Synthese

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1881-x

Knowledge without safety

Haicheng Zhao1

Received: 29 December 2017 / Accepted: 16 July 2018

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Abstract
The safety principle is the view that, roughly, if one knows that p, p could not easily
have been false. It is common for safety theorists to relativize safety to belief-formation
methods. In this paper, I argue that there is no fixed principle of method-individuation
that can stand up to scrutiny. I examine various ways to individuate methods and
argue that all of them are subject to serious counterexamples. In the end, I conclude
by considering some alternative ways to preserve the insight behind safety without
invoking a fixed principle of method-individuation.

Keywords Safety · Method-safety · Virtue epistemology · Virtue-theoretic safety

1 Introduction

Recently, the safety principle has attracted much attention among epistemologists.
Roughly, this principle goes as follows:
SAFETY : S’s belief p is safe, iff, in almost all nearby possible worlds where S
believes p, p is true.1
This is only a rough characterization of safety. Other qualifications should be added.
But details aside, philosophers including Sosa (1999a, 1999b), Williamson (2000),
Pritchard (2005, 2012) and Greco (2016) concur that some formulation in the vicinity
of SAFETY is necessary for knowledge. And there are good reasons for this. For
Sosa, safety is not only a powerful anti-skeptical tool, but also explains how inductive

1 Pritchard (2005) characterizes safety along these lines. The nearness relation of possible worlds is typically
understood according to Lewis/Stalnaker possible world semantics. Distance between worlds is a function
of similarity between them, such that the more similar a possible world is to another possible world, the
nearer (or closer) it is. (Some have suggested that safety theorists’ understanding of nearness relation is
problematic. See, e.g. Baumann (2008). For a helpful survey on the methodology of nearness relation in
safety, see Bogardus (2014, pp. 294–297)).

B Haicheng Zhao
haicheng.zhao@slu.edu

1 Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO 63108, USA

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knowledge is possible. For Williamson, safety captures the intuition that knowledge
requires reliability, and it serves as a crucial premise in his notorious ‘anti-luminosity
argument’. For Pritchard, safety is introduced as an anti-luck machinery which aims
to exclude knowledge-undermining luck. For Greco, safety is naturally entailed by his
virtue-theoretic approach to epistemology, and it indicates how knowledge is modally
tied to one’s intellectual ability, which is the cause of that knowledge.
Now, it is common among safety theorists to index safety to a certain belief-
formation method. I shall call this view Method-Safety. By way of counterexamples, in
the next section I argue that Method-Safety, with its varieties, is bound to fail. Section 3
defends my argument from objections. In Sect. 4, I argue that a recent formulation of
safety by Greco falls prey to my argument as well. In conclusion, I sketch some alter-
native approaches to develop the safety principle without invoking a fixed principle
of method-individuation.

2 The main argument

2.1 Overture: Dachshund-Weasel I

To start with, consider the following case (call it Dachshund-Weasel I) adapted from
Hawthorne (2004, p. 42): With excellent eyesight and optimal lighting condition,
Lucy clearly sees a dachshund in front of her. A perfect weasel facsimile is behind the
dachshund, obscured from Lucy’s view. Also suppose that since Lucy has never seen
a weasel before, even if she saw the weasel facsimile, she would only be able to form
the belief that it is an animal, not a weasel.2
Now, we stipulate that by seeing the dachshund, Lucy forms the belief that there
is a dachshund in front of her (call this ‘dachshund-belief’). This belief is safe: In all
the nearby possible worlds where she forms the same belief, it is true. Suppose she
also knows that all dachshunds are animals. By combining this latter belief and the
dachshund-belief, Lucy competently infers that there is an animal in front of her (call
this ‘animal-belief’). Is this belief also safe?
As per SAFETY , it is unsafe: Presumably, in quite a few nearby worlds, Lucy
would see the weasel facsimile and falsely believe there is an animal in front of her.
Thus, Lucy fails to know the object she actually sees is an animal, which seems quite
counterintuitive. After all, Lucy knows that the object is a dachshund and competently
infers that the same object is an animal. Presumably, her animal-belief seems to share
as good epistemic status as her dachshund belief, such that if she knows the object is
a dachshund, she must also know it is an animal.
Fortunately, safety theorists typically insist that their theory should be relativized
to the same belief-formation method, where methods can be broadly understood as
ways of belief formation. Thus, in considering whether a belief is safe, only the nearby

2 Hawthorne brings up a similar example to refute sensitivity: “Suppose I observe a real dog that obscures
an excellent facsimile of a duck. I believe a dog is in front of me. That belief is sensitive. I deduce that there
is an animal in front of me. That isn’t sensitive: if there weren’t an animal in front of me, I would see the
fake duck and believe there was an animal there” (Hawthorne 2004, p. 42). In a footnote on same page,
Hawthorne admits that such a counterexample can be fixed by Nozick’s talk of ‘method’ of belief.

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worlds where the subject forms the belief with the same belief -formation method as
in the actual world are relevant.
Immediately a question follows: What counts as the same method? Specifically,
given two tokens of method, m1 and m2, what makes m1 and m2 belong to the same
type of method? For current purposes, let us consider the following proposal:

Same Method (Faculty):

Two method-tokens, m1 and m2, belong to the same type of method M iff
m1 and m2 are both cases of vision or olfaction or audition or taction or
gustation or testimony or memory or inference, etc.3

Same Method (Faculty) states that two method tokens count as the same type as long
as they are of the same belief-producing faculty. Returning to the case above, if Lucy
saw the weasel facsimile, she would form the animal-belief by the faculty of vision.
Therefore, weasel facsimile worlds are irrelevant to her animal-belief formed in the
actual world. For the latter belief is formed by inference from the dachshund-belief.
According to Same Method (Faculty), inference and vision are clearly two different
method types. Hence, Lucy’s animal-belief is also safe.
These results correspond to our intuition about Lucy’s knowledge. Again, it seems
quite plausible that given the circumstance described, Lucy not only knows there is a
dachshund in front of her, but also knows the same object is an animal. As Hawthorne
puts it, “We can’t live with the idea that I know that there is a dachshund[dog] there but
I do not know there is an animal there” (Hawthorne 2004, p. 42). A safety condition
conceived in terms of Same Method (Faculty) produces correct verdicts.

2.2 Counterexample presented: Dachshund-Weasel II

Consider another scenario. Suppose the same subject Lucy is in exactly the same
situation, but this time, by perception (/vision), she forms the first belief as follows:

P1: There is an animal in front of me.

Suppose P1 is formed by Lucy at t1. After only one millisecond, at t2, Lucy forms a
second perceptual belief:

P2: There is a dachshund in front of me.

This scenario is a counterexample to the safety principle, provided that the latter is
cashed out in terms of Same Method (Faculty). Note that Lucy’s belief in P2 is Same
Method (Faculty)-safe: Since there is no such thing as a ‘dachshund facsimile’ around,
P2 is true in all the nearby possible worlds where she believes there is a dachshund by
perception. However, her belief in P1 is not Same Method (Faculty)-safe: Given that
P1 is formed by vision in the actual world, the weasel facsimile world where Lucy
forms the same animal-belief falsely by vision should be relevant. Therefore, at t2
Lucy knows there is a dachshund in front of her but does not know the same object is

3 This formulation is adapted from Alfano (2009, p. 279). .

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an animal. This seems to be a hard pill to swallow. (I shall further defend this intuition
in Sect. 3.) Hence, Same Method (Faculty) should be rejected.4

2.3 Method-safety further refuted I (internalist method)

Of course, the demise of Same Method (Faculty) does not demonstrate Method-Safety
is false. There are other ways to elucidate Method-Safety. In fact, two method tokens
belonging to the same faculty seems to be only a minimum requirement for them being
of the same type of method. Safety theorists can certainly require more similarities
between token methods. On this front, a number of foremost epistemologists (Goldman
1976; Nozick 1981; Sosa 1999b) adopt the following proposal:
Same Method (Internal Experience):
Two method-tokens, m1 and m2, belong to the same type of method M iff
m1 and m2 produce sufficiently similar internal experience for S.5,6
Two remarks here. First, to what extent should m1 and m2 be similar enough to count
as the same method? A definite answer is hardly available here. But in any case, m1
and m2 need not involve identical experiences. One could rarely have two identical
experiences. A demand for identity would make the safety condition trivially obtained
even in cases where we think the subject has no knowledge.
Second, in the case of perception, the ‘internal experience’ can be construed as
the content of perceptual appearance. For instance, the method of my believing there
is a cup of coffee by vision can be conveniently described as ‘looking-at-an-object-
appearing-as-a-cup-of -coffee’.
Now, returning to our counterexample, safety theorists may argue that according
to Same Method (Internal Experience), at t2 the method of animal-belief is looking-
at-an-animal-appearing-as-a-dachshund; whereas in the weasel-facsimile world, the
method would be looking-at-an-object-appearing-as-a-weasel. Same Method (Inter-
nal Experience) counts them as different methods. After all, a weasel differs from
a dachshund in many ways in terms of appearance. Therefore, armed with Same
Method (Internal Experience), safety theorists can plausibly predict that at t2 both
animal-belief and dachshund-belief are safe.

4 Goldman (1976, 2009) presents a similar case involving a dachshund and a wolf: “I look at a nearby
dachshund and truly believe that what I see is a dog. Had I not been seeing a dachshund, I would have been
seeing a wolf, and would have falsely believed myself to be seeing a dog” (Goldman 2009, p. 80). Goldman
thinks that in this case the existence of the wolf does not prevent the subject from knowing what she actually
sees—the dachshund—is a dog, for a wolf does not really look like a dachshund. This motivates Goldman
to develop method-individuation according to a subject’s internal experience. I argue in the next subsection
that this approach fails as well.
5 For Goldman (1976) this method-individuation serves his relevant alternative theory of perceptual knowl-
edge.
6 For Nozick this method-individuation is designed for his sensitivity principle. Here is how he specifies the
method: “Usually, a method will have a final upshot in experience on which the belief is based, such as visual
experience, and then (a) no method without this upshot is the same method, and (b) any method experientially
the same, the same “from the inside”, will count as the same method.” (Nozick 1981, pp. 184–185).

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But Same Method (Internal Experience) doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. Consider

