1
2. Given the gravity of offense there is probability that the
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION (IMPORTANT)
TWO (2) KINDS OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF CIVIL SERVICE
EMPLOYEES WHO ARE CHARGED WITH OFFENSES PUNISHABLE
BY SUSPENSION OR REMOVAL:
Take note that all of these types of preventive suspension arise
during the administrative proceedings.
1. Pending Investigation (Section 51, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A
of RAC of 1987) (precautionary measure)
- Objective: to prevent the respondent officer or employee from
influencing the witnesses or utilizing the power of his office in
order to harass, intimidate, coerce the complainant and/or
witnesses. To ensure the conduct of impartial proceeding.
- Not entitled to back wages even if one is subsequently
exonerated
- This is not yet the penalty, but a measure to enable the
disciplining authority to investigate charges against the accused
by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing
witnesses against him or to destroy the evidence
- Precautionary measure to safeguard the proceedings
- Maximum: Upto 90 days under the CS Law and Revised
Administrative Code
Considering that the issuance of preventive suspension by the tribunal,
pending investigation, is not yet a penalty so there is no valid basis to claim
that the tribunal cannot issue the preventive suspension order without yet a
full-blown hearing.
This can be issued without a full-blown hearing because the respondent
will be given his full day in court during the trial of the case.
For the Administrative cases filed against a local elective official, there is a
separate requirement that the preventive suspension order cannot be
issued until there is a joinder of issues.
Even if there is a joinder but the respondent refuses or neglects to file,
there may still be a joinder of issues and the preventive suspension may
already be issued as a master of force.
Under the Ombudsman Act, Section 24 upto 6 months. This is a longer
period than the period authorized under the Civil Service Law (90 days).
The ombudsman may preventively suspend any officer under his
authority:
1. If the judgment of the Ombudsman is that the evidence of guilt is
strong and the charge against him involves grave offenses-
dishonesty, oppression, misconduct; or
2. If the evidence of guilt is strong and the charge would warrant his
removal from service. (there may be a basis for issuance of
preventive suspension up to 6 months)
3. If the evidence of guilt is strong and his continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
For local officials: Section 63 of RA 7160 in relation to Section 64 of
LGC: General Rule maximum of 60 days. If facing so many charges, up to
90days.
Basis preventive suspension under Sec 63 of RA 7160
1. Evidence of guilt is strong; and
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continuance in office could influence the witness, pose danger or
threat to the city, integrity of the court.
Section 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority may
preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect
in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the
respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the
service.
Section 51 CSC Of Revised Administrative Code :
If the charge involves:
1. Dishonesty; or
2. There are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of the
charge warranting his removal from office.
RA 6770 together with the IRR
Basis for issuance of preventive suspension under the LGC, Revised
Administrative Code, CSC law or proceedings are under the Rules of the
OMB.
2. Pending Appeal (punitive) (Section 47 of the same Code) – if
the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or
dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated
- This is already the penalty.
- applies whenever there is an imposition of either
dismissal from service or suspension of more than 1
month up to 1 year (not exceeding 1 year). In these
instances, there may be appeal lodged by the
aggrieved party and during the period of appeal, is
already under preventive suspension.
- To be entitled to back wages, one must be completely
exonerated of the charges against him and the reason
for his suspension is unjustified, both must concur
- Is actually punitive although it is in effect
subsequently considered illegal if respondent is
exonerated and the administrative decision finding him
guilty is reversed
SUSPENSION IS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE BY THE
DISCIPLINING AUTHORITY TO PREVENT:
1. Concealing of documents
2. Harassing of witness (protect complainants, to prevent the
respondent in harassing them)
3. Using the office to meddle in the investigation or to influence the
outcome of the case
EO 292
GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION:
· Dishonesty
· Oppression
· Grave Misconduct
· Neglect in the performance of duty
· where there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of
the charge justifying his removal from the service
DAYS OF SUSPENSION:

Local elective officials (section 63 in relation to section 64)– not
exceeding 60 days - up to 90 days(if facing so many charges)
Appointive officials; CSC Law – not exceeding 90 days
Public officer charged under the Ombudsman Act – 6 months
Unlike proceedings against appointive officers, pursuant to the provisions
of CSC law and the Revised Administrative Code, there can be no recovery
of back salaries during the period of preventive suspension, pending
investigation.
But, the rule is different for Local elective officials facing charges because
under Sec 64 of LGC, in the event that he is exonerated, he can recover
the back salaries, which he failed to receive even during the period of
preventive suspension, pending investigation. But not for appointive
officers.
For proceedings under OMB Act, whenever an administrative case is filed
against, whether appointive or elective officer, before the office of the
ombudsman, Sec 24 applies. Meaning, maximum preventive suspension of
upto 6months.
Another concept of preventive suspension - in criminal cases (sec 13 of
Anti-graft and corrupt practices act RA 3019)
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted
by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under
any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and
to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
Who issues the preventive suspension? (term in criminal case is
suspension pendente lite). The court has the authority to issue the order
of suspension pendente lite on the basis of Sec of RA 3019.
In an Administrative case, applying RA 60770 (OMB Act), who is
authorized to issue the preventive suspension pending investigation? The
ombudsman or his deputy.
RA 3019 – preventive suspension is mandatory upon violation of its
provisions
APPEAL:
When allowable, shall be made within 15 days from the receipt of the
decision, unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which
petition shall be decided within 15 days
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION – shall be based only of the
following grounds:
· Newly discovered evidence
· The decision is not supported by the evidence on record
· Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65:
From the resolution of the CSC, the petitioner may file a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 (not Rule 45) to the SC within 30 days from receipt
of copy of the resolution.
Provisions on Summary Dismissal have already been repealed by RA
6654, approved on May 20, 1988 and published in the Official Gazette on
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May 30, 1988. Thus, there must always be hearing and notice. An
exception to this is when there is a waiver.
RELATED CASES:
GLORIA vs. CA
306 SCRA 287
There are 2 kinds of preventive suspension.
FACTS: Private respondents were public school teachers who did not
report for work during a teacher’s strike. They were administratively
charged with grave misconduct, etc. Result of the investigation showed all
of them as guilty.
On appeal to MSPB, one of them was also found guilty and was imposed a
6-month suspension. CA ruled that they were entitled to back salaries
“beyond the 90-days” of their suspension.
Hence, this petition by DECS Secretary Gloria. The others were
suspended. The CA modified the decision. They were simply imposed the
penalty of reprimand on the finding that they failed to file their application
for leave of absence.
ISSUES
Whether or not employees have the right to compensation pending
investigation. NO
Whether or not employees have the right to compensation pending appeal?
YES.
Whether there may be a recovery by the public school teachers of
compensation, which they failed to receive during the period of
preventive suspension pending appeal. They are entitled to
compensation for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal.
For public teachers, whose penalty was commuted from dismissal to
suspension, may he be allowed to recover? No. He cannot be said that
he is innocent of the charge.
HELD
(1) NO, the respondents are not entitled to back salaries pending
investigation even if they are exonerated. It is one of those sacrifices
which holding a public office requires. Preventive suspension pending
investigation is not a penalty but a measure intended to be able for the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. For this
reason, it is limited only to 90 days. The preventive suspension of CS
employees charged with dishonesty, oppression, etc is authorized by the
CS Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered “unjustified”.
(2) YES, the respondents may be entitled to back salaries pending
appeal if eventually they are found innocent. This is so because
preventive suspension pending appeal is actually “punitive”. Hence, they
should be reinstated with full pay for the period of suspension.
Under the existing jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the
equivalent of 5 years pay at the rate last received before the suspension
was imposed.
On the other hand, if the conviction is affirmed, the period of his suspension
becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal.
- Recovery of back salaries can be made since they were
exonerated of the original charges.
SALES vs. MATHAY

129 SCRA 180 (May 3, 1984)
Before a public official can claim back salaries, suspension
should be unjustified or that the employee was innocent was the charges
proffered against him. Postal Clerk Sales originally dismissed from service
for his shortages on a finding of gross neglect of duty but penalty reduced
by CSC to suspension is not entited to back salary
FACTS: Being guilty of gross neglect of duty, petitioner Sales, a clerk of
the Bureau of Posts, was given a 6 months suspension. During such time,
he was not given any salary. He then claimed for back salaries from Auditor
General Mathay, which was denied. Mathay reasoned that Sales’ claim for
back salaries “may not be authorized for the reason that you have not
shown that your suspension for the period covered by the claim is
unjustified, that you have not rendered service for said period, and that you
were not exonerated from the administrative charges against you.”
Upon appeal, the CSC reduced the penalty into 6 months suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sales is entitled to back salaries during the period
he was under suspension. NO
HELD: No. The general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to
any compensation if he has not rendered any service. As you work, so shall
you earn. And even if we consider the punishment as suspension, before a
public official or employee is entitled to payment of salaries withheld, it
should be shown that that the suspension was unjustified or that the
employee was innocent of the charges proffered against him.
- He was never found to be innocent but was found guilty of simple
neglect of duty. It must be shown that the suspension was
improper for him to be entitled to backwages.
If he is exonerated, can he recover during the period of suspension
pending appeal? YES.
CSC vs. RABANG
548 SCRA 541 (March 14, 2008)
Modification of penalty of appeal, from dismissal from service for
a charge of gross neglect, to 3 months suspension for simple neglect is not
exoneration; there will be reinstatement but no payment of back wages.
FACTS: Jessie Rabang was a transportation regulation officer of LTO
Bacolod, with the duty to inspect motor vehicles sought to be registered
and to process the applications for vehicle registration.
On Dec. 1991, he evaluated an application of Mr. Young for the registration
of a purportedly new and locally rebuilt Isuzu truck. After conducting an
ocular inspection of the vehicle, Rabang recommended that it be assigned
a Chassis ID No. which was approved by his superior Antonio Saril.
Rabang conducted a 2nd ocular inspection before issuing a Motor Vehicle
Inspection Report. Saril approved the registration of the vehicle after
payment of registration fee. The vehicle turned out to be stolen. The DOTC
conducted an investigation and Rabang and Saril were charged with grave
misconduct, gross negligence if the performance of official duties and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Rabang was found
guilty of gross negligence by the DOTC Sec. and was suspended for 6
months while SAril was admonished. The CSC sustained the DOTC
findings but changed the penalty to dismissal from service.
The CA found Rabang guilty only for simple negligence and penalized him
with suspension for three months without pay but ordered his reinstatement
and payment of his corresponding back wages and benefits due him after
he had served his 3 mos. suspension.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Rabang should receive payment of backwages
during the period of preventive suspension during appeal? NO, it cannot
be said that he was innocent of the charge. If he has already served
the suspension, he should be reinstated after the period of
suspension.
HELD: The Court held in Bruguda vs. Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports that “the payment of backwages during the period of suspension of
a civil servant who is subsequently reinstated is proper if he is found
innocent of the charges and the suspension is unjustified.” In this case,
although Rabang is not guilty of gross neglect of duty he is however liable
for simple neglect. He is not exonerated from liability. Moreover preventive
suspension pending appeal was not unjustified as it was to protect public
interest considering that he was charged with gross negligence/gross
neglect of duty and found guilty thereof by the DOTC and the CSC.
The Court sustained the penalty of suspension for 3 months without pay
imposed by the CA for simple neglect of duty since this is his 1 st offense in
15 years of service. The CSC and DOTC are ordered to reinstate Rabang
however he is not entitled to payment of back wages during the period of
time he was considered to be on preventive suspension.
Discussion:
Basic Rule, it cannot be said that he is innocent of the charge. In fact, there
is still this finding. There is an imposition. So, there will be no payment of
back salaries. But certainly, he should be reinstated.
The effect of a suspension as a penalty is reinstatement after the service of
the suspension as decreed in the decision of the tribunal. He should be
reinstated to his original position but there can be no payment of back
salaries.
Take note:
Under the Civil Service Law, and even under the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the preventive suspension pending investigation
can already be issued even yet without a formal hearing since it is not
punitive. The intention is the conduct of impartial proceeding or that there
will be no opportunity for the respondent to harass or threaten the
witnesses against him or to destroy vital evidence.
Under the Local Government Code, the preventive suspension may only be
issued after joinder of issues. It means that there must still be authority for
local government officials to file his pleading. Only then, after joinder of
issues, that the preventive suspension may be issued by the Sanggunian
or the office of the President. If the administrative case is filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, there is no need for such joinder of issues
requirement. There is no provision in the Ombudsman Act requiring such.
Section 63 and 64, RA 716 (LGC)0:
Section 63. Preventive Suspension. -
(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a
highly urbanized or an independent component city;
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component
city or municipality; or
(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the
offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the

respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single
preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond
sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several
administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single
year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the
first suspension.
(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective
official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings against him, which shall be terminated
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time he was formally
notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of
the case is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly
filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time
of termination of the case.
(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall
be penalized as abuse of authority.
Section 64. Salary of Respondent Pending Suspension. - The respondent
official preventively suspended from office shall receive no salary or
compensation during such suspension; but upon subsequent exoneration
and reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or compensation including
such emoluments accruing during such suspension.
Section 24, RA 6770:
Section 24. Preventives Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy
may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong,
and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b)
the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by
the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without
pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of
the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Section 13, RA 3019:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but
if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
- CSC dismissed him from office. CA found him guilty of simple
neglect and imposed 3 month suspension. No since it cannot be
said that he is innocent of the charge.
Local elective officials (section 63)– not exceeding 60 days - up to 90
days; there is basis under Section 64 if the is exonerated/found innocent so
he shall be paid compensation which he failed to receive during the period
of suspension pending investigation
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Section 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative
Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or
employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the
date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due
to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.
Appointive officials; CSC Law – not exceeding 90 days ; there can be no
recovery of back salaries during the period of preventive suspension
pending investigation
Public officer charged under the Ombudsman Act – 6 months
Ombudsman Section 24
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IN CRIMINAL CASES - Basis is Section 13
of RA 3019: Anti-graft and corrupt practices act.
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
When the information is filed in court, he shall be suspended by the Court
from office.
‘Suspension pendente lite’
Requisites:
1. Pre-suspension hearing
RELATED CASES:
BAYOT vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
128 SCRA 383
Suspension from office is not a penalty because it is not imposed
as a result of a judicial proceeding.
- RA 13 of Section 3019 is not ex post facto law because it is not
punitive. This was issued not as a penalty. There is nothing yet
proved against the accused. It is simply the initial step in order to
safeguard the proceedings; in order to prevent the accused from
utilizing the powers of his office in order to coerce, threaten, or
intimidate the witnesses of the complainant.
- As to the second contention, the wording of Sec of RA 3019 is
very clear. It does not make any distinction, as long as he is
holding public office, regardless of whether it was still the same
office at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It doesn't really
matter. So, he can be preventively suspended by the
Sandiganbayan.
FACTS: Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons
accused in more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification
of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan.

In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo,
Cavite. He was elected. Afterwhich, Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the
charges. Appeals were taken at the SC.
However, BP 195 was passed regarding the suspension of and loss of
benefits upon any public officer against whom any criminal charges are
filed for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds.
Sandiganbayan suspended him.
Bayot contended that:
1) The application of said law upon him amounts to an ex post facto
legislation and
2) That he cannot be suspended from his current position based on
an act which was done while he was in his previous position.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot was validly suspended
HELD: YES, he was. The claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended
because he is presently occupying a position different from that under
which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states
that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under RA 3019 or for any offense involving fraud
upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as
a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from “office”. Thus, by
the use of the word "office" the same applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
was charged.
-ex post facto: a law punishing an offense which was previously
not punishable
DELOSO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN BAR Q
173 SCRA 409
Indefinite suspensions are invalid.
FACTS: Petitioner Amor D. Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan,
Zambales. A certain Juan Villanueva filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan
accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law
(Republic Act 3019) in relation to the award of licenses to operate fish
corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales and the issuance of
five (5) tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without
any agreement as to the payment of rentals.
For this, he was suspended indefinitely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the indefinite suspension of Deloso is proper
HELD: NO. It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected
the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their command if they are
deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his
case possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big
number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of public
funds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that
may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited
determination of his innocence or guilt.
Clearly then, the policy of the law as mandated by the Constitution frowns
at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case the mere fact
that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the
safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.
Discussion:
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Deloso was charged in his capacity as a Municipal Mayor but when the
case was filed against him before the SB, he was already occupying a
different elective position- Governor.
He raises that he is occupying a different position so there is no more basis
for his preventive suspension.
The court ruled that the suspension of Deloso was proper even if at the
time of the issuance of the preventive suspension pendente lite, he was
already occupying the office of Governor and not the position of Municipal
Mayor.
LIBANAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
233 SCRA 163
FACTS: Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern
Samar and was a former member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior
to the 1992 elections. He was charged in conspiring with other members to
prevent and exclude Docena (Respondent), a qualified replacement of a
deceased member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a
member of the said body. In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a
resolution suspending their respective public position and office for ninety
(90) days.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1]
Order of Suspension if executed shall affront the petitioner’s right for due
process; [2] the suspension would assault his covenant to the people of
Samaras their vice-governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented
by the suspension no longer exist. Petitioner contends that the order of
suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that
he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the
SANDIGANBAYAN is valid?
HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could
apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and
not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged. The
suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. Public office is "a public agency or trust, "and it is not the
property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which petitioner
invokes.
BERONA v SANDIGANBAYAN
435 SCRA 306
Facts: Dr. Berona was charged in his capacity as the provincial official
health officer. He was indicted before the Sandiganbayan. In the
meantime, he won as municipal mayor.
Issue: Does section 13 which qualifies the public officer as incumbent
apply since the petitioner is no longer occupying the same position at
the time he was charged?
Held: Yes. The term ‘office’ in Section 13 applies to any office which the
officer might currently be holding and not necessarily the office in relation to
which he was charged. Suspension pendente lite applies to all persons
indicted upon a valid information; whether they be appointive or elective
officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career
or non-career service.

Preventive suspension of the accused is mandatory, after the
determination of the validity of the information. Its purpose is to prevent the
officer from hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing
witnesses, tampering with evidence, or committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office. Preventive suspension is not a penalty.
Petitioner is still entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence.
NATURE OF SUSPENSION UNDER SEC 13
Before a suspension order may be issued, what is required for the court to
determine the validity of the information so that it will have the basis to
suspend the accused and proceed with the trial; or the court may withhold
the suspension and dismiss the case; or the court may correct any part of
the proceedings that impairs the validity thereof?
The court must conduct a pre-suspension hearing. The purpose is to
determine the validity of information. (Talaga vs SB)
TALAGA v SANDIGANBAYAN
570 SCRA 622
Facts: Criminal complaints were filed by Elan Recreation against petitioner
alleging that petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of Lucena, had unlawfully
granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of bingo games
in the city.
Petitioner: the Information is invalid because the allegations do not
constitute an offense, thus preventive suspension is not proper.
SB: denied the Motion to Quash and ordered the suspension of petitioner
and co-accused
Issue: Can the SB validly impose preventive suspension?
Held: Yes. The Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of the charges
against him in relation to acts under Section 3(e) of RA3019. The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of
preventive suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed.
Once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of
the court functions, including issuing preventive suspension, should be
acknowledged. Once the validity of the information has been made, it
becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forwith issue the order of
preventive suspension.
- It becomes therefore, a mandatory on the part of the court to
issue the suspension order pendente lite after the pre-suspension
hearing.
- In pre-suspension hearing, there is already a determination as to
the validity of the information.
JUAN v PEOPLE
322 SCRA 126
Suspension hearing may be done not only oral but through filing
of pleadings
Facts: Petitioner, a brgy elective official, was criminally charged for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was charged of unlawful use of
VHF radio transceiver, an equipment owned by the barangay government
of Talipapa, for election campaign or for partisan activity.
TC: immediate suspension
CA: affirms suspension under Sec13 RA3019
Issue: Would a violation under OEC warrant preventive suspension under
RA3019?
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Held: Yes. Charges involving violations of the Election Code are not
unidimensional. Unless otherwise irreconcilable, every law must be read
together with the provisions of any other complementing law. Petitioners
were incumbent public officers charged with the unauthorized and unlawful
use of government property in their custody, in the pursuit of personal
interests. Thus, the acts constitute fraud against the government covered
by Section 13 of RA 3019.
- Even if there was no pre-suspension hearing but if there were
numerous pleadings filed, the right to due process is already
satisfied.
- His unlawful and unauthorized use of government property
constitutes fraud so the provision on pre-suspension under Sec
13 of RA 3019 is application to him even if the alleged violation is
primarily an election offense.
- There is still basis for the issuance of preventive suspension
pending investigation.
- Another issue: the need to have pre-suspension hearing. Should
oral hearing be conducted? The right of due process is already
satisfied not just by oral hearing, but even by consideration of the
court of the pleading submitted by the parties.
SANTIAGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN BAR QUESTION
356 SCRA 636
Courts have the ministerial duty to issue and order suspension
upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it.
Facts: A group of employees of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation filed a complaint against Senator Meriam Defensor-Santiago,
as the then CID Commissioner. The charge was for alleged violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act where she allegedly collected fees.
For this, Santiago was suspended by Sandiganbayan for 90 days. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to suspend a
CID Commissioner
Held: YES, it has. The authority of the Sandiganbanyan has both legal and
jurisprudential support. It is but a ministerial duty of the court to issue and
order suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed
before it.
However, it should be noted that the accused should be given a fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings
against him. Section 16 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution (60days)
is separate and distinctive from Section 13 or RA 2019 (preventive,
not a penalty)
- Main argument: The authority to suspend Santiago belongs to the
Senate because when the case was filed, she already became a
senator. According to her, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution is applicable.
- The Supreme Court ruled that the basis under Section 39 is
different from what Santiago cited under Section 16 (3), Article
VI. Whereas Section 13 is merely preventive.
FLORES V. LAYOSA
FACTS: Respondent Montera of the Enforcement, Investigation and
Prosecution Department of the NFA filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging Dansal and Vallada et, al. With Estafa through
Falsification of Public Document. The Ombudsman filed an Information
charging the petitioners.The RTC suspended the petitioners for 90 days,

saying that under RA 3019, a public official charged under it, or under title 7
book ii of the revised penal code or any offense under it shall be
suspended from office while the criminal prosecution against him is
pending in court.
ISSUE: Does the falsification of daily time record constitute fraud? YES
HELD: It is settled that once a court determines that the information
charging a public officer with an offense under R.A. No. 3019 or Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or any other offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property is valid, it is bound to issue an
order of preventive suspension of the accused public officer as a matter of
course.
The order of suspension pendente lite, while mandatory in nature, is by no
means automatic or self-operative. Before such suspension is imposed, a
determination as to the validity of the information must first be made in a
pre-suspension hearing.
There is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct of such hearing, as the
Court has previously explained in several cases:
...No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair
and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal
proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the
right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal
Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office
under Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash
the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court…
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his
prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is charged do not
constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the
information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of
court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the
ground that the acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery
of the Revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as
a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the
ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other
words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal
proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the
facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions
on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.
It therefore suffices that the accused is afforded the opportunity of
challenging the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him and that
the information charging the accused of any of the offenses mentioned
under Section 13, R.A. No. 3019 is found to be valid before the court
suspends the accused pendente lite.
In the present case, the record shows that petitioners were given the
chance to dispute the validity of the Information against them and the
January 17, 2001 Order suspending them for ninety (90)-days while their
case is pending when they opposed Montera’s motion for their suspension.
Discussion:
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The court ruled that there is still basis for the issuance of the preventive
suspension under Sec 13 because the falsification of daily time records of
the government employee constitute fraud involving public funds.
RIGHTS, DUTIES AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES:
1. Right to Compensation or Salary
2. Right to Retirement Pay
3. Right to Self-Organization
4. Right to Leave Credits
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION OR SALARY
What is the BASIS of the employee ‘s right to recover salary or the
officer’s authority to recover salary? It is his legal title to the office. This
legal title is evidenced by the appointment issued to the appointive officer.
Can there be RECOVERY by the officer de jure from the government
of salary paid to a de facto officer? You have to distinguish. Before the
adjudication upon title, who between them is entitled to the public office.
Certainly, without yet such determination, the de jure officer cannot recover
salaries paid to the de facto officer because there is still no basis. But,
there can be recovery after adjudication.
If after adjudication, the court says that the de jure officer is entitled to this
office not the one in possession thereof, so the good faith now becomes
bad faith if the de facto still continues to hold on and receive salaries. There
is no more basis. In such a situation, the de jure officer can already
recover, after adjudication, such salaries from de facto officer.
SALARY – personal compensation to be paid to the public officer for his
services, and it is generally fixed annual or periodical payment depending
on the time and not on the amount of service; an incident to public office.
SALARY WAGES
Given to officers of higher degree Given to those employees of lower
of employment degree of employment
Compensation per annum Paid day by day, or week by week
BASIS: The legal title to the office and the fact that the law attaches
compensation to the office.
● A de facto officer has the right to salary.
● Salary cannot be garnished, attached or executed.
Agreement to the contrary is void being contrary to public
policy.
● Additional, double or indirect compensation are prohibited, unless
specifically authorized by law. (Section 8 of Article IX-B of the
Constitution)
REASONS WHY SALARY OF A PUBLIC OFFICER CANNOT BE
GARNISHED:
1. The nature of a salary is that it is still a part of public funds or
treasury.
2. Prohibition of suit against the State, “Doctrine of State Immunity”.
3. It would be contrary to public policy
Civil Liberties Union Case

