--2NC OV

Mexican Water Trading Markets get co-opted by ‘water mafias’ with strong
links to the cartels and gives them new revenue sources to consolidate power—
that’s Felbab-Brown. This causes Mexican State Collapse and extinction.
 AT Turn
First in order for the plan to have any impact on Mexican renewals, the government must
oversee the plan. (explain ) Extend Felbab-Brown 20. Second, us and Mexico can’t
cooperate on energy if the cartels take more power and have broader control
of the government. Extend Grinberg 19 , Any risndk that cartels take power and
the Mexican state fails means that you need to ignore this turn, which is mean
that Mexico can’t transition to renewbales (explain)
Furthermore
Even if they win that the government oversees this, it doesn’t mean that the
Cartels won’t manipulate it. Still can’t transiton to renewables (explain why
cartels taking power would eliminate US pc)

And there are loopholes which can be exploited which IS the thesis of the DA.
We read GREEN
1AC Nitze
In such an exchange, holders of historical water rights would enter the market with their rights intact but
would be free to sell those rights or buy additional rights as they saw fit. Futures, hedges, and other contractual devices could be
created to manage risk and to improve market efficiency. The exchange would be subject to government
regulation to ensure transparency and to prevent fraud and manipulation, but the
regulatory authority would not attempt to control the prices at which
rights were traded or the purposes for which the water was used.
 --2NC AT: We are government controlled water markets
Water Mafia’s are a link magnifier to cartel strength—they co-opt legitimate
water markets
Felbab-Brown 17 (Vanda Felbab-Brown Director - Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors Co-
Director - Africa Security Initiative Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy,
and Technology. WATER THEFT AND WATER SMUGGLING: GROWING PROBLEM OR TEMPEST IN
A TEAPOT? Brookings Institute, 2017.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/fp_201703_water_theft_smuggling.
pdf)tjf

The smuggling networks that provide water vary widely in their organizational structures and
the degrees of their hierarchical and vertical integration. They also vary widely in the quality of
water distribution services they provide to the marginalized, and in the level of their
accountability as well as in their responsiveness to powerful, legal, industrial businesses and
agricultural lobbies. Indeed, although widely referred to as “water mafias,” the providers of
illegally-sourced water often operate in complex ways and also supply legally-sourced water.
Sometimes, they even have a license for distributing water, despite acquiring some (or most) of
it illegally. And they supply not only illegal slum settlements; they also deliver water to powerful
legal economic actors as well as the upper and middle classes —such as in India and Brazil.
Crucially, these so-called water mafias at times operate in collusion with official water board
authorities and enjoy the cover of political parties to whom they deliver important services,
including donations and votes. Key operators of the illegal water supply also accumulate large
political capital by providing slum and marginalized populations with de facto survival —even if
the water distribution to the marginalized remains shoddy and suboptimal. They can often
ensure the perpetuation of their patrons in elected offices as well as derail the adoption of
better water policies and prevent or disrupt an extension of public water provision systems to
unconnected areas. In short, highly varied levels of accountability, equity, and efficiency can be
present in illegal water markets. Those crucial characteristics as well as water sustainability also
vary widely in legal private or public water markets. But those who control the tap, particularly
illegally, establish dependencies, clients, and patronage networks and can accumulate large
political capital and power.

Cartels will control private water markets—it happened in Puebla

Pearson 17 (Tamara Pearson is a long time journalist based in Latin America, alternative
pedagogy teacher, and author of The Butterfly Prison. She blogs at Resistance Words. New
Internationalist, 8/14/17. https://newint.org/web-exclusive/2017-08-14/mexico-water-
cartels)tjf

