MR

Consider the extent to which collective responsibility can still be considered a cornerstone of cabinet
government.

Collective responsibility has long been regarded as a fundamental principle of cabinet government,
emphasizing the unity and solidarity of the government as a whole. It establishes that ministers must
publicly support and defend the decisions taken by the cabinet, even if they personally disagree with
them. However, the evolving political landscape and changing dynamics within governments raise
questions about the continued relevance and effectiveness of collective responsibility. This raises the
need to examine the extent to which collective responsibility remains a cornerstone of cabinet
government

Collective responsibility means that all members of the government are held accountable for the
decisions and actions of the government as a whole. The Ministerial Code 2019 outlines this principle,
stating that the principle of collective responsibility requires the Ministers to express their opinions
openly and have discussions freely in private with the understanding that once decisions have been
made, they will present a unified front. The constitutional convention of collective ministerial
responsibility consists of three rules: the confidence rule, the unanimity rule, and the confidentiality
rule. The confidence rule requires that government must resign or request a dissolution of Parliament if
they lose the confidence from the House of Commons. However, resignations are now only expected in
relation to a loss of a vote on the motion of confidence, which is rare. The can also be seen in 1979 when
there was already a minority government. In January 2019, the former Prime Minister, Theresa May,
successfully won a vote of no confidence, with a majority of 325 to 306

Unanimity and confidentiality are two important elements of collective ministerial responsibility.
Unanimity means that the government should speak with one voice on policy, and confidentiality means
that Cabinet discussions should remain private. Ministers should be able to have confidential discussions
and express their views freely. Once a decision has been made in Cabinet, all ministers are expected to
show a united front and support the decision, or else resign from ministerial office. It is important to
maintain confidentiality and unity over the government policy rather than spilt and divided. While
significant decisions may be made by Cabinet or Cabinet committees without the involvement or dissent
of junior ministers, it is still the responsibility of all ministers to publicly support and justify those
decisions.

Constitutional conventions are flexible and the consequences of a breach of ministerial responsibility are
varied and difficult to predict. The principle of collective responsibility may be suspended in certain
situations, such as when Ministers are allowed to give their own views outside the parliament on a
specific issue for a limited time. It is also known as an "agreement to differ". This was seen in 1975 and
again in 2016 before the Brexit referendum. Under a Coalition Government, there may be certain areas
where Ministers from different parties can adopt different positions and "agree to differ". This was the
case during the UK's Coalition Government between 2010 and 2015 which is formed by Conservative
and Liberal Democrat parties. The parties agreed to differ on five issues including the referendum on
changing the voting system, university funding, and the renewal of Trident, nuclear power; and a tax
allowance for married couples.
A device known as ‘free vote’ is utilized in situations where a division described as ‘issue of conscience’
takes place. For example, social, moral or religious questions such as capital punishment or abortion. For
these issues, the government typically does not have a stated policy, so there is no potential for
disagreement or dissent among ministers. However, an "agreement to differ" is a situation in which the
government has established a specific policy, but ministers are allowed to publicly dissent for a limited
period. The principle of confidentiality is a fundamental principle which represents that discussions held
within the Cabinet are kept private and confidential. Confidentiality serves multiple purposes, including
emphasizing the idea of a unified front, ensuring ministerial unanimity, and maintaining the necessary
level of government secrecy for effective administration and governance.

There are also examples of ministers resigning due to collective ministerial responsibility. Collective
ministerial responsibility allows for constructive criticism and debate within the government, and
ministers are expected to express their views and concerns in private. If a minister feels strongly enough
about a policy or decision, they may choose to resign rather than support it. One such example is that of
Robin Cook, who resigned from his position as Leader of the House of Commons in 2003, in protest of
the decision to invade Iraq. The other example is that of Michael Heseltine, who resigned as Secretary of
State for Defence in Margaret Thatcher's government, as he disagreed with the decision to select an
American company to merge with Westland helicopters, rather than the European consortium bid he
preferred. In both cases, the resignations were a result of a disagreement within the cabinet over policy
scope.

