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Mind, Text, and Commentary: Early Christianity in The Context of Antiquity
Mind, Text, and Commentary: Early Christianity in The Context of Antiquity
Mind, Text, and Commentary: Early Christianity in The Context of Antiquity
IN THE CONTEXT
OF ANTIQUITY
Edited by David Brakke, Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Jörg Ulrich
Blossom Stefaniw
Mind, Text,
and Commentary
Noetic Exegesis in
Origen of Alexandria, Didymus the Blind,
and Evagrius Ponticus
6
PETER LANG
Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften
Scholarship on early Christian exegesis is full of puzzlement at the commentator’s ap-
parent lack of concern for the literal or historical meaning of the text, usually explained
as the result of an illegitimate allegorical method. This study comes to grips with the
particularities of this type of interpretation by using tools from ethnography and literary
criticism. By analysing the commentator’s interpretive assumptions and the framework
of significances within which the commentaries were produced and read, the author
is able to solve a chronic problem in the study of early Christian exegesis. Further, she
articulates the social context of the performance of noetic exegesis and its significance
for monastic teachers, philosophers, and their audiences.
Blossom Stefaniw grew up in both the United States and Papua New Guinea, com-
pleting her undergraduate studies in 1999. After taking a Masters of Theology at the
University of Wales, she completed her PhD in Religious Studies at the University of
Erfurt (Germany). She is currently pursuing postdoctoral research.
www.peterlang.de
Mind, Text, and Commentary
Early Christianity
in the Context
of Antiquity
Edited by David Brakke,
Anders-Christian Jacobsen,
Jörg Ulrich
Advisory board:
Hanns Christof Brennecke
Ferdinand R. Prostmeier
Einar Thomassen
Nils Arne Pedersen
Volume 6
Peter Lang
Frankfurt am Main · Berlin · Bern · Bruxelles · New York · Oxford · Wien
Blossom Stefaniw
Mind, Text,
and Commentary
Noetic Exegesis in
Origen of Alexandria, Didymus the Blind,
and Evagrius Ponticus
Peter Lang
Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften
Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche
Nationalbibliothek
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Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is
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547
ISSN 1862-197X
ISBN 978-3-653-00187-7
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1
Studying Exegesis, Interpreting Interpretation 9
Introduction 9
Terminology 28
Chapter 2
What: What Manner of Thing Was The Text Beleived To Be? 59
Introduction 59
Constructing Revelation:
Interpretive Maintenance of the Authority of the Text 116
Conclusions 145
6 Mind, Text, and Commentary
Chapter 3
Why: Under What Conditions Was Noetic Exegesis Considered
Necessary? 149
Introduction 149
Conclusions 218
Chapter 4
How: The Performance, Embodiment,
and Acquisition of Noetic Skill 221
Introduction 221
Conclusions 296
Blossom Stefaniw 7
Chapter 5
Where: The Social and Institutional Context
of Noetic Exegesis 299
Introduction 299
Conclusions 363
Chapter 6
Noetic Exegesis 365
Introduction 365
Bibliography 387
Acknowledgements 415
1
STUDYING EXEGESIS,
INTERPRETING INTERPRETATION
Introduction
that was not an ancient linguistic turn, but rather the interaction of the
ideas and assumptions and social contexts analysed in the following
chapters. This book is about using some of the ideas which have arisen
out of the fascination with interpretation in recent decades to better
understand how one type of interpretive project worked in late
antiquity, what the aims and motivations were that drove it, and to
identify its relationship with its social context and with religion.
Since commentaries in the third and fourth centuries were not
exclusively produced in a context of scholarly privacy, there is a social
context attached to them which requires attention. While we have some
exegetical works which do represent scholarly treatments produced on
commission from wealthy sponsors, we also have exegetical works, from
Didymus the Blind, for example, which were produced orally and reflect
the impromptu setting of an informal lecture. Others, like those of
Evagrius Ponticus, were written for use within a specific context of
spiritual formation, and still others, such as those of Origen of Alexandria,
reflect a constant concern for the moral and spiritual progress of the reader
or hearer. In order to articulate a historical perspective on early Christian
exegesis, it is necessary to examine the social context in which particular
interpretations were generated and the function that biblical commentaries
had within a given community.
Also, given the role of the community which reads a text in
establishing the meaning of that text, the possibility presents itself that
the interpretations reached by the commentators, especially in cases
where these diverge sharply from the surface reading of the text, can be
Blossom Stefaniw 11
2
Philo of Alexandria, also known as Philo Judaeus (c. 20 BCE–c. 50 CE) was a
Hellenised Jewish intellectual who wrote exegetical works on the Pentateuch.
Clement of Alexandria, or Titus Flavius Clemens, (c. 150–c. 215) was a Christian
teacher and intellectual in Alexandria. The Cappadocian Fathers include Basil the
Great (329–379), Gregory Nazianzus (329–389) and Gregory of Nyssa (340–390).
Blossom Stefaniw 17
3
This is the only context in ancient sources in which these three thinkers are
explicitly named together as a group, as in Evagrius Scholasticus, h. e. 4.38.
4
Pall., h. mon. 4.20,80. See also the introduction to L. Dysinger, Psalmody and
Prayer in the Writings of Evagrius Ponticus, Oxford 2005, on contact between
Evagrius and Didymus.
18 Mind, Text, and Commentary
5
Origen died long before Didymus was born, although both Didymus and
Evagrius were familiar with his thought. While Didymus and Evagrius probably
met, they lived and worked in separate locations, and Evagrius completed both
his formal and his monastic education elsewhere.
Blossom Stefaniw 19
7
Each of the following chapters contains brief sections on the larger cultural
context in order to indicate the degree to which the interpretive assumptions we
see in action in the practice of noetic exegesis were current in non-Christian and
non-religious segments of the culture as well, and in recognition of the role of
context, both social and cultural, in making up the locus of meaning.
20 Mind, Text, and Commentary
10
This view of Origen is exemplified by R.P.C. Hanson, Allegory and Event. A Study
of the Sources and Significance of Origen’s Interpretation of Scripture, Richmond 1959.
Blossom Stefaniw 23
11
See R. Layton, Didymus the Blind and his Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria. Virtue
and Narrative in Biblical Scholarship, Chicago 2004, 2–3, for a full account of the
discovery and condition of the Tura Papyri.
24 Mind, Text, and Commentary
12
The works of Didymus which are included among the Tura Papyri have been
published in the series Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen (PTA) as listed in the
bibliography.
Blossom Stefaniw 25
Thus nearly one hundred years had passed since Origen had been
resident in Alexandria, and Didymus was already around seventy years
of age when Evagrius came to Egypt. We do not know anything about
his parentage or social status, although a certain degree of privilege
would have been necessary for him to acquire the education and the
familiarity with the curricula of the philosophical and rhetorical schools
which is reflected in his commentaries. Presumably his scholarly
activity also depended on a certain degree of assistance due to his
blindness but we do not know if this was provided by slaves, relatives,
students, or friends. Didymus is described as having, through his
learnedness and his fame as a biblical commentator, attracted the
interest of other fourth-century scholars such as Jerome, Rufinus, and
Palladius, and Evagrius is also said to have visited him, as noted above.
What is less clear is exactly what the social context of Didymus’
scholarly and pedagogical activity was. Palladius describes people as
visiting him in his cell, with the result that some scholars have
concluded that Didymus was a monk.13 On the other hand, Didymus
seems to have remained in or near the urban center of Alexandria, and
does not appear to have been part of one of the established monastic
communities in the region as was Evagrius. He can at least be said, on
the basis of the content of his commentaries, to have been active as an
ascetic teacher.
13
Ancient accounts of Didymus’ life and works can be found in Pall., h. Laus. 4.9;
Soz., h. e. 3.15; Socr., h. e. 4.25; Rufinus, h. e. 2.7; Hier., chronicon 8.812; vir. ill. 109;
Thdt., h. e. 4.26. Cf. PG 39.216–268.
26 Mind, Text, and Commentary
and then moved permanently to Kellia where he died at the age of 55.14
He became a respected monastic teacher and wrote his works of
spiritual development and his biblical scholia while a monk in the desert.
Evagrius’ works have also suffered as a result of his
condemnation as an Origenist. Recent scholarship has taken an
increasing interest in Evagrius, whose life and works are valuable
sources on the role of mysticism and philosophy in desert asceticism
and on the social networks existing among educated Christians in the
fourth century. For the present study, Evagrius, like Didymus,
demonstrates the link between noetic exegesis, the ascetic life, and the
process of spiritual formation.
Terminology
Specifying the exact definition of the term noetic exegesis, which I have
introduced to denote the broad interpretive project observable in the
commentaries, is a large part of the purpose of this study. In general, I
have chosen the term ‘noetic exegesis’ because this type of interpretation
is particularly concerned with applying and developing the νοῦς. The
term ‘noetic exegesis’ was also used by Eric Osborne in his 1998 article
truths contained within it. It should be noted that the term ‘noetic
exegesis’ is not by any means merely an updated alternative to
‘allegorical interpretation’, signifying more or less the same thing in a
less brutally inaccurate manner. This type of exegesis includes but is not
at all limited to allegorisation. Noetic exegesis includes the entire project
of perceiving and articulating the higher noetic content of the text,
15
E. Osborne, Philo and Clement. Quiet Conversion and Noetic Exegesis, in StPhilo
10 (1998), 108–124. The term is also used technically in philosophy and political
philosophy. In its original sense in Aristotle it indicates participatory
interpretation of the divine ground. That usage is very roughly compatible with
the concerns of the commentators examined here, but did not inform my original
decision to use this term.
16
The term νοῦς can indicate both mind and meaning, and the commentators in this
study fully exploit this ambiguity.
30 Mind, Text, and Commentary
this study is concerned with are, among others, the following: What did
involvement in the study of biblical texts through noetic exegesis signify
to others regarding an individual’s spiritual condition? What did the
commentators and their students feel they could achieve by performing
or studying noetic exegesis? Why does noetic exegesis continuously
appear in connection with asceticism and philosophical study? What
was the significance of performing noetic exegesis on the biblical text
rather than on other texts? These are all questions which are
unavoidable if we are to know what we are looking at when we look at
certain commentaries, but which cannot be answered satisfactorily by
finding out a given commentator’s sources nor by tracing his technique
or the recurrence of particular terms.
Serious doubts have been raised as to the applicability of the
Geertzian culture-as-text concept to the study of early Christian texts.
On the one hand, an anthropological approach has proven very
attractive to textual scholars, and the idea of thick description has been
widely appropriated by historians. On the other hand, Geertz’ theory
and the legitimacy of its application to pre-modern history has been
criticized. A historian is not able to interact with textual or material
evidence in the same way as would be possible for an anthropologist
working with a living informant, and the point that it is dangerous to be
seduced by the adulterous glitter of other discipline’s methodologies is
well-taken. Also, Geertz’ text-culture metaphor has been faulted for
eliding unavoidable differences between ‘both the status of practices
and the particular work performed by high literary and philosophical
38 Mind, Text, and Commentary
20
E.A. Clark, History, Theory, Text. Historians and the Linguistic Turn,
Cambridge 2004, 7–8.
