10

Hick’s Theory of Religion and a Muslim View

on the Inclusivist Option
Amir Dastmalchian

Introduction
It is often the case that the writing of an influential thinker is
preceded by his or her reputation. This is certainly true for John Hick
who is remembered by analytical philosophers of religion as the
foremost proponent of religious pluralism. But while a reputation
forged through personal relationships, conference addresses, and
university lectures is important, it is the writing of an author that
forms their enduring legacy and the means by which later
generations can assess their ideas.
While I do not claim any major discrepancy between Hick’s
spoken and written advocacy of his brand of religious pluralism it is
at least interesting to note that his religious pluralism is not entailed
by his theory of religion, as one acquainted with Hick only through
his reputation (as opposed his writing) might have expected. Rather,
I suggest, it is the case that alternative implications of Hick’s theory
of religion might possibly be inferred.

A. Dastmalchian (*)
Independent scholar, Leeds, UK
224 A. Dastmalchian
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 223
S. Sugirtharajah (ed.), John Hick’s Religious Pluralism in Global Perspective, Palgrave
Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11008-5_10
In discussing the way that Hick supports his views on the diversity
of religion we will also find cause to become more familiar with
those views by relating them to prominent terminology in
philosophical literature and to briefly suggesting at the close of this
chapter why, by way of example, a Muslim might want to reach a
different conclusion about religious diversity than Hick.

Hick’s Argument for Religious Pluralism

Hick’s theory of religion was developed over the course of some
forty years and is to be found in mature and complete form in his An
Interpretation of Religion (2004 [1989]). However, in the process of
defending his theory from heavy criticism from both philosophers of
religion and Christian theologians, Hick retold his theory in concise
form on many occasions. One particular summary of his theory
stands out not only due to its concision but due to the way it makes
explicit the premises upon which the theory rests.
In a philosophy of religion anthology, in which Hick contributes a
chapter on religious pluralism, Hick (2007, 219) says that his theory
of religion is inferred from four premises. The four premises (P) and
the theory (T) can be summarised as follows:

P1: critical realism—the view that there is a mind-independent

reality which can only be known through the medium of our
concepts and not in any direct way;
P2: critical trust—the view that it is prima facie rational to form
beliefs in accordance with our experience, including in matters of
religion, given that reality is ambiguous and lends itself to
different understandings;1
P3: common focus—the major religious traditions are each oriented
to ultimate reality (the ‘Real’) and they each recognise that it is
not humanly possible to obtain a full and complete understanding
of ultimate reality;
 10 Hick’s Theory of Religion and a Muslim View… 225
P4: moral parity—the major religious traditions seem to be as
effective as each other in producing spiritual and moral
transformation, that is, their adherents are generally as good as
each other;
T: there is a ‘Real’ which is both transcendent and immanent and
which humans can allow themselves to be aware of through the
medium of their different conceptual systems and spiritual
practices.

Hick’s own name for his theory of religion was the ‘pluralist
hypothesis’ due to the unity it envisages amongst the major religious
traditions, a unity which goes beyond that expressed in premises P3
and P4. In more concrete terms, Hick’s theory has it that religious
traditions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (in the West) and
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sikhism (in the East) are united in all
having metaphorically true accounts of the Real, at least insofar that
the Real is transcendent. But insofar that the Real is immanent the
major religious traditions have conflicting accounts of it as can be
seen in their various doctrines and rituals. In Hick’s writing the
distinction between the transcendence and immanence of the Real
has also been phrased in terms of noumenon and phenomena or in
terms of Real as it is in itself and as it is manifested in human
experience.
In his anthology contribution, after summarising his theory of
religion and the premises upon which it is based, Hick says,

The practical outcome is that the religions should accept each other as
different but equally valid responses to the Ultimate, should engage in
mutual dialogue, including tactful criticism of particular practices,
and should each gradually modify any elements in its own dogmas
which prevent this. (Hick 2007, 222)

