Introduction to NuScale Design

Dr. José N. Reyes, Jr.

Chief Technical Officer
NuScale Power Inc.

July 24, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Pre-Application Meeting
Rockville, MD
Outline
 Single Power Module
 Multi-Module Plant
 Refueling Process
 I&C Approach
 Multi-Module Control Room
 Engineered Safety Features
 Expert Panel Review
 Severe Accident Mitigation and Prevention
 Security and Safeguards Advantages
 Conclusions
2
Power Module

3
Power Module
45 MWe

 Simple and Robust Design

 Integrated Reactor Vessel enclosed
in an air evacuated Containment
Vessel
 Immersed in a large pool of water
 Located below grade
 Utilizes off-the-shelf turbine-
generator set
 Negatively buoyant (slightly)
module with seismic supports on
the side (not shown)
 Multiple fission product barriers

4
 Plant Characteristics
Power Generation Module
• Reactor Type PWR
• Electrical Output 45 MWe
• Steam Generator Number Two independent tube bundles
• Steam Generator Type Vertical, once-through, helical tubes
• Average Steam Generator Tube Length 22.3 m (73.2 ft)
• Steam Generator Tube Number ~1000
• Steam Cycle Superheated
• Turbine Type 3600 rpm, single pressure
• Steam Flow 56.1 kg/s (445,000 lb/hr)
Reactor
• Thermal Power 150 MWt
• Reactor Pressure and Core Exit P < 10.4 MPa (1500 psig), 575 K (575 F)
Temperature
• Primary Coolant Mass Flow Rate ~600 kg/s (4.76E6 lb/hr)
• Refueling Intervals 30 months, UO2, 4.95% enriched

5
Standard Materials
 Carbon steel containment
 Carbon steel vessel, stainless steel lined
 Standard PWR-type fuel (half-height)
 Stainless steel/Inconel steam generators
 Stress corrosion cracking issues reduced due to
lower operating pressures and temperatures

6
Core Design
Core Neutronics Optimization
Ø .8 11

 PWR Core Analysis Codes

C ro ss Sec tion B

Ø 1.70
Ø 1.5 0 Ø 2 .7 4 2

Ø .2 0 3 Ø 2.3 4 2

 CASMO-4 a a b b

a a b b

 SIMULATE-3 c

c
c

c
d

d
d

 Core Features
 24 - 17x17 standard fuel
assemblies
 1.82 m (6 ft) length
 Four control rod drives
 Four clusters/drive
 Sixteen assemblies with control
rod clusters
 Additional Core Design Goals
 Rapid load following

7
Integrated Reactor Vessel
Improved Reliability

 2.7 m (9 ft) OD , 13.7 m (45 ft) long

 7.6 cm (3.0 in) carbon steel vessel
with internal stainless steel liner
 Reduced operating pressure: 10.4
MPa (< 1500 psig)
 Natural circulation flow (no pumps)
 150 MWth UO2 LWR core
 Pressurizer heaters (not shown)
 Steam Generator
 Two Independent helical coil tube
bundles
 Two feedwater inlets
 Two main steam outlets
 Core shroud and riser
 Four CRDMs/16 control rod clusters
 Two reactor vent valves
 Two sump valves
 One flange location 8
High Pressure Containment
Enhanced Safety

 Capable of 3.1 MPa (450 psia)

 Equilibrium pressure between reactor and
containment following any LOCA is always
below containment design pressure.
 Insulating Vacuum
 Significantly reduces convection heat transfer
during normal operation.
 No insulation on reactor vessel. ELIMINATES
SUMP SCREEN BLOCKAGE ISSUE (GSI-191).
 Improves steam condensation rates during a
LOCA by eliminating air.
 Prevents combustible hydrogen mixture in
the unlikely event of a severe accident (i.e.,
no oxygen).
 Eliminates corrosion and humidity problems
inside containment.
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Multiple-Module Complex – Flexible Capacity
(12 modules – 540 MWe)

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Reactor Building/Turbine Generator Buildings
Transversal Elevation View

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 Refueling Process
 Reactor shutdown using normal feedwater
 Decay heat removal transferred to passive
DHRS
 Containment partially flooded
 Module disconnected from all piping and
instrumentation
 Module is connected to crane and transferred
to refueling pool
 Lower containment is removed
 Lower reactor head is removed
 Core is shuffled/reloaded
 Replace lower reactor head and containment
 Module is transferred back to reactor bay
 Module is reconnected
 Containment is drained and module is
restarted
Refueling Animation

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I&C Approach
 Multi-Module Operation
 State-of-the-Art Digital System Design
 Complete separation between safety and non-safety systems
 Redundant safety actuation systems
 Upfront PC-based testing to inform control room design
 Incorporation of lessons learned/data from related industries (e.g., air
traffic controllers)
 Human-Machine Interface Verification and Validation
 Single module testing
 Full-scale integrated simulator testing

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Multi-Module Control Room

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Engineered Safety Features
 High Pressure Containment Vessel
 Shutdown Accumulator System (SAS)
 Passive Safety Systems
 Decay Heat Removal System (DHRS)
 Containment Heat Removal System
(CHRS)
 Severe Accident Mitigation and
Prevention Design Features

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Decay Heat Removal
System (DHRS)
 Two independent trains of
emergency feedwater to the
steam generator tube bundles.
 Water is drawn from the
containment cooling pool
through a sump screen.
 Steam is vented through
spargers and condensed in the
pool.
 Feedwater Accumulators
provide initial feed flow while
DHRS transitions to natural
circulation flow.
 Pool provides a 3 day cooling
supply for decay heat removal.

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Containment Heat Removal
System (CHRS)
 Provides a means of removing
core decay heat and limits
containment pressure by:
 Steam Condensation
 Convective Heat Transfer
 Heat Conduction
 Sump Recirculation
 Reactor Vessel steam is vented
through the reactor vent valves
(flow limiter).
 Steam condenses on
containment.
 Condensate collects in lower
containment region (sump).
 Sump valves open to provide
recirculation path through the
core. 18
Event Response Logic
INITIATING EVENT1 DHRS2 CHRS2
Loss of Feedwater X
Station Blackout X
MSLB X
SGTR – 1 Tube bundle Unaffected
Train
SGTR – 2 Tube bundle X
LOCA w/o SGTR X X
1. Initiating Events cause Reactor Scram
2. Two independent trains each capable of 7% decay heat removal.

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Expert Panel Review
 June 2-3, 2008, a panel of experts convened to
develop a Thermal-Hydraulics/Neutronics Phenomena
Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) for the NuScale
module:
 Graham Wallis, Creare (Panel Chairman)
 Mujid Kazimi, MIT
 Larry Hochreiter, Penn State
 Kord Smith, Studsvik Scanpower
 Brent Boyack, LANL retired
 Jose Reyes, NuScale Power, OSU
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Preliminary Panel Results
 Large-break LOCA eliminated by design
 In other words, no large-break LOCA phenomena
 Since all water “lost” out of the primary system
can be recovered by opening the sump
recirculation valves, it is impossible to uncover
the core during design bases LOCAs
 Therefore even a small-break LOCA does not
challenge the safety of the reactor

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Severe Accident Mitigation
and Prevention
 Reduced source term due to modularization and
additional fission product barriers
 No need for combustible gas control in
containment (containment inerted)
 No molten concrete coolant interactions
 Reliable and redundant reactor depressurization
system (no high-pressure melt ejection)

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Additional Fission Product Barriers

 Fuel Pellet and Cladding

 Reactor Vessel
 Containment
 Containment Cooling
Pool Water
 Containment Pool
Structure
 Biological Shield
 Reactor Building
NOT TO SCALE
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Security and Safeguards
Advantages
 Safety maintained without external power
 Below-grade
 Power Module (NSSS and Containment)
 Control Room
 Spent Fuel Pool
 Low profile building
 Containment pool Impact Shield for aircraft

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Conclusions
 Simple and Robust Design
 Maximizes safety and security through
use of passive systems, modularity, and
multiple fission product barriers
 Natural circulation eliminates failure
modes and need for pumps
 Integrated power module eliminates
unnecessary piping and improves reliability
 Large-break LOCAs eliminated by design and small-
break LOCAs do not challenge the safety of the plant
 Probability of post-DCD design revisions are significantly
reduced due to simplicity of the design
 The NuScale design is based on decades of LWR
experience and incorporates numerous innovative
safety and security enhancements 25
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