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Line Protection Operate Time; How Fast Shall It Be?

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DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3081993

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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3081993

Line Protection Operate Time: How Fast

Shall It Be?
SINISA ZUBIC 1, ZORAN GAJIC1 , AND DAVOR KRALJ2
1 GridAutomation and Communication, Hitachi ABB Power Grids, 72136 Vasteras, Sweden
2 Svenska Kraftnat, 172 24 Sundbyberg, Sweden

Corresponding author: Sinisa Zubic (sinisa.zubic@hitachi-powergrids.com)

ABSTRACT An ultra-high-speed protective relay has been an important topic within the scientific com-
munity, and specifically within the power industry, for decades. The main drivers are the anticipated
improvements in power system stability and power transfer capability which have become even more
important with the increased penetration of renewable generation sources. The relay operate time is a
relatively small part of the required improvement, since the circuit breaker interrupting time contributes
the major part of the total fault clearing time. The first promising results in reducing the fault clearing time,
from two or three cycles, down to one power system cycle, date back to 1976 when the relay operate time
of 1.5 ms was achieved. Availability of sub-cycle breakers was anticipated in the early 1980-s. Nevertheless,
almost forty years later, commercially viable 3/4 cycle breakers are still not available and their impact on
the total fault clearing time has been omitted from most of the literature. The numerical relays operate time
improvement has become the only goal and results are wrongly equalized with improvements in the total
fault clearing time and directly correlated with improvements in power system stability. In this paper the real
benefits of ultra-high-speed relay operate time are analyzed, considering the characteristics of the state-of-
the-art circuit breakers and their interrupting time of 1.5-2 power system cycles (older circuit breakers are
slower). A more holistic view, including interactions between protective relays and circuit breakers, as well
as final benefits to utilities, is given in the paper.

INDEX TERMS Power system protection, line protection, circuit breaker, power system faults, power system
stability, transmission lines.

I. INTRODUCTION on a traveling wave approach [3], was put into service by

The requirement for ultra-high-speed relaying arises from
the need for improvements in power system stability and
increased power transmission capability. The decrease of
fault clearing time reduces the synchronous generator rotor
acceleration during the fault, and consequently helps to main-
tain power system stability [1], [2]. With the increased pene-
tration of renewable sources, the total inertia in the system
has been reduced, which furthermore increases the system
acceleration during a fault, and thereby affects the stability
of the power system [19]–[22].
Achieving the ultra-high-speed total fault clearing time
has been an open question for more than 40 years. The first
promising results in reducing the fault clearing time, from
two or three cycles, down to one power system cycle, date
back to 1976 [2]–[4]. Then, an analog relaying system, based
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Nagesh Prabhu.
Bonneville Power Administration. Independent of communi-
cation channel the relay achieved an operate time of 1.5 ms,
while a dependent scheme with pilot channel had a 4-6 ms
operate time [3]. This operate time was near the physical
limitations, since no information travels faster than light.
Nevertheless, to achieve fast fault clearing time, improvement
of the circuit breaker speed is even more important. It was
expected that 3/4 cycle circuit breakers would be installed
in 1981 [2], [4]; yet today, forty years later, despite many
circuit breaker technology developments, reliable and com-
mercially viable 3/4 cycle breakers are still not a reality.
The push for improvements in relay operate time continues
still, despite missing key improvements in circuit breaker
operating speed. There are many studies on line protection
speed improvements where relay speed is considered and
incorrectly interpreted as the determining factor for improv-
ing the fault clearing time, ignoring the circuit breaker con-
tribution. To our best knowledge, a holistic view, whereby

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
VOLUME 9, 2021 1

FIGURE 1. Illustration of a fault clearance system that consists of
instrumental transformers, protection equipment and circuit breaker.
the performance of relays and circuit breakers are considered
in combination, along with their combined impact on system
stability, is not present in available literature.
In this paper, a new methodology for estimating the total
fault clearing time is proposed. The impact of relay operate
time together with circuit breaker interrupting time (i.e total
fault clearing time) on power system stability, is presented.
Relevant mechanical and electrical characteristics of widely
used circuit breakers were taken into consideration during
the analysis, together with different relay generations (phasor
domain, time domain and travelling wave approach). Circuit
breakers are also analyzed from the perspective of require-
ments from standards and their lifetime.
II. FAULT CLEARING TIME DEFINITION
Fig.1 shows a part of a substation where protection of a power
line is illustrated. In order to protect the line (or any other
power system element) it is necessary to have:
• instrument transformers – to provide measurements of
the most important variables related to the protected
element (currents and voltages),
• circuit breaker (CB) – to interrupt the fault current (to
allow physical separation of the protected element),
• protection equipment (protective relay) – to recognize
abnormal operating conditions of the protected element
and to trigger the circuit breaker operation when needed.
The trip coil and DC control voltage are also parts of the
protection system, while all of them together make the fault
clearance system [17]. The protection system complies with
N-1 requirement since each element is typically duplicated
for HV lines [25], while this is only partially true for the
circuit breaker. On the power system level, the performance
of the fault clearance system is relevant, not performance of
the protection equipment or circuit breaker itself.
The total Fault Clearing Time (FCT in Fig.2) is the time
between the fault inception and the moment when fault
current is interrupted. It consists of the relay operate time and
the circuit breaker interrupting time (if CB operates correctly,
otherwise it prolongs until a breaker failure scheme opens
2 VOLUME 9, 2021
S. Zubic et al.: Line Protection Operate Time: How Fast Shall It Be?
FIGURE 2. Definition of Fault Clearing Time (FCT), relay operate time and
circuit breaker interrupting time.
adjacent CBs). The relay operate time is the time between the
fault inception and the moment when the relay operate signal
triggers the CB to interrupt the current.
The circuit breaker interrupting time is the interval of time
between the beginning of the opening time and the end of
the arcing time. The opening time is the time between the
moment when relay signal appears to the CB trip coil until
the moment when the arcing CB contacts physically start to
separate. Vendors usually provide some average value and
variation interval for the opening time. After the arcing con-
tacts start to separate, the current continues to flow and final
fault clearing happens when the arc is extinguished, which
can occur only at one of the current’s natural zero-crossing
points. The time interval during which current continues to
flow is called the arcing time and thermal and dielectric
stresses require a minimum arcing time prior to successful
interruption at a fault current zero-crossing [16].
Due to the all mentioned factors there is an embedded
uncertainty in the circuit breaker interrupting time. An even
more important fact is that the nature of that time is discrete
since current can be interrupted only in the fault current
zero-crossing moments.
III. FAULT CLEARING TIME REQUIREMENTS FROM A
POWER SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE
There are two main requirements, at the power system level,
that could be related to the protective relay performances:
1) to minimize damage on power system equipment in
case of abnormal operating conditions,
2) to help maintain power system stability.
Both requirements imply that the fault clearing time shall be
as short as possible. Additionally, in the first case, the relay
needs to be selective since the unnecessary disconnection of
healthy elements affects more customers and system stability.
From the perspective of the transient stability of power sys-
tems, besides the speed requirement, a relay must be secure.
This means that the relay must not trip in the case of a
fault outside of its zone of protection or in the case of a
disturbance that is not a genuine faulty state. In the case of
a temporary disturbance, incorrect relay operation might lead
S. Zubic et al.: Line Protection Operate Time: How Fast Shall It Be?
FIGURE 3. Disturbance record from a 765 kV transmission line where a
temporary phase current disturbance occurs and extinguishes without
developing into a permanent fault that requires relay operation.
to a domino effect with resultant system blackout. There are
disturbances that never develop into a fault condition as well
as temporary faults, which can disappear after a brief time
interval. Protective relays require some time to distinguish
these types of conditions, for which they shall not operate,
from permanent faults, which must be disconnected. Such
events are very common at distribution voltage levels, but
they occur even on the highest voltage levels, where unnec-
essary relay operation can be very harmful. Fig. 3 shows a
record from 765kV network where a disturbance caused a
very high spike in phase A current, however the condition
disappeared by itself and currents returned to normal load
levels. The network operator does not want the UHV line to be
disconnected from the system in such a case. That means that
both too slow and too fast operation might negatively affect
the power system stability and availability.
A. POWER SYSTEM STABILITY REQUIREMENT
A common criterion for the evaluation of transient angle
stability is the Critical Clearing Time (CCT). It is defined as
the maximum time during which a disturbance can be applied
without the power system losing its stability [5]. The main
requirement for the fault clearance system (Fig.1) is to clear
faults faster than the CCT, considering worst-case scenarios
when the CB fails to break the current after receiving the trip
command from the associated protective relay. In such situa-
tions a dedicated Breaker Failure Protection (BFP) scheme is
used to ensure fault clearing within CCT by opening adjacent
breakers in the power system (Fig.4). The BFP will send a
trip signal after a predefined time delay if the fault current
is still present (despite the initial relay operating signal).
Typical time delay of BFP is between 7.2 cycles and 15 cycles
(144 ms – 300 ms in 50 Hz systems [6]). As an example,
in recent years in China Southern Grid (CSG) several cases
of breaker failures occurred and CCT of some 500kV stations
was around 350 ms [6].
Despite all these aspects, in most of the scientific publi-
cations, a simplified interpretation of protection systems is
present, whereby only the relay operate time is considered as
the important part of the overall protection system. There is
an assumption that each millisecond of faster relay operate
time directly results in improved FCT [14] and consequently
improved power system stability [23], however, this con-
VOLUME 9, 2021
FIGURE 4. Total fault clearing time when breaker failure protection
initiates the fault clearing.
FIGURE 5. Illustration of how different relay operate time does not
impose a difference in total fault clearing time: a) relay operating at 11
ms causes FCT of 36.6 ms and arcing time of 7.6 ms; b) ultra-fast relay
operating at 1.5 ms causes the same FCT of 36.6 ms and prolonged arcing
time of 17.1 ms.
clusion is not supported by results presented in this paper.
Fig.4 illustrates that transient stability relies on the total fault
clearing time with BFP, while relay operate time takes just a
small fraction of that time.
The impact of the relay operate time is not as high as
expected, even in cases where the CB operates without prob-
lems (fault clearing time from Fig.2). Fig.5 shows an example
whereby a significant reduction of relay operate time does
not lead to any reduction in FCT, since circuit breaker design
limitations, (operating principle as well as the fault-circuit
physics) do not allow for instantaneous current interruption.
In the illustrated example a commercial CB with an opening
time of 18 ms and a minimum arcing time of 7.6 ms is
considered. In Fig.5a we see that relay operate time of 11 ms
allows the minimum required arcing time of 7.6 ms which
leads to fault current interruption after 36.6 ms (during the
third zero-crossing). In the case of a much faster relay operate
time of 1.5 ms (Fig.5b) the current interruption at the second
zero-crossing is not possible since the arcing time is shorter
than the required minimum value. Therefore, the current
interruption occurs again at the third zero-crossing, with
identical FCT of 36.6 ms. It is not only that the faster operate
time has not lead to a shorter FCT, but instead, the circuit
breaker was exposed to much higher stresses since the arcing
time was significantly longer (17.1 ms instead of 7.6 ms)
causing higher wear of the CB arcing contacts which further
contributes to the reduction of its service lifetime [7], [16].
For this reason, the relay operate time is not relevant by itself;
only the fault clearing time has a meaningful effect on the rest
3

of the power system. From the perspective of power system
stability, the FCT with BFP scheme is relevant, as shown in
Fig.4.
It is important to notice that in the given example a single-
phase to ground fault is considered as the most optimistic
scenario. In case of two-phase or three-phase faults the fault
clearing times will be somewhat longer since fault current
interruption in each phase will occur at different time instants,
due to the phase displacement of individual phase currents.
Sometimes series capacitors are used on transmission lines
to increase the line transfer capability; however, there are
several negative impacts of series compensation on the perfor-
mance of the line relay protection and the line circuit breaker.
A well-known impact on line protection is that the change
of line series impedance can pose a problem to distance pro-
tection. To overcome this, there are several modern solutions
based on communication schemes, which from the perspec-
tive of this study do not greatly impact the relay operate
time [11], [12], [14], [27]. Also, it should be observed that the
accumulated energy in the series capacitance will expose the
circuit breaker to higher transient recovery voltages [28]. The
resultant prolonged total fault clearing time, will exacerbate
the results presented in this study.
Additionally, according to the international standards
[8], [9] the asymmetrical breaker rating is based on the refer-
ence that the relay operate time is not faster than a half-cycle
of power-frequency (10 ms for 50 Hz and 8.3 ms for 60Hz).
If relay operate time is made shorter, it will lead to a higher
percentage of d.c. component at contact separation and in
the worst-case scenario a circuit breaker might not be able to
interrupt the fault current. In other words, if faster protection
is used, it might be required to derate the CBs and/or perform
additional system studies to verify if the CBs are still able to
operate properly [10], [24]. This is another factor that needs
to be considered when the speed of protection is discussed.
It would be incorrect (based only on Fig.5) to conclude that
faster operate times are not beneficial. There are other factors,
such as fault inception angle and current magnitude, where a
faster relay operate time will lead to a faster FCT. For this
reason, it is important to use a methodology that considers
all of the important factors, and shows the real difference
in FCT for varying relay performances and considers all of
the pros and cons relevant to power system stability. A new
methodology for such assessment is proposed and presented
in Section IV.
IV. FAULT CLEARING TIME EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
The starting point in the proposed methodology is the model-
ing of all relevant system elements. In order to consider all
the uncertainties in power systems (such as fault location,
source impedance, fault inception angle), different fault cur-
rent waveforms were simulated on a network model. All the
variations in relay operate times were statistically modeled
and sorted into three generations of protection devices. The
circuit breaker’s complex physics is statistically modeled
based on ranges of opening and arcing times obtained from
4 VOLUME 9, 2021
S. Zubic et al.: Line Protection Operate Time: How Fast Shall It Be?
the type tests of a widely used CB model and addition-
ally, using statistics from CB operations in China Southern
Grid [6]. Finally, >1 million fault cases were simulated and
average fault clearing times were calculated for each one of
the three generations of protective relays.
A. IMPACT OF POWER SYSTEMS ON FAULT
CLEARING TIME
In Fig.5, a situation is illustrated where the case of fault cur-
rent zero-crossings occurring at 17 ms, 22.5 ms and 36.6 ms
after fault inception, and relay operate time from 1,5 ms
to 11 ms, did not change the total fault clearing time. It is
obvious that for different zero-crossing moments and/or cir-
cuit breaker characteristics the impact of the relay operate
time will differ. In order to have a fair evaluation, a wide
range of fault current asymmetry levels were used, resulting
in a different time spread of fault current zero-crossings –
different peaks and duration of last major and minor loops,
as shown in Fig. 6.
The set of 48 asymmetrical fault current waveforms and
corresponding zero-crossings were obtained from simula-
tions of power line faults where:
• fault inception angle was selected from 0◦ to 330◦ (with
30◦ steps),
• fault location is varied to achieve different levels of d.c.
component (faults close to busbar, at 40 km, 80 km and
120 km).
As an illustration, in Fig.6, 12 waveforms are shown for
sets of faults close to the busbar and relay location. The first
six zero-crossings are recorded for each of the 48 waveforms
and are used for further calculation of fault clearing time
distribution.
B. IMPACT OF PROTECTIVE RELAYS ON FAULT
CLEARING TIME
The relay operate time depends on a number of factors: the
protection algorithm type, hardware and software limitations
(algorithm execution interval, bandwidth of internal filters,
speed of output contacts), accuracy of measurement chain
(CT saturation, CVT transients, noise) and a number of exter-
nal factors (fault inception angle, fault location, power flow,
fault resistance etc.). To get exact values it would be required
to use products from different vendors with correct settings
and test them in a hardware-in-loop setup with a large number
of test scenarios, which is not practical.
The proposed approach is to divide all numerical relays
into three generations, which should cover the main algorithm
types and hardware limitations.
I generation line protective relays are based on low
sampling frequency (from <1kHz till a few kHz) and
phasor-domain (PD) algorithms [11], [12] (or some hybrid
with incremental quantities). Operate times in the range
of 8 ms – 20 ms are assumed, which should cover the majority
of cases.
II generation line protective relays use higher sampling
frequency (4 kHz – 10 kHz) and time-domain (TD) algo-
S. Zubic et al.: Line Protection Operate Time: How Fast Shall It Be?
FIGURE 6. Different zero-crossing moments used for calculation of fault
clearing time with different generations of protective relays (50 Hz system
considered).
FIGURE 7. Distribution of operate time in case of three generations of
line protective relays, used for evaluation of FCT.
rithms (usually incremental quantities and differential equa-
tions instead of phasor approach [13], [14]). In the analysis
operate times in the range of 3 ms – 8 ms are assumed.
III generation line protective relays use high sampling
frequency (≥1 MHz) and traveling wave (TW) based algo-
rithms [14]. Operate times in range of 1.5 ms – 3 ms are
assumed.
The distribution of relay operate times used in the evalua-
tion of the total fault clearing time are shown in Fig. 7. A uni-
form distribution of the operate times is assumed and there
are, in total, 10,000 operate time values for each generation
of relays used in the testing.
C. IMPACT OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON FAULT
CLEARING TIME
The circuit breaker technology is a wide topic that goes
beyond the scope of this paper. In this study the focus is
only on CB opening and arcing time as the most relevant
parameters that contribute to the fault clearing time. It needs
to be clarified that complex arc physics and transient recovery
voltages (TRV) were not directly considered. Instead, the
proposed approach was to take statistical representations of
opening time and arcing times as a model of CB behavior.
It was assumed that the circuit breaker model’s interrupt-
ing performance, would remain consistent as on reference
type tests. Rated opening time was also assumed to remain
unchanged. Reference type tests used were the same as con-
sidered by IEC 62271-100 - basic short-circuit test-duties:
T10, T30, T60, T100s, T100a and short-line fault tests: L90,
L75. This was deemed sufficient to cover almost all possible
fault cases in transmission grids and hence provide the rele-
vant insight into the true contribution of relay time to FCT.
Two scenarios were used to evaluate the model perfor-
mance: type test data of a state-of-the-art circuit breaker
VOLUME 9, 2021
TABLE 1. Arcing time ranges in different type test scenarios.
FIGURE 8. Distribution of circuit breaker interrupting time, used for
evaluation of FCT: a) model based on factory testing of selected CB
model, b) CB model based on records from CSG.
model and records of CB interrupting time from an actual
power grid.
For the first scenario, the characteristics of a widely
used SF6 live-tank circuit breaker type were chosen. Circuit
breaker interrupting time can differ largely, depending on
the design, voltage level as well as on fault type and incep-
tion angle. Since this analysis is considering transmission
system stability problems, one of the best SF6 high-voltage
circuit breakers (420 kV, 63 kA) was selected for model-
ing. This circuit breaker type has been applied worldwide
during the last 30+ years. The rated opening time of this
circuit breaker is 18±2 ms. Minimum and maximum arc-
ing times that were used for modeling were derived from
420 kV based type tests performed in an independent and
ISO/IEC 17025 accredited laboratory. These are summarized
in Table 1.
The range of the arcing times used in the model was
selected such that the shortest of the minimum values (7.6 ms)
and longest of the maximum values (21.9 ms) were cho-
sen and uniform distribution was applied. Combining the
selected minimum and maximum arcing times with the range
of rated opening times (18±2 ms) produces a uniform distri-
bution of the circuit breaker interrupting times in the interval
from 23.6 ms to 41.9 ms, as shown in Fig.8a. The CB has
three independent operating mechanisms - one for each pole
(phase) – which sometimes can make it possible for the
single-phase to ground fault to be cleared only in affected
phase. In this scenario single-phase to ground faults are only
considered, while FCT for other types of faults will be even
longer than the one presented in this paper.
Similarly, data from the second scenario, a study con-
ducted in China, were used for additional evaluation [6].
The study provides data collected over several years in the
5
 S. Zubic et al.: Line Protection Operate Time: How Fast Shall It Be?

China Southern Grid at 550 kV level and contains 2,710 CB

operations. The data is used to generate the distribution from
Fig.8b. where percentages in 10 ms time intervals are pro-
vided in [6]. The difference in the range of the CB interrupting
times in Fig.8 a and b could be due to the presence of CBs
with different characteristics and due to some percentage
of two-phase and/or three-phase faults among 2,710 fault
incidents. Since data is not specific on the minimum recorded
breaker interrupting time, and since all major CB manufactur-
ers mostly use identical designs for both 420 kV and 550 kV
rated CBs, the minimum value of 23.6 ms as in the first
scenario is assumed. The maximum recorded break time was
74 ms and it is used as well in our model.
FIGURE 9. Distribution of fault clearing time for three generations of line
protective relays – CB model based on factory testing.
D. TESTING METHODOLOGY
The question is how to calculate the average fault clear-
ing time for each generation of relays? It is considered
that 48 fault current waveforms (example of first 16 shown
in Fig.6) are good representations of all the scenarios in a
power system, despite being a discrete set of the zero-crossing
moments. For each of these waveforms a set of 3 × 10.000
calculations of the fault clearing time were performed. The
algorithm’s steps are:
1. Take 48 fault current waveforms (more precisely their
FIGURE 10. Comparison of average FCT for three generations of
zero-crossing moments) and for each of them run protective relays – CB model based on type testing.
step 2;
2. Run a loop of 10,000 repetitions and in each of them: TABLE 2. Fault clearing time limits – scenario with circuit breaker model
based on type testing.
a. take one relay operate time from Fig.7 for each of
three relay generations;
b. take one CB interrupting time from its distribution
(Fig.8a);
c. add CB interrupting time to PD, TD and
TW operate times and find the first following zero-crossing (as in Fig.4a). If different relay generations are
zero-crossing moment for the selected waveform; compared it is shown that using TD protection, instead of PD,
d. record the FCT for PD, TD and TW relay; reduces the average FCT by 8.68 ms or 16.7%. The maximum
3. Calculate average FCT for PD, TD and TW relay (out FCT is improved by 11.8 ms or 16.5%. In 23.9% of fault
of 10,000 values for each of them); cases both algorithms cleared the fault in the same time (as
4. Calculate percentage of cases where different relay illustrated in Fig 4).
generations have the same FCT; Using TW protection, instead of TD, reduces the average
The same steps were executed in another scenario where FCT by 3.12 ms or 7.2%. The maximum FCT is improved
in 2.b, the CB interruption time distribution from China is by 4.2 ms or 7%. In 68% of fault cases both algorithms
used (Fig.8b). cleared the fault in the same time (as illustrated in Fig 4).
Theoretically, the minimum FCT could be improved up to
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 1.5 ms, but in this simulation there was no such case.
A. SCENARIO WITH FAST CB
In Fig. 9, Fig. 10 and Table 2 the results from the simula- B. SCENARIO WITH DIFFERENT CIRCUIT BREAKERS
tion explained in Section IV, are summarized. As expected, FROM CSG 550KV TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
the phasor domain algorithm has the most widely spread In Fig. 11, Fig. 12 and Table 3 the results from the scenario
distribution and the longest FCT, due to the wide range of based on 2,710 CB operations in China Southern Grid at
operate times. Also, the large number of simulations showed 550 kV level are summarized. The distribution of the CB
that the minimum FCT for all algorithms is approximately interrupting time is modeled, and 10,000 cases are generated
the sum of the minimum CB interrupting time (Fig.8) and (Fig.8b). Since the spread of CB interrupting times is much
minimum relay operate time (Fig.7). Those are the ‘‘lucky wider, due to the possible differences that various CB models,
shots’’ when the relay is fast, CB opening time is at the shorter brands and designs present in the sample, it results in a wider
end and the trip comes at such a moment that the arcing spread of the total FCT. As a consequence, the average FCT
time is just enough to clear the fault current in the nearest for each generation of relays increased by 3-4 ms.

6 VOLUME 9, 2021
S. Zubic et al.: Line Protection Operate Time: How Fast Shall It Be?
FIGURE 11. Distribution of fault clearing time for three generations of
line protective relays – CB model based on records from CSG.
FIGURE 12. Comparison of average FCT for three generations of line
protective relays – CB model based on records from CSG.
TABLE 3. Fault clearing time limits – scenario with circuit breaker model
based on records from china southern grid.
Using TW protection, instead of TD, reduces the average
FCT by 3.29 ms or 7%. The maximum FCT is improved by
5.2 ms or 5.71%. The minimum FCT was improved by 2.5 ms.
In 66% of fault cases both algorithms cleared the fault in the
same time (as illustrated in Fig 4).
In Fig.13 the distribution of FCT records from CSG [6]
(CB plus relay operate time) are shown. The range of the
results fits well into simulated results from Fig.11a, while
FCT distribution is between simulated PD and TD protection
since more FCT were in the range of 40 ms – 50 ms than in
the range of 50 ms – 60 ms.
VI. FAULT CLEARING TIME IMPROVEMENTS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE POWER SYSTEM
The results show that ultra-high speed protection based on
TW is capable of clearing faults in about 25 ms, albeit only in
a very limited number of cases. Overall speed improvements
are very modest, since both the average and the maximum
FCT improvements were below 10%, when compared to the
time-domain based algorithms. The main reason for this is
the physics of the short-circuit current interruption process
and associated circuit breaker technology, which allows for
fault current interruption to take place only at a few discrete
moments which are separated by approximately half the time
period increments of the power-frequency cycle: 10 ms at
50Hz and 8.33 ms at 60Hz. For this reason, two out of three
VOLUME 9, 2021
FIGURE 13. Distribution of fault clearing time based on 2,710 fault
records from installed relays in CSG.
faults will be cleared in the same time for both generations of
relays.
Such a small improvement in FCT cannot justify the risk of
maloperations as a result of unsecured relay operation (Fig.3).
Some of the situations whereby disturbances could wrongly
be interpreted as genuine faults within the protection zone
are [14], [15], [24]:
• parallel line faults that induce traveling waves in the
protected line,
• lightning strikes,
• operation of surge arresters,
• operation of the bypass breakers on series capacitors,
• contamination of isolators (organic or chemical)
• encroaching vegetation,
• brush fires.
Slightly better improvement in FCT was achieved with TD
based protection when compared to the slowest, PD protec-
tion; but even in that case, both the average and the maximum
FCT improvements were below 20%. This reinforces the
point that relay operate time cannot be analyzed separately
from circuit breaker interrupting time, which is an equally
important part of the fault clearance system (Fig. 1).
Are those FCT improvements relevant for the transient
stability of a power system? The power system stability must
be secured for the worst-case scenarios and cannot rely on
a few cases where ultra-fast FCT is achieved. The presented
reduction in the maximum FCT cannot be taken as an impor-
tant factor since the ultra-fast protection is not 100% depend-
able, and also, there are faults which would not be detected
with such algorithms, whereas slower and more dependable
algorithms will pick them up. Therefore, the power system
stability must be preserved in such situations; even if circuit
breaker fails to operate.
To secure power system stability, a more reasonable
approach is to secure the fault clearance time below the
critical clearing time in a power system through optimization
of the breaker failure scheme, as presented in a study from
China Southern Grid [6]. If in a particular location in the
network the critical clearing time is shorter than the possible
fault clearing time (with the breaker failure scheme), then
it is necessary to use two breakers in series, preferably of
the same make/type [18]. In such a case, at least one of the
breakers will interrupt the fault and the total clearing time will
be close to the shortest possible with existing circuit breaker
technology. There is also an alternative proposal for using a
breaking resistor for large thermal generators to increase the
critical fault clearance time [26].
7
 S. Zubic et al.: Line Protection Operate Time: How Fast Shall It Be?

publications was that each millisecond of reduced relay oper-

ate time is contributing directly to system stability and as such
generates the ‘‘need-for-speed’’.
The results presented in this study do not support such
assumption. The ‘‘need-for-speed’’ approach is far too
simplistic since it does not consider the physics of the
short-circuit current interruption process and associated cir-
cuit breaker technology limitations, nor the fact that system
FIGURE 14. Fault clearing time in case of an ideal fault clearance system
where relay is operating in a perfect moment to allow the minimum fault
stability relies on the worst-case scenarios, rather than on
clearing time and minimum damage to CB contacts. occasional ‘‘lucky shots’’ when very fast fault clearing time
is achieved.
VII. WHAT WOULD BE AN IDEAL PROTECTIVE RELAY?
The results show that a significant reduction in relay oper-
Since the ultra-fast relay operation does not compensate for
ate time brings only a very modest reduction in total fault
limitations of the state-of-the-art circuit breaker technology,
clearing time (below 20% for TD and below 10% for TW
the question is what the characteristics of an ideal protective
protection). The main reason is because circuit breakers are
relay under given conditions, should be?
still a relatively slow part of the fault clearance system with
An ideal protective relay would operate to achieve mini-
their opening and arcing time limitations. Additionally, fault
mum fault clearing time and at the same time would cause
current zero-crossings are a natural limiting factor that cannot
minimum contact erosion of the circuit breaker by causing
be completely compensated for only by a shorter relay oper-
arcing time close to the minimum value, as shown in Fig.5a.
ate time. As it was indicated 40 years ago, the only way to
A security window, after the fault inception time, would be
improve FCT is to improve both the protection and the circuit
used to distinguish disturbances from faults (Fig.14), but at
breaker part of the fault clearance system.
the same time the fault current waveforms and zero-crossing
From the power system stability perspective, the effect of
moments (ZC1-3) would be estimated. It would also be
the ultra-fast relay operation is more likely to be negative
required to know/estimate the CB opening time and the min-
rather than positive. The minor reduction in FCT cannot
imum arcing time, with a narrow margin.
justify the risk of maloperations related to the fact that the trip
If such estimation would be possible, the relay would
decision is made in a very short time frame, when it is hard
subtract the estimated CB interrupting time from the targeted
to distinguish brief transient disturbances from actual faulty
zero-crossing moment (in this example ZC3) to determine
conditions (Fig.3).
the ideal operating moment for the relay. That means that
Finally, the International Standards for circuit breakers do
the relay would not operate as fast as possible, but would
not consider relay operate times shorter than a half cycle.
intentionally wait for the right instant in time. The waiting
Shortening this time would potentially require derating of the
time could also be used for an additional security check, so if
circuit breaker or repetition of type tests, and could negatively
the fault current, for any reason, disappears (as in Fig.3),
affect its service lifetime by increasing the amount of cumu-
the operating signal would not be released, to additionally
lative interruption stresses.
improve protection security. This would be a perfect fault
When all these factors are taken into consideration, instead
clearance system where the protective relay and the circuit
of the ‘‘need for speed’’, a more reasonable expectation for
breaker are synchronized to deliver the fastest FCT and the
protective relays is to have an operate time close to the half
longest CB lifetime.
cycle time: 10 ms at 50 Hz or 8.33 ms at 60 Hz. Such a
This is not a new idea since an algorithm for controlled
‘‘sweet spot’’ is not harmful for the design of commercial
fault interruption is developed and presented in [16]. The
circuit breakers. Within this time interval a relay can securely
algorithm for optimized CB arcing time is based on prediction
distinguish real faults from disturbances and avoid triggering
of the future current zero-crossing moments, and with the
events that might lead to a blackout. For further improvement
objective to reduce the electrical stress and wear on circuit
of FCT, as correctly assumed 40 years ago, it is necessary to
breakers. The current zeros were predicted with ±1 ms accu-
have significant improvements in circuit breaker technology.
racy. Despite this, even more than 15 years later, the algorithm
Meanwhile, to secure power system stability, if in a particular
has not been implemented and tested in real life. One of
location in the network the critical clearing time shall be
the main challenges is uncertainty in predicting the circuit
shorter than the possible fault clearing time (with already
breaker minimum arcing time, which depends on a number
optimized breaker failure scheme), then it is necessary to
of factors (e.g. fault parameters in Table 1) and changes over
either use two breakers in series or a braking resistor.
time. As well, such prediction should be done separately for
each CB pole which shall be opened during the fault.
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SINISA ZUBIC was born in Bugojno, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in 1982. He received the M.S.E.E.
degree in power engineering from the Faculty of
Electrical Engineering, Banja Luka, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in 2006, and the Ph.D. degree from
the University of Belgrade, Serbia, in 2013. He has
worked as a Teaching and Research Assistant with
the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Banja Luka,
till 2014. He joined ABB, in 2014, where he
was the Senior Scientist of the ABB Corporate
Research Center, Cracow, Poland. Since 2018, he has been the Research
and Development Manager (application software) of Hitachi ABB Power
Grids, Vasteras, Sweden. His main research interest includes power system
protection.
ZORAN GAJIC received the M.S.E.E. degree
(Hons.) in power engineering from the University
of Belgrade, Serbia, in 1990, and the Ph.D. degree
in electrical engineering from Lund University,
Sweden, in 2008.
He is currently a Relay Protection Expert with
Grid Automation Products, Hitachi ABB Power
Grids, Vasteras, Sweden. Since 1993, he has been
working in the area of power system protection and
control within ABB Group of companies, where
he had various engineering positions. From 2008 to 2015, he was the ABB
Global Product Manager for generator and transformer protection. He has
published many technical articles in the relay protection area and holds
more than 20 patents. He has participated in different CIGRE, IEC, and
PSRC/IEEE working groups and was the Convenor of CIGRE Working
Group ‘‘Modern techniques for Protecting Busbars in HV Networks.’’ In
2014, he received the Technical Committee Award from Cigré Study Com-
mittee B5 (Protection and Automation).
DAVOR KRALJ was born in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia,
in 1979. He received the M.S.E.E. degree in elec-
trical engineering from the Electronic Faculty,
Nis, Serbia, in 2010. From 2012 to 2020, he has
worked as a Research and Development Engineer
with ABB Global Technical Lead Center, Ludvika,
Sweden, where he worked on developing new and
existing SF6 live-tank high voltage circuit break-
ers, as well as on implementation of controlled
switching technology. He is currently working as
a Technical Expert for substation primary equipment and switchgear with
Swedish National Grid, Svenska Kraftnet. He is an Active Member of IEC
TC/SC 17A Switching Devices.
9