‘Baja California was the first state in Mexico to plan to privatize its water, but protests and
resistance stopped that. Puebla was the second state,’ Fernando, an indigenous water
activist in the Peoples Against the Privatization of Water group told me. He asked that I not
include his last name, given the arrest warrants pending on a number of water activists, and
the risk involved. In 2013, the Puebla state government justified the privatization of water
by arguing that the incoming company would invest the money necessary to improve the
service, eliminate leaking pipes that saw 30 per cent of all water lost, and expand the reach
of piped water. It passed the Water Law, that would allow the new company to set prices
without oversight and to hire other private companies, and put out a call for bids in
September that year. The government awarded the bid to Concessions Integrales, also
known as Aguas de Puebla, three days before the consortium was actually formed and
legally able to participate in a bid for tender. Though the governor had talked about a 30
year deal, that was extended to 60 years. No one imagined that one of the main companies
behind Enrique Peñ a Nieto's presidential election campaign in 2012 would ultimately end
up running Puebla's water supply system, in a consortium made up of other corrupt and
scandalous companies. Monex, Epccor, and Grupo Financiero Interacciones are the main
companies involved in Aguas de Puebla, though reports of their exact shares in ownership
vary. Monex itself told the press that it owned a ‘third’, but added that exactly who has how
many shares was a ‘banking secret’. Monex made news at the time for running Peñ a Nieto's
campaign strategy of buying votes through the distribution of pre-paid cards, and funneling
money to his campaigning fund. Reports suggest that this money, however, likely came from
the Juarez Cartel – one of the oldest and most powerful criminal organizations in the
country. Mexico's election court ultimately ruled that there hadn't been any fraud, but many
are skeptical of this ruling because Mexico's courts are known for their extremely high
levels of corruption and political interference. Additionally, it wasn't the first time that
Monex had allegedly been involved with major drug cartels. An investigation conducted by
newspaper Reforma found a working relationship with the Arellano Feliz cartel in 2003,
and with the Colombian cartel, Valle del Norte, in 2006. In 2008, Spanish authorities found
that the Beltran Leyva cartel had changed some 78 million euros through Monex and a
company called Intercam. Epccor is owned by Juan Gutierrez, who is also president of Aguas
de Puebla, and who also owned the company Gutsa, a key financial backer of the 1994 PRI
presidential campaign (Peñ a Nieto's party). Gutierrez's companies have been repeatedly
fined for mismanagement. Epccor, with it connections in the government, regularly receives
contracts for public works like hospitals, roads, and airports; consistently spends more than
it originally declared in its budget, and delays completion by years. The most recent case
was a hospital which has spent nine years so far under construction, and still isn't finished.
Grupo Financiero Interacciones, run by the infamously corrupt and excessive rich Hank
family, has strong links to the PRI and to the Juarez Cartel. Grandfather Hank, Carlos Hank
Rhon, is a billionaire, and his family has been the subject of numerous reports of drug
laundering on a massive scale, as well as assisting cartels with drug shipments, and large-
scale public corruption. A World Policy Report from 1995 went so far as to describe Carlos
Hank as the "primary intermediary between the multinational drug trafficking enterprises
and the Mexican political system,” and Hank has been investigated for money laundering by
Mexican, Swiss, and French judges. One key strategy Hank is alleged to have used, was to
buy food products with the money cartels made from selling cocaine in the US. Hank's
companies had a monopoly on these food products, which they then sold back in Mexico.
The Hank family has also colluded with Mexican state authorities to gain permits for their
rooster fighting and horse racing, and to get significant debts pardoned. Son Jorge Hank
Rhon has also been accused of using the gambling business for drug trafficking links and to
launder money. With corrupt narcos running Puebla’s water, it's no surprise that the system
is beyond dysfunctional. People have accused the company of charging for non-existing
debts, of water supply issues and random bill increases, and of charging up to 3,000 pesos
(a good month's wage) for meters to be installed. Some areas are supplied with
contaminated water, whole suburbs have gone without water for weeks, the company
charges to check people's broken connections, and people report that their meters aren't
working but the company refuses to repair them and keeps charging an incorrect rate.
People facing errors like mine tend to wait a year for a resolution, if they get any at all.
 2NC Turns the Case (Northside)
Turns the Aff—Scarcity, Economy, Water Wars, Environment
Felbab-Brown 17 (Vanda Felbab-Brown Director - Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors Co-
Director - Africa Security Initiative Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy,
and Technology. WATER THEFT AND WATER SMUGGLING: GROWING PROBLEM OR TEMPEST IN
A TEAPOT? Brookings Institute, 2017.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/fp_201703_water_theft_smuggling.
pdf)tjf

Water theft and smuggling, just like unregulated or poorly regulated use of water,23 can
threaten the water security of licensed users. But it also ultimately threatens the water security
of unlicensed users and users who violate regulations, leading to scarcity, and thus to rationing,
increased prices, and potentially insufficient availability. In the worst situations, this can lead to
a lack of water even for drinking. Many cities in India24 and Pakistan, for example, only have
running water for several hours a day, similar to their lack of electricity. The first and often most
affected are the world’s poorest and most marginalized populations. Typically, slum residents
around the world lack access to potable water. Many households are not hooked up to public
water distribution systems, and they need to rely on informal or outright illegal sources and
actors for water distribution. These informal and illegal distribution systems are often
inadequate and are provided at very high prices, with the paradoxical effect that the world’s
poorest and most marginalized who most intensely lack water also often pay far more for it than
the affluent and the middle class. In El Salvador, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, the poorest
households often spend more than 10 percent of their income on water, while in the United
States, such households spend only 3 percent.25 In some of the world’s most water-distressed
countries, such as Yemen and in Africa, even the most basic water use —for subsistence,
cooking, and hygiene — becomes unaffordable for the poor and largest segments of the
population. Furthermore, many segments of this population are at a particularly high risk given
that conflict-affected communities and refugees are most vulnerable to water scarcity. Overuse
of water —whether through the lwack of regulation and its enforcement, or through illegal
appropriation of water —also undermines water quality, compounding the salinization and
intrusion of pollutants into water sources. Such water degradation does not come only from
improper use of surface water. Drilling deeper and deeper to access underground water sources
can equally tap polluted water. In Mexico’s Guanajuato state, a prime agricultural area, the
unpaid overuse of water by agricultural businesses and small farmers alike has produced such
water scarcity that deep underground water polluted with arsenic and fluoride is now regularly
used by the poor for drinking, and likely also by businesses for agriculture.26 Yet it is the
agricultural farms that are the big users; they consume some 82 percent of all water in the
region and do not pay for it. In turn, poor water quality and high pollution levels can cause a
variety of serious and potentially deadly diseases, whether cholera or typhoid or other longer-
term illnesses. Water scarcity and the lack of access to clean water also greatly increase infant
mortality and are linked to poverty in multiple complex ways. Indeed, water scarcity
disproportionately affects women in developing countries. In South Asia and Africa, women
often have to travel great distances and spend a lot of time acquiring water even as water
smuggling and illegal water sourcing outfits are almost exclusively the domain of men. The
resulting inability of countries or cities to collect payments for water use, including as a result of
large-scale delinquency and massive water theft and smuggling, means that there are
inadequate resources for repairing, updating, and enlarging water distribution systems and for
finding measures to cope with scarcity. Thus in many cities, water pipeline networks are often
more than a century old and designed for much smaller populations, leading roughly one
quarter of the world’s cities to suffer from water stress.27 For example, Karachi, Pakistan’s
metropolis of 20 million, requires 1.1 billion gallons of water every day.28 Quite apart from the
large theft and smuggling of water in the city described below, the water distribution system is
designed to carry only half of that demand at best. Meanwhile, the city continues to experience
population growth of 4.5 percent per year, adding further demands on its dysfunctional water
distribution system. Yet only one quarter of Karachi’s residents pay their water bills.29 In
Mumbai, the corrosion and dilapidation of the water distribution system has periodically
resulted in the contamination of the water and the growth of bacteria in the pipelines.
Moreover, the costs of repairs can be enormous; in the United States, where pipes are also old
and billions of gallons of water disappear every day through leaks, repairing water and
wastewater systems could cost $1.3 trillion or more.30 Indeed, the need to upgrade the water
infrastructure of urban areas is not limited to the developing world. For instance, Chicago, the
third most populous city in the U.S., to this day relies on wooden pipes to carry water to its
population. Unpaid, illegal, or underpaid and unregulated overuse of water for agriculture is one
of the biggest causes of water scarcity. Subsequently, however, water scarcity negatively affects
agriculture and undermines food security by compromising both crop production and grazing.
Similarly, industries regularly overuse water and fail to pay for their water consumption, thus
engaging in water theft. In addition, subsequent water shortages may severely affect these and
other industries, thus triggering even larger negative economic effects . Water degradation and
depletion through unsustainable use and water theft can compromise the sustainability of
entire ecosystems, generating a cascade of bad environmental effects . As water is depleted,
wetlands dry up, forests die, and biodiversity collapses. Biodiversity reflects local habitats, with
water-rich areas, such as wetlands and rainforests, having far greater biodiversity than
waterpoor habitats. As a forest dies (or is logged out), further undesirable hydrological effects
take place, with more water evaporating and soil erosion increasing. Illegal use and overuse of
groundwater also negatively affect surface water and can fundamentally and perniciously alter
the complex dynamics between surface and groundwater. Theft- and mismanagement-induced
water scarcity and the vagaries of water smuggling can also lead to political, social, and
communal strife, riots, and instability.
 --2NC Readiness Impact Module

