Marcos' gambit changing the equation in the Asia-Pacific

For six years under the past president Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines took a 180-degree turn
in its foreign policy, isolating itself from the West and placing itself closer towards China. This
policy of appeasement, Duterte and his staunchest supporters argued, placed the Philippines
away from Beijing’s crosshairs.
The Duterte administration’s reversal of decades of pro-Washington foreign policy bore little
fruit, however. In the same manner that the appeasement of Hitler in the 1938 Munich
Agreement failed to stop Nazi Germany’s territorial ambitions in Europe, Manila’s friendlier
stance towards Beijing did little to stop the latter’s expansionist policy in the South China Sea,
and area that overlaps with waters being claimed by the Philippines and other Southeast Asian
neighbors.
If anything, China’s presence in the Philippines’ claimed territories only increased during this
period of appeasement. During this period, the Philippines gave up plenty, including a 2016
Hague ruling in the country’s favor on the South China Sea dispute but ended up receiving
nothing. Under the Duterte administration, Filipino fishermen continued to experience
harassment from Chinese vessels.
Therefore, the challenge for the succeeding administration was to find a way to change the
course of the game in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea. Shifting the tide is
critical for the Philippines as well as its neighbors that have experiences similar acts of
harassment in the hands of Chinese vessels.
Then came the 2022 national election, in which the son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos
Sr., Ferdinand Jr., was elected to the presidency in the first majority victory of a presidential
candidate in a generation. Critics of the newly-elected president mostly expected a similar
approach to foreign policy as Duterte. After all, Marcos had selected Duterte’s daughter Sara as
his Vice President.
In his inaugural address, Marcos vowed a similar “independent foreign policy” as his
predecessor, stating that the Philippines would be “a friend to all, and an enemy to none.”
Although his predecessor undertook a more pro-Beijing foreign policy rather than an
independent one, Marcos has once again ushered in an era of closer cooperation with
Washington, once again shifting the country’s foreign policy towards its traditional and proven
allies.
Most critics of the new administration did not expect this shift in the country’s foreign policy. In
a matter of months, Marcos completely reversed Manila’s stand in the great geopolitical game
in the Asia-Pacific.
On the sidelines of the September 2022 United Nations General Assembly, Marcos met with US
President Joe Biden in an effort to “rekindle critical ties after rocky times.” This meeting made it
clear that the Philippines was redirecting itself towards the United States, as well as an
admission that the pivot of the previous administration resulted in very little gains for the
country.
In November 2022, US Vice President Kamala Harris gave a strong commitment that the
Washington would come to the Philippines’ defense in the event of an attack of a foreign
invader, a commitment enshrined in the two countries’ Mutual Defense Treaty. She gave the
assurance of Washington as she visited the island province of Palawan, the province closest to
the disputed waters.
A visit to Palawan by no less than the US Vice President sent a stern message to Beijing that the
United States is reassuming its position beside its oldest ally in the Asia-Pacific. This was
received adversely by Beijing, which had continuously and repeatedly threatened an invasion of
the self-governing island of Taiwan, a threat that many fear could lead to armed conflict in the
Asia-Pacific region right when the world is still grappling with the global repercussions of the
Russia-Ukraine war.
To take matters a step further, Marcos most recently announced the establishment of four new
military bases scattered around the country which would be accessed by the US military under
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, a suppletory agreement inked in 2014. Access
to these bases would allow the US to conduct joint training exercises with their Philippine
counterparts, pre-positioning of equipment, and the construction of other essential structures
such as runways and fuel storage.
At least one of the bases would be located in Northern Luzon, the part of the Philippines closest
to Taiwan. This move has been quickly condemned by Beijing for being escalatory, and it is easy
to see that Beijing fears that US access to this part of the Philippines would help the US in
deploying military and humanitarian aid to Taiwan in the event of an invasion.
The Philippines remains to be one of the most strategic locations in the Asia-Pacific. This
archipelago of 110 million people serves as the gateway between the South China Sea and the
Pacific Ocean. Such a strategic trait of the Philippines’ location is not an exaggeration. After all,
the country had previously served as a staging area for US forces during the Vietnam War.
Access to Philippine bases would provide Washington with major leverage in the region and,
along with its deployed assets in Japan and South Korea, basically encircle China. It bears to
stress, however, that the United States is not the only country which Marcos has attempted to
re-establish stronger ties with.
Following his visit to Japan last February, Marcos spoke of forming a security triad with the
United States and Japan. Although the security triad remains to be a proposal, it has been the
boldest suggestion from the Marcos administration. In a joint statement, Marcos and Japanese
prime minister Fumio Kishida declared that the countries had resolved to increase their defense
capabilities and strengthen security cooperation.
Likewise, Marcos retained an open mind when asked if the proposed security triad could lead to
a NATO-like alliance in the region. Although Manila, Tokyo, and Washington have not stated it,
increased joint activities by the three players in the region are clearly meant to serve as a
warning to Beijing.
Marcos’ reopening of ties with Washington has gradually changed the equation of the great
geopolitical game in the Asia-Pacific. With increased access to Philippine bases, Beijing’s
positioning over the region, especially over the South China Sea, appears to be in peril. Once
again, Washington sees a willing partner in Manila and the opportunity to bolster American
presence in the area has once again presented itself.
It remains to be seen what the final outcome of these changes in the geopolitical equation will
be. Skeptics would express fear that this would only escalate tensions in this part of the world
and only push China to further expand its presence in disputed waters and eventually force
Beijing’s hand in invading Taiwan. Governor Manuel Mamba of Cagayan, a northern province
where one of the new bases is expected to be established, has expressed concerns that
increased US presence will only put the Philippines, and his province in particular, in China’s
sights.
However, if anything is to be learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, its that even a global
superpower could face difficulties when its smaller and weaker opponent is supported by a
strong network of allies willing to provide armaments and financial support. The influx of
support from NATO and its allies has helped Ukraine resist the Russian invasion, and China
would be correct to fear a repeat of the same in Taiwan as well as in disputed waters in the
South China Sea.
Fears of escalation may be allayed by the Russian’s blunders in Ukraine. Beijing has shown itself
to be an aggressive actor in the region, but it is also quite rational. Chinese President Xi Jinping,
driven by his desire to expand China’s influence in the world through its massive economic
reach, could very well choose to be a cooperative partner for the region instead of forcing his
way through, and doing so would help maintain the rapport that Beijing has established all over
the world.
Unlike Russian president Vladimir Putin who is driven by a strong nationalist desire to restore
Moscow’s prestige from the days of the old Soviet Union, Xi has shown himself to be a more
pragmatic actor, and when faced with the possibility of isolation and encirclement, may opt for
increased cooperation rather than aggression.
What NATO showed in Ukraine is that it works when aggressive behavior is punished rather
than awarded. Players in the Asia-Pacific are learning the same lesson, and picking up from the
lessons of Ukraine, Marcos’ gambit has changed the flow of the geopolitical struggle in the Asia-
Pacific Region. In the end, this may eventually work out for the Philippines and the rest of the
region.