Blossom Stefaniw 39
defended the position that meaning comes from the text itself in some
objective and determined manner.21
Fish engaged opponents of his view who objected that
identifying the locus of meaning as outside of the text itself and
determined by a given community’s interpretive assumptions, which of
course can change, is equivalent to claiming that the text means
anything that any one arbitrarily ascribes to it. This objection expressed
a feeling of offense on the part of objectivist literary critics, who saw the
substantiality of the literary canon under threat and felt that their
respect for the text as an independent object, and indeed the authority of
the text itself, was being attacked. A similar aversion to what is
understood as arbitrariness in the interpretation of texts has been behind
various criticisms of allegorical interpretation which portray it as an
irresponsible hermeneutic which allows any commentator to impose his
or her personal ideas on any passage of Scripture, a process which is
perceived as illegitimate and offensive to the integrity of the text. Fish
responded to the alarm of his colleagues by explaining that although the
text does not consist of an objective container of determinate meaning,
the meaning found in the text is still constrained by the interpretive
norms extant and applicable in the social context in which it is read.22
Thus even though interpretation is not a question of more or less correct
reading of a text whose meaning is determined by the language which it
contains, and even if one concedes that the meaning of the text is not
located within the text, one is not yet faced with total hermeneutical
anarchy and arbitrariness. There are rules governing the construction
and articulation of meaning when a text is read by a given community,
although the relevant rules are cultural and social rather than strictly
grammatical or literary ones.
In terms of this study, the concept that the locus of meaning is to
be found in the community which reads the text is being applied to early
Christian commentaries both in examining the social and cultural
context in which they were read and how that context constructed the
significances found in the biblical text being commented upon, and also in
identifying the interpretive assumptions considered applicable to and thus
constraining noetic exegesis. Granted that the locus of meaning exists in
the community reading the text, what exactly were the interpretive
assumptions from which our sample commentators proceeded? How did
these assumptions motivate and constrain their interpretations?
The link between this idea from Fish and the above concept from
Geertz also requires articulation. Both concepts are relevant to the
concerns and goals of this study, despite their diverse provenance,
because they are both concerned with the question of meaning and
significance. A thick description requires attention to the meaning of any
given practice (in this case the practice of exegeting and explaining the
exegesis of Scripture) to the community involved in it. Looking for the
particular interpretive assumptions which are manifestations of the
concerns and preoccupations of the interpreting communities is the same
42 Mind, Text, and Commentary
This study carries forward the work of several scholars who have
pursued and developed a cultural and literary critical approach to early
Christian exegesis. This direction in scholarship on patristic authors
represents a significant contrast to earlier studies on allegorical
interpretation which all too often were characterised by an evaluative
approach, criticising exegetes such as Origen for what was perceived as
a lack of attention to ‘the historicity of the biblical narrative’ and treating
Origen’s exegesis as the regrettable result of illegitimate philosophical
24
See for some early examples G.W. Bowersock, Hellenism in Late Antiquity,
Cambridge 1990, and G. Fowden, Between Pagans and Christians, in JRS 78 (1988),
173–182, and A. Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire. The Development
of Christian Discourse, Sather Classical Lectures 55, Berkeley 1991.
44 Mind, Text, and Commentary
25
This attitude is typified by R.P.C. Hanson, Allegory and Event. A Study of the
Sources and Significance of Origen’s Interpretation of Scripture, Richmond 1959.
Blossom Stefaniw 45
26
E.A. Clark, 2004, and E.A. Clark, Reading Renunciation. Asceticism and Scripture in
Early Christianity, Princeton 1998.
46 Mind, Text, and Commentary
Historians and the Linguistic Turn, Clark traces the development of the
linguistic turn and its influence on historians of pre-modern cultures.
The primary contribution of the linguistic turn to the present study is the
recognition of the importance of the role of the reader and of the fluid
boundary that exists between the text and the context in which it is read
and used. 27 The following chapters also avoid investigation of patristic
texts from a standpoint of theological monism and instead argue for
pursuing issues of the collaboration of readers with the text. Scriptural
commentaries are a clear case of readers, in interaction with the text,
themselves becoming writers, but the use of the text in specific social
contexts, such as the mental and spiritual formation of a group of students,
is also an example of how the reading of the text is at the same time its re-
writing, as it is invested with meaning determined by the context in which
it is read. Integrating the results of the linguistic turn into the study of
early Christian exegesis provides a coherent way to investigate the cultural
institutions surrounding the reading of biblical texts in a particular milieu
which is similarly pursued in the present study.
This book also pursues the same overall agenda which Elizabeth
Clark states in her introduction to Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and
Scripture in Early Christianity. The goal of this study is likewise to make a
contribution to the history of early Christian reading with special
attention to the ‘social location of writings and the institutional
27
Clark, 2004, 133. See also ‘From Work to Text’, in R. Barthes, The Semiotic
Challenge, New York 1988, 160; 163, on the collaboration of readers with the text.
Blossom Stefaniw 47
28 Clark, 1998, 4.
29
Clark, 1998, 5.
48 Mind, Text, and Commentary
30
J.D. Dawson, Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity, Berkeley 2002.
Blossom Stefaniw 49
have been inspired by the same spirit that animates the very
words they seek to understand.31
31 Dawson, 2002, 6.
exegetical method. I could not more heartily agree with the view that
the arena of cultural assumptions, such as conceiving ‘of the material
universe as interpenetrated by another reality which is transcendent and
spiritual’, 33 is the place to find adequate explanations for any particular
type of late ancient exegesis. Above all, leaving aside issues of method
means the question of the rightness or wrongness of other exegetical
procedures is not raised, and the status of patristic exegesis as part of a pre-
modern, non-Western culture is respected. Young is also sensitive to the
apparent contradictions of concealment and revelation in non-literal
exegesis in writers like Origen, so that her work has raised many of the
same questions motivating my own.34 Young also offers an assessment of
the significance for commentators like Origen of interaction with Scripture
which likewise demonstrates a sensitivity to cultural differences:
the commentators’ belief in ‘literary organicism, i. e. the belief that a work of
literature is an organic microcosm, created by an intelligent artisan in the
light of some pre-existing aim or intention’ as set out in Phaedrus 264c and in
the Anonymous Prolegomena to Philosophy. 40 This drive for establishing a
coherent unity, also evidenced in patristic commentary, is exactly the sort of
belief which I am analysing in this study as a part of the network of
interpretive assumptions driving noetic exegesis.
There has clearly been a strong desire in the scholarly community
for a more satisfactory state of clarity concerning the cultural
significance of the exegetical project as it appears in late antique
commentaries. Many of the above studies have demonstrated the
usefulness of treating early Christian exegetical works in terms of the
ideas and assumptions from which the commentators proceed and the
goals they aim to achieve in their exegesis. This is apparent in analyses
of a particular interpretive agenda (as in Elizabeth Clark’s work on
ascetic readers) and also in David Dawson’s study of the role of
allegorical readings in inter-communal maneuvering, both showing the
connection between the overt or covert aims of the exegetical
community and the manner in which their representatives interpret. An
awareness of the importance of the social or religious context in which
exegesis is performed is also persistent in this general line of
scholarship. The present study integrates questions of both the
interpreters’ agenda (in investigating persistent trends in the direction of
interpretation and the reasons for them) as well as the didactic or social
application of noetic exegesis (in the analysis of the pedagogical context
in which it was performed and its role in an overall project of mental, moral,
and spiritual formation). This study also adds to both of these concerns
through the identification and analysis of the interpretive assumptions
which link both agenda and application, thereby not only adding onto the
direction of scholarship described above, but also systematising the
methodological priorities which it manifests, namely attention to social
context and to the subjective preoccupations of the commentators.
Finally, it is necessary to articulate how this approach is distinct
from and more satisfactory than a theological approach to early
Christian, or patristic, exegesis. On a general level, taking a historical
approach means that an explanation for the manner in which particular
exegetes work is to be sought in their interpretive assumptions and the
social context in which they interpret, and not in their religious
confession. This is not to deny that Origen, Didymus, or Evagrius were
Christians or that they were true Christians. It is only to maintain a
chronologically appropriate level of skepticism about the degree to
which it is possible to know, without further ado, what their being
Christian meant for their exegesis or what it meant at all at that time. A
departure from a theological approach is also motivated by the
conviction that religion is part of culture and culture is stronger than
doctrine. It seems historically more plausible that particular exegetes
interpreted as they did because they considered it obviously necessary
56 Mind, Text, and Commentary
Introduction
see these thinkers functioning within a culture which gave certain texts a
privileged status and attributed special characteristics and capabilities to
them, so that the most pressing question was whether a given text
should be categorised as corrupting, deceitful, merely frivolous,
worthwhile, useful in forming young minds or, at the highest end of the
scale, capable of conveying intelligible truths. Specifically, this chapter
addresses the assumption manifested in the commentaries of Origen,
Didymus, and Evagrius that the text of the Bible is a vessel of divine
revelation whose content could appropriately be applied to moral and
spiritual development.
One may question the usefulness of investigating this point,
given our own habit of understanding the writings of the church fathers
as determined by their Christianity, which leaves us decidedly
unsurprised when we perceive ourselves as observing Christian readers
finding Christian revelation in Christian texts. However, the issue is not
quite as simple as it appears on a model which assumes that exegesis is
determined by religious confession. If exegesis is determined by
interpretive assumptions which could be and were held by members of
various religious confessions, then particular Christian doctrines such as
the divine authorship of Scripture do not explain why a certain text was
treated in a certain way. Rather, the doctrines themselves may have
resulted from the application of the relevant interpretive assumptions
within a given religious community: a text read as revelatory, whose
revelatory status has been practiced socially, becomes a doctrinally
legitimised deposit of revelation.
Blossom Stefaniw 61
that the text was a vessel of divine revelation, can be addressed in this
chapter. What I am here proposing is that the assumption of Origen,
Evagrius, and Didymus that the text they were interpreting, despite any
and all appearances to the contrary on the surface of the text, was
designed to convey divine revelation of higher spiritual realities, is
neither specifically nor exclusively Christian. Nor are the non-literal
readings arising out of this assumption evidence of a desperate attempt
to reconcile ‘philosophical’ and ‘Jewish’ frames of thought. Rather, the
assumption that certain texts have a special revelatory status and that
those texts require an appropriately extraordinary type of interpretation
is typical of the milieu with which we are here concerned, with its
involvement in spiritual guidance and philosophical formation. This
assumption was so usual among educated persons interpreting texts
within the cultural context of noetic pedagogy as to have appeared
completely obvious and unavoidable to these commentators- studying a
text which was not revelatory, or non-noetic readings of a revelatory
text, could at best be applied to the lower levels of education, to practice
in dialectic, for example.