Goldman-Ginet’s fake barn case:7 Henry happens to look at the only real barn in a
county where numerous fake barns are constructed nearby. The standard diagnosis is
that Henry’s belief is merely luckily true, so it fails to be knowledge.
Now, let us add the following specification to the case. Call the following case
Artistic Barn. Suppose that the residents in the barn county are very artistic, such
that they have built each barn (no matter fake or not) with different shapes, colors,
heights etc., in order to make them look more attractive. Despite such differences in
appearance, Henry would still identify all of them as barns.
Adding this further twist won’t affect our intuition that Henry doesn’t know what
he sees is a barn. Presumably, our intuition here has nothing to do with barns’ specific
physical appearances. What really matters here is that Henry’s barn-belief doesn’t meet
certain condition(s) (e.g. “anti-luck” condition) for knowledge, and such deficiency
of his belief remains however the appearances of the barns are changed.
Unfortunately, Same Method (Internal Experience) leads to the result that in Artis-
tic Barn, Henry has a safe belief. For, if the genuine barn Henry perceives in the actual
world delivers to him a different visual appearance (in terms of color, shape, height,
etc.) from those of fake counterparts, then the method utilized in the actual world
would protect his belief and make it immune to counterfactual errors. Accordingly,
Henry’s belief is safe. This is clearly not a desired result.8
It is worth noting here that Artistic Barn doesn’t show that safety—conceived as
Same Method (Internal Experience)—is not necessary for knowledge; rather, it shows
that safe true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Nevertheless, safety theorists are
faced with a formidable challenge here. On the one hand, they have to appeal to a
condition other than safety to explain why Henry in Artistic Barn fails to know.
Not only is it unclear what this other condition should be, but even if we found
it, the addition of this condition would inevitably make safety theorists’ theory less
elegant. On the other hand, the safety condition is acclaimed in epistemology largely
because it can serve as an important anti-luck machinery which eliminates knowledge-
undermining luck.9 But Artistic Barn deprives safety of its anti-luck power: clearly,
Henry’s belief in this case—just as in the original barn case—is saturated with luck,
but the current form of safety predicts that it is safe. This makes the safety principle
conceived here quite unappealing.
Now, in order to deal with the current problem, one may appeal to the following
tentative proposal, which is a further restriction of Same Method (Internal Experi-
ence). The idea is, roughly, that not every aspect of perceptual appearance is relevant
7 See Goldman (1976).
8 Incidentally, the implication of Artistic Barn goes beyond the current context. The case also renders
Goldman’s (1976) famous discussion of perceptual knowledge problematic. According to Goldman, S
perceptually knows that p only if there is no perceptual equivalent where p is false. The idea here is in
line with Same Method (Internal Experience). ‘Perceptual equivalent’ is a possible situation where S has
sufficiently similar perceptual experience that she cannot discriminate from her actual experience. In the
original fake barn case, Henry has perceptual equivalents of his actual barn-experience, which are induced
by those fake duplicates—duplicates that give sufficiently similar visual experiences. But once we move on
to Artistic Barn, clearly there will be no perceptual equivalents for Henry, although we would still judge
that he has no perceptual knowledge. Clearly, something is lacking in Goldman’s analysis.
9 See, e.g. Pritchard (2005).

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for method-individuation. What is relevant is only the aspect of appearance—call it

perceptual ‘gestalt’ (or ‘organization’)—based on which a subject could classify the
object as a certain kind.10 Presumably, such perceptual gestalt, as a ‘holistic picture’, is
not determined by any single aspect of other perceptual experiences (e.g. color, shape,
etc.). Thus, one may argue that in Artistic Barn, however different the genuine and
the fake barns look, there should be sufficiently similar “barn gestalts” present in each
barn. And it is exactly by the presence of such barn gestalts that Henry would classify
all the objects in the area as barns, as opposed to other objects. Accordingly, once
method is indexed exclusively to such barn gestalts, the differences in other physical
appearances, such as colors, should be irrelevant. As a result, there will be sufficient
similarity between actual method and methods employed in nearby worlds, in the
sense that they are all of the same type of ‘barn-classification method’. This would
make Henry’s belief unsafe—just as our intuition predicts.
Now, what has been presented above is a rough-and-ready proposal. Safety theorists
need to provide more details about the nature of ‘perceptual gestalt’, without which
the current idea of method-individuation remains unclear. But such difficulty aside,
consider how the current proposal would judge our Dachshund-Weasel II. When
Lucy sees the dachshund and forms a perceptual belief that it is an animal, presumably
the relevant aspect of her visual experience would be ‘animal gestalt’ on which Lucy
bases her animal-classification. But if this is Lucy’s method, doesn’t the same type of
method also apply to the nearby worlds where Lucy sees the fake weasel and forms
a false animal-belief? Of course, this would fly in the face of our intuition that Lucy
knows what she actually sees (i.e. dachshund) is an animal.
On this juncture, objectors may argue that gestalts on which Lucy bases her animal-
classification are not sufficiently similar in the two scenarios. Apparently, the difficulty
here is to give a plausible, non-ad hoc explanation of why they are not sufficiently
similar. I doubt such explanation is available. Granted, Lucy may have different sorts
of animal gestalts. For example, we could imagine that all the fish constitute one sort
of ‘animal gestalt’ for her, all the insects constitute another sort, etc., and perhaps none
of these sorts are similar enough to underlie the same type of ‘animal-classification
method’. But there seems to be no obstacle to supposing that as hairy, four-legged,
medium-sized mammals, weasel and dachshund do constitute sufficiently similar ‘ani-
mal gestalts’ for Lucy, such that the same type of classification-method is involved
in the two scenarios. At the very least, there is no reason for rejecting this stipulation
and dwelling on the difference between the dachshund and the weasel, if different
physical appearances of the barns do not prevent Henry from using the same barn-
classification method. That is, consistency demands that, just as looking at different
barns can involve the same type of barn-classification method, looking at different
animals—specifically, weasel and dachshund—can also involve the same type of ani-
mal-classification method. Again, this result would implausibly lead to the verdict that
Lucy’s animal-belief fails to be knowledge.11

10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing on this point.

11 My discussion here has focused on Lucy’s animal-belief, which is initially formed at t1. What about
her dachshund-belief formed at t2? Presumably, the current proposal would claim that the method for
dachshund-belief is ‘dachshund-classification’, which is based on perceptual appearance that gives rise to

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The upshot so far is that the internalist way of method-individuation—no matter

whether the method is broadly construed in terms of ‘internal experience’ or more
finely considered as a ‘classification method’—cannot simultaneously do justice to
both Artistic Barn and Dachshund-Weasel II. Either way, it fails in one of these cases.
I submit that the prospects for a plausible principle of internalist method-individuation
look bleak.

2.4 Method-safety further refuted II (externalist method)

Now, let us consider another species of Method-Safety, which is cast along externalist
lines.12 This approach is defended by, among others, Timothy Williamson. Although
this was not explicit in Williamson (2000), later he confirms that “I had in mind a very
liberal conception, on which the basis [method] of a belief includes the specific causal
process leading to it and relevant causal background” (2009, p. 307).
How to comprehend the so-called “causal process”? Without going into further
detail, it would be illuminating to ask the following question: In perceptual cases,
does the same type of method require beliefs be led by a causal process from the same
perceptual object? An externalist theorist of method will have to face a dilemma here.
On the one hand, if the answer is ‘yes’, then looking at a fake barn and looking at a
genuine barn will count as different methods, such that Henry’s belief would be safe,
contradicting the standard diagnosis. On the other hand, if the answer is ‘no’—that is,
beliefs formed by the causal processes from different objects can still share the same
method—then in Dachshund-Weasel II, it is hard to deny that looking at the weasel
facsimile is the same method as looking at the dachshund. After all, the example can
be presented in a way such that, except for the difference of the object, all the external
conditions and causal backgrounds (i.e. lighting condition, distance of the object etc.)
are very similar between the weasel facsimile situation and the dachshund situation.
In this way, safety theorists will be forced to admit that the same type of method is
employed in both situations, such that Lucy’s animal-belief is unsafe—contradicting
our intuition that it is a case of knowledge.
In a nutshell, a principled externalist version of method-individuation—one that
simultaneously delivers correct verdicts to both the fake barn case and Dachshund-
Weasel II—seems unavailable. In the latter case, in order to secure Lucy’s knowledge
of the presence of an animal, we need a principle that counts the weasel scenario and
the dachshund scenario as involving different methods. By contrast, in the fake barn
case, the same principle has to count the fake barn scenario and Henry’s actual situation
as involving the same method. As it stands, however, there seems to be no relevant

Footnote 11 continued
‘dachshund gestalt’ (as opposed to ‘animal gestalt’). According to the current proposal, this is not the same
type of method as the method in the weasel scenario, which is ‘animal-classification method’ involving
‘animal-gestalt’. But be that as it may, this does not affect that at t2 Lucy’s animal-belief is still held on
the basis of the same method as in t1. Forming a new belief does not mean the method of one’s previously
formed belief is changed. Since that method of animal-belief at t1 involves ‘animal gestalt’—which, as
argued, can be similar to the method in the weasel scenario—Lucy’s animal-belief is still unsafe at t2.
12 Recent literature has witnessed some failure of this approach. Broncano-Berrocal (2014) develops a com-
prehensive version of externalist method-individuation. But see Bogardus and Marxen (2014) for objections
to Broncano-Berrocal.

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external difference between the two examples that could enable safety theorists to treat
them differently.13 In both scenarios, there are fake objects in the vicinity that could
be easily seen by the subjects and make their beliefs false.
In order to further appreciate the difficulty here, consider a recent development of
externalist method-individuation by Grundmann (forthcoming). Grundmann argues
that a plausible method-individuation should incorporate the following two externalist
constraints:

(1) Belief-forming methods should be individuated independently of their objects

such that the individuation of a method does not entail its safety.
(2) Methods should be individuated widely such that they can give rise to beliefs
with different contents (Grundmann forthcoming, p. 17).

(1) claims that a method should be individuated broadly enough such that it is not
confined to a specific object. As argued above, a constraint like this is helpful in the fake
barn case. Surely one does not want to narrowly take Henry’s method as ‘looking at that
specific barn’. For this would make his belief safe from errors occurring in the nearby
worlds. Instead, following (1), the method should be broadly construed as, say, ‘looking
at barns in the area’—a method that is equally applied in nearby worlds where Henry
sees fake barns. However, (1) sits quite uneasily with Dachshund-Weasel II. Here,
the desired result is that Lucy’s animal-belief acquired by perceiving the dachshund is
safe. But this verdict can hardly be given if the method is individuated independently
of the specific object (i.e. dachshund) that Lucy actually perceives. Individuating the
method independent of the dachshund would easily make the weasel scenario involve
the same type of method as in the actual world, which means that Lucy’s animal-belief
would be unsafe. Thus, (1) is unhelpful in saving safety from Dachshund-Weasel II.
Now, let us turn to (2). At first glance, (2) seems to be plausible. Intuitively, a
method should be something repeatable—we do not expect a method can be used
only once.14 And if it is repeatable, it is quite natural to grant that at least sometimes
a method can produce beliefs with different contents. The problem with (2), however,
is that as a constraint on method-individuation, it doesn’t help to determine what is
the relevant method type. To see the point here, note that (2) ambiguates between the
following two specifications:

13 One may be tempted to argue here that two method tokens are of the same type only if they are caused
by objects of the same kind. Furthermore, the dachshund and the fake weasel are not of the same kind.
Therefore, Lucy’s animal-belief formed by perceiving the dachshund is safe.
Here is my response. Granting that the above reasoning is plausible, what shall we say about the fake
barn case? Are the genuine barn and the fake barns of the same kind? I think the answer is negative. Given
that fake barns are paper facsimiles which share very few similar properties with the genuine barn, it seems
quite a stretch to say that they are of the same kind. Most plausibly, just as a dachshund and a fake weasel
belong to different kinds, a genuine barn and fake barns also belong to different kinds. As a result, appealing
to the talk of ‘kinds’ doesn’t help to predict that Lucy’s animal-belief is safe whereas Henry’s barn-belief
is unsafe.
Additionally, metaphysically determining whether different objects are of the same kind is itself a matter
of significant controversy. It would be an undesirable result for an epistemological principle of method-
individuation to rely on it.
Thanks to Katherine Sweet for helpful discussion on this point.
14 See, e.g. Bogardus and Marxen (2014, p. 325).

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(2*) Methods should be individuated widely such that they can give rise to beliefs
with some different contents.
(2**) Methods should be individuated widely such that they can give rise to beliefs
with (sufficiently) many different contents.

Consider (2*) first. The problem with (2*) is that most methods do give rise to beliefs
with some different contents, even if the method is individuated very finely. Suppose
by perception I believe there is a tree in front me. Let us finely take my method of
belief-formation as “visually perceiving a tree under such-and-such lighting condition,
and such-and-such distance, with no alcohol or drug, etc.” But presumably, even such
a fine-grained method could still produce beliefs with some different contents, such
as “there is a plant” or “there is a green tree,” “there is a tall tree,” etc. Thus, if (2) is
understood along the line of (2*), then it won’t be helpful in determining the relevant
method type.15 No matter whether methods are individuated finely or widely, they
typically do give rise to beliefs with some different contents.
Now, consider (2**). The implausibility of (2**) can be seen by, again, consider-
ing the fake barn case. As discussed above, (1) dictates that Henry’s method should
be individuated independently of the particular barn he actually perceives. Thus, a
good candidate for Henry’s method is “perceiving barns in the area” (as opposed to
“perceiving that object as a barn”). But does this method produce beliefs with many
different contents? Presumably not. As long as we stick to the original barn case and
stipulate that all the barns look exactly the same, Henry would only be able to form
beliefs with very limited contents, such as “there is a barn” or “there is a white barn”
(assuming all the barns are white). This makes the method that is dictated by (1) incon-
sistent with what is required by (2**). So, the lesson here is that (2**) poses a too
strong constraint: In some cases, such as fake barn scenario, the method which does
not produce beliefs with many different contents may very well be the correct method
to individuate.16
The upshot here is that, neither (1) nor (2) help to cut the joints of method correctly.
Grundamnn’s proposal does not help to elucidate a defensible externalist method-
safety. I conclude that, just as internalist methods face a bleak future, externalist
methods of belief-formation fare no better.

3 Objections and replies

In the last section, Dachshund-Weasel II played an important role in my arguments

against safety. In this section, I shall consider three objections to my verdict regarding

15 Perhaps the only lesson (2*) could tell us is that a method should not be individuated in a way that
involves exclusively the specific belief that is formed by a subject. But this is hardly a useful lesson since
it still leaves wide open the question of how to individuate the method.
16 Grundmann argues in his paper that his two constraints make it the case that in the fake barn example,
Henry’s method should not be “seeing that specific barn” because individuating method this way would
violate both of his constraints. However, he does not go ahead and discuss what Henry’s method should
be. My discussion here shows that once we try to tackle this latter question, it becomes obvious that his
constraints are implausible.

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this example. (Readers who agree with my verdict, especially my intuition that Lucy’s
animal-belief counts as knowledge, may move on to the next section.)

3.1 Countering counterintuitive?

Objection Almost every case in epistemology has some dissenters whose intuitions run
counter to the majority. Dachshund-Weasel II should be no exception. One may insist
that at t2 it is a correct result that Lucy knows there is a dachshund but does not know it
is an animal. For safety theorists, of course, it would be unilluminating to defend such
an intuition by simply repeating their theory (i.e., say, the animal-belief can easily
be false in nearby possible worlds, but the dachshund-belief cannot). Since we have
already stated that our intuition opposes what safety theorists may predict, they should
appeal to some other resources than safety to refute our intuition. In fact, it is not hard
to find some theory which favors their position. One prominent candidate is Plantinga’s
(1993) proper functionalism: the view that a belief is warranted only if it is produced
by a properly functioning cognitive faculty in a congenial epistemic environment,
according to a good, truth-conducive design plan (Plantinga 1993, italics added).
Safety theorists can move on to argue that the existence of the weasel facsimile in
Dachshund-Weasel II creates an unfavorable environment relative to the production
of Lucy’s animal-belief, even though the dachshund-belief enjoys a rather congenial
epistemic environment. And such difference in the epistemic environment renders
Lucy be able to know there is a dachshund but unable to know the same object is an
animal—a result that corresponds with what safety (construed according to e.g. Same
Method (Faculty)) predicts.
Reply Emphasis on the epistemic environment doesn’t help much, for one could apply
the same reasoning to Dachshund-Weasel I. That is, one could argue that since in
Dachshund-Weasel II Lucy does not know there is an animal by perception because
of the bad epistemic environment, for the same reason this very belief formed by
deduction should also fail to be knowledge in Dachshund-Weasel I. After all, why
would the difference in the way this belief is formed make any difference in the
quality of the epistemic environment?17 But denying that Lucy’s animal-belief counts
as knowledge in Dachshund-Weasel I simply costs too much, because the closure

17 One may insist that although the environment is the same, this same environment is epistemically
unfavorable relative to Lucy’s animal-belief formed by perception. Relative to her animal-belief formed by
competent deduction, however, the environment is epistemically benign.
My response is that, admittedly, the same environment could be unfavorable to a belief formed by one
faculty, X, but not unfavorable relative to the same belief formed by another faculty, Y. But presumably
this is because the environment would affect one’s performance of X but wouldn’t affect the performance
of Y . For instance, imagine that two subjects, A and B, form the same belief that there is a bird. A forms
the belief by vision whereas B forms it by hearing the bird’s chirping. Further suppose that both A and B
are situated in the same dark environment. Plausibly, this dark environment is unfavorable relative to A’s
believing that there is a bird, but it is not unfavorable relative to B’s believing the same proposition by
hearing. Why? Because the darkness affects performance of A’s cognitive faculty, i.e. vision, but it does
not affect B’s faculty, i.e., hearing. However, there is no such difference between Lucy’ animal-belief in
Dachshund-Weasel I and the same belief in Dachshund-Weasel II. In the latter example, the existence of
the weasel facsimile doesn’t affect Lucy’s seeing the dachshund clearly and forming a true belief that there
is an animal. Similarly, in the former case, the weasel facsimile doesn’t prevent Lucy from competently

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principle will thereby be breached. In Dachshund-Weasel I, given that Lucy knows

there is a dachshund in front of her and competently deduces that there is an animal
in front of her, closure predicts that Lucy also knows it is an animal.18 If Lucy fails to
know this, closure fails immediately.
Perhaps failure of closure is a price that some philosophers are willing to pay.19
But it is a particularly hard pill for safety theorists to swallow. As Sosa (1999a, 1999b)
argues, one of the main motivations for adopting safety over other modal principle
(i.e. sensitivity) is its ability to save closure. A failure to save closure will inevitably
make safety a much less attractive theory. Therefore, it is best for safety theorists to
seek other strategies.

3.2 Belief-method transformation

Objection Some may worry that my description of Dachshund-Weasel II does not tell
the full story behind Lucy’s beliefs at t2. The reasoning may go as follows. At t2 Lucy’s
method for believing there is an animal should have changed. For not only does there
being a dachshund conceptually entail there being an animal, but these two propositions
are intimately related to each other,20 such that one can hardly form the dachshund-
belief at t2 without simultaneously inferring (albeit perhaps subconsciously) that there
is an animal. Hence, although at t1 the method of forming animal-belief is merely
perception, at t2 it develops into a conjunctive method, which incorporates both per-
ception and deduction (/inference). So construed, the safety principle, armed with
Same Method (Faculty), delivers the verdict that the method of the animal-belief at
t2 is indeed different from the method applied in weasel facsimile worlds (where
only perception is employed). Thus, weasel facsimile worlds are irrelevant at t2 with
respect to both the dachshund-belief and the animal-belief, so both beliefs are safe at
t2, corresponding to our intuition that both beliefs count as knowledge.
Reply I have two responses. First, the proposition that ‘there is a dachshund in front
of me’ conceptually entails many other propositions, such as ‘there is a mammal in
front of me,’ ‘there is a dog in front of me,’ ‘there is an animal in front of me,’ etc.
However, exactly which proposition will be inferred by a subject and become a belief is
an open question. But this much seems obvious: Whatever is inferred largely depends
on the subject’s personal experience and background information. If we stipulate that
Lucy is a fanatical dog-lover who is not inclined to treat a dog as an animal at all, but
rather as an intimate friend, then believing there is a dachshund hardly simultaneously

Footnote 17 continued
inferring that there is an animal. Thus, as far as the epistemic environment is concerned, I see no good
reason to treat these cases differently.
Thanks to John Greco for pressing me on this issue.
18 Determining the correct version of closure is a tricky issue, but this need not bother us here. The case can
be easily adjusted in order to meet a form of closure that one favors. For an overview of different versions
of closure, see Baumann (2011).
19 See, e.g. Nozick (1981).
20 This can certainly be true if one considers these two propositions: “there is a dachshund” and “there is
a mammal.” Although the former entails the latter, for many people these two may not be quite related to
each other, in the sense that while believing the former proposition one may fail to infer the latter one.

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accompanies believing the same object is an animal, even subconsciously. (Probably

she would instead infer and believe ‘there is my lovely buddy in front of me.’) So
construed, the method of forming the animal-belief remains unchanged at t2. The
counterexample still goes through.
Second, consider:
(1) There is a dachshund in front of me (P2).
(2) If there is a dachshund in front of me, then there is an animal in front of me.
(3) There is an animal in front of me (P1).
In Dachshund-Weasel II, as an assumption, Lucy knows (1) and (2) at t2. Now, to
arrive at (3) Lucy must apply modus ponens to premises (1) and (2). So, the above
objection amounts to the claim that for Lucy, applying modus ponens to (1) and (2)
and arriving at the conclusion (3) takes no time. This happens simultaneously with the
formation of belief in P2. Is this possible? I am not sure.21 But be that as it may, it is
simply not necessary for us to put the case in this way. We could stipulate that because
of, say, cognitive laziness, it took Lucy some time to deduce (3) by modus ponens. As
a result, at t2, animal-belief is still based on Lucy’s perception. The method remains
unchanged.
In summary, the above objection works only if a very restricted interpretation of
the counterexample is assumed, but that is certainly not my counterexample here.

3.3 The source of intuition

Objection Related to the above objection, a similar worry can be raised as follows.
Objectors may wonder why in Dachshund-Weasel II it is counterintuitive that Lucy
fails to know there is an animal when she already knows there is a dachshund. Shouldn’t
she actually infer animal-belief from dachshund-belief in order to know what she sees
is an animal? That is, it should be this inference process that guarantees our intuition
that Lucy really knows there is an animal. Therefore, if the animal-belief is still only
based on perception at t2, not on inference, we may lose the intuition that the animal-
belief counts as knowledge. On the other hand, if Lucy indeed infers the animal-belief,
we would have a secure intuition that Lucy knows there is an animal, but then the
method of her animal-belief has also changed, such that this belief will be safe (e.g.
construed according to Same Method (Faculty)). Either way, safety can remain intact.

Reply Something conclusive can hardly be said about what exactly is the source of
our intuition regarding Lucy’s knowledge. But it would be helpful to relate this issue
to epistemic closure principle. Objectors should find the following form of closure
plausible:22

21 This is an interesting empirical question, though.

22 Other details should be added to Closure in order to have a sufficiently plausible form of closure. For
example, (3) does not exclude the possibility that one’s belief is overdetermined by both deduction and
improper reasons. Therefore, another premise such as “no defective reason” should be added to Closure.
Since in our case Lucy’s beliefs are not going astray in this way, I will set these subtleties aside. For more
discussion on Closure, see David and Warfield (2008, pp. 149–150).

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Closure: (1) Kp
(2) K(p entails q)
(3) Bq based on deduction from p and (p entails q))
So, (C) Kq

Closure is developed from the following problematic formulation:

Closure*: (1) Kp
(2) K(p entails q)
(3) Bq
So, (C) Kq

In their widely cited paper, David and Warfield (2008) explain why we should
replace Closure* with Closure. Closure* faces the “warrant problem.” Specifically,
even if premises (1)–(3) in Closure* are met, one may still fail to know q if her belief
in q is formed in a problematic way (e.g. wishful thinking). This motivates us to drop
Closure* and adopt Closure.
Returning to our counterexample, at t2 Lucy (a) knows there is a dachshund, (b)
knows being a dachshund entails being an animal, and (c) believes there is an animal;
therefore, premises in Closure* are all satisfied. Closure, however, is violated: Lucy’s
animal-belief is based on visual perception, not deduction, and so premise (3) of
Closure is not met. Despite this, Lucy’s animal-belief doesn’t face the warrant problem
at all. That is, given that Lucy clearly perceives the dachshund as an animal, her belief
is based on proper grounds. The motivation for favoring Closure over Closure* is
only to exclude problematic cases in which a subject forms belief in q based on
improper reasons.23 Therefore, the burden of proof is shifted to the objectors, who
should explain why Lucy’s belief meets the motivation for adopting Closure but still
does not constitute knowledge. That is, why must Lucy base her belief on deduction
in order to know? Unless adopting a quite demanding conception of knowledge, one
wouldn’t be convinced that Lucy must undergo the deduction process in order to know
the dachshund she sees is an animal.24

23 Here is an example: “…I know that there are at least nine people in the room (I started counting and
stopped at nine), and I know that this entails that there are at least seven people in the room, and I believe
that there are at last seven people in the room but not because of the inference or the counting but rather
because I always believe that there are at least seven people in the room when I am in the room. Though
the example is somewhat frivolous, it should be clear that, in this sort of situation, where one does not base
believing q on proper grounds for believing q, it looks like one does not know q” (David and Warfield 2008,
p. 147).
24 It may also be helpful here to consider the following plausible form of closure:

Closure**: (1) Kp
(2) K(p entails q)
So, (C) S is in a position to know q.

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4 Virtue-theoretic safety

I have argued that various versions of Method-Safety, including faculty-based, inter-

nalist, and externalist varieties, are all subject to serious objections. However, it should
be noted here that these varieties do not constitute an exhaustive list of Method-Safety
varieties on the epistemological market. Since I have taken ‘methods’ broadly to mean
ways of belief-formation, there is at least another version of Method-Safety worth con-
sidering. The latter construes methods as a subject’s intellectual abilities or virtues.
Call this version of Method-Safety ‘virtue-theoretic safety’.
Naturally, virtue-theoretic safety is favored by virtue epistemologists, who give
intellectual abilities or virtues a central place in their theory of knowledge. Most
explicitly, virtue-theoretic safety is defended by Greco (2016). Here is his formulation:
(Ability + Proper Conditions)-relative Safety: A belief is (Ability + Proper
Conditions)-relative safe just in case: In close worlds where S believes p from
ability A, and in conditions proper for the exercise of A, p is true.
Greco argues that this form of safety is the correct one.25 Specifically, compared to
other forms of safety which typically lack particular motivation for adopting them,
(Ability + Proper Conditions)-relative Safety is entailed by, and hence motivated by,
(reliabilist) virtue epistemology. Therefore, it has resources to explain why modal
stability required by safety is necessary for knowledge. According to Greco, this is a
substantial advantage over other forms of safety.26
Unfortunately, Ability + Proper Conditions)-relative Safety doesn’t seem to be plau-
sible. To illustrate, consider Dachshund-Weasel II again. According to Greco’s safety
principle, on the one hand, Lucy’s dachshund-belief is safe at t2. Note that she believes
there is a dachshund in front of her by way of her visual ability. The conditions in
the case are also proper for such an ability to be manifested: there is a good lighting
condition, there is no such thing as a ‘dachshund facsimile’ around, etc. These factors
guarantee that the dachshund-belief would be true in all the close possible worlds
where she forms the belief through the same visual ability. So, dachshund-belief is
safe. On the other hand, Lucy’s animal-belief is unsafe. The ability performed by

Footnote 24 continued
It has been notoriously difficult to interpret the phrase “being in a position to know.” But this much
seems obvious:

Other things being equal, a subject who satisfies (1) and (2) is in a significantly positive epistemic
status with respect to knowing q.

In our counterexample, the fact that Lucy knows there is a dachshund, plus her background knowledge
that dachshunds are animals, renders her a significantly positive epistemic status with respect to knowing
that what she sees is an animal. This, coupled with the fact that Lucy properly bases her animal-belief on
perception, seems enough to guarantee our intuition that at t2 Lucy knows what she sees is an animal. Our
intuition doesn’t hinge on whether she actually undergoes the inferential process or not.
25 Greco (2016) interprets this form of safety to be the one that Sosa argues for in a number of recent
works, including Sosa (2007, 2015). For my purposes here, I shall put aside the issue of interpreting Sosa’s
safety and focus on Greco’s formulation of virtue-theoretic safety. Thanks to John Greco for discussion on
this point.
26 See Greco (2016, p. 52).

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Lucy to form the animal-belief is, again, visual ability. Unfortunately, the existence of
weasel-facsimile renders Lucy prone to believe falsely that there is an animal by way
of vision in the close possible worlds. Thus, Greco’s (Ability + Proper Conditions)-
relative Safety passes the wrong verdict that Lucy’s dachshund-belief is safe but her
animal-belief is unsafe.
So far, ability is conceived in a coarse-grained way, taking it as faculty-based
ability. But isn’t there a more fine-grained way to interpret ability? In addressing the
fake barn case, Greco (2010) argues that ability is relative to environment. Relative to
the environment of the fake barn county, Henry does not have the ability to recognize
the object as a barn, but relative to a normal environment where no fake barns exist, he
does have the ability. With this way of individuating Henry’s ability, it follows that his
belief is unsafe according to Ability + Proper Conditions)-relative Safety, for Henry
simply does not have the relevant ability at all.
However, this fine-grained way of individuating ability is of no help with
Dachshund-Weasel II. If Henry does not have the ability to recognize the object
as a barn because of the presence of fakes nearby, then, by the same token, Lucy does
not have the ability to recognize the object (i.e. dachshund) as an animal because of
the fake animal nearby. Lucy’s animal belief is thus in the same boat with Henry’s
barn-belief. If the latter is unsafe as per Ability + Proper Conditions)-relative Safety,
then so is the former. Again, this would be bad news for Greco.

5 Concluding remarks: different visions

My discussion here reveals a fundamental difficulty for safety theorists. It turns out that
it is tremendously hard to come up with a defensible principle of method-individuation.
The difficulty here remains, no matter if one individuates method along faculty-based,
internalist, externalist, or virtue-theoretic lines. This may be frustrating for safety
theorists. Given the popularity of these interpretations of ‘method’ in the literature,
what theoretical options are safety theorists left with?
For knowledge-first epistemologists, this could be an opportunity to advertise their
methodological maneuver. Williamson, as a knowledge-first-safety theorist, takes
safety as a necessary, circular condition of knowledge. That is, he thinks that we
cannot determine whether safety is obtained or not in a certain case without first con-
sulting our intuition about whether knowledge exists or not. Specifically, regarding
method, he does not think that there is a principle that could tell in advance whether
two method tokens are similar enough to count as the same type. Whether they are of
the same type is decided in a post hoc way, by first determining whether knowledge
is obtained.27
Now, the worry here is that if safety theorists have to circularly appeal to knowledge
before they determine safety, then the safety condition seems to be less motivated.
For any alleged necessary condition for knowledge, the ability to give non-circular
prediction of existence of knowledge constitutes a prima facie reason in favor of that
condition. Inability to do so means a theorist has to seek other motivations to advance

27 See Williamson (2009).

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their theory and explain why it is specifically their theory, instead of others’, that
should be favored.28
In addition, safety theorists would move a bit too quickly to appeal to a knowledge-
first approach at this point. Granting the plausibility of my arguments in this paper, what
I have established so far is, specifically, that there is no plausible fixed, across-context,
principle of method-individuation that could give correct verdicts in our problematic
cases. But couldn’t this assumption of demanding a ‘fixed, across-context principle’
be reasonably rejected while maintaining safety as a non-circular necessary condition
of knowledge? I think so. The reason that safety theorists seek a principle of method-
individuation is to find out which possible worlds are relevant for evaluating the safety
of a belief. But our ordinary discourse reveals that the term ‘safe’ is context-sensitive
in such a way that a fixed way to determine relevant worlds across all the contexts
seems to be unavailable. Consider the following scenarios.
Suppose Mary and her son live in an extremely dangerous war zone where aircraft
bombs are exploding almost everywhere. After finally managing to take her son to a
small bomb shelter, Mary says, “We are in a safe place now.” Compare this with a
case where Cathy moves into a new apartment in Chicago. She tells her friend, “I live
in a safe place.” Presumably, Mary and Cathy have in mind rather different standards
for ‘safe’. In the case of Mary, we can imagine she has in mind a set of rather selective
nearby worlds. This is a small set of very similar worlds where very little has changed
from Mary’s actual situation. She certainly does not have in mind a slightly far-off
world where she or her son steps out of the bomb shelter. In comparison, the worlds
that Cathy picks out as ‘safe’ are much less selective. Those are a larger set of possible
worlds where more dissimilarities from the actual situation are allowed.
Thus, the term ‘safe’ is context-sensitive such that in different contexts, different
standards are implemented for picking out the range of possible worlds relevant for
determining safety. Starting from this insight, a safety theorist could move on to argue
that our epistemic evaluation of ‘safe belief’ also inherits a contextualist feature.
For method-safety theorists, it seems most natural to take their principle of method-
individuation contextually, such that whether two method tokens employed in two
worlds are of the same type or not is determined by the context. More specifically,
the idea is that the context determines the relevant method type. (For instance, in
Dachshund-Weasel II, depending on the context, the method type of Lucy’s animal-
belief can be described either broadly as (a) ‘perceiving objects in the area as animal’
or, more narrowly as (b) ‘perceiving that object—the dachshund—as an animal’.)
Then, this contextually determined method type in turn determines in which nearby
worlds the subject would be using method tokens of that same type. (Thus, if (a)
is Lucy’s method type, then in the weasel facsimile world she would be using the
same type of method. But if (b) is the method type, in weasel facsimile world she
would not be using the method of the same type, thus ruling out weasel facsimile
world as being relevant for evaluating safety.) The resultant picture is that, instead of
28 For Williamson, safety does lots of theoretical work, such as rejecting the KK principle. However, this
is at most the consequence of his safety principle. Such a consequence does not exempt Williamson from
the burden of explaining in the first place why it is safety, instead of other theories (e.g. process reliabilism,
sensitivity, etc.), that should be considered as a necessary condition of knowledge. It seems to me that
Williamson does not say much in this regard.

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a fixed principle, it is the context that determines which nearby worlds are relevant for
determining safety. To clarify, the context here is not the context that determines the
similarity orderings of possible worlds, as explicated in Lewisian semantics; rather,
it is the context that dictates, again, which of those similar worlds (which are already
determined by Lewisian semantics) are relevant for evaluating safety.29
I think the proposal here, though still rough, is worth exploring.30 A fixed principle
that can uniformly identify the relevant nearby worlds for determining safety in each
case seems to be an unreachable ideal. Perhaps pursuit of such a fixed principle is
motivated by safety theorists’ eagerness for simplicity and theoretical elegance. But
what has to be faced eventually should be the complexity of context-sensitivity. Such
complexities include, importantly, whose context is relevant for evaluation (attribu-
tor’s, subject’s or both) and what factors affect a context. Also, of course, whether
such a contextualist approach could pass the test of our problematic cases remains as
an issue. A satisfactory answer to these questions awaits future research, but I hope I
have at least made a correct gesture towards the future development of safety.

Acknowledgements For helpful comments and discussions, I am grateful for Peter Baumann, Quan Jin,
Minghe Li, Joe Salerno, Katherine Sweet, Chong Yuan, Yiling Zhou, two anonymous referees for Synthese,
and especially, John Greco.

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