Cartels draw the US inward—causes global war.

Haddick 10—(Currently a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies,
Columnist for Foreign Policy Magazine, Infantry Company Commander at the United States
Marine Corps). Robbert Haddick. September 10, 2010. “This Week at War: If Mexico Is at War,
Does America Have to Win It?”. Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/10/this-week-
at-war-if-mexico-is-at-war-does-america-have-to-win-it/. Accessed 8/13/21.

Most significantly, a strengthening Mexican insurgency would very likely affect America’s role in
the rest of the world. An increasingly chaotic American side of the border, marked by bloody
cartel wars, corrupted government and media, and a breakdown in security, would likely cause
many in the United States to question the importance of military and foreign policy ventures
elsewhere in the world. Should the southern border become a U.S. president’s primary national
security concern, nervous allies and opportunistic adversaries elsewhere in the world would no
doubt adjust to a distracted and inward-looking America, with potentially disruptive arms races
the result. Secretary Clinton has looked south and now sees an insurgency. Let’s hope that the
United States can apply what it has recently learned about insurgencies to stop this one from
getting out of control.

Mexican collapse causes U.S. isolationism

Haddick 8 (Robert, Managing Editor, Small Wars Journal, former U.S. Marine Corps officer,
advisor for the State Department and the National Intelligence Council on irregular warfare
issues, former Director of Research at the Fremont Group,
http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/12/now-that-would-change-everything.html, MH)

There is one dynamic in the literature of weak and failing states that has received relatively little
attention, namely the phenomenon of “rapid collapse.” For the most part, weak and failing
states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained
periods. The collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute
problems. The collapse of Yugoslavia into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities in 1990
suggests how suddenly and catastrophically state collapse can happen - in this case, a state
which had hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics at Sarajevo, and which then quickly became the
epicenter of the ensuing civil war. In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and
indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden
collapse: Pakistan and Mexico. Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the
likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for
violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons. That
“perfect storm” of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces
into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of
the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used. The Mexican
possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial
infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels.
How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the
stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by the Mexico into chaos would demand an
American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone. Yes, the
“rapid collapse” of Mexico would change everything with respect to the global security
environment. Such a collapse would have enormous humanitarian, constitutional, economic,
cultural, and security implications for the U.S. It would seem the U.S. federal government,
indeed American society at large, would have little ability to focus serious attention on much
else in the world. The hypothetical collapse of Pakistan is a scenario that has already been well
discussed. In the worst case, the U.S. would be able to isolate itself from most effects emanating
from south Asia. However, there would be no running from a Mexican collapse.

Global readiness breakdown goes nuclear.

Dowd 15—(senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose). Alan
Dowd. 2015. “Shield & Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence”.
https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/.

Some people of faith oppose the threat of military force, let alone the use of military force,
because of Christ’s message of peace. This is understandable in the abstract, but we must keep
in mind two truths.

First, governments are held to a different standard than individuals, and hence are expected to
do certain things individuals aren’t expected to do—and arguably shouldn’t do certain things
individuals should do. For example, a government that turned the other cheek when attacked
would be conquered by its foes, leaving countless innocents defenseless. A government that put
away the sword—that neglected its defenses—would invite aggression, thus jeopardizing its
people.

Second, all uses of force are not the same. The sheriff who uses force to apprehend a murderer
is decidedly different from the criminal who uses force to commit a murder. The policemen
posted outside a sporting event to deter violence are decidedly different from those who plot
violence. Moral relativism is anything but a virtue.

Some lament the fact that we live in such a violent world, but that’s precisely the point. Because
we live in a violent world, governments must take steps to deter those who can be deterred—
and neutralize those who cannot. In this regard, it pays to recall that Jesus had sterner words for
scholars and scribes than He did for soldiers. In fact, when a centurion asked Jesus for help, He
didn’t admonish the military commander to put down his sword. Instead, He commended him
for his faith.[i] “Even in the Gospels,” soldier-scholar Ralph Peters reminds us, “it is assumed
that soldiers are, however regrettably, necessary.”[ii] They are necessary not only for waging
war but, preferably, for maintaining peace.
It’s a paradoxical truth that military readiness can keep the peace. The Romans had a phrase for
it: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.” President George
Washington put it more genteelly: “There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well
prepared to meet an enemy.” Or, in the same way, “We infinitely desire peace,” President
Theodore Roosevelt declared. “And the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not
afraid of war.” After the West gambled civilization’s very existence in the 1920s and 1930s on
hopes that war could somehow be outlawed, the men who crafted the blueprint for waging the
Cold War returned to peace through strength. Winston Churchill proposed “defense through
deterrents.” President Harry Truman called NATO “an integrated international force whose
object is to maintain peace through strength…we devoutly pray that our present course of
action will succeed and maintain peace without war.”[iii] President Dwight Eisenhower
explained, “Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor
may be tempted to risk its own destruction.” President John Kennedy vowed to “strengthen our
military power to the point where no aggressor will dare attack.” And President Ronald Reagan
steered the Cold War to a peaceful end by noting, “None of the four wars in my lifetime came
about because we were too strong.” Reagan also argued, “Our military strength is a prerequisite
for peace.”[iv]