What is of primary relevance to this chapter’s task of
understanding the role of this assumption in noetic exegesis is
demonstrating that the Bible was, by virtue of being read allegorically
(in the late antique sense of the word), maneuvered into a position of
parallel status to Homer, Plato, and other ancient writers. We then
turn to addressing the additional interpretive assumptions which
depend from this idea and constitute a first cluster of the interpretive
Blossom Stefaniw 63
41
R.D. Lamberton, The Neoplatonists and the Spiritualization of Homer, in: R.D.
Lamberton / J.J. Keaney (eds.), Homer’s Ancient Readers. The Hermeneutics of Greek
Epic’s Earliest Exegetes, Princeton 1992, 115–133 (122).
42 A.A. Long, Stoic Readings of Homer, in: Lamberton / Keaney, 1992, 41–66 (44).
44
R.D. Lamberton, Homer the Theologian. Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the
Growth of the Epic Tradition, Berkeley 1986, 1. See also R.A. Kaster, Guardians of
Language. The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity, Berkeley 1988, 16, who also
discusses Phocas, v. Verg. praef.24: carmen sacrum; Macr. 1.24,13: sacrum poema as
examples of this attitude toward traditional texts in late antiquity.
Blossom Stefaniw 65
47
R.P.C. Hanson, Allegory and Event. A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen’s
Interpretation of Scripture, Richmond 1959, 39.
48
Even if the text considered allegorical is not of one’s own religious tradition,
considering it so implies its value as a medium of spiritual truth: “Numenius
does, however, provide Origen with a valuable example of a pagan who (in
contrast to the ‘Epicurean’ Celsus) read and studied the Hebrew and Christian
scriptures and held them in respect ‘as writings that are allegorical and are not
stupid’ (hos peri tropologoumenon kai ou moron syggrammaton, Contra Cels. 4.51)[...]
It is clear to Origen that, in Numenius’ circle as in his own, to judge a piece of
writing worthy of allegorical reading is to lend it dignity and importance—and
he accepts this compliment to the scriptures.” Lamberton, 1986, 80–81.
Proclus explains that this text is really about progressively diluted levels
of reality and is not just a charming detail in the narrative by means of
which characters in the dialogue are conveniently introduced. He
reaches this conclusion by looking for the spiritual significance of the
fact that there are qualifiers like ‘this’ and ‘a certain’ before the names of
Antiphon and Pythodorus, while Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides’ names
are left unqualified. This suggests to Proclus that the latter represent a
more absolute, unified level of reality, while the former are closer to the
realm of multiplicity. That, for him, is an acceptable interpretation, but
concluding that this passage is simply about who told what to whom
would contradict beliefs about the type of meaning that traditionally
respected texts contain, and about the nature of such texts. Similarly, for
Proclus, Homeric myth is not about a completely gratuitous war over
somebody’s wife, but reveals higher metaphysical realities:
50
Procl., in Prm. 630.21–36. Translation from J.A. Coulter, The Literary Microcosm.
Theories of interpretation of the later Neoplatonists, Leiden 1976, 121.
68 Mind, Text, and Commentary
52
Lamberton, 1986, 37: ‘The use of the myths of Plato to explicate the myths of
Homer and the idea that the two bodies of story telling had like structures of
meaning were perhaps the most important developments in the history of the
reading of Homer in Platonic circles.’
Blossom Stefaniw 69
εἶναι ἀλληγορεῖν τι καὶ αἰνίττεσθαι διὰ τούτων τὸν ποιητήν).’ Thus the Homeric
56
M.J. Edwards, Porphyry’s Cave of the Nymphs and the Gnostic Controversy, in: Hermes
124 (1996), 88–100 (58).
58
Porph., antr. 59.21–25 (Edwards, 1996, 93): ὄθεν οἰκείως ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἂν ῥηθείη ἄντρον
ἐπήρατον µὲν τῷ εὐθὺς ἐντυγχάνοντι διὰ τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν µέθεξιν, ἠεροειδὲς δὲ σκοποῦντι τὴν
ὑποβάθραν αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν εἰσιόντι τῷ νῷ.
72 Mind, Text, and Commentary
The degree to which interpreters are willing to pursue details in this way
and to struggle with points in the text which seem paradoxical to them
indicates a very deep and deeply valued conviction that these texts
contain a higher significance and are able to reveal that significance if
interpreted appropriately.
Further, Mark Edwards has analysed the manner in which
Porphyry’s interpretation of this passage itself reflects his ideas about
the mental processes necessary for proper reading of revelatory texts:
59
Porph., antr. 4.
Blossom Stefaniw 73
Because of the reverence for the text which allegorisation (in the late
antique sense) implied, the legitimacy of searching for spiritual truths in
a given text through allegory is often an issue in intercommunal polemic.
Objections to allegorising either the Bible or Homeric myth, for example,
were grounded on the assumption that only a text which contained divine
wisdom could appropriately be allegorised, coupled with the author’s
conviction that the other party’s text did not in fact contain divine wisdom
but was merely a collection of stories. The denial of cultural ‘permission’
61
Or., Cels. 4.21 (H. Chadwick [ed.], Origen. Contra Celsum, Cambridge 1986, 197–8).
Blossom Stefaniw 75
with the stories about Eros related in the Symposium, portraying both as
legitimately allegorical.
It is especially of note here that Origen suggests not only that no good
Christian would make fun of Plato, but also that Christians respect both
the legitimacy of the Bible and that of ‘so great a man as Plato’, so that
the special interpretation of the Bible for him is an addition to the canon
of texts already accepted as revelatory in that sense, rather than a
replacement or substitution. As in the previous passage, Origen is
agitating for a treatment of Biblical myth as analogous to other myths
which are accepted as containing philosophical truths which must be
extracted through special interpretation. On the other hand, Origen’s
task suggests that he expects any traditional text or any text with a
special revelatory status to facillitate the spiritual formation of those
exposed to its contents. Here we see the link between the belief in the
revelatory status of the text and its usefulness in spiritual formation
which will be discussed further in Chapter Four.
Porphyry also objects to Christian figural readings, as recorded in
Eusebius’ Church History:
66
Eus., h.e., 6.19,4 (C.F. Cruse [ed.], Eusebius. Ecclesiastical History, Peabody 1998, 208).
Blossom Stefaniw 81
For Didymus, it is a sort of natural law that anything inspired by the Holy
Spirit also has a spiritual significance and therefore not only allows for but
also requires an interpretation capable of exposing that significance.
Didymus also treats an example of Porphyry’s polemic against
Christian exegetes in which he caricatures allegorical interpretation as a
68
Didym., eccl. 9.10 c–d (M. Gronewald [ed.], Didymus der Blinde. Kommentar zum
Ekklesiastes 5, PTA 24, Bonn 1979, 37). Also discussed in W. Bienert, Allegoria und
Anagoge bei Didymos dem Blinden von Alexandria, Berlin 1972, 142.
84 Mind, Text, and Commentary
69
G. Binder, Eine Polemik des Porphyrios gegen die allegorische Auslegung des Alten
Testaments durch die Christen, in: ZPE 3 (1968), 81–95 (93) refers to the polemical
comment of Porphyry (a facetious Christian allegory of Homer) which Didymus
treats as a means of demonstrating the absurdity of allegorsation so that anything
and everything refers to Christ.
70
Didym., eccl. 9.10 c–d (Gronewald, 1979, 39). Cf. Eus., h.e. 6.19,4 f.
Blossom Stefaniw 85
The assumption that traditional texts are media of divine revelation and
that they therefore require a special type of interpretation appears
persistently in our sample commentaries. In Origen’s Peri Archon, we
see evidence that Origen considers it obvious that the Hebrew
Scriptures cannot possibly really be about what they seem to be about:
72
Or., princ. 4.2,2 (G.W. Butterworth [ed.], Origen. On First Principles, Gloucester
1985, 271).
Blossom Stefaniw 87
For Origen it is obvious that reading a text to ‘assure oneself of the facts
it tells’ is an inadequate use of Scripture. The concern of noetic exegetes
when they read was to ‘penetrate to the deep things’, so that, as we will
see in Chapter Four, interpretive assumptions about the nature of the
text have implications for further assumptions about what the act of
reading should involve. This conviction at the same time maneuvers the
Gospel narrative into the same category as other privileged traditional
texts, but also reflects the cultural and chronological distance of the late
antique reader, who has difficulty seeing the value or coherence in the
surface narrative.
In Origen’s Commentary on Matthew, the Gospel text is described
as referring to ‘unspeakable and mysterious things’ and as a ‘revelation
of things fundamentally beyond mere letters’. In the same passage
Origen claims that he himself is ‘far from able to penetrate to the depths
of what is here revealed’. 74 For Origen, while actually perceiving the
divine content of the text requires special dedication and ability, the
revelatory capacity of the Scriptures is something even uneducated
Christians are aware of:
Accordingly, the need to depart from the literal meaning and pursue the
higher significance of the text through special forms of exegesis seems a
question of plain common sense to Origen, especially when the literal
meaning appears to him to be incoherent as in the following:
74
Or., comm. in Mt. 14.12 (H.J. Vogt [ed.], Der Kommentar zum Evangelium nach
Mattäus 2, BGrL 18/30/38, Stuttgart 1983/1990/1993, 48).
75
Or., princ. 4.2,1 (Butterworth, 1985, 272). The same pseudo-argument for the
obviousness of the need for non-literal reading was noted above in the discussion
of Porphyry.
Blossom Stefaniw 89
76
Or., princ. 4.3,9 (Butterworth, 1985, 302). Origen is referring to Ezek 29:11–12;
30:7, 10–12; 32:5–6, 12–13, 15.
90 Mind, Text, and Commentary
On Psalm 44:1 ‘In view of the goal’. So, ‘for those who
have been transformed. For the insight (σύνεσιν) of the
sons of Kora.’ And since even the title and the whole
Psalm have mysteries hidden within them, thus the one
who performs this song needs insight. For (the Psalm) is
Blossom Stefaniw 91
Here Didymus puts forward the view of the Psalms as the hiding-place
of mysteries not as a debatable point to be argued for, but as a reason to
conclude something else (‘the one who performs this song needs
insight’). While modern scholars would wish to relate this Psalm and its
title to its original historical context, Didymus, not just in his comment
on this verse, but also in his work as a teacher, is interested in ‘the goal’
taken as the goal of the spiritual life, so that those who are in view of it
are those who have already been transformed and who have insight.
