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Single Variable Calculus Concepts and Contexts 4th Edition Stewart Solutions Manual
Single Variable Calculus Concepts and Contexts 4th Edition Stewart Solutions Manual
JEFFERY A. COLE
Anoka Ramsey Community College
TIMOTHY J. FLAHERTY
Carnegie Mellon University
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This Complete Solutions Manual contains solutions to all exercises in the texts Single Variable
Calculus: Concepts and Contexts, Fourth Edition, and Chapters 1–8 of Calculus: Concepts and
Contexts, Fourth Edition, by James Stewart. A student version of this manual is also available; it
contains solutions to the odd-numbered exercises in each chapter section, the review sections, the
True-False Quizzes, and the Focus on Problem Solving sections, as well as solutions to all the
exercises in the Concept Checks. No solutions to the Projects appear in the student version. It is
our hope that by browsing through the solutions, professors will save time in determining appro-
priate assignments for their particular classes.
Some nonstandard notation is used in order to save space. If you see a symbol that you don’t
recognize, refer to the Table of Abbreviations and Symbols on page v.
We appreciate feedback concerning errors, solution correctness or style, and manual style. Any
comments may be sent directly to us at jeff.cole@anokaramsey.edu or tim@andrew.cmu.edu, or
in care of the publisher: Cengage Learning Brooks/Cole, 20 Davis Drive, Belmont, CA 94002.
We would like to thank Jim Stewart, for his guidance; Brian Betsill, Kathi Townes, and
Rebekah Million, of TECH-arts, for their production services; and Richard Stratton and Jeannine
Lawless, of Cengage Learning Brooks/Cole, for entrusting us with this project as well as for their
patience and support.
Jeffery A. Cole
Anoka Ramsey Community College
Timothy J. Flaherty
Carnegie Mellon University
It was the good fortune of the new duke to retain amongst his
commanders Francesco Bussone, surnamed Carmagnola; and by the skill
and prowess of this renowned general many of the lost territories of
Milan were rapidly recaptured. Bergamo, Piacenza, Como, and Lodi
were again annexed to the duchy; Cremona, Parma, Brescia, Crema, and
Asti once more submitted; and Genoa yielded to the arms of
Carmagnola. These signal services were rewarded by the duke with
wealth and honours; who united the meritorious warrior to one of his
natural daughters, and even adopted him as his successor in the
dukedom, by the name of Francesco Visconti.
His well-earned trophies, however, were not long to be worn by the
gallant Carmagnola. Every day proved to him that, having reached the
highest point in his sovereign’s favour, the fickleness or jealousy of the
duke forbade him to look for a continuance of his regard. Without being
able to ascertain the cause of his disgrace, he found himself deprived of
his command, and even excluded from the ducal presence; and he
indignantly quitted the court of Milan, denouncing vengeance on the
ungrateful Filippo. As Venice was now in league with Florence and some
less considerable states, in order to check the increasing power of the
duke, Carmagnola offered his services to the Venetian government, and
was entrusted with the command of the allied army. The capture of
Brescia and other considerable cities soon reduced the duke to alarming
extremities, and he was happy to purchase a respite from this ruinous
warfare by ceding Bergamo and great part of the Cremonese to Venice.
But the good fortune of Carmagnola forsook him in a new campaign
against his former master; he received a complete overthrow by the
Milanese troops under Niccolo Piccinino, a defeat which was rendered
doubly disastrous by its mainly contributing to the discomfiture of the
Venetian fleet two days afterwards. Whilst the Venetian galleys were
attacked in the Po by those of Milan, the defeated general, encamped on
the neighbouring shore, was repeatedly summoned to the assistance of
his naval colleague. But though Carmagnola was still at the head of a
considerable armament he made no effort to accede to the call; and under
the eyes of the troops of Venice their fleet was entirely destroyed, with
the loss of eight thousand prisoners (1431).
