personal, family and social circumstances, such as, but not limited to,
the following:
 (1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical, psychological, mental, economic or
any other means and the parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or unable to provide
protection for the child;

(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;

(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and inquiry, the parent or guardian
cannot be found;

(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a parent or guardian;

(5) being out of school;

(6) being a streetchild;

(7) being a member of a gang;

(8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug abuse; and

(9) living in situations of armed conflict.

(B) “Child in Conflict with the Law” refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or
adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws.

NEW BENEVOLENT FEACTURES IN R.A. 9344:

“SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15)

years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall
be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to
an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing
laws.

SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict
with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older.

The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other
 relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved
in his/her favor.

Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the
filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary
proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall
decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate
pleadings of all interested.

Basis: complete absence of intelligence.

Presumptions of incapability of committing a crime is absolute.

Age is computed up to the time of the commission of the crime. Age can be established by the
testimonies of families and relatives.

Senility or second childhood is only mitigating.

SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL EXEMPTION AND RESPONSIBILITY BY REASON OF

AGE:

1. A minor 15 YEARS \OLD or BELOW – EXEMPT from criminal liability. AGE OF FULL
IRRESPONSIBILITY.

2. A minor above 15 but below 18 years old (16 - 17 years old only) is also exempt from
criminal responsibility except when he acted with discernment. It is incumbent upon the
prosecutor to prove that he acted with discernment otherwise, he is still free from criminal
liability. AGE OF CONDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

3. 18 YEARS OLD OR OVER TO 70 YEARS OLD. – AGE OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY.

4. OVER 70 YEARS OLD- AGE OF MITIGATED RESPONSIBILITY.

The law says that a minor is fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of
his/her birth date. In A.M. No. 02-l-18- SC49 dated November 24, 2009, the Supreme Court likewise
defined the age of criminal responsibility as the age when a child, fifteen (15) years and one (1) day
old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense with discernment. (People
vs. Joery Deliola, g.r. No. 200157, August 31, 2016, Third Division)

Meaning of DISCERNMENT- it is a mental capacity to understand the difference between right

and wrong which can be determined from the comportment and behavior of the minor not only
before and during the commission of the crime but even after and during the trial.

How is discernment shown by the minor offender? (1) manner of committing the crime (2) conduct
of the offender after its commission.
-OFFENSES NOT APPLICABLE TO CHILDREN BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE: (Exempt)

- Vagrancy
- Prostitution
- Mendicancy
- Sniffing of rugby

(They are inconsistent with UN Conventions of rights of the child.)

LEGAL EFFECTS OF VARIOUS AGES OF OFFENDER

15 and below – exempting

Privileged mitigating circumstance

Above 15 but under 18 – exempting unless acted with discernment – But even with discernment,
penalty is reduced by one (1) degree lower than that imposed. (Art 68, par 2, amended by RA 9344)

Minor delinquent under 18 years of age – sentence suspended (Art 192, PD 603 as amended by PD
1179, referred to as Children in Conflict with the Law under RA 9344). Child in Conflict with the Law –
refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or being adjudged as, having committed an offense
under Philippine laws.

SEC. 5. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Every child in conflict with the law shall
have the following rights, including but not limited to:

(a) the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;

(b) the right not to be imposed a sentence of capital punishment or life imprisonment, without
the possibility of release;

(c) the right not to be deprived, unlawfully or arbitrarily, of his/her liberty; detention or
imprisonment being a disposition of last resort, and which shall be for the shortest appropriate
period of time;

(d) the right to be treated with humanity and respect, for the inherent dignity of the person,
and in a manner which takes into account the needs of a person of his/her age. In particular,
a child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adult offenders at all times. No child shall be
detained together with adult offenders. He/She shall be conveyed separately to or from court.
He/She shall await hearing of his/her own case in a separate holding area. A child in conflict
with the law shall have the right to maintain contact with his/her family through
correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances;
 (e) the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to
challenge the legality of the deprivation of his/her liberty before a court or other competent,
independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on such action;

(f) the right to bail and recognizance, in appropriate cases;

(g) the right to testify as a witness in his/her own behalf under the rule on examination of a
child witness;

(h) the right to have his/her privacy respected fully at all stages of the proceedings;

(i) the right to diversion if he/she is qualified and voluntarily avails of the same;

(j) the right to be imposed a judgment in proportion to the gravity of the offense where
his/her best interest, the rights of the victim and the needs of society are all taken into
consideration by the court, under the principle of restorative justice;

(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her personal liberty limited to the minimum, and where
discretion is given by law to the judge to determine whether to impose fine or imprisonment,
the imposition of fine being preferred as the more appropriate penalty;

(I) in general, the right to automatic suspension of sentence;

(m) the right to probation as an alternative to imprisonment, if qualified under the Probation
Law;

(n) the right to be free from liability for perjury, concealment or misrepresentation; and

(o) other rights as provided for under existing laws, rules and regulations.

CUSTODY OF CHILDREN BELOW THE AGE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY:

- If it has been determined that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old
or below, the authority which will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to
immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence
thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social welfare
and development officer who will determine the appropriate programs in consultation with the
child and to the person having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest
relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any
of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay
official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local
social welfare and development officer; or when and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the
child referred to herein has been found by the Local Social Welfare and Development Office to
be abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents will not
comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be
filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 603,
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.

This paragraph is called ACCIDENT.

Before the accused may be exempted from criminal liability by reason of Article 12 (paragraph 4), the
following elements must concur:

(1) a person is performing a lawful act

(2) with due care, and
(3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident and
(4) without any fault or intention of causing it. 

Basis of exemption: The exemption from criminal liability under the circumstance showing accident is
based on the lack of criminal intent.

For an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the act has to be lawful.

An accident is an occurrence that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about
through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.  It
connotes the absence of criminal intent. Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by
a persons overt acts. (People vs. Ricardo Agliday, G.R. No. 140794, Oct. 16, 2001)

WHEN THE ACT IS WITH FAULT, IT IS CULPABLE FELONY. WHEN THERE IS INTENT, IT
IS INTENTIONAL FELONY.

There must be no fault or negligence on the one claiming accident.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.

Malice is the antithesis of reckless imprudence. Once malice is proven, recklessness disappears.

(1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend, who got killed by the accidental discharge arising from
negligent handling;

(2) discharging a firearm from the window of ones house and killing a neighbor who, at just that
moment, leaned over a balcony front; and

(3) firing a .45 caliber pistol twice in the air to stop a fist fight; and, as the fight continued, firing
another shot at the ground but, after the bullet ricocheted, hitting a bystander who died thereafter.

The said examples though are not exempting as accidents , there is Reckless imprudence. It consists
of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act. 

Example: While defending yourself, you cause damage to another by firing at random in a thickly
populated area. It is not exempting under this paragraph because you are not performing a lawful
act.

Example of ACCIDENT: Driving a vehicle in slow speed, to avoid danger to your life by bumping a
truck in front of you swerve it to the left causing damage to another. This an accident, something
that happens outside the sway of our will although it comes through some act of our will, lies
beyond the bounds of humanly forseeable consequences.

Accident presupposes lack of intention to commit the wrong done. Accident and negligence are
intrinsically contradictory.

Accident and self-defense are two incompatible defenses. This means that in self-defense,
the prosecution need not prove the commission of the crime. But if the defense is accident, the
prosecution should still prove the commission of the crime.

Accident presupposes lack of intention, while self-defense assumes voluntariness, but

induced only by necessity. When the accused claims that the crime was the result of an accident,
the burden of proving self-defense will not come into play. The burden of proving self-defense, which
normally would have belonged to the accused, did not come into play. Although accused must
prove his defense of accident by clear and convincing evidence, the burden of proving the
commission of the crime remained in the prosecution. (Aradillos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 135619, Jan. 15, 2004)

EXAMPLE: Gloria who went near Aradillos who was then cutting the roots of the "idyok" tree, and
grabbed the ax, obviously with the intention of stopping Aradillos from cutting the tree. Not wanting
to let go of the ax, Aradillos held on to it and the two then struggled for its possession. With both of
their hands on the handle, the ax went swaying and swinging, which accidentally hit Gloria. The
injuries sustained by Gloria, in fact, confirm that it was not intentional. For if it were so, petitioner
Aradillos would have exerted such force that Gloria would have suffered more than what she had
sustained. Worse, she would not have survived at all.

XXX

Aradillos must be answerable for the injuries he inflicted on Gloria. He cannot hide behind the
defense of accident to escape the consequences of his act. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, a person, who while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by accident without fault or intention of causing it, is exempt from criminal
liability. It cannot be said that Aradillos was performing a lawful act when he struggled with Gloria
for the ax as the latter’s act of taking hold of the ax was equivocal, and it cannot be deduced
therefrom that he was under the threat of an unlawful aggression from her . The defense of
accident, therefore, cannot exempt Aradillos from liability.” (Aradillos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
135619, Jan. 15, 2004)
5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of irresistible force.

IRRESISTIBLE FORCE:

Elements:

1. The compulsion must be by means of PHYSICAL FORCE.

2. The physical force must be irresistible
3. The physical force must come from a third person.

The accused here is reduced as a mere instrument, thus incapable of committing a crime.

The force coming from a third person or extraneous force must be so irresistible that he has no
option but to obey. He acts not only without a will but against his will.

EXAMPLE: Striking a person with the butt of the gun to bury a victim.

A person under gun point was ordered by the third party to set fire a house is not guilty of arson.

NATURE OF FORCE REQUIRED:

There must be duress, force, fear or intimidation which is present, imminent and impending in
such a nature that there is a well grounded apprehension on the part of the person to do the act
because of the bodily harm to him coming from the third person.

It is also necessary that in doing such wrongful act, it leaves no opportunity to the person to
escape or put up a self defense in equal combat.

In order that duress may be validly availed of by an accused as a defense, it should actually be
anchored on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's own life or limb and should not
be speculative, fanciful, or imagined.9 

It is based on the complete absence of freedom on the part of the accused and has its roots in the
Latin maxim "Actus me invito factus non est meus actus," which translates to "An act done
by me against my will is not my act."

The compulsion employed upon the accused must have been of such character as to leave no
opportunity for him to spring an escape or to himself foist any act of defense for self-
preservation. Thus, duress has been held unavailing where the accused had every opportunity to
run away if he had wanted to or to resist any possible aggression because he was also armed.
(People vs. Salvatierra, G.R. No. 111124, June 20, 1996)
BASIS OF EXEMPTION: Complete absence of freedom, an element of voluntariness. Actus
me invito factus non est meus actus," which translates to "An act done by me against my
will is not my act."

It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for

escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under
the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom.

However, we held that for such a defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear, or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat
of future injury is not enough.

In this case, as correctly held by the CA, based on the evidence on record, appellant had the chance
to escape Lumbayan's threat or engage Lumbayan in combat, as appellant was also holding a knife
at the time. Thus, appellant's allegation of fear or duress is untenable. We have held that in order
for the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion
be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal
combat.11 Therefore, under the circumstances, appellant’s alleged fear, arising from the
threat of Lumbayan, would not suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability.
(People vs. Samuel Anod, G.R. No. 186420, August 25, 2009, Third Division)

6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury.

UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR:

Here, a person is also compelled to commit a crime by another person. But the compulsion is by
means of INTIMIDATION or THREAT from another person, not by force or violence.

ELEMENTS:

1. There is an existence of an uncontrollable fear

2. The fear must be real and imminent.
3. The fear of an injury must is greater than or at least equal to that which he is required to
commit.

To be a valid defense, duress or intimidation must be real , imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life
or limb, not merely SPECULATIVE, FANCIFUL or REMOTE FEAR.

To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating
circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under
Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an
accused, the following elements must concur:

(a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear;

(b) that the fear must be real and imminent; and

(c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. 29

 For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. (Adina vs. People, G.R. No. 215424,
Dec. 09, 2015)

There should be a fear of immediate death. A threat of future injury is not enough.

The accused must not have the opportunity to escape or to put up self defense in equal combat.

In the case of People vs. Fronda, G.R. No. 102361-62, May 14, 1993, the Supreme Court
declares, “Appellant cannot claim the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear (Art. 12, par. 6,
RPC). Fear in order to be valid should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's life
or limb (People vs. Abanes, 73 SCRA 44, [1976]). In the case at bar, records indicate that appellant
was seen being handed by and receiving from one of the armed men a hunting knife. Also, as
aforesaid, appellant was not able to explain his failure to report the incident to the explain his failure
to report the incident to the authorities for more than three (3) years. These circumstances, among
others, establish the fact that appellant consciously concurred with the acts of the assailants. In order
that the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such
a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat. (People vs. Loreno,
130 SCRA 311, [1984])

Appellant had the opportunity to escape when he was ordered by the armed men to go home after
bringing the victims the mountains. He did not. Instead he joined the armed men when required to
bring a spade with which he was ordered to dig the grave. Appellant also chose to remain silent for
more than three (3) years before reporting the killing to the authorities. Based on these
circumstances, We hold that the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of appellant can not be
regarded as having been done under the impulse of uncontrollable fear.”

Uncontrollable fear is different from irresistible fear in the sense that in IF, the offender uses
violence or physical force to compel another person to commit a crime while in UF, the offender uses
intimidation or threat in compelling a person to commit a crime.

EXAMPLE: A threatens B that if B did not kill C by tomorrow, if he would kill all his family. B kills C
because of fear that A might kill his family.

Is A exempt under this paragraph? No. While the threat is equal to that committed by A, the
treat of future injury is not enough, because A has still the opportunity for self defense or resist the
possible aggression to his family by reporting the matter to the police. The threat is also NOT REAL
or even imminent.
EXAMPLE: Vicky intimidates Hayden that if he would not kill Katrina, she would put their intimate
relation in the internet for them to suffer dishonor and embarrassment from the public. Hayden kills
Katrina. Hayden when sued for murder puts up this defense of uncontrollable fear?

No, the fear of injury to Hayden is not greater than the murder committed by Hayden. The
fear is not also actual but remote.
EXAMPLE: A kidnapper calls B that he would kill his family if he will not produce 2 million within
24 hours. B robbed the bank to raise the 2 million and when caught, puts up this defense.

Is B liable for robbery? Yes, while the threat that causes the fear is greater than that he
committed, but under the circumstance, B is not required to rob the bank to give him the ransom of
P2 million. Besides, B has the opportunity to call for help to save his family by reporting the matter to
the police. It would be different if he is required to rob the bank to save his family under the
custody of the kidnapper.

EXAMPLE:

A threatens B that if he would not falsify the document, he would burn his house and family at
anytime. A is a notorious killer and an ex convict. He falsified a document to favor A because of the
safety of his own family. He is exempt.

BASIS OF EXEMPTION: Complete absence of freedom.” “Actus me invite factus non est meus
actus.” An act done by me against my will is not my act.”

7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some
lawful insuperable cause.

INSUPERABLE CAUSE:

To be exempting, it implies knowledge of the precept of the law to be complied with but is
prevented become lawful cause or insuperable cause, that is by some motive which has lawfully,
morally or physically prevented one to do what the law commands.

ELEMENTS:

1. An act is required by law to be done.

2. A person fails to perform such act.
3. His failure to perform such act was due to some lawful insuperable cause.

Insuperable Cause – some motive which has lawfully, morally, or physically prevented a person to do
what the law commands.

EXAMPLE:

A gave birth to a child alone in his house. The baby had an internal bleeding but since she was
weak and dizzy, she left the child to die. She is not liable for infanticide because her failure to bring
him to the hospital is due to insuperable cause. She was weak and dizzy. She was unable to do it due
to lack of help.

An arresting officer who fails to bring a person to judicial authority due to causes beyond his control
can avail of this exempting circumstance.

“The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according
to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was
perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same
place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all
happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).

In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the
appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her
child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it
should be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it
appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting
circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had been accused and
convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is
ordered that she be released immediately.” (People vs. Josefina Bandian, G.R. No. 451186,
Sept. 30, 1936, En Banc)

BASIS OF EXEMPTION: No criminal intent, the third condition of voluntariness.

DISTINCTION OF JUSTIFYING AND EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES:

1. JC – No crime, no criminal, the act of the accused is within legal bounds. In EC – the act done
constitutes a crime, but the actor acted without voluntariness, intent or freedom and
negligence.

2. JC – There is no crime and no criminal. In EC – there is crime but no criminal, the actor is
reduced to an instrument of the crime. He is just like a key to the door. He cannot do anything
to the man using him.

3. JC – No criminal, no civil liability except Art. 11, par. 4 (AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL OR
INJURY) insofar as he is benefited by the act. In EC- No criminal but there is CIVIL LIABILITY
except under par. 4 (Accident) and 7 (prevented by insuperable cause), here, there is no civil
liability.

ABSOLUTORY CAUSES:

Absolutory cause are those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and
sentiment, there is no penalty imposed.
What are absolutory causes in the RPC:

1. Art. 6, par. 3 – Spontaneous desistance during attempted stage.

2. Art. 7 – Accessories are not criminally liable. (Art 16, par. 2) for light felony punishable only
when consummated with the exception of light felonies committed against person or property.
3. Art. 20, Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability.
4. Justifying circumstances (Art. 11, RPC)
5. Exempting circumstances (Art. 12, RPC)
6. Art. 89- Total extinction of criminal liability.
7. Art 124, last par. -Legal grounds for arbitrary detention.
8. Art. 247 par. 1 and 2, Death of Physical injuries afflicted under exceptional circumstances.
9. Art. 280 par. 3, On trespass to dwelling.
10.Art. 332, persons exempt from criminal liability.
11.Art. 344, par. 4 – Marraige of offender by the offended party in seduction, abduction,
abduction, rape and acvts lasciviousness.In case of seduction, etc.
12.Art. 280, par. 3 – Legal excuses for trespass dwelling.
13.Art 344, par. 3 – Express pardon of the offended party in seduction, abduction, pare and acts
of lasciviousness.
14.Absence of criminal intent as in mistake of fact.

INTIGATION: Is instigation an absolutory cause? Yes, the instigator practically induces the
would be accused into the commission of the crime and the instigator himself becomes a co-
principal. Thus, the police after inducing an innocent person to commit a crime would then arrest him
upon or after the commission of the crime by the accused.

This practice of the police of instigating a would be criminal for the purpose of arresting him is
proscribed and the person instigated is acquitted. (Ex. A police officer offers Peter the amount
P20,000.00 if he would steal the Rolex watch of Mario. When Peter steals it and give it to the police
officer and the latter arrests Peter. That is instigation.

But ENTRAPMENT is not an absolutory cause. The police here resort to ways and means for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. The means
originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and resolve to commit a crime comes from the
mind of the criminal WHEREAS in instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime
and suggest it to the would be criminal who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.

ENTRAPMENT and INSTIGATION

Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged
in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker.

Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused
into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of
committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged
originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the
apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or
her conduct.
In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted. But
entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a "trap for the
unwary innocent," while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary criminal. (People vs. Noel
Bartolome, G.R. NO. 191726, Feb. 06, 2013)

Entrapment is not a defense. This is common and buy bust operation in drug related cases.