Even so, arms alone aren’t enough to deter war. After all, the great powers were armed to the
teeth in 1914. But since they weren’t clear about their intentions and treaty commitments, a
small crisis on the fringes of Europe mushroomed into a global war. Neither is clarity alone
enough to deter war. After all, President Woodrow Wilson’s admonitions to the Kaiser were
clear, but America lacked the military strength at the onset of war to make those words matter
and thus deter German aggression. In other words, America was unable to deter. “The purpose
of a deterrence force is to create a set of conditions that would cause an adversary to conclude
that the cost of any particular act against the United States of America or her allies is far higher
than the potential benefit of that act,” explains Gen. Kevin Chilton, former commander of U.S.
Strategic Command. It is a “cost-benefit calculus.”[v] So, given the anemic state of America’s
military before 1917, the Kaiser calculated that the benefits of attacking U.S. ships and trying to
lure Mexico into an alliance outweighed the costs. That proved to be a grave miscalculation.

In order for the adversary not to miscalculate, a few factors must hold.

First, consequences must be clear, which was not the case on the eve of World War I. Critics of
deterrence often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it were that
simple, then a) there wouldn’t have been a World War II, since the Allies allowed their arsenals
to atrophy after 1918, and b) there would have been a World War III, since Washington and
Moscow engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that miscalculation lit the fuse of
World War I. The antidote, as alluded to above, is strength plus clarity.

A second important factor to avoid miscalculation: The adversary must be rational, which means
it can grasp and fear consequences. Fear is an essential ingredient of deterrence. It pays to recall
that deterrence comes from the Latin dēterreō: “to frighten off.”[vi] Of course, as Churchill
conceded, “The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics.”[vii] Mass-murderers
masquerading as holy men and death-wish dictators may be immune from deterrence. (The
secondary benefit of the peace-through-strength model is that it equips those who embrace it
with the capacity to defeat these sorts of enemies rapidly and return to the status quo ante.)

Third, the consequences of military confrontation must be credible and tangible, which was the
case during most of the Cold War. Not only did Washington and Moscow construct vast military
arsenals to deter one another; they were clear about their treaty commitments and about the
consequences of any threat to those commitments. Recall how Eisenhower answered Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s boast about the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional advantage
in Germany: “If you attack us in Germany,” the steely American commander-in-chief fired back,
“there will be nothing conventional about our response.”[viii] Eisenhower’s words were
unambiguously clear, and unlike Wilson, he wielded the military strength to give them
credibility.

Discussing military deterrence in the context of Christianity may seem incongruent to some
readers. But for a pair of reasons it is not.

First, deterrence is not system is a form of military readiness. Similarly, I Chronicles 27 provides
detail about the Israelites’ just a matter of GDPs and geopolitics. In fact, scripture often uses the
language of deterrence and preparedness. For example, in the first chapter of Numbers the Lord
directs Moses and Aaron to count “all the men in Israel who are twenty years old or more and
able to serve in the army.” This ancient selective-service massive standing army: twelve divisions
of 24,000 men each. II Chronicles 17 explains the military preparations made by King
Jehoshaphat of Judah, a king highly revered for his piety, who built forts, maintained armories in
strategically located cities “with large supplies” and fielded an army of more than a million men
“armed for battle.” Not surprisingly, “the fear of the Lord fell on all the kingdoms of the lands
surrounding Judah, so that they did not go to war against Jehoshaphat.” In the New Testament,
Paul writes in Romans 13 that “Rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who
do wrong…Rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.” Again, this is the language of
deterrence. Those who follow the law within a country and who respect codes of conduct
between countries have nothing to fear. Those who don’t have much to fear. Likewise, to
explain the importance of calculating the costs of following Him, Jesus asks in Luke 14, “What
king would go to war against another king without first sitting down to consider whether his
10,000 soldiers could go up against the 20,000 coming against him? And if he didn’t think he
could win, he would send a representative to discuss terms of peace while his enemy was still a
long way off.” In a sense, both kings are wise—one because he recognizes that he’s
outnumbered; the other because he makes sure that he’s not. Put another way, both kings
subscribe to peace through strength. Again, as with the Centurion earlier, Jesus could have
rebuked the martial character of these kings, but he did not. This is not just description but
commendation. We ignore their example at our peril.

Secondly, it is not incongruent if we understand military deterrence as a means to prevent

great-power war—the kind that kills by the millions, the kind humanity has not endured for
seven decades. We know we will not experience the biblical notion of peace—of shalom, peace
with harmony and justice—until Christ returns to make all things new. In the interim, in a
broken world, the alternatives to peace through strength leave much to be desired: peace
through hope, peace through violence, or peace through submission. But these options are
inadequate.

The sheer destructiveness and totality of great-power war testify that crossing our fingers and
hoping for peace is not a Christian option. Wishful thinking, romanticizing reality, is the surest
way to invite what Churchill called “temptations to a trial of strength.”

Moreover, the likelihood that the next great-power war would involve multiple nuclear-
weapons states means that it could end civilization . Therefore, a posture that leaves peer
adversaries doubting the West’s capabilities and resolve—thus inviting miscalculation—is not
only unsound, but immoral and inhumane—unchristian. “Deterrence of war is more
humanitarian than anything,” Gen. Park Yong Ok, a longtime South Korean military official,
argues. “If we fail to deter war, a tremendous number of civilians will be killed.”[ix]

Peace through violence has been tried throughout history. Pharaoh, Caesar and Genghis Khan,
Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, all attained a kind of peace by employing brutal forms of violence.
However, this is not the kind of “peace” under which God’s crowning creation can flourish;
neither would the world long tolerate such a scorched-earth “peace.” This option, too, the
Christian rejects.

Finally, the civilized world could bring about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of
civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the 38th
Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying
of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As
Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you can have it in the
next second—surrender.”[x]

The world has tried these alternatives to peace through strength, and the outcomes have been
disastrous.

After World War I, Western powers disarmed and convinced themselves they had waged the
war to end all wars. By 1938, as Churchill concluded after Munich, the Allies had been
“reduced…from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never
cared to think about it.”[xi] Like predators in the wilderness, the Axis powers sensed weakness
and attacked.

In October 1945—not three months after the Missouri steamed into Tokyo Bay—Gen. George
Marshall decried the “disintegration not only of the Armed Forces, but apparently…all
conception of world responsibility,” warily asking, “Are we already, at this early date, inviting
that same international disrespect that prevailed before this war?”[xii] Stalin answered
Marshall’s question by gobbling up half of Europe, blockading Berlin, and arming Kim Il-Sung in
patient preparation for the invasion of South Korea.[xiii] The U.S. military had taken up positions
in Korea in 1945, but withdrew all combat forces in 1949.[xiv] Then, in 1950, Secretary of State
Dean Acheson announced that Japan, Alaska and the Philippines fell within America’s “defensive
perimeter.”[xv] Korea didn’t. Stalin noticed. Without a U.S. deterrent in place, Stalin gave Kim a
green light to invade. Washington then reversed course and rushed American forces back into
Korea, and the Korean peninsula plunged into one of the most ferocious wars in history. The
cost of miscalculation in Washington and Moscow: 38,000 Americans, 103,250 South Korean
troops, 316,000 North Korean troops, 422,000 Chinese troops and 2 million civilian casualties.
[xvi] The North Korean tyranny— now under command of Kim’s grandson—still dreams of
conquering South Korea. The difference between 2015 and 1950 is that tens of thousands of
battle-ready U.S. and ROK troops are stationed on the border. They’ve been there every day
since 1953.

The lesson of history is that waging war is far more costly than maintaining a military capable of
deterring war. As Washington observed, “Timely disbursements to prepare for danger
frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it.” Just compare military allocations,
as a percentage of GDP, during times of war and times of peace:

In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States devoted an average of 0.7
percent of GDP to defense; during the war, U.S. defense spending spiked to 16.1 percent of
GDP. In the decade before entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1
percent of GDP on defense; during the war, the U.S. diverted an average of 27 percent of GDP to
the military annually.

During the Cold War, Washington spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter
Moscow; it worked.

Yet it seems we have forgotten those hard-learned lessons. In his book The World America
Made, Robert Kagan explains how “America’s most important role has been to dampen and
deter the normal tendencies of other great powers to compete and jostle with one another in
ways that historically have led to war.” This role has depended on America’s military might.
“There is no better recipe for great-power peace,” Kagan concludes, “than certainty about who
holds the upper hand.”[xvii]
Case
 No Resource Wars---2NC
No resource wars – that’s Atkins – interdependence dampens the effects of
price shocks, and no study has proven a causal link between insecurity and war.

There’s not enough evidence to prove resources are a causal factor in conflict
Atkins, 16—PhD Candidate in Energy, Environment & Resilience at the University of Bristol
(Ed, “Environmental Conflict: A Misnomer?,” http://www.e-ir.info/2016/05/12/environmental-
conflict-a-misnomer/, dml)

The historical evidence fails to support any arguments of environmentally driven conflict and
instead provides indications that the environment as an operating cause is placed within a
causal framework where numerous factors intersect. Within the literature, a confused
permutation of conflicts involving resources with an economic value and environmental
degradation results in misguided conclusions regarding the environmental causality and nature
of many conflicts. Such assumptions result in the neglect of additional variables that have
created a framework in which conflict takes place. Social, political and economic factors are all
important facets of the process that may eventually lead to conflict. It is these factors that have
resulted in minerals in Angola and Sierra Leone leading to prolonged civil conflicts and
unprecedented violence, and the same resources resulting in relative peace and growth in
nations such as Botswana. The landmark academic examples of the role of such resources in the
formation of conflicts neglect key variables in the occurrence of such struggles. World War Two
was not caused by Adolf Hitler’s pursuit of lebensraum alone. Numerous additional factors
provided an underlying interplay that resulted in the outbreak of war in 1939 . This chapter has
sought to illustrate that such a relationship is particularly evident in the discourse of conflict
surrounding environmental migrants and refugees.

Other factors vastly outweigh.

Buhaug et al 15 [Halvard Buhaug, Peace Research Institute in Oslo an Norwegian University
of Science and Technology. Tor Benjaminsen, Espen Sjaastad, Ole Magnus Theisen.] “Climate
variability, food production shocks, and violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa” Environmental
Research Letters, Volume 10, Number 12 (http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-
9326/10/12/125015) - MZhu

Across all models, we find relatively weak and insignificant effects for domestic food production
and we also note that the sign of the coefficients shifts between outcome types. In this sense, table 1 implicitly contrasts both claims that political violence is more prevalent

The results are

when basic needs are met (Salehyan and Hendrix 2014) and claims that agricultural income shocks increase civil conflict risk (von Uexkull 2014).

