Sec. 2.
Cause of action, defined
Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte
G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with
Damages (subject complaint) against respondent. In
their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon
(Magdaleno) died intestate and childless, leaving
behind parcels of land. Claiming to be the sole heir
of Magdaleno, Gaudioso, Respondent (Gaudioso
Ypon) executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and
caused the cancellation of the aforementioned
certificates of title, leading to their subsequent
transfer in his name to the prejudice of petitioners
who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest.
In his Answer, Gaudioso Ypon alleged that
he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by:
(a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters
from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy
of his passport. Further, by way of affirmative
defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no
cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to
state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not
prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is
no showing that the petitioners have been judicially
declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.
The RTC issued an order, finding that the
subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
against Gaudioso. It observed that while the
plaintiffs therein had established their relationship
with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for
the issuance of letters of administration, this did not
mean that they could already be considered as the
decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary,
Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir –
through the documentary evidence he submitted.
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for
reconsideration which was, however, denied.
Aggrieved, petitioners sought direct recourse to the
SC through the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the RTC’s dismissal of the case on
the ground that the subject complaint failed to state
a cause of action was proper.
Held:
Yes. Cause of action is defined as the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another.
It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of
action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to
assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for.
Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis
by which the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses
that may be averred by the defendants.
As stated in the subject complaint,
petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein,
alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno
and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared
null and void and that the transfer certificates of title
issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the
foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the
said complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC,
in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and
reconveyance, from granting the same.
Determination of who are the decedent’s lawful
heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding
for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and/or possession.
Determination of who are the legal heirs of
the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court (proper probate court), and not
in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property.1âwphi1 This must take
precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is
then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship
can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch
as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment
of a status or right.
By way of exception, the need to institute a
separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and
already presented their evidence regarding the issue
of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered
judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had
been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing
exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to
exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the
proper special proceeding in order to determine the
heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting
to the dismissal. Since a determination of heirship
cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil
Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light,
it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on
Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein
discussed, be threshed out and determined in the
proper special proceeding.
Swagman Hotels v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 161135, April 8, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondent Christian filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59, a
complaint for a sum of money and damages against
the petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty.
Infante. The complaint alleged as follows: The
petitioner, as well as its president and vice-president
obtained loans from him in the total amount of
US$150,000 payable after three years, with an
interest of 15% per annum payable quarterly or
every three months. For a while, they paid an
interest of 15% per annum every three months in
accordance with the three promissory notes.
However, starting January 1998 until December
1998, they paid him only an interest of 6% per
annum, instead of 15% per annum, in violation of the
terms of the three promissory notes. Thus, Christian
prayed that the trial court order them to pay him
jointly and solidarily the amount of US$150,000
representing the total amount of the loans;
US$13,500 representing unpaid interests from
January 1998 until December 1998; P100,000 for
moral damages; P50,000 for attorney’s fees; and the
cost of the suit.
The petitioner corporation, together with its
president and vice-president, filed an Answer raising
as defenses lack of cause of action and novation of
the principal obligations. According to them,
Christian had no cause of action because the three
promissory notes were not yet due and demandable.
In December 1997, since the petitioner corporation
was experiencing huge losses due to the Asian
financial crisis, Christian agreed (a) to waive the
interest of 15% per annum, and (b) accept payments
of the principal loans in installment basis, the
amount and period of which would depend on the
state of business of the petitioner corporation. Thus,
the petitioner paid Christian capital repayment in the
amount of US$750 per month from January 1998
until the time the complaint was filed in February
1999. The petitioner and its co-defendants then
prayed that the complaint be dismissed and that
Christian be ordered to pay P1 million as moral
damages; P500,000 as exemplary damages; and
P100,000 as attorney’s fees.
Issue: W/N appellee Christian had no cause of action
because none of the promissory notes was due and
demandable.
Ruling:
No. While it is true that appellant Swagman
raised in its Answer the issue of prematurity in the
filing of the complaint, appellant Swagman
nonetheless failed to object to appellee Christian's
presentation of evidence to the effect that the
promissory notes have become due and
demandable.
Cause of action, as defined in Section 2,
Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the act
or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the
last element that a cause of action arises, giving the
plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
The three promissory notes were for the
amount of P50,000 each and uniformly provided for
(1) a term of three years; (2) an interest of 15 % per
annum, payable quarterly; and (3) the repayment of
the principal loans after three years from their
respective dates. However, both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court found that
renegotiation of the three promissory notes indeed
happened in December 1997 between the private
respondent and the petitioner resulting in the
reduction - not waiver - of the interest from 15% to
6% per annum, which from then on was payable
monthly, instead of quarterly. The term of the
principal loans remained unchanged in that they
were still due three years from the respective dates
of the promissory notes. Thus, at the time the
complaint was filed with the trial court on 2 February
1999, none of the three promissory notes was due
yet; although, two of the promissory notes with the
due dates of 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000
matured during the pendency of the case with the
trial court. Both courts also found that the petitioner
had been religiously paying the private respondent
US$750 per month from January 1998 and even
during the pendency of the case before the trial
court and that the private respondent had accepted
all these monthly payments.
With these findings of facts, it has become
glaringly obvious that when the complaint for a sum
of money and damages was filed with the trial court
on 2 February 1999, no cause of action has as yet
existed because the petitioner had not committed
any act in violation of the terms of the three
promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in
December 1997. Without a cause of action, the
private respondent had no right to maintain an
action in court, and the trial court should have
therefore dismissed his complaint.
