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Introduction

Basically, in literal sense, jurisprudence is a knowledge of law. According to the Julius Stone
state that Jurisprudence is the lawyer’s examination of the precepts, ideals and techniques of
the law in the like derived from present knowledge in disciplines other than the law. For other
jurists, jurisprudence is a science as seen in Salmond’s explanation of jurisprudence in that it
is the science of civil law. However, such a positivist approach excludes the rationale for
examining rules and what they do in a social context.

Kelsen, Finnis and Dworkin has come out with question of interrelationship of law and
morality. They represent three conventional strands in the debate. Of the three, only Kelsen,
insisting from a strict separation of law and morality, would agree with the statement “It is
apparent that there is no morality in law” although I will argue, he inadvertently lets a
morality of orthodoxy in the back door. Finnis, a natural law proponent, argues that the law
should be imbued with a morality discoverable by a process of practical reason, but that there
is necessary connection between the legal and the moral. Dworkin occupies the middle
ground. Concerned to broaden legal analysis from a preoccupation with the pedigree of rules,
he also suggest that background principles firsts of political morality inform the law. I will
argue that Dworkin’s conception of morality is backward looking and denies an emancipatory
aspect to law making.

Although starting from different premises, each theorist, admits a conservative morality to the
legal sphere that is inadequate to the task of articulating a non-exclusionary vision for law.