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Presentation 1
Presentation 1
Presentation 1
COURSE FACILITATOR
DR KAEPAE KEN AIL (PHD)
Refinery/Market
NSR REVENUE
FLOWS Providers of inputs to
production and capital
owners
MINING CYCLE
Haul
Rehabilitation
Drill
Blast
Load
Surface Mining
Underground Mining
UG Mining Cycle
EVERY STAKEHOLDER HAS A FINANCIAL OBJECTIVE
At the enterprise level means: continuing financial profitability, solvency and liquidity,
payout dividends and market performances
To employees – higher wages and rewards, better working conditions and higher job
security
To the state – higher tax revenues, royalty and fees, and maximise contribution to
economic activity, higher exports and GDP.
GOVERNMENT’S INVOLVEMENT
A primary purpose of legislating and regulating the industry is to control differing interests of
participating stakeholders:
1. Government has the ultimate power to legislate and enforce laws to ensure the points in
previous slide are executed to meet resource development policy.
2. Mining companies are licensed to extract minerals so that financial and economic benefits can
be shared and distributed to different benefactors. Governments can become part-owners
through SoEs having equity interests.
3. Lenders provide the capital for mine exploration and development, and thus, mining companies
are obliged to pay back the capital invested with interest to capital owners.
4. Factor providers: mining companies employ the providers of inputs to production (machines,
equipment, explosive, fuel, labour, etc.) for their service in production.
5. Employees: mining companies need to look after employees’ needs and government makes
employment laws for the industry to follow labour regulations (payroll taxes, FIFO, human
resource nationalisation)
6. Landowners (community) – investors and governments make commitments through MoAs to
meet infrastructure, redistribute benefits, and meet economic and social needs of host
communities
STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS
Provincial governments being custodian of the people are involved in monitoring and
administration and benefit redistribution processes. In PNG’s case, many PGs want to have direct
equity shares in projects as they are not allowed to collect royalties and income taxes (centralized
fiscal system).
State agencies such as CEPA, DMPGM, MRA, MRDC, KMHL, IRC, EITI, National Planning and
Labour & Employment Departments are linked to the mining industry in various ways and play
critical roles in regulating, compliance auditing and benefit collection and distribution.
NGOs like Mine Watch, OXFAM, Global Witness and others also contribute to effective regulation,
compliance auditing and impact related issues. They mainly exist as “whistle-blowers”.
Some scientific NGOs participate in research and development (e.g., CSIRO) are often engaged
to undertake independent technical assessments and others are directly involved in sustainable
development planning and programs in mining regions
Transnational organizations like the World Bank and IMF make global standard guidelines,
policies and regulations for the mining industry to contribute to national growth, social and
environment sustainability, poverty reduction and climate change.
Justice Department provides a common ground to ensure the rule of law is maintained by
legislating and ensure regulations are administered effectively and fairly.
PRIVATE COMPANIES’ CORPORATE POLICY AND OBJECTIVES
- Maximise the value of the project to the benefit of current shareholders and capital owners
- Short-term cash budgeting
- Long-term financial plan and asset procurements
- Current and non-current asset inventory and accumulation
- Current and long-term liabilities to meet long-term and short-term financing needs of the core
business activity
v) At an industry level:
- Chase projects that are larger reserves (e.g., Newcrest’s Wafi-Golfu project)
- Look for acquisitions (Barrick acquired the Porgera gold mine in 2006)
- Forego small projects (which could commit resources, time and efforts for little financial
rewards (e.g., Barrick disposed K92 mine)
- Aim for lager cash flow projects
- Medium to long-life projects
- Choose to invest in projects that have higher to moderate rate of return.
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY CHART
Growth horizons
Horizon 3: create viable options
(acquire mines/exploration - farmout)
Profit
Horizon 2: Build emerging business (vertical
integration through farmin)
The three growth horizons are devised to defend the core business, develop
emerging businesses and create options for new business options. A firm has to be
capable of doing these three growth horizons in parallel. For example, Newcrest
extends and defend the Lihir gold mine as a core business and hopes to develop the
Wafi-Golpu project as an emerging business in the copper sector while creating
viable options in other countries (e.g., Gosowong, Indonesia).
STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF GROWTH
To maintain its rate of growth the firm is compelled to:
- Chase larger minimum targets (e.g., Frieda River, Wafi-Golfu and Yandara type
deposits)
- Look for acquisitions (farmin) by targeting low cost operations (e.g., Porgera gold mine)
-Mining firms look for acquisitions rather than greenfield exploration that are mostly
done by junior exploration firms
-Foregoes small projects (e.g., Barrick dispose of Tolakuma and Kainantu gold mines
may have low takeover/farmin) targets
- Farmout large exploration properties by large firms (e.g., Frieda – deposit)
The objectives generally aim for large annual cash flows
Medium to long life mining projects
Settles for more stable and moderate rate of return (ROR)
A COMPANY THAT IS NOT SHOWING SIGNS OF GROWTH HAS NO LONG-TERM
INTEREST
RESOURCE SECTOR FINANCE
4. Private Enterprise’s Corporate Financial Policy and Objectives
RISK
REDUCTION
Payback
IRR (KE)
period
FINANCIAL MODELING OF MINING PROJECTS
Financial evaluation is a techno-economic model because:
- mineral deposit is said to be financial viable if they have the capacity to generate
cash flows
- a technical study component has to come first: feasibility study of mining method,
milling and social and environmental impacts
- next, a financial component which investigates the cash flows are sufficient (given
price, capital and operating costs) to meet operational liabilities (e.g., capital and
wages and taxes) and still generate a profit.
-Production phase lasting over the anticipated life of the mine, which is determined
by the production rate (throughput) until the reserve is depleted.
USES OF PRELIMINARY EVALUATIONS
Competitive market: companies are price takers and enter the industry when there is an
opportunity to make a profit and build a market base. They exit the market if there are no profit-
making opportunities, especially during low prices. They survive by creating barriers to entry (product
differentiation & high marketing and complex value-chain network & government protection).
Government creates a market failure (e.g., Oil Search used GoPNG to raise capital to acquire an
interest in gas projects). All producers are in this category, and most mineral legislation and
regulation focus on the competitive structure.
Monopoly: a single producer controls outputs to manipulate the price (e.g., OPEC). There are no
cartel producers or organizations existing in the mining industry, though many have attempted but
failed. The industry competitive complicates the entry of a monopolist into the mining industry.
Duopoly: two suppliers can collude to behave as a monopolist producers (e.g., Newmont- 5.8 MOz
and Barrick – 4.8 MOz can acquire AngloGold Ashanti- 3 MOz, Polyus – 2.8 MOz and Kinross Gold –
2.4 Moz) to form a duopoly. Legislation and regulation of monopoly and duopoly could be complex.
But in a competitive market, the price and the quantity produced are controlled through domestic
legislation.
What drives mining as an economic activity
The existence of economic rents drive companies to explore and extract the minerals
Rent is a neoclassical concept with reference to payments made to landholders for possessing
collateral rights to agricultural lands, which include mineral property rights. However, classical
economists argue that in-situ mineral has no value without a sacrifice (Tilton 2004)
Ricardian rent is an economic rent available to different mines (mineral types) as a result of
differences in costs, prices and deposit qualities (Tilton 2004). A government setting different tax rules
for different types of mineral extraction may target the Ricardian rents. E.g., Australia devised the RSPT
to capture Ricardian rents from iron ore sector (high profit) and thus, burdening a low profit sector (e.g.,
bauxite). This tax policy causes fiscal bias against marginal and low profit coal mines.
Parentian rent, economic rent and pure rent (all have same meaning) – defined as “the excess of
the return to a factor of production above the amount that is required to sustain the current use of the
factor (or to entice the use of the factor” (Ergas, Harrison and Pincus 2010). The economic rent is also
referred to as pure profit, or excess profit. The economic rent is taxable, where the “excess profits” that
is considered to be above the normal rent (Garnaut 2010b) are also subject to tax (APT).
Normal rent is defined as the “minimum rate of return required to hold capital for the activity” (Hogan
and Goldsworthy 2010, 135) or inflows before reaching the capital cost are normal rents
Quasi-rents are sunk and capital costs and operating costs available to suppliers of inputs to
production. The quasi-rents must not be taxed (including interest on debt capital)
Source: Tilton (2004), Otto et al. (2006) and Garnaut and Ross (1983). There are variations in Fig. 1b from Tilton (2004).
Fig. 1a Ricardian rent and user costs from Fig. 1b Categories of rents for a single mine
industry perspectives.
What drives mining as a economic activity
A profit is made by managing the variations in price, capital and operating costs, and deposit quality
etc. to maximise the economic rent
1. The value of metal output from a refinery is expensed against transport and handling costs,
smelting and refining costs – Gross revenue
2. Market conditions like supply and demand and price disturbance (strikes, wars, geopolitical
upheaval, legislative changes and disasters), drive price up or down depending on demand
conditions.
3. A price cycle is such that a prolonged low price causes a shortage of supply (existing mines may
close, no new mines developed, exploration decline). This triggers an increase in demand, that cause
a price to increase (e.g., 2003 – 2007). In that period, the mineral prices peaked (exploration picked
up and re-open closed mines). As this happens over time, an oversupply occurs, which entices
importers turn to stockpiles and recycled metals. It in turn causes the demand to decline and, thus,
the price to an initial condition of the cycle. This is called a price cycle.
4. A price upswing can cause changes to existing mineral legislation and policies as governments try
maximise revenues – why? A previous tax system may not capture enough revenues for communities
and thus, governments may insert new laws to maximize resource revenues
PRICE CYCLE: 5-10 years
After economic
cycles have peaked
as indicated by a
sustained reversal
in the rate of A market oversupply
growth in industrial causes prices drop,
outputs leading to slow down
in production (no new
High supply mines develop and
low demand
dampen exploration). and high price
-price disturbance
cause by geopolitical
tensions (e.g., terrorists)
Low supply Low supply
Three main price drivers: (1) fast macroeconomic growth in OECD countries, (2) high demands from
China and (3) speculative activity due to price disturbances. However, increasing population and food
shortages causes an emerging long-run demand growth for industrial minerals, (e.g., phosphate
needed for fertilizer production will trigger the demand for lime).
Mineral price forecasts up to 2025 and 2030:
Hydrocarbon: (1) Crude Oil (US$251.42/TOE; (2) LPG (US 6.9/MBtu, (3) LNG (US$ 6.8 /MBtu)
Metallic minerals: (1) copper (US$ 12,341.88/ton); (2) nickel (US$ 41,970/ton); (3) iron ore (US$
247.26/ton); (4) aluminum (US$ 2,824.23/ton), (5) tin (US$ 28.536/ton), (6) lead (US$ 4,927.81/ton),
(7) zinc (US$ 2,933.26/ton); (8) high rank coal (US$ 239.43/ton)
Precious metals: (1) gold (US$ 3,973.93/troy ounce); (2) platinum (US$ 4,162.35/troy ounce); (3)
silver (US$ 68.01/troy ounce).
Note: The three drivers may add to price increases, and governments’ are expected to increase
legislation and regulation reforms as they push to maximise benefits (e.g., Chile and PNG). That may
cause a supply shortage. Legislative push for downstream processing may not occur soon enough due
to lack of energy and technology requirements in developing countries like PNG. Also reduced
production due to COVID-19 will significantly cause a shortage of supply in highly infected regions in
South America.
BE AN INFORMED LEGISLATOR AND REGULATOR
THE WORLD IS PREPARING FOR THIS NOW, WHAT ABOUT PNG?
RESOURCE EXTRACTION POLICY
- To ensure tailings and other environmental impacts do not impact people’s lives
now and beyond a mine’s (project’s) life
- Harmonize the co-existence of mining land use and other life supporting enterprises
to occur concurrently
- Reduce negative impacts and maximise the positive impacts that would exist
beyond a mine’s life
INDUSTRY’S EXPECTATIONS ON RESOURCE LAWS AND REGULATION
A licence granted must be secured over an whole of life of a mining project. Legislated or
legally bidding promissory MDC clauses such as “fiscal stability” often protects investor’s
rights. A top priority is that an investor seeks transparent political and social bargaining
processes that clearly determine the national and local contents through fiscal measures
and policies that are aligned within the legislative framework.
Fiscal stabilisation clauses in MDCs must be balanced. It should avoid investor focus
(fiscal leniency like tax holidays); and national and local content focused (high tax rates,
royalty, production sharing etc.). Investment disputes often arise from alleged breaches of
stabilisation clauses and bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. For instance, the
Porgera’s FA provides fiscal stability insurance by charging a 2% tax on top of the
corporate income tax.
Bilateral investment and multilateral treaties seek to support financial, capital and labour
imports and export restrictions.
Now a days, political risks have become a critical priority over fiscal laws. These are: risks
of disrupting an operating mine; currency convertibility and transfer restrictions; returns on
projects; expropriation of operating mines; civil unrest; war and terrorism; and breach of
contract and non-honouring of sovereign financial obligations.
POLITICAL AND REGULATORY RISKS
In jurisdictions whose political risks are high and investors are unwilling to invest, international
organizations like the World Bank provides Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) as
an investment guarantees against political risks and gives assurance to a firm to invest in that
country (specially benefits venerable lower to middle income countries like PNG). Newcrest is
taking approach to seek MIGA from the world Bank to develop the Wafi-Golfu project.
Likewise, reports of investment attractiveness ranking are often used as indicators of security
assurance and predictability of local laws for investments on foreign soils. The extractive industry
risk survey published in World Risk Report shows that PNG is placed in ‘C’ category, indicating that
it is perceived as a high-risk jurisdiction due to uncertainty over long-term security of mining leases
(Chris, 2020). Also, credit worthiness ratings such as Standard and Poor, Moddy and Fitch Ratings
assist investors to consider their investment and financing decisions that could possibly delay a
financially attractive project.
The political and regulatory risks may outweigh the geological attractiveness and
financial viability (NPV & IRR).
POLITICAL AND REGULATORY RISKS
Wafi-Golfu project – a right deposit at the at the right time? -weight it out
The Wafi-Golfu copper-gold project is tipped to coincide with the high copper and gold prices, with
its financial attractiveness (high NPV: $1.8 bln and IRR: 18%) and long mine’s life. The quality and
geological reserve of the deposit are much higher than that of the Ok Tedi copper mine.
However, combined with the recent high-risk rating, change of mining laws (Mining (Amendment)
Act 200), series of litigations by the MPG and landowners opposing the DSTDS, and the quests for
increasing the national and local contents, put a BIG QUESTION is whether the Mining Forum will
eventuate in July 2021. My prediction, is that Newcrest may not want to talk about Wafi until after
the 2022 National Election.
The government proposes a social loyalty fund against these risks to entice the LOs to attend the
Mining Forum and sign the MoA to grant SML. “The K100 million development fund (PMJM
promises) is in the budget and available but landowners will not get the money if the development
forum is not held.” (Post Courier, June 23, 2021) – A band-aid solution?
At the development stage of a new project, the major controversy emerges at the investment
negotiation stages relating to national and local contents (fiscal benefit packages and benefit
sharing mechanisms), and social and environmental impacts rather than holistically opposing a
mining project.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS?