SPS. MORATA VS.
SPS GO TOPIC: Condition precedent – Referral to
FACTS:
Original Complaint: Recovery for a
Sum of Money
Important principle:
“The conciliation process at the
barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508
as a pre-condition for filing a complaint
in court, is compulsory not only for
cases falling under the exclusive
competence of the metropolitan and
municipal trial courts, but for actions
cognizable by the regional trial courts as
well.”
Spouses Go filed the action to
recover against herein Petitioners Sps.
Morata for a sum of money (P
49,000).Both parties are residents of
Cebu City. Sps. Morata filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that there is the failure
of the complaint to allege prior availment
by the plaintiffs of the barangay
conciliation process required by P.D.
1508, as well as the absence of a
certification by the Lupon or Pangkat
Secretary that no conciliation or
settlement had been reached by the
parties. The motion was opposed by
Sps. Go. The motion was then
dismissed by the trial judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conciliation
process at the barangay level,
prescribed by P.D. 1508, is compulsory
not only for cases falling under the
exclusive competence of the
the Katarungang Pambarangay
metropolitan and municipal trial courts,
but for actions cognizable by the
regional trial courts as well
RULING:
Yes. . Section 6 of P.D. 1508
provides: No complaint, petition, action
for proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of the Lupon as
provided in Section 2 hereof shall be
filed or instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication
unless there has been a confrontation of
the parties before the Lupon Chairman
or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified
by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the
settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to
court in the following cases:
[1] Where the accused is under
detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been
deprived of personal liberty calling for
habeas corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal
property and support pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be
barred by the Statute of Limitations
 Section 2 of the law defines the
scope of authority of the Lupon. The
Lupon of each barangay shall have
authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of
all disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the
government ,or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public
officer or employee, and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official
functions;
[3] Offenses punishable by
imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a
fine exceeding P200.00;
[4] Offenses where there is no
private offended party;
[5] Such other classes of disputes
which the Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of
Justice and the Minister of Local
Government.
Except in the instances
enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the
law, the Lupon has the authority to settle
amicably all types of disputes involving
parties who actually reside in the same
city or municipality. The law, as written,
makes no distinction whatsoever with
respect to the classes of civil disputes
that should be compromised at the
barangay level, in contradistinction to
the limitation imposed upon the Lupon
by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as
regards its authority over criminal cases.
Section 2 of said law employed
the universal and comprehensive term
"all", to which usage We should neither
add nor subtract in consonance with the
rudimentary precept in statutory
construction that "where the law does
not distinguish, We should not
distinguish.
The law conferred upon the
Lupon "the authority to bring together
the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes, ... ," its
intendment was to grant to the Lupon as
broad and comprehensive an authority
as possible as would bring about the
optimum realization of the aforesaid
objectives. These objectives would only
be half-met and easily thwarted if the
Lupon's authority is exercised only in
cases falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Moreover, if it is the intention of
the law to restrict its coverage only to
cases cognizable by the inferior courts,
then it would not have provided in
Section 3 thereof the following rule on
Venue, to wit:
Section 3. Venue. ... However, all
disputes which involve real property or
any interest therein shall be brought in
the Barangay where the real property or
and part thereof is situated.
Such is further evidence by
Circular No. 22 as issued by SC, which
was directed towards ALL JUDGES OF
THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE,
CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS,
JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF
AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY
COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND
THEIR CLERKS OF COURT to desist
from receiving complaints within the
Lupon’s authority.
UY VS. HON. CONTRERAS
Topic: Referral to the Katarungang
Pambarangay
Principle:
(1) “When there is failure to appear at
the first scheduled mediation, no
complaint for slight physical injuries
could be validly filed with the Trial Court
at any time before such date.”
(2) “Cases requiring referral to the
Lupon for conciliation under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1508 where there is no showing of
compliance with such requirement, shall
be dismissed without prejudice, and may
be revived only after such requirement
shall have been complied with.”
Original Complaint: Criminal complaint
for Slight Physical Injuries
FACTS:
Respondent Contreras was the
presiding judge for MTC of Makati
Branch 61. He denied the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss a crim. complaint for
SPI.
A scuffle ensued between the
petitioner (Uy) and Atayde over a
misunderstanding on lease, causing
injuries over Atayde.Atayde et. al. filed a
private complaint with the Brgy. Captain
of Valenzuela, Makati. Only the
petitioner appeared on said date so it
was rescheduled.
2 informations for SPI was then
filed against Uy with the MTC of Makati.
Judge Contreras ordered her to submit
her counter-affidavit, to which she
alleged that there was failure to undergo
conciliation proceedings, as both parties
are residents of Manila. She also
alleged that there was an ongoing
conciliation between them in the Brgy.
Judge Contreras denied the
motion, ruling that Barangay Valenzuela
of the Municipality of Makati had started
the conciliation proceedings between
the parties but nothing has been
achieved by the barangay. The accused
and her witnesses had already filed their
counter-affidavits and documents. The
court believes that the accused had
already waived the right to a
reconciliation proceedings before the
barangay of Valenzuela, Makati
considering that accused and
complainant are residents of different
barangays; that the offense charged
occurred in the Municipality of Makati;
and finally, this offense is about to
prescribe.