consistent with Koubi et al (2012) and van Weezel (2015), however, who conclude that rainfall—a significant determinant of
yields in SSA—has little impact on conflict either directly or through economic performance. The covariate that best and most consistently explains
temporal variation in political violence is the time-lagged conflict incidence indicator. Models 1–2 show that a new civil conflict is unlikely to break out if another one is already
ongoing in the same country whereas Models 3–6, which capture the occurrence of less organized conflict, demonstrate that violence begets violence. Coups d'état (Models 7–

we
8) exhibit a comparatively weak temporal correlation pattern in our data and are generally regarded as a highly unpredictable phenomenon (Luttwak 1979). Next,

estimate the same set of models on a subsample of 14 countries in SSA where rainfall has a large and
significant positive effect on food production (figure 2(b); see supplementary information, section B for details). To better capture the
influence of climate variability and reduce concerns with endogeneity, we further replace the standard OLS model with two-stage instrumental variable regression. The first
stage in this model estimates the joint influence of annual rainfall (linear and squared terms) and temperature (linear) on contemporaneous food production. This effect then

constitutes the exogenous instrument for food production in the second stage. The results are reported in table 2. Mirroring the results presented above, we fail to
uncover a robust signal for agricultural performance , although the sign of the coefficient for food production now remains negative in
seven of the eight specifications. Food production shocks may have different consequences depending on the socioeconomic context, so next we consider a series of interactive
relationships. Specifically, we investigate the joint effect of food production and (i) low level of development, (ii) extent of discriminatory political system, and (iii) economic
dependence on agriculture; three conditions whereby loss of income from agriculture might constitute a particular challenge to society. To model these interactions, we include
time-varying regressors instead of country-fixed effects where (i) is represented by infant mortality rate (IMR; World Bank 2014), (ii) is captured using the Ethnic Power Relations
v.1.1 data (Cederman et al 2010), while (iii) uses an index of agricultural contribution to GDP (World Bank 2014). Moreover, to preserve focus on temporal dynamics, food
production is now operationalized as yearly deviation from the country mean, 1961–2009. We use additive inverse deviation values to ensure theoretical consistency among the

All models control for (ln) population size, conflict history, and a common time
components in the interaction terms.

trend, and models without IMR and agricultural dependence additionally control for (ln) GDP per
capita. The results are presented in table 3. Again, we are unsuccessful in establishing a consistent covariation
pattern between agricultural performance and political violence. Interpreting the combined effect of interaction terms
with continuous parameters is inherently difficult but figure 4 shows that food production is insignificantly related to all conflict outcomes across levels of socioeconomic
development for all three interaction terms. The sole exception is the result in Model 24, where lower food production in highly discriminatory societies is negatively associated

with non-state conflict. This result would seem to contradict the standard scarcity thesis (Homer-Dixon 1999) although it
is consistent with observations that conflict is more prevalent during surplus years (Witsenburg and Adano 2009, Salehyan and Hendrix 2014). Mirroring earlier research,
ethnopolitical exclusion is strongly related to higher civil conflict risk, but not necessarily to other forms of political violence. Infant mortality rate and economic dependence on
agriculture appear largely irrelevant. While this may come as a surprise, recall that most countries in SSA are characterized by underdevelopment and a large agricultural sector,
implying that the variation in values on these indicators is modest. Large parameter uncertainties and p-values above the conventional significance threshold (5%) may disguise
substantively important effects (Ward et al 2010). Accordingly, as a final assessment, we conduct a set of out-of-sample simulations and compare predictions for models with
and without food production. The models are estimated on a subset of the full sample, in this case all years before 2000, and the estimated effects are then used to predict
conflict outcomes out of sample, i.e., the 2000–09 period. Figure 5 shows the predicted values from four pairs of models that are specified similarly to Models 17, 20, 23, and 26,

For civil conflict and social

except for the shorter time period and the fact that one model in each pair drops the food production deviation variable.

unrest, the models generate very similar predictions, signaling that agricultural performance
adds little to the models' predictive power. There is more spread in the predictions for the remaining two outcome categories.
Puzzlingly, the model without food production performs better in both cases—i.e., the Receiver Operating
Characteristics curves have higher 'Area Under the Curve' scores. We hesitate to put too much emphasis on the ROC tests, given the rareness of the outcomes (notably Models
17 and 26) and the relatively small training samples (Models 20 and 23), but nonetheless the patterns observed in the out-of-sample simulations substantiate the regression
results reported above; fluctuations in agricultural output explain little of the observed variation in political violence in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. 5. Concluding remarks

Emerging evidence suggests that food price shocks are associated with an increase in social unrest
(Smith 2014, Bellemare 2015, Hendrix and Haggard 2015, Weinberg and Bakker 2015). Yet, the robust 'non-finding' presented here implies that so-called 'food riots' play out

claims that adverse weather and harvest failure drive

largely isolated from climate-sensitive production dynamics in the affected countries. Likewise,

violence in Africa (e.g., Hsiang et al 2013, IFPRI 2015) are not supported by our analysis. Instead, social
contemporary

protest and rebellion during times of food price spikes may be better understood as reactions
to poor and unjust government policies, corruption, repression, and market failure (e.g., Bush 2010, Buhaug and Urdal 2013, Sneyd et al 2013,
Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).

No food wars – that’s Pinker – dozens of countries with shortages now prove
wars aren’t tied to food shortages. Their evidence cherry-picks data –
overwhelming literature consensus concludes that external factors generally
motivate hungry countries to escalate conflicts.

The countries that matter for their impact are resilient and institutional
responses prevent escalation
Sarah Cliffe 16, Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University,
3/29/16, “Food Security, Nutrition, and Peace,” http://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/food-
security-nutrition-and-peace

However, current research does not yet indicate a clear link between climate change, food insecurity
and conflict, except perhaps where rapidly deteriorating water availability cuts across existing tensions and weak institutions.
But a series of interlinked problems – changing global patterns of consumption of energy and scarce resources, increasing demands
for food imports (which draw on land, water, and energy inputs) can create pressure on fragile situations.
Food security – and food prices – are a highly political issue , being a very immediate and visible source of
popular welfare or popular uncertainty. But their link to conflict (and the wider links between climate change and conflict)
is indirect rather than direct.
What makes some countries more resilient than others?