There must be some cause of action at the
commencement of the suit. Unless the plaintiff has a
valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his
a action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or
remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while
the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint
or an amendment setting up such after-accrued
cause of action is not permissible. the defect of lack
of cause of action at the commencement of this suit
cannot be cured by the accrual of a cause of action
during the pendency of this case
Sec. 3. One suit for a single cause of action
Joseph v. Bautista
G.R. No. L-41423, February 23, 1989
FACTS:
Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo
truck for conveying cargoes and passengers for a
consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. Said
cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was
on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan.
Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock,
boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan to Valenzuela,
Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the
National Highway proceeding towards Manila,
defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle
likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about
the same time, a pick- up truck supposedly owned by
respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan,
then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to
overtake the cargo truck which was then in the
process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing
the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the
road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner
sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages
against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the
cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of
carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and
Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively,
of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he
is not and never was an owner of the pick-up truck
and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in
the future. Petitioner apparently could not ascertain
who the real owner of said cargo truck was
Respondents thru their insurer, Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines, paid petitioner's
claim for injuries sustained. By reason thereof,
petitioner executed a release of claim releasing from
liability the following parties, viz: Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno,
Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto
Pagarigan. They also paid respondent Patrocinio
Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck.
Respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and
Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude
Defs/ Cross defs.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her
"Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion dated Dec. 2,
1974 and Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so- called
counter motion to dismiss was premised on the fact
that the release of claim executed by petitioner in
favor of the other respondents inured to the benefit
of respondent Perez, considering that all the
respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
Petitioner argues that there are two causes
of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence
the judgment on the compromise agreement under
the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar
to the cause of action for breach of contract of
carriage,
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s argument is
tenable
RULING:
No. A cause of action is understood to be
the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by
the defendant in violation of the primary rights of
the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission
can be violative of various rights at the same time, as
when the act constitutes juridically a violation of
several separate and distinct legal obligations.
However where there is only one delict or wrong,
there is but a single cause of action regardless of the
number of rights that may have been violated
belonging to one person.
The singleness of a cause of action lies in
the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the
rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury
resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause
of action arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no
question that the petitioner sustained a single injury
on his person. That vested in him a single cause of
action, albeit with the correlative rights of action
against the different respondents through the
appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was correct in holding that
there was only one cause of action involved although
the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against
the defendants therein were not necessarily
Identical since the respondents were not identically
circumstanced. However, a recovery by the
petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars
recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the
rationale for the proscription in our law against
double recovery for the same act or omission which,
obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against
unjust enrichment.
The respondents having been found to be
solidarity liable to petitioner, the full payment made
by some of the solidary debtors and their
subsequent release from any and all liability to
petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment
and release from liability of the other solidary
debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio
Perez.
Phil. Bank of Comm. v. Lim
G.R. No. 158138, April 12, 2005
FACTS:
PBCom filed a complaint against
respondents in the RTC of Manila for the collection
of a deficiency. Petitioner alleged therein that
respondents obtained a loan from it and executed a
continuing surety agreement in favor of petitioner
for all loans, credits, etc. that were extended or may
be extended in the future to respondents. Petitioner
granted a renewal of said loan upon respondent’s
request. It was expressly stipulated therein that the
venue for any legal action that may arise out of said
promissory note shall be Makati City, “to the
exclusion of all other courts…” Respondents
allegedly failed to pay said obligation upon maturity.
Thus, petitioner foreclosed the real estate mortgage
executed by respondents, leaving a deficiency
balance.
Respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of improper venue,
invoking the stipulation contained in the last
paragraph of the promissory note with respect to
the restrictive/exclusive venue.
The trial court denied said motion
asseverating that petitioner had separate causes of
action arising from the promissory note and the
continuing surety agreement. Thus, [under] Rule 4,
Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, x x x venue was properly laid in Manila.
An MR of said order was likewise denied.
On appeal, the CA ruled that respondents’ alleged
debt was based on the Promissory Note, which had
provided an exclusionary stipulation on venue “to
the exclusion of all other courts.” The parties’ Surety
Agreement, though silent as to venue, was an
accessory contract that should have been
interpreted in consonance with the Promissory Note.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner adds that its Complaint filed in
the trial court had two causes of action: the first was
founded on a breach of the Promissory Note; and
the second, on a violation of the Surety Agreement.
Consequently, it was allegedly correct to join the
causes of action and to file the case in Manila, per
Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
"Section 5. Joinder of Causes of Action. –A party may
in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venue or jurisdictions,
the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial
Court provided one of the causes of action falls
within the jurisdiction of the said court and venue
lies therein."
ISSUE: Whether or not there are two causes of
action in the complaint
RULING:
Petitioner correctly argues that there are
two causes of action contained in its Complaint. A
cause of action is a party’s act or omission that
violates the rights of the other. Only one suit may be
commenced for a single cause of action. If two or
more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, only one case should remain and the
others must be dismissed.
As against Tri-Oro International Trading &
Manufacturing Corporation, petitioner’s cause of
action is the alleged failure to pay the debt in
violation of the PN; as against Elena Lim and Ramon
Calderon, in violation of the SA.
Because of the variance between the causes
of action, petitioner could have filed separate actions
against respondents to recover the debt, on
condition that it could not recover twice from the
same cause. It could have proceeded against only
one or all of them, as full payment by any one of
them would have extinguished the obligation. By the
same token, respondents could have been joined as
defendants in one suit, because petitioner’s alleged
right of relief arose from the same transaction or
series of transactions that had common questions of
fact. To avoid a multiplicity of suits, joinder of parties
is encouraged by the law.
