Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences

ISSN: 0045-0618 (Print) 1834-562X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tajf20

Investigative science and technology supporting

the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW)

Veronica Borrett, Christopher M. Timperley, Jonathan E. Forman & Cheng

Tang

To cite this article: Veronica Borrett, Christopher M. Timperley, Jonathan E. Forman &
Cheng Tang (2018): Investigative science and technology supporting the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, DOI:
10.1080/00450618.2018.1559356

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00450618.2018.1559356

Published online: 26 Dec 2018.

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AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
https://doi.org/10.1080/00450618.2018.1559356

Investigative science and technology supporting the

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW)
Veronica Borretta, Christopher M. Timperleyb, Jonathan E. Formanc and Cheng Tangd
a
OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), Chair of the Temporary Working Group on Investigative Science
and Technology of the SAB, and BAI Scientific, The University of Melbourne Bio21 Institute, Melbourne,
Australia; bChair of SAB, and Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), Porton Down, Salisbury,
Wiltshire, UK; cScience Policy Adviser and Secretary to the SAB, OPCW, The Hague, The Netherlands; dVice-
Chair of SAB, and Office for the Disposal of Japanese Abandoned Chemical Weapons, Ministry of National
Defence, Beijing, China

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter ‘the Convention’), Received 10 December 2018
an international disarmament and non-proliferation treaty, entered Accepted 10 December 2018
into force in 1997. It prohibits the development, stockpiling, trans- KEYWORDS
fer and use of chemical weapons. Today there are 193 nations Chemical forensics; chemical
(‘States Parties’) that are members. The Organization for the warfare agents; chemical
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in The Hague, is the weapons; Chemical
implementing body of the Convention. Herein we outline the Weapons Convention;
verification regime of the Convention and how the work of the investigative science and
OPCW has evolved in recent years in response to the use of technology
chemical warfare agents (CWAs), as well as potential impacts
from advances in science and technology (S&T). We describe
challenges recognized from recent contingency operations in
response to the use of CWAs and how S&T might support the
development of safe and effective approaches to verification. The
role of OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board and its Temporary
Working Group on Investigative Science and Technology are dis-
cussed; specifically, how scientific advice supports the develop-
ment of the capability for the verification of alleged use of CWAs,
as well as informing the decisions made by policymakers. The
importance of engagement with forensic agencies for the continu-
ing development of state-of-the-art approaches to verification is
highlighted.

Introduction
The Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter ‘the Convention’) is an international dis-
armament and non-proliferation treaty that entered into force in 1997.1 It prohibits the
development, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Currently, 193 States
Parties (nation States) are members of the Convention, representing over 98% of the world’s
population. These make up the Conference of the States Parties. The Organization for the

CONTACT Veronica Borrett veronica.borrett@baiscientific.com BAI Scientific, Level 17, 31 Queen Street,
Melbourne 3000, Australia
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 V. BORRETT ET AL.

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in The Hague, is the implementing body of the
Convention.2
The Convention is significant for the extent of its verification provisions that require
States Parties to declare certain industry and military activities, sites and facilities, and
imposes an inspection regime involving routine inspections with the provision for ‘chal-
lenge inspections’ (CIs) and ‘investigations of alleged use’ (IAUs) of chemical weapons (CWs)
and chemical warfare agents (CWAs) by the OPCW. Possessor States are required to declare
and destroy stockpiles of CWs and since entry-into-force of the Convention, the OPCW has
overseen the destruction of more than 96.5% of the declared stockpiles, over 72,304 tonnes
of CWAs (by 31 October 2018). The OPCW’s efforts in implementing the Convention were
recognized in 2013 with a Nobel Peace Prize.3 The Convention also includes provisions for
protection and assistance to States Parties and capacity building programmes to facilitate
greater international cooperation through the peaceful uses of chemistry.
Recent events4 demonstrate that the international community must remain vigilant;
consequently the OPCW must identify and be prepared for challenges to ensure it has
the tools to prevent the re-emergence of CWs. The OPCW and the international com-
munity continue to work towards the elimination of CWs and the prevention of their re-
emergence. However, in an uncertain security environment with increasingly blurred
lines between warfare, insurgency, terrorism and crime, and considering the impacts of
rapid advances in technology, the OPCW must also have fit-for-purpose investigative
tools to support its mandate.

OPCW inspections
The verification provisions of the Convention include mechanisms for the monitoring of
chemicals contained in its Annex on Chemicals (referred to as the ‘Schedules’)5 and the
inspection of sites and facilities relevant to the Convention. The Convention provides for
OPCW inspectors to access CW storage sites, production and destruction facilities and other
declared facilities. The Schedules comprise CWAs and their precursors, arranged in three
schedules according to the risks they pose to the object and purpose of the Convention. The
Schedules include both individual chemicals and ‘families of chemicals’, intended to act as
‘catch-all’ chemical structures, representing compounds that could theoretically be
expected to have sufficient toxicity for use as CWs. Key precursors of scheduled CWAs are
also included. Many scheduled chemicals and precursors monitored under the Convention
are dual-use chemicals commonly used in industry, often in large quantities, for legitimate
purposes.6
OPCW inspections may include the collection and analysis of samples. For routine
inspections that include on-site analysis, screening techniques are employed that are
designed to detect ambiguities, but not to reveal confidential business information unre-
lated to the inspection. There is provision for off-site analysis for a sample, by at least two of
the OPCW’s network of Designated Laboratories,7,8 after sample splitting at the OPCW
Laboratory. Off-site analysis could involve the verification of ambiguities detected in the on-
site analysis or in IAUs, involving unambiguous identification using two independent
analysis techniques by two independent laboratories (which are blinded from one another).
From April 1997 to October 2017, the OPCW has undertaken routine inspections of
declared industrial facilities, on the territories of over 86 States Parties, and monitored
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 3

the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles within those States possessing them. 9
While chemicals in the Schedules are monitored under the Convention, the Convention’s
General Purpose Criterion ensures that any chemical intended for use as a chemical
weapon (defined under Article II of the Convention) would be prohibited; this includes
toxic chemicals not specifically listed in the Schedules.

OPCW contingency operations

Since 2013, the OPCW has undertaken contingency operations, beginning with the UN-led
mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, that have included non-routine inspection, verification
and technical assistance activities in Syria, Libya and Iraq.10 These contingency operations
have included the collection of environmental and biomedical samples, documents, digital
evidence and witness accounts. More recently, the OPCW undertook Technical Assistance
Visits to the UK in response to incidents of the use of a highly toxic nerve agent in Salisbury11
and Amesbury.12
A Fact Finding Mission (FFM) was established in 2014, through a special arrangement
made by the OPCW Executive Council ‘to establish facts surrounding allegations of the
use of toxic chemicals, reportedly chlorine, for hostile purposes in the Syrian Arab
Republic’.13 This arrangement excluded the attribution of responsibility.
For the OPCW inspectors, contingency operations have presented a range of challenges.
Reliable information is needed to guide mission planning, scene assessment and conduct of
the operation. In addition to information that may be provided by the State Party where the
operation takes place, situational awareness for the safe assessment of the scene can be
informed by a number of factors, some of which may be difficult to verify, and may include
information regarding alleged casualties and reported symptoms, open source and social
media reporting, imaging, and witness accounts. The assessment of the scene is required to
identify potential hazards, allow mitigation/avoidance of hazards, and decisions relating to
appropriate protective clothing, detection equipment and sampling systems. This assess-
ment would also facilitate the identification of sampling ‘hot spots’ to identify the location
and type of samples that will provide the most useful information. More accurate character-
ization of the chemical(s) used would result in more accurate assessments of hazard,
facilitating measures to refine the response and sampling procedures. For the inspection
teams, these activities are more difficult when undertaken in hostile environments, such as
those involving extreme weather conditions, and dynamic security situations. The work of
the inspectors can also be hampered by restrictions or delays related to dangerous goods
shipments for equipment (for example, laboratory gases, radioactive sources associated
with detection equipment) or problems inherent in the transport of samples for
analysis.14–16
These operations have highlighted the need for technical solutions that will sup-
port the assessment of the scene, reduce the time required for inspectors to remain
at the site, and provide representative samples, information and materials from the
scene. Science and technology can play an important role in supporting safe and
effective sample collection, hazard assessment and protection in challenging
environments.15,16
In June 2018, a Special Session of the Conference of States Parties was convened to
address the threat of chemical weapons use.17 In response, the OPCW Director-General
4 V. BORRETT ET AL.

undertook to strengthen the OPCW’s capabilities for investigative work,18 which has
resulted in the planning for, and progress towards, the establishment of an attribution
team within its Technical Secretariat.

OPCW laboratory and equipment store

The contingency operations also have implications for the OPCW Laboratory and
Equipment Store. Since entry-into-force of the Convention, the role of the laboratory had
mainly involved supporting routine inspections through the preparation and calibration of
inspection equipment; management of the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD);
training and international cooperation activities; preparedness for receipt, splitting and
transport of samples; and coordinating the proficiency testing for Designated
Laboratories (with their assistance). The Designated Laboratories are an international net-
work of laboratories with expertise in the characterization of chemicals relevant to the
Convention.7,8 The designation process occurs through a series of proficiency tests. These
are extremely difficult and only those laboratories with a high degree of knowledge and
expertise will acquire and maintain their Designated Laboratory status. Until 2016, these
tests had been exclusively for environmental samples; the first official OPCW biomedical
sample proficiency test was conducted from February to June 2016. A regime for the
designation of laboratories for biomedical samples was developed and implemented,
resulting in the establishment of a Designated Laboratory network for biomedical
samples.8 The Designated Laboratory network represents an international network where
capabilities, experience and expertise can be continuously shared in support of the
Convention. This continues a long history of international cooperation between laboratories
for the characterization of CWAs and related chemicals. From 1977 and the early negotia-
tions of the Convention at the United Nations Disarmament Committee in Geneva,19
through the Preparatory Commission20 and on to this day, VERIFIN (the Finnish Institute
for the Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, University of Helsinki, Finland) has
led the publication of the ‘Blue Books’.21 This endeavour has involved a series of round robin
exercises dating back to the 1980s and, since 1994, the provision of Recommended
Operating Procedures (ROPs) for the analysis of chemicals relevant to the Convention. The
most recent ‘Blue Book’ was published in 2017 and is available online.22
The OPCW contingency operations saw large numbers of samples transported to its
laboratory, requiring their management, splitting and transport, and liaison with the
Designated Laboratories undertaking the analysis.23 They also saw the collection of
biomedical samples for analysis. This had the potential to put pressure on laboratory
capacity and functions.
There can be logistical challenges for the collection, transport and storage of samples,
as they may require special handling due to their toxicity, hazard and vulnerability to
degradation depending on the conditions. This can also have implications for the
workflow and any concurrent activities within a laboratory. The impact on the OPCW
Laboratory and Equipment Store for the management of equipment required to support
contingency operations must also be considered.
With a view toward future needs, the OPCW has developed a plan for the
construction of a purpose-built Centre for Chemistry and Technology to provide
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 5

suitable capacity and capability and to facilitate alignment with developments in

science and technology and new chemical weapons threats.24–26

National capability
The investigation by jurisdictional authorities of possible terrorist, or other criminal
use, of CWs would also involve hazard assessment of relevant sites, and the analysis of
samples and other materials associated with an alleged incident. Under these circum-
stances, these authorities would sample suspected sites and items, to assist in the local
investigation and prosecution of the alleged offence(s). The investigation of such
incidents may involve witness accounts, the collection of biomedical samples, or the
sampling of materials from a dispersion device or dispersed materials and objects;
confiscated or intercepted materials; environmental samples; or materials sampled at
a suspected clandestine laboratory. Any casualties would most likely be treated on the
basis of their symptoms, as even with rapid detection and screening techniques there
may be some delay before the agent is identified. However, rapid characterization of
the chemical agent is important to guide operational decision making, and to assist
a criminal investigation that would be associated with the deliberate use of CWs.
In 2016, the Director-General announced the OPCW’s readiness to assist
States Parties affected by an incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals by a non-
State actor, with the establishment of the Rapid Response and Assistance Mission
(RRAM).27 The RRAM is intended to deploy at short notice, at the request of a State
Party, to provide assistance. In addition, the establishment of the RRAM enhances the
OPCW’s capacity and readiness to undertake investigations of alleged use of CWs,
consistent with its mission.

Impact of developments in and convergence of Science, Technology,

Engineering and Mathematics (STEM)
For the OPCW, recent events have marked a change in the types of operations it
undertakes, against a backdrop of technological change. The rapid pace of technol-
ogy development and the capabilities realized through research and development,
notably from the convergence of STEM fields, may provide new opportunities and
new tools for the implementation of the Convention;14,28 for example, for situational
awareness and assessment of a site; improved detection, hazard assessment, protec-
tion and medical countermeasures; new sampling technologies, tools and strategies
that may reduce the time that inspectors need to spend at the scene; and new
approaches that can identify sampling ‘hot spots’ aimed at reducing the number of
samples required (to reduce the burden on both the OPCW Laboratory and the
Designated Laboratories). Technological change also presents challenges to the
purposes of the Convention. For its Fourth Review Conference, the OPCW Scientific
Advisory Board addressed these opportunities and challenges in its report on science
and technology that may impact the Convention.29 The Convention provides for five-
yearly reviews of its operation, with the Fourth Review Conference having been held
from 21 to 30 November 2018.30
6 V. BORRETT ET AL.

Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)

The SAB provides specialist scientific advice to the OPCW Director General and States
Parties.31,32 The Board comprises 25 experts from States Parties who serve as independent
specialists selected for their experience and expertise in areas relevant to the Convention.
The SAB engages with scientific associations, scientists across the STEM disciplines,
academia, government laboratories, the OPCW Technical Secretariat, Designated
Laboratories, and industry. In preparation for its report to the Fourth Review
Conference, the SAB conducted four international workshops, in close cooperation with
national and international bodies, including the International Union of Pure and Applied
Chemistry (IUPAC), the Brazilian Academy of Science, the American Academies of Science
and Medicine, VERIFIN, the Croatian Institute of Medical Research and Occupational
Health, the French Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale
(SGDSN), and the European Union. The workshops addressed: ‘Chemical forensics: cap-
abilities across the field and the potential applications in Chemical Weapons Convention
implementation’ (Helsinki, Finland, 2016),33 ‘Chemical warfare agents: toxicity, emergency
response and medical countermeasures’ (Paris, France, 2016),34 ‘Innovative technologies
for chemical security’ (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2017)14,28,35 and ‘Trends in chemical produc-
tion’ (Zagreb, Republic of Croatia, 2017).36 These workshops, together with a review of SAB
reports and those of its Temporary Working Groups (TWGs), outcomes of the Spiez
CONVERGENCE workshop series,37–40 and literature and patent reviews, contributed to
the development of the final report. Intersessional reports in response to requests for
advice from the OPCW Director-General addressed medical treatments for casualties of
chemical agent exposure,41 scheduled chemicals,42 sample storage and stability43 and riot
control agents.44 The SAB, recognizing the value of this work to the broader scientific
community and policymakers, has also published some of this advice in the scientific
literature.
The OPCW Director-General can request the SAB to establish TWGs to provide com-
prehensive advice on key topics.31 The work of some of the former TWGs has covered
Sampling and Analysis, Verification,45 Education and Outreach46 and the Convergence of
Chemistry and Biology.47 In 2017, the TWG on Investigative Science and Technology was
launched.15,48,49

Temporary Working Group on Investigative Science and Technology

The lessons learned from contingency operations, such as the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in
the Syrian Arab Republic, have highlighted the need for continued broad engagement and
evaluation of technologies and methods (both current and emerging) relevant to the
verification regime. The OPCW Director-General in his response to the Report of the Twenty-
Fourth Session of the SAB, and the recommendations of the Forensic Workshop in
Helsinki,33 requested the SAB to establish the TWG on Investigative Science and
Technology48 to review the science and technology relevant to investigations (such as
those mandated under Articles IX and X of the Convention). The TWG held its first meeting
in February 2018.15
The TWG recognizes the importance of robust, impartial and expert capability for the
investigative functions of the OPCW to ensure consistency with the verification regime of
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 7

the Convention. As such, the TWG is strengthening links and expanding engagement with the
forensic community to support the development of recommendations and advice to the
Director-General, and the development of capability within the OPCW. The TWG is working
closely with the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW (in particular, inspectors and staff of the
OPCW Laboratory) to understand the challenges and requirements the OPCW faces within an
operational context (such that the TWG can provide meaningful and actionable advice for the
Director-General to consider). The TWG is also undertaking a review of best-practices, ROPs,
and approaches for the integration of multiple information streams.
The TWG has been tasked to address a series of questions through its terms of
reference (TOR),49 for which it has established the following subgroups.15

Subgroup A. Forensic methods and capabilities

(1) Which methods and capabilities used in the forensic sciences could usefully be
developed and/or adopted for Chemical Weapons Convention-based investigations?
(2) Are there stakeholders that the Technical Secretariat could usefully engage with
to leverage their capabilities on investigative matters?

Subgroup B. Data collection and management

(1) What are the best practices and analysis tools used in the forensic sciences for
effectively cross-referencing, validating and linking together information related to
investigation sites, materials collected/analysed and individuals interviewed?
(2) What are the best practices for management of data collected in investigations,
including compilation, curation and analytics?

Subgroup C. Sampling, detection and analysis

(1) Which technologies and methodologies (whether established or new) allow point-of-
care and non-destructive measurements at an investigation site to help guide
evidence collection?
(2) Which methods are available (or are being developed) for the sampling and analysis
of environmental and biomedical materials and can be used in the detection of
toxic industrial chemicals relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention?

Subgroup D. Integrity of scene and evidence collection

(1) What are the best practices for the collection, handling, curation and storage, and
annotation of evidence?
(2) Which technologies and methodologies (whether established or new) can be used
in ensuring chain of custody and verifying authenticity (especially in regard to
digital images and video recordings)?
(3) Which technologies and methodologies (whether established or new) can be used
to ensure the integrity of an investigation site?
8 V. BORRETT ET AL.

Subgroup E. Provenance
(1) Which technologies and methodologies (whether established or new) can be used in
the provenancing of chemical and/or material samples collected in an investigation?
(2) Do collections of physical objects, samples and other information for chemical
weapons-related analysis exist and can they be made available to investigators for
retrospective review? How might these collections be used to support
investigations?

Subgroup F. Additional considerations

● Sub-group F will address additional considerations, and provide advice on
Technical Secretariat proposals for methodologies, procedures, technologies and
equipment for investigative purposes.

The TWG held its second meeting in November 2018,16 where it reviewed its intersessional
work programme, received briefings from the Technical Secretariat and from international
forensic and related experts, and articulated the work programme going forward. The report
for that meeting will be considered by the SAB at its Twenty-Eighth Session in 2019; it will
provide a detailed update on the work of the subgroups.
To date, the TWG has identified capabilities related to traditional forensic techniques that
may be considered and how experts and laboratories relevant to investigative science and
technology might be engaged. It has explored the authentication and validation of data;
information and data analysis; cross-referencing of information; chain of custody and the
reconstruction of past events. The considerable expertise of TWG members in the analysis and
characterization of traditional CWAs, toxic chemicals and toxins, has been utilized to compile
information on relevant detection systems and point-of-care devices. Furthermore, the TWG is
considering the approaches used by other disciplines that employ provenancing and is work-
ing closely with the Chemical Forensics International Technical Working Group (CFITWG)50 and
its programmes on the provenancing of CWAs using chemical and impurity profiling. It is also
addressing non-traditional means for collecting and authenticating information, for example
using remote sensing, and exploring opportunities presented by digitalization.
Additionally, the TWG recognizes that site assessment, documentation, sampling and
analysis, and chain of custody may benefit from the application of technology solutions,
such as unmanned ground vehicles/aerial vehicles (UGVs/UAVs), remote and satellite imaging,
3D laser-scanning technologies, and inclusion of radiofrequency identification tags for mon-
itoring, tracking and chain of custody, and intends to provide recommendations to the OPCW
for how its Technical Secretariat could most usefully evaluate such technologies in support of
OPCW contingency operations. The TWG has a two-year term of reference and will complete
its work by February 2020.

Conclusions
The Convention is the first multilateral treaty that bans an entire class of weapons of
mass destruction and is significant in the extent and measures of its verification provi-
sions, which include on-site inspections. The Convention also contains provisions for
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 9

assistance and protection to State Parties. Despite the success of the Convention in the
destruction of more than 96.5% of the world’s declared CW stockpiles, the OPCW and
global community must remain vigilant and work towards a world free of CWs. The
verification regime should continue to be supported by new tools and capabilities to
meet new challenges. This mandate is provided for in the text of the Convention
through paragraph 6 of its Article VIII, which states that ‘in undertaking its verification
activities the Organization [OPCW] shall consider measures to make use of advances in
science and technology’. The continued development of investigative science and
technology approaches that provide robust, independent and expert capability, consis-
tent with the mission of the OPCW, requires close cooperation and engagement with
operational experts and the broader scientific community and, in particular, the inter-
national forensic community.

Acknowledgements
The authors thank the members of the TWG on Investigative Science and Technology: Ed van Zalen,
Crister Åstot, Augustin Baulig, Christophe Curty, Brigette Dorner, Carlos Fraga, David Gonzalez,
Robert Mikulak, Daan Noort, Syed Raza, Valentin Rubaylo, Francois van Straten, Paula Vanninen
and Farhat Waqar; as well as the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the interns in the OPCW’s Office of
Strategy and Policy (Nadine Gürer, Maria Hemme, Sofia Sola, Siqing Sun and Pei Yang) for valuable
support provided to the first two meetings of the TWG.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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