In the absence of a de jure officer, a de facto officer who has possession
and in good faith has discharged the duties of the offices, he is legally
entitled to compensation and other benefits.
IMPORTANT RULE:The public officer or employee cannot retain whatever
he receives in the form of fees he collected from the public.
Ex. Public officer: May utang ang government sa kanya and he retained the
fees. He becomes administratively and criminally liable. He cannot do that,
otherwise he becomes liable. He cannot retain salaries from whatever fees
he collected.
IMPORTANT RULE: The salary of a public officer cannot be a subject of
attachment, garnishment or order of execution before being paid to him.
Before being paid to him, his salary still forms part of the public treasury.
Still a public fund so there is still no basis.
Practice of assigning salaries: Against public policy, hence the salary of
a public officer cannot be a subject of assignment.
Eg. any agreement affecting compensation is against public policy
BE FAMILIAR:
Section 8 Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution:
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign
government.
Exception:
Pension or gratuity is not considered as additional, double, or indirect
compensation.
Pension refers to some kind of reward or liberality to those who served
the government with loyalty. It is in compliance with social justice in order to
help the aged who in their prime rendered satisfactory service to the
government. The intention is to provide for his sustenance or comfort.
Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the retiree. The intention
is to provide for his sustenance or comfort.
FUNA v. Chairman Duque
Receipt of per diem of a CSC Chairman by his designation as a member
of the governing Boards of GSIS, Philhealth, ECC and HDMF, is a form of
additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio
position by virtue of its clear contravention of Sec. 2, Article IX-A
FACTS: Then president GMA issued EO 864 which allows the chairman of
the CSC to be on the board of trustees/directors of certain GOCCs. Funa
asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292
violate the independence of the CSC, which was constitutionally created to
be protected from outside influences and political pressures due to the
significance of its government functions. He further asserts that such
independence is violated by the fact that the CSC is not a part of the
Executive Branch of Government while the concerned GOCCs are
considered instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government.
In this situation, the President may exercise his power of control over the
CSC considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member
are attached to the Executive Department. Funa claims that EO 864 and
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the prohibition
imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any
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other office or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event that
a Board decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning
personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC considering that such
GOCCs have original charters, and their employees are governed by CSC
laws, rules and regulations. Respondents submit that the prohibition
against holding any other office or employment under Section 2, Article IX-
A of the 1987 Constitution does not cover positions held without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities.
Duque was already the Chairman of CSC Commission. He was also
designated as a trustee or member of the Board of so many government
entities. He was receiving additional compensation.
ISSUE: W/N the designation of Duque as member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex
officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the
constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple office or
employment.
Is his double compensation valid? This is not allowed by the concept
of ex officio position. No member of a ConCom during his office may
hold any other position.
DECISION: Yes. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO
864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as a
member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
RATIO DECIDENDI: While all other appointive officials in the civil service
are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during
their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so
only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants. .Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An
office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the
Executive Branch, hence when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may
exercise powers and functions which are not anymore derived from his
position as CSC Chairman
Singson vs et al. vs COA
There is no double compensation where the officials of the
Bangko Sentral, on bases of Monetary Board resolutions, are granted
additional monthly RATA as members of BoD of Phil. International
Convention Center Inc. (PICC)
Facts: The PICC is a GOCC owned solely by the BSP. Villanueva was
then a member of the PICCI BoD and the OIC of PICCI, while Singson et
al., petitioners, were members of the BOD and officials of the BSP. They
were authorized to receive 1000 per diem as members of the BOD of
PICCI, under the by-laws. They were also given additional RATA of 1500
pesos each, pursuant to a board resolution. From 1996 to 1998 petitioners
received their rata with a total of 1,565,000. PICCI Corporate Auditor
Aldovino issued a Notice of DIsallowance on such disbursements, saying
that there was a double payment, in violation of Sec 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitution and of the PICCI By laws.
Issue: Was there violation of the prohibition of double compensation? NO.

Held: The Constitutional prohibition against double compensation in
consonance with section 30 of the corporation code does not apply to the
petitioners as there was no double compensation of RATA to the
petitioners.
The receipt of RATA from the Central Bank was separate and distinct from
the receipt of RATA as members of the Board of Directors of PICCI.
VALDEZ vs. GSIS (June 30, 2008)
For purposes of the computation of the credit for retirement
purpose, only full time services with compensation ought to be considered.
FACTS Valdez applied for retirement benefits and sought the CSC opinion
on whether his stint as director of MECO can be accredited as government
service among others. He was claiming that his other services in the
government should also be considered.
Only full-time services with compensation are credited for retirement
purposes.
HELD Relevantly, the last paragraph of Section 10 of RA No. 8291 dictates
that for purposes of computation of government service, only full-time
services with compensation are included:
For the purpose of this section, the term service shall include full time
service with compensation: Provided, That part time and other services
with compensation may be included under such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by the GSIS.
While petitioner invokes the proviso in the above-quoted provision of law,
the GSIS, which has been given the authority to include part-time services
in the computation, has pointed out that the services in the MMSU,
PHIVIDEC and as OIC ViceGovernor of Ilocos Norte cannot be credited
because, aside from having been rendered part-time in said agencies, the
said positions were without compensation as defined in Section 2(i) of RA
No. 8291.
Petitioner’s insistence that the emoluments he received as MECO director
be the basis in the computation of his retirement benefits, the same being
the highest basic salary rate, is unavailing. Indeed, the salaries that he
received at the time he served as MECO director were unusually high for
any position covered by the civil service. Petitioner received a monthly pay
of P40,000.00 in addition to a P65,000.00 representation and travel
allowance and US$2,500.00 per diem for overseas board meetings. The
Constitution itself mandated the standardization of compensation of
government officials and employees covered by the civil service under
Article IX B, Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation
of government officials and employees, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account
the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications
required for their positions.
The salary received by petitioner during his stint at MECO appears to be
way beyond that authorized by RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the
Salary Standardization Law. For this reason, it is doubtful that petitioner’s
employment with the MECO is embraced by the civil service. Otherwise,
the salary rate received by petitioner from MECO would not have been
legally feasible, unless there was a law exempting the MECO from the
Salary Standardization Law.
CRUZ vs. TANTUICO 166 SCRA 670 (Asked at least twice in the Bar)
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Retirement pay cannot be withheld and made to apply to one’s
indebtedness.
FACTS: The case arose when an investigation of the anomaly revealed
that it was the handiwork of a "syndicate" composed of employees of the
Budget Commission and the Department of Education and Culture (DEC).
Using falsified computations and service records, some sixty-eight (68)
treasury warrants were issued and made payable to fictitious or "ghost"
teachers in Zamboanga del Sur.
Petitioner Romana Cruz as paying teller was impleaded. The auditor of the
Bureau of Treasury decided to charge the check against Cruz. COA Acting
Chairman: Tantuico affirmed the decision. Thus, the check was charged
against Cruz’ retirement pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the retirement pay accruing to the public officer
may be withheld and applied to her indebtedness to the government. NO
HELD NO. The retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be
withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government is settled.
Section 624 of the Revised Administrative Code cannot be construed
to authorize a deduction of the value of the treasury warrants from her
retirement benefits. Said section provides: "Section 624. Retention of salary
for satisfaction of indebtedness. — When any person is indebted to the
Government of the Philippine Islands (or Government of the United
States), the Insular Auditor may direct the proper officer to withhold the
payment of any money due him or his estate, the same to be applied in
satisfaction of such indebtedness."
Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the
Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to
provide the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his
family.
Even under the GSIS Law, benefits granted under such law cannot be
the subject of attachment because retirement laws ought to be liberally
construed and interpreted in favor of the retiree.
Can the benefits granted under the GSIS Law be the subject of judicial or
administrative processes? NO.
GSIS vs. COA 441 SCRA 534
Benefits granted under the GSIS Act (RA 8291) are not subject
to judicial and administrative processes (attachment), including COA
disallowances; exception.-
FACTS: The Board of GSIS passed a financial retirement plan. This
financial retirement plan is intended for employees availing of early
retirement. The Charter of GSIS allows it provided that the employees are
not covered by the GSIS Act. The law of GSIS allows the Board to have a
financial scheme for employees availing of early retirement.
HELD: This retirement plan is void because it is not really an early
retirement but a form of reward for GSIS retiring employees. To do so
would lead to prejudice as to the large membership of the GSIS. The Court
directed that those who received such benefits under this retirement plan
are liable to return such amounts.
TEVES RETIREMENT LAW RA4968
Benefits under SSS Res. 56 which grants financial incentive to SSS
employees who avail of retirement benefits under RA 660, though referred
to as ‘financial assistance’, constitute a supplementary retirement plan
proscribed by RA 4968
CONTE v. COA

This has reference to The Teves Retirement Law which prohibits the
creation of any insurance or retirement plan because such are already
covered by the GSIS Law. You cannot have too many pension plans for
government offices or employees. This is to prevent the undue and
iniquitous appropriation of such funds.
The Board of GSIS passed Resolution No. 56 granting financial incentives
to the employees of SSS availing of retirement benefits. The Board treated
it as financial assistance.
The Supreme Court considered it as a supplementary retirement plan
which is prohibited under The Teves Retirement Law. SSS has no authority
to establish, maintain or implement such retirement benefits in the guise of
its rule making power. The resolution passed by the Board is void and of no
effect.
DBP VS COA
G.R. No. 210838, July 03, 2018
There was no bad faith on DBP’s part re: grant of Governance
Forum Productivity Award. To remedy an ongoing labor dispute, DBP’s
BOD relied in good faith on its interpretation of statutory authority to fix the
compensation structure of officials and employees vis-a-vis statutory power
to enter into compromise in protection of the bank's interests.
Facts: There was an on-going labor dispute in the DBP. The Board of
Directors of DBP claimed that it’s charter allows or has authority to settle
contested employees benefits in the interest of the body. They passed this
Governance Forum Productivity Award as a remedy to the labor dispute.
There was good faith on the part of the Board in its authority under the law
to fix the issue with its employees and officials vis-a-vis its authority to
compromise or protect the interests of the bank.
This was disallowed by COA. This was affirmed by the court of the
payment of this Governance Forum Productivity Award. Considering the
good faith on the part of the officials, they were no longer required to refund
this Governance Forum Productivity Award.
Therefore, it is also important to determine whether there is good faith or
bad faith.
Section 13, RA 3019:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted
by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
DELA CRUZ vs. COA 371 SCRA 157
Representatives of ex-officio members of the NHA are likewise
prohibited from receiving per diems and other allowances. They become
members of the board because of their principal positions.
FACTS: Petitioners, numbering 20, were members of the Board of
Directors of the National Housing Authority (NHA) from 1991 to 1996. This
petition assails the decision rendered by the Commission on Audit (COA),
denying petitioners’ appeal from the Notice of Disallowance issued by the
NHA Resident Auditor on October 23, 1997. Such Notice disallowed
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payment to petitioners of their representation allowances and per diems for
the period from August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996 in the total amount of
P276,600.00.
The COA issued a memorandum directing all unit heads/auditors/team
leaders of the national government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations which have affected payment of any form of
additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their
deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on
multiple positions, to immediately cause the disallowance of such additional
compensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned
officials.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners should be disallowed from receiving
allowances and per diems
HELD
Yes, the petitioners should be disallowed. Since the Executive Department
Secretaries, as ex-officio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from
receiving “extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a
per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism,” it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot
likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would
give petitioners a better right than their principals.
They cannot have better rights than their principal.
- Take note of the concept of principals being made members of
the Boards of government entities in ex officio capacity, by
reason of their principal positions.
- If the ex officio member designates an alternate, under the
Constitution: if the ex officio member is not allowed to receive
additional compensation, there is more reason for the agent or
alternate not to receive additional compensation.
REPUBLIC ACT 10149 “GOCC Governance Act of 2011”
To rationalize the salaries and benefits of government offices and
employees based on their performance etc.
The commission ought to approve such compensation.
DBM vs. MANILA’S FINEST RETIREES ASSOCIATION, INC G.R. No.
169466 (May 9, 2007)
Admin law: the predecessor of PNP prior to 1987 Constitution is
the Integrated National Police which was governed by RA 6975 as
amended by RA8551: the retirement benefits have retroactive effect.
INP members are not excluded from the retirement benefits
given to PNP retirees under Sec. 74 and 75 RA 6975 as amended. Sec. 38
RA 8551 provides that retirement benefits shall have retroactive effect in
favor of PNP members and officers retired or separated.
FACTS: In 1975, PD 765 was issued, constituting the Integrated National
Police (INP).
In 1990, RA 6975, referred to as PNP Law, was enacted. Under said law,
the PNP would initially consist of the members of the INP, created under
PD 765.
In 1998, RA 6975 was amended by RA 8551. Among other things, the
amendatory law reengineered the retirement scheme in the police
organization. Relevantly, PNP personnel, under the new law, stood to
collect more retirement benefits than what the INP members of equivalent

rank, who had retired under the INP law, received. Hence, the INP retirees,
spearheaded by the MFRAI, filed this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the INP retirees are entitled to the retirement
benefits granted to the PNP retirees, by virtue of said PNP Law or Republic
Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act 8551.
HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Section 23 of R.A. No. 6975, the PNP initially
consisted of the members of the police forces who were integrated into the
INP by virtue of P.D. No. 765, while Section 86 of the same law provides
for the assumption by the PNP of the police functions of the INP and its
absorption by the former, including its appropriations, funds, records,
equipment, etc., as well as its personnel.
The INP was never abolished or terminated out of existence by RA 6975.
Instead, the INP was being absorbed by the PNP. Hence, members of the
INP which include herein respondents are, therefore, not excluded from
availing themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees
under RA 6975. The law itself provides that these retirement benefits
should have retroactive effect in favor of the members of the PNP and the
members of the INP who have retired.
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
BASIS OF STRIKE- Provisions in the 1987 Constitution
Article III Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Article IX-B Section 2(5) The right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees.
Article XIII, Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth.
The right to strike shall be in accordance with law.
At present, there is no law conferring the right to strike to government
employees. Why? The terms and conditions of employment in the
government are governed by the Civil Service Laws, Rules, and
Regulations. Government employees do not have the right to strike.
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What is the mechanism in case there is grievance or complaint
involving government employees? The disposition or resolution of such
grievance cannot be left to bargaining or concerted actions. It shall be
resolved by applying the sanctions of administrative remedies first.
If there is no resolution yet and the dispute remains unresolved, it shall be
referred to the Public Sector Labor Management Council (pursuant to
Executive Order 180).
SSS-EA vs. CA 175 SCRA 686
Employees under the CS Law are covered under the memorandum
prohibiting strikes.
FACTS
SSS filed a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that, the
officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the
SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management
Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers
refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of
the strike.
RTC ruled that the strike was illegal. CA affirmed. It further ruled that since
SSS employees are covered by the CS Law, SSS-EA does not have the
right to strike.
ISSUE
Whether or not the SSS-EA has the right to strike NO, they do not have
such right.
HELD
While the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether or not
government employees may strike, they are prohibited from striking, by
express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of 1987 of the Civil
Service Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
SSS employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSN. vs. LAGUIO 200 SCRA
323
Public school teachers have no right to strike.
FACTS: Petitioners and other teachers in other cities and municipalities in
Metro Manila staged a protest rally at the DECS premises without
disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the
granting of demands. No response was made by the respondent Secretary
of Education, despite the demonstration, so the petitioners began the
ongoing protest mass actions.
Because of their refusal to heed the “Return to Work” order, DECS
Secretary filed administrative complaints against them. They were all found
guilty. Thus, some of the petitioners were suspended while the others were
dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the right to strike.
HELD: NO, they do not have. This question was already settled in a long
line of cases. The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the
administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and
vindicate their rights therein, see those proceedings through to judgment
and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the CSC; or if, pending said proceedings,

immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary because
the respondent Secretary or those acting under him or on his instructions
were acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, to apply, not directly to the SC, but to the RTC, where there
would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting corrective
relief.
Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order of recourse
through the judicial hierarchy; they by-pass the rungs of the judicial ladder
at the peril of their own causes. SC is a court of last resort. Its review
jurisdiction is limited to resolving questions of law where there is no dispute
of the facts or the facts have already been determined by lower tribunals,
except only in criminal actions where capital penalties have been imposed.
GESITE vs. CA G.R. Nos. 123562-65 (November 25, 2004)
FACTS: Gesite, et. al are public school teachers of the E. de los Santos
Elementary School in Manila.
Beginning March 1990, simmering unrest struck the ranks of the public
school teachers in Metro Manila. They pressed for, among others, the
immediate payment of their allowances, 13th month pay for 1989,etc.
When their demands were not granted, the dissatisfied teachers resolved
to take direct mass actions.
On September 17, 1990, a regular school day, about 800 teachers in Metro
Manila did not conduct classes. Instead, they assembled in front of the
DECS offices to air their grievances.
When their representatives conferred with then DECS Secretary Isidro
Cariño, he brushed aside their complaints, warning them they would lose
their jobs for taking illegal mass actions.
The action of the DECS Secretary caused more teachers to join the protest
action. These included the above-named four petitioners who did not report
for work. Hence, the DECS Secretary filed administrative complaints
against them for defying his return-to-work order.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners, in joining the mass actions taken by the public
school teachers, may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
HELD
YES. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public
service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms
of mass action that will lead to the temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service. The right of government employees to organize is
limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.
Here, petitioners, in joining the mass actions, failed to hold classes to the
prejudice of their students. While petitioners have the right to assemble
peaceably to air their grievances, however, they should have exercised
such right in a lawful manner.
Their absences without authority caused adverse effects upon their
students for whose education they are responsible. Clearly, their acts
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
- Resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving
government employees is ordinarily not left to collective
bargaining or concerted action
- In case any dispute remains unresolved after all available
remedies, refer dispute to Public Sector Labor Managemnet
Council.
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Bangalisan v CA: (ASKED IN THE BAR)
Exercise of rights of public school teachers to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances may be exercised within reasonable limits
xxx without stoppage of classes
Is peaceably assembly proper? The rights must be done under
reasonable circumstances. It is not proper when it causes a stoppage in
classes.
Facts: Delia Bangalisan et. al. were among the 800 public school teachers
who staged “mass actions” on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their
grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public
authorities to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and
measures intended for their material benefit. On September 17, 1990, the
DECS Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order. Bangalisan et. al. failed to
comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with
“grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service
law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to
perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of the
Civil Service Law.
They were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension. Despite
due notice, Bangalisan et. al. failed to submit their answer to the complaint.
The DECS Secretary then rendered a decision finding them guilty as
charged and dismissing them from the service effective immediately.
Bangalisan et. al. filed an MR hence the decision was modified imposing to
them 9 months of suspension w/o pay instead. MSPB denied their appeal
thus, they brought their case to CSC which in turn upheld the DECS
decision with some modifications. MR was denied. CA dismissed their
petition for review. Issue: Whether the petitioners engaged in strike or just
an exercise of their right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
Issue: Whether the petitioners engaged in strike or just an exercise of their
right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances
Held: They staged a strike. it is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that
employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize,
they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves,
walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government
employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike. The issue of whether or
not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the
period from September up to the first half of October, 1990 was a strike has
been decided by this Court in a resolution, dated December 18, 1990, in
the herein cited case of Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al.
vs. Laguio, Jr., supra. It was there held “that from the pleaded and admitted
facts, these ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike;
they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or
absence from, work which it was the teachers’ duty to perform,
undertaken for essentially economic reasons.” It is an undisputed fact
that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize
their demands by withholding their services.
The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential,
since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be
deemed to be controlling. The ability to strike is not essential to the right of
association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the
right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose. Bangalisan

et. al. are being penalized not because they exercised their right of
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of
their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which
produced adverse effects upon their students for whose education
they are responsible.
13
However, since there was good faith on the part of the employees, the
employees shall not refund the grant even if such was disallowed by COA.
The employees did not have participation in the approval by the Board of
Directors.

The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the On the part of the officials who passed the Board Resolution granting the
best interest of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules signing bonus, the Court ruled that they should refund the disallowed grant.
and regulations. Suspension of public services, however temporary, will
inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the DUTY UNDER Article XI Section 17 (SALN)
right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that
the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the
Article XI Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon
“mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by
innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an
law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and
illegal work stoppage.
net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
ALIPAT v CA BAR QUESTION
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers
of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
No payment of back salaries if penalty was committed by CSC
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
from DECS imposition of dismissal to 6 months suspension

Issue: Whether the public school teachers can recover back salaries by a Instances when a government employee shall submit the SALN:
reason of the modification of penalties by higher court? Instead of dismissal
from service the penalty was modified to suspension. 1) Within 30 days from assumption of office
2) Every year on or before April 30, declaring their assets, liabilities,
Held: No, they are not allowed to receive back salaries. They are not fully and net worth as of the previous year
innocent of the charges but are still guilty. 3) If they separate from the service, within 30 days from such
separation
WHAT MATTERS MAY BE SUBJECT AND NOT SUBJECT TO
NEGOTIATION OR CBA: OBJECTIVE: The need to promote transparency in the Civil Service. This
requirement operates as a deterrent against government officers or
employees who acquire material wealth or enrich themselves through
SUBJECT NOT SUBJECT
unlawful means. We have this express mandate under the Constitution and
this is being implemented under so many laws (RA 6713, Section 8 and RA
Scheduling of leave granted by Matters that would require
3019, Section 7). By mandate of these laws, the rule is that every
law (ex. Maternity or Paternity expenditure/disbursement of
government employee and officer must submit a SALN to completely
leave) public funds (ex. Increase of
disclose such information. This also includes those of his spouse and
salaries)
unmarried children below 18. This also aims to suppress any questionable
Conduct of recreational activities.
accumulation of wealth.
Exercise of management
prerogative (ex. Appointment,
The SALN of high-raking officials should be disclosed to the public.
promotion)
However, until today, there is no such law requiring the officials to disclose
their SALN to the public. Why? You can just imagine that if they pass such
Terms and conditions of
law, they will disclose their hidden wealth. President Duterte already issued
employment (because they are
the Freedom of Information Program in 2016 but this only applies to offices
provided by law, labor Code,
in the Executive branch of the government since the President does not
others)
have control over the other branches of the government. However, this
issuance provides for so many exceptions.

MIAA v. COA
02/14/12
Grant of signing bonus by MIAA BOD to their employees, as
reward for successful conclusion of collective negotiations agreement is
illegal. Signing bonus is not one of the benefits in RA 6758.
Facts: The Board of Directors of MIAA granted signing bonuses to their
employees. They were happy because they successfully concluded a
collective negotiations agreement.
Issue: Is the grant valid? NO.
Held: It is not valid because the conduct of peaceful negotiations should
not be done with a price tag. Even the matter of signing bonus is not one of
the benefits written under the law.
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Daplas v Ombudsman
GR 221153, 17 April 2017
Requirement of filing SALN is enshrined in the Constitution x x x
and operates as a deterrent v. officials bent on enriching themselves
through unlawful means.
Facts: Dallas was the city treasurer of Pasay City and the current officer-in-
charge of the Bureau of Local Government Finance. She was charged by
her failure to disclose on her SALN her ownership of a car, stocks
subscription worth 1.5M, and that she owned several properties in different
areas.
OMB: dismissal from service on the finding that she was found guilty of
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and violation of RA 6713 Section 8.
SC: suspension only, guilty of simple negligence

