G.R. No.

205357 September 2, 2014

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
SENATOR ALAN PETER "COMPAÑERO" S. CAYETANO,Petitioner-Intervenor.

FACTS: Assailed in these petitions are certain regulations promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
relative to the conduct of the 2013 national and local elections dealing with political advertisements. Specifically, the
petitions question the constitutionality of the limitations placed on aggregate airtime allowed to candidates and
political parties, as well as the requirements incident thereto, such as the need to report the same, and the sanctions
imposed for violations
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties
for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of
the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their
right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections.
The heart of the controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation of the limitation on the number of minutes that
candidates may use for television and radio advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 (R.A.
No. 9006), otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. Pertinent portions of said provision state.
In addition, petitioner ABC also questions Section 1 (4) 11 thereof, which defines the term "political advertisement"
or "election propaganda," while petitioner GMA further assails Section 35, 12 which states that any violation of said
Rules shall constitute an election offense. Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, providing for a candidate's or political
party's "right to reply," is likewise assailed to be unconstitutional for being an improper exercise of the COMELEC's
regulatory powers; for constituting prior restraint and infringing petitioners' freedom of expression, speech and the
press; and for being violative of the equal protection guarantee.
Further, petitioners claim that Section 7 (d) is null and void for unlawfully criminalizing acts not prohibited and
penalized as criminal offenses by R.A. No. 9006
ISSUE: W/N Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
HELD:
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election
laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations - or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or
regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion,
but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is
not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner
in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis
Given the foregoing considerations, the traditional notions of preferring speech and the press over so many other
values of society do not readily lend itself to this particular matter. Instead, additional weight should be accorded on
the constitutional directive to afford a right to reply. If there was no such mandate, then the submissions of petitioners
may more easily commend themselves for this Court's acceptance. But as noted above, this is not the case. Their
arguments simplistically provide minimal importance to that constitutional command to the point of marginalizing
its importance in the equation.
In fine, when it comes to election and the exercise of freedom of speech, of expression and of the press, the latter must
be properly viewed in context as being necessarily made to accommodate the imperatives of fairness by giving teeth
and substance to the right to reply requirement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED, Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615,
as amended by Resolution No. 9631, is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, therefore, NULL and VOID. The
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, is upheld
and remain in full force and effect.
In view of this Decision, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on April 16, 2013 is hereby made
PERMANENT.
G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN.
EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
FACTS: On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP")
filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment
of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional,
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the
bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions
the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP
in law enforcement
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the
President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner
has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not
proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that
the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the
team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate
the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
ISSUE: The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not
petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the President’s factual
determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the
PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
HELD: Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved
is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the
grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the
limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or
validity, not its wisdom
President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge
such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there
exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no
evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because
the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional
provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this
Court’s duty of "purposeful hesitation" before declaring an act of another
branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the President’s judgment. To doubt is to
sustain. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is
evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes
and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police
forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 159139 January 13, 2004
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; ET al, respondents.

FACTS: On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the
AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Report on the Evaluation of the Technical
Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a
number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these
failures, Comelec en banc, on April 15, 2003, promulgated Resolution No. 6074
awarding the project to MPC. The Commission publicized this Resolution and
the award of the project to MPC on May 16, 2003. On May 29, 2003, five
individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines, wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman
Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent
MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process
had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well
as technical and procedural requirements they sought a re-bidding.

ISSUE:1. The COMELEC awarded and contracted with a non-eligible entity;

2. Private respondents failed to pass the Technical Test as required in the RFP.
Notwithstanding, such failure was ignored. In effect, the COMELEC changed
the rules after the bidding in effect changing the nature of the contract bidded
upon.3. Petitioners have locus standi.4. Instant Petition is not premature.
Direct resort to the Supreme Court is justified."17

HELD:The subject matter of this case is "a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest"; in other words, it is of "paramount public
interest" and "transcendental importance. This fact alone would justify
relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court
whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching significance to our society.
Petitioners’ legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.

Respondent Comelec came out with its en banc Resolution No. 6074 dated April
15, 2003, awarding the project to Respondent MPC even before the BAC
managed to issue its written report and recommendation on April 21, 2003.
Thus, how could petitioners have appealed the BAC’s recommendation or
report to the head of the procuring entity (the chairman of Comelec), when the
Comelec en banc had already approved the award of the contract to MPC even
before petitioners learned of the BAC recommendation.

Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste,

without adequately checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and
legal requirements. It also accepted the proferred computer hardware and
software even if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass
eight critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL

and VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of
the AES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the
subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions
(MPEI).55 Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any
other contract or agreement entered into with regard to this project.
G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., ET AL respondents

FACTS: On June 26, 1990; then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued
Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S.
Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within
a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one
(1) year. The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and
validity of certain memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board LTFRB)2 which, among others, (a)
authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the
prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB
and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency in violation of Sec.
16(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Service Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix and determine just
and reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus operators, and (b)
establish a presumption of public need in favor of applicants for certificates of
public convenience (CPC) and place on the oppositor the burden of proving that
there is no need for the proposed service, in patent violation not only of Sec.
16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating
that fares should be "just and reasonable."
ISSUE: W/N The instant petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order be sustained? And the DOTC
Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum CircularNo. 92-009, and
the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB is contrary to law
and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein.
HELD: Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is
permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. In the
case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus
operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is
illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated
cannot be delegated. The authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB to issue
administrative orders to regulate the transport sector, court find that they
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOTC Department Order No.
92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services
and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the
implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, the said
administrative issuances being amendatory and violative of the Public Service
Act and the Rules of Court. Consequently, we rule that the twenty (20%) per
centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994
without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no
force and effect. No grave abuse of discretion however was committed in the
issuance of DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 and DOTC Memorandum
dated October 8, 1992, the same being merely internal communications
between administrative officers. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED and the challenged administrative issuances and orders, namely:
DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-
009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are
hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE
PERMANENT
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,

vs.

RUBEN D. TORRES ET AL respondents

FACTS: A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December
12, 1996.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed
the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O.
No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
its implementation
ISSUE: W/N Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" be invalidated on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy?
HELD: As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold
issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of
the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to
be promulgated. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not
affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as
infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents
themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting
for the rules. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative
order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He
alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and
foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. The
right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the
people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on
the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-
keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger
that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating
dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-
worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone
will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a
way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost
its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say
we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental
right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved
in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 148334 January 21, 2004
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and
SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, Respondents.
FACTS: January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
("Senator Guingona") as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath
as Vice-President on 9 February 2001. Following Senator Guingona’s confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001
passed Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. On 5 June 2001,
after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005
also provided that "the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th)
Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. On 20 June 2001,
petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica ("petitioners"), as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for
prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming
with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election
for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so
far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all
the provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-006 declaring "official and final" the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed
in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.

ISSUE: (1) Procedurally –(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is the sole judge;(b) whether the petition is moot; and (c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.

(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May
2001.
HELD: The petition has no merit.
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office
and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded.10 Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,
the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the
Senate. On the Mootness of the Petition- Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or
board to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.11 Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done.12
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. On Petitioners’ Standing- Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed
bar the instant petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001,
petitioners assert a harm classified as a "generalized grievance." This generalized grievance is shared in substantially
equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election.19 Neither have petitioners
alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special
election held on 14 May 2001 "tax money [was] ‘x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protections against abuses of legislative power’ or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that
public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose." On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on
standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters’ suits involving the right of suffrage. Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount
interest is involved, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure, in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they raise important issues involving
their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again. Senatorial Seat was
Validly Held on 14 May 2001, Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the
14 May 2001 regular elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election

Evidently,
to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.

COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to

conduct the special election within the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose
to adopt the Senate’s proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court
has consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELEC’s wide latitude of
discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly,
and honest elections subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted
are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.