Many countries face food price or natural resource shocks without falling into conflict . Essentially,
the two important factors in determining their resilience are:

First, whether food insecurity is combined with other stresses – issues such as unemployment, but most
fundamentally issues such as political exclusion or human rights abuses. We sometimes read nowadays that the 2006-2009
drought was a factor in the Syrian conflict, by driving rural-urban migration that caused societal stresses. It may of
course have been one factor amongst many but it would be too simplistic to suggest that it was the primary
driver of the Syrian conflict.

Second, whether countries have strong enough institutions to fulfill a social compact with their citizens,
providing help quickly to citizens affected by food insecurity, with or without international assistance.
During the 2007-2008 food crisis, developing countries with low institutional strength experienced
more food price protests than those with higher institutional strengths, and more than half these protests turned violent.
This for example, is the difference in the events in Haiti versus those in Mexico or the Philippines
where far greater institutional strength existed to deal with the food price shocks and protests
did not spur deteriorating national security or widespread violence.

Global responses to food insecurity can effectively prevent conflict now

Emmy Simmons 17, nonresident senior adviser to the CSIS Global Food Security Project,
independent consultant on international development issues with a focus on food, agriculture,
and Africa, February 2017, “RECURRING STORMS: Food Insecurity, Political Instability, and
Conflict,”
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/170124_Simmons_RecurringStorms_We
b.pdf

Sharp rises in global food prices in 2007/08 jolted global political leaders out of any
complacency they might have had regarding the future of food and agriculture. Street demonstrations and food
riots broke out in more than 40 countries across the world, provoking unrest and violence in several places.

The L’Aquila Food Security Initiative, launched by the G-8 and the G-20 in 2009, brought new funding
and energy to the task of quelling the “perfect storm” of food insecurity set off by spiking global food and
fuel prices, financial and commodity market turmoil, the competition of biofuel production, and adverse weather in key
agricultural regions. The L’Aquila Food Security Initiative successfully reversed a decades-long decline in
international support for agricultural development.

To implement the L’Aquila Initiative, programs were put in place across the developing world to increase
agricultural productivity, strengthen smallholder farmer linkages to commercial markets, and
ensure that youth, women, and marginalized populations were full participants in the growth of the
sector. But as this work went forward, new threats to sustainable food security became apparent.
Changes in global weather patterns are now projected to have potentially devastating impacts on agriculture in the coming years
and decades. The rising “double burden” of malnutrition already threatens to dampen global progress toward better health.
Demographic change—a bulging population of youth in Africa and rapid urbanization—is creating opportunities for an economic
growth spurt that will affect food demand and organized protests when food security is endangered. Food safety issues, economic
and social inequities, and foodprice volatility are seen as persistent disrupters of food systems and food
security. Outbreaks of civil unrest and violent conflict have deprived millions of reliable access to food and challenged their
physical security and social cohesion. Whether these threats will combine to drive repeats of 2007/08’s “perfect storm” of food
insecurity in the future is unknown. But it is predicted that, singly or together, they already pose critical risks—likely to erupt in
“recurring storms”—somewhere around the globe.

The L’Aquila Initiative was brought to a close in 2012. But in

2015, “ending hunger, achieving food security and improved
nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture” was adopted
as one of 17 Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) to be accomplished by 2030. Strong international collaboration to build more productive and

resilient households, nations, and food systems—to help them withstand the likely recurring storms of
hunger, food insecurity, and agricultural market volatility—seems like the obvious path forward .
 no warming ! --- 2NC
No impact – that’s Farquhar –
1) Timescales give us response time even in extreme scenarios
2) We’ll take action once we can see the large costs
3) Most likely levels don’t cause extinction – their evidence is hyperbolic and
assumes the worst
4) Adaption checks
Shani ’15 (Amir Shani – PhD @ the University of Central Florida, researches ecotourism and
ethics at the University of the Negev, Eilat Campus. Boaz Arad – spokesman in the Public Policy
Center at the Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies, “There is always time for rational
skepticism: Reply to Hall et al,” April 2015, ScienceDirect)

The uncertainty that encompasses current climate change assessments is strengthened in light of the studies indicating that over

earth's history there have been distinct warm periods with temperatures exceeding the
current ones (Esper et al., 2012, McIntyre and McKittrick, 2003 and Soon and Baliunas, 2003). Reviewing the relevant
scientific literature, Khandekar, Murty, and Chittibabu (2005 ) concluded that “in the context of
the earth's climate through the last 500 million years, the recent (1975–2000) increase in the earth's
mean temperature does not appear to be unusual or unprecedented as claimed by IPCC and
many supporters of the global warming hypothesis ” (p. 1568). Other studies challenged the mainstream climate
change narrative, according to which CO2 levels in the earth's atmosphere play a prominent role in rising temperatures. One notable
example is the research by Shaviv and Veizer (2003), which demonstrates that the earth's temperature correlates well with
variations in cosmic ray flux, rather than changes in atmospheric CO2. These findings and others stir contentious debates within the
climate scientific community, but are nevertheless largely overlooked by the IPCC, which ignores alternative explanations for climate
change. Regrettably, Hall et al. scornfully dismiss this evidence, presented in our research note, based on cherry-picking of a few
“non-peer-reviewed” references that were cited, some vague claims about “misreading” and “selective citing,” as well as other
semantic nitpicking. 4. Impacts of climate change The
IPCC warns that climate change is likely to have severe
consequences, particularly for poor countries, such as increased hunger, water shortages,
vulnerability to extreme weather events and debilitating diseases. However , these estimations
have been heavily criticized for failing to properly account for substantial improvements in
adaptive capacity (i.e., the capability of coping with the impact of global warming) that are likely to occur due to
advances in economic development , technological change and human capital over the next
century (Goklany, 2007). Fostering economic growth and technological development, largely
achievable through the use of fossil fuels , will strengthen both industrialized and developing
countries' adaptive capacity to deal not just with possible future climate change consequences,
but also with other environmental and public health problems . Such policy will provide greater
benefits at lower costs than drastic climate change mitigation efforts involving substantially
cutting greenhouse gas emissions (Goklany, 2004 and Goklany, 2012). Furthermore, the analyses of Galiana and Green
(2009) exemplify that in the current state of energy technologies, the suggested plans for ambitious emission reductions will likely
severely clobber the global economy, especially in view of present economic conditions. In order to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at
accepted levels, there is a need for enormous advances in efficient energy technology, which is currently missing (Pielke, Wigley &