The cause of action, however, does not
affect the venue of the action. The vital issue in the
present case is whether the action against the
sureties is covered by the restriction on venue
stipulated in the PN. As earlier stated, the answer is
in the affirmative. Since the cases pertaining to both
causes of action are restricted to Makati City as the
proper venue, petitioner cannot rely on Section 5 of
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of
Chua v. Metrobank
G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners obtained from respondent
Metrobank a loan.
Having failed to fully pay their obligations,
petitioners entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement with respondent Metrobank, whereby
the loan obligations of the former were restructured.
The lawyers of respondent Metrobank demanded
that petitioners fully pay and settle their liabilities,
including interest and penalties.
When petitioners still failed to pay their
loans, respondent Metrobank sought to extra-
judicially foreclose the REM constituted on the
subject properties.
Petitioner Chua, in his personal capacity and
acting on behalf of petitioner Filiden, filed before
Branch 257 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
(RTC-Branch 257), a Complaint for Injunction with
Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO),... Preliminary Injunction and Damages
Petitioners filed with RTC-Branch 195 a
Motion to Consolidate since the subject matter of
both cases are the same properties and the parties
of both cases are almost the same, and both cases
have the same central issue of whether there was an
auction sale, then necessarily, both cases should be
consolidated. They argue that the above-captioned
case is a complaint for damages as a result of the
[herein respondents’] conspiracy to make it appear
as if there was an auction sale conducted on
November 8, 2001 when in fact there was none. The
properties subject of the said auction sale are the
same properties subject of Civil Case No. 01-0207.
Respondents filed with RTC-Branch 195 an
Opposition to Motion to Consolidate with Prayer for
Sanctions, praying for the dismissal of the Complaint
for Damages in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, on the
ground of forum shopping.
It is, therefore, the honest belief of the
Court that since there is identity of parties and the
rights asserted, the allegations of the defendant are
found meritorious and with legal basis, hence, the
motion is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED due
to forum shopping.
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration... petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari,... the Court of
Appeals reversed the 6 March 2002 Order of RTC-
Branch 257 and remanded the case for further
proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal of respondents with finality. Thus, on 27
September 2005, RTC-Branch 257 set the hearing for
the... presentation of evidence by respondent
Metrobank for the application for preliminary
injunction on 9 November 2005.
ISSUE: Whether or not successively filing Civil Case
No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05-0402
amounts to forum shopping.
RULING:
Yes. The proscription against forum
shopping is found in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Court, which provides that:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.—The
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that
he has not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim
is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing
requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided,
upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a
false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Forum shopping exists when a party
repeatedly avails himself of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues either pending
in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
Ultimately, what is truly important in
determining whether forum shopping exists or not is
the vexation caused the courts and party-litigant by
a party who asks different courts to rule on the same
or related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered
by the different fora upon the same issue.
Forum shopping can be committed in three
ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where
the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res
judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action, but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for
dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
In the present case, there is no dispute that
petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of Non-
Forum Shopping, attached to their Verified
Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before RTC-
Branch 195, the existence of Civil Case No. CV-01-
0207 pending before RTC-Branch 258. Nevertheless,
petitioners insist that they are not guilty of forum
shopping, since (1) the two cases do not have the
same ultimate objective – Civil Case No. CV-01-0207
seeks the annulment of the 8 November 2001 public
auction and certificate of sale issued therein, while
Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 prays for the award of
actual and compensatory damages for respondents’
tortuous act of making it appear that an auction sale
actually took place on 8 November 2001; and (2) the
judgment in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207, on the
annulment of the foreclosure sale, would not affect
the outcome of Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, on the
entitlement of petitioners to damages. The Court,
however, finds these arguments refuted by the
allegations made by petitioners themselves in their
Complaints in both cases.
Petitioners committed forum shopping by
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action, although with different prayers.
Petitioners’ contention that the outcome of
Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 will not determine that of
Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 does not justify the filing
of separate cases. Even if it were assumed that the
two cases contain two separate remedies that are
both available to petitioners, these two remedies
that arose from one wrongful act cannot be pursued
in two different cases. The rule against splitting a
cause of action is intended to prevent repeated
litigation between the same parties in regard to the
same subject of controversy, to protect the
defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid
the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. It
comes from the old maxim nemo debet bis vexari,
pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twice
vexed for one and the same cause).

Chu v. Spouses Cunanan
G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011
FACTS:
Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus)
executed a deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage involving their five parcels of land,
registered under different TCTs.
They also executed a so-called side
agreement, whereby they clarified that Cunanan had
paid only ₱1,000,000.00 to the Chus despite the
Chus, as vendors, having acknowledged receiving
₱5,161,090.00; that the amount of ₱1,600,000.00
was to be paid directly to Benito Co and to Security
Bank and Trust Company (SBTC) in whose favor the
five lots had been mortgaged; and that Cunanan
would pay the balance of ₱2,561.90.00 within three
months, with a grace period of one month.
Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the
five lots to her name without the knowledge of the
Chus, and to borrow money with the lots as security
without paying the balance of the purchase price to
the Chus. She later transferred two of the lots to
Spouses Amado and Gloria Carlos.
The Chus commenced Civil Case No. G-1936
in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from
Spouses Fernando and Trinidad Cunanan
(Cunanans). Five years later, on April 19, 1993, the
Chus amended the complaint to seek the annulment
of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and
of the TCTs issued pursuant to the deed, and to
recover damages. They impleaded Cool Town Realty
and Development Corporation (Cool Town Realty),
and the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga
as defendants.