In Didymus’ Commentary on Zechariah, we hear echoes of the
same rhetorical certainty that the revelatory nature of the text is obvious
and indisputable to any right-thinking person which we found in
Origen. Having provided an interpretation of the attire described in the
text as ‘by divine anagogy’ referring to the virtues, Didymus defends his
interpretation thus: ‘I mean, surely the mind is not so blind as to think
that the Holy Spirit is teaching about corporeal vesture, and not about
78
The passage in full reads as follows: ‘Now, clothing and garments by divine
anagogy are the different kinds of virtue and the actions performed in accord
with them, as well as the doctrines of piety and the mysteries of truth. With both
of these is draped [...] the queen, bride of Christ, the Church, as the singer says in
the forty-fifth Psalm, “the queen attends at your right clad in a garment of gold of
a rich variety”, and further on, “clad in golden tassels of a rich variety” [Ps
45:9,14]. I mean, surely the mind is not so blind as to think that the Holy Spirit is
teaching about corporeal vesture, and not about garments covering and adorning
the inner person [...].’ Didym., Zach. 14.13–14 (R.C. Hill [ed.], Didymus the Blind.
Commentary on Zechariah. FaCh 111, 344–5).
A similar expression of this assumption also provides a link to the issue of
the intelligible referent to be discussed in the following chapter: ‘Surely, after
all, our mind is not so confined to earth as to believe that spiritual people under
the inspiration of the Holy Spirit have referred to material wine presses and
vats, and not instead to lofty spiritual interpretations.’ Didym., Zach. 14.9–11
(Hill, 2006, 340).
Blossom Stefaniw 93
The Scripture does not concern itself, for Evagrius, with the demeanor
with which it is appropriate to eat in the presence of rulers. Instead,
Evagrius constructs a metaphor according to which sitting down to eat
corresponds with sitting down to read the Bible. One should ‘consider
diligently’ (his copy of the verse also has νοητὸς νοεῖ) what one is
80
Evagr. Pont., schol. pr. 250–251 (P. Géhin [ed.], Evagrius Ponticus. Scholies aux
Proverbes, SC 340, Paris 1987, 346–347).
Blossom Stefaniw 95
less valuable type of nourishment for a more substantial one within it.
That type of engagement with Scripture is typical of ‘the holy prophets
and apostles’ and is described in this interpretation as eating the
honeycomb rather than just the honey. Anyone can eat the honey
81
Evagr. Pont., schol. pr. 270 (Géhin, 1987, 364–5). Géhin has ‘ses doctrines des
réalités elles-mêmes’ for τῶν πραγµάτων τοὺς λόγους, since the ‘these things’ I have
translated would normally imply ‘these intelligible/noetic things’.
96 Mind, Text, and Commentary
(benefit from Scripture), but only those who are pure can eat the
honeycomb (progress from the words to the substance within them).
Here we see not only Evagrius’ assumption that Scripture has a deeper
revelatory meaning at work, but once again its association with spiritual
purity and an accomodation of different types of readers similar to what
is familiar from Origen as in his discussion in Peri Archon IV.2.6 of
different levels of meaning in Scripture to provide for the different
capacities of various readers.
So in all of the sample commentators, the assumption that
Scripture is one of the texts which functions as a medium of divine
revelation is observable, as well as the further implication that this state
of affairs requires a special type of interpretive effort.
What does the assumption that a particular text has a special revelatory
status imply about the author or writer of that text? Logically, the
author or writer of such a text must necessarily have some ability to
perceive and to communicate revelatory content. The role assigned to a
person who is characterised as able to access revelatory or divine forms
of knowledge in any particular culture will vary depending on whether
that culture believes something like divine knowledge really exists,
whether it is desirable or possible for individuals to perceive it, and the
social implications for the person who does perceive it (Can they still
Blossom Stefaniw 97
82
J. Dillon, The Golden Chain. Studies in the Development of Platonism and Christianity,
Aldershot 1990, 73 (‘Self-Definition in Later Platonism’).
Blossom Stefaniw 99
84
Lamberton, 1986, 80: “[...] Homer was both an allegorical poet whose prestige
might add to that of the Christian tradition and a participant in the revelation
lying behind Christianity. But the limitations of Homer are crucially important.
Homer perceived only dimly the truth of the revelation to the Jews. His poetic
fictions are a ‘screen’ (παραπέτασµα): the term, so characteristic of Proclus, is used
in Clement to refer to poetry of Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, Linus, and Musaeus.
But that ‘screen’ is misleading, false, and for all its beauty and ingenuity, Homer
the allegorical poet, a visionary by heathen standards, is in fundamental points of
doctrine profoundly wrong.”
100 Mind, Text, and Commentary
87
Pl. Ion 534 c (Loeb Classical Library, 164, 420–25); Pl. ap. 22 c (Loeb Classical
Library 261, 416–417).
shaped his story. Thus the mental and moral status of the authors or
writers is what allows them to not only perceive higher intelligible
truths but also to encode them in written stories.
If we turn now from the larger cultural context to our sample
commentators, we can observe Origen, in the course of arguing that wise
men who lived before Christ shared in the same knowledge as the Apostles
who had seen Christ directly, setting out a catalogue of figures from the Old
Testament who he claims were privy to complete understanding of the
‘higher interpretations’ of the stories which they recorded:
who sat upon the throne, and of the two seraphim, and of
the veiling of their faces and their feet, and of their wings,
104 Mind, Text, and Commentary
θεοσεβείας µυστήρια).91
This implies that the human authors of Scripture not only deposited
divine knowledge beneath the surface of the text, but were aware that
they were doing so and also of what that knowledge consisted of. The
mind of each of the persons Origen lists had access to ‘the truth’, ‘the
higher interpretations’, the ‘meaning’, ‘the mystery’, the ‘true
significance’, etc. It is of note that the meanings deposited in the text are
the sort of thing a sage knows. As we will investigate in more detail in
Chapter Four, in noetic exegesis we find the reader or interpreter of
Scripture taking on a role directly parallel to that of its writer or author,
such that both are concerned with a vision of ultimate reality which is
mediated by the text.
92
Or., princ. 4.2,2 (G.W. Butterworth [ed.], Origen. On First Principles.: Being
Koetschau’s Text of the ‘De Principiis’, Gloucester 1985, 272). E. Nardoni, Origen’s
Concept of Biblical Inspiration, in: Second Century 4 (1984), 9–23 (11), also collects
the following repetitions of this point in Origen: Or., hom. in 1 Reg. 2 (PG
12.1017). See also Or., schol. in Lc. 1 (PG 17.312); Or., princ. pref.8 (Butterworth,
1985, 5).
94
E.A. Dively Lauro, The Soul and Spirit of Scripture Within Origen’s Exegesis,
Leiden 2005, 39. Or., princ. pref.1,8; SC 252:84.
For Origen, the fact that the stopping-places of Israel during their
wanderings in the desert are recorded twice is not evidence of a certain
manuscript tradition, and certainly not a mere coincidence. It is
included in the text purposefully, and its purpose is to indicate spiritual
truths, in this case to reflect the ‘two journeys for the soul’.
Origen also frequently speaks of the methods by which the Holy
Spirit inserts divine truth into the text in such a way as to alert the
reader to the fact that there is a spiritual content beyond the plain
narrative. These methods include such signals as paradox, a few cases of
which we have already had occasion to examine. The Holy Spirit crafts
the text deliberately to contain but also to conceal the divine revelation,
which Origen terms ‘the spiritual meaning’ or ‘the secret meaning’:
[...] we must point out that the aim of the Spirit who, by
the providence of God through the Word who was ‘in
the beginning with God’, enlightened the servants of the
truth, that is, the prophets and apostles, was pre-
eminently concerned with the unspeakable mysteries
(τὸν ἀπόρρητον µυστήριον) connected with the affairs of men
Spirit’s counsel. 97
97
Or., princ. 4.2,7 (Butterworth, 1985, 282, has ‘deep things revealed in the spiritual
meaning of the words’).
Blossom Stefaniw 109
The divine authorship of the text is not only explicitly stated, but also
related to the special significance even of details about times of day in
the narrative.
For Origen, the purpose of the Holy Spirit is concentrated on the
capable reader and the process in which he engages in order to perceive
98
Or., comm. in cant. 2.4 (R.P. Lawson [ed.], Origen. The Song of Songs. Commentary
and Homilies, ACW 26, New York 1957, 125).
110 Mind, Text, and Commentary
and identify what Origen calls the ‘deep things’. Thus the author of
Scripture does not only act as a visionary or prophet, implanting the
divine truth which he perceives into the text, but he does so with a
specific purpose in mind, namely the spiritual cultivation of the reader.
Although Origen sometimes describes the author of Scripture as himself
divine (the Holy Spirit) rather than as some one experiencing a vision of
divine things (Moses), what is consistent is that each has access to
intelligible realities and each composes the text with a view to revealing
these in an enigmatic manner.
Several examples of this view of the author or writer of Scripture
can also be drawn from Didymus the Blind’s Commentary on Zechariah.
First we may examine a passage in which (re-enacted) vision, writing,
and commentary follow close upon each other so that their relationship
to each other can be seen. Didymus describes the experience of
Zechariah while writing and explains why he chose particular words to
convey his vision:
99
Didym., Zach. 4.1–3 (R.C. Hill [transl.], Didymus the Blind. Commentary on
Zechariah, FaCh 111, Washington 2006, 85).
112 Mind, Text, and Commentary
laws tells the godly person: ‘This is life and length of days
for you, to love the Lord your God with your whole soul
and your whole heart.’ [Deut 30:20,6]. In other words,
since intense love of God is illuminating, it is also
productive of length and quality of days, so that the
person practising it lives a long and fruitful life.
Compared with these days the initial enlightenment
involves brief days, but whoever does not scorn it will
very easily experience further illumination after the initial
stages; at that point they will rejoice ‘with the
indescribable and glorious joy’ which is ‘the fruit of the
holy spirit’. [1Pet 1:8; Gal 5:22]. 101
102
Didym., Zach. 8.16–17 (Hill, 2006, 189). This point is made in the context of
Didymus’ explanation of the active and the contemplative life.
Blossom Stefaniw 115
to get his νοῦς to see the divine wisdom in creation or in the Scriptures.
The created world and the Scriptures are thus treated as having arisen
specifically for pedagogical purposes, to facilitate the journey of return
to perfect union by means of exploiting the link between sensible and
intelligible things in order to train the human mind to perceive
intelligible things. This mechanism is possible because, for Evagrius,
Scripture originates in an act of providence through Christ and depends
on Christ’s position as a perfect νοῦς able to reflect the divine wisdom
into creation and also to reveal the divine wisdom to other creatures
because he is united to both creation and to God. 103 Thus the divine
103
Evagr. Pont., keph. gnost. 3.24 (L. Dysinger, Psalmody and Prayer in the Writings
of Evagrius Ponticus, Oxford 2005).
