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Barzley - Revisiting Public Management As A Design Science
Barzley - Revisiting Public Management As A Design Science
Barzley - Revisiting Public Management As A Design Science
In recent years, design thinking has conquered the chapters, Barzelay revisits the theoretical foundations
public and nonprofit sectors by storm. All over the of public management by explaining what a design-
world, design labs are founded in both academia and oriented public management encompasses (chapter 1),
government with an explicit focus on using design how the history of management schools has also
thinking to solve public issues. Examples include the shaped public management (chapter 2), the role of
Erasmus Governance Design Studio at the Erasmus mechanism-intent thinking and analysis in public man-
dialogue between the reader and the author concerning Not much is mentioned about public service motivation
the usage of design-focused case studies (chapter 6). (PSM), which is somewhat of a limitation as any descrip-
Third, the book includes a “Public Management tion of the intellectual tradition of public management
Gallery” (chapter 4), where foundational public man- should include the great theorizing on PSM done by au-
agement theories are being discussed. Barzelay right- thors such as Perry (1996). Another important public
fully claims that these are examples of “authors and management theory that could have received more at-
readings that everyone who’s educated in [public man- tention in the gallery concerns the literature on govern-
agement] should know” (p. 59). And, more import- ance networks. Much like the impact Bryson has had
antly, the gallery pushes readers to be confronted with with his strategic planning model, authors such as Klijn
a variety of theories about purposeful phenomena in and Koppenjan (2015) have theorized about (and em-
public management, which induces more generative, pirically tested) approaches to network governance and
critical thinking. If ever there was a book chapter or network management that have become core to public
article that proved that public management does in- management theory and practice. This would have been
Personnel Administration 37 (2): 139–159. doi:10.1177/07343 Perry, James L. 1996. Measuring public service motivation: An as-
71X17697248 sessment of construct reliability and validity. Journal of Public
Bryson, John M. 2018. Strategic planning for public and nonprofit Administration Research and Theory 6 (1): 5–22. doi:10.1093/
organizations: A guide to strengthening and sustaining organiza- oxfordjournals.jpart.a024303
tional achievement. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Simon, Herbert A. 1996. Sciences of the artificial, 3rd ed. Cambridge,
Klijn, Erik-Hans, and Joop Koppenjan. 2015. Governance networks MA: MIT Press.
in the public sector. New York, NY: Routledge.
Moore, Mark H. 1995. Creating public value: Strategic management doi:10.1093/jopart/muaa015
in government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Advance Access publication April 10, 2020
Local Accountability and National Coordination in accountability and good governance. This is said to
Fiscal Federalism: A Fine Balance, by Charles Hankla, be preferable to centralization because local leaders
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Raúl Alberto Ponce have a better sense of the needs of their local constitu-
Rodriguez is a book rooted in the political economy ents and centralized provision tends to ignore these
literature. It asks the question of why governments specific needs.
spend resources on public goods and services that are The authors want to extend the decentralization
often used by residents outside of their jurisdictions. theorem. They suggest that the truth of the decentral-
For example, the public transportation networks and ization theorem depends on whether the political par-
highways that are built and maintained by city govern- ties are integrated. Countries with integrated parties
ments are often used by the residents of neighboring have institutionalized parties that exist across mul-
jurisdictions. Even more so, city governments often pay tiple levels of government, where national leaders have
for this infrastructure to extend into neighboring jur- some power over their subnational partisans through
isdictions that do not pay for this infrastructure. The nomination and other mechanisms of control such as
assumption is that this is an inefficient outcome (this is career advancement.
otherwise known as free-ridership by non-paying jur- The first chapter introduces the core research ques-
isdictions or a negative externality). The authors start tion and then describes and defines democratically cen-
from this assumption and formally and empirically test tralized (and decentralized) systems and political party
the circumstances under which this spillover effect can (integrated and nonintegrated) structures. This chapter
be Pareto efficient.1 prepares readers for chapters 2 through 5, which con-
The book theoretically and conceptually begins tain formal explanation of the theory, including the de-
with Oates’ (1973) decentralization theorem, which velopment of propositions. Chapters 2 and 3 examine
suggests that the decentralized provision of local the effect of party integration and non-integration, re-
public goods is more efficient than its centralized pro- spectively, in majoritarian party systems. Chapters 4
vision. The specific reference is to decentralized dem- and 5 examine the effect of party integration and non-
ocracies, which are defined as having elected officials integration, respectively, in systems of proportional
and fiscally autonomous subnational governments. representation and open party lists. Overall, the pur-
Put simply, and this is important for the purpose of pose of chapters 2 through 5 is to formally examine
the book, democratic decentralization is the pres- forms of political institutions under party integration
ence of competitive local elections that encourage (and non-integration). This is useful because, although
public good spillover is said to be efficient under de-
centralized democracies that are integrated, demo-
1 The authors define efficiency in the classical sense of Pareto efficiency
wherein resources cannot be reallocated to make one individual better cratic electoral systems are different.
off without making at least one individual worse off. In other words, it is The sixth chapter (specifically Table 6.1) sums
the most efficient possible outcome. up the formal propositions advanced in chapters 2