A few things should be noted about this statement of Hick’s by way

of interpretation.
Firstly, by the ‘Ultimate’ Hick refers to the ‘Real’ mentioned in P3
and T. As Hick (cf. 2004, 10–11, 236; 2010, 190) says elsewhere,
‘To avoid using a string of alternative terms, such as the Divine, the
Transcendent, the Ultimate, Ultimate Reality, the Real, I shall
226 A. Dastmalchian
arbitrarily employ the last.’ Secondly, Hick refers to ‘the religions’
by which I understand ‘the religious traditions’. As Legenhausen
(2006, para. 15) recognises, ‘The difference can be crucial.’ Given
that P3, P4, and T relate to the major religious traditions it seems
safe to presume that Hick’s statement above also refers to them, after
all, ‘the religions’ themselves are but inanimate human constructs—
systems of belief and ritual—which could not possibly undergo the
human activities to which Hick refers, namely, engagement,
dialogue, and reform. While I believe the presumption that Hick
refers to ‘religious traditions’ is plausible, Hick could have also been
referring to the religions insofar that they each have a core teaching
which is independent of the human developments and
interpretations.
Thirdly, Hick himself suggests three outcomes (O) of his theory of
religion which we can represent as follows:

O1: the major religious traditions are equally valid responses to the
Real; O2: members of the major religious traditions should engage in
dialogue;
O3: if the dogmas of the major religious traditions prevent dialogue
then they should be revised.

In this chapter I will accept T together with the epistemological

premises, P1 and P2, and the empirical premises, P3 and P4.
However, I want to take issue with O1. Clearly, O1 is not entailed by
T, just as T is not entailed by any of its premises and so there is
plenty of scope to infer a different outcome of T. In other words, I
will be arguing that a person could consistently affirm T but also
affirm that the major religious traditions are not necessarily equally
valid responses to the Real (cf. Ward 1990). While this point may
seem trivial it is not a point which I believe has been given any
recognition by students of Hick’s philosophy. Recognising that O1
has plausible alternatives would undermine the force with which
Hick defended it in his writings.
As already stated, the above presentation of Hick’s theory of
religion is especially concise, yet I believe it will suffice for the
purposes of this chapter. The terminology used to discuss religion
 10 Hick’s Theory of Religion and a Muslim View… 227
and its diversity will next be explained so that Hick’s perspective on
O1 may be examined and possible alternatives considered.
The Terminology of Religious Diversity
As Hick’s theory of religion was being developed and then
defended, so too was a terminology for discussing such theories and
their implications. This terminology appears to have been first used
in print by Race (1983), a student of Hick, but was also used by Hick
(1985, chap. 3) himself soon after, as well as by D’Costa (1986),
another student of Hick. As
Hick was to say later,

In contemporary philosophy of religion it is customary to use the

tripartite distinction between exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism.
And providing we recognise a range of variations within each, this is
accurate. (Hick
2007, 216)

Hick was more disposed to the first-order activity of theorising

about religion and its diversity rather than the second-order activity
of categorising such theories and so he did not define ‘exclusivism’,
‘inclusivism’, and ‘pluralism’ in his writings even though he did
defend its use at some length (see Hick 1997). However, to get an
idea of what he could have been endorsing in the quotation above we
can consider the definitions given by Schmidt-Leukel (2005). The
reason Schmidt-Leukel’s definitions are worth considering is
because the ‘tripartite distinction’ (in Hick’s terms) or the ‘tripolar
typology’ (in Schmidt-Leukel’s terms) has been the subject of a
range of criticisms. Schmidt-Leukel identifies eight types of
criticism of the terminology but persuasively argues that his precise,
‘fully disjunctive’ definitions avoid these criticisms. Schmidt-Leukel
(2005) first designates a property—let’s call it X, although he calls it
P— as ‘mediation of a salvific knowledge of ultimate/transcendent
reality’ and then asks whether X is found among the religions, that
is, whether any religious community is correct in maintaining X.
(Although Schmidt- Leukel refers to the ‘religions’, following the
discussion above, I take it that ‘religious traditions’ is meant.)
Exclusivism is the position which holds that X is given among the
228 A. Dastmalchian
religions but only once. Inclusivism is the position which holds that
X is given among the religions more than once but with only one
singular maximum. Pluralism is the position which holds that X is
given among the religions more than once and without a singular
maximum. Atheism (or naturalism), then, is the denial that P is given
in any of the religions.
While agreeing with Schmidt-Leukel, it is nonetheless necessary
to recognise that the terminology of religious diversity can be used
for speaking of other than salvific knowledge. As Hick (2007, 216)
says, ‘the entire discussion can be conducted in terms of truth claims
or salvation claims or both.’ Legenhausen (2006) is particularly
aware of this and uses the terminology in conjunction with various
adjectives to discuss specific beliefs about religious diversity. It
follows that X need not just refer to salvific knowledge but could,
for example, instead refer to doctrinal truth, soteriological success,
moral truth, experiential veridicality, and so forth.

Hick’s Religious Pluralism

Now that an understanding of Hick’s theory of religion is in place
together with an understanding of the terminology of religious
diversity we can identify a few types of pluralism espoused by Hick
before continuing, in the next section, to elaborate upon one of the
main contentions of this chapter, specifically, that O1 is not entailed
by T. The motivation of this present section arises from the view that
by identifying, and naming, the various pluralisms espoused by Hick
we become better acquainted with his thought.
Firstly, we perhaps see ‘alethic’ pluralism (see Legenhausen 2006,
para. 4) intimated in P3 given that orientation to the Real is
mentioned alongside limited human understanding. In P3 Hick
appears to be concerned with truth rather than, say, the moral
orientation of P4 in which we see ‘moral’ pluralism. P4 is the result
of Hick identifying the presence of the ethical Golden Rule in major
religious traditions: to treat others as one would wish to be treated
themselves. Secondly, we see in T what Legenhausen (2006) has
termed ‘hermetic’ pluralism:
 10 Hick’s Theory of Religion and a Muslim View… 229
The sort of pluralism advanced by writers such as Ramakrishna
(1834–1886), Madame Blavatsky (1831–1891), René Guénon (1886–
1951) and Frithjof Schuon (1907–1998) could be called hermetic
religious pluralism. According to this sort of religious pluralism,
although religions are different exoterically, they share a common
esoteric core. Although the thesis of hermetic pluralism is
characteristically left rather vague, it is often presented as the claim
that the major religions lead to the same goal, which is a certain
perennial wisdom that comprises various metaphysical principles. A
hermetic pluralist could claim that the religions are equally effective
means for reaching this knowledge, or merely that the ultimate
wisdom is the same, or that some essential portion of it is common to
the esoteric traditions of the major religions. (Legenhausen 2006,
para. 7)

As Legenhausen (2006, para. 38) also says, ‘Hick’s pluralism […]

shares various features in common with the proponents of hermetic
pluralism, since he holds that religious differences are like the masks
of an ineffable reality.’
Thirdly, in O2 we perhaps see a hint at what Legenhausen (2006,
para. 20) calls ‘normative’ pluralism which advocates equal
treatment for members of all religious traditions. This type of
pluralism does not lend itself to being formulated as a property of a
religion, or religious tradition, and so Schmidt-Leukel’s definitions
are not so useful for defining normative pluralism.
Fourthly, and most importantly for this chapter is the type of
pluralism expressed in O1. But before we can name this type of
pluralism we should seek to understand what Hick means when he
suggests that the major religious traditions are equally valid
responses to the Real. To do this it is necessary to infer a meaning of
a ‘valid response to the Real’ from Hick’s writing for he does not
offer an explicit explanation of this phrase. However, this phrase is
at the heart of Hick’s reflections on religion as the subtitle of An
Interpretation of Religion (2004 [1989]) (which is Human
Responses to the Transcendent) makes clear; and so a good sense of
the phrase can be gained from considering the overall thrust of
Hick’s reflections on religion.
230 A. Dastmalchian
In developing his theory of religion, Hick explains the type of
language that can be used to describe the Real as it is in itself. He
says one form of language that can apply to the Real as it is in itself
is ‘myth’. For Hick (2004, 248) a myth is ‘a story or statement which
is not literally true but which tends to evoke an appropriate
dispositional attitude to its subject- matter.’ In other words, a myth is
a metaphor. Hick says,
the truth of a myth is a practical truthfulness: a true myth is one which
rightly relates us to a reality about which we cannot speak in non-
mythological terms. […] And true religious myths are accordingly
those that evoke in us attitudes and modes of behaviour which are
appropriate to our situation in relation to the Real. (Hick 2004, 248)

Immediately after making this statement Hick asks, in relation to the

Real, ‘what is it for human attitudes, behaviours, patterns of life to
be appropriate or inappropriate’? Hick answers his question as
follows:

It is for the persona or impersona in relation to which we live to be an

authentic manifestation of the Real and for our practical response to
be appropriate to that manifestation. To the extent that a persona or
impersona is in soteriological alignment with the Real, an appropriate
response to that deity or absolute is an appropriate response to the
Real. It need not however be the only such response: for other
phenomenal manifestations of the Real within other human traditions
evoke other responses which may be equally appropriate. (Hick 2004,
248)

The persona and impersona of the Real are, respectively, the

personal deities (such as Vishnu, Shiva, Yahweh, the Holy Trinity,
and Allah) and the impersonal absolutes (such as Brahman, Nirvana,
and Tao) by which humans experience manifestations of the Real.
The consequence of the foregoing is that we are now a little closer
to understanding what Hick meant by a ‘valid response to the Real’.
We can see that metaphors can be used to evoke valid responses to
the Real in the form of appropriate belief and behaviour. We can
also see Hick saying that the appropriateness of such belief and
behaviour depends on the manifestation of the Real to which is being
 10 Hick’s Theory of Religion and a Muslim View… 231
responded. So, for example, it would be appropriate to respond to a
conception of Nirvana with a life of self-discipline as prescribed by
the Buddha’s Eightfold Path (Hick 2004, 287). Similarly, it would be
appropriate to respond to Yahweh through annual festivals such as
Passover, Yom Kippur, and Rosh Hashanah (Hick 2004, 267).
Furthermore, that a manifestation of the Real is authentic depends
on whether it is in ‘soteriological alignment with the Real’. All the
major religious traditions are aligned with the Real, according to
Hick (2004, 303), but soteriological alignment finds its meaning in
transformation from our unsatisfactory present existence to a more
satisfying state (2004, 32–33) or, in alternative terms, from self-
centredness to Reality- centredness (2004, 51, 301, 303). According
to Hick (2004, 33), it is a characteristic of the post-axial religions
that they are soteriologically aligned. It follows that we can
understand a manifestation of the Real to be authentic, that is, a
genuine manifestation of the Real as it is in itself, when it promotes
positive spiritual and moral transformation (2004, 301).
A few more clues about Hick’s view of responding to the Real can
be gained from elsewhere in his writing. Hick says that there is:

an aspect or dimension of our being that naturally responds to the

universal presence of the Real. This is recognised as the image of God
within us, the Atman, the Buddha nature, the universal Tao, etc. (Hick
2007, 221)

Elsewhere, Hick explains a response to the Real in terms of

spirituality, for want of a better term, and contrasts this inner aspect
of religion with the outward institutional aspect.

The other aspect [of religion] is something for which we do not have
an ideal word, but which can vaguely be called spirituality, meaning
each individual’s inner response to the Divine, the Transcendent,
Ultimate Reality, the Ultimate, the Real. […] I wish we had a better
word for the inner response to the Ultimate than spirituality, which is
often used so loosely today […] but even so spirituality is probably a
better word for my purpose than such alternatives as piety, mysticism,
religiosity, or faith. (Hick 2005, 5)
232 A. Dastmalchian
Hick continues to describe the spiritual life as the ‘transforming
personal response to the Ultimate’ and the ‘living heart of religion’.
So, having explored what Hick could have meant by the phrase
‘valid response to the Real’, a reformulation of O1 could be offered
as O1*:

O1*: the major religious traditions promote ways of life which are
equally valid in terms of the spiritual and moral transformation
that they can bring about in devotees.
I suggest, therefore, that ‘path’ pluralism could be an appropriate
label for the type of pluralism Hick implies by O1. The sentiment
behind path pluralism could be that there might be different ways to
reach the summit of a mountain—some easier, some quicker, some
less risky—but ultimately, they are all valid ways and the reality of
the summit is independent of the means taken to reach it.

Are Alternatives Possible?

We have seen that for Hick hermetic, normative, and path pluralism
follow from alethic and moral pluralism and an epistemology that
embraces critical realism and critical trust. One wonders whether one
could accept Hick’s epistemic and religious premises while plausibly
rejecting his conclusions. In other words, even if a person accepted
Hick’s principles of critical realism and critical trust together with
alethic and moral pluralism, would he also be compelled to accept
Hick’s hermetic, normative, and path pluralism? After all, perhaps
alethic pluralism—while intolerable to many religious believers—
could be accommodated by some as a mystical thesis or as one
which expresses human epistemic limitations. Moral pluralism could
also perhaps be similarly accommodated by those committed to a
particular religious tradition but the closely related positions of
hermetic and path pluralism might be especially troublesome.
While it is difficult to generalise the views of religious believers it
does seem that many would certainly want to reject hermetic and
path pluralism and that they would find normative pluralism less
concerning, if at all. In terms of religious affiliation, over half of the
 10 Hick’s Theory of Religion and a Muslim View… 233
world’s population is either Christian or Muslim (Pew Research
Center 2015) and these two religious traditions have traditionally
been associated with hermetic and path exclusivism, among other
types of exclusivism. Christians and Muslims have traditionally
wanted to claim, and often continue to claim, something of special
significance for their own respective religions and reject the idea that
their religions are just one valid path among many.
I have already stated that Hick’s conclusions are not entailed by
his premises. Rather, Hick’s pluralisms were informed by close
personal involvement, even ‘comradeship’, with members of other
religious traditions together with study of world religion (Hick 2002,
227; 2010, 122–23, 180). It is interesting to note that the trajectory
of Hick’s own religious life has followed that of British society:
staunchly Christian at the beginning of the twentieth century but
somewhat less so at the turn of the twenty-first century (Bray 2021,
chap. 14; Brown 2001, 2006). As we would expect of any theory or
philosophy, Hick’s pluralist hypothesis was at least partially
informed by the society in which he was formed and with which he
engaged and not purely on the basis of theoretical considerations. In
one sense, then, a religious believer could accept Hick’s theory of
religion while rejecting his conclusions, that is, he or she would
certainly not be breaking any logical principles. But granted that
Hick’s pluralisms are not logical corollaries of his theory of religion
the question remains as to whether there are any plausible
alternatives to these pluralisms. If these pluralisms express
falsehoods then what position is closer to the truth?
As we have seen, rejecting pluralism does not entail accepting
exclusivism. A person who wants to reject hermetic or path
pluralism could adopt an inclusivist position which would not be at
odds with the idea that there are multiple ways in which a person
could be morally or spiritually transformed but which would insist
that only one way would be the best. The idea of grading religions
has gained a little attention by some authors (Cohn-Sherbok 1986;
Iwasa 2011; Yandell 2007), including Hick (1981) himself, and Hick
affirms that there is at least scope for religious traditions to be
empirically assessed.
234 A. Dastmalchian
Each tradition has its own distinctive religious ‘pluses’ and ‘minuses’,
for each is a different and unique mixture of good and evil. But this
fact does not amount to one of these complex mixtures’ being
superior as a totality to the others. If any of them claims this for itself,
that claim must be established by objective evidence. (Hick 2010,
188–89)

My suggestion is that there is scope for a Christian, Muslim, or any

other type of religious believer to agree with Hick in terms of
epistemology and the character of the major religious traditions but
argue that a particular religious tradition is a better path of moral and
spiritual transformation. Hick would surely argue that preferring one
tradition to another is arbitrary in the sense that it is relative to a
person’s own tastes and not any higher philosophical principles.
However, his claim is perhaps undermined by the way he treats pre-
and post-axial religions.
In his distinction between pre- and post-axial religions, Hick
(2004, chap. 2) implies that the former are inferior to the latter
because the former merely help their devotees to survive whereas the
latter help their devotees to thrive, that is, to go beyond self-
centredness and toward actualising human moral and spiritual
potentials. Given that Hick draws a distinction between different
types of religion, and in so doing passes judgement upon them, it
would seem that Hick should allow a person to continue to
distinguish, and evaluate, between different types of religion. If Hick
can prefer post-axial religions as being more sophisticated then he
should allow for the possibility that some post-axial religions might
be even more sophisticated than others in some regard. To recall the
metaphor of the mountain, perhaps it could be argued that one
religion presents a particularly effective path to moral and spiritual
transformation whereas others are less effective.
It must be admitted that the above talk of grading religions is quite
abstract. Religious traditions, being concerned with the
metaphysical, make few tangible claims by which their credibility
could be evaluated in the way that scientific theories, for example,
are evaluated. As Hick (2004, 12, 132) teaches, our view of the
religious and ethical aspects of reality are less impinged by facts
than our view of the physical aspect of reality (see also
 10 Hick’s Theory of Religion and a Muslim View… 235
Dastmalchian 2009, 84–87). Although it can be envisaged how to
establish a claim about subatomic particles or distant galaxies even
headline religious claims—such as there being the existence of one
God—lack the ability to be incontrovertibly verified. This is not said
to imply that scientific claims are better than religious claims but
only to draw attention to the fact that the two are of a different nature
and that evaluation is more difficult in the case of religious claims
(McKim 2008; Dastmalchian 2012).
Furthermore, it seems implausible to think that timeless, neutral,
and objective criteria could be established for grading religious
traditions. But while grading religions might be difficult it remains
the case that Hick’s pluralist hypothesis amounts to a subjective
assessment of competing factors.2 This is not to undermine Hick’s
insightful philosophy—for we would be hard pressed to do anything
other than be subjective in philosophy—but rather to put into context
Hick’s ideas and to draw attention to their limits. While I will not be
arguing in this chapter for the exceptional position of one religion
over overs, it is at least interesting to note, I suggest, that this is not
logically precluded by Hick’s philosophy.

An Islamic Inclusivism?
The point that Hick’s theory of religion does not logically preclude
non- pluralist responses to religious diversity is a realisation that has
been overlooked in discussions of Hick’s thought. It is a point that
enables one who accepts Hick’s theory to explore alternatives to
religious pluralism. So, for example, what might be interesting to
discover for a Hickean is whether one religious tradition could be
shown to be closer to Hick’s philosophy or to make its insights on
the nature of religion easier to grasp. While, to an extent, this would
involve circularity—for Hick builds his philosophy upon selected
teachings from the world’s religious traditions—the idea that one
religion could be preferred on philosophical grounds to another
would give rise to a unique type of inclusivism. Inclusivism is
usually a confessionalist stance in which one judges other religious
traditions from the viewpoint of his or her own (Byrne 1995, 3–5).
236 A. Dastmalchian
However, the type of inclusivism which would be of special interest
to a Hickean would be philosophical rather than theological: a
person would express a religious commitment based on
philosophical views about the nature of religions rather than, as is so
often the case, express views about religions based on a prior
religious commitment.
From the perspective of a committed Muslim, however, the
motivation for seeking a path to inclusivism might be seen, for
example, in verses of the Qur’an which emphasise that Muhammad
was not the only of God’s chosen guides for humanity. Addressing
perhaps Muhammad, but perhaps the reader or listener, God says in
the Qur’an (using the first- person plural, that is, a ‘royal we’),

We have indeed revealed to you as We revealed to Noah and the

prophets after him,
and [as] We revealed to Abraham and Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the
Tribes,
Jesus and Job, Jonah, Aaron, and Solomon;
and We gave David the Psalms;
and apostles We have recounted to you earlier and apostles We have
not recounted to you;
and to Moses Allah spoke directly;
apostles, as bearers of good news and
warners,
so that mankind may not have any argument against Allah, after the
[sending of the] apostles;
and Allah is all-mighty, all-
wise.
(Qur’an 4:163–165; trans. Quli Qara’i 2004; edited and emphasis
added; square brackets in original)

As well as mentioning a number of prophets other than Muhammad,

the above verses are particularly interesting because they make it
clear that God (Arabic, ‘Allah’) has not divulged all details of the
people He has sanctioned to guide humanity. The implication, then,
is that many of God’s prophets are unknown and we might be daring
enough to speculate that many of the world’s religious traditions
other than Islam also have divine origins.
 10 Hick’s Theory of Religion and a Muslim View… 237
Muslims see Muhammad as the last of a long line of prophets sent
by God to warn and guide humanity. As the above verse reflects,
Muslims are particularly aware of the prophets of the Judaeo-
Christian tradition and followers of Judaism and Christianity are
given a special status in the Qur’an as ‘people of the book’, or what
might be thought of as people in an alternative revelatory tradition
which has since been succeeded but which nonetheless has
genuinely divine origins. The Qur’an has little or nothing to say
about religious traditions other than Judaism and Christianity but the
above verses might inspire a Muslim to reflect upon them as also
possibly being traditions with genuine divine origins and, therefore,
worthy of at least some respect and recognition.
The Qur’an also speaks of unbelievers challenging Muhammad to
produce a miracle. The response is worth mentioning here as it
serves to buttress the point that God’s guidance has not just reached
Muslims, Jews, and Christians but that other religious traditions
might be worthy of respect and recognition too.

The faithless say, ‘Why has not some sign been sent down to him from
his Lord?’ You are only a warner, and there is a guide for every people.
(Qur’an
13:7; trans. Quli Qara’i 2004; emphasis added)
Moreover, a commonly-cited teaching (hadith) of Muhammad
states that the world has seen 124,000 prophets. Whether this
teaching could withstand scholarly scrutiny and whether it is to be
taken literally is debatable but the fact that it is widely known among
Muslims means that it is worth noting. One Sunni source presents
the teaching in a conversation between the Prophet and a companion,
Abu Dharr, as follows,

I said: ‘O Messenger of Allah, how many Prophets were there?’

He said: ‘One hundred and twenty four thousand.’
I said: ‘O Messenger of Allah, how many of them were Messengers?’
He said: ‘Three hundred and thirteen, a good
number.’ I said: ‘O Messenger of Allah, who was the
first of them?’ He said: ‘Adam’.
(Muḥammad ibn Ḥ ibbān al-Bustī 2012, vol. 1, p. 33)
238 A. Dastmalchian
A Twelver Shia source records the teaching as follows,

Authentic chains of reporters mention from Imam al-Ridha and Imam

Zayn al-Abidin (A) that the Messenger of Allah (S) said: ‘The
Almighty Allah created 124,000 Prophets and I am the most honored
one before Allah. However, I do not pride myself upon it. And He
created 124,000 Successors, among whom Ali is the most exalted.
(Majlisī 2003, vol. 1, sec. ‘Aim of Sending the Prophets’)

If this teaching is to be taken seriously then, given that humans have

a history of only around 100,000 years, a remarkable number of
prophets are unaccounted for in the Islamic tradition. The Qur’an,
for example, only mentions twenty-five prophets by name and hints
at a few others. Other names can be found in reports received from
Muhammad but these are hardly enough to bring us close to the
magnitude of 124,000. Again, the suggestion is, therefore, that a
committed Muslim might well be inspired to speculate as to the
possible divine origins of the various religious traditions in the world
today. Perhaps some of the religious traditions not overtly mentioned
in the Islamic tradition—such as Buddhism, Daoism, and Hinduism
—might nevertheless have been founded by unaccounted prophets.
As might be expected, there are also resources within the Islamic
tradition—including verses in the Qur’an and narrations from the
Prophet— which do not inspire the recognition of other religious
traditions within a positive framework. The brief comments here are
only intended to suggest that a committed Muslim need not
necessarily dismiss Hick and his ideas out of hand but rather that she
or he might continue to engage with them, perhaps accepting Hick’s
theory of religion but finding alternative implications of the theory.
That Hick’s ideas on religious diversity continue to be discussed
after his death is testament to their appeal as well as to his ability to
communicate and defend them. Despite declining religiosity in some
parts of the world the subject matter of religion continues to
captivate and those located in the contemporary world who seek a
more substantial understanding of religion than that received through
partaking in polemics and popular media will continue to do well by
reading Hick. It is hoped that the exploration of some of Hick’s ideas
in this chapter will help to keep the discussion of them alive.
 10 Hick’s Theory of Religion and a Muslim View… 239
Notes
1. Compare P2 with Swinburne’s (2004, 303) ‘Principle of Credulity’
and Alston’s (1991) argument for the prima facie rationality of
basing beliefs on religious experience.
2. This is similar to Hick’s (2004, 102) own assessment of Swinburne’s
(1979) argument for the existence of God where he criticises the
qualitative judgements involved to be too vague.

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