116 Mind, Text, and Commentary
authorship of Scripture not only arises out of but also guarantees its
revelatory status.
104
A.A. Long, Stoic Readings of Homer, in R. Lamberton / J.J. Keaney (eds.),
Homer’s Ancient Readers. The Hermeneutics of Greek Epic’s Earliest Exegetes,
Princeton 1992, 41–66 (45–46).
Blossom Stefaniw 117
105
Lamberton, On the Cave of the Nymphs (introduction), Barrytown 1993, 11. See J. Pépin,
Porphyre. exégète d’Homère, In Porphyre, EnAC 12, Vandœuvres-Genève 1966, 231–266
(252–256), for a full discussion of ancient passages which take surface-level incoherence
or obscurity as a signal that a non-literal reading is needed.
118 Mind, Text, and Commentary
107
Or., hom. in lev. 3.8 (quoted and translated in R.P.C. Hanson, Allegory and Event.
A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen’s Interpretation of Scripture,
Richmond 1959, 307).
120 Mind, Text, and Commentary
109
Or., comm. in Mt. 16.27 (H.J. Vogt [ed.], Origen. Der Kommentar zum Evangelium
nach Mattäus, vol. 2, BGrL 18/30/38, Stuttgart 1983/1990/1993, 208).
Blossom Stefaniw 123
Origen sees the habit of interpreting Scripture literally as the reason for
what he sees as his opponents’ false beliefs, and lists several passages
which he considers morally problematic if taken literally. The Bible is
not only divine revelation for Origen, but it is the revelation of a good
and just God, so it must render meaning that is appropriate to that sort
of divine nature. Again, Origen’s difficulty with the passages he refers
to results from his particular concept of justice and his assumption that
God is just, and is a difficulty that would not arise in a reader willing to
accept moral arbitrariness in the divinity.
The perception of a text as literally senseless or paradoxical is
determined by the reader’s cultural and religious paradigm, as when
111
On the exegetical strategies arising out of this perceived paradox for both
Didymus and other early Christian readers, see E. Clark, Reading Renunciation.
Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity, Princeton 1998.
112
R. Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria. Virtue and
Narrative in Biblical Scholarship, Chicago 2004, 57: “Didymus renders Job’s
experience as that of a saint maintaining undisturbed contemplation of the
divine truths throughout an arduous ordeal, an achievement he views as the
perfect expression of the most ancient of virtues: courage. (JobT 91.29–92.7;
254.34–255.13; 262.26–263.28) By means of this depiction, Didymus integrates Job
into the economy of salvation and proffers for subsequent ascetics a species of
heroic virtue that corresponds to the state of the perfect Christian, the ‘gnostic’.”
Blossom Stefaniw 125
curse, Didymus explains that, since cursing the day of one’s birth is
obviously not appropriate for a wise man, one must necessarily interpret
the text noetically, ‘so that it renders a reasonable sense which is fitting to
the saint.’113 What we today read as Job’s expression of despair is for
Didymus a sign of the greatness of Job’s soul and an expression of the
intensity of his contemplation of the virtues.114 When Job wishes he had
never been born, Didymus sees this as Job asking for clarity about the
judgments of God for the enlightenment of his hearers, although he, as a
saint, already knows them.115 After struggling with this passage for some
time, Didymus presents the following interpretation:
113
Didym., Job 3.3–5 (A. Henrichs [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Kommentar zu Hiob I.
Kap. 1–4. PTA 1. Bonn 1968, 171–173).
114
Didym., Job 9.27 (A. Henrichs [ed., and trans.], Didymos der Blinde. Kommentar
zu Hiob III. Kap. 7–12. PTA 2. Bonn 1968, 93).
pray that beings who possess reason strive for virtue and
do not return to a bad state—for that state would no
longer be the same—as those believe who ascribe to the
idea of reincarnation.
‘Nor may light come upon it’. May striving
towards the bad be prevented, in that those who do so
remain without light, so that according to the word from
Scripture ‘the light of the godless will be put out’. ‘Death
is surrounded by dark and shadows’, so that those, who
are oriented to darkness and evil, will be thwarted and
the shadows will so hinder them in their striving
towards evil that they come to the realisation that their
endeavor brings only death [...]. ‘May darkness come
upon it, cursed be that day and that night, may darkness
carry them away’. These words must not be considered
curses, but pleas that evil find an end. For according to
what is set out above, it is desirable that the cause of the fall
and its path remain unknown, so that ‘man comes to no
good end in evil’. For striving after virtue makes the path to
evil unclear, and virtue, when it gains strength, causes
complete forgetting of the effects of evil. That is what the
expression means ‘may darkness carry it away’. 116
the literal meaning, they will undo the courage of the saint
—which the devil was unable to loosen—by supposing
him to have such great ὀλιγωρίαν. Neither would the devil
119
Evagr. Pont., schol. in pr. 1.1 (P. Géhin [ed.], Scholies aux Proverbes. Introduction,
texte critique, traduction, notes, appendices et index, SC 340, Paris 1987, 92).
Blossom Stefaniw 131
πράγµατα), is pulled down by the weight of its free will.’ Thus the text
the nature of Beauty. Thus, when Socrates says that he is going for a
walk outside the walls of the city, Hermeias takes this to indicate that
Socrates is dedicated to a higher and better form of life, separate from
the masses, and that Socrates is a role model for the way of life
concerned with knowledge of spiritual beauty. Another example can be
taken from Olympiodorus, who treats the passage in the Phaedo which
describes how Socrates rejects the instructions of the executioner not to
talk after drinking the hemlock. Olympiodorus does not think that the
Here the text has been expected to reveal deeper truths about the
metaphysical structure of reality, and, in response to this expectation
and the application of special interpretation, has done so. Olympiodorus
is thus able to find in it guidance for the philosophical student seeking
to emulate the very ‘intellective and purificatory way of life’ which
Socrates is understood to represent. Olympiodorus is also quick to re-
interpret Socratic irony as something less frivolous or flippant than it
might appear on the surface, finding a more serious moral meaning in
Gorgias 489 d 7–8, which is even, in the text of the dialogue, directly
followed by the comment on the part of Callicles ‘You’re being ironic,
121
Olymp., comm. in Phd. 2.8 (L.G. Westerink, Olympiodorus, The Greek
Commentaries on Plato’s ‘Phaedo’ 1, Amsterdam 1976, 64).
134 Mind, Text, and Commentary
symbol of all his appetite for money. You will surely say
that such a person found himself in the sea and in the
salty business of life and in the waves of thoughts and
worries revolving around money and had the coin in his
mouth, as long as he was unbelieving and avaricious, but
he rose up out of the sea when he was caught by the hook
of reason and experienced this great favor (through some
Peter who taught him the truth) so that he no longer has
the coin in his mouth, but instead words which bear the
image of God.123
This is a rare case of true allegory, in which the fish stands for an
avaricious person, the coin for money, the position of the coin in the
mouth for a fixation on money in the conversation and mentality and
appetites of the avaricious person, the sea for the tumultuous life
resulting from dependence on business concerns and lack of belief, the
fishing hook for reason, and the removal of the coin by Peter as the
replacement of ‘words which bear the image of God’ for avarice. What
is of note, however, is the fact that Origen looks for a moral referent even
in a miracle story, and does not show much interest in the miracle as
such. He is more concerned with the victory of reason and virtue over
irrational sins like avarice. Origen does not explicitly express
reservations about the surface referent, but the fact that he provides a
special interpretation indicates his assumptions: the divine is not
concerned with saving himself trouble when it is time to pay taxes, but
with the moral reform of individuals.
Origen even finds moral lessons in minor details of the Gospel
narrative, just as details which he considered to result in a paradox were
seen as a signal that special interpretation was needed:
with rich blessings and placed a crown of pure gold on his head’, he
draws the conclusion that the precious stones must either represent ‘the
virtues or those who have achieved the virtues’, if his identification of
the passage as referring to the incarnate Christ holds.
125
Didym., ps. 20.4 (L. Doutreleau / A. Gesché / M. Gronewald [eds.], Didymos der
Blinde. Psalmenkommentar I zu Ps 20–21. PTA 7, Bonn 1969, 43–44).
138 Mind, Text, and Commentary
Didymus allows that the passage might refer not to Christ incarnate, but
to any king, and thus offers alternative interpretations. On that basis
saints in general are praised as being kings who deserve crowns.
Didymus then specifies that the stones contained in the crowns are the
virtues in which each saint excelled, such as chastity for Joseph and
Susanna. The weaving of the crown serves Didymus to explain that the
virtues are all interconnected, so that achieving one of them is equivalent
to achieving all of them. Thus Didymus is not actually commenting on
the passage before him, but on the moral and spiritual life which he is
encouraging his hearers to pursue by praising those who have excelled
in that way of life.
Again when Psalm 20:5 speaks of ‘length of days for all eternity’
Didymus discovers a reference to the virtues in the midst of a digression
on various reasons for wanting a long life and how the term ‘day’
should be understood:
having them leads one to ‘possess righteousness both now and in the
future’, how is this future to be characterised? What comes after the
days/virtues? Didymus answers by eliding his analogy of days to
virtues with the mention of ‘perfect and all embracing knowledge’
which he had just made. He first provides the alternative analogy of
days to each individual dogma which enlightens the soul and proceeds
to use it as a basis on which to describe the state of perfect knowledge.
The multiplicity or series of days is thus equivalent to intermittent
partial enlightenment, followed by ‘a certain perfect state of light’
equivalent to complete and constant enlightenment. Didymus then
returns to his original analogy for days, namely virtues, and adds the
alternative interpretation that the transition from a series of individual
days to one single uninterrupted day is equivalent to the transition from
separate individual virtues to ‘their following upon each other without
interruption’. Here again Didymus is less concerned about finding a single
definitive interpretation for the passage under examination as he is with
explaining the goals and content of the moral and spiritual life on the basis
of elements from the text which he uses as illustrations and analogies.
Several examples of interpretation towards the moral and
spiritual can also be taken from Evagrius’ Commentary on the Psalms.
Evagrius interprets the attack made by ‘sinners’ upon the ‘upright of
heart’ in terms of the spiritual struggle of the soul:
‘For behold the sinners have bent their bow, they have
prepared their arrows for the quiver, to shoot in the
Blossom Stefaniw 141
129
Ibid.
Blossom Stefaniw 143
the body of the monk which invites attacks from the enemy: those
things which sprout from the flesh provide something for demons to
bite into and thus make the monk prone to attack. The lesson is then
clear: the monk must discipline the flesh to protect himself from
‘irrational tempting thoughts’.
Again, in his Scholia on Ecclesiastes, Evagrius reads the text as
conveying divine truth about the life of virtue:
4.5 ‘The senseless man crosses his arms and devours his
own flesh.’