The rule of collective ministerial responsibility requires ministers to maintain confidentiality and not
disclose discussions or disagreements that take place in Cabinet. The court's obiter in AG v Jonathan
Cape Ltd suggests that constitutional conventions are not legally enforceable, but they may create
obligations that are binding in law and not just in morals. These conventions are upheld by common law
doctrines, particularly in matters of public interest, such as the confidentiality of Cabinet meetings. In
Miller II, the UK Supreme Court invoked parliamentary accountability, which some political
constitutionalists argue elevated the status of ministerial accountability as a constitutional convention
into a legal principle. However, Professor Elliot argues that the court did not enforce any constitutional
convention, but instead held that conventions may exist in parliamentary democracies to regulate
political behavior and ensure that the executive's powers are exercised lawfully.

It is arguable that collective responsibility implies a level of obedience to the Prime Minister, as Cabinet
ministers are expected to present a united front and collectively support the Prime Minister's decisions
and actions. The Prime Minister may be seen as the first among equals in the Cabinet, collective
ministerial responsibility is a broader concept that applies to all government ministers and their
accountability to Parliament, not just to the Prime Minister. However, in practice, the extent to which
collective responsibility operates as mere obedience to the Prime Minister can vary. While the Prime
Minister holds significant influence and leadership within the cabinet, it is important to recognize that
cabinet ministers are also individuals with their own expertise, perspectives, and responsibilities. They
are expected to offer constructive criticism, challenge ideas, and provide input to shape policy decisions.
While loyalty to the Prime Minister is important for maintaining cabinet cohesion and effective
governance, collective ministerial responsibility should not be reduced to blind obedience. It should
encompass a balance between loyalty to the government's decisions and the ability to exercise
independent judgment and contribute to the decision-making process.
Discuss the range of individual and collective responsibilities of government ministers, together with
the means by which they are established and enforced

The Westminster Model of government places great importance on the relationship between the
Executive and the Legislature. In this system, government ministers are required by constitutional
convention to hold seats in parliament, ensuring political accountability between general elections.
While this arrangement has its merits, it has also garnered criticism, with some perceiving it as an
"elective dictatorship." In reality, the balance lies between these extremes, as there exists a risk of
executive dominance over parliament, but this is constrained by statutory laws and constitutional
conventions. In this essay the range of individual and collective responsibilities of government ministers
will be discussed along with the means by which they are established and enforced.

The effectiveness of the parliamentary executive in the Westminster model relies heavily on the
successful implementation of constitutional conventions, especially those pertaining to collective and
individual Ministerial Responsibility. Breaching these conventions carries political consequences rather
than legal ones. To maintain the legal and political limits on the executive's power, there are multiple
accountability mechanisms in place, encompassing both legal and political checks and controls.
Ministerial accountability to Parliament is achieved through various means, including ministerial
responsibility, parliamentary questions, debates, and committee roles. Additionally, the actions of the
Executive are subject to scrutiny by the courts and tribunals through processes such as judicial review.
These accountability mechanisms serve to uphold the principles of transparency, democratic
governance, and public trust in the functioning of the government within the Westminster Model
system.

Collective responsibility holds all government members accountable for the actions and decisions of the
government as a whole. The Ministerial Code 2019 establishes this principle, emphasizing open
discussions and unity once decisions are made. The constitutional convention of collective ministerial
responsibility encompasses the confidence rule, unanimity rule, and confidentiality rule. The confidence
rule mandates resignation or dissolution of Parliament if the government loses confidence from the
House of Commons. However, resignations typically occur only after a confidence vote, which is rare.
Unanimity requires a unified government stance on policies, while confidentiality ensures private
Cabinet discussions. Ministers are expected to freely express their views in confidence but publicly
support and justify Cabinet decisions. Maintaining confidentiality and unity over government policies is
crucial to prevent division. Although significant decisions may involve Cabinet or Cabinet committees
without the participation of junior ministers, all ministers bear the responsibility to publicly endorse and
defend those decisions.

Constitutional conventions regarding ministerial responsibility are flexible, and the consequences of
breaching them can be unpredictable. The principle of collective responsibility can be temporarily
suspended in certain circumstances, allowing ministers to express their individual views on specific
issues outside of Parliament, known as an "agreement to differ." This was observed in 1975 and 2016
during the Brexit referendum. In a Coalition Government, ministers from different parties may be
permitted to hold differing positions on certain matters. The UK's Coalition Government between 2010
and 2015, composed of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties, exemplified this approach on
issues such as the voting system, university funding, nuclear power, and tax allowances for married
couples.
In cases involving matters of conscience, a "free vote" is employed, where ministers are allowed to vote
based on their personal beliefs on social, moral, or religious questions like capital punishment or
abortion. Conversely, an "agreement to differ" occurs when the government establishes a specific policy,
yet ministers are permitted to publicly dissent for a limited period. The principle of confidentiality is vital,
ensuring that Cabinet discussions remain private. Confidentiality serves various purposes, including
fostering a united front, maintaining ministerial unanimity, and safeguarding government secrecy for
effective governance and administration.

Instances of ministers resigning due to collective ministerial responsibility demonstrate the significance
of constructive criticism and debate within the government. While ministers are expected to express
their views and concerns in private, there are occasions when they feel compelled to resign rather than
support a policy or decision. One notable example is Robin Cook, who resigned as Leader of the House of
Commons in 2003 to protest the decision to invade Iraq. Another instance is Michael Heseltine, who
resigned as Secretary of State for Defence in Margaret Thatcher's government due to his disagreement
with the choice of an American company for the merger with Westland helicopters instead of the
European consortium bid he favored. Both resignations resulted from disagreements within the cabinet
over policy matters. The rule of collective ministerial responsibility also encompasses the requirement of
maintaining confidentiality regarding Cabinet discussions and disagreements. Although constitutional
conventions are not legally enforceable, the court's statement in AG v Jonathan Cape Ltd suggests that
they may give rise to binding legal obligations, extending beyond moral considerations. These
conventions find support in common law doctrines, particularly concerning matters of public interest
such as the confidentiality of Cabinet meetings. In the Miller II case, the UK Supreme Court referenced
parliamentary accountability, leading some political constitutionalists to argue that ministerial
accountability was elevated to a legal principle from a constitutional convention. However, Professor
Elliot contends that the court did not enforce a specific convention but rather recognized the existence
of conventions in parliamentary democracies to regulate political behavior and ensure the lawful
exercise of executive powers.

The convention of individual ministerial responsibility requires ministers to take constitutional

responsibility for their department and its decisions and actions. If breached, this convention may lead
to the ultimate sanction of departure from ministerial office, either by resignation or dismissal. It is
important to note that departing from ministerial office does not necessarily mean leaving Parliament as
former ministers may continue as parliamentarians in the House of Commons or the House of Lords.
Individual ministerial responsibility can take several forms of accountability to Parliament, such as
informing and explaining, apologizing, taking action, or ultimately resigning. The convention of individual
ministerial responsibility is focused on ensuring that ministers are held accountable to Parliament for
their department's actions and decisions. This accountability is an important aspect of the relationship
between the executive and legislature, as it helps to prevent the executive from becoming too dominant.
Individual ministerial responsibility has various strands such as responsibility for personal conduct and
responsibility for their department, including the actions of officials within that department. The
Carltona principle allows government ministers to delegate their powers to civil servants in their
departments to ensure efficient administration. As ministers cannot attend to all functions personally,
their duties and powers are usually exercised by officials under their authority. Thus, the decisions and
actions of officials are considered equivalent to those of the minister, who is accountable to Parliament.
The Crichel Down Affair of 1954 is an example of a ministerial resignation resulting from a departmental
failure. Sir Thomas Dugdale MP resigned as Minister of Agriculture over a land acquisition issue that
arose during the war. The Air Ministry had acquired land which was later transferred to the Ministry of
Agriculture. A former landowner was denied permission to buy back his land, while others were not
permitted to seek tenancies of it. An inquiry established that civil servant had mishandled the matter,
and Dugdale resigned as a result. Lord Carrington's resignation in 1982 over the Falklands invasion is
another example of ministerial resignation.

Discuss the powers exercised by a British Prime Minister, and the political and legal limitations upon
their use.

The prime minister of the United Kingdom serves as the head of government. They provide advice to the
monarch on exercising the royal prerogative, chair the Cabinet, and select its ministers. The prime
minister's position is not established by law or constitutional document but is based on longstanding
convention. The Monarch possesses the prerogative power to appoint anyone she chooses as Prime
Minister but convention dictates that She usually doesn’t do it. She appoints the person who is capable
of 'commanding a majority in the House of Commons' which means she appoints the leader of the
political party that wins most seats in a general election. The appointment of other ministers is also
theoretically made by the Queen but in reality, it is done based on the advice of the Prime Minister.

In the Parliament of 2010-15, the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee conducted an
investigation into the role and powers of the British Prime Minister. According to the evidence received,
there is no defined constitutional definition of the Prime Minister's responsibilities, powers, and
functions. These are determined by convention and usage and are subject to change over time. The role
of Prime Minister in the British constitution has evolved over time by convention rather than legislation.
Conventions dictate that the Prime Minister must be a member of the House of Commons, and the
Queen's power to appoint the Prime Minister is limited by the convention that the person who can
command the majority in the House of Commons should be chosen, usually the leader of the largest
political party.

The Prime Minister holds significant powers, such as the power of patronage, which allows them to
appoint and dismiss all ministers. This power can be used to form alliances and relationships with other
senior MPs, but can also result in the collapse of these alliances when ministers are demoted or
promoted. The Prime Minister also has the authority to create new government departments or merge
and rename existing ones. An example of this is the announcement made by Boris Johnson in June 2020,
in which he merged the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) to create a new department called the Foreign, Commonwealth and
Development Office.

Similar to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet is also shaped by convention rather than law. While technically
the monarch has the authority to appoint all ministers, in reality it is the Prime Minister who makes
these decisions. The Prime Minister also chooses which government departments will have
representation at Cabinet meetings, although some departments such as the Home Office and Foreign
Office are always present. The Cabinet consists of the most significant and experienced ministers, from
both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Cabinet meetings and committees, which occur
weekly, are where important decisions on policy and future laws are made.

The Prime Minister selects around 20 of the most senior ministers in the government to form the
Cabinet, which is responsible for leading specific policy areas such as Health, Transport, Foreign Affairs,
and Defense. The government has a few different types of officials, including the Attorney General,
Solicitor General, and Chief Whip. The number of ministers in the House of Commons is legally limited to
95, but there are also ministers in the House of Lords. Parliamentary private secretaries are not
ministers, but they are expected to support the government's votes and are often seen as a first step
towards becoming a minister. Despite not being salaried, they are often part of the "payroll vote".

Although the British Prime Minister possesses many powers, their party can impose significant
limitations. The appointment of ministers, for instance, necessitates a certain amount of political
equilibrium and administrative proficiency. Pressure from colleagues or the media can influence the
Prime Minister's selection of certain individuals, and they generally seek counsel from senior colleagues
before finalizing appointments. The Prime Minister's authority over the management of business is
restricted, and they typically do not initiate policies beyond drawing up the party manifesto. Given their
limited staff and the departmental expertise and information, the bulk of policy formulation falls within
the purview of individual departments. A significant limitation on a Prime Minister's power is the
accountability they bear for any major failures that occur during their tenure. They are held publicly
responsible for such mishaps. While rare, the potential for a Cabinet revolt poses another constraint on a
Prime Minister. Cabinet membership is at the discretion of the Prime Minister, and it is uncommon for
politicians to challenge the authority of the one who appointed them. However, it should be noted that
instances of Cabinet problems have occurred, as demonstrated during John Major's time as Prime
Minister.

In the Parliamentary system of government, if Members of Parliament are dissatisfied with the
performance of the Prime Minister and feel that their expectations are not being met, they have the
ability to pass a vote of no confidence. In such a scenario, the Prime Minister is required to resign. The
prospect of being forced out of power acts as a constraint on the Prime Minister's powers. The Prime
Minister is constrained by the ideology and policy manifesto of their political party. They are unable to
act outside of the policies advocated by the party, which serves as another limitation on their powers. In
a cabinet system of government, the presence of a Prime Minister also entails the existence of an
officially recognized opposition. The opposition's role is to provide constructive criticism aimed at
holding the government accountable and keeping them vigilant. This represents an additional constraint
on the powers of the Prime Minister.

Consider whether “Cabinet government” or “Prime Ministerial government” is the more accurate
description of the political executive in the UK.

The Westminster Model of government places great importance on the relationship between the
Executive and the Legislature. In this system, government ministers are required by constitutional
convention to hold seats in parliament, ensuring political accountability between general elections.
While this arrangement has its merits, it has also garnered criticism, with some perceiving it as an
"elective dictatorship." In reality, the balance lies between these extremes, as there exists a risk of
executive dominance over parliament, but this is constrained by statutory laws and constitutional
conventions. The question of whether the political executive in the UK is best described as "Cabinet
government" or "Prime Ministerial government" has been a subject of debate among scholars and
political observers.

The Cabinet government model in the UK places emphasis on collective decision-making within the
Cabinet, with the Prime Minister serving as a primus inter pares, or "first among equals." In this model,
the Prime Minister's authority is limited by the requirement to retain the support of the Cabinet, which
reflects the political composition of the governing party or coalition. Cabinet ministers hold individual
responsibilities and possess autonomy within their respective departments. The Prime Minister's role is
to coordinate their endeavors and ensure that policies align with the government's overarching agenda.
This model acknowledges the significance of consensus and collaboration among Cabinet members, with
the Prime Minister acting as a facilitator rather than an all-powerful figure. By adhering to the Cabinet
government approach, the UK's political system aims to balance collective decision-making with
individual ministerial autonomy.

The effectiveness of the parliamentary executive in the Westminster model relies heavily on the
successful implementation of constitutional conventions, especially those pertaining to collective and
individual Ministerial Responsibility. Breaching these conventions carries political consequences rather
than legal ones. To maintain the legal and political limits on the executive's power, there are multiple
accountability mechanisms in place, encompassing both legal and political checks and controls.
Ministerial accountability to Parliament is achieved through various means, including ministerial
responsibility, parliamentary questions, debates, and committee roles. Additionally, the actions of the
Executive are subject to scrutiny by the courts and tribunals through processes such as judicial review.
These accountability mechanisms serve to uphold the principles of transparency, democratic
governance, and public trust in the functioning of the government within the Westminster Model
system.

Collective responsibility holds all government members accountable for the actions and decisions of the
government as a whole. The Ministerial Code 2019 establishes this principle, emphasizing open
discussions and unity once decisions are made. The constitutional convention of collective ministerial
responsibility encompasses the confidence rule, unanimity rule, and confidentiality rule. The confidence
rule mandates resignation or dissolution of Parliament if the government loses confidence from the
House of Commons. However, resignations typically occur only after a confidence vote, which is rare.
Unanimity requires a unified government stance on policies, while confidentiality ensures private
Cabinet discussions. Ministers are expected to freely express their views in confidence but publicly
support and justify Cabinet decisions. Maintaining confidentiality and unity over government policies is
crucial to prevent division. Although significant decisions may involve Cabinet or Cabinet committees
without the participation of junior ministers, all ministers bear the responsibility to publicly endorse and
defend those decisions.

Constitutional conventions regarding ministerial responsibility are flexible, and the consequences of
breaching them can be unpredictable. The principle of collective responsibility can be temporarily
suspended in certain circumstances, allowing ministers to express their individual views on specific
issues outside of Parliament, known as an "agreement to differ." This was observed in 1975 and 2016
during the Brexit referendum. In a Coalition Government, ministers from different parties may be
permitted to hold differing positions on certain matters. The UK's Coalition Government between 2010
and 2015, composed of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties, exemplified this approach on
issues such as the voting system, university funding, nuclear power, and tax allowances for married
couples.

Instances of ministers resigning due to collective ministerial responsibility demonstrate the significance
of constructive criticism and debate within the government. While ministers are expected to express
their views and concerns in private, there are occasions when they feel compelled to resign rather than
support a policy or decision. One notable example is Robin Cook, who resigned as Leader of the House of
Commons in 2003 to protest the decision to invade Iraq. The rule of collective ministerial responsibility
also encompasses the requirement of maintaining confidentiality regarding Cabinet discussions and
disagreements. Although constitutional conventions are not legally enforceable, the court's statement in
AG v Jonathan Cape Ltd suggests that they may give rise to binding legal obligations, extending beyond
moral considerations. These conventions find support in common law doctrines, particularly concerning
matters of public interest such as the confidentiality of Cabinet meetings. In the Miller II case, the UK
Supreme Court referenced parliamentary accountability, leading some political constitutionalists to
argue that ministerial accountability was elevated to a legal principle from a constitutional convention.
However, Professor Elliot contends that the court did not enforce a specific convention but rather
recognized the existence of conventions in parliamentary democracies to regulate political behavior and
ensure the lawful exercise of executive powers.

The convention of individual ministerial responsibility requires ministers to take constitutional

responsibility for their department and its decisions and actions. If breached, this convention may lead
to the ultimate sanction of departure from ministerial office, either by resignation or dismissal. It is
important to note that departing from ministerial office does not necessarily mean leaving Parliament as
former ministers may continue as parliamentarians in the House of Commons or the House of Lords.
Individual ministerial responsibility can take several forms of accountability to Parliament, such as
informing and explaining, apologizing, taking action, or ultimately resigning. The convention of individual
ministerial responsibility is focused on ensuring that ministers are held accountable to Parliament for
their department's actions and decisions. This accountability is an important aspect of the relationship
between the executive and legislature, as it helps to prevent the executive from becoming too dominant.
Individual ministerial responsibility has various strands such as responsibility for personal conduct and
responsibility for their department, including the actions of officials within that department. The
Carltona principle allows government ministers to delegate their powers to civil servants in their
departments to ensure efficient administration. As ministers cannot attend to all functions personally,
their duties and powers are usually exercised by officials under their authority. Thus, the decisions and
actions of officials are considered equivalent to those of the minister, who is accountable to Parliament.
The Crichel Down Affair of 1954 is an example of a ministerial resignation resulting from a departmental
failure. Sir Thomas Dugdale MP resigned as Minister of Agriculture over a land acquisition issue that
arose during the war.

Contrary to the Cabinet government model, the Prime Ministerial government model gives prominence
to the dominant role of the Prime Minister in decision-making and policy formulation. In this model, the
Prime Minister is considered the primary driving force behind the government's agenda, while Cabinet
ministers are relegated to secondary roles as implementers of the Prime Minister's vision. The Prime
Minister enjoys more authority in shaping the composition of the Cabinet and is not as bound by the
necessity to maintain political balance or cater to the individual preferences of ministers. This model
highlights the Prime Minister's greater control and influence over the direction and execution of
government policies. It places a greater emphasis on the Prime Minister's leadership and decision-
making capabilities, often portraying them as the central figure in the political executive, shaping and
driving the government's agenda. In practice, the reality of the UK's political executive is likely a
combination of both models.