Private respondents (Atayde et
al) assert that the said law is not
applicable to their cases before the court
a quo because (a) the petitioner and
respondent Atayde are not residents of
barangays in the same city or
municipality; (b) the law does not apply
when the action, as in the said cases,
may otherwise be barred by the statute
of limitations; and (c) even assuming
that the law applies insofar as Atayde is
concerned, she has substantially
complied with it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the
Criminal Cases with the court was
premature pursuant to Sec. 412 of the
LGC
RULING:
In view of the private
respondents' failure to appear at the first
scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993
for which the mediation was reset to 26
May 1993, no complaint for slight
physical injuries could be validly filed
with the MTC of Makati at any time
before such date. The filing then of
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and
145234 with the said court on 11 May
1993 was premature and, pursuant to
paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local
Government Code, respondent Judge
Contreras should have granted the
motion to dismiss the criminal cases.
PD 1508 (the old law) was
repealed expressly by the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Sec.
534(b)).
The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules to implement the
Revised Law on Katarungang
Pambarangay. Sections 8 and 11 of
Rule VI (Amicable Settlement of
Disputes) thereof provide in part as
follows:
SECTION 8. Failure to appear. —
a. Sanctions
The complaint may be dismissed when
complainant, after due notice, refuses or
willfully fails to appear without justifiable
reason on the date set for mediation,
conciliation or arbitration. Such
dismissal ordered by the Punong
Barangay/Pangkat Chairman after giving
the complainant an opportunity to
explain his non-appearance shall be
certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat
Secretary as the case may be, and shall
bar the complainant from seeking
judicial recourse for the same cause of
action as that dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Suspension of prescriptive
period of offenses and cause of action.
— The prescriptive periods for offenses
and causes of action under existing laws
shall be interrupted upon filing of the
complaint with the Punong Barangay.
The running of the prescriptive periods
shall resume upon receipts by the
complainant of the certificate of
repudiation or of the certification to file
action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat
Secretary: Provided, however, that such
interruption shall not exceed sixty (60)
days from the filing of the complaint with
the Punong Barangay. After the
expiration of the aforesaid period of sixty
days, the filing of the case in court or
government office for adjudication shall
be subject to the provision of paragraph
(b) (4) of Rule VIII of these Rules.
The Supreme Court promulgated
the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.19 Section 18 thereof
provides:
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases
requiring referral to the Lupon for
conciliation under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 where
there is no showing of compliance with
such requirement, shall be dismissed
without prejudice, and may be revived
only after such requirement shall have
been complied with. This provision shall
not apply to criminal cases where the
accused was arrested without a warrant.
The Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay law has at least three
new significant features, to wit:
1. increased the authority of the lupon in
criminal offenses from those punishable
by imprisonment not exceeding thirty
days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in
P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses
punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding one year or a fine not
exceeding P5,000.00.
2. As to venue, it provides that disputes
arising at the workplace where the
contending parties are employed or at
the institution where such parties are
enrolled for study, shall be brought in
the barangay where such workplace or
institution is located.
3. For the suspension of the prescriptive
periods of offenses during the pendency
of the mediation, conciliation, or
arbitration process. Paragraph (c) of
Section 410 of the law, however, suffers
from some ambiguity when it provides
that the prescriptive periods "shall
resume upon receipt by the complainant
of the complaint or the certificate of
repudiation or of the certification to file
action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary." What is referred to as receipt
by the complainant of the complaint is
unclear; obviously, it could have been a
drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the
above quoted Section 11 of the Rules
and Regulations issued by the Secretary
of Justice, the phrase "the complaint or"
is not found, such that the resumption of
the running of the prescriptive period
shall, properly, be from receipt by the
complainant of the certificate of
repudiation or the certification to file
action issued by the lupon or the
pangkat secretary. Such suspension,
however, shall not exceed sixty days.
The failure of the defendant to
seasonably invoke non-referral to the
appropriate lupon operated as a waiver
thereof. Furthermore, when such defect
was initially present when the case was
first filed in the trial court, the
subsequent issuance of the certification
to file action by the barangay, which
constituted substantial compliance with
the said requirement, cures the defect.
The parties herein had in mind
only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner
further invoked the aforequoted Section
18. None knew of the repeal of the
decree by the Local Government Code
of 1991. Even in her instant petition, the
petitioner invokes the decree and
Section 18 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
Ignorance could be imputed
against Judge Contreras for his total
unawareness of the LGC provisions on
the Katarungang Pambarangay.
 As to the argument that the
petitioner "had already waived the right
to a reconciliation proceedings before
the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati,
considering that the accused and the
complainant are residents of different
barangays," the petitioner did not waive
the reconciliation proceedings before the
lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she
submitted to it and attended the
scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993
and invoked the pre-condition of referral
to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.
Neither is it true that the parties
could not agree on a compromise. The
request for issuance of a certificate to
file action was filed one and a half
months after the criminal cases were
filed (this was merely filed in order to
sufficiently prove that there was
“substantial compliance”). The private
respondents, after failing to appear at
the initial confrontation and long after
the criminal cases were filed, had no
right to demand the issuance of a
certification to file action