26. If the arms are the symbol of ascetic work, everyone
who does not work righteousness folds his arms—and
that, he says, is why such a person devours his own flesh,
filling himself with the sins that spring from the flesh.130
130
Evagr. Pont., schol. in eccl. 4.5. The above quote is Augustine Casiday’s
translation from A.M. Casiday, Evagrius Ponticus, New York 2006, 137.
144 Mind, Text, and Commentary
Conclusions
consider the ‘nature’ or genre of the text in its original setting or the
purpose for which the text may originally have been written, and its
perceived nature and the purposes the commentators believed it to be
intended to serve. The text of Scripture means something different to
these exegetes because of what they believe that text to be, namely, a
vessel of divine revelation about higher spiritual truths which, if
properly engaged with by the reader or commentator, could aid in the
cultivation of the mind and soul. Since it is clear that a great many
cultures or sub-cultures regard the text of the Bible as some manner of
divine revelation which should lead to the moral and spiritual
development of the reader, the rest of this study is to a great extent
concerned with moving on from specifying what revelation means
within the cultural context of noetic exegesis, as we have just done, to
setting out what was understood, within this context, as moral or
spiritual development, and where and how the reading and study of
texts believed to have a revelatory status was performed.
3
WHY:
UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WAS NOETIC EXEGESIS
CONSIDERED NECESSARY?
Introduction
To some degree each of the chapters of this study concerns itself with the
question ‘Why was noetic exegesis practiced?’. This is not least because
investigating the motivations and aims of our sample exegetes is
naturally the focus of a study of their interpretive assumptions and of a
thick description approach. In the present chapter we are not yet
concerned with answering this question in terms of the social
application of noetic exegesis or the larger cultural aims it was believed
to be able to facilitate, but first with moving on directly from Chapter
Two’s most general assumptions about the nature of the text to similarly
broad quasi-philosophical beliefs which, for the exegetes concerned,
provided a framework within which noetic exegesis, given the
interpretive assumptions on the nature of the text just collected and
those on the means and social location of noetic exegesis we are to
examine in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, was necessary. In speaking
of necessity, I am referring to a perceived need for noetic exegesis above
and beyond the mere grammatical comprehension of the textual
narrative in order to achieve the aims to which the reading of the text in
150 Mind, Text, and Commentary
and truly real reality (τὸν νοητόν), on the other. In noetic exegesis, this
idea is applied in the form of an arrangement of the text and its meaning
across these categories. Thus the ordinary everyday historical referent
of the biblical narrative is mapped onto the category sensible and
Blossom Stefaniw 151
131
This view can be observed in R.P.C. Hanson, Allegory and Event. A Study of the
Sources and Significance of Origen’s Interpretation of Scripture, Richmond 1959.
133
See for example P.C. Miller, Poetic Words, Abysmal Words. Reflections on Origen’s
Hermeneutics, in Ch. Kannengiesser / W.L. Petersen (eds.), Origen of Alexandria.
His World and Legacy, Notre Dame 1988, 165–178.
154 Mind, Text, and Commentary
yet been fully articulated. Thus this chapter is not engaged in tracing
the presence of these ideas in the commentaries under examination here,
but rather with establishing their particular role as key interpretive
assumptions in noetic exegesis.
The Intelligible and the Sensible: Metaphysical Categories and Multiple Referents
The sensible universe, that which can be seen and touched and
perceived through the bodily senses, was commonly understood by
Origen’s contemporaries, as well as by fourth-century intellectuals, to
represent a less real and derivative level of reality. It was seen as an
illusory screen covering over the intelligible world, that which is eternal,
unchanging, perceived with the mind rather than the body. The fact that
a large portion of intellectuals in the period we are examining generally
assumed a metaphysical state of affairs constructed from the
phenomenal vs. the noumenal or the sensible vs. the intelligible is
neither novel nor disputed, and indeed this construction of reality goes
back at least as far as Plato. What has not yet been satisfactorily
explained is how and why this presumed metaphysical state of affairs
played a role in noetic exegesis. In the larger cultural context, as well as
among our sample commentators, we can observe this view closely
interacting with beliefs about the nature of the text as a divine revelation
conveyed to the reader through the work of a visionary writer or divine
author just examined in Chapter Two. Where there is also a belief in a
Blossom Stefaniw 155
134
R.D. Lamberton, Homer the Theologian. Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the
Growth of the Epic Tradition, The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 9,
Berkeley 1986, 201. (Sallustius, De diis 3, p. 4, lines 9–11 ed. Nock). Sallustius
was a fourth-century intellectual who participated with the Emperor Julian in
an effort to reform and re-establish paganism.
135
Or., Jo. 1.10 (This passage is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two).
156 Mind, Text, and Commentary
do not mean ‘literal’ in the same sense that a modern English dictionary
defines the term ‘literal’, but rather something more like ‘referring to the
ordinary world or to observable historical events’ or ‘interpreted in the
obvious sense’. 136 The reason that the surface sense of the text does not
render an intelligible meaning is not that the letters and physical words
are seen as material objects which only have a higher significance when
they are seen as symbols, but because the words, already processed as
symbols through actual reading, refer to ordinary worldly, historical
events and not to heavenly, spiritual, moral or intellectual things. Again,
this does not imply any difficulty with the words themselves, as exactly
the same passages can be and are interpreted both according to their
plain narrative sense and in terms of one or more higher meanings,
without the higher meaning being presented as exclusive or definitive.
Whether the words refer to historical events or the everyday world and
thus fail to render noetic knowledge, or else refer to intelligible realities
136
See E.A. Dively Lauro, The Soul and Spirit of Scripture Within Origen’s Exegesis,
Boston 2005, 52–55, who argues that Origen’s use of this term cannot refer to
the literal sense as such since Origen also claims that some passages have no
literal sense, which Dively Lauro holds to be impossible. Noam Chomsky
would disagree.
Blossom Stefaniw 157
and thereby indeed supply the mind with noetic truth, is not a function
of the words themselves but of the manner in which they are read.
Origen’s Commentary on the Song of Songs supplies several
statements on the relationship between the perceived metaphysical
state of affairs and the way in which Scriptural texts can and should be
interpreted, not least because the Song of Songs is the one book of the
Bible which Origen takes to be completely figurative. 137 In the
following, Origen expresses his view of how human beings can
overcome the epistemological limitations of physicality and how they
should pursue intelligible knowledge:
So with all else that God made– it is good for the use of
man, but it bears also the imprint of celestial things,
whereby the soul may be taught, and elevated to the
contemplation of the invisible and eternal. Nor is it
possible for man, while he lives in the flesh, to know
anything that transcends his sensible experience, except
by seizing and deciphering this imprint. For God has so
ordered His creation, has so linked the lower to the
higher by subtle signatures and affinities, that the world
137
The idea that certain books or passages within a larger work were more
figurative than others is also familiar from Neoplatonic exegesis of Homer, as
evidenced in Porphyry’s Cave of the Nymphs (Porph., antr.).
158 Mind, Text, and Commentary
138
Or., comm. in cant. 3.12 (R.P. Lawson [ed.], The Song of Songs. Commentary and
Homilies, ACW 26, New York 1957, 220). The original Greek for this work is lost.
Blossom Stefaniw 159
One can ‘mount up from things below to things above’, not only from
the physical creation to a perception of it as divine revelation, but also
from the apparent, ordinary referent of a passage of Scripture to its
noetic significance in the realm of eternal truth, because ‘this visible
world teaches us about that which is invisible’ and ‘the invisible things
of God are understood by means of things that are visible’. Again, like
the deposit of intelligible truth in texts or in creation, the establishment
of a relationship between visible and invisible things, a relationship
which it is possible for the human mind to deduce and understand, is a
result of creative providence. Without this relationship, even if there
140
The same idea can be observed in the thought of Plotinus, as explained in
Lamberton, 1986, 95: ‘[...] this universe is for Plotinus merely the insubstantial
expression of higher true realities. This is not to reduce it to the level of the
utterly contemptible; in his tract against the Gnostics (Enn. 2.9) and elsewhere,
Plotinus is explicit that the material cosmos, though teetering on the edge of
nonexistence, is not to be viewed as inherently evil or the product of an evil
creator. It is redeemed by the fact that it expresses higher realities. Implied in
this attitude is the belief that the material universe itself constitutes a system of
meaning, a language of symbols that, properly read, will yield a truth that
transcends its physical substrate [...] Any statement about this world may, on a
higher plane, mask a statement about some true existent, not because of the
nature of the statement, but because of the inherently symbolic structure of the
universe to which it refers.’ Also ibid., 87–88: ‘[...] it is axiomatic for Plotinus
that the order we observe in the material universe is the expression of a non-
spatial, unchanging reality. An image used tentatively to express this
relationship is that of the natural world as the mirror, itself devoid of form, of
the ordering principles emanating from the higher realities of soul (psyche) and
mind (nous), beyond which lies the One (to hen) (Enn. 1.1.8).’
Blossom Stefaniw 161
those that are seen’. People who have achieved this realisation will also
realise that figurative interpretation is ‘that which they should follow
and embrace’, precisely because it, in finding invisible, spiritual things
in the text, constitutes a ‘way of understanding truth that leads to
God’.142 The same concern about the truthfulness of the text is evident
in Origen’s Commentary on John.
Christ, again, the light of the world, is the true light (φῶς
Origen asserts that ‘nothing that is sensible is true’. This implies that the
interpreter seeking the higher truth in the Gospel, if he is concerned
with expounding ‘truth’, must leave the ‘sensible’ (ordinary, everyday,
historical) meaning behind and press on toward the noetic significance.
At the same time, Origen does not hold that that which is sensible is
false (which would clearly cause him difficulties in denying the value of
144
Or., princ. 4.2,4 (G.W. Butterworth [ed.], On First Principles. Being Koetschau’s
Text of the ‘De Principiis’, Gloucester 1985, 273–275).
Blossom Stefaniw 165
Here Origen characterises the Gospel writers’ goal not as the accurate
reporting of historical events, but as conveying intellectual, mystical,
and spiritual truth. In the service of this overall goal, it was permissible
for them to take liberties with ‘things which to the eye of history
happened differently’ when this was done for the purpose of speaking
the truth, where truth is assumed to correspond to what is valuable in
the pursuit of spiritual and mental development, namely intelligible
things. Whenever possible, they spoke ‘the truth [...] both materially
and spiritually’, but where the material element of the narrative is not
historically accurate, Origen holds that there is in fact spiritual truth
there, because the Gospel is taken as having been written deliberately to
convey things ‘made manifest to them (the writers) in a purely
intellectual way’. Thus it is precisely then when a passage seems to be
‘implying things of sense’ but cannot be historically or logically correct,
that Origen sees the writers as having deposited something in the text of
their intellectual apprehension of truth. That is how ‘the spiritual truth
was often preserved, as one might say, in the material falsehood.’