Republic v Sereno
Public officials who have chronically failed to comply with such
requirements cannot be said to be of proven integrity and she may be
considered disqualified from holding public office.
Held: Failed to comply with duty which affects her integrity. She is a public
official who consistently failed to file SALN from 1986 to 2006 while
employed in UP college of law. She cannot be said to be of proven integrity
or the lack of it.
JBC was tasked to conduct interviews but she failed to disclose such
material facts.
Iglesias v Office of Ombudsman
GR 180745
The Court may relax the rule on strictly complying with the SALN
in cases where minor errors were committed since these may simply be
used to harass and obstruct public officers in the performance of their
duties.
Facts: Iglesias was the Customs director and she did not declare certain
real properties worth more than 50M which is disproportionate to her lawful
income.
OMB: dismissal based on grave misconduct
Held: Dismissal is affirmed.
- Minor errors in SALN’s may not be penalized. Minor errors may
be used to harass or intimidate officers in the discharge of their
functions.
- In this case, the errors in the SALN are not minor, but substantial.
UNEXPLAINED WEALTH OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (ASKED SO MANY
TIMES IN THE BAR)
Conduct of lifestyle check against public officers and employees who have
ill-gotten wealth.
Basis: Concept of Public Accountability (Section 1, Article XI 1987
Constitution)
Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 8, RA 3019 in relation to RA 1379 (AN ACT DECLARING
FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND
TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC
OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE
PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR):
Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with
the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred
seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during
his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons,
an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for
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dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and
unmarried children of such public official may be taken into
consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot
be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration
in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary.
Norm of simple living: Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
RA 1379, Section 4 (h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees
and their families shall lead modest lives appropriate to their
positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or
ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
BAR QUESTION: Does the presumption of innocence apply in the
forfeiture proceedings done by government in connection with RA 1379 in
relation to RA 3019?
ONG v. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005)
Presumption of innocence applies to criminal prosecution and not forfeiture
proceeding which are civil actions in rem.
Constitutional presumption of innocence refers to criminal prosecution and
not to forfeiture proceedings which are civil actions in rem. The Constitution
is not violated by Sec. 2 of RA 1379
Facts: BIR Commissioner Ong challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 2 of
RA 1379, which creates a presumption of guilt in cases where the value of
the property is disproportionate to the public officer’s lawful income. He
alleged that it violates the presumption of innocence. SC said that in
statutory crimes, no constitutional provision is violated by a statute
providing that proof by the State of some material fact or facts shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted
to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are
innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.
In his counter-affidavit, he explained that his properties were lawfully
acquired; these were from his P7.8M retirement pay from SGV & Co.,
money market placements, proceeds of his loan from Allied Bank and one
property was from his brother-in-law.
Issue: WON RA 1379 is unconstitutional – NO
Ruling: The Constitutional presumption of innocence is applicable to
criminal prosecution. It has nothing to do with forfeiture proceedings.
Furthermore, the presumption of innocence clause of the Constitution
refers to criminal prosecutions and not to forfeiture proceedings which
are civil actions in rem. The Constitution is likewise not violated by RA
1379 because statutes which declare that as a matter of law a particular
inference follows from the proof of a particular fact, one fact becoming
prima facie evidence of another, are not necessarily invalid, the effect of
the presumption being merely to shift the burden of proof upon the adverse
party.
Ratio 1. It is well-within the right of the legislature, in enacting statutory
crimes, to declare w/c act are criminal, as well as what proof shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt Sec. 2 of RA 1379 which states that
property acquired by a public officer or employee during his incumbency in
an amount which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property shall be presumed prima facie to have been

unlawfully acquired. As elaborated by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, under the
principle of presumption of innocence, it is merely required of the State to
establish a prima facie case, after which the burden of proof shifts to the
accused.
In People v. Alicante, it was already declared that in case of statutory
crimes, no constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that
proof by the State of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie
evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for
the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are
committed without unlawful intention. The State having the right to declare
what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a right to
specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant
the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention.
Ratio 2. The constitutional right against self-incrimination is N/A here
The right is a prohibition against the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused. It is simply a prohibition against
legal process to extract from the accused's own lips, against his will,
admission of his guilt. In this case, petitioners are not compelled to present
themselves as witnesses in rebutting the presumption established by law.
They may present documents evidencing the purported bank loans, money
market placements and other fund sources in their defense.
RA 1379 Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or
employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer
or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon
complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall
conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal
cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable
ground to believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name and
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance
of the city or province where said public officer or employee resides or
holds office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer or employee to
show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should not
be declared property of the State: Provided, That no such petition shall
be filed within one year before any general election or within three
months before any special election.
Section 2 of RA 1379 shall be related to Section 8 of RA 3019
LAW ON SECRECY OF BANK DEPOSITS (RA 1405):
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in
the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government
of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are
hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office, except:
· Upon written permission of the depositor
· In cases of impeachment
· Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials,
· In cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of litigation
RELATED CASES:
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PNB vs. GANCAYCO
15 SCRA 92
Ø Exception to the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Law.
FACTS
Defendants Emilio A. Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special
prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine
National Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of
Ernesto T. Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for
unexplained wealth.
The bank declined the order of the prosecutors invoking the
provisions of the Bank Secrecy Law.
ISSUE
Whether a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of
accounts of a depositor who is under investigation for unexplained wealth.
HELD
YES. This case is an exception to the general rule. Cases of
unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and
no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from
the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be
different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion
that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its
discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to
his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS vs. PURISIMA
161 SCRA 576
Ø Exception to the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Law.
Section 8 of RA 3019 is intended to amend Section 2 of RA1405
(Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) by providing an additional
exception to the rule vs. disclosure of bank deposits (BF vs
CFI Judge Purisima, 161 SCRA 576).
FACTS
Manuel Caturla is a special agent of the Bureau of Customs. The
accusation against him was filed by the BIR. In the course of the
preliminary investigation thereof, the Tanodbayan issued a subpoena
duces tecum to the Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, commanding
its representative to appear at a specified time at the Office of the
Tanodbayan and furnish the latter with duly certified copies of the records
in all its branches and extension offices, of the loans, savings and time
deposits and other banking transactions, appearing in the names of
Caturla, his wife and their children.
Caturla moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that it would
result in a violation of the Bank Secrecy Law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of the subpoena violates the
provisions of the Bank Secrecy Law.
Does Section 8 of RA 3019 amend Section 2 RA 1405? Section 8 of RA
3019 is one of the exceptions (the conduct of investigation whenever there
is ill-gotten wealth)
Importance of RA 1405 “Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law”
- Section 2 provides for the non-disclosure of deposits. They are
confidential.

- Exceptions: Section 8 of RA 3019, pertains to the conduct of
investigation whenever there is unexplained wealth/ill-gotten
wealth by the public officer.
HELD:
NO, this case falls under the exception. Thus, the subpoena can
be imposed. The inquiry into illegally acquired property — or property NOT
"legitimately acquired" — extends to cases where such property is
concealed by being held by or recorded in the name of other persons. This
proposition is made clear by R.A. No. 3019 which quite categorically states
that the term, "legitimately acquired property of a public officer or employee
shall not include . . . property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its
ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by,
respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives or any other
persons.
To sustain the petitioner's theory, and restrict the inquiry only to
property held by or in the name of the government official or employee, or
his spouse and unmarried children is unwarranted in the light of the
provisions of the statutes in question, and would make available to persons
in government who illegally acquire property an easy and fool-proof means
of evading investigation and prosecution; all they would have to do would
be to simply place the property in the possession or name of persons other
than their spouse and unmarried children. This is an absurdity that we will
not ascribe to the lawmakers.
Exceptions to RA 1405
1) Depositor consents in writing
2) Impeachment Cases
3) Court order in bribery cases
4) Deposit of subject of litigation
5) Section 8 RA 3019 in unexplained wealth cases
MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTO
359 SCRA 772
Ø In order for the Bank Secrecy Law to apply, there must be
a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction.
FACTS: Petitioner Marquez received an order from Ombudsman Desierto
to produce several bank documents for purposes of in-camera inspection
relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines.
The accounts to be inspected are involved in fact-finding investigation by
the Ombudsman against a certain Lagdameo.Petitioner declined the order
invoking the Bank Secrecy Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marquez can be cited for contempt for failure to
produce the documents as ordered by the Ombudsman
HELD: NO. The following are the requisites before an in-camera
inspection by the Ombudsman may be allowed:
· A pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction
· The account must be clearly identified
· The inspection must be limited to the subject matter of the
pending case
· The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified
to be present during the inspection
· Such inspection may cover only the account identified in the
pending case
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of
competent authority. What is there is a mere investigation, a fishing
expedition for additional evidence to charge. Thus, the prohibition applies.
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Foreign Currency Deposits: RA 6426 : ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION
In no instance shall foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired, or
looked into by any person, judicial or legislative.
LIABILITY OF HEAD OF OFFICE
LIABILITY OF HEAD OF OFFICE:
Section 102 PD 1445 (Auditing Code of the Philippines) provides that the
head of office is primarily and immediately accountable for all government
funds and properties pertaining to his office.
Section 102. Primary and secondary responsibility.
1. The head of any agency of the government is immediately and
primarily responsible for all government funds and property
pertaining to his agency.
2. Persons entrusted with the possession or custody of the funds
or property under the agency head shall be immediately
responsible to him, without prejudice to the liability of either
party to the government.
Section 103 PD 1445 provides that the expenditure of government funds or
uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a
personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly
responsible therefor.
Section 103. General liability for unlawful expenditures.
Expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in
violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or
employee found to be directly responsible therefor.
ALBERT vs. GANGAN
353 SCRA 680 (March 6, 2001)
That office head is the final approving authority of the transaction and that
those who processed the same were directly under his supervision does
not necessarily make him ultimately liable in case of disallowance
FACTS: Community Mortgage Program (CMP) is a scheme in mortgage
financing through the concept of community ownership. Under its financing
procedure, application for loan is coursed through duly accredited
originators such as NHA and NGOs. National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NMHFC) approved the CMP. An application for the Purchase
Commitment Line for AMAKO was submitted (P 36M) and was approved.
It was discovered that the AMAKO project was 3 months in arrears in their
amortization. COA found petitioner as among the persons liable for the
amount representing the payment of the loan proceeds obtained by
AMAKO.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be held liable.
Are the facts sufficient to make Albert liable? NO, unless there are other
facts available, the mere fact that he is the head of office does not
necessarily mean that he is liable.
HELD: The mere fact that a public officer is the head of the agency does
not necessarily mean that he is the party ultimately liable in case of
disallowance of expenses for questionable transactions of his agency. He
cannot be held personally liable for the same simply because he was the
final approving authority of the transaction and that the officers and

employees who processed the same are directly under his supervision. It
would be improbable for him to check all the details and conduct physical
inspection and verification. Every person who signs or initials documents in
the course of transit through standard operating procedure does not
automatically become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage
where he had no participation. There is no evidence or record to show that
petitioner had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by some
employees of NHMFC. In fact, he filed a complaint before the Ombudsman
against the subordinate employees who appeared responsible for the
fraud.
- The fact that he is the final approving authority of the transaction,
does not make him liable for the fraudulent scheme, absent any
evidence. He has no responsibility to check every detail. He may
rely on the good faith of his subordinates.
- When the anomaly was discovered, he was the first to call for an
investigation.
ARIAS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN IMPORTANT DOCTRINE (Always
resorted to by lawyers in defending their clients.)
That office head is the final approving authority of the transaction and that
those who processed the same were directly under his supervision does
not necessarily make him ultimately liable in case of disallowance.
Heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates
and on good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter
into negotiations
Facts: The district engineer was made liable when he was the head of
office and signed a voucher for the purchase of land which was allegedly
overpriced. The purchase price was 80 pesos per square. He was made
responsible as part of the supposed conspiracy.
Held: The head of office has to rely at a reasonable extent to his
subordinates and on the good faith of his people who prepared the
pertinent documents. He cannot be expected to examine every part of the
detail. The head office cannot be made to be part of the conspiracy
because he did not examine every part of the transaction, unless the head
has personal knowledge or a participant himself.
There should be other evidence to sustain the conviction and not merely on
the basis of supposed conspiracy.
Exception to Arias Doctrine:
LEYCANO v. COA
Arias doctrine does not apply when an approving officer is not
acting as head of office.
Facts: Manuel Leycano, Jr. was the Provincial Treasurer of Oriental
Mindoro and at the same time a member of the Provincial School Board
(PSB) of that province. During his tenure, he was appointed by the PSB as
a member of its Inspectorate Team which, according to him, had the
function of "monitoring the progress of PSB projects. “In the year 1995,
several checks were issued to various private contractors in connection
with the repair, rehabilitation, and construction projects covered by the
Special Education Fund (SEF) of Oriental Mindoro to several public
schools.
The Special Audit Team, COA Regional Office No. IV, headed by State
Auditor Joselyn Cirujano (the Auditor), subsequently audited selected
transactions under the SEF of the Province of Oriental Mindoro, which
included those projects covered by the checks issued. The Special Audit
Team found deficiencies in the projects; hence, it issued the questioned
Notices of Disallowance holding petitioner, liable for signing the Certificates
of Inspection relative to the projects and thereby falsely attesting to their
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100% completion Petitioner appealed that he be excluded from those lists
held liable for the deficiency of the project
COA: held Leycano liable because he signed the certificate of
inspection
Take note that the Arias doctrine does not apply when the approving officer
is not discharging as the head of office as the provincial treasurer. He is
being made accountable because he signed the inspection report.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is held accountable for the deficiency of
the said project?
Ruling: When the head officer signed the inspection report attesting that
the project was 100% completed despite the absence of completion. The
head is liable because he is part of the inspection.
In light of this function of the Inspectorate Team, its members may be held
liable by the COA for any irregular expenditure of the SEF if their
participation in such irregularity can be established. While petitioner, in his
capacity as member of the Inspectorate Team, is not an accountable officer
as contemplated in Section101 of P.D. No. 1445.
Payment should not be made to a contractor without the prior inspection of
the project by the Inspectorate Team, the members thereof who sign the
certificate of inspection participate in the use and application of local
government funds (in this case, the Special Education Fund of the Province
of Oriental Mindoro). Thus, if there is an irregularity in the performance of
this duty, they may be held liable for any loss that is incurred by the
government as a consequence thereof. In this case, there was such
irregularity when petitioner and other members of the Team attested to the
100% completion of the projects notwithstanding their undisputed
deficiencies.
Section 340 of the LGC states: “…Other local officers who, though not
accountable by the nature of their duties, may likewise be similarly held
accountable and responsible for local government funds through their
participation in the use or application thereof.” Expressly provides that even
officers though not accountable by the nature of their duties shall be
accountable upon involvement of local government funds. A member of the
inspectorate team is not an accountable person, but may be held liable by
the above provision.
Cruz v SB
GR 134493
Exceptional circumstance exists to prod the petitioner to be on his guard, if
he were out to protect the interest of the municipality, to be curious and go
beyond what his subordinates prepared.
Facts: Following the May 1992 local elections and his proclamation as
mayor-elect of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Victor Miranda sought an
audit investigation of the municipality's 1991-1992 financial transactions.
Petitioner Buencamino Cruz served as municipal mayor of the town in 1991
until his term ended in the middle of 1992.
Acting on the request, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued COA Order
No. 19-1700 constituting a Special Audit Team. In the course of the
investigation, the Special Audit Team discovered that certain anomalous
and irregular transactions transpired during the covered period, the most
serious being the purchase of construction materials evidenced by Sales
Invoices No. 131145 and 131137 in the aggregate amount of P54,542.56,
for which payment out of municipal funds was effected twice. The double
payments were made in favor of Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply
(Kelly Lumber, for short) and were accomplished through the issuance of
two (2) disbursement vouchers (DVs), i.e., DV No. 101-92-06-1222 and DV

No. 101-92-01-195. Petitioner signed the vouchers and encashed the two
(2) corresponding PNB checks, both of which were payable to his order.
(Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. NO. 134493 August 16, 2005)
Issue: Is the mayor not liable since he relied on good faith?
Ruling: Contrary to such a claim, it was shown that there were double
payments and checks issued for the construction materials purchased by
the municipality. These checks were not even made payable to the
supplier but to the mayor. It is very clear that the Arias doctrine cannot be
applied. He was a participant in this anomaly.
PRINCIPE vs. OMBUDSMAN
374 SCRA 460
In the absence of substantial evidence of gross neglect of
petitioner, administrative liability could not be based on the principle of
command responsibility, without proof of actual act or omission constituting
neglect of duty.
Facts: Principe signed the environmental clearance certificates. After
proceedings, the Ombudsman dismissed him for gross neglect of duty
under the concept of Command Responsibility.
The Ombudsman conducted an investigation on the collapse of the housing
project at the Cherry Hills Subdivision, Antipolo, Rizal, where several
families lost their lives and homes. Thereafter, the Ombudsman found
petitioner, Regional Executive Director for Region IV, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, administratively liable for gross
neglect of duty because he was the one who signed and approved the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). The Ombudsman held that
as the signing and approving authority of the ECC issued to PHILJAS, it
was incumbent upon petitioner to conduct actual monitoring and enforce
strict compliance with the terms and conditions of the ECC. The
Ombudsman, therefore, dismissed the petitioner from the service. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman.
OMB: Dismissed Principe on the concept of command responsibility
Issue: Can Principe be held liable?
HELD: The applicable administrative orders provide that the function of
monitoring environmental programs, projects and activities in the region is
lodged with the Regional Technical Director, not with the Regional
Executive Director, the position occupied by petitioner. Under DAO 38-
1990 there is no mention of the responsibility of a regional executive
director to monitor projects. Monitoring is defined in DAO No. 21, Series of
1992, as the activity designed to gauge the level of compliance with the
conditions stipulated in the ECC, and in the EIS or PD submitted. This is
the function of the PENR and CENR offices as mandated in DAO No. 37,
Series of 1996.
“Section 10. Compliance Monitoring
“x x x
“b. Monitoring of compliance with the proponent’s ECC
issued pursuant to an IEE, and applicable laws, rules and
regulations, shall be undertaken by the concerned PENRO
and CENRO with support from the Regional Office and/or
EMB whenever necessary.”
Hence, how could petitioner be guilty of neglecting a duty, which is not
even his to begin with? Administrative liability could not be based on the
fact that the petitioner was the person who signed and approved the ECC,
without proof of actual act or omission constituting neglect of duty.
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In the absence of substantial evidence of gross neglect of petitioner,
administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command
responsibility. The negligence of petitioner’s subordinates is not tantamount
to his own negligence.
It was not within the mandated responsibilities of petitioner to conduct
actual monitoring of projects.
The principles governing public officers under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 clearly provide that a head of a
department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the
wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his
subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the
specific act or misconduct complained of.
- The duty of monitoring for ECC does not fall under his office
DE JESUS vs. GUERRERO
G.R. No. 171491 (September 4, 2009)
Superior cannot be liable for negligence of subordinates in absence of
evidence of the former’s own negligence
HELD: In the absence of substantial evidence of gross negligence of the
respondents, administrative liability could not be based on the principle of
command responsibility. Without proof that the head of office was
negligent, no administrative liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of
subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of
evidence of the latter’s own negligence. While it may be true that certain
PCAMRD employees were sanctioned for negligence and some other
administrative infractions, it does not follow that those holding responsible
positions, like the respondents in this case, are likewise negligent,
especially so when the contentions of petitioner remain unsubstantiated.
MONTALLANA v. CA
GR 179677
Division chief is liable for gross neglect of duty on basis of command
responsibility as he miserably failed to ensure that proper annual
inspections are made.
Facts: Electrical division chief of Quezon city. A fire gutted to the ground
the 6-storey manor hotel in Quezon city. Almost 80 people were killed.
They were participants in a weekly evangelical religious gathering. As
electrical division chief he was charged because it was his duty to inspect
annually. The fact is he failed to perform such duties. The Certificate was
only issued on the first year of the hotel’s operations; It was issued
business permits even without actual inspections.
Held: Montillano is held liable on the basis of command responsibility. In
fact, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing
him from service. The division of Montillano could not even produce the
approved electrical plans and specifications of the hotel. It is very clear that
he should be made liable.
GENERAL RULE: Superiors cannot be held liable for acts of their
subordinates.
EXCEPTIONS:
1) If the superior has the duty of employing the subordinates but he
negligently or willfully employs or retains unfit or improper
persons.
2) The superior officer willfully or negligently fails to require the due
diligence or due conformity to prescribed regulation.

3) The superior officer himself carelessly or negligently oversees the
conduct or business of his office such that there would be
opportunity for such fraud.
4) If the superior officer himself authorized or cooperated in the
commission of Fraud.
VINZONS-CHATO VS FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.
FACTS: Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and
“More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. When RA 7654
(local cigarettes are taxed at 55% provided that the max tax shall not be
less than Php 5 per pack) was passed, these cigarette brands were already
covered. Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of
law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Liwayway claimed that she
acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one
responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no
cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. The order
denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the
case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the
defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of
the functions of his/her office and
2) Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of
Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code
HELD:
1) A public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside
the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle
of immunity for official actions.
2) On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is
Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general
law (the Administrative Code).
Section 38. Liability of Superior Officers. -
(1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance
of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or
gross negligence.
(2) Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects to perform a duty
within a period fixed by law or regulation, or within a reasonable period if
none is fixed, shall be liable for damages to the private party concerned
without prejudice to such other liability as may be prescribed by law.
(3) A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for
the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his
subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the
specific act or misconduct complained of.
- Civil liability may arise when there is bad faith on the part of the
superior officer
Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. No subordinate officer or
employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the
performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent
acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good
customs even if he acted under orders or instructions of his superiors.
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- The subordinate cannot use as defense that he was simply
ordered if he knew that such order was improper. Unless he
performed the act in good faith in the performance of his duty.
Cojuangco v CA
Public officials violating, directly or indirectly, the Constitutional rights of a
person will be liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were
not tainted with bad faith or malice.
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the ROC seeking to set aside CA’s decision, after it reversed a favorable
decision of the RTC that ordered the private respondents to pay him moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit, and denied
his Motion for Reconsideration.
Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses
which he entered in sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the
races on various dates, and won prizes together with the 30% due for
trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand for the collection of the prizes
due him but private respondents PCSO and its then chairman Fernando
Carrascoso Jr. consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being
withheld on advice of PCGG. Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case
before the Manila RTC but before the receipt summons, PCGG advised
private respondents that “it poses no more objection to its remittance of the
prized winnings”. This was immediately communicated to petitioner’s
counsel Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso but the former refused to accept
the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought
to court.
The trial court ruled that the private respondents had no authority to
withhold the subject racehorse winnings since no writ of sequestration was
issued by PCGG. Ordering the private respondents to pay in solidum the
claimed winnings, the trial court further held that, by not paying the
winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution
and harassment of petitioner and his family. While the case was pending
with the CA, the petitioner moved for partial execution pending appeal to
which the private respondents posed no objection to.
CA reversed the trial court’s finding of bad faith, holding that the former
PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG. It
likewise noted that Carrascoso’s acts of promptly replying to demands and
not objecting to partial execution negated bad faith.
Issue:
W/N the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso is warranted
by evidence in the law.
Held:
YES AND NO. Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest of ill
will that partakes of the nature of fraud. There is sufficient evidence on
record to support Respondent Court’s conclusion that Carrascoso did not
act in bad faith. His letters to PCGG indicated his uncertainties as to the
extent of the sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. There is
also denying that plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of
the former President Marcos. Sequestration was also a novel remedy.
Under these equivocalities, Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking
further instructions from the PCGG, on what to do and more so, to obey the
instructions given. Besides, EO2 has just been issued by President Aquino,

“freezing all assets and properties in the Philippines (of) former President
Marcos and/or his wife…their close friends, subordinates, business
associates…”
The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral and
exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties,
unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the
absence of clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the
Civil Code. The trial court’s award of these kinds of damages must perforce
be deleted.
Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that
Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted
with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation
of the constitutional rights of the petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of one’s duties.
We hold that petitioner’s right to the use of his property was unduly
impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG’s
instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefore.
A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ
issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of
petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his
racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the
showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due
process. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a
properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his
property rights without due process of law.
SORIANO v. OMBUDSMAN
Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear
showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting
to bad faith
Facts: On 1 June 2001, petitioner filed an affidavit-complaint against Mely
S. Palad (Palad), a bank examiner of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, for
Falsification of Public Documents and Use of Falsified Document
punishable under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint
was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and was docketed
as I.S. No. 01-F-22547. Acting on the complaint, Balasbas issued a
Resolution on 27 August 2001 recommending that Palad be charged in
court with Falsification of Public Documents and that the charge of Use of
Falsified Document be dropped for lack of merit.
Issue: Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint against Balasbas.
Ruling: Well-settled is the rule that good faith is always presumed and the
Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter
alia, to observe good faith which springs from the fountain of good
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conscience. Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good
faith in the performance of his duties. Mistakes committed by a public
officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. "Bad faith"
does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be
some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It
partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for
ulterior purposes.
The law also requires that the public officer’s action caused undue injury to
any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. x x x
Petitioner failed to show that Balasbas acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence in issuing the subpoena. As
further pointed out by the Office of the Ombudsman in its Resolution of 29
July 2002, there was no undue injury because the petitioner "had suffered
no actual damage."
COLLANTES v. MARCELO
Absent any evidence of bad faith, the presumption that respondents acted
in good faith in the performance of their duties prevails.
Facts:
YAP v. LANTAKON
Wala sa case list ni Sir?
Facts:
GATMAITAN V GONZALES
GR 149226
The law bestows upon a public official the presumption of regularity in the
discharge of official functions
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
PRESUMPTION: The law bestows upon the public official the presumption
of regularity in the discharge of official functions. In order to successfully
overcome this presumption of regularity, the evidence against it must be
clear and convincing. In the absence of quantum of proof to the contrary,
meaning the clear and convincing evidence, the presumption still stands.
The regularity presumption in favor of the public officer. The complainant
has the burden of proof of proving the allegations in his complaint.
Otherwise, this presumption may be negated.
REYES VS BELISARIO
14 August 2009
As a general rule, official acts enjoy the presumption of regularity
and the presumption may be overthrown only by evidence to the contrary.
FACTS: Deputy Administrators Simplicio Belisario, Jr. and Emmanuel B.
Malicdem filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint
against LWUA Administrator Prudencio M. Reyes, Jr. for violation of

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Only 13 days after the filing of the graft charge, the Reyes issued Office
Order reassigning Belisario and Malicdem together with De Jesus from the
offices they then held to the Office of the Administrator. The OIC for
Administration issued a directive to the Magilas Security Agency to bar the
Belisario and Malicdem from using the rooms and facilities they occupied
prior to their reassignments. Atty. Arnaldo M. Espinas, LWUA corporate
legal counsel, sought the opinion of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
regarding the regularity of the reassignments of respondents and of De
Jesus. The CSC responded through a legal opinion which categorically
ruled that the reassignments were not in order, were tainted with bad faith,
and constituted constructive dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reassignments are proper. No.
As a general rule, "official acts" enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the
presumption may be overthrown only by evidence to the contrary. When an
act is official, a presumption of regularity exists because of the assumption
that the law tells the official what his duties are and that he discharged
these duties accordingly. The presumption does not apply when an
official’s acts are not within the duties specified by law, particularly when
his acts properly pertain or belong to another entity, agency, or public
official. In the present case, the CSC had spoken by way of an en banc
resolution, no less, that the petitioner LWUA Administrator’s reassignment
orders were illegal because, by law, the authority to reassign officers and
employees of the LWUA lies with the LWUA Board; the LWUA
Administrator’s authority is merely to recommend a reassignment to the
Board. The court also ruled that Administrator acted in bad faith in
reassigning the Belisario and Malicdem barely ten (10) days after the latter
filed their complaint against him for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. No reassignment shall be undertaken if done whimsically
because the law is not intended as a convenient shield for the
appointing/disciplining authority to harass or suppress a subordinate on the
pretext of advancing and promoting public interest.
Discussion: As a general rule, official acts enjoy the presumption of
regularity and the presumption may be overthrown by evidence to the
contrary
- The evidence must be clear and convincing
- In the absence of the quantum of proof to the contrary, the
presumption stands - the regularity presumption should be given
full faith and credit
- The complainant has the burden of proof of proving the
allegations in his complaint. Otherwise, this presumption may be
negated by evidence of bad faith
- Reyes was then administrator of the LWUA issued order
assigning belisario et al. the issuance came after the institution of
charges against reyes. They averred here, that the issuance was
made after the institution and therefore such issuance was made
in bad faith because it was made in response to the institution of
the charges.
BAÑAS vs. CA
325 SCRA 262
The test of actual malice is the basis for the recovery of
damages. As a rule, a public official may not recover damages for charges
of falsehood related to his official conduct unless he proves that the charge
was made with malice.
FACTS: Petitioner Bañas (BIR Revenue Official) filed a complaint for
extortion and malicious publication of the BIR’s tax audit report against
Aquilino Larin, BIR Regional Director.
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For his part, Larin also filed a criminal complaint for tax evasion against
Bañas. The former was offended by the headlines alluding him as a tax
evader as published by Bañas.
ISSUE: Whether or not Larin can recover moral damages
HELD: YES, he can. As a rule, a public official may not recover damages
for charges of falsehood related to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with actual malice. The test is “with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”
In the case at bar, there is sufficient basis for the award of moral and
exemplary damages in favor of a BIR Revenue official where he suffered
anxiety and humiliation because of a baseless prosecution by a taxpayer.
Petitioner presented no evidence to prove that Larin extorted money from
him. When the tax evasion case investigation was started against Bañas,
Larin was not yet the RD. Hence, there is sufficient basis for the award of
moral and exemplary damages in favor of Larin where he suffered anxiety
and humiliation because of such baseless prosecution by the taxpayer.
However, considering that the awards is in favor of a government official in
connection with his official function, it is with caution that the Court affirms
granting moral damages, for it might open the floodgates for government
officials counter-claiming in suits filed against them in connection with their
functions and lest the amounts awarded would make the citizens hesitant
to expose corruption in government for fear of suits from vindictive officials.
This must be done cautiously. Otherwise, it would discourage citizens from
filing against erring officers.
Discussion:
- Test for actual malice: that the act by the person against public
officer was done with knowledge -it was false, or if not, it was
done maliciously
- Banas filed extortion charges, but there was no evidence
presented, apparently the extortion charge was in response to tax
evasion case
- Clearly the charges were baseless, therefore the Court allowed
the recovery of moral and exemplary damages. The award
should be done with caution. Otherwise, it might open flood gates
for officials to counter file suits against citizens. The citizens
might be hesitant to file cases to expose the irregular actions of
government officials and employees.
DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT is applicable to complaints
against employees or officials for the discharge of official acts in the
performance of their responsibilities and duties.
The rule does not apply if the public employee or officer is being sued in his
personal capacity. The State can never be the author of a wrongful act.
This Doctrine affording protection to the public official is applicable only to
activities within the ambit of the public officer’s authority and done in good
faith.
LANSANG vs. CA
February 23, 2000
Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit does not apply where the
public official is being sued in his personal capacity. Such doctrine applies
to complaints vs officials for acts in discharge of their duties.
FACTS: Petitioner Lansang evicted Gabi with malice and bad faith.
However, there was no evidence of such abuse of authority on record. Gabi
sued Lansang in his personal capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lansang can invoke the Doctrine of State Immunity
HELD: The Doctrine of Immunity from suit applies to complaints filed
against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The
rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the State where the
satisfaction of judgment against a public official concerned will require the
State itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount
necessary to pay the damages.
On the other hand, the rule does not apply where the public official is
charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the
rights of the others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly
being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although
the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a
public position.
Note: The Doctrine of State Immunity” may only be invoked if the public
official performs governmental functions. If the performance itself is
unlawful, the government cannot be held liable.
CALUB vs. CA
331 SCRA 55
The Doctrine of State Immunity affording protection to a public
official applies only to activities within the scope of their authority done in
good faith.
FACTS: The DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles carrying illegal-
sourced lumber. The vehicles and the load of lumber were taken by the
team to a DENR office. Calub, a DENR officer, filed a criminal charge
against the drivers but they were later acquitted. Subsequently, the vehicle
owner and one of the drivers filed a complaint for recovery of possession of
the impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against the
petitioners, which the trial court granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for replevin against the petitioners is
a suit against the state.
HELD: Yes. Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued
without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is,
in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good
faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the
acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed
by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are
clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and
89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so
within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on
their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is
a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. vs. LICHAUCO
G.R. No. 142362 (May 3, 2006)
Public officer cannot invoke immunity if complaint against him
does not impose financial liability on the State but merely nullification of
state action.
FACTS: Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI) entered into a Memorandum
of Understanding with the DOTC, on a planned launch of Philippine-owned
satellite into outer space. PASI averred that while preparations for the
launching were ongoing, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary
for Communications, allegedly “embarked on a crusade to malign the name
of Michael de Guzman (PASI president) and sabotage the business of
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PASI.” Lichauco’s purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in
her offering an orbital slot to other parties, despite prior assignment to PASI
of the said slot. It was later claimed that Lichauco subsequently awarded
the orbital slot to another entity.
Aggrieved, PASI and de Guzman instituted a civil action against Lichauco
and the unknown awardee of the orbital slot. The complaint, alleging three
(3) causes of action, was for injunction (the award of orbital slot to another
should be enjoined since the DOTC previously assigned the same slot to
PASI), declaration of nullity of award (as it was rendered beyond
Lichauco’s authority), and damages (for maligning the name of de Guzman
and sabotaging the business of PASI).
ISSUE: Whether or not the suit is against the state.
HELD: The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of
official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen
which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the
government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it
has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from
suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer
has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the
officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance
of his/her duties.
As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court rules that the defense of
state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be
properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional
contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or
financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state
action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the
revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award,
nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in
relation to said causes of action, the suit would have been considered as
one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an
unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit
would have been considered as one against the State. But neither
circumstance obtains in this case.
Discussion:
- A public officer who acts without or in excess of jurisdiction any
injury caused by him or her is his or her own personal liability.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (RA 3019)
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the
official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced,
or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government
and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has
to intervene under the law.

- Exception Section 14
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or
other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from
any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has
secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or
license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without
prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
- For example a person who applies for a renewal of license and
an employee of that office demands or requests something in
consideration of the issuance of permit or license.
- Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small
or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token
of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage,
shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act. utang na
loob customs of Filipinoes
- Take note: Unsolicited gift or present of small value
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in
a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during
the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.
- Example, a government official intimates to a private
enterprise owner, that his son be employed to that private
enterprise.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
- Most often invoked. This is a broad provision that covers any
act. The Supreme Court in so many cases has ruled that
undue injury in Section 3(e) cannot simply be presumed even
after a wrong or violation of a right has been established.
- Requirement: the undue injury has to be quantified, specified,
and proven to the point of moral certainty. It cannot be mere
speculation. It cannot be a speculative or incidental injury
since it is not sufficient.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any
matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or
material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own
interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against
any other interested party.
- Example: Inaction or delaying a transaction or papers,
because he is expecting a pecuniary or material benefit
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
- Example: There is a contract entered and there is an
overpricing. Clearly, this is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
- Or the public officer enters into a negotiated transaction
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instead of a public bidding, in order to give advantage to a
particular contractor.
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes
or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having
a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a
board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises
discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does
not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers
responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or
irregular transactions or acts by the board, panel or group to which they
belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or
benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled
to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere
representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character,
acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to
unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its
authorized release date.
- Example: Leaking to the media, the decision of the court
before it was released.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred
to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer
the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging
or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in
subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public
officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be
permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court,
from transacting business in any form with the Government.
- Act of public officer receiving, demanding , soliciting, any gift,
xx, presen (a) (b) (c) - exception: section 14
- Act persuading, influencing another public officer
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals.—(a) It shall be unlawful
for any person having family or close personal relation with any public
official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close
personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with
the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family
relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity
in the third civil degree. The word “close personal relation” shall include
close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free
access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any
public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
- Prohibits private individuals from capitalizing or exploiting
his/her close personal or family relations with a public officer
by soliciting, receiving, accepting any gift, share, or anything of

monetary value from any person having business with any
government official or employee.
Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives.—It shall be unlawful for
the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the
third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President
of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to
the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is
related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same
line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already
existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to
any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on
the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon
compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations
issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official
capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
- A prohibition applicable to relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the President, Vice-President,
Speaker of the House, Senate President from intervening in
any transaction or contract with the government.
Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress.—It shall be unlawful
hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the term for which he
has been elected, to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest
in any specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly
favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him previously
approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term.
The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who
recommended the initiation in Congress of the enactment or adoption of
any law or resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during
his incumbency.
It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public
officer, who, having such interest prior to the approval of such law or
resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days
after such approval to retain such interest.
- It is unlawful for a Congressman or a Senator while in office to
have pecuniary or personal interest in any business enterprise
which will be benefited by any resolution or law authored by
him.
Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities.—Every public officer,
within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office,
and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well
as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or
separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the
corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of
Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the
President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials
and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the
corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and
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liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his
income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year:
Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months
before the end of the calendar year, may file their first statements in the
following months of January.
- Similar to Section 8 of the Code of Conduct on Ethical
Standards (RA 6713)
Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth.—If in accordance
with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three
hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired
during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other
persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be
a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse
and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into
consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot
be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration
in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary.
- The dismissal of a public officer by reason of his ill-gotten
wealth or unexplained wealth. There is investigation whenever
a public officer acquires property or money that is obviously
outside his legitimate income and he cannot explain the
discrepancy. There is basis for the filing of petition under
Section 2 of RA 1379 for the forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth. This
may be a basis for his dismissal due to unexplained wealth
under Section 8 of the Anti-graft Law.
BAR Q Section 11. Prescription of offenses.—All offenses punishable
under this Act shall prescribe in ten years.
- This used to be 15 years but it is now 20 years.
Section 12. Termination of office.—No public officer shall be allowed
to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or
pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
- It provides that no public officer or employee shall be allowed
to resign or separate from public service pending investigation
or prosecution.
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.—Any public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted
by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under
any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and
to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
- As a basis for the issuance SECTION 13. Suspension and
loss of benefits.—Any public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be

convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him of preventive suspension pendente lite.
- The loss of benefits (all gratuity and retirement benefits under
any law) should the public officer be convicted by final
judgment.
CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES (RA 6713)
Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. -
(A) Every public official and employee shall observe the following as
standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official
duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall
always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All
government resources and powers of their respective offices must be
employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically,
particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and
discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service
with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to
discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of
undue patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain
true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity
and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and
shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall
not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their
relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to
appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly
confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are
coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide
service to everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party
affiliation or preference.
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall
extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless
otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest, public
officials and employees shall provide information of their policies and
procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of
information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate,
encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and
procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and
appreciation of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country,
especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at
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all times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the
use of locally produced goods, resources and technology and encourage
appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to
maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall
commit themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain
the principle of public accountability, and manifest by deeds the
supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times
uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to
persons or party.
(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall
lead modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall
not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to
promote (1) observance of these standards including the dissemination
of information programs and workshops authorizing merit increases
beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees
recognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding in their
observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and
experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to public
officials and employees in raising the general level of observance of
these standards.
- This is one of the basis of conducting a lifestyle check
- The SC, in its early rulings, was consistent in declaring that
there may be administrative imposition for violation of this
norm. However, this no longer applies.
SAMSON v. RESTRIVIERA
GR 178454
IRR of RA 6713 mandates the grant of incentives/rewards to
officials/employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct
based on their observance of norms. The IRR does not provide that they
will be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms.
FACTS: Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of
the Population Commission with office at the Provincial Capitol, Trece
Martirez City, Cavite. Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help
her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have the latter's land located
in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System. Petitioner said
that the expenses would reachP150,000 and accepted P50,000 from
respondent to cover the initial expenses for the titling of respondents land.
However, the petitioner failed to accomplish the task as it was found out
that the land is government property. When the petitioner failed to return
the P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa. The Respondent also filed an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a
public officer against the petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No.
6713 and suspended her from office for three months without pay. The CA
on appeal affirmed the Ombudsman's Order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held administratively liable for
grave misconduct
HELD: No. Decision Set Aside and a New judgment is Entered.

Political Law- Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.
The matter of violation of norms of conduct under RA 6713 does not confer
any sanctions. In fact, the implementing rules do not provide sanctions for
failure to observe these norms. These norms are important for the purpose
of the grant of rewards and incentives to officers or employees who
demonstrate exemplary service etc.
This cannot be a basis for administrative imposition. The court ruled that
the act, even if it has nothing to do with her duties as a public officer,
nonetheless was transgression which eroded public trust and confidence in
government employees. That is why, the Supreme Court imposed the
penalty of a fine of 15,000.00 against her. However, this is not a violation
against Section 4 as a basis for administrative sanction.
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the
performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are under
obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. - All public officials and
employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof,
respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by
the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.
(b) Submit annual performance reports. - All heads or other
responsible officers of offices and agencies of the government and of
government-owned or controlled corporations shall, within forty-five (45)
working days from the end of the year, render a performance report of
the agency or office or corporation concerned. Such report shall be open
and available to the public within regular office hours.
(c) Process documents and papers expeditiously. - All official papers
and documents must be processed and completed within a reasonable
time from the preparation thereof and must contain, as far as
practicable, not more than three (3) signatories therein. In the absence
of duly authorized signatories, the official next-in-rank or officer in charge
shall sign for and in their behalf.
(d) Act immediately on the public's personal transactions. - All
public officials and employees must attend to anyone who wants to avail
himself of the services of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly
and expeditiously.
(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents
must be made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the
public within reasonable working hours.
Note: The prohibitions under Section 7 are quite similar with those
enumerated under Section 3 of RA 3019.
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(a) Financial and material interest. - Public officials and employees
shall not, directly or indirectly, have any financial or material interest in
any transaction requiring the approval of their office.
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(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer,
employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any
private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless
expressly allowed by law;
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which
has a regular or pending official transaction with their office.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year
after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in
the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned
cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the
office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
likewise apply.
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public
officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and not
made available to the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone;
or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees
shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in
the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation
being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office.
As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents
to:
(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift
of nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of
courtesy;
(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature
of a scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment; or
(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or
expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the Philippine (such as
allowances, transportation, food, and lodging) of more than nominal
value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interests of
the Philippines, and permitted by the head of office, branch or agency to
which he belongs.
The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purpose of this subsection, including pertinent reporting
and disclosure requirements.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any
educational, scientific or cultural exchange programs subject to national
security requirements.

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and
employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations
under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets,
liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those
of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of
age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All
public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary
capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath
their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their
spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living
in their households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value
and current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks,
stocks, bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities, and;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.
The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the
aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty (30) days from
the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of
the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies,
including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may show
their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and
financial connections in previous years, including, if possible, the year
when they first assumed any office in the Government.
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file
the required statements jointly or separately.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure
of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of
the Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and
all national executive officials with the Office of the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy
Ombudsman in their respective regions;
(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
with the Office of the President, and those below said ranks, with the
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Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission.
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of every
public official or employee to identify and disclose, to the best of his
knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the form,
manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed under
this Act, shall be made available for inspection at reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction
after ten (10) working days from the time they are filed as required by
law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay
a reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of such
statement, as well as the cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for
a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After such
period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing
investigation.
(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use
any statement filed under this Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications
media for dissemination to the general public.
Section 9. Divestment. - A public official or employee shall avoid
conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict of interest arises, he
shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within
thirty (30) days from his assumption of office and/or divest himself of his
shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such assumption.
The same rule shall apply where the public official or employee is a
partner in a partnership.
The requirement of divestment shall not apply to those who serve the
Government in an honorary capacity nor to laborers and casual or
temporary workers.
- If there is conflict of interest, the public officer should resign
from his position in the private enterprise
- Aboitiz was appointed as NAPOCOR chair many years ago.
He should divest of his shareholdings in electric companies
owned by him all over the country (within 60 days from
assumption)
DISABILITIES AND INHIBITIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Article VI Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,

including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he
be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Article IX-B Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.
- “Unless allowed”, nature of ex officio
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment
in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
- He can accept other public office if he surrenders his elective
position.
FLORES vs. DRILON BAR QUESTION
223 SCRA 568
The prohibition applies even where the second position is being
held in an ex-officio capacity only.
FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise
known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under
which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SMBA), is challenged in this petition.
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at
Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that
the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on
the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par.,
Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is
an elective official and the subject posts are public offices.
ISSUE: Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states,
"Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed
as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates
the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts
HELD: YES, it violated the proscription in the Constitution. It is further
argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor
of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, where we stated that the prohibition against
the holding of any other office or employment by the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during
their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not
comprehend additional duties and functions required by the primary
functions of the officials concerned, who are to perform them in an ex
officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor.
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This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not
contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically
attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the
intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the
post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make
the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the
word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used.
- It violates Article IX-B, Section 7
Article VII Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as
members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (supra)
Remember in this case the court reiterated that:
- Sec. 13 Article VII does not apply to positions occupied by
executive officials without additional compensation in ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and required by the primary functions
of their office because these other positions are additional
impositions of official duties upon the Cabinet Member.
- But there has to be a direct connection (related) in the positions
- Example: Secretary of Finance - by the charter of the
monetary board, because there is a direct connection
between Secretary of Finance and Monetary Board Member -
the SOF must be a member of the Monetary board.
- Note that there is no additional compensation here
- It is different if the second position has nothing to do with the
primary position (example, press secretary was made
member of PAGCOR)
We are talking here of high ranking officials in the executive branch
Remember the fourth group (lower in rank) they are not covered here, they
are covered in Article IX-B Section 7.
Section 7, Article IX-B lays down the general rule while Section 13,
Article VII is the exception.
Section 13 Article VII is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to
the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel.
The reason why lower rank officials, in certain instances, may be allowed to
have other positions is to give them a chance to engage in some lawful
activity to augment their income.

Under Section 7, we mentioned “unless otherwise provided under the
Constitution”, so there are situations where there is no violation if it falls
under any of the cases authorized by the Constitution:
1) Vice President as Cabinet Secretary (Section 3(2) Article VII)
2) Justice Secretary as ex-officio JBC member (Section 8, Article
VIII)
3) President as head of economic and planning agency (Section 9,
Article XII)
FUNA vs. AGRA
19 February 2013
He was holding two positions, as Acting Solicitor General and
Acting Secretary of Justice, and was covered by Section 13, Article VII. He
could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as
the Acting SolGen because the Constitution has not otherwise been
provided. It is not material that his position was only in acting capacity.
Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice
following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to
vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010,
President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a
concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as
a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to
challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or
designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno
S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor
General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced
his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra renders a different version of
the antecedents.
He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting
Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been
appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President
Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice
Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in
order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the
May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his position as the
Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his
successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor
General.
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra
has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is
settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional
question that petitioner raises herein.
Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is
unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 13. The
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
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A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise
allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Being designated as the
Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article
VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read.
Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during
his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not
otherwise so provided. It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in
an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly
indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so
far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in
government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned.
In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or
to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing
less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes
no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation.
The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official
must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective
of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention
of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive
Department and of limitations on the President's power of appointment in
the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations. It is not
amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor
General, was not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13,
supra, due to such position being merely vested with a cabinet rank under
Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the
general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent
designations were still subject to the conditions under the latter
constitutional provision.
In this regard, the Court aptly pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma: The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
permits an appointive official to hold more than one office only if “allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position.” In the case of Quimson
v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a
government official occupying two government offices and performing the
functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.” The crucial test in
determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was
laid out in People v. Green – whether one office is subordinate to the
other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the
other.
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC. vs. ELMA
The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists
between two offices is whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the
sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
FACTS: Respondent Magdangal Elma was first appointed as PCGG
Chairman. During his tenure as such, he was also appointed as Chief

Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He took his oath of office, but waived
any remuneration he may receive as CPLC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC
falls under the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 7,
par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution?
HELD: Yes, they fall under such prohibition. The general rule in Sec. 7, Art.
IX-B permits an appointive official to hold more than 1 office only if “allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position” and as long as there is no
incompatibility. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists
between two offices is whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the
sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
Here, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG
Chairman and the CPLC. As CPLC, Elma will be required to give his legal
opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman, the PCGG being an
agency under the Executive Department, and review any investigation
conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve
himself as PCGG Chairman. Does Elma belong under Article IX-B Section
7 or Section VII Section 13? (executive officials)
SC: Elma is not a secretary, nor a usec or asec, even if he has an
equivalent rank, he is not mentioned in Section 13 of Article VII He is
therefore covered under the general rule of article IX-B section 7.
There would be a violation of Article VII Section 13 if the second position
has nothing to do with the first position.
LORENZANA vs. FAJARDO
A.C. No. 5712 (June 29, 2005)
The private practice of law by respondent and his acceptance of
employment as PLEB member of Quezon City while being employed as
Legal Officer of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, constitute a violation
of Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution, EO 292, and RA 7160.
However, his appointment as Lupon Tagapamayapa member, as well as
his receipt of honorarium, is lawful under Section 406 of the LGC,
FACTS: Lorenzana filed a complaint against Atty. Fajardo with violation of
the Civil Service Law and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and seeks his disbarment from the practice of the law
profession. The complaint alleged that the respondent, while employed as
Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office in Manila, was a member of
the PLEB of Quezon City and a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Brgy. Novaliches Proper. The complaint also alleged that Atty. Fajardo was
engaged in the private practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Fajardo violated the law.
HELD: Yes. Respondent failed to establish that his primary functions as
Legal Officer of the Manila Urban Settlements Office allow his appointment
as PLEB member, an exception to dual appointment prohibited by the
Constitution and the statutes. Indeed, respondent, in accepting such
appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative
Code of 1987, and the Local Government Code of 1991. Being contra
leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Attorney’s Oath.
Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the
Manila Urban Resettlement) is “not really strict when it comes to appearing
in some private cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to
render service even on holidays without additional compensation.” At
most, he should have asked written permission from his chief as required
by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules that “(n)o
officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation
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or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department.”
- There is no law allowing Fajardo to be member of the PLEB
- The LGC, AC, and the CPR are violated here
- As member of Lupon - he is allowed to accept this, because
membership in the lupon is a civic duty, he is allowed to even get
honorarium under the law
RAMOS vs. IMBANG
530 SCRA 759
Government lawyers cannot handle private cases for they are
expected to devote full-time to their work. Here, respondent PAO lawyer
handles private cases and accepts attorney’s fees for which acts he was
disbarred from law practice.
FACTS: Complainant Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Imbang in filing
civil and criminal actions against Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500
as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.
Subsequently, Ramos found out that the respondent never filed any case
against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public
Attorney’s Office.
ISSUE: Whether or not a PAO lawyer can engage in private practice of law.
HELD: No. Government employees are expected to devote themselves
completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of
profession is prohibited.
Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for
they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their
respective offices.
As a PAO lawyer, the respondent should not have accepted
attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the
office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal
fees other than his salary.
QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE
A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC
As an exception, public officer can engage in private practice
under the following conditions: it is authorized by Constitution or law or it
will not conflict with her public functions.
Facts: The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision
places a limitation on public officials and employees during their
incumbency, and those already separated from government employment
for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private
practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. -
Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
 31
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
xxx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1)
year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office,
except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the
professional concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with,
in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court
VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned
from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the
one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision),
she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel
in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential
treatment to an incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private
practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend
to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or employee
who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government service
like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter
before the office where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from
the date of her separation from government employment.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Karen Silverio-Buffe may appear as private

counsel before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon within the 1 year prohibition.

HELD: A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law

immediately after her separation from the service and without any period
limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No.
6713. The clerk of court’s limitation is that she cannot practice her
profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work
with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or
employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the
other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with
respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of
one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where
specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas
where no conflict of interests exists.

- Allowed as long as there is no conflict of interest

BUENA SUERTE A TODOS USTEDES!

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