After a short peace, the restless and ambitious spirit of the duke of
Milan again agitated Italy; and the papal dominions, as well as those of
Florence, were the objects of his rapacity. After ravaging Romagna and
defeating the Florentines at Anghiera, the Milanese general Piccinino
was recalled into Lombardy once more to the attack of Venice. But
besides her trusty general Gattamelata, the republic had secured the
services of Francesco Sforza, son of Giacomuzzo, the favourite of
Joanna II, queen of Naples. Francesco, endowed with the military talents
of his father, after leading the forces of the duke of Milan, saw reason to
abandon his patron, and devoted himself to the service of Venice. He was
now opposed to Piccinino, his former companion in arms, and the annals
of Italy are swelled with the splendid exploits of these great
commanders. But the genius of Sforza, if not superior to, was at least
more fortunate than that of his rival; and his glory was completed by a
triumphant campaign, in which he discomfited Piccinino and rescued
Verona and Brescia from the hands of Filippo. During a short interval of
peace the duke of Milan diligently laboured to recover the friendship of
Sforza, who was won over by the offer of Cremona and the hand of
Bianca, the natural daughter of Filippo. But the latter years of this
inconstant prince were spent in turmoil and distraction, and his new son-
in-law became the object of his bitterest persecution. Again reconciled to
the duke, and again exposed to his malice, Sforza still had good reason
for preserving his connection with Milan, since Filippo had no legitimate
issue, and his marriage with Bianca encouraged hopes of his succession
to the duchy. At the close of his life the duke again invoked the aid of
Sforza against the Venetians, and immediately afterwards terminated his
tumultuous reign.
With him ended the dynasty of the Visconti in Milan. Without
possessing the personal courage which distinguished many of his family,
Filippo Maria Visconti was endowed with no common share of that
keenness and subtlety which are frequently more efficacious than
wisdom and valour. He has been praised for the clemency and generosity
with which he treated his prisoners—no inconsiderable merit in an age
full of perfidy and cruelty, when, the gates of the prison once closed
upon the captive, his fate remained matter of doubt and secrecy. We have
already seen his extraordinary moderation, when Alfonso of Aragon and
his noble companions were led prisoners to Milan; nor are there wanting
other examples of the magnanimous conduct of Filippo. But a dark stain
rests upon his fame, from his unfeeling treatment of his duchess
Beatrice, whose alliance and ample fortune had rendered him the most
signal service, when in the outset of his reign he was beset by poverty
and threatened with expulsion from his paternal inheritance. An
improbable accusation of adultery with one of his domestics stretched
the devoted victims on the rack; and condemned by the ravings of her
imputed paramour the duchess suffered an ignominious death. In the last
moments of her life Beatrice maintained a calmness which can seldom
be commanded by guilt, and died with such solemn assertions of her
innocence as seem to have convinced all save her obdurate husband
(1418).
The House of Sforza
FOOTNOTES
[16] It will be of aid to have a list of the kings of Naples and Sicily, and of
the tyrants of Milan, presented here as a guide to the text.
K N S (1309-1496 . .).—Naples (House of
Anjou); 1309, Robert (The Wise); 1343, Joanna I; 1382, Charles III; 1386,
Ladislaus; 1414, Joanna II.
Sicily (House of Aragon); 1337, Pedro II, king of Sicily; 1342, Louis;
1355, Frederick III; 1377, Maria; 1402, Martin I, king of Aragon; 1409,
Martin II, king of Aragon; 1412, Ferdinand, king of Aragon; 1416, Alfonso I,
king of Aragon.
Naples and Sicily (House of Aragon); 1435, Alfonso I, king of Aragon;
1458, Ferdinand I, king of the Two Sicilies; 1494, Alfonso II; 1495,
Ferdinand II; 1496, Frederick II.
T D M (1295-1494 . .).—1295, Matteo Visconti,
lord of Milan; 1322, Galeazzo Visconti; 1328, Azzo Visconti; 1339, Lucchino
Visconti; 1349, Giovanni Visconti; 1354, Matteo II, Barnabò, Galeazzo II;
1378, Gian Galeazzo, Barnabò Visconti; 1385, Gian Galeazzo Visconti, duke
of Milan in 1395; 1402, Gian Maria Visconti, duke; 1412, Filippo Maria
Visconti, duke; 1447, Francesco Sforza, duke from 1450; 1466, Galeazzo
Maria Sforza, duke; 1476, Gian Galeazzo Maria Sforza, duke; 1494,
Lodovico Maria Sforza, duke.
W D B ,P
CHAPTER IX. THE MARITIME REPUBLICS IN
THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH
CENTURIES
THE AFFAIRS OF PISA AND GENOA
In the disputes between the emperors and the popes, the Pisans followed the
Ghibelline, the Genoese, the Guelf party. Both republics, too, late in the twelfth
century, often replaced their consuls by podestas, and both were the frequent
theatre of strife between the nobles and the populace. In Genoa, from 1190 to
1216, there appears to have been a struggle whether consuls or the podesta
should govern the state, for during that period we find both, and, from 1216 to
1252, podestas alone. But, as the popular assemblies were still convoked
whenever any important decision was to be made, and as the podesta, like the
consul, was elected, the citizens still retained some of their ancient privileges.
These, however, were not the only changes in the form of the executive; the
podesta was sometimes replaced by the capitano, sometimes by the abbate, and
at other times by the anziano—dignities of which we find frequent instances in
the thirteenth century. But none appear to have enjoyed a long lease of power;
often the very next election, according as faction or prejudice or love of novelty
prevailed, ended their name with their administration; they could, however,
hope that in the perpetually revolving wheel of change their dignity might again
attain the summit—a hope which was almost sure to be realised. “At present,”
says the archbishop of Genoa, who wrote towards the close of the same century,
“we have an abbot and elders; whether we must soon change them or not, no
one can tell; but at least let us pray God that we may change for the better, so
that we are governed well, no matter whether we obey consuls, or podestas, or
captains, or abbots.”
The good prelate proceeds to illustrate this truth by
[1262-1298 . .] quaintly comparing the different forms of government to
three keys, one of gold, one of silver, the third of wood;
though the material of these, he observes, is very differently estimated, one is in
reality as good as another, provided it does its office, that of opening. The first
capitano surnamed Boccanera, owed his election to the mob, whom he had
gained by flattery, and whom he persuaded to be no longer governed by
tyrannical podestas; his election was for ten years; a council of thirty-two elders
was elected to aid, or, rather, to obey him; a judge, two secretaries, and twelve
lictors were constantly to await his orders; and a knight and fifty archers were
appointed his body-guard. A man with powers so ample was sure to become a
tyrant; and we accordingly find that in the second year of his administration a
conspiracy was formed to depose him. This time he triumphed; but when half
his term was expired, a confederacy of the nobles, aided by the populace,
compelled him to retire into private life.
Into the endless domestic quarrels of the Guelfs
and Ghibellines at Genoa and Pisa, and the
consequent alliances—alliances of momentary
duration—contracted in both cities with the
emperor, the pope, or the king of Naples, we cannot
enter; and if we could, nobody would thank us for
the wearisome detail. As in Lombardy, the nobles
were often banished, and as often recalled. The year
1282 is more famous in the annals of both republics,
as the origin of a ruinous war between them. Pisa,
with her sovereignty over Corsica, Elba, and the
greater part of Sardinia; with her immense
commerce, her establishments in Spain, Asia, and
Greece, her revenues and stores, had little to gain
and much to lose, by contending with a poor and
perhaps braver power. If Genoa had less wealth, she
had equal enterprise, an equal thirst for gain, and
equal ambition. Where so much rivalry existed, it
AL A
would easily degenerate into discord; and petty acts
of offence were followed by general hostilities. In
one of their expeditions the fleet of the Pisans was almost destroyed by a
tempest; a second, by the enemy; a third, after a bloody conflict off the isle of
Meloria, was all but annihilated, and the loss in killed was five thousand, in
prisoners eleven thousand. These prisoners the victors refused to ransom and for
a reason truly Italian—that the retention of so many husbands in captivity
would prevent their wives from renewing the population, and that Pisa must in
consequence decline. This infernal policy succeeded; when, after sixteen years’
warfare, peace was made, scarcely a thousand remained to be restored to their
country.
But Pisa had other enemies; all the cities of Tuscany, with Florence at their
head, entered into an alliance with Genoa to crush the falling republic, which
had rendered itself so obnoxious by its Ghibelline spirit. In this emergency,
convinced how feeble must be the divided efforts of its municipal magistrates,
Pisa subjected itself to the authority of an able and valiant noble, Ugolino della
Gheradesca, who dissipated the formidable confederacy, and, by some sacrifice
of territory, procured peace. Not less distracted was the internal state of the
republic, now the Ghibellines, now the Guelfs being called by the populace to
usurp the chief authority. Though the Genoese had less domestic liberty, since
they were more frequently under the control of some one tyrant, they were in
general much more tranquil. In 1312 they submitted to the emperor Henry of
Luxemburg, but evidently with the resolution of throwing off the yoke the
moment he repassed the Alps; while the submission of the Pisans was sincere.
Two years afterwards the capitano or dictator of the latter reduced Lucca, and
humbled the Florentines; but such was his own tyranny that the people expelled
him. His fate is that of all the petty rulers of Italy; yet, though after this
expulsion the forms of a republic were frequently restored, the spirit was gone;
there was no patriotism, no enlightened notions of social duties; violence and
anarchy triumphed, until the citizens, preferring the tyranny of one to that of
many, again created or recalled a dictator. The war of the Pisans with Aragon
for the recovery of Sardinia was even more disastrous than that with the
Genoese. It ended in the loss of that important island, which had formed a
considerable source of their resources.
The evils, indeed, were partly counterbalanced by the conquest of Lucca,
which had sometimes proved a troublesome neighbour; but nothing could
restore them to their ancient wealth or power, so long as they were menaced by
so many rival states, especially those of Tuscany, and so long as they were
distracted by never-ceasing domestic broils. In fact, at one time, their existence
depended only on the imperial support; at another, on the dissensions or
misfortunes of their enemies.
The little republic of Genoa, which, in imitation of
[1284-1369 . .] Venice, had forsaken its podestas, abbots, elders, and
captains for a doge and senate—but a senate much less
aristocratic than that of the ocean queen, was scarcely more enviable, though
doubtless more secure. This republic, too, had its pretensions to Sardinia, and
consequently a perpetual enemy in the Aragonese kings. Often vanquished, it
implored the protection of the king of Naples or the duke of Milan, according as
policy or inclination dictated. It had, however, a better defence in its natural
position, in the barren rocks which skirted it to the north and east, and in the
valour of its sailors; and when, as was sometimes the case, its protectors became
its masters, the foreign garrison, being cut off from supplies both by sea and
land, was soon compelled to surrender.
But Pisa had no such defence; and in 1369 she had the mortification to see
the republic of Lucca restored to independence by the emperor Charles IV. On
this occasion the Lucchese remodelled their constitution; they retained their
anziani, or elders, with a gonfalonier at their head; both, however, in the fear of
absolute sway, they renewed every two months. Ten anziani, with the
gonfalonier, formed the seigniory, or executive government, and were assisted
by a council of thirty-six, called boni homines, and elected every six months.
Over these was the college of 180 members, who were annually elected.b
Of all the republics, Genoa, in the fourteenth century,
[1339-1458 . .] was accounted the most wealthy and powerful. But after
throwing off the yoke of Robert, king of Naples, the city
was agitated by continual commotions, in which the Guelfs and Ghibellines
were alternately expelled. The institution of an officer called the abbot of the
people, like that of the Roman tribunes, had been intended to repress the power
of the nobles; and the attempt to dispense with this office was resisted by the
commons, who chose for their abbot, Simone Boccanera, a nobleman of the
Ghibelline party, and a zealous advocate for the popular cause. But his noble
descent impelled him to decline an office which had hitherto been held by only
one of the people; and the multitude overcame his scruples by changing the title
of abbot to that of duke, or doge, in imitation of the Venetians (1339). A select
few of the popular leaders were nominated as his council; but the authority of
Boccanera appears to have been almost unlimited. He governed with firmness
and discretion, and according to Giovanni Villani a conspiracy of the nobles
was promptly and capitally punished. His reign was, however, suspended in
1344; the members of the noble families, Doria, Spinola, Fieschi, and Grimaldi
reassembled in the suburbs, and the doge avoided a violent deposition by a
secret retreat to Pisa. After some confusion, a nobleman, Giovanni da Murta,
was proclaimed doge; but as renewed disorder convulsed the city, the
contending factions agreed to submit their differences to Lucchino Visconti, and
the rapacious arbitrator was prevented by death alone from occupying the
distracted state.
After the death of Da Murta, a new doge was set up; but disorder within and
defeat without induced Genoa to throw herself under the protection of Giovanni
Visconti. On the death of that prelate she reassumed her independence; her
original doge was recalled, and continued to rule until 1363. But from the death
of Boccanera the state was torn by dissension for upwards of thirty years, and
two rival families of the mercantile class, the Adorni, adherents of the Guelfs,
and the Fregosi of the opposite party, alternately furnished Genoa with an
ephemeral sovereign. In 1396 the reigning doge, Antonio Adorno, by an act of
miserable impolicy, surrendered the state to Charles VI, king of France, who
deputed the government to a renowned captain, Jean le Maingre, marshal of
France, and lord of Boucicault. The stern severity of this approved soldier was
manifested on his entry into the city; and two of the most refractory citizens,
Battista Boccanera and Battista Luciardo, were at his command led out to
execution. Boccanera’s head was severed from the body, and his companion
was about to suffer, when a new commotion in the assembled crowd distracted
the attention of the French guard. The criminal seized the propitious moment,
and darting into the dense throng was lost among the multitude; but his place
was instantly supplied by the officer whose neglect had permitted his escape,
and whose head immediately rolled upon the ground at the mandate of the
peremptory Boucicault. For eight years the Genoese were overawed by his
rigorous government; but his absence favouring insurrection, the French
lieutenant was assassinated, and the state was delivered from the yoke of
France.
GRAND CANAL, VENICE
Naval Exploits
Notwithstanding the perpetual dissensions of Genoa,
[1337-1354 . .] she long continued to maintain her naval renown; and
whilst the plebeians were intent on the depression of the
nobles, the family of Doria were conducting her fleets to the discomfiture of her
enemies. Like her ancient rival Venice, she had long been acquainted with the
Levant; and Galata and Pera, the suburbs of Constantinople, were the reward of
services rendered to the Greek emperor.
After the peace of 1299 the Venetians, though
strengthened by the alliance of the Aragonese,
abstained for a time from renewing the contest; and
the first attack upon the galleys of Genoa was
punished by defeat and disgrace. A breach of faith
on the part of Venice was resented by the seizure of
all her traders in the Black Sea; but Genoa paid
dearly for this aggression, and a signal defeat by the
Venetians off Caristo nearly annihilated her fleet. In
1351 a powerful armament sailed from Venice under
the command of Niccolo Pisani, one of the most
distinguished commanders of his age; and a fierce
encounter in the Dardanelles covered the sea with
the fragments of the hostile vessels. But severely as
the Genoese suffered on this occasion, they might
fairly claim the victory, since the destruction of the
Venetian and Aragonese galleys was more than
double the loss which they themselves sustained;
AV N O
and Pisani admitted the defeat by leaving his
enemies in possession of the scene of action. Even (After Vicellio)
the seat of empire was threatened by the conquerors;
and the Greek emperor averted their vengeance by
the expulsion of his former allies from the capital. But the pride of Genoa soon
afterwards sustained a severe check; her fleet, under Antonio Grimaldi, was
surprised off Cagliari on the anniversary of the defeat of Caristo; and the loss of
more than thirty ships and forty-five hundred prisoners reduced the public to
despair. This disaster, however, was amply compensated by a splendid victory
in the following year, achieved over Pisani by Andrea Doria and his nephew
Giovanni; and to the bold and spirited manœuvre of the latter the success of the
day was chiefly to be attributed. Whilst the Venetians lay within the harbour of
Sapienza, a little island of the Morea, the younger Doria dashed into the port
with twelve galleys, and, placing his force between the shore and the enemy,
commenced a furious assault. Meanwhile the residue of the Genoese fleet
attacked the galleys of Pisani in front, and most complete victory was obtained.
The Venetians suffered an enormous loss of both vessels and men; and amongst