STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

I. OBJECTIVES
At the end of the course, the students must;
1. Understand the legislative process of enacting a statute.
2. Know the different principles in statutory construction.
3. Apply the rules of statutory construction.
II PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
SYLLABUS TITLE FACTS
A. Distinction between CALTEX v. This is a petition of declaratory relief filed by Petitioner Caltex
Interpretation and PALOMAR G.R. Philippines, Inc. against Respondent Postmaster General
Construction - Caltex No. L-19650. Enrico Palomar. In 1960, the Petitioner devised a contest to
versus Palomar G.R. No. L- September 29, increase patronage for their products called “Caltex Hooded
19650 1966 Castro, J Pump Contest”, in which participants are to estimate the
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period. No fee nor purchase is
required to join the contest – participants must only secure a
form available upon request at stations. Foreseeing the
extensive use of mail for the contest, Caltex, through a
representative, attempted to secure clearance for mailing, on
the grounds that their contest does not violate the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law. Respondent, however, declined
the grant, prompting the petitioner to seek reconsideration.
Respondent then maintained that if the contest was pursued, a
fraud order will be issued against Caltex.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the petition
has sufficient cause for
declaratory relief.
(2) Whether or not the Caltex
Hooded Pump contest is violative
of the anti-lottery provision of the
Postal Law as provided by
Section 1954 (a) of the Revised
Administrative Code
RULING
(1) Yes. Per Section 1 Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, declaratory relief is available to any person “whose
rights are affected by statute… to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the…
statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder”. This is the case here, as the question of the promo
violating the Postal Law requires an inquiry to the intent of the legislation, which is the act of construction –
the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst other, by reason
of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws). This
petition, then, warrants a declaratory relief.
(2) No. The Court held that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provision, which makes absolutely
non-mailable “any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise or similar scheme depending in whole
or in part upon a lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of
any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises”. Lottery in this case was
described as having three (3) requisites: consideration, chance, and prize; chance and prize being clear as
is, while consideration referring to the need of participants to pay for a chance to win. The term “gift
enterprise” was disputed but resolved by applying the principle of “noscitur a sociis” in which terms under
construction shall be understood by the words preceding and following it. In this case, promo does not
qualify as a lottery nor a gift enterprise for lack of element of consideration.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – act or process or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided in the law.
Difference between judicial legislation and statutory construction
Statutory construction is art of seeking the intention of the legislature in enacting statute and applying it to a given state of facts.
Judicial legislation is the process when a statute is invoked, and different interpretations are in contention.
CONSTRUCTION – the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct expression of the text; the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the expressions of the text; makes use of
extrinsic aids or those found outside the written language of the law
INTERPRETATION – process of discovering the true meaning of the language used; limited to exploring the written text; use of intrinsic aids or those found on the statute itself;
B. Branches of The Philippines is a republic with a presidential form of government wherein power is equally divided among its three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.
Government
The legislative department enacts the laws. And, the judiciary interprets the laws. And then, the executive implements the laws. In case the law is not clear, it is the judiciary that solves the concern. The law is not clear if its
meaning is doubtful. To solve this, the judiciary interprets or construes the law.
C. Authority/Power to SITUS OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF WRITTEN LAWS BELONG TO THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT. IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE TO SETTLE ACTUAL CONTROVERSIES
Construe INVOLVING RIGHTS WHICH ARE LEGALLY DEMANDABLE AND ENFORECEABLE AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNG TO LACK OR EXCESS
JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF GOVERNMENT.

Requisites: Duty of Court to construe and interpret the law

1.There must be an actual case or controversy;
2.There is an ambiguity in the law involved in the controversy
*ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different meanings in a statute, document
*IF THE LAW IS CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL, the COURT HAS TO APPLY THE LAW AND NOT INTERPRET

III. SUBJECT OF CONSTRUCTION
A. Hierarchy of Statutes a. Constitution
In the hierarchy of Philippine laws, the Constitution is the supreme and fundamental law. It was ordained and promulgated by the people, from whom all political authority originates. As the fundamental law, all laws, rules,
regulations, and executive issuances must conform to it.
Doctrine of Constitutional
Supremacy
mandatory versus
directory provisions
Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different meanings in a statute, document, etc.
A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more possible meanings.
If the law is clear and unequivocal, the Court has no other alternative but to apply the law and not to interpret.
Construction and interpretation of law come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.
To execute the mandate of the people, the Constitution authorizes the three equal branches of government, namely, the executive, legislative, and judicial, to exercise certain powers. It grants the legislative power to the Philippine
Congress and the judicial power to one Supreme Court and lower courts. The executive power, on the other hand, is vested on
the president of the Philippines.
In the exercise of their functions, the three branches of government issue binding declarations through statutes, rules and regulations, executive issuances, treaties, and judicial interpretations. However, these declarations must
be consistent with the powers granted by the Constitution, whether made in the direct exercise of the power or delegated to some other entity, to be valid and binding.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy , if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons
for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount, and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
Bernardo Bernardino Marcelino was indicted for rape. On August 4, 1975, Whether or not Judge Cruz had Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last day of filing of the
Marcelino v. The the prosecution finished presenting evidence against Marcelino resolved the case within the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period begins to run so Judge Cruz had
Hon. and rested its case. On the same date, the attorneys of both allotted period. until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November 28,
Fernando Cruz, parties in the criminal case moved for time within which to 1975. The date of rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge Cruz was
Jr. G.R. submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because November 28, 1975 was merely the 85th day
No. L-42428 Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4, from September 4, 1975.
March 18, 1983 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a memoranda.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not serve as the
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
a copy of his decision, his decision bears the same date of
November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the decision was Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that the
court can no longer promulgate judgment because by January Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “upon the effectivity of this constitution, the
1976, the 3-month period (90 day period) within which lower maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission
courts must decide on cases had already lapsed, thus, the lower shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts.
court lost its jurisdiction over the case. In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is not mandatory, it is
merely directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such provision as mandatory
Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court judges to resolve
prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, cases within the prescribed period and not take this liberal construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at
being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and later periods.
that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of
the court over the unresolved case. On this view, authorities are one in saying that:
Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately after the trial or verdict have been held
by some courts to be merely directory so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment,
on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would clearly have indicated it." [American Tupe
Founders Co. v. Justice's Court.
Pimentel v. In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all
Aguirre G.R. No. government departments and agencies, including SUCs,
132988 July 19, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY
2000 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least
25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services items (Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of
10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998,
President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount of
IRA to be withheld from LGU
1. Whether or not the president
committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering all LGUS to
adopt a 25%cost reduction
program in violation of the LGU'S
fiscal autonomy.
2. Whether or not Section 4 of the characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
same issuance, which withholds 10 2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
percent of their internal
revenueallotments, are valid
exercises of the President's power after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
of general supervision over local government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory
governments
1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any
manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs,
fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is
the head of the economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and
implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for
the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies
and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and
local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with
the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary
adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be
less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an
unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of
the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the
implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government was suffering
from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different
leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce,
unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision
over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-
reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties.
Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of
AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days
meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative.
 ACORD v. Pres. Estrada submitted the National Expenditures Program Whether or not the questioned Yes. Article X, Sec. 6 of the Constitution provides “Local government units shall have a just share, as
Zamora G.R. No. for Fiscal Year 2000 pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the provisions violate the determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.” Only the just share
144256 June 8, Constitution. The President proposed an IRA in the amount of constitutional injunction that the of the local government is qualified by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof.
2005 P121,778,000,000. This became Republic Act No. 8760, “An Act just share of the local Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the governments in the IRA shall be
Republic of the Philippines from January One to December automatically released? A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of the LGUs in the national
Thirty-One, Two Thousand, and For Other Purposes”. The act internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution. While “automatic release” implies that the just share
was known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year of the local governments determined by law should be released to them as a matter of course, the GAA
2000. It provides under the heading “Allocations to Local provisions withhold its release pending an event which is not even certain of occurring.
Government” that the IRA for local government units shall
amount to P111,778,000,000. In Pimentel vs. Aguirre, the executive withheld the release of the IRA pending an assessment very similar to
In another part of the GAA, under the heading the one provided in the GAA. It was ruled that such withholding violated the constitutional mandate of
“Unprogrammed Fund,” it is provided that an amount of automatic release. Thereby, the questioned provisions of the GAA were declared unconstitutional.
P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000
mentioned, shall be used to fund the IRA which shall be ===============================================
released only when the revenue collections exceed the original
revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly
Congress based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. Moreover, as correctly
certain committees. Thus, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition posited by the petitioner, the use of the word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes
and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
Order filed against respondents. supplied)
Petitioners contend that such provisions under GAA
violated the autonomy of local governments by unlawfully
reducing by P10 Billion the IRA due to the local governments
and withholding the release of such amount by placing it under
“Unprogrammed Funds.” This violated the constitutional
mandate in Art. X Sec. 6 that the local government units’ just
share in the national taxes shall be automatically released to
them.
Respondents counter argue that constitutional provision is
addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the
same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions
upon the release of the IRA. Respondents infer that the
constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of
the government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA but not
the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold
the same.
self-executing versus non- Manila Prince Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippines
self-executing provisions Hotel v. Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8,
GSIS, Manila 1986 GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
Hotel the issued outstanding shares of respondent Manila Prince
G.R. No. 122156 Hotel. In a close bidding held on September 18,1995 only two (2)
Feb. 3, 1997 bidders participated: Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation
a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhard, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to GSIS dated September 28,
1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhard. In the subsequent letter dated October 10,
1995 the petitioner sent a managers check for P33, 000,000.00
as bid security to match the bid of Renong Berhard, which
respondent GSIS refuse to accept.
On October 17, 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent
GSIS has disregard the tender of the matching bid and that the
sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS
and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to
Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Whether or not Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is Self-executing or
not.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid
of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
not self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with
the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable.
=========================
in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall
be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (G.R. No. 122156;
February 3, 1997

b. Legislative Enactments Legislative Enactments means domestic, foreign and international laws (including without limitation common law), treaties, ordinances, regulations and rules at any international, national, federal, state, local or regional level, both
c. Ordinances
B. Implementing Rules and
Regulations
a. Department Orders
b. Administrative Orders
C. Parts of Statute
a. preamble
b. title - Constitutional
limitation, Purpose
c. enacting clause
d. body of statute
e. separability clause
f. repealing clause
g. effectivity clause
D. Legislative Process
a. legislative power David v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396;
Sanidad v.
COMELEC G.R.
No. L-44640
b. scope and limitation of ABAKADA Guro
legislative power Partylist V.
Purisima
G.R. No. 166715

Ang Nars
Partylist v.
Executive
Secretary
G.R. No. 215746

c. constitutional process of enacting a law (how a bill becomes a law?)