1.

Bondad vs Bondad
GR No. L-8092. March 14, 1916

FACTS:
The plaintiff, Rufina Bondad, had two brothers and sisters and on May 6, 1911, brought suit
against her brothers and sisters, and even the nephews to secure the partition on the property
left to these defendants by their father or grandfather, respectively, Crisanto Bondad upon his
untimely death on March 17, 1902. She designates the said lands to be divided.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff, Rufina Bondad is entitled to a partition of the defendant’s property
that was left by their predecessors upon their death.

RULING:
As clearly stated under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, articles 657 to 661,
that the rights to succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death, meaning
that the heirs succeed immediately to all of the properties of the deceased ancestor. The
property solely belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as
if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.

The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for
partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. The property belonging to the heirs,
in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right whatever to
intervene in any way in the division of the estate among the heirs. The plaintiff already received
her part of the property which was the one the plaintiff had 200 coconut trees under the land and
have possessed it for 10 years.

2. Estate of Hemady vs Luzon Surety Co., Inc.

GR No. L-8437. November 28, 1956

FACTS:
Respondent Luzon Surety Co. filed a claim against the Estate of deceased Hemady based on
the counter-bonds executed in favor of respondent by the latter who made himself a surety
solidary guarantor in all of the indemnity agreements entered into by respondent. Respondent
prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the indemnity agreements.

The lower court dismissed the claim on the ground that upon Hemady’s death, his obligation as
a surety was terminated. It justified its ruling that the obligation of a guarantor is strictly
personal. Hence, the same should not be transmitted to his heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether Hemady’s liability as a solidary guarantor is extinguished by his death

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Hemady’s liability as a solidary guarantor is not extinguished
by his death.

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact
that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.

Under the Civil Code, the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession, are subrogated to all the
rights and obligations of the deceased (Art. 661) and cannot be regarded as third parties with
respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased.
The heirs take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him
from whom they derive their rights.

3. Ledesma vs McLachlin
GR No. L-44837. November 23, 1938

FACTS:
Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff
Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her
as compulsory heir which the court however denied.

Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he left some personal and real
properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his
compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following such court action, the plaintiff
proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by
Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum
be paid out of the properties inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional
rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.

ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiff has the right to collect the sum promised by her father from her
grandfather's estate?

RULING:
No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father,
who died without leaving any property.

While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents
his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother,
this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations
contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with
the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from
their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their
father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom they
did not inherit anything.

4. Barrios vs Dolor
G.R. No. 559. March 14, 1903

FACTS: MANUEL BARREDO has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants, heirs
of the late Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, of one-half of a sugar estate and the stock thereon,
which he claims to have purchased from the said Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. In support of his
contention as to the law of the case he attached to the complaint a public instrument which
appears to have been executed by himself and Demonteverde, February 3, 1883, in which,
according to the plaintiff, a stipulation is made for a contract of partnership for the operation of
the said estate, and, furthermore, a community of ownership is established with respect to the
estate in favor of the two parties to this instrument. It does not appear that this instrument has
been recorded in the registry of property.

Service of the complaint having been had on the defendants, Doña Maria Pascuala Dolor raised
an incidental issue as a previous question, praying that the instrument referred to be ruled out of
evidence on the ground that it had not been recorded in the registry of property, and that it be
returned to the plaintiff without leaving in the record any transcript or copy thereof or extract
therefrom, resting this contention upon article 389 of the Mortgage Law. This motion was
granted by the judge by order of the 24th of March, 1898, against which the plaintiff appeals.

ISSUE: whether the defendants, as heirs of Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, can and should be
regarded as third persons.

RULING: The Mortgage Law itself, in article 27, gives the definition of a third person, which is,
"he who has not taken part in the act or contract recorded."

According to this the parties to a contract are not third persons; consequently, Demonteverde
was not a third person with respect to the contract entered into by him and evidenced by the
instrument in question. He not being such a third person, neither can his heirs be so regarded,
nor should they be so regarded with respect to the same contract, because they are only the
juridical continuation of his personality, they having been subrogated, by virtue of the right of
succession, to all his rights and obligations, in accordance with provisions of article 661 of the
Civil Code.

5. Ortiga brothers and Co vs Enage

G.R. No. L-6228 January 30, 1911

FACTS:
ISSUE:

RULING:

6. Estate of Hemady vs Luzon Surety co inc.

G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956

FACTS:
Respondent Luzon Surety Co. filed a claim against the Estate of deceased Hemady based on
the counter-bonds executed in favor of respondent by the latter who made himself a surety
solidary guarantor in all of the indemnity agreements entered into by respondent. Respondent
prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the indemnity agreements.

The lower court dismissed the claim on the ground that upon Hemady’s death, his obligation as
a surety was terminated. It justified its ruling that the obligation of a guarantor is strictly
personal. Hence, the same should not be transmitted to his heirs.

ISSUE:
Whether the surety liability of the deceased can be passed to the heirs

RULING:
Yes. Under our law, the general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.

While the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of
the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not
only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.

Under the present Civil Code (Art. 1311), “Contracts take effect only as between the parties,
their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.”

7. Bonilla v. Barcena
GR No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
On March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena filed an action to quiet title over certain parcels of land
located in Abra against Bonilla et al.

On July 9, 1975, Barcena died. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion
to dismiss was heard and during the hearing, the counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of
Fortunata Barcena and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband.

However, the RTC granted the MTD and dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person
cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the
plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a written
manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to
substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Barcena,thru his heirs, has legal capacity to sue upon her death

RULING:
Yes. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.

From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of
their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right
be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even
before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.

8. Uson vs Del Rosario

GR No. L-4963. January 29, 1953

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

9. De Borja vs. Vda. De Borja

GR No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa, filed for the probate of her will. When the
will was probated, Francisco was appointed as executor and administrator and herein appellee,
Jose de Borja, their son was appointed as coadministrator. Subsequently, Francisco took upon
himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco (Vda. De Borja). Even before the estate of Josefa
was settled, Francisco died. Tasiana instituted testate proceedings wherein she was appointed
special Administratrix.

Numerous suits b/n Jose and Tasiana arose. A compromise agreement was eventually entered
into. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Jose agreed and obligated himself to pay Tasiana
the amount of P 800,000.00 as ‘”full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary
share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa, and to any
properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.”

When Jose submitted the compromise agreement for Court approval with the CFI of Rizal
(probate of will of first wife) and the CFI of Nueva Ecija (probate of will of Francisco), Tasiana
opposed in both instances. She claims among others, that the heirs cannot enter into such kind
of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja.

ISSUE:
Whether the compromise agreement is valid?

RULING:
Yes.

The doctrine in Guevara v. Guevara wherein the Court held the view that presentation of a will
for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy, is not applicable to
the case at bar.

There was here no attempt to settle or to distribute the estate of Francisco among the heirs
thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the
estate of Francisco and Josefa.

Since a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such predecessor in interest, there is no legal bar to a successor
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent
of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the
effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor
heir.
10. Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon
GR No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

11. Baun vs. Heirs of Baun

GR No. 30750 October 24, 1929
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

12. Ibarle vs. Po

G.R. No. L-5064 February 27, 1953
FACTS: Upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land to her surviving spouse and
they’re minor children. The mentioned property was a conjugal property

The surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of land to the
spouses Maria Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed money for the support of
her children. The spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy then sold the same parcel of land to
the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle. The two deeds of sale referred to were not
registered and have never been registered up to the date.

Sometime in 1948, surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her
appointment as guardian of her children by this court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold
one-half of the land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which
portion belongs to the children of the above named spouses.

ISSUE: Which of the two sales made by Catalina Navarro is valid?

RULING: The sale to the defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly
different language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.

The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff
because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

13. Morales vs. YAÑEZ

G.R. No. L-9315. March 24, 1956
FACTS: A three parcels of land belonged to Eugeniano Saarenas, who died intestate in 1937,
leaving no ascendants nor descendants; that as his surviving nephews (by a sister) defendant
Proceso Yañez (and his sisters) took possession of said lots; and that plaintiffs are illegitimate
(adulterous) children of Eugeniano, born between 1910 and 1927.

Plaintiffs’ action is founded on arts. 287 and 988 of the New Civil Code, giving illegitimate
children the right to succeed, where decedent leaves no ascendants nor descendants.
Defendant Yañez (and his sisters) claim the right to inherit under the Civil Code articles 946,
947, and 948 — the law in force at the time of Eugeniano’s death.

ISSUE: Who shall inherit the parcels of land?

RULING: Applying the Civil Code, the trial judge absolved the defendant. He refused to apply
the New Civil Code that grants for the first time successional rights to illegitimate children.

Appellants contend, however, that for defendant to acquire a vested right to Eugeniano’s
property, he must first commence proceedings to settle Eugeniano’s estate — which he had not
done. There is no merit to the contention. This Court has repeatedly held that the right of heirs
to the property of the deceased is vested from the moment of death. Of course the formal
declaration or recognition or enforcement of such right needs judicial confirmation in proper
proceedings. But we have often enforced or protected such rights from encroachments made or
attempted before the judicial declaration. Which can only mean that the heir acquired hereditary
rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings.

However, a more conclusive consideration barring plaintiffs’ demand is to be found in Article

2263 of the New Civil Code which read:

"ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and
by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after the
beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with
this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be
carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments,
legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in no other
manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code.
According to the above italicized portion the rights of the herein litigants to the property of
Eugeniano must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code, because he died in 1937, i.
e, before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1949.

14. Bonilla vs. Barcena

G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
FACTS: Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of
Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over
certain parcels of land located in Abra.

The defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata
Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Counsel for the plaintiff confirmed
the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her
husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case
on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality
to sue.

The court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit.
Counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio
Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court
denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit.

ISSUE: May the children of Fortunata Barcena be allowed to be the defendants in this case?

RULING: YES, they’re allowed. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of
the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the
rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except
by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the
heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The
right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration
of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore,
died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus
acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There
is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in
interest for the deceased plaintiff.

15. DKC Holdings Corp vs. CA

G.R. No. 118248 April 5, 2000
FACTS:

ISSUE:
RULING: