C. Equal Protection of the laws. fSec. 1. Art.

Ill: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal

protection of the laws”.]

1. Meaning; persons protected. All persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Natural and juridical persons are entitled to this
guarantee; but with respect to artificial persons, they enjoy the protection only insofar as their property is
concerned.

2. Scope of Equality.

a) Economic. See constitutional provisions on: (i) Free access to courts [Sec. 11, Art.
Ill]; (ii) Marine wealth reserved for Filipino citizens; and Congress may reserve certain areas of
investments [Sec. 2, par. 2, and Sec. 10, Art. XII]; (iii) Reduction of social, economic and political
inequities [Secs. 1, 2 and 3, Art. XIII]. See Ichong v. Hernandez, supra., Villegas v. Hiu Chiong,
86 SCRA 275;
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392. i)

i) In Tan v. Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 7496
limiting the allowable deductions from gross income of single proprietorships and professionals. It
was held that uniformity of taxation does not prohibit classification, provided the requirements of
valid classification are complied with.

b) Political. See constitutional provisions on: free access to courts [Sec.

11, Art. Ill]; bona fide candidates being free from harassment or discrimination
[Sec. 10, Art. IX-C]; reduction of social, economic and political inequities [Sec. 1, Art. XIII].

i) The Constitution, as a general rule, places the civil rights of

aliens on an equal footing with those of citizens; but their political rights do not enjoy the same protection
[Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 534]. In Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, the Court upheld the adoption of
block voting, saying that if a candidate wishes to avail of the advantage of block voting he was free to join a
party. In Ceniza v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 763, the law excluding residents of Mandaue City from voting for
provincial officials was justified as a “matter of legislative discretion”, and that equal protection would be
violated only if groups within the city were allowed to vote while others were not. In Unido v. Comelec, 104
SCRA 17, the Court denied the request of the opposition for equal time and media coverage for its Plaza
Miranda rally (as that given to President Marcos), because “the head of state of every country in the world
must, from the very nature of his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally available to those who
are opposed to him”.

ii) In the criminal process, Sec. 11, Art. Ill, insures free access to
the courts. In Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420, petitioners who had been sentenced to life
imprisonment for the complex crime of rebellion with murder were ordered released after 12 years of
incarceration when, in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil 515, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no complex
crime of rebellion with murder, inasmuch as common crimes are deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion. In
Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433, the constitutional mandate for the creation of a special court to hear
offenses committed by public officers was the authority to make a distinction between prosecution for
dishonesty in public service and prosecution for crimes not connected with public office.

c) Social. See Sec. 1, Art. XIII.

3. Valid Classification. Persons or things ostensibly similarly situated may, nonetheless, be

treated differently if there is a basis for valid classification. The requisites are:
 a) Substantial distinctions which make for real differences.

i) In Mirasol v. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, where the

petitioners assailed the validity of DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, which prohibited motorcycles on limited
access highways on the basis of RA 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act), the Supreme Court held that there is
a real and substantial distinction between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles.Not all motorized vehicles are
created equal — real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways.

ii) In Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA

386, it was held that Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by
themselves, because of the special risks to which their class was exposed. In
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666, there was found
substantial distinctions between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers,
because of dissimilarities in work environment, safety, danger to life and limb, and
accessibility to social, civil and spiritual activities. In JMM Promotion and Management v.
Court of Appeals, supra., the Court upheld the classification on the ground that the DOLE
Order applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad, as they
are prone to exploitation and abuse being beyond the physical reach of government
regulatory agencies. In Dumlao v. Comelec, supra., the Court upheld the validity of the
law disqualifying from running for the same elective office from which he retired, any
retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received payment of retirement
benefits and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected. In its Resolution (on the Motion for
Reconsideration), October 30, 1995, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra., the
Court rejected the contention that the exemption from VAT of electric cooperatives and
sales of realty to the “homeless poor” violated the equal protection clause. The
classification between electric and other cooperatives rests on a Congressional
determination that there is greater need to provide cheaper electric power to as many
people as possible, especially in the rural areas; and there is a difference between the
“homeless poor” and the “homeless less poor”, because the latter class can afford to rent
houses in the meantime that they cannot yet buy their own homes, while the former
cannot. In Ichong v. Hernandez, supra., the Court upheld the validity of the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law despite the objection that it violated the equal protection clause,
because there exist real and actual, positive ,and fundamental differences between an
alien and a national.

iii) The preventive suspension of a policeman lasting until

termination of the criminal case against him, as provided in Sec. 47, RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), does not
violate the policeman’s right to equal protection of the laws. There is substantial distinction between policemen
and other government employees; policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law, which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them. Besides, Sec. 42 of P.D. 807 (Civil Service Law), which was
raised as argument for equal treatment, refers to preventive suspension in administrative cases, not in criminal
cases [Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538]. In Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, it was held that the fact
that the Ombudsman may start an investigation on the basis of an anonymous letter does not violate the equal
protection clause. Firstly, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution
itself; secondly, in permitting the filing of complaints “in any form and in any manner”, the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of people which keep them from complaining against
official wrongdoing; finally, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from other investigatory and prosecutory
agencies of government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. In Telecommunications
and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 337, the Supreme Court found substantial
distinction between the print and the broadcast media which would justify different treatment under B.P. 881,
viz: the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the pervasive presence of the broadcast media in the
lives of Filipinos, and the earlier ruling that the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat
lesser than the freedom accorded to the print media. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096,
January 20, 1999, it was held that the petitioner’s and intervenors’ right to equal protection of the law was not
violated by the enactment of R.A. 8249 because the law was not directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases.
Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable, and the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness.

iv) On the other hand, in People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 13287576,

February 3, 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
basis for valid classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all
those belonging to the same class. Likewise, in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing,
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000, it was held that there was no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by “foreign hires" and “local hires” as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to these teachers. In
GSIS v. Montesclaros, 434 SCRA 441, in declaring as invalid Sec. 18 of PD 1146 — which provides that a
surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension benefits if the surviving spouse contracted marriage with
the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension — theSupreme Court said that
the classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed
marriages, there is no reason why the proviso reckons the 3-year prohibition from the date the pensioner
qualified for the pension and not from the date the pensioner died. It lumps all marriages contracted within
three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial
convenience. In Re: Request of Assistant Court Administrators, 40 SCRA 16, the Supreme Court held that
there is no reasonable basis for the exclusion of the Assistant Court Administrator, the Assistant Clerks of
Court and Division Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals and the Division Clerks of the Court of the
Sandiganbayan from the grant of special allowances provided in R.A. 9227.

b) Germane to the purpose of the law. The distinctions which are the
bases for the classification should have a reasonable relation to the purpose of the law.

c) Not limited to existing conditions only.

i) In People v. Cayat, 68 Phil 12, the Supreme Court upheld the

validity of the law prohibiting members of non-Christian tribes from drinking foreign liquor, on the ground that
their low degree of culture and unfamiliarity with the drink rendered them more susceptible to its effects. In
Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, 22 SCRA 603, the ordinance was declared invalid because it
taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, and none other, such that
if a new sugar central is established in Ormoc, it would not be subject to the ordinance.

d) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

i) In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, Sec. 35, R.A. 7354, which
withdrew franking privileges formerly granted to the judiciary but remained with the executive and legislative
departments, was declared unconstitutional, because the three branches of government are similarly situated.
In Villegas v. Hui Chiong, supra., the ordinance imposing a work permit fee of P50.00 upon all aliens desirous
of obtaining employment in the City of Manila was declared unconstitutional, because the fee imposed was
unreasonable and excessive, and it failed to consider valid substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who were required to pay it. In Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700, it was held that
when the Mayor issued a permit in favor of unidentified vendors while imposing numerous requirements upon
the Baclaran Credit Cooperative, he violated the equal protection clause because he failed to show that the
two were not similarly situated.

ii) The constitutional right to equal protection of the law is not violated
by an executive order, issued pursuant to law, granting tax and duty incentives only to businesses and
residents within the “secured area” of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live
within the Zone but outside such “fenced-in” territory. The Constitution does not require absolute equality
among residents; it is enough that all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same
privileges and required to follow the same obligations. In short, a classification based on valid and reasonable
standards does not violate the equal protection clause [Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20,
1999]. This was reiterated in Coconut Oil Refiners Association v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005.
iia) But the compromise agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos family providing that
the assets to be retained by the Marcos family are exempt from all taxes violates the equal protection clause.
Any special grant of tax exemption in favor of the Marcos family would constitute class legislation [Chavez v.
PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998].