Green, 2008). In any case, even if every industrialized nation meets the most ambitious emissions
targets set by the Kyoto Protocol , such efforts are likely to have little effect , particularly in the
light of the considerable increases in greenhouse gas emissions by rising economic superpowers
as China and India , as well as the remaining developing world (Wigley, 1998). Hall et al. criticized us for
choosing “selective citations…that discuss natural processes potentially affect climate in specific locations and times.” Yet the
purpose of referring to such studies was to refute the claims made by the IPCC and other climate change alarmists to the effect that
recent extreme weather events (e.g., floods, droughts and storms) are the consequences of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases. Moreover, data shows that despite claims that the number and intensity of extreme weather has increased, between 1900
and 2010 the average annual death and death rates from extreme weather events has declined by 93% and 98%, respectively
(Goklany, 2009). This is mostly due to economic and technological factors, such as improved global food production, increase
globalized food trade and better disaster preparedness. IPCC's exaggerated estimations of climate change impacts were also noted
in an op-ed in Financial Times written by climate economist Richard Tol (2014), a week following his demand that his name as one of
the leading authors be removed from the IPCC's AR5 due to its over alarmist assessments of the impacts of AGW and

underestimation of humanity's adaptive capacity. As concluded by Tol, “Humans are a tough and adaptable
species. People live on the equator and in the Arctic, in the desert and in the rainforest. We survived ice ages with
primitive technologies . The idea that climate change poses an existential threat to humankind
is laughable ” (2014, para 1).
 --2NC No China Tech Leadership

China tech leadership is limited. That’s Li and Tong. 4 warrants:

1. Innovation done at universities with poor linkage to
industry
2. Focus on applied tech and not long-term innovation
3. Regulatory Uncertainty
4. Trade War effectiveness

China doesn’t hurt US tech leadership.

Economist ’18 [5-3-2018, “Fears that China has hurt innovation in the West are overblown,”
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/05/03/fears-that-china-has-hurt-
innovation-in-the-west-are-overblown]
POPULAR concern about free trade with China has focused on the loss of manufacturing jobs in America and Europe.
Policymakers have an additional worry: that China’s rise is hurting innovation in the West . This fear
is among the small set of issues that unites American Democrats and Republicans. In 2016 Barack Obama’s commerce secretary said
that China’s state-driven economy would weaken the world’s innovation ecosystem. Donald
Trump’s advisers allege
that China makes it harder for foreign firms to invest in innovation by squeezing their returns . Mr
Trump’s trade team was expected to raise this complaint, among others, with Chinese officials during talks in Beijing on May 3rd and
4th, as The Economist went to press. There
is one problem. Data suggest that competition with China has
coincided with more innovation in America, not less. The relationship between competition and innovation is
complex, even before considering trade with China. Economists agree that the right competitive landscape fosters innovation. But
they disagree about what exactly that landscape looks like. More competition might prod companies to try harder to develop new
products in the hope of gaining market share. Alternatively, if competition is cut-throat, profits might evaporate to the point that
companies have little incentive to take risks. The fear is that China generates the wrong kind of competition
and stunts the good kind. Businesspeople elsewhere worry that when the Chinese government decides to fund this or that
industry, investment soars and margins collapse. Overcapacity in steel was caused in part by Chinese investment in steel processing;
semiconductor firms think their industry might be next. At the same time, argues Robert Lighthizer, the US Trade Representative,
foreign companies that beat their Chinese competitors are not adequately rewarded because China presses them to transfer their
intellectual property. The
two main academic papers on this question looked at the years around
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 . Far from settling the matter, they
were contradictory. Economists studying European companies found that competition from Chinese imports both caused
firms to improve their technology and led to a shift in jobs to the most advanced firms. They concluded that 15% of the upgrading of
technology in Europe between 2000 and 2007 could be attributed to the increase in imports from China. But economists examining
the impact on America argued that, on the contrary, Chinese competition had led companies to spend less on research as profits fell.
They calculated that imports from China explained 40% of a slowdown in American patenting between 1999 and 2007, compared
with the preceding decade. The
IMF has now weighed in with more recent figures. Its conclusion is
rather more cheerful, at least for those who think a trade war with China is a rotten ide a. In a
report published in April the fund showed that, following an extended period of decline, high-
quality patents granted to American companies had risen sharply between 2010 and 2014. It
also pointed to a big increase in American spending on research and development during the
same years—even as America’s trade deficit with China rocketed (see chart). The growth in patents was more sluggish in Europe
and Japan. But both patents and research spending soared in South Korea, the country most
directly exposed to manufacturing competition from China. A separate IMF working paper late last year
unpicked some of what is happening in America. Competition from Chinese imports has caused research
spending to be reallocated within certain industries, away from also-rans and towards the most
productive and profitable firms. At the same time, many researchers left manufacturing
industries and moved into service sectors such as data-processing and finance. Both results are
consistent with an American economy that is playing to its strengths . The IMF’s analysts
concluded that Chinese imports were not a threat to innovation in America, after all, and that
policymakers could take a deep breath. No loud inhaling sounds have yet been reported from the White House.