Considering that the Carloses had
meanwhile sold the two lots to Benelda Estate
Development Corporation (Benelda Estate) in 1995,
the Chus further amended the complaint in Civil Case
No. G-1936 to implead Benelda Estate as additional
defendant. In due course, Benelda Estate filed its
answer with a motion to dismiss, claiming, among
others, that the amended complaint stated no cause
of action because it had acted in good faith in buying
the affected lots, exerting all efforts to verify the
authenticity of the titles.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of
splitting a single cause of action to enforce or rescind
the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
RULING:
The rights and obligations of the parties vis-
à-vis the five lots were all defined and governed by
the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, the
only contract between them. That contract was
single and indivisible, as far as they were concerned.
Consequently, the Chus could not properly proceed
against the respondents in Civil Case No. 12251,
despite the silence of the compromise agreement as
to the Carloses and Benelda Estate, because there
can only be one action where the contract is entire,
and the breach total, and the petitioners must
therein recover all their claims and damages. The
Chus could not be permitted to split up a single
cause of action and make that single cause of action
the basis of several suits.
Petitioners were guilty of splitting their
single cause of action to enforce or rescind the deed
of sale with assumption of mortgage. Splitting a
single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or
indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims
and instituting two or more actions upon them. A
single cause of action or entire claim or demand
cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the
subject of two or more different actions. Thus,
Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly
prohibits splitting of a single cause of action, viz:
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of.
— If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as
a ground for the dismissal of the others.
The petitioners were not at liberty to split
their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage and to prosecute
piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
upon which a special relief was sought under the
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then
to leave the rest to be presented in another suit;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Their
splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of
suits, whose primary objective was to avoid unduly
burdening the dockets of the courts. Their
contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 12251 on the ground of bar by res
judicata.
Pantranco v. Standard Insurance
G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005
ACTION: Complaint for a sum of money
FACTS:
Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger
jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale.
Alexander Buncan, on the other hand, was driving a
bus owned by Pantranco North Express Inc. Both
drivers were travelling along the National Highway of
Talavera, Nueva Ecija in a rainy afternoon. Buncan
was driving the bus northbound while Cripin was
trailing behind. When the two vehicles were
negotiating a curve along the highway, the
passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, the
passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney
and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to the police and
to the insurer of their jeepney, Standard Insurance
Co. The total cost of the repair amounted to P21,
415. Standard only paid P8,000 while Martina Gicale
shouldered the remaining P13,415. Thereafter,
Standard and Martina demanded reimbursements
from Pantranco and Buncan, but the bus company
and the driver refused. Thus, Standard and Martina
were prompted to file a complaint for sum of money
with the RTC of Manila.
Pantranco and Buncan denied the allegations
of the complaint and asserted that it is the MeTC
which has jurisdiction over the case.
- RTC: The trial court ruled in favor of Standard and
Martina, and ordered Pantranco and Buncan to pay
the former reimbursements with interests due
thereon plus attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
- Pantranco and Buncan: The RTC has no jurisdiction
over the complaint. Arguments:
1) Martina Gicale was claiming P13,415, while
Standard was claiming P8,000. Their individual claims
are below P20,000. Thus, the case falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
2) There was a misjoinder of parties.
CA: The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
1) Under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec.
19 of BP 129, it is the sum of the two claims that
determines the jurisdictional amount. At the time
this case was heard, cases involving money claims
that amounts to more than P20,000 falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
2) Even assuming that there was a misjoinder of
parties, it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court
nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint. The
claims of Gicale and Standard arose from the same
vehicular accident involving Pantranco's bus and
Gicale's jeepney. Thus, there was a question of fact
common to all parties.
Pantranco and Buncan's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the CA.
Gicale and Standard: There was no misjoinder of
parties. Their individual claims arose from the same
vehicular accident and involve a common question of
fact and law. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not trial court has no jurisdiction
over the case since the cause of action of each
respondent did not arise from the same transaction
and that there are no common questions of law and
fact common to both parties
RULING:
In this case, there is a single transaction
common to all, that is, Pantranco's bus hitting the
rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common
question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are
negligent. There being a single transaction common
to both respondents, consequently, they have the
same cause of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it
must be ascertained whether the same evidence
which is necessary to sustain the second cause of
action would have been sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first. Here, had respondents filed
separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence
would have been presented to sustain the same
cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents
of the complaint with the court below is in order.
Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and
ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly
administration of justice.
Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules
provides:
"Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in
one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise,
as many causes of action as he may have against an
opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction."
The above provision presupposes that the
different causes of action which are joined accrue in
favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same
defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is
involved. The issue of whether respondents' claims
shall be lumped together is determined by
paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph
embodies the "totality rule" as exemplified by
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 1299 which states, among
others, that "where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same
or different transactions."
As previously stated, respondents' cause of
action against petitioners arose out of the same
transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims.
Respondent Standard's claim is P8,000.00,
while that of respondent Martina Gicale is
P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of
B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has "exclusive
original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the
demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value
of the property in controversy, amounts to more
than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)."
ISSUE: Whether or not Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210
involve different causes of action
RULING:
Yes. Generally, a suit may only be instituted
for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in any
one is ground for the dismissal of the others.
Several tests exist to ascertain whether two
suits relate to a single or common cause of action,
such as whether the same evidence would support
and sustain both the first and second causes of
action (also known as the "same evidence" test), or
whether the defenses in one case may be used to
substantiate the complaint in the other. Also
fundamental is the test of determining whether the
cause of action in the second case existed at the
time of the filing of the first complaint.
Of the three tests cited, the third one is
especially applicable to the present case, i.e.,
whether the cause of action in the second case
existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint
- and to which we answer in the negative. The facts
clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case
was grounded on the petitioner's violation of
stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of
the second case was based on the expiration of the
lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the
first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the
lease contract between the parties was still in effect.
The lease was fixed for a period of 2 years, from
January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal
agreed upon by the parties, the lease remained
effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the
expiration of the lease contract that the cause of
action in the second ejectment complaint accrued
and made available to the respondent as a ground
for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action
in the second case was not yet in existence at the
time of filing of the first ejectment case.
Petitioner contended that the similarity of
Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 rests on the
reiteration in the second case of the cause of action
in the first case. However, such contention is
untenable. restatement does not result in
substantial identity between the two cases. Even if
the respondent alleged violations of the lease
contract as a ground for ejectment in the second
complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner
in the second case was the expiration of the lease
contract. If not for this subsequent development, the
respondent could no longer file a second complaint
for unlawful detainer because an ejectment
complaint may only be filed within one year after the
accrual of the cause of action, which, in the second
case, was the expiration of the lease contract.
Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva G.R. No. 172909, March 5,
2014
ACTION: Complaint for injunction with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction
FACTS:
Among her other siblings (respondents),
Barbara Plaza was declared by the CA as the owner
of the subject property in question. Consequently,
her successors in interest, herein respondents, have
continued to occupy the property. The son of one of
Barbaras siblings (Vidal) filed a complaint for
injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against the respondents and the city
government of Butuan. They prayed that
respondents be enjoined from unlawfully taking the
subject property. According to petitioners, they
acquired the property from Virginia Tuazon who was
the sole bidder in a tax delinquency sale conducted
by the City of Butuan on December 1997.
In their answer, respondents contended
that they were never delinquent in paying the land
taxes and that Tuazon is a government employee
who is disqualified to bid in the public auction as
provided under the Local Government Code and
such sale, if ever there was, is void.
The RTC denied the petition, holding that
there was indeed an irregularity in the auction sale
since the highest bidder was a government
employee disqualified under the LGC. Petitioners
challenged the RTC decision through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 65. While such
petition is pending, petitioners filed an action for
specific performance against the City of Butuan. The
CA affirmed RTC decision and found petitioners
guilty of forum shopping. CA concluded that for
being disqualified to bid, Tuazon never obtained
ownership over the property; much less transmit any
proprietary rights to the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of
forum-shopping
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners committed forum shopping
when they filed the specific performance case
despite the pendency of the present case before the
CA. The Court laid down the three ways forum
shopping may be committed: 1) through litis
pendentia — filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet; 2)
through res judicata — filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved; and 3)
splitting of causes of action — filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action but with different
prayers — the ground to dismiss being either litis
pendentia or res judicata.
 The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the
identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.
Cause of action is "the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another." The
cause of action in the present case (and the main
case) is the petitioners’ claim of ownership of the
land when they bought it, either from the City
Government of Butuan or from Tuazon. This
ownership is the petitioners’ basis in enjoining the
respondents from dispossessing them of the
property. On the other hand, the specific
performance case prayed that the City Government
of Butuan be ordered to issue the petitioners the
certificate of sale grounded on the petitioners’
ownership of the land when they had bought it,
either from the City Government of Butuan or from
Tuazon. While it may appear that the main relief
prayed for in the present injunction case is different
from what was prayed for in the specific
performance case, the cause of action which serves
as the basis for the reliefs remains the same — the
petitioners’ alleged ownership of the property after
its purchase in a public auction.
Thus, the petitioners' subsequent filing of
the specific performance action is forum shopping of
the third kind-splitting causes of action or filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action,
but with different prayers. As the Court has held in
the past, "there is still forum shopping even if the
reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so
long as both cases raise substantially the same
issues."
Similarly, the CA correctly found that the
petitioners and their counsel were guilty of forum
shopping based on litis pendentia. Not only were the
parties in both cases the same insofar as the City
Government of Butuan is concerned, there was also
identity of rights asserted and identity of facts
alleged. The cause of action in the specific
performance case had already been ruled upon in
the present case, although it was still pending appeal
before the CA. Likewise, the prayer sought in the
specific performance case-for the City Government
of Butuan to execute a deed of sale in favor of the
petitioners - had been indirectly ruled upon in the
present case when the RTC declared that no
certificate of sale could be issued because there had
been no valid sale. (claim of ownership vs.
dispossession of property)
Bayang v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-53564, February 27, 1987
FACTS:
Juan Bayang filed a complaint for quieting
of title with damages against Benigno Biong. The
case was decided in favor of Biong, but the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court. Bayang filed a
second case (2589) seeking to recover from Biong
the incomes earned from the same land from 1970
up to the quarterly incomes from 1978 until the said
land was delivered to the plaintiff. At the pre-trial
conference, the counsel for Bayang admitted that as
of January 25, 1978, Biong had already surrendered
possession of the land in question to Bayang. On
August 16, 1978, Biong filed a motion for summary
judgment, reiterating the affirmative defense of res
judicata raised in his answer dated April 12, 1978,
insofar as it related to the incidents concerning the
case prior to January 25, 1978. An opposition to this
motion was duly filed by Bayang. Said decision was
sustained by the Court of Appeals, and Bayang is
now before us in this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment in CA-G.R. No.
54720-R (appeal from judgment in Civil Case No.
1892) did not constitute res judicata as to bar Civil
Case No. 2589
RULING:
A long line of decisions has consistently held
that for res judicata to apply: a) the former judgment
must be final; b) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and d) there must be between the first case and the
second case identity of parties, identity of subject
matter and Identity of cause of action.
The decision in Civil Case No. 1892 became
final and executory on February 2, 1978. There is no
dispute that the trial court which rendered that
decision had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and
the parties to the proceeding.
The petitioner would draw a distinction
between the land in dispute in Civil Case No. 1892
and the income from that land being claimed in Civil
Case No. 2589. But that is in our view splitting hairs
to split a cause of action. The subject-matter is
essentially the same in both cases as the income is
only a consequence or accessory of the disputed
property. We cannot agree that there are involved
here two causes of action calling for two separate
cases. The claim for the income from the land was
incidental to, and should have been raised by Bayang
in his earlier claim for, ownership of the land.
De Larena v. Villanueva,
G.R. No. L-29155, November 5, 1928
FACTS:
The case at bar is a sequel to case G. R. No.
21706, Josefina Rubio de Larena vs. Hermenegildo
Villanueva, ordering the rescission of a lease of the
Tacgajan Sugar Plantation and the payment by the
defendant-lessee of the unpaid balance of the rent.
The decision also provided that the possession of the
leased land be delivered to the plaintiff.
Shortly after the record was returned to the
court, a writ of execution was issued, but before levy
was made the parties came to an agreement, under
which the money judgment was to be satisfied by
the payment of P10,500 in cash and the transfer to
the plaintiff of a dwelling house situated in the
municipality of Bais. The agreement was carried out
in accordance with its terms.
As her first cause of action the plaintiff has
demanded payment to her of the total value of said
1,679.02 piculs, amounting to P21,827.26, but that
the defendant refuses to pay. The plaintiff,
therefore, asks judgment for the sum
For the second cause of action the plaintiff
alleges that under the contract of lease of the
Tacgajan Hacienda, one of the obligations assumed
by the defendant was that he would use the care of
a good father of the family in conserving the tools,
agricultural implements, that he was further
obligated to return said property to the plaintiff, but
that he returned only a part thereof. As a third
cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant illegally harvested ratoon canes together
with some recently planted canes.
The defendant maintains that the plaintiff
having had an opportunity to ventilate the matter in
the former case, she cannot now enforce the same
cause of action in the present case. Properly
speaking, this argument does not involve the
doctrine of res judicata but rests on the well-known
an, in American law, firmly established principle that
a party will not be permitted to split up a single
cause of action an make it the basis for several
suits.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The rule is well established that when a
lease provides for the payment of the rent in
separate installments, each installment is an
independent cause of action, though it has been held
and is good law, that in an action upon such a lease
for the recovery of rent, the installments due at the
time the action brought must be included in the
complaint an that failure to do so will constitute a
bar to a subsequent action for the payment of that
rent. The aforesaid action, G. R. No. 21706, was
brought on August 23, 1922, the plaintiff demanding
payment of then sue rent in addition to the
rescission of the lease.
Blossom & Company v. Manila Gas Corp.
G.R. No. L-32958, November 8, 1930
Topic: Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach
Original Action:
FACTS:
Plaintiff alleges that it entered into a
contract with the defendant in which the plaintiff
promised and undertook to purchase and receive
from the defendant and the defendant agreed to sell
and deliver to the plaintiff, for a period of four years,
three tons of water gas tar per month from
September to January 1, 1919 and twenty tons per
month after January 1, 1919, for the remaining
period of the contract; one-half ton of coal gas tar a
month from September to January 1, 1919, and six
tons per month after January 1, 1919, for the
remainder of the contract, delivery to be made at
the plant of the defendant
On January 31, 1919, this contract was
amended so that it should continue to remain in
force for a period of ten years from January 1, 1919,
and it was agreed that the plaintiff should not be
obliged to take the qualities of the tars required
during the year 1919, but that it might purchase tars
in such quantities as it could use to advantage at the
stipulated price.
Manila Gas Corporation willfully, and
deliberately breached its said contract, Exhibit C,
with the plaintiff by ceasing to deliver any coal and
water gas tar to it thereunder solely because of the
increased price of its tar products and its desire to
secure better prices therefor than plaintiff was
obliged to pay to it
RULING:
Inasmuch as there was a total breach of the
contract by the defendant's refusal to deliver, the
plaintiff cannot split up his demand and maintain
successive actions, but must either recover all his
damages in the first suit or wait until the contract
matured or the time for the delivery of all the goods
had arrived. In other words, there can be but one
action for damages for a total breach of an entire
contract to deliver goods, and the fact that they
were to be delivered in installment from time to
time does not change the general rule. (Doctrine of
Anticipatory Breach)
The doctrine of anticipatory breach refers
to an unqualified and positive refusal to perform a
contract, though the performance thereof is not yet
due, may, if the renunciation goes into the whole
contract, be treated as a complete breach which will
entitle the injured party to bring his action at once.
Danfoss v. Continental Cement
G.R. No. 143788, September 9, 2005
Action: Complaint for Damages
FACTS:
Mechatronics Instruments and Controls,
Inc. (MINCI) is an agent of Danfoss, Inc.’s products
here in the Philippines. CCC ordered two units Brand
Frequency Converter/Inverter from MINCI to be
used in the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant in Bulacan.
