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Chapter 2: Adaptations to Aquatic Environments

Water has many properties favorable to life.

MULTIPLE CHOICE

1. Topic: thermal properties of water

Level: easy

Adding dissolved compounds such as salt to water _____ the boiling point and _____ the freezing point.
a. increases; increases
b. increases; decreases
c. decrease; increases
d. decreases; decreases
Answer: b

2. Topic: thermal properties of water

Level: easy

The high specific heat of water

a. means large amounts of heat are needed to change the temperature of water.
b. requires significant heat energy to make the transition from solid to liquid.
c. requires significant heat energy to make the transition from liquid to gas.
d. makes it difficult to increase the temperature of liquid water above 100ºC.
Answer: a

3. Topic: Density and viscosity of water

Level: easy

Which is NOT an adaptation that exploits the density of water?

a. a gas-filled swim bladder
b. droplets of oil on algae
c. long, filamentous appendages
d. high percentages of fat
Answer: c

4. Topic: thermal properties of water

Level: easy

The low density of ice

a. makes it ineffective at insulating water from the cold.
b. allows aquatic plants to survive the winter.
c. is due to the high viscosity of water.
d. prevents it from moving in water.
Answer: b

5. Topic: Dissolved inorganic nutrients

Level: easy

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Water's polar nature
a. explains its high density.
b. makes it a good solvent.
c. causes it to freeze at 0ºC.
d. limits the amount of dissolved nutrients it can hold.
Answer: b

6. Topic: Thermal properties of water

Level: easy

At what temperature does water reach its maximum density?

a. 32ºC
b. 0ºC
c. 4ºC
d. −12ºC
e. 100ºC
Answer: c

7. Topic: Dissolved inorganic nutrients

Level: easy

The limit to the amount of minerals water can hold is called

a. the dissolution limit.
b. the solvent point.
c. deposition.
d. saturation.
Answer: d

8. Topic: Dissolved inorganic nutrients

Level: easy

Which is the most basic?

a. human blood
b. acid rain
c. carbonated beverages
d. pure water
Answer: a

9. Topic: Dissolved inorganic nutrients

Level: easy

Which causes acid rain?

a. CO2
b. SO2
c. HCO3
d. NaOH
Answer: b

10. Topic: density and viscosity of water

Level: easy

Aquatic organisms have developed streamlined shapes to adapt to

a. the density of water.
b. the viscosity of water.
c. the polar nature of water.
d. the basic nature of water.
Answer: b

11. Topic: density and viscosity of water

Level: easy

Which part of an organism is less dense than water?

a. bone
b. protein
c. muscle
d. fat
Answer: d

12. Topic: dissolved inorganic nutrients

Level: easy

A liquid with low pH would have

a. high OH− concentration.
b. low NO2 concentration.
c. low CaCO3 concentration.
d. high H+ concentration.
Answer: d

13. Topic: dissolved inorganic nutrients

Level: easy

Which of the nutrients listed below is NOT required by all organisms?

a. nitrogen
b. phosphorus
c. potassium
d. sulfur
e. silicon
Answer: e

14. Topic: dissolved inorganic nutrients

Level: easy

Limestone deposits are due to

a. the low pH of ocean water.
b. the solubility of calcium carbonate.
c. the polar nature of water.
d. acid deposition.
Answer: b
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 SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, that can only apply to the time
when I was there and acted as deputy.
MR. DODD: Of course. I certainly don’t mean after you left there. I
am only talking about the time that you were there.
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, then, as deputy, only where I acted as
deputy, or where crimes came to my knowledge without my taking
measures against them.
MR. DODD: I just want to read into the record one sentence from a
document that has already been offered in evidence, Mr. President. It is
Document 2233-PS; and from that document, Page 1, Paragraph 4, I
would like to read this, because part of it was read by the Defense, but
this part was left out. It is under the small Arabic Figure 3:
“The necessary police and other measures arising therefrom
will be under the immediate direction of the Chief of the
Security Police; every arbitrary action is to be strictly
avoided.”
This had to do, by the way, with the “AB Action,” concerning
which this witness has testified.
The records show that you, indeed, Mr. Defendant, were present at
the time that the Defendant Frank discussed this AB Action and made
this statement which I have just read into the record. Certainly you don’t
deny responsibility for whatever was done under the AB Action, do you?
Because you did know about that.
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither in connection with the AB case nor in
any other case did I deny anything. I spoke especially about the AB
Action.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, Document 2233-PS, which is USSR-
223, is now available in the French. It is already in evidence and has
been accepted by the Tribunal, but a French copy was not available at the
time it was offered. It has now been completely translated into the
French, and I offer it to the Tribunal for assistance in the French.
I have concluded my examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you said that the document of 11
November 1937, 3369-PS, was a new document. Did you give it a
number?
MR. DODD: Just a moment, Mr. President. I will check that. I
meant to offer it, and I fear that I did omit to do so. That would become
USA-889. It was a new document, and I did intend to offer it.
 THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn, and we will
reconvene at 10 minutes past 2.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours.]

 Afternoon Session

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the French prosecutor asked you

whether you were the deputy of Governor General Frank, and for that
reason knew Auschwitz. Can you tell us where Auschwitz is located?
SEYSS-INQUART: Auschwitz was not in the region of the
Government General, but rather in the area which belonged to the Gau
Upper Silesia.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Then the same prosecutor
confronted you with the testimony of a girl of 20 years old, by the name
of Kunze, in 3594-PS. According to this testimony you allegedly
repeatedly sent reports to Himmler.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday evening, when I was confronted with
this matter, I was rather tired, and made a statement somewhat in
contradiction to the fact contained in the document, and said that under
Paragraph 3 certain reports were mentioned which had no connection
with me. Now this witness asserts that reports from me went to Himmler
by way of the Security Police, dealing with the condition of the Jews.
That is utter nonsense, which the results contradict. The Reich
Commissioners were in no way subordinate to Himmler as far as the
Jewish question was concerned. I sent perhaps two or three letters
concerning individual cases. They went from my staff to the staff of
Himmler; but never by way of the Security Police.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is sufficient. You were, in addition,
confronted with the testimony of a Dr. Karl Georg Schöngarth in
connection with the question of the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Schöngarth was the successor, or more
accurately, the deputy of Rauter; and it is correct that he came to me after
he had inspected the scene of the assassination. He told me that Himmler
demanded the shooting of 500 real hostages, prominent Dutchmen. I was
aghast; and Schöngarth said immediately that that was completely out of
the question. Thereupon I most certainly said to Schöngarth: “But we
must do something, we must react in some way to this.” He then told me
that a number of cases of death sentences were on hand which were to be
carried out by shooting within the next few days and weeks. He
suggested that these people be shot and that an announcement be made to
the effect that this was in retaliation for the assassination.
 DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and the Armed Forces commander in
the Netherlands, in connection with the question of hostages, issue
warnings to the population, as is customary under international law?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe there is a document available which
contains a warning by me against sabotage, et cetera, in which I
threatened, in the case of violation of the laws, to confiscate property and
to draft the population for guard duty.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to call the attention of the
Tribunal to the fact that this warning is contained in 1163-PS.
[Turning to the defendant.] Further, I have to confront you with a
document which is an interrogatory of the Defendant General
Christiansen, in which he says that you were the one who issued the
order for the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that Christiansen does not say that. He
admits that he issued the order; but what he means is that I, so to speak,
was urging the matter behind the scenes. I made my statement, but
perhaps the witness Wimmer can give us more exact details on this, since
he was present at this discussion, as Christiansen himself states.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yesterday evening I once more studied this
question, since the resolution of the Court remained in my mind to the
effect that this statement by the witness, which is really the interrogation
of an accused person, was admitted by the Court. In my opinion,
Paragraph 21 of the Charter means something else here. I believe that a
partial matter like that has no probative value, for it is theoretically
possible that Christiansen could now be sentenced by the British on the
grounds that his statement is not correct. Now, I do not want to delay this
Tribunal, but I wish to call attention to the equivalent statement of
Criminal Commissioner Munt, which I have already submitted in
Document Number 77, Page 199.
Then I call your attention to another matter. The French prosecutor
asserted that the Dutch secretaries general were left behind by the Dutch
Government to serve as a government, and that you were not justified in
interfering with the sovereignty of the Netherlands. What have you to
say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that and I also believe it
is of no consequence. The Netherlands capitulated, and they did so for
the entire region except Zeeland.
The terms of capitulation consisted only of military details. From
the civilian point of view it was unconditional surrender. I believe that on
the basis of international law I was entirely justified in taking the
government into my own hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I
should like to submit a document which takes issue with this question.
This is a verdict by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands of 12 January
1942. In my final speech I shall refer to this from the legal standpoint. It
will be submitted to the Tribunal in certified form in four languages
through the Prosecution who have agreed to this. The Exhibit Number is
96.
Then further, the French prosecutor asserted that you carried out
mass shootings and, particularly, deportations of civilian workers and the
displacement of Jews, in order to weaken the biological power of the
Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that I can cite concrete examples
which show that I had the opposite intentions. It is certain that during a
war losses do arise among the population, and perhaps if I had given
more attention or put up greater resistance, I might have prevented
something. That this did not take place, I truly regret. But two figures are
decisive: the figures for mortality and those showing the increase in the
population.
Until the year 1944, the mortality rate in Holland, on the basis of
the statistical data of the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, rose from 9.5 to
10 per thousand, whereas in the years 1914-18, the original rate of 12 per
thousand increased to 17 per thousand, in other words by almost 50
percent even though the Dutch people were under their own
Government, were not in the war, and were not under a blockade.
According to the statistics which I received from the Netherlands
Statistics Bureau, from 1914 to 1918 there was a decrease of about one-
half. In the year of my administration, up until 1944, the population
increased from 20 per thousand to 25 per thousand. That is a good one-
fourth increase. Of course it is primarily the will to live of the Dutch
people. But it is surely also a consequence of the measures of my civil
administration.
DR. STEINBAUER: In order to prove the figures just cited by my
client, I should like to submit a report of the Netherlands Central
Statistics Bureau. I received this by way of the General Secretary in a
German and English version, but it is not certified. The original should
be in the office of the General Secretary.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to remark that in these statistics...
 THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, how do you show the relevance
of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: Because in the Indictment and in the
proceedings here, it was claimed that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of
germanizing the Dutch people and of breaking resistance, and because he
is also held responsible for the poor state of health of the population, the
decrease in births, and the mortality rate. These were all assertions made
in the Dutch Government report and in part also produced here.
Yesterday, with the permission of the Tribunal, I submitted this query to
the Dutch Government and I received this answer. In fact it answered
more than I requested, particularly taking war victims into account. But
we will pay homage to the truth and submit it as we got it.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting that in then? Are you offering
that in evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I submit it the way I received it from the
General Secretary. It is Number 106.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that the reduction of the
birth rate in the years 1914-18 is shown at a lower figure than the report
which I received in January of 1945.
DR. STEINBAUER: I still have two brief questions regarding
Austria. The first question is this: The American prosecutor has charged
that you gave Mühlmann notes to take to Berchtesgaden. Can you say
what the notes contained?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that was the outcome of the discussion
which I had just had with Dr. Schuschnigg and it included, above all, the
agreement to call upon Dr. Jury, Dr. Reinthaller, and Dr. Fischböck, and
the institution of national political sections within the Fatherland Front—
in short, things that we had agreed on, things which Adolf Hitler, at
Berchtesgaden, did not in any way have to put through for the Austrian
National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then the American prosecutor asked you
whether you knew that Austrians died in concentration camps after the
Anschluss. You answered, no, that you did not know this. But people did
die in Austrian concentration camps. Here in this room, in the course of
months, you have become familiar with concentration camps. Do you
mean to say that they were identical with those which you meant?
SEYSS-INQUART: In no way at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient.
 SEYSS-INQUART: And apart from that, I said I heard that it might
have been possible that Austrians died in German concentration camps.
The Austrian concentration camps can in no way be compared with what
we have heard here about German concentration camps.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have concluded my examination-
in-chief of the defendant, and with the permission of the Tribunal, I
should like to call my first witness on the Austrian question, General
Glaise-Horstenau.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United
States): Defendant, you said that you had considered that the laws of
land warfare were obsolete. Do you remember?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you consider that they were all
obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Which ones did you consider were
obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was of the opinion that the contractual
stipulations for the protection of the civilian population were outdated by
technical developments in weapons, for obviously certain warlike
measures like total blockade, demolition bombing attacks, et cetera, are
directed primarily at the destruction of the civilian population and
consequently are only justifiable if the civilian population is considered a
war potential like the troops at the front. But if that is the case, then the
civilian population of the occupied countries must be considered in such
a way also.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And when you say “considered in
such a way,” you mean therefore Germany had the right to use the
civilian population to fight the war, make ammunition and so forth; is
that not the conclusion?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is my conclusion, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that conclusion reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe with the increase of the bombing
attacks, approximately.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind the increase of the
bombing attacks. Just give me the date. When was it reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942.
 THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right; now there are two short
questions. You said that you told the Führer that you would not act as a
Trojan Horse; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, of course.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, had he suggested to you that
you should act as a Trojan Horse?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not that, but I was fully aware of my
difficult position. It was quite obvious to me that I could be misused for
such purposes, that behind the back of my ministerial post a situation
could be prepared so that Austria would be overrun.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you used that expression after
you had been talking to the Führer for some time, did you?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the discussion, but the thought
itself had come to me previously; I only brought it up during the
discussion.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, you had had this thought for
some time?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Ever since you had gotten into this
Austrian matter actively you had had the thought, I suppose?
SEYSS-INQUART: The possibility of dissension and of a
difference of opinion about this situation was quite clear to me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That your actions might be
misconstrued?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all; and secondly, that the fact of my
activity could be exploited in a way that I did not intend.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of course, because you represented
both sides at the same time and that was always a difficult position, was
it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well now, let us take up this matter
of declaring forfeited property of enemies of the State. You made those
declarations, I presume, did you not, as Reich Commissioner?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And was that made under a decree
of the Führer’s giving you authority to do that?
 SEYSS-INQUART: That was a basic practice which was current in
the Reich, and if I did not get the order I nevertheless had a sort of
directive...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now wait a minute. I did not ask
you about the practice. It was made under a decree, was it not? That
practice was under a decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And that decree applied to all
occupied countries, did it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so. I first announced this decree
in the Netherlands myself. The measures in the Netherlands came about
on the basis of my directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. I do not want to
get you confused. Your action was taken under a decree of the Führer,
was it not, giving you that authority; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Let us say on the basis of a directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of a directive of the Führer; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that directive in evidence? Has it
been put in evidence?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. Now tell us what was in
it. What was in that directive?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was the general directive that the property of
persons who committed acts inimical to the Reich was to be confiscated.
I had already issued a decree similar to this in Austria. The first one was
issued in the Reich itself; that was the model.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you were the person in the
Netherlands who had complete discretion to make the determination of
who was an enemy of the Reich, did you not? That was your decision
under the decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that was actually a matter for the Police
and the courts.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see.
SEYSS-INQUART: I only had influence.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the Police did not have to go
to the courts to get that determination surely, did they?
 SEYSS-INQUART: No. Either the Police directly made a decision
of this kind or the people were put at the disposal of the court and the
court sentenced the people on the basis of certain offenses, and then on
the basis of the judgment the property suffered the legal consequences.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the property of the
Freemasons was confiscated under that decree. What other property, of
what other groups, was confiscated in the Netherlands under that
direction of the Führer? I do not mean individuals; I mean groups.
SEYSS-INQUART: At the moment I cannot think of any others,
although there were a few other groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But, in effect—see if I state the
practice correctly—the Police would decide that an individual or group
of individuals, on account of their words or their actions, were enemies
of the Reich, and then their property would be confiscated; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. And the decisive office at the time was
that of Heydrich.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The decisive factor was Heydrich?
SEYSS-INQUART: And the Netherlands agencies carried through
his decisions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And you carried through
Heydrich’s decisions; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: I carried through Heydrich’s decisions when it
came to property rights. The association of Jehovah’s Witnesses
belonged to those groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, Jehovah’s Witnesses belonged
to the group too?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were also among them.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the property of Jehovah’s
Witnesses was confiscated also, since they were enemies of the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: They probably did not have very much, but
what they had was confiscated because of their attitude in refusing to
serve in the war effort.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They refused—let me get this
straight. This is interesting. Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to fight or to
serve in the German war effort and therefore their property was
confiscated. Is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not quite. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Germany
refused to serve in the German Army. So first of all they were prohibited
there and then this prohibition was expanded for all other regions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. I am not talking
about that. I am talking about the Netherlands. Was that true in the
Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; but Jehovah’s Witnesses in the
Netherlands were not prohibited because they refused to serve in the
German Army, but rather because we were against this group on
principle.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see, on general principles. As
pacifists, you were against them, so you confiscated their property; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[The witness Glaise-Horstenau took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
EDMUND GLAISE-HORSTENAU (Witness): Edmund Glaise-
Horstenau.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by
God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—
and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what position did you have in the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was born in 1882 in Braunau in Upper
Austria. I came of an officer’s family of French descent. In 1918 I was a
major in the General Staff of the Austrian headquarters as adviser on
politics and the press.
DR. STEINBAUER: What position did you have then in the
Austrian Republic?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After the overthrow of 1918 I was in the
civil service as director of archives at the university, a historian and
author. Among other things, I was the author of a basic work about the
collapse of old Austria, which...
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I am sorry to interrupt you, but we
want only your public positions; I am interested in knowing about them
only.
What public positions did you have?
 GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Director of archives; then, from 11 July
1936 on, I was Minister in the Cabinet of Schuschnigg, as guarantor of
the July Agreement; and then during the March days of 1938, I was in
the Cabinet of Seyss-Inquart.
In November 1939 I voluntarily entered the German Army, first in
the obscure job of a graves registration inspector; and from 1941 on I
had to do with military diplomatic tasks and was on duty at Zagreb
without troop command. In September 1944 I was dismissed from my
post in Zagreb because, being an Austrian of the old regime, I was
against the official policy and was one of the basic opponents of the
Ustashi terror. Another reason was that I was supposed to have called the
head of the State, who was elected and appointed by us, Ante Pavelich, a
“criminal subject,” among other undiplomatic things.
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I shall put a few brief questions to
you, and it is quite sufficient if you just answer them with a
characterizing phrase. The Tribunal does not want to know very much
about the Anschluss itself, but everything as to how it came about.
Therefore I ask you very briefly: After the July Putsch of 1934, were you
in any way connected with Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the economic situation at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The economic situation at that time may
be characterized through the average figure of unemployment. Out of 6
million inhabitants, 400,000 were unemployed, and that means, counting
their families, that more than a million were in the misery of
unemployment.
DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities were there regarding the
expansion of the economic area?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In this connection I can say openly and
immediately that all the possibilities always received “no” as an answer.
If Austria wanted the Anschluss, the answer was “no.” If Austria wanted
to call the Hapsburgs back, the answer was “no.” If Austria wanted to
enter a German customs union in order to expand her economic area, the
answer was “no.” And when great men like Briand and Tardieu spoke of
a Danube federation, we received only cold shoulders from our
autarchically minded neighbors. That is the Austrian tragedy.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now a party was formed which took up the
Anschluss as the main point of its program. What were the combat
methods of this party?
 GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In the year 1918 the standard bearer of
this Anschluss was no less than the Social Democratic Party led by Otto
Bauer who the year before had declared the Anschluss to be the only
possibility for the Austrian proletariat. Later the National Socialist Party
crowded to the front, though it was not unified, to be sure, until the end
of the twenties by unconditional subordination to the leadership of Adolf
Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the leader of the NSDAP in Austria
at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The leaders themselves changed
frequently. Hitler, however, sent a land inspector by the name of—what
was his name; a Prussian—I cannot think of the name at the moment—
who was evicted from the country by Dollfuss in 1933. Habicht—Dr.
Habicht is his name.
DR. STEINBAUER: And after him, is it correct that it was Captain
Leopold?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After him, Captain Leopold rose to the
leadership of the Party.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did the Austrian National Socialists
stand with respect to Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: They considered themselves bound by
absolute obedience and loyalty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now the famous Agreement of 11 July 1936
was reached. After this agreement, you met Seyss-Inquart. What did he
tell you about his political objectives?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I became well acquainted with Seyss-
Inquart shortly before this agreement. I do not remember exactly what he
told me then about his political objectives. In general, it coincides with
what he later set up as his political objectives.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what was that, briefly?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Party, not as an organization, but
only as a support for an ideology in the totalitarian instrument of the
Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, in the Fatherland Front—at the same time
its members were to acknowledge the State and Constitution in Austria,
and had Adolf Hitler’s blessing in addition.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you yourself deal with the Führer, Adolf
Hitler, or did you talk with him?
 GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Apart from the March days of 1938, I had
three opportunities to speak with Adolf Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did Seyss-Inquart enter the
Government?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart entered the Government
after 12 February 1938.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he visit Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: As far as I can remember, he visited
Adolf Hitler on 17 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he make a report about his visit with
Hitler to Schuschnigg and the other members of the Cabinet?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Certainly he told Schuschnigg, and he
told me as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he collaborate in the planned plebiscite
which was to take place on 13 March 1938?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: At that time, without knowing about the
plebiscite, I left, on the 6th of the month, on 2 weeks’ leave. Therefore, I
cannot give you a reliable answer to this question.
DR. STEINBAUER: But do you know whether this plebiscite had
been decided upon in the Ministerial Council with the consent of Seyss-
Inquart or not? Did he tell you about that subsequently?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: To my knowledge, the plebiscite was not
handled by any Ministerial Council.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the National Socialists agree to the
plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: So far as I could judge on my return from
my leave, certainly not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it became known that Schuschnigg
wanted to have a plebiscite. Where were you and what did you
experience at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: On 6 March, as I have already said, I
went on leave, and in Stuttgart I gave a lecture, something I had planned
for a long time. And the subject of my speech was “Central Europe in the
Year 1000 A. D.”
DR. STEINBAUER: We are not interested in details, only in the
facts.
 GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Then I undertook a private visit to Landau
in the Pfalz to visit my French relatives, and there Bürckel, whom I had
told nothing about my arrival, came to see me, and in his home I heard
over the radio the speech made by Schuschnigg at Innsbruck.
Immediately it was obvious to me that the scheduled plebiscite would, in
view of Hitler’s nature, certainly bring about some form of grave
countermeasure, and I decided to fly to Vienna at once. Bürckel was to
have arranged this. However, he telephoned to the Reich Chancellery
and Hitler expressed the wish that I should come to Berlin. I gave the
reasons for complying with his request to the American interrogator, and
subsequently, only here, I found out why Hitler had called me to Berlin. I
heard from the mouth of an absolutely authentic witness that he did not
want me to return to Austria. He knew that I was an enemy of all
solutions by force. During the night between 9 and 10 March I reached
Hitler and entered upon a discussion which lasted for 2½ hours, a
conference which assumed no concrete proportions and led to no
concrete decision. Instead he told me that during the course of the day, at
11 o’clock in the morning, he would have me called in. In fact, he did
not call me until 8 o’clock in the evening in order to give me the drafts
for Seyss-Inquart: a) of an offer of resignation for Schuschnigg, and b) of
a radio speech.
I declared that I could not bring these notes to Austria myself, and I
asked that it be taken care of in the regular way by courier.
Later on I received a third draft from Göring, who was Field
Marshal at the time. There was a telegram therein, containing a second
request to Hitler asking for the marching-in of German troops. I should
like to say from the beginning, all these drafts—as far as I know also the
third draft—had no actual significance. These were my experiences on
the 11th in Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you flew to Vienna and met Seyss-
Inquart. What did you do with him on that critical morning of 11 March?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart met me at the airport. I
advised him briefly about what had taken place in Berlin, and made
entirely clear to him the grave misgivings which I had. Together, Seyss-
Inquart and I, at 11 o’clock in the morning, shortly after my arrival, went
to see Schuschnigg. While Seyss-Inquart placed before Schuschnigg
certain inner political problems which I did not know about because I
had been absent, I pointed out to Schuschnigg, who was on the verge of
tears, that there was great danger of new world complications, even of a
new world war, and, implored him to give in and to rescind the plebiscite
which was scheduled for Sunday.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and Seyss-Inquart offer to resign?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot recall whether we went so far
orally. This discussion was comparatively brief, but afterwards, at about
1 o’clock, we offered to resign.
For this neither a decree by Hitler nor a decree by the National
Socialist leader, Klausner, was necessary. Already on Thursday evening I
had made my decision in the home of Bürckel that, in connection with
the plebiscite, I would also make use of this traditional method of
ministerial resignation in order to prevent the worst, if possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did Schuschnigg react to this
proposal to postpone the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Schuschnigg at first was rather reserved,
but at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, Guido Schmidt and Guido
Zernatto—I do not have to tell you who these gentlemen were—made
efforts to establish a modus vivendi with Seyss-Inquart. I myself kept in
the background since my mission had already been fully accomplished
on 12 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did Seyss-Inquart do in the
afternoon?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Shortly after this discussion, which led to
no result, Schuschnigg still hesitated. But finally, he declared that in
accordance with the wishes expressed he would postpone the Sunday
plebiscite. I believed that the worst had passed. A short time thereafter
Seyss-Inquart was called to the telephone, and returned visibly agitated,
saying that he had been advised from Berlin that Hitler could not work
any longer with Schuschnigg, and that Seyss-Inquart was to demand
succession to the post of Chancellor.
Seyss-Inquart invited me to go with him to Schuschnigg. I turned
this down for reasons of delicacy. Seyss-Inquart went in alone and
returned after a brief period, and we had a discussion which seems to me
to be of importance to this Court. He was confident of receiving the
Chancellorship, and said to me, almost with an undertone of regret:
“Now we will have to take in the Nazis after all, and we shall work with
the Catholics and others who are of similar trends to establish a political
combine with which I shall govern.” However, he was going to demand
of Hitler, as far as internal politics were concerned, an agreement of 5
years’ tranquillity.
 DR. STEINBAUER: And, of course, Hitler did not agree to that.
Instead he marched into Austria and you were confronted with a law.
You were named Vice Chancellor. Did you sign this law, and why?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a cosignatory of this law. I entered
into the Government after Keppler requested me to and I countersigned
this law, for three reasons:
First, under the impression that Austria was completely alone in the
world, and that no one was lifting a finger on our behalf; secondly, and I
must say something here which has been said in the southern German
press, I entered under the impression of the overwhelming street
demonstrations that were taking place. You can call this mass
psychology, or what you will, but this mass psychology was present and
it was an unequaled popular demonstration. Thirdly, on the
Ballhausplatz, on the night that I received this law into my hands—I did
not participate in the origination of this law—the German tanks were
rolling past below me, and the occupation of the country by Adolf Hitler
was accomplished. With him this meant “bend or break.” If Austria had
tried to assert a different will it would not have been possible.
Of course, one is easily inclined to say about my home country that
it should have committed suicide from fear of death...
DR. STEINBAUER: That is sufficient, General, thank you. Mr.
President, I have no further questions to address to this witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the July Agreement concluded as a result
of pressure from Germany or through mutual desire and mutual interest?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: It was concluded on the basis of mutual
desire and mutual interest.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you then and later have complete
confidence in Schuschnigg and he in you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Up until the winter of 1937-38, my
relationship to Schuschnigg was one of complete confidence.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know anything about the intention of
Herr Von Papen to effect the removal of Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Never did I have the slightest hint of that
sort.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the so-called “Langot aid fund”?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Langot aid fund was a fund which
was established quietly by the Government in typical Austrian fashion—
this is not intended as criticism, my saying that it is a typical Austrian
fashion—for the help of National Socialist family members of National
Socialists who had been imprisoned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Schuschnigg and the Government have
knowledge of this fund?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Both of them knew about this and they
both knew definitely of Langot.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of the NSDAP and
particularly of Leopold to Herr Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The NSDAP and Leopold were
completely opposed to Von Papen. They were inimical toward him to
begin with because he was a Catholic, and they distrusted him
additionally in every sort of way.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Did you know a man named General Muff?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes, very well indeed.
MR. DODD: You were in the habit of telling him everything that
went on in the Ministerial Consulate of Austria, were you not?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No.
MR. DODD: Do you know Stephan Tauschitz, the Austrian
Ambassador to Germany?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Not him either. We spoke to him about
some topic but that I should let myself be used as an informer was
contrary to my tradition as a soldier of the Empire.
MR. DODD: Then what did you think you were being brought to
Berlin for by Bürckel from Stuttgart?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot follow you, I am sorry.
MR. DODD: What did you understand to be the purpose of your
trip when you were being brought to Berlin from Stuttgart in March
1938, when Hitler wanted to see you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not go to Berlin from Stuttgart, but
rather from the Pfalz. Hitler had had me advised to come at all costs. I
considered this matter and finally accepted, a) because I wanted to know
what was going on in Berlin...
MR. DODD: I wanted to know what you thought was the purpose
of your trip when you left, from wherever it was, to go to Berlin. That is
all. What did you understand was the purpose?
 GLAISE-HORSTENAU: My intention was to comply with Hitler’s
invitation and to see just what was taking place in Berlin.
MR. DODD: All right. Now you have told the Tribunal that you
were interested only in a peaceful solution of the question. Surely, when
you got this false telegram and the draft of the radio speech for Seyss-
Inquart, you certainly did not think you were proceeding in a peaceful
and loyal manner insofar as Austria was concerned; did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: From all these three things I had gained
the absolute impression that if Schuschnigg were to cancel the Sunday
plebiscite, then a peaceful solution would still be possible.
MR. DODD: And what do you suppose you were going to do with
that telegram, that false telegram that asked Hitler for help because of
disorders? This was days before it actually took place. You knew that
this was a complete fraud, an obvious fraud. Why did you even consent
to carry that back to Austria?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not take it along. There was even a
sharp difference of opinion between myself and Field Marshal Göring. I
did not take it along. It was given to a courier.
MR. DODD: You told us; you know we have your notes here, in
which you said that you did carry it along.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, never did I say that. That was
contrary to the truth. I never put down or said that I took any of these
three things along personally, but I emphasized that the courier did that. I
should like to call your attention to the fact that, according to the
agreement of 12 February, Seyss-Inquart had the right to deal with Reich
and Party agencies in the Reich.
MR. DODD: Well, in any event, you knew that the telegram was a
falsehood, did you not? Whether you carried it or Globocznik did, it was
not true, was it?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I beg your pardon, I had nothing whatever
to do with this telegram afterwards. Months later I asked Seyss-Inquart
whether this telegram had ever been sent off and he said “no,” it had
never been sent. I have already said that all three documents were not
used.
MR. DODD: Certainly they were not given to you by Hitler to be
thrown away, and when you consented to carry them, you did not know
that they were not going to be utilized, did you?
 GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Anything further was the task of Seyss-
Inquart who, according to the Berchtesgaden agreement, had contact
with the Reich and Party offices...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you try to answer the question
instead of answering something else?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Very well...
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to press it any further. You seem
to think that you had some other reasons, but I do not want to press it any
further.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, I would be very grateful if I could
follow, but I do not understand this question.
MR. DODD: Well, if you do not understand it, I do not think there
is any point in pressing it.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I should be very grateful if you would
repeat it.
MR. DODD: What I suggested in my question was what you, at
least, knew about this false telegram which was handed to you, a draft of
it, I think you said either by Hitler or by Göring. You were then a
Minister without Portfolio of the Austrian Government. You certainly
knew it was a complete falsehood and yet you were willing to go back to
Austria and deal with Seyss-Inquart, knowing that such a telegram had
been arranged, and that it had been sent by courier.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The telegram had lost all significance
through the fact that Schuschnigg canceled the plebiscite, and I told
Schuschnigg explicitly—leaving it to Seyss-Inquart, who sat beside me,
to say anything more specific—that Hitler would march in if we did not
call off the plebiscite. That is exactly what I said to Schuschnigg.
MR. DODD: All right. That is not what I am talking about, but I am
not going on with it.
Do you remember telling us that at the time that Göring was talking
to Seyss-Inquart at the telephone, you found out that the Defendant Von
Papen and Fritz Wiedemann were sitting beside Göring in Berlin?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I am sorry. I only heard about that after
the collapse in 1945, from Wiedemann.
MR. DODD: What I want to know is, how did you find that out?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I found out from Captain Wiedemann,
whom I just happened to be with.