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Israel Goldiamond1
The University of Chicago2
The relation between talk about events, and what we otherwise do about
how we
them, is, of course, of interest not only to students of philosophy but also to students of
behavior analysis. The terms we use tend to classify our observations. They may thereby
dictate what it is thatwe admit as data, and govern our data collecting procedures. In a
scientific discipline, terminological problems can lead to the formulation of scientific
puzzles and to the pursuit of experimental problems which might otherwise not have been
1
Professor of Psychology in the Departments of Psychiatry and of Behavioral Sciences (Biopsychology),
and in the College. Mailing address: Department of Psychiatry (Box 411), The University of Chicago, 950
East 59th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637.
article was written with support
2This from a grant from the State of Illinois, Department of Mental
Health, entitled: "Self-Control Procedures: Variables in Training Social Agents and Patients in Construc
tional Diagnosis and Intervention." The author wishes to express his appreciation toMarvin Segal, Research
Associate in the Department of Psychiatry, for helpful comments and criticisms of sections of the manus
cript. The views expressed are those of the author. The figures were made by Mrs. Judith E. D. MacPhail.
49
eg., that there be two punishments, negative and positive, to parallel the two reinforce
ments; that passive and active avoidance be substituted for punishment and avoidance.
An overhauling seems overdue. The use of confusing terms is not restricted to behavior
analysis, of course. Nor
is the precise specification of different procedures always
accompanied by equal in the descriptive terms used for them. This is not an
niceties
apology for slovenly, confusing, or out-dated terms. Other disciplines live with such
terms (possibly not happily) as long as their procedural and relational referents are not
confused thereby. Here, I wish to address a different problem, not considered by the
suggested revisions. These revisions implicitly accept an extant framework of discourse
which can present problems more serious than terminological confusion. It has also
produced confusion in social application. An alternative framework addressed to these
issues will be proposed. This framework also specifies more closely than the present one
certain of the behaviors of the investigator in socially applied situations, and in some
cases also does so in a laboratory situation.
The two frameworks
to be contrasted are ( 1) the present unilinear framework which
describes behavior
by the contingencies into which it enters,3 and (2) a proposed
framework of alternative sets, which requires description not only of behavior and its
relation to environmental events, but also of alternative sets of behavior-environment
relations. In a previous discussion (Goldiamond, 1974, pp. 54-63) some of the alterna
tives were sketched and their relevance to unilinear descriptions was noted in passing.
Here, that discussion will be expanded insofar as itbears on the present terminological
issue.
The present unilinear system has only one well-defined set, with the behavioral
element designated as the response (R). The alternatives are
("competing behavior")
defined solely by negation or exclusion from that set. For a
example, key-peck with a
specified range of force may be R, with everything else excluded from consideration.
Machine definition can readily enter. It becomes redundant to consider
competing
behaviors, since R. This exercise can be
they merely complement logically trivial.
Further, the explanatory status of competing behaviors ismade untenable by the fact that
they are poorly defined as the open expanse of anything outside the boundaries of the
well-defined R set.
However, triviality is not the case when there are at least two well-defined sets. Such
designs are sample by research in concurrent behavior, but are not limited to them.
Indeed, the matching relation (Herrnstein, 1961) involves such "choice" (cf. Baum,
1974). The present discussion will consider as basic the situation inwhich there are at
least two well-defined sets. This situation will be considered as theminimal case of those
which have a larger number of well-defined sets; the present formulation treats only one
well-defined set as the basic one.
The two well-defined behaviors which enter into the two sets of behavior
environment relations of the proposed system will be
designated as target behavior (TB)
50
and alternative behavior (AB). A third class which is defined by exclusion of both TB and
AB will be designated as neither behavior (NB). The NB category can be subdivided into
other well-defined behaviors, and the classification can be extended, but for purposes of
discussion, two well-defined behaviors will suffice.
To any student of stimulus control, such a classification should present no conceptual
problems. Two well-defined sets typify op?rant research in stimulus discrimination and
stimulus control. Indeed, consideration of only-one well-defined stimulus set as basic,
rather than minimally-two, has led to differing experimental results. These differences
have been used to support and generate theoretical differences which are not trivial in
science or application.
In the instrumental situation in which there is only one well-defined set, Sd is
topographically defined as a stimulus, say, a key which is trans-illuminated red, inwhose
presence a response is consequential, and SA is defined as anything else, that is, the
not-red inwhose presence the response is inconsequential. Stimulus discrimination is
defined as differential responding between these "two." Generalization has been loosely
defined as responding to some stimulus other than the training one (Sd). Since no two
stimuli are every completely identical, the question of the extent to which Caesar will
keep putting his foot into a riverwhich differs from the one of original immersion, has not
been considered a trivial one. The curve which describes the functional relation between
(y) different rates, strengths of behavior and (x) stimuli which differ in their distance
from the stimulus inwhose presence control was established is defined as the generaliza
tion gradient. The stimulus dynamism of classical behaviorism is derived from experi
ments inwhich a "tent-like" gradient was produced, that is, the further the stimulus was
from the supporting pole (the original stimulus in whose presence reinforcement was
provided) on either side, the smaller its effects upon behavior. Control was considered
quite specific to the original stimulus.
K?hler' s experiment is one of the crucial experiments forGestalt theory as opposed to
behaviorism. Chicks found food available in a medium gray box rather than a light gray
one. When the light gray box was replaced by a dark gray box, the chicks should have
gone to themedium box, response towhich had previously been reinforced, according to
the classical behaviorist theory of specific stimulus control, as exemplified by the
tent-like gradient. Instead, theywent to the (different) dark box. Behavior was governed
by the relations between stimuli rather than by their absolute properties. Behaviorism had
been dealt a mortal blow and a configurational (Gestalt) theory was upheld! In applica
tion, educators sought to teach children to read by the contextual properties and
memorized form of the whole word rather than by the specific letter-sounds of the
alphabet.
What was overlooked at the funeral was that classic formulations rested on data from
situations with only one well-defined set, and K?hler used two. Indeed, behaviorism is
not discomfited in the latter case, which ismore representative of op?rant discrimination
research. Here Sd may be a well-defined red key in whose presence responding is
consequential, and SA may be a well-defined greey key inwhose presence responding is
inconsequential. The fact that responding in the presence of anything else is also
inconsequential, namely, responding to anything which is not red (including the key
51
when it is not illuminated or a bolt on thefloor) does not, in the usual discussions, lead to
formulations of red versus everything else. Stated otherwise, the discussions center on
differential responding in the presence of red and in the presence of green. Here, the
The discussion will open with a brief consideration of the highlights of the present
unilinear definitional schema. Detailed coverage is not attempted.
? The major contingencies which underlie the present de
Major contingencies :
are are on the left,
scriptive system presented inFigure 1. The presentation contingencies
and the withdrawal contingencies are on the right.
4
The procedure used was more complex, but the present description is close enough for our purposes.
52
merits. The uppermost line describes TB.5 The line below defines the consequences
which the experimenter arranges, contingent on the presence or absence of TB. The third
- -
R? R
0 0
?
JT1
O?
o
CB
Z LT CBZ
LT U LT
line describes the undefined set of all other behaviors (competing responses). Time flows
from left to right. A perpendicular line through all three lines describes contemporaneous
events.
"negative," depending on which the experimenter had introduced. Where this stimulus
is absent (withdrawal or zero state), the line is at the lower null position. Positive and
negative stimuli are not depicted opposites. Both are presentations of choice by the
investigator, and the presence of either is indicated by the same upper position.
In the presentation relations, positive reinforcement and punishment are both de
scribed by the same procedural schematic. They may be restated unilinearly in the
following manner:
[1.1] TB?? Event delivered.
If pTB then increases (or ismaintained), positive reinforcement is defined, and the
event delivered is assigned a reinforcing property. If pTB decreases (or ismaintained at a
lower probability), punishment is defined, and the event delivered is considered as being
aversi ve (or negatively reinforcing).6
In thewithdrawal relations, negative reinforcement and time-out are both described
by the same procedural schematic, restated unilinearly in the following manner:
5In the conventional notation system, TB is the response, designated R. It is so noted in the schematic
diagrams. For purposes of comparison in the text, it is referred to as TB, namely, the behavior which is the
53
contingencies in [ 1.1] and[ 1.2] were (positive or negative) reinforcement. If the effect of
[ 1.3] is increase inpTB, itcan be assumed that the prior contingencies were punishment.
Itwill be noted that description of the (behavior ?? consequence) procedures ( [1.1],
[1.2] ) differs from definition of the contingencies. These are defined functionally, that
is, by the effects the procedures have on behavior. The event delivered or removed is also
defined functionally.
The parsimony of the present definitional system is evident from
Figure 1, and may
have contributed to its staying power. Where TB is depicted as the same in both
presentation (left) and withdrawal (right) relations, the corresponding consequences
which are made contingent on TB will have identical temporal patterns, but are comple
ments of each other, in accord with differences between
presentation and withdrawal.
one of freedom is
Accordingly, only degree (df) logically necessary. For each contingen
cy, CB ismerely the complement of TB, since it is defined only by negation of TB. Only
one df holds here, as well. And reinforcement and
punishment are functionally defined
by opposite effects on behavior. Accordingly, attempting to explain an obtained effect on
TB by an opposite effect on CB (e.g., TB is maintained because CB is is
punished)
questionable on at least three grounds. First, since one df describes TB and CB, such
explanation ismerely a restatement and provides no logical gain. Second, ifan explana
tion in terms of TB is unsatisfactory, then by virtue of the
logical identity, an explanation
using an opposite function for the of TB must also be unsatisfactory. Third,
complement
whereas TB constitutes a well-defined CB is the
set, poorly-defined class of anything
else and can be regarded as an open set with questionable
explanatory value.
In summary, it should be noted that the present definitional
system is highly
parsimonious and logically elegant. It has served well to formalize much
laboratory
research. This elegant formulation has served to provide a framework for discussion of
laboratory findings which have suggested ever-expanding areas of investigation.
Discriminative and nondiscriminative avoidance: ? One other form of negative
reinforcement will be noted in addition to the escape contingency. Two avoidance forms
are outlined in
Figure 2. Discriminative avoidance is depicted on the left, and nondis
54
r r
o o
-
iti
s s
o o?
cb ? cb ?
o
- U-LT 0
-
the coupling terminates the presentation(s) at that point. During establishment, TB may
occur during the noxious component, thereby terminating it, as depicted by the shortened
consequence. This is the escape behavior of Figure 1. In the established state, TB
terminates or escapes from the preaversi ve stimulus, and the coupled noxious stimulus
is, accordingly, never delivered. It is avoided.
Since TB is defined by discrete occurrence, and nontarget behavior
a is anything else,
the conventional systems of description allow for only one df.
In the early stages of nondiscriminative avoidance (NDA), presented at the begin
a noxious stimulus such as
ning, a recycling timer periodically produces delivery of
shock. Absence of TB is accompanied by such cyclical presentation of shock. There is no
no warning is given. Each full cycle of the clock is indicated
preaversive stimulus, that is,
by an arrow. TB interrupts the clock cycle and resets it.As can be seen in the schematic
The scientific puzzle provided by NDA may be introduced by the following unilinear
statement of successful avoidance:
[2.1] TB?? Event not delivered (No environmental change).
Such behavior is characterized by itspersistency. If the experimenter disconnects the
descriptive:
[2.2] TB ~? Event not delivered (No environmental change).
This, of course, is extinction, cf. [1.3]. As far as an observer who is naive about the
actual contingencies (such naivete can also characterize the subject himself), Lines [2.2]
and [2.1] are identical, yet one is defined as a behavioral maintenance procedure, and the
other as an extinction procedure. Indeed, under the extinction procedure, well
established behavior can continue for an inordinate period of time.
Another puzzle is generated by the absence of stimulus change in [2.1]. Prior to the
establishment of successful NDA avoidance, there were no antecedent discriminative
stimuli associated with absence or delivery of consequences, and after its establishment,
there are no stimulus changes generated by themaintaining consequence itself! The issue
of explaining the persistence of behavior under such conditions has attracted considera
ble theoretical and experimental attention.
One resolution has been to reject reinforcement theory as inapplicable. Another has
been to use some term suggesting abnormality, such as compulsion. Yet another has been
to maintain that (negative) reinforcement is still operative, but it has become inter
nalized, hence its external (re)presentation is no longer necessary. It is here that the
two-factor theory (Mowrer, 1947) has been pressed into heroic service. This theory
opens with discriminative avoidance. According to the theory, the preaversi ve stimulus
becomes classically conditioned to the aversive event. This event is internalized as
anxiety. Accordingly, the preaversive stimulus produces anxiety (factor one). In ter
minating this stimulus, TB terminates (escapes) anxiety, and ismaintained as moperant
(factor two) by this consequence. In NDA, which lacks such stimulus changes, anxiety
builds up over time during the timer cycle. This is terminated by TB in accord with the
termination of the preaversive stimulus. As in psychoanalytic theory, the compulsive
behavior wards off anxiety. This time interval is considered as the conditioned aversive
temporal stimulus by Anger (1963), in a parallel theory which omits terms such as
anxiety. The "need to rationalize stimulus nonoccurrence as reinforcing" (Schoenfeld,
1969) has also been met by assigning the reinforcing function to other nonobservables
such as proprioceptive-kinesthetic stimuli, as Schoenfeld also observers. Increase inTB,
through attenuative punishment of CB, has also been pressed into service.
Sidman, on the other hand, has attributed the increase in response probability to
consequential (overall) reduction in delivery of shock (1962). And, in accord with this
interpretation, Hineline and Herrnstein (1970) note that a difficulty with "traditional
[avoidance] theories [is that they] . . .were conceived to explain responding to proce
dures that provide an immediate stimulus change after each response" (emphasis
mine?I.G.). Their experiment is one of the many generated by these interpretations,
and probably the most significant one to date. Indeed, the role
played by unilinear
description of the procedure (Line [2.1] ) in creating the puzzle is suggested by the
opening sentence of their study: "What is the reinforcer for avoidance responding?"
Their results support neither the overall shock reduction
interpretation nor the two-factor
theory, and question the ability of the latter "to define the substantive issues in avoid
56
ance" (p. 126). An experimental extension by Hineline (1970) is more definite in its
challenge to the two-factor theory. Space precludes further discussion.
Alternative Sets
Although the descriptions made will be set in the context of laboratory arrangements,
the formulations and outcomes so derived have often been extended to application and
purposes. ABis ignored. The outcomes so obtained in the present schema should be
similar to the gross expectations derived from an analysis of alternative sets, when AB
idles and TB alone is effective (left schematic). To the extent that similarity in expecta
tions occurs, the alternative-sets formulation does not violate present understanding. In
the present schema, competing behavior is the residual outside the well-defined re
sponse, which is effective. NB is also a residual when TB and AB are each effective
(right schematic). Here, the outcomes presently obtained should be the gross expecta
tions for the combination (TB, AB). However, the TB outcome, the presently-defined
"outcome", should then not be generally comparable for unilinear and alternative sets.
To the extent that an effective AB enters into a situation described unilinearly, TB can
become unpredictable. The second situation then becomes a requisite for understanding
and application. This point has been made for the laboratory by Schoenfeld and Farmer
(1970). For application designed to change behavior, and for understanding (theory)
derived from the natural environment, the differences are impressive. Use of unilinear
formulations, as will be noted, is not confined to behavior analysis.
It should be reiterated that the expectations presented are gross. They are not intended
to serve as a theoretical explanation of present schedules, nor as solutions to the puzzles
they present. Such explanation and resolution require a fine-grain analysis under condi
tions which make itpossible, namely, the laboratory. Nor are the expectations intended
to serve explanatory functions for themore "socially relevant" phenomena of applica
tion. Analogous immersion in these phenomena is also necessary. The presentation is
intended only to recommend a framework which may be more useful for fine-grain
analysis and application than the present unilinear one, and to explore relations to the
terminological issues raised.
The settings inwhich the two situations and their outcomes are compared will include
"pr?sentation" and "withdrawal" contingencies. These contingencies will be consid
ered separately. The former will be characterized as a setting in which there is a
57
similarly pair AB and contemporaneous stimulus events. The third set will pair NB and
contemporaneous stimulus events. Since this pair is defined only by negation of (AB,
TB), itwill be presented in full only when necessary.
TB
O? n n_TLn
?
?
o
AB
b
0 n
?
?
0
?
NB
0
-
TUUriuru
?
0_
As
is evident from the schematic diagram for TB alone
operative (left), each TB is
of a discrete event. whether
accompanied by presentation AB, occurring instead of TB
(b), or at some other time (a), is a zero state of the environment, as in
accompanied by
occurrence of NB. Nonoccurrence of NB (the competing response explanation) is
accompanied by a discrete presentation only if nonoccurrence represents occurrence of
TB, and not when it represents occurrence of AB. Even when AB idles, NB is not the
complement ofTB.
58
Extension of the schematics over time suggests that if the alternative sets are
continually in force, and they are accompanied by increase in pTB, with reference toTB
alone the procedure would be conventionally defined as positive reinforcement, and the
stimulus event defined as a (positive) reinforcing stimulus. Where pTB decreases, the
stimulus is assumed to be aversive and the procedure is defined as punishment. These
expectations accord with present formulations.
As is evident from the schematic diagram forTB and AB each operative (right), TB is
accompanied by presentation of an event, and AB is also so accompanied whether
instead of TB (b) or at some other time (a). NB is accompanied by a zero state, but its
nonoccurrence is always accompanied by presentation of an event. Accordingly, its
nonoccurrence becomes
explanatory (but see earlier discussion) only when AB is
explicitly effective. Under such conditions, as will be seen, it can become difficult to
define effects on TB. These procedures and outcomes are related to no existing designa
tions.
contingency thereby preempts TB. Inference is safe only when pTB increases (TB?? + ),
but prediction is then not possible.
If the joint environment effects are considered, the alternative sets from the subject's
vantage point are the following for [3.1a], TB alone operative:
59
Comparison of left and right sides indicates thatTB is the critical behavior here. The
discrete presentations for AB, NB can be considered "free" presentations.
-
A stimulus having been assigned + or status through functional scanning of [3.1],
itmight now be applied in a contingency to change TB. The expected long-range
outcomes may be inferred grossly from inspection of limits:
a. TB alone operative b. TB, AB each operative
- -
Presentation + Presentation Presentation + Presentation
TB lim-? 1.00 TB lim-> .00 TB lim-> .00
TB]
[3.2] AB lim-* .00 AB? >lim-? 1.00 AB lim-? .00
NB lim-? .00 1.00 A?] NB lim-? 1.00
|lim-> NB lim-? .00
NB)
Where either (TB, AB) approach lim?? 1.00, prediction of outcome of one is, of
course, impossible, since either can rise as the other decreases, or both can rise in a
variety of ways. A more interesting inference emerges from comparing the effects of
presenting 4- in [3.2a] and [3.2b]. The p(TB) should increase in [3.2a], but not
necessarily in [3.2b]. Expectations derived from one situation may not hold for the other.
The sets described when TB and AB are each effective are by no means trivial. A
social system which desires increase of some specified TB for individuals under its
purview must engineer the situation extremely carefully. As long as AB is present and
produces the same positive consequences as TB, itmay replace it, especially if it is less
costly or more readily available in the response repertoire. If theAB substitute is costly to
the system, it may attempt to decrease AB through means described as punitive.
Examples of such patterns are cheating, stealing, lying, or any one of a variety of other
shortcuts. Indeed, laboratory animals have also been known to engage in such shortcuts,
for example, discriminating the sound of their own relays, rather than the "approved" Sd
and SA. The experimenter also must ever be on the alert. Many patterns of neurotic
behavior may also be considered as examples of an AB class under the benign positive
stimulus sets of [3. lb]. The question of why the patient (or system) then applies for
therapy has already been answered. He may be "hurting" from the negative conse
quences^/?? also apply toAB in an effort to decrease it,or AB may be preempting TB.
History will enter importantly into the availability of TB, AB repertoires. The therapeu
tic effort described as pathological will focus on AB and itshistory, at least initially, and
may regard it as a class to be eliminated. However, the therapeutic effort described as
constructional will seek to ascertain from AB itsmaintaining consequences and seek to
program a TB repertoire which produces the same consequences. The history sought will
be relevant to such tasks (Goldiamond, 1974). A patient I interviewed at a state mental
hospital clearly indicated the existence of such alternatives. To attain sustenance and
shelter when he had outworn his stays at all the homes of his friends and relatives, he
could either engage in criminal behavior and be sent to prison, or engage in crazy
behavior and be sent to themental hospital, or engage in neither behavior and starve and
die of exposure. Viewed unilinearly, engaging in behaviors whose consequence is
confinement in a ward in a state hospital does not make "sense," hence is "crazy." Nor
does repeated self-infliction of pain make "sense," hence is "masochistic." Indeed,
60
much of classic psychiatric description is unilinear, and the classic op?rant unilinear
system is not alone in this regard. They both may represent a Zeitgeist inwhich such
was taken for The now be ? witness the
unilinearity granted. Zeitgeist may changing
attacks against "mechanistic" approaches. Returning to the patient under discussion, his
"crazy" behavior did not represent "psychosis," nor would criminal behavior have
represented "criminality." Both were AB which were maintained by the same conse
quences, namely, sustenance and shelter, albeit in different packages. The socially
a
approved TB, working for salary, was in his repertoire, but its availability was not in
the repertoires of prospective employers who avoided hiring him or who fired him when
they found out about his hospital record. His "psychotic" behavior, considered in terms
of alternative sets, made eminent sense, as did the behaviors of his employers. These
were not necessarily governed by his "labelling" as a psychotic, as some sociological
theorists would currently hold in a unilinear statement (Labelling?> Nonhiring). Rather,
they could be related to consequences to employers made by insurance companies, often
based on actuarial tables.
It may also socially useful to encourage AB, as when
be inventions and other
disturbing behaviors suggests that the social programs are not that rare, and that they are
of standard laboratory procedure, which involves a TB alone effective [3. la] paradigm.
However, to the extent that AB's are available [3. lb], for the same positive presenta
tions, the equation of TB^ discrete presentation with coercion may become inappro
The can escape the critical state of need by engaging inAB other than
priate. organism
61
the TB the system has established. It is not necessarily coerced intoTB. To get TB, the
or capitalizing on an extant history,
system might then facilitate it through programing
among other procedures.
Such design also relieves behavior analysts from the conceptual dilemma created
when a consequence iswithheld (zero state) unless TB occurs, and all other behaviors are
ill-defined. When is defined in terms of behavioral outcomes, that is,
punishment
functionally (Azrin and Holz, 1966), the results can be described either as punishment of
non-TB or reinforcement of TB. Since the defining procedures are identical, the terms
Nor does insistence thatwe
punishment and reinforcement appear to lose theirmeaning.
differentiate extinction (zero state) from punishment wash well given functional defini
tion under such circumstances. Conceptualization in terms of alternative sets helps
resolve the dilemma, and consideration of alternatives between sets of alternatives is
even more helpful.
Consideration of the joint-environment-effect when the subject overlooks AB has an
for
interesting implication for investigator reliance on subject's report of his experiences
The subject may ascribe his behavior to all kinds of other
explanatory purposes.
relations, and this can define superstitious experience. This can also be defined, with
respect to AB, when he overlooks TB when it alone is effective, or when both are. Of
course, if the investigator is similarly ignorant, he, too, may derive spurious relations.
On the other hand, both may be spurred to more careful investigation. In all events,
reliance on the subject's reported experience is hazardous, even when his report is a
"valid" indicator of his subjective experience, at least when the conceptual system is
described in terms of alternative sets.
TB -
0 ?
-
O o
b - a b a a b
AB AB
0
? J~L O
?
ru7L_n_n_a.
-
0 O
?
NB
O
-
Untnun nu
O -
62
As is evident
from the schematic diagram for TB alone effective (left), TB is
accompanied by a brief zero state. This is followed by a continuous presentation. AB,
whether occurring instead (b), or at some other time (a), is accompanied by a continuous
presentation. Occurrence of NB is also accompanied by a continuous presentation.
However, is accompanied by the substitution of a brief zero state only
its nonoccurrence
when TB occurs
instead of NB, and not when AB occurs instead of NB. Stated
otherwise, all occurrences of NB are accompanied by continuous presentation, but all
nonoccurrences of NB are not accompanied by zero states. NB is not the complement of
TB.
history, happenstance occurrence at the time, etc.), pAB may increase, and pTB then
decrease. Inference
concerning the prevailing presentation is safe only when pTB
?
the presentation is then negative. Such inference about the presentation must
increases
be distinguished, of course, from prediction of pTB. The former is possible for a negative
state only if pTB increases. This depends on AB.
Consideration of the joint-environment-effect here is analogous to [3. lj] for [4. la],
TB alone effective.
63
Comparison of leftand right sides indicates thatTB is critical; theAB, NB zeroes can
be considered as "free" discrete cessations.
-
The presentation having been assigned + or status through functional scanning of
[4.1], itmight now be applied in contingency sets to change TB. The long-term expected
outcomes may be inferred grossly from inspection of limits:
presentation for (TB, AB) effective increases pAB instead. Further, if pTB decreases
after being accompanied by discrete zero interruption of a continuous presentation, this
may occur because pAB increases instead when interruptions in a continuous negative
presentation are attached to each, or because TB accompanies interruption of a continu
ous positive presentation. Accordingly, functional definition of procedures and presenta
tions based on relations between procedures and changes inpTB is possible only when
positive or negative reinforcement procedures are applied either to TB alone (the
classical or (TB, AB) effective. Such definition is not possible when either
procedure)
punishment procedure is applied to (TB, AB), although it is possible when TB alone is
effective. The classical insistence on basing functional definition on pTB incremental
procedures, i.e., reinforcement, rather than d?cr?mentai punitive procedures turns out to
64
have beena happy choice when alternative sets are considered. Basing functional
definitions on
incremental procedures instead of d?cr?mentai procedures appears.as
simply arbitrary when a unilinear approach is used.
With regard to prediction of pTB, the same analysis which indicates that functional
definition is determinate only during reinforcement paradoxically indicates that predic
tion of pTB is determinate only when d?cr?mentai procedures ("positive" or "negative")
are applied. When (TB, AB) are operative, positive or negative reinforcement applied to
both may result in either an increase or decrease in pTB, with decrease occurring ifpAB
increases (TB, AB) are effective, punishment of each, either by applying
instead. When
a discrete presentation during continuous zero, or a discrete zero during continuous
presentation, should result in decrease of the effective behavior. When TB alone is
effective, either form of punishment should produce attenuation of pTB. Accordingly,
prediction of pTB is possible only when d?cr?mentai (punitive) procedures are used.
The statement that the effects of punishment are unpredictable appears to be a
generalization from limited conditions. The world outside the laboratory abounds inAB
sets, and such an analysis suggests that the continued social use of punishment may
reflect its predictive properties for TB, rather than reflecting ignorance of the lessons of
behavior analysis.
It is also instructive to examine negative reinforcement when (TB, AB) are operative.
Lewin (1935) places a child into a psychological box whose walls are impenetrable
barriers which radiate negative valences in all directions around him (e.g., Figures 13
and 14, page 135). Rather than engaging in TB, the child may "escape the field" by
lifting himself, so to speak, off the page along a different dimension through fantasy or
psychological withdrawal. Skinner notes that "if you make a student study to escape
or
punishment, then he will soon escape in other ways; he'll play hookey, be a truant,
become a dropout. Or he may counterattack. Vandalism against school property is easily
explained just by looking at the techniques schools use to control their students" (in
Evans, 1968, p. 34). Both stress the controls necessary to prevent AB, in contrast to the
ease of instituting positive reinforcement. Under negative reinforcement, AB "necessar
ily occurs unless especial measures are taken to prevent it" (Lewin, 1935, p. 125,
emphasis Lewin's). All of the foregoing comments about negative reinforcement are
unquestionably supported by social experience, but itdoes not necessarily follow that use
of positive reinforcement relieves the system of the necessity for taking "especial
measures ... to prevent" AB. Such socially-undesirable AB were noted in discussion of
(TB, AB) effective under continuous zero interrupted by discrete presentation. And it
does not follow that use of positive reinforcement is any the less coercive than use of
negative reinforcement. Noncoercion requires that "especial measures are taken." These
measures would not include tightening of barriers to prevent AB, but the opposite,
AB rests
namely, to allow forAB, so that the increase of system-defined TB rather than
upon considerations other than simple escape from the coercion of an applied positive or
reinforcement system. Other procedures have been discussed elsewhere (Gol
negative
diamond, 1974).
Prisons are, indeed, expensive both in construction and maintenance. Analyzed in
terms, what is about the may not involve their use
contingency expensive contingencies
65
expensive than discrete presentation of the same event. An applied behavior analyst who
seeks to "meliorate" in a socially-established
the conditions continuous (negative)
presentation institution by introducing some "positive reinforcement" in this situation,
at null states? within the confine of a
may best be introducing occasional continually
negative system. The time-out procedure can be cut of similar cloth. Indeed, removal of
freedom contingent on TB is relatable to the negative reinforcement situation just
described. In one children's home I visited, the time-out room could best be described as
a small jail on the premises of a therapeutic institution.Where the total environment is a
positive one, and the staff is pleasant throughout as a standard operating procedure, then
time-out may be inexpensive to introduce. Similarly, where the conditions are exceed
ingly harsh, for example, intense starvation and deprivation, as a standard situation
(recurrent famines), then negative reinforcement (occasional relief) may also be an
economical procedure to introduce. The change agent may readily find some people who
are "willing to sell their souls" for a slight respite. Citing the conditions under which the
procedures are inexpensive does not imply endorsement. It is simply intended to
demonstrate that comparison of the relative costs of different contingency systems
requires careful analysis.
Systems which institute procedures which disturb us can be viewed pathologically as
incompetent, malicious, "sick," and so on. Their institutional behavior may also be
examined constructionally. The maintaining consequences of such behavior may be the
optimization of certain cost-benefits. Other (TB) procedures may have been tried and
may not have produced such optimization. Other historical features may enter, as well as
present knowledge and availability of alternative procedures. The task of the social
analyst-programmer would seem evident, namely, to help construct and systematize
programs and demonstrate their effectiveness in producing the critical consequences
currently governing socially-disturbing procedures. All the ethical and co-contractual
issues applicable to individuals will enter. It would seem that we might divert to the
development of constructional theory and procedures some of the prodigious effort
The alternatives described when a recycling timer interrupts a continuous zero state
by presenting a discrete event, with behavior interrupting the cycle, are depicted in
Figure 5.
As evident from the schematic for TB alone effective (left), TB interrupts the timer
cycle, and the timer resets for a full cycle. The presentation is delivered on completion.
66
jxxiJri
?
?
o
When TB occurs at less-than-cycle (LTC) intervals, the timer is continually reset and
there are no presentations. AB, whether occurring instead of TB, or at some other time,
may be accompanied or followed by a presentation or zero, as in NB.
The joint-environment-effect noted earlier will analogously be present here, except
that its impact will indirectly affect presentation of an event, through itsdirect effect on
the timer. If both (TB, AB) occur at a rate sufficient to interrupt the timer cycle
continually, this will suffice to maintain continuous zero. However, the rate of neither
TB or AB alone may be so sufficient.
The alternative sets may be described as follows:
A. TB alone operative b. TB, AB each operative
TB-* Continuous zero TB?? Continuous zero
[5,1] AB?? Occasional presen. AB-> Continuous zero
NB-* Occasional
presen. NB-? Occasional presen.
+ ?
With regard to assigning or status to the presentation, scanning [5.1a] suggests
that ifpTB increases, the presentation functions negatively, and ifpTB decreases, the
presentation functions positively. These are derivable from current procedures. With
regard to [5.1b], the same conclusions can be derived from p(TB, AB). The procedures,
?
of course, are defined as nondiscriminative avoidance (presentation ), and DRO
(presentation + ). However, from the effects of pTB alone (the conventional basis for
stimulus definition), inference is hazardous. Either or both may increase or decrease for a
negative presentation. They should both decrease for a positive presentation. Inference
?
about the presentation is safe only for an increase inpTB (presentation ), but prediction
of pTB is safe only when d?cr?mentai procedures are applied.
67
68
panied by a zero state. InNDA, each TB is also accompanied by a zero state. Further, it is
the only response which has this consistent relationship. Both AB and NB will occasion
ally be accompanied by a negative condition. True, the zero condition which accom
panies TB in negative reinforcement was immediately preceded by a negative condition,
and the zero condition which accompanies TB in Sidman avoidance is not immediately
preceded by a negative state. Rather, it is preceded by the same condition which is
present when the behavior occurs.
However, successful avoidance through TB is
generally preceded by ahistory of negative presentations in the absence of LTC patterns.
Instatement of "free shocks" when TB is established might then increase pTB not
because of related increase in anxiety, but by reinstatement of a past early history when
increase in pTB eliminated shock.
In escape, the change in conditions from negative to zero has been interpreted as the
stimulus in negative reinforcement, but exactly how a zero state qualifies as a stimulus
has puzzled many observers. It may be assumed to be the functional equivalent of a
reinforcing event and may acquire this functional quality through the fact that the
alternative state of the environment is negative. In Sidman avoidance, the negative
alternative is occasional, but is historically relevant to TB. Conceivably, appropriate
occurrence of TB can facilitate occurrence of all theworkaday behaviors which are not in
the investigator's experimental purview, and which are governed by the consequences
contingent upon them. In successful avoidance, these are disrupted neither by the
As is evident from the schematic forTB alone operative (left) TB interrupts the timer
and the timer resets for a full cycle, with the continuous presentation then
cycle,
a zero. When TB occurs at LTC the timer is
interrupted by discrete intervals, continually
reset, and the continuous presentation is not interrupted. AB, whether occurring instead
of TB, or at some other time, may be accompanied or followed by a presentation or zero,
as is NB.
69
TB -
0
?
JTLJTI_TLITL
-
0
AB -
n (-^
AglTLnJTl TX
ururui
NB
-
O
Scanning [5.1a] suggests that ifpTB increases, the presentation functions positively,
and ifpTB decreases, the presentation functions negatively. With regard to [6. lb], the
same conclusions can be derived, but for p(TB, AB). However, for the effects on pTB,
inference is hazardous, with the same relations noted earlier obtaining, as they do for
prediction of pTB. The long-term expected outcomes may be inferred grossly from
inspection of limits:
a. TB alone operative b. tb, ab each operative
? -
Presentation + Presentation Presentation + Presentation
TB lim -* LTC pat. TB lim -> .00
tb]
[6.2] AB] AB]
1 lim-> ltc pat.
1.00-LTC 1.00 ab)
[lim-* [lim-*
NB] (TB) NB] nb lim-* 1.00-ltc-(tb, ab).
70
presentations, at least initially. The key lightmight go on or off when the timer is reset,
and then be faded out to establish nondiscriminative control. Space precludes further
discussion.
JTLJUJTLJTl^
tb
tb
0
? 0
?
JTL-TLJTUar^
? ?
h-h
-???v?
ad a a b a a b a a b a b
ab
oZTLTLTl_TL -TUTLn_n_n?n?
? ?
0 ?
>>>>>>>>>>> > >>->>
0? n_n_ji
_???>
nb
'grurLfiiriJJi^
- ? n
?
o
?
tin o n.
71
the cycle that a presentation interrupts the continuous zero state, and the timer is reset to
run its cycle. As is evident, the TB which are accompanied by presentations are those
spaced at greater than cycle (GTC) intervals. AB, whether occurring instead of TB (b), or
at some other time (a), is accompanied only by a zero state, as is NB.
Analogous joint-environment effects also hold.
Description of alternative sets requires three groupings, which are related to different
rates of TB:
a. TB alone operative
i. ii. iii.
TB zero Cont. zero TB rare-* Discr. pres. TB freq.^ Cont. zero
[7.1a] AB-> Cont. zero AB?? Cont. zero AB-> Cont. zero
NB-> Cont. zero NB-^ Cont. zero NB-^ Cont. zero
IfTB is absent, continuous zero ismaintained (i). IfTB occurs more frequently than
zero, itmay be accompanied by discrete presentations (ii), providing it is not so frequent
that a continuous zero is reinstated (iii). If rate of TB increases from a zero rate, then
increases further, then drops, hovering around a low rate defined by GTC intervals, the
presentation can be considered +. This procedure is classically designated as DRL
(differential reinforcement of low rates). If rate of TB is zero, or extremely high, this
suggests that the presentation is ?. The latter procedure might be designated as DPL
(differential punishment of low rates) and itmight be of interest to investigate the
conditions under which DPL results in absence of TB, or in an extremely high rate of TB.
Description of alternative sets when (TB, AB) are both operative also requires three
groupings:
b. (TB, AB) each operative
i. ii. in.
(TB, AB) zero^ Contin. (TB, AB) rare-* Discrete (TB, AB) freq. Contin
zero presens. zero
[7.1b]
NB-* Contin. NB-* Contin. NB Contin
zero zero zero
The same relations noted for TB alone operative [7.1a] also hold for combined (TB,
AB). However, except for (TB, AB) zero (i), their rates can vary independently of each
other.
72
Or Or
(AB, NB) lim-? high TB lim-? 1.00 TB?
rate (high or Ltc Him-^ 1.00
(AB, NB) lim-? .00 A?) or
(high
(low or 1.00-LTC) AB lim high LTC)
rate NB lim-? .00, low
limits approached are 1.00 or high rate (LTC, less than cycle intervals), low rate
The
(GTC, greater than cycle intervals), and .00. Itwill be noted that forTB, when (TB, AB)
are operative, a .00 rate, or a .00 or low rate (AB instead of TB lim?? LTC), or a high rate
(TB lim-?- LTC), can ensue. However, only an incremental outcome for TB can
functionally define the presentation. These definitional properties of the schedules are
similar to the others.
The situation when (a) no behavior produces no effects and (b) a high rate also has no
effects ("overeagerness"), but (c) a low rate is effective ("playing itcool") is, of course,
not confined to the laboratory.
A. TB alone effective
B. TB, AB each effective
-
tb ? tb
o ?
o
o ITU LTU
>??h
j"-^
ab a a b a b
ab
a a b
0
-^>>> ?> >>>>>>>>>>*>>>>>>>
o UU?Lf
nb nb
o^UTJTJJTJJL^^ o-1
?
U
73
The schematic diagrams forTB alone operative are presented on the left, and for (TB,
AB) operative on the right. Analogous j.e.e. hold. For TB alone operative, the alterna
tive sets, given three different rates, are described as follows:
1. TB alone operative
i. ii. iii.
TB zero-*- Contin. TB low^> Discrete TB high?> Contin.
zero
pres. pres.
IfTB is absent (i) or at a high rate (iii), the presentation is continuous, and only if it is
low (ii), is itaccompanied by a temporary interruption. IfTB hovers around this low rate,
-
the presentation can be considered ,with a temporary "restraining injunction" (neither
overdone, nor neveruseu; in effect. IfTB is either zero or at a high rate, the
presentation
can be considered + ,with a low rate
accompanied by discrete losses.
Description of alternative sets when (TB, AB) are both operative follows:
b. (TB, AB) each operative,
i. ii. iii.
TB, AB) zero-^ Contin. (TB, AB) rare-^Discrete (TB, AB) freq.^ Contin.
zero
pres. pres.
The same relations noted for TB alone operative [8.1a] also hold for combined (TB,
AB). However, except for (TB, AB) zero (i) their rates can vary independent of each
other. Inspection in terms of limits indicates the complexities:
a. TB alone operative b. TB, AB each operative
- -
[8.2] Presentation + Presentation Presentation + Presentation
(See 7.2- ) (see 7.2a+ ) (See 7.2b- ) (See 7.2b+ ).
As noted for [7.2], only an incremental outcome can functionally define the presenta
-
tion. In the "presentation" contingency , increment may define a presentation, while in
the "withdrawal" contingency, it
may define a -I-presentation. This is also the case in
positive (Figure 3) and negative (Figure 4) reinforcement. Reinforcement provides the
only possible basis for functional definition here as well as in the other situations
discussed.
One final set of schedules will be considered, simply to contrast itwith DRL. Here,
both a timer and a response counter are involved in the procedures to be discussed. Upon
the completion of its cycle the timer automatically resets the timer and the counter.
Nothing else is then programmed. A predetermined number of responses counted during
the cycle (that is, before the slate iswiped clean at completion), resets both the timer and
74
the counter but, in contrast to cycle completion, also interrupts the continuous zero state
by a discrete presentation. The alternatives are presented'in Figure 9. Analogous j.e.e.
can be derived.
As is evident for the schematic for TB alone operative (left), the timer recycles and
resets the counter when less than required (LTR) TB occurs during a cycle. If the required
TB
Ml I lllll,1111
II 11 1111 Mill
Hill,
NB-
0 un mn
urn
TTTTTT Ngrnn
-
?
-
0 wuui_nn
-->
5:
VUW V
number occurs during a cycle, the last response is accompanied by a presentation. Since
the timer is then reset, it is obvious that the duration of the TB-controlled reset is
governed by the time inwhich the requirement was met. A short time produces a short
cycle, at which time there is a presentation, and a longer time produces a longer cycle,
with the maximum being the setting of the timer, at which point there may be no
presentation, and the counter is reset. The alternative sets require two groupings:
a. TB alone operative
h.
TB zero, low Continuous zero TB high Occasional presen,
[9.1a] AB?? Continuous zero (every /?thTB)
NB^ Continuous zero AB?? Continuous zero
NB^ Continuous zero
75
Inspection suggests that if rate of TB increases, and ismaintained at a high rate, the
presentation is +. This, of course, is theDRH (differential reinforcement of high rates)
schedule. If rate of TB drops, and ismaintained at a low or .00 rate, the presentation is -.
This arrangement has no name, but might be called a DPH.
Description of alternative sets when (TB, AB) are both operative follows:
b. (TB, AB) each operative
i. ii.
[9.1b] (TB, AB) zero, low-* Continuous zero (TB, AB) high-* Continuous pres.
NB?> Continuous zero NB-* Continuous zero.
or
High rate of TB can represent either high TB (and low AB), high AB (and low TB),
both. Similarly, both or either can be low when (TB, AB) low, but each must be zero if
(TB, AB) zero.
The DRH schedule [9.2a+] has often been bracketed with DRL as arate procedure
which is opposite in effect. It is evident that such a bracketing is oversimplified. In
contrast to DRH, whose outcomes are straightforward, the DRL outcomes [8.2+] are
complex and wavering. Further, the procedures (Figures 7, 9) are not complementary (as
they are in the reinforcement and punishment of Figure 3), but are markedly disparate.
The "withdrawal" analogies to Figure 9 are presented in Figure 10. The predeter
mined number of responses interrupts a continuous presentation and substitutes a discrete
zero. Analogous j.e.e. may be described.
76
o o
->
5 K
? -
NB
0
NB
0 11
0
->
5r 5:
0e \aAA7 uwwww
0:
Decision Theory
One major logical extension will be noted, namely, decision theory. The simplest
two well-defined responses. A thirdNR class must
paradigm for decision theory requires
also be considered, although this class is usually implied. Although it is assumed that
-
other well-defined behaviors may exist and, indeed, are explicitly analyzed (n alterna
tives), the (TB, AB) case is considered the simplest expository case.
77
behavior-consequential relations, often in terms of net outcome for the entire matrix.
Decision theory can thus be considered an,extension of the cases which have been
presented, in which expectation of outcome also required such inspection.
Differential Reinforcement
78
applied behavior analyst who steps into such total institutions under the impression that
by substituting differential reinforcement for aversi ve control, he is tempering the
system, is deluding himself. His delusion is supported by a unilinear definition of
reinforcement as a positive contingency and the ensuing conceptual neglect of the
alternative class which necessarily enters into the definition of reinforcement. And he has
been surprised by the vehemence of the reaction. The alternative class is not neglected by
others. It is noticed by the subjects. They react to the excluded and much larger set of
behaviors which are treated to a neglect which by no stretch of the imagination can be
called benign, and to the system-imposed deprivation necessary to make the positive
consequence potent. In the mental hospital, this procedure is usually tempered by the
hospital's curative mission. However, where the administration neglects to supervise its
professionals or patients, gross abuses can also occur inmental hospitals and children's
homes. "Benign" neglect also characterizes those humanist approaches which
a
rationalize doing nothing for mental patient until he asks for therapy.
The parents or other custodians of a child whose behavior disturbs them often can not
simply do nothing until the child does the right thing. Depending on the urgency created
by the ensuing behaviors, they or the institution may apply physical or chemical
constraints to avoid such behaviors, or they may apply punishment when they occur.
Parents may withhold reinforcement ? for a time? and then yield, but the response
pattern in the meantime may have escalated. Thereby behaviors further removed from
parental requirements are reinforced. Programed (or nonprogramed) disaster can accom
pany programed (or nonprogramed) differential reinforcement or the humanist ap
proaches noted.
The practical difficulty of doing nothing when the response requirement is not met
outside the laboratory has already been noted even where the aim is scientific (e.g.,
Azrin, Holz, Ulrich, andGoldiamond, 1961). It is often insurmountable where the aim is
applied. The term, differential reinforcement, as then used, may then be only metaphori
cal.
procedures have been tapped for application is often obscured by describing the proce
dures in the language of laboratory differential reinforcement. Explanation of success in
such simple termsmay underlie the unfortunate statement by Hilgard and Bower (1966)
that "the practical use of the (op?rant) system is based on the complementary principles
of control through presenting and withholding reward. The supplementary principles of
stimulus discrimination and response differentiation suffice to inaugurate shaping
through themethod of successive approximations. Beyond that, all that is needed is the
experimenter's ingenuity" (p. 144). Indeed, training-courses and manuals for parents
and others often do not provide even as much.
The "experimenter's ingenuity" consists of applying procedures other than those
confined by the oversimplified formulations used. Itmay involve contriving situations
79
which will increase the likelihood of occurrence of the response required. Itmay involve
the selection of response-requirements considerably removed from the outcomes de
sired, and which are farmore probable than such targets. Itmay involve the development
of curricula in applied areas (Goldiamond and Dyrud, 1967). The issue often is the
program developed, and there is all the difference in theworld between telling someone
to reinforce differentially in a step-by-step manner, and the actual development of a
program, e.g., as by Sidman and Sidman (1967). The impression created in the former
case is that anyone can do it.Experience, training, and supervision are not required. The
picture of false simplicity created, as reflected in the distorted image of Hilgard and
Bower, may be related to accurate reflection of much practice, as reported, rather than to
distortions in theirmirror.
No pretense is made that adoption of a framework of alternative sets provides
conceptual solutions to problems whose resolution must be experimental. The
framework is one inwhich certain issues can be seen more clearly. It was noted that,
when applied problems are examined within this framework, the understanding of
successful solution requires more than is implied by the present oversimplified formula
tions. Among the things required is the consideration of a curriculum, that is, a program
(as used in programed instruction). A program may be considered as an active and
manipulative establishment of a sequence of events to produce an explicitly stipulated
outcome. A history may be considered a retrospective attempt to reconstruct a sequence
of events which have culminated in a particular outcome. An appropriate history, may,
accordingly, be said to be the resurrection of the program involved. Morse and Kelleher
(1970) report research inwhich a variety of different op?rant responses by monkeys was
maintained by scheduled-presentation of shock which was not relatable to any consequ
ences intuitively regarded as positive. Stated otherwise, shock by itself served to
maintain behavior. They ascribe their results to the schedules and to the history of their
establishment: "It should be understood that a scheduled performance represents what
has happened to a subject and as part of that subject's experience will determine its
subsequent behavior" (p. 182). Stated otherwise, the program, or history, is critical, and
it should simply be added that history should be formulated for laboratory animals, as it
must for people outside, in terms of the alternatives, past and present, involved.
Discussion
Presentations have been kept to their simplest possible forms. Only two well-defined
sets of behavior have been considered; in actuality, many more sets are often found. The
- -
alternative to + or has always been 0, rather than such combinations as 4- and or
4- + and +. TB and AB have either been related to the same consequences or to 0 forAB.
Schedules considered have been variants of CRF or a few inwhich a fixed timer-period is
involved. The joint-environment-effects have not been pursued fully. And so on.
Nevertheless, even wtih these limitations, some interesting patterns emerge. Among
these is the happy decision, made some time ago, to define the stimulus functionally only
by incremental effects on TB, rather than also by d?cr?mentai outcomes. This holds even
when the definitional system is strained by extending the defining effects toAB, as well.
Accordingly, itwould appear that the terms positive and negative reinforcement are
80
useful laboratory terms. The nondifferentiated use of the itxmpunishment also appears to
be a useful usage, since differentiation (negative and positive, Type I and Type II, among
others) serves no purpose in functional definition. Some savings may ensue from
winnowing terms from the two reinforcements and punishment, but their nicety in
functional definition may thereby be blurred. The cost of restructuring might also be
considered. Stated otherwise, a decision formulation is appropriate forwhat is, after all,
a decision. Of course, there are costs attached to any restructuring, but the question is
raised, are they justified by the benefits? In a different context, Michael (1974) has
elegantly argued that the choice between using statistical tests of significance and using
experimental analysis be examined in terms of decision outcomes. Favoring retention of
the terms noted is the fact that the typical laboratory situation, which can be described in
terms of TB idling, is sufficiently close to the situation described by a unilinear notational
system that terms derived from that system may still serve parismoniously. As long as
this laboratory situation is dominant, either in practice or conceptually, revision of the
three terms which derive from them should be considered with deliberation.
However, this does not necessarily hold for the status of terms such as positive and
negative reinforcers, aversive stimuli, and the like. Substitution of positive (+) and
negative (?) serves present laboratory purposes and also brings them more into line
with notations and descriptions in other disciplines (e.g., positive and negative sanc
tions, gains and losses), including those formally applying decision theory. And be
havior analysis can make a singular contribution by defining these terms functionally,
instead of the presents priori basis. However, their functional definition would derive not
from their effects on TB alone, but by considering the alternatives involved. The Law of
Effect, as was noted, refers to TB alone in a unilinear system. Definition through its
alternatives as well removes TB from itspresent central position. Itmust be considered as
one among equals. However, it is not thereby necessarily removed from privileged
attention. Conditions abound in which we focus on specific patterns for increment,
decrement, or other purposes. Even then, we must consider as equals the AB our
procedures may also affect in order to understand or control TB. In such a paradigm, the
laboratory condition when experimental control is such that AB is not affected, is a
limiting case which might be best encompassed within the same framework, namely, AB
idling, as has been done here. We have, so to speak, deprived TB of its exclusive control
of the reins, but not its title; it is no longer the exclusive conceptual dispenser.
It is also suggested that terms related to "withdrawal" contingencies might also be
reconsidered, together with that term What
itself. the stimulus is in such a case is always
a problem. Instead, we might consider arrangements whereby the investigator sets up a
continuous presentation, positive or negative, and then, for some period of time does not
do so (discrete zero). These can be compared, as has been done, to those arrangements in
which, for contingency contrast, he does nothing for a continuous zero, and then
term
occasionally presents a positive or negative event. It will be noted that the
presentation is used consistently throughout all contingencies. The relations of this
redefinition to application have been noted in the body of the discussion.
If the two reinforcement terms and the punishment term have a certain elegance in the
laboratory as long as the present one-defined-response laboratory system is regnant (and
81
will therefore probably remain with us for some time) can one make predictions, or at
least recommendations concerning their staying power if the one-response-system be
comes no longer standard? Certainly, such a restatement is by this discussion,
suggested
and implied by research such as concurrent schedules, choice and matching, theHerrn
stein and Hineline experiments noted, and the differences between tent gradients and
peak-shifts when analogous reformulation was introduced into discrimination research.
The discussion will be centered on the conditioning laboratory itself, since the terms
noted derive from its requirements. How well does thismodel account formore recent
data and formulations?
The use of the laboratory term reinforcement in application, has produced at least as
much confusion, ifnot more, than itsmodifiers, positive and negative. Reinforcement
has prior association with Pavlovian conditioning and, in the popular press, at least, has
led to confounding with op?rant procedures. Behavior analysts, whether experimental or
applied, have always had to take pains to explain the differences between op?rant and
respondent which, after all these years, are still not evident. This is true not simply for
popular audiences, but also for more sophisticated members of our literate culture.
Indeed, Kling (1971) notes the existence of confusion even among "many biological
scientists that these are merely two slightly different forms of the same procedure and that
they probably involve the same neuronal process" (page 566). He suggests that clarity is
facilitated when "we reserve the term 'conditioning' for themethods of Pavlov, and say
'instrumental' or'op?rant' training or learning when referring to the latter procedures"
{idem., emphases in original). If there is one termwe might dispense with readily, it is
conditioning. Its relationship to op?rant procedures has been implicitly tenuous for some
time. Indeed, Holland and Skinner ( 1961 ) open their still classic program (derived from a
section of Skinner's 1953 text) with respondent procedures. These procedures are
thereafter almost completely ignored. One gets the impression gained from a scientific
treatise of a few hundred years ago which opens with statements of fealty to theCrown
and the true precepts of the true Church, and having done so, forthwith presents an
independent coherent account; or from a Soviet textbook on experimental psychology
which opened with the indication that the contents to follow were in accord with and
inspired by Marxist-Lenninist doctrine, followed by a straightforward textwhich could
have easily been accommodated within the American range of offerings. Reconsidera
tion of conditioning might simply make explicit what is currently implicit. It
might
relieve introductory authors of the necessity for their Pavlovian introductions. If the
relation of op?rant procedures to conditioning is to be questioned, we might also
reconsider derivatives such as conditioned (conditional) reinforcers and unconditioned
stimuli.
Itmay be worthwhile to consider the very term reinforcement. Michael would
accept
this term and also punishment, and use the two and their derivatives (reinforcers,
punishers) as substitutes for negative-positive reinforcements, negative-positive rein
forcers, punishment, aversives, and the like.We run into some problems even with this
reformulation when we examine the situations for TB, AB each effective. Itwas noted
that under appropriate conditions, pTB can be decreased in the benign condition when a
consequence functionally defined as positive is also attached to AB. The resultant
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punishment, and various maintenances (of high rates, attenuated rates, zero or extinc
tion).
6. That along with (or independently of) the preceding recommendation, nouns such
as analysis and behavior (and the like, depending on context) replace the term condition
ing as the substantive which op?rant modifies. Wherever possible, we might shed
derivative conditioning terms such as unconditioned stimulus, conditioned reinforcer.
7. That we begin reconsidering terms related to behavior analysis, modification, and
similar compounds.
Although we do analyze behavior at all times, what we analyze is much more
extensive. And behavior modification is simply a misnomer. Sometimes in this area,
specialization which happens to characterize this area. Schedules define the precise way
inwhich consequences are related to behavior, for the environmental settings. (The point
has repeatedly been made elsewhere, e.g., Ferster and Skinner, 1957; Skinner, 1969).
Given identical availability of identical consequences, identical occasions, identity in
anything else necessary to define environments, and genetically identical organisms with
identical responses, different patterns of behavior will emerge if the precise ways in
which the consequences are related to behavior differ. Further, given the same sets of
schedules, whether behavior is sensitive to the new schedule or insensitive, that is, a
behavioral requirement for a previous one persists, will be a function of the serial order of
these schedules. These relations tend to be glossed over by statistical studies. They may
be subsumed under interaction variance, but this does not suffice. To these requirements
for analysis, the present discussion suggests the consideration of alternative contingen
cies. Behavior can increase or decrease for the same schedule, depending on the
7Skinner opens the book with the following definition of behaviorism:kk Behaviorism is not the science of
human behavior; it is the philosophy ofthat science." (p. 3). A behaviorist would then be one who expounds
that philosophy or uses it to guide his practice, and not necessarily one who uses certain experimental
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alternatives. Where possible schedule differences and alternatives have not been consid
ered, it is difficult to justify inferences of hereditary differences from behavioral
differences, when consanguinity variance and environmental variance represent 'the
major independent variables, or to justify a variety of other inferences being made.
It would be poor programing to recommend that these reformulations replace the
present ones m toto and immediately. Good programing suggests thatwe proceed slowly
and make those changes that our own requirements call for, examine the extent towhich
we gain or lose thereby, and so on. The basic procedural heritage we have been
bequeathed has been a goodly one, and can be used as long as is necessary and be referred
to as the original referent framework.
The limited presentation made has generally abided by the recommendations pro
posed, and the reader is invited to assess the effectiveness with which they describe
procedures, relations, and outcomes. The currently prevailing formulations are encom
passed by the framework proposed. Prevailing definitions and predictions are not
violated. Within the same proposed framework, other predictions, paradigms, and
schedules flow systematically, and are neither derived nor expected from the currently
prevailing system. Whether the apparent implications of the reformulation for the
laboratory are fulfilled requires experimental validation. However, their implications for
application are glaring. That the applied implications have been overlooked by experi
mental and applied behavior analysts singularly illustrates the powerful hold of an
intellectual formulation which, within itsown limited area, is elegant. The illustration is
all themore interesting in view of the fact that these applied implications have been noted
not only by those vehemently opposed to the system, but also by neutrals and friends?
and widely publicized. The intellectual formulation referred to is, of course, the present
unilinear framework. Critics have attributed its limitations and implications to experi
mental and applied behavior analysis. Unfortunately, behavior analysts have contributed
to this confusion by couching their presentations in unilinear terms. We can do ? and
deserve ? It that some of the critics were but for the
certainly better. may be said right,
wrong reasons and against the wrong target.
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