The arrangement of the obvious meaning of the text and its
higher noetic significance across the categories of sensible and
intelligible is also frequently evidenced in the commentaries of Didymus
the Blind. Apprehending the meaning of the text is a matter of relating
it to higher things or in a way that leads the mind upward (κατ᾽
(αἰσθητά) and pursuing the higher ideas (νοητά) within it. 147 The
147
The specific mechanics of this process and a comparison with interpretations
Didymus characterises by means of the term ἀλληγορία can be found in
W. Bienert, Allegoria und Anagoge bei Didymos dem Blinden von Alexandria,
Berlin 1972.
168 Mind, Text, and Commentary
of the inner man are never satiated nor do they tire of the
countenance of God; for because it constantly shines, it
enlightens and increases desire. So ‘let the light of your
countenance shine upon us, O Lord’ [Ps 4:7]. It remains.
The light of the sun, or generally any light source which
is perceptible to the senses, does not remain. If one
retreats from the light or closes his eyes, it does not shine
on him. The intelligible light however obviously remains
with those it enlightens, it cannot be lost. 148
148
Didym., ps. 26.9 (M. Gronewald [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar II
zu Ps 22–26:10, PTA 4, Bonn 1968, 237).
Blossom Stefaniw 169
and a countenance whose light constantly remains with the one it shines
upon. Thus the phrase ‘turn not thy face away from me’ is not, for
Didymus, a plea by a distressed individual to the personified divinity,
but a hint at what Didymus believes to be the real possibility of the
noetic contemplation of God. Thus for this phrase, the intelligible
referent is distinguished from the sensible one (historical case of
individual existential distress) and defined as referring to an exemplary
desire for perfect contemplation. A comparison with Origen’s
description of the role of material things in teaching the soul and
allowing the mind to ‘climb upwards to spiritual intelligence’ is
instructive: in the above passage from Didymus, we see the same idea in
exegetical action. 149
As with Origen and Evagrius, Didymus sees Scripture as
functioning analogously to the physical created world to reveal God when
the mind perceives divine things which have been providentially
deposited in the text. Didymus also proceeds from the same assumption
of the relatedness between the sensible and intelligible levels of perception:
Didymus does not explain the mechanics of how ‘we confront the
visible creations of God’ in order to ‘apprehend the invisible God’ any
more specifically than Origen does, nor does he argue for the point he is
making. He states it in a matter-of-fact manner, much as a teacher of
economics would set out the principle of supply and demand. For
Didymus, this is just the way the world is: invisible, divine, intelligible
things can be perceived on the basis of the visible and sensible.
In another passage which we will now discuss in some detail,
Didymus provides an interpretation which itself gives testimony to his
understanding of the relationship between the words of the text and
their spiritual significance which makes interpretation both possible and
necessary. The passage he is discussing is from Psalm 22, including the
verses 14–18, which read as follows:
The clothes however are the words; for the noetic sense
(κατὰ τὴν νόησιν) is clothed by the words. 151
because they lie deep inside the body and because they are strong like
bones. Knowing what we already know about noetic interpretations,
and given the term used and the analogy to Scripture, it seems Didymus
is referring to exactly that deeper significance of Scripture which the
noetic exegete is concerned to discover. As his discussion of this passage
151
The editor’s German gloss for εὔτονα νοήµατα is ‘passende Interpretationen’ or, in
English, ‘fitting interpretations’. I disagree with this not only because it
disregards the analogy on which Didymus is basing his commentary, but also
because that is a very unusual translation for the terms involved.
172 Mind, Text, and Commentary
So when they counted his bones, they did not share them
among themselves. They merely perceived them µόνον
have been integrated into the interpreter and increased his or her own
noetic content, so to speak.
Didymus also connects those who tear the Psalmist’s clothes and divide
them among themselves with those who misuse Scripture. Having
already mapped ‘clothes’ onto ‘the words of Scripture’, Didymus
continues the metaphor and describes ‘heretics’ as arbitrarily tugging at
the ‘clothes’ of Scripture in that they interpret in constantly changing
ways and divest it of its true meaning. The examples he gives make it
evident that he is referring to Arian exegetes. For Didymus, the true
meaning of Scripture is maintained when ‘the men of the church [...] see it
in the way that the wisdom, who said it, wears it’. That is, the words of
Scripture must be seen in relation to the wisdom (Christ? God?) who
‘wears’ them if they are to be seen correctly. Otherwise the words become
‘naked of meaning’, so that Didymus again insists on the value not only of
the intelligible content of Scripture but also on the link between the
sensible level (the words) and their meaning. Here the correspondence of
the higher meaning of Scripture to intelligible things is not only persistent,
but also associated with proper interpretation and with the capacity of the
process of interpretation to benefit the interpreter.
Didymus frequently concentrates on a specific term in a verse
from the text he is explaining and introduces the noetic interpretation by
claiming that the verse obviously does not refer to the visible term or the
term as it is perceived by the senses, but to its invisible/intelligible/
spiritual counterpart. This is a clear indication of an assumption on his
part that the higher meaning of the text, which it is the task of the
commentator to perceive and explain, is located in the intelligible realm.
For example, the reference in Proverbs to ‘the houses of the lawless’
does not refer, for Didymus, to certain people’s domestic
accommodation, but to their ‘spiritual habits’:
154
Didym., Job 5.24 (A. Henrichs, Didymos der Blinde. Kommentar zu Hiob II. Kap.
5.1–6.29, PTA 2, Bonn 1968, 101).
176 Mind, Text, and Commentary
‘And light is sweet and good for the eyes.’ One can take
‘light’ and ‘eyes’ in two ways, and also ‘sweetness’.
Accordingly, when it refers to the visible realm, which is
revealed by perceptible ‘light’, it says sweet instead of
‘pleasant’. But when you think of the inner ‘eyes’ and the
‘true light’, ‘sweet’ should be understood in the same
way as it is meant in the following sentences: ‘Taste and
see that the Lord is good’; ‘how sweet are your words,
sweeter than honey from the comb’: ‘eat honey, my son,
for the comb is good and sweetens the throat’. And
(here) the ‘honey’ being eaten is the ‘good’ of the spiritual
(πνευµατικῶν) content of Scripture, the ‘comb’, though,
156
Didym., eccl. 11.7 a (G. Binder / L. Liesenborghs [eds.], Didymos der Blinde.
Kommentar zum Ekklesiastes VI. Kap. 11–12, PTA 9, Bonn 1969, 71).
Blossom Stefaniw 179
accept that which comes from the spirit (τὰ τοῦ πνεύµατος),
158
Didym., ps. 38.12 (M. Gronewald [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar IV
zu Ps 35–39, PTA 6, Bonn 1969, 249–251).
182 Mind, Text, and Commentary
159
Didym., eccl. 5.11 (J. Kramer [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Kommentar zum
Ekklesiastes III. Kap. 5–6, PTA 13, Bonn 1970, 21). The Apollinarius mentioned
here could conceivably be Apollinarius of Laodicea (310–390), a contemporary
of Didymus who was involved in Christological controversies.
184 Mind, Text, and Commentary
same rules and on the assumption that allegory should refer to the
intelligible world and is legitimate if and only if it does so in relation to a
text whose content is intelligible.
In the writings of Evagrius Ponticus, this contrast between
sensible and intelligible and the arrangement of the ordinary referent of
a word of Scripture and its higher interpretation around the categories
of sensible and intelligible is also evident. In his Kephalaia Gnostika,
Evagrius repeatedly and explicitly calls his noetic interpretation of some
term from a passage of Scripture ‘intelligible’. Several series of exegesis
can be identified. Due to the fact that noetic interpretation in the
Kephalaia Gnostika is both voluminous and ambiguous, I will restrict the
discussion here to explicitly stated ‘intelligible’ (νοητή, πνευµατική)
All of the astronomical bodies referred to here are taken as signifying the
reasoning nature(s) (ἡ λογική). The various types of reasoning natures
160
Evagr. Pont., keph. gnost. 3.44 (L. Dysinger, Psalmody and Prayer in the Writings
of Evagrius Ponticus, Oxford 2005).
condition not of containing ‘the first and blessed light’ but of being
illuminated by such a reasoning nature. This implies a condition
approximate to that of pure contemplation, but one that is more distant
and passive, possibly that of a student of a fully noetically developed
teacher. The third condition Evagrius describes in his exegesis is that of
‘stars’ or those ‘reasoning natures to which it has been confided to
illuminate those who are in the darkness’. This implies people whose
task is not that of pure contemplation but of conveying ‘light’ to those
who are as yet unenlightened. That could refer to those who are
engaged in teaching or preaching to those who as yet have no
knowledge of whatever Evagrius takes to be the source of the ‘light’
around which his interpretation is constructed. Here Evagrius is
explicitly locating the significance in the words (or elements of creation)
in the intelligible realm. The referent is not any physical body, but rather
the condition of the mind in relation to other minds and in relation to
‘the first and blessed light’.
A longer series of noetic interpretations which can be clearly
attached to a text from the Bible treats the ceremonial apparatus laid out
in Exodus 28 and 29:
163
Evagr. Pont., keph. gnost. 4.28 (Dysinger, 2005). A form of πνευµατικός is used
in all of the remaining excerpts from Evagrius for ‘intelligible’ unless
otherwise noted.
Blossom Stefaniw 187
of God.173
Once again, the referents are spiritual states which all constitute stages
and tools of the monastic life, whose goal is ‘the contemplation of the
Blessed Trinity’, a form of pure noetic knowledge. In this case, some of
the noetic referents are not as penultimately intelligible as usual, but
properly intelligible, such as ‘the pure νοῦς’, but the relation to the
and the worlds are vain after one has knowledge of the
Holy Trinity.176
176
Evagr. Pont., schol. eccl. 1.2 (A.M. Casiday, Evagrius Ponticus, London 2006, 131,
CPG 2458 e).
Blossom Stefaniw 193
Just as the ordinary reading of the text is not rejected as wrong or bad,
the perceptible world is not bad as such but has been providentially
177
The text Evagrius is commenting on reads: ‘I have seen the business which God
has given the sons of man to be busy with. Everything that he has made is
beautiful in its time; he has also given the age to their hearts, in such a way that
man cannot discover the work that God has worked from the beginning even
unto the end. I have recognised that there is no good for them except to rejoice
and do good in one’s life. As for everyone who eats and drinks and sees good
from all his toil–this is a gift from God.’
180
Ibid.
196 Mind, Text, and Commentary
The referent is the noncorporeal state which can effect a part of the soul.
The word fat cannot be taken purely metaphorically to mean wealth or
meat or flesh, because for Evagrius the text is not about material things
like wealth or meat. It is about the spiritual and moral life and is a tool
for perceiving intelligible things, so that is what ‘the intelligible fat’
refers to.
In sum, the manner in which a particular metaphysical state of
affairs is attached to the exegetical project brings to the surface another
cluster of interpretive assumptions about what a text is believed to refer
to or to be able to refer to and what the point of reading is: reading is not
a way to collect information or trace the linguistic structures which had
previously been generated and deposited in writing by an author. Nor is
the text a means by which an author may communicate a series of facts
to the reader. Rather, because (among other things) the revelatory status
of the text entails that it has an intelligible referent and therefore requires
the reader to exercise discernment and skillful noetic perception to access
the intelligible significance behind the ordinary, historical, or everyday
referent, reading or interpreting becomes a spiritual discipline or
philosophical exercise whose mastery is proved by the ability of the
reader to penetrate the surface meaning of the text and perceive the
higher reality beyond it. The belief in an intelligible referent is not, to our
sample commentators, equivalent to a belief that all passages from all
texts admit of or require a noetic interpretation. At the same time, it is
closely linked to their belief that certain texts, those to whom the status
of revered tradition and the function of revelatory media was granted or
assumed, contained the potential to provide access to intelligible truth if
noetic exegesis was applied appropriately to particular passages.
198 Mind, Text, and Commentary
Without this metaphysical state of affairs being presumed and the text
and its referents being oriented around it, noetic exegesis would be
something completely different, and the revelatory potential of the text
established in the previous chapter could, for example, have resulted in
oracular readings about worldly affairs and would have played a
completely different role as a social act, serving as a means of political
subversion, perhaps, rather than serving to cultivate the reader mentally
and spiritually. Assumptions about whether the surface meaning of the
text and its deeper meaning are identical or separate, and about where
one should look for the deeper meaning if it is separate, and how it
relates to the surface meaning, are all vital in defining what
interpretation consists of and what it can be used for.
183
Cf. Pl., smp. 205 b–c on the ambiguity of terms and Plato’s Epistle Pl., ep. 7.341 c
on teachings which cannot be communicated from teacher to student in words.
Blossom Stefaniw 201
proper to the psyche, whose mental capacities are more limited and
more reliant on discursive processes. When the νοῦς involves itself with
189
Lamberton, 1986, 169: ‘Direct expression on the part of a god in human
language is finally an impossibility, though perhaps as early as Xenocrates
demonology had developed to the point where ‘divine’ utterance could be
understood to mean the use by a lowly providential daimon of human speech in
order to express in fragmented form for our discursive perceptions truths
emanating from a higher plane. Likewise, as we shall see, the highest form of
poetry comes close to communicating experience on this level.’
contrasts ‘the meanness of the language’ of the Gospel with ‘the divine
power of the Holy Spirit’, and ‘certain things’ with what it would be
possible to ‘adequately explain by any human language’:
Our aim has been to show that there are certain things, the
meaning of which it is impossible adequately to explain by
any human language, but which are made clear rather
through simple apprehension than through any power of
words. This rule must control our interpretation even of the
divine writings, in order that what is said therein may be
estimated in accordance not with the meanness of the
language but with the divine power of the Holy Spirit who
inspired their composition.192
Origen even explicitly states that ‘this rule must control our
interpretation even of the divine writings’, the rule he refers to being
assent to the proposition that certain things cannot be adequately
explained in human language but instead require ‘simple apprehension’.
This for Origen is what controls proper interpretation of Scripture, given
that Scripture consists of divine writings inspired by the Holy Spirit. Once
again, the approach to the written revelation by means of ‘simple
apprehension’ or attention to ‘what is meant’ is the way that Origen
192
Or., princ. 4.3,15 (Butterworth, 1985, 312). The Greek text of this passage is lost,
so that a gloss on ‘simple apprehension’ cannot be provided. This term
suggests the type of direct non-propositional comprehension of intelligible
things which is the highest type of noetic skill and which is discussed in depth
in the following chapter.
206 Mind, Text, and Commentary
193
Or., ps. fragm. 80.1 (J.B. Pitra, ASSSP 3, 135). Quoted in Ch.J. King, Origen on the
Song of Songs as the Spirit of Scripture. The Bridegroom’s Perfect Marriage Song,
Oxford 2005, 146; also cited in H.U. von Balthasar, Origen. Spirit and Fire,
Washington 1984, 107.
Blossom Stefaniw 207
Origen considers it something that anyone who really wants to can see
for himself that mere ‘language and the power of speech’ is referred to
as silver in Scripture, being something less valuable, while what is most
valuable and referred to as gold is ‘the intellect and mind’. This same
194
Or., comm. in cant. 3.9 (R.P. Lawson [ed.], Origen. The Song of Songs. Commentary
and Homilies, ACW 26, New York 1957, 201).
Gregory finds fault with himself for having ‘dared to dump’ human
words ‘on ears which have been trained to listen to divine and pure
sounds’. He characterises Origen as some one who, because of his
196
Gr. Thaum., pan. 2.18 (M. Slusser [ed.], St. Gregory Thaumaturgus. Life and Works,
FaCh 98, Washington 1998, 94).
210 Mind, Text, and Commentary
‘Taste and see, that the Lord is good.’ How often have we
said that the sensible and corporeal things are like this:
Each thing is only that which it is. For example a
pomegranate is nothing other than a pomegranate, and
so also with bread. But for the food which nourishes the
Blossom Stefaniw 211
Referents within the sensible realm have one name each: each thing is
simply what it is, and the terms used to refer to them are simple and
unambiguous. But referents within the invisible, eternal, and intelligible
realm may be referred to by several different terms in the text. Thus, if a
text is believed to refer to the intelligible realm, it automatically does not
mean what it appears to mean, because words used for intelligible
referents are always ambiguous. The terms of Scripture are being
stretched and required to do more than they ordinarily can when they
are expected to refer to things in the intelligible realm such as the true
nourishment of the soul. The same differentiation of ordinary
unambiguous language referring to the sensible realm and ambiguous or
ambivalent (homonymous) terms being used of the intelligible is
expressed elsewhere in an instance of magnificently circular reasoning:
197
Didym., ps. 33.9 (M. Gronewald, Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar III zu Ps
29–34, PTA 8, Bonn 1969, 245).
212 Mind, Text, and Commentary
human or the soul is called light, but also sheep and plant
—for the soul is also called plant and sheep—it cannot be
all of these things in a physical manner, and thus we are
dealing with an intelligible being. So when you hear the
words heart, thought, belly, or well, do not understand
that literally. The container of the soul, in which it takes
in spiritual nourishment, is called belly. And since it also
Blossom Stefaniw 213
Human words provide a ‘veil’ covering over pure divine wisdom which
Didymus considers to have been necessary ‘because humans could not
understand the wisdom of God’. Again, this concession is a means of
making divine wisdom comprehensible to embodied human beings,
and the need for this ‘veiled form’ arises out of the presumed
metaphysical gap between embodied human beings and the intelligible
truth represented by divine wisdom, as well as the inadequacy of
ordinary human language to communicate it. This passage is also
suggestive in its image of Scripture not as a record of the work of God in
history or of instruction in the path to salvation, but as a mixture of
divine wisdom and ‘human words’. This implies that the text is a sort
of metaphysical hybrid and that noetic exegesis is a means of exploiting
that hybrid status in order to gain access to intelligible knowledge by
means of the words mixed in with it.
200
Didym., ps. 22.5 (M. Gronewald [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar II
zu Ps 22–26:10, PTA 4, Bonn 1968, 27.
216 Mind, Text, and Commentary
manage language, concepts, and any manner of mental images and use
them as a means of detecting divine realities rather than being distracted
or seduced by them. Language, like mental concepts, is one of the
‘images’ Evagrius expects the monk to employ as a contemplative tool
rather than focussing on it itself. Thus the language of Scripture,
understood literally, does not move the monk forward in his
contemplative journey. It only serves this purpose when treated as an
image of higher realities.
Evagrius explains this progression in an extended analogy
between contemplation and the acquisition of literacy (ep. mel. 11–14).
The ‘small letters’ of creation reveal the wisdom of the Creator, but
contemplation of rational beings (first order images closely related to
God) is like reading in capital letters, whence one recognises Christ and
the Holy Spirit. This is a very revealing analogy for θεωρία φυσική—
images, so that all are basically ontologically identical with each other.
This, in the context of noetic exegesis, means that the logos of God which
is deposited in the text is the same as the νοῦς by means of which and for
Conclusions
Introduction
203
For a summary of this debate, see the introduction in E.A. Dively Lauro, The
Soul and Spirit of Scripture Within Origen’s Exegesis, The Bible in Ancient
Christianity 3, Leiden 2005.
205
W. Bienert, Allegoria und Anagoge bei Didymos dem Blinden von Alexandria,
Berlin 1972, and J. Tigcheler, Didyme l’Aveugle et l’Exégèse allegorique. Étude
semantique de quelques termes exégétiques importantes de son commentaire sur
Zacharie, GCP 6, Nijmegen 1977).
224 Mind, Text, and Commentary
206
L. Dysinger, Psalmody and Prayer in the Writings of Evagrius Ponticus, Oxford 2005.
Blossom Stefaniw 225
noetic exegetes and their readers and hearers believe that it was possible
to comprehend and articulate the noetic significance of the text?’ rather
than ‘What technique, method, or procedure was employed by a specific
exegete in order to reach a given interpretation?’. Given the interpretive
assumptions on the revelatory nature of the text and its intelligible
content already collected, it is possible to stipulate at this point that we
are looking for some means of comprehension which is believed to be
suitable to intelligible truths and which is seen as appropriate for
engagement with a text of divine origin. When we look at interpretive
assumptions which are primarily socially, rather than theoretically
expressed, such as those relating to the person of the exegete, we are also
faced with questions of the interpreter’s identity and role in relation to
the text, its explication, and those receiving the interpretation, and also
with questions of the qualifications which an interpreter was expected to
have to guarantee the legitimacy and validity of his interpretation.
The commentaries frequently reflect the interpreters’
assumptions about the mental equipment available to the reader and
what part of this equipment could appropriately be used in noetic
exegesis. What is observable is a particular psychology, not uncommon
among contemporaries, which postulates a part of the mind, the νοῦς,
returning the νοῦς to a state of fitness for perfect knowledge. Also, the
lower sections of the person, namely the body and the psyche, so that
discipline with regard to the impulses and appetites of the body and
emotions must be achieved before the νοῦς can be expected to work
properly. This in turn explains why noetic exegesis so often appears in
conjunction with ascetic and semi-ascetic social contexts, and with an
educational curriculum dedicated to the overall moral and mental
formation of the student.
It is also necessary to examine ‘how’ noetic exegesis was
performed not only in the sense of ‘by what means’ but also in the sense
of ‘in what manner’. The commentaries suggest that the interpreter was
understood to be working or reading in the manner of a philosopher or
spiritual guide, because the interpretation of a text believed to contain
divine wisdom required him to conform his mind to divine things