In the terms of conditions of the original purchase
order, the two unit Frequency Converter shall be
delivered by Danfoss within 8 to 10 weeks from the
opening of the letter of credit. The letter of credit
opened by CCC in favour of Danfoss on September 9,
1997. On September 17, 1997, MINCI informed CCC
that its order is already ready for shipment and
MINCI requested to amend the letter of credit
changing the port of origin/loading from Singapore
to Denmark (Singapore is the Asian Regional Office
of Danfoss, the Head Office of the company is
Denmark). CCC complied and the port of origin in the
letter of credit was changed. On November 6, 1997,
MINCI relayed to CCC that Danfoss Inc. was still
checking the status of their order. CCC replied that
every delay in the delivery of the order will cause
loss to their company, so CCC requested for early
work out and immediate shipment to avoid further
loss. But, on November 9, 1997, Danfoss Inc.
informed MINCI through fax, that the reason for the
delivery problems was that some of the supplied
components for the new VLT 5000 series (this may
be a part of the converter which is the subject thing
in this case or a machine to create the converter) did
not meet the agreed quality standard. So, Danfoss
was canvassing for another supplier for the said VLT
5000 series. In the fax, there was no clear message
as to when normal production will resume. Upon
receiving the relayed information, CCC surmised that
Danfoss would not be able to deliver their order.
There was also no definite commitment of the
delivery from Danfoss and MINCI, so CCC informed
MINCI that they intend to cancel its order. The order
was cancelled on November 13, 1997. Hence, the
complaint for damages filed by CCC with the RTC of
Quezon City against Danfoss and MINCI on
November 5, 1998. In reply, Danfoss filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint. CCC: Due to the
“impending” delay in the delivery of its order, it
suffered more than P8 million and was compelled to
look for another supplier. Danfoss: The case should
be dismissed on the ground that it did not state a
cause of action.
1) The letter of credit was opened on September 9,
1997, so, since the agreed delivery period is 8 to 10
weeks from the opening of the letter of credit, the
due date is until November 19, 1997. 2) Although
Danfoss was having a problem with its supplier prior
to CCC’s cancellation of its order, CCC only surmised
that Danfoss could not deliver within the due date
agreed upon. 3) Neither Danfoss nor CCC agreed to
change the date of delivery. Only the port of origin
was changed in the letter of credit. Danfoss has until
November 19, 1997 to deliver the order, CCC
cancelled the order on November 13, 1997. 4) CCC
never made an extrajudicial demand for the delivery
of its order on its due date as it cancelled the order
before the due date. 5) Damages sought for by CCC
could not have accrued yet since the order was
cancelled before the delivery was actually delayed.
ISSUE: Whether or not CCC had a cause of action
against Danfoss; Whether or not the doctrine of
anticipatory breach applies herein
RULING:
None. Anticipatory breach does not apply
as well. It is the delict or wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary right of the plaintiff.
In order to sustain a dismissal on the
ground of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency
must appear on the face of the complaint. And the
test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether
or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with
the prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the
motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
After a careful perusal of the allegations in
respondent’s complaint for damages against
petitioner, we rule that the same failed to state a
cause of action. When respondent sued petitioner
for damages, petitioner had not violated any right of
respondent from which a cause of action had arisen.
Respondent only surmised that petitioner would not
be able to deliver the two units frequency
converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by
them. Based on this apprehension, it cancelled its
order six days prior to the agreed date of delivery.
How could respondent hold petitioner liable for
damages (1) when petitioner had not yet breached
its obligation to deliver the goods and (2) after
respondent made it impossible for petitioner to
deliver them by cancelling its order even before the
agreed delivery date?
The trial court erred in ruling that the issue
of whether or not the defendants incurred delay in
the delivery of the equipment within the period
stipulated was a debatable question. It said that trial
on the merits was necessary and the parties had to
adduce evidence in support of their respective
positions. But what was there to argue about when,
based on the allegations of the complaint, petitioner
was not yet due to deliver the two units frequency
converter/inverter when respondent cancelled its
order? It still had six days within which to comply
with its obligation. The court a quo should not have
denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint
(for its failure to state a cause of action) when, on its
face, it was clear that petitioner had not yet reneged
on its obligation to deliver the frequency
converter/inverter on the date mutually agreed
upon by the parties. Moreover, the obligation itself
was negated by no less than respondent’s own act of
cancelling its order even before the prestation
became due and demandable. Where therefore was
the breach? Where was the damage caused by
petitioner? There was none.
Consequently, it was wrong for the CA to
affirm the order of the trial court denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint for its
failure to state a cause of action.
The principle of anticipatory breach
enunciated in Blossom & Company, Inc. v. Manila
Gas Corporation does not apply here because the
former involved a continuous obligation. In that
case, Blossom & Company, Inc. entered into a
contract with Manila Gas Corporation for the sale
and delivery of water gas and coal gas tar at
stipulated prices for a period of four years. On the
second year of the contract, Manila Gas willfully and
deliberately refused to deliver any coal and water
gas tar to Blossom and Company, Inc. because it was
asking for a higher price than what had been
previously stipulated by them. The price of its tar
products had gone up. We held that even if the
contract is divisible in its performance and the future
periodic deliveries are not yet due, if the obligor has
already manifested his refusal to comply with his
future periodic obligations, "the contract is entire
and the breach total," hence, there can only be one
action for damages.
Thus, the principle contemplates future
periodic deliveries and a willful refusal to comply
therewith. Here, the obligation was single and
indivisible – to deliver two units of frequency
converter/inverter by November 19, 1997. The
records do not show that petitioner refused to
deliver the goods on the date agreed upon. On the
contrary, petitioner exerted efforts to make good its
obligation by looking for other suppliers who could
provide it the parts needed to make timely delivery
of the frequency converter/inverter ordered by
respondent.
Furthermore, respondent’s complaint
suffered from another fatal infirmity. It was
premature. The obligation of petitioner to
respondent was not yet due and demandable at the
time the latter filed the complaint. The alleged
violation of respondent’s right being no more than
mere speculation, there was no need to call for
judicial intervention.
The premature invocation of the court’s
intervention was fatal to respondent’s cause of
action. Hence, the dismissal of respondent’s
complaint was in order.
CAUSE OF ACTION VS. RIGHT OF ACTION –
- In case of estoppel, right of action ang ma
stop, not cause of action
Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties
Flores v. Hon. Mallare-Philipps
G.R. No. L-66620, September 24, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from
the order of Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and
Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner did not attach to his
petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous
belief that the entire original record of the case shall
be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 39 of BP129.
counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against
said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under
Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount
of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion
that although another person, Fernando Calion, was
allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct
from that of the other respondent. At the hearing of
said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent
Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to
Dismiss. As above stated, the trial court dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court
has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel"
totality rule, which provides that where there are
several claims or causes of action between the same
or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisdictional test refers
to the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different
transactions.
RULING:
There is no difference between the former
and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a
defendant on two or more separate causes of action.
In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions. If the total
demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the
regional trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to
state, if the causes of action are separate and
independent, their joinder in one complaint is
permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of
action where the amount of the demand is twenty
thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a
separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or
municipal trial court.
On the other hand, there is a difference
between the former and present rules in cases
where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes
of action against a defendant join in a single
complaint. Under the former rule, "where the claims
or causes of action joined in a single complaint are
separately owned by or due to different parties, each
separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test"
(Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended,
supra). This was based on the ruling in the case of
Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace. As worded,
the former rule applied only to cases of permissive
joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also
applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties
defendant.
The difference between the former and
present rules in cases of permissive joinder of parties
may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited
in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace
(supra) as exceptions to the totality rule. In the case
of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86 Phil. 523), where twenty-
nine dismissed employees joined in a complaint
against the defendant to collect their respective
claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of
the municipal court although the total exceeded the
jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the
law then the municipal court had jurisdiction. In said
case, although the plaintiffs' demands were
separate, distinct and independent of one another,
their joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of
Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the
jurisdictional test. In the case of International
Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90 Phil. 470), where
twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly sued the
defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also held
that the municipal court had jurisdiction because the
amount of each claim was within, although the total
exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff.
in cases of permissive joinder of parties,
whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section
6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now
furnish the jurisdictional test. If instead of joining or
being joined in one complaint separate actions are
filed by or against the parties, the amount
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, there is a misjoinder of
parties for the reason that the claims against
respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and
distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties
Boston Equity v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of
money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel
and Lolita Toledo. Respondent Toledo filed an
Answer but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for
Leave to Admit Amended Answer7 in which she
alleged, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel
is already dead. As a result, petitioner filed a motion
to require respondent to disclose the heirs of
Manuel. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Substitution praying that Manuel be substituted by
his children as party-defendants. Respondent instead
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing that
when petitioner Boston filed the complaint,
defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already dead. Such
being the case, the court a quo could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant
Manuel S. Toledo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as
party-defendant is a mere misjoinder of party not
warranting the dismissal of the case before the
lower court
RULING:
The estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party to the collection case, for the
simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his
wife, respondent herein, is solidary.
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties. – Parties-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants.
An indispensable party is one who has such
an interest in the controversy or subject matter of a
case that a final adjudication cannot be made in his
or her absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest. He or she is a party who has not only an
interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but
"an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot
be made without affecting that interest or leaving
the controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. It has also been
considered that an indispensable party is a person in
whose absence there cannot be a determination
between the parties already before the court which
is effective, complete or equitable." Further, an
indispensable party is one who must be included in
an action before it may properly proceed.
On the other hand, a "person is not an
indispensable party if his interest in the controversy
or subject matter is separable from the interest of
the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be
directly or injuriously affected by a decree which
does complete justice between them. Also, a person
is not an indispensable party if his presence would
merely permit complete relief between him or her
and those already parties to the action, or if he or
she has no interest in the subject matter of the
action." It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
person to be an indispensable party simply because
his or her presence will avoid multiple litigations.
Malazarte v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of
title to property with damages before the Court of
First Instance of Maasin. The property subject of the
case was a parcel of coconut land. Petitioners prayed
that judgment be rendered confirming their rights
and legal title to the subject property and ordering
the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and
to pay damages.
Respondents Lumen and Aunzo denied
petitioners’ allegation of ownership and possession
of the premises, and interposed, as their main
defense, that the subject land was inherited by all
the parties from their common ancestor, Francisco
Plasabas.
Revealed in the course of the trial was that
petitioner Nieves, contrary to her allegations in the
complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of
the land. Based on the testimonies of petitioners’
witnesses, the property passed on from Francisco to
his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner
Nieves’ grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her
mother; and then to her and her siblings—Jose,
Victor and Victoria.
Respondents raised in their memorandum
the argument that the case should have been
terminated at inception for petitioners’ failure to
implead indispensable parties, the other co-owners –
Jose, Victor and Victoria.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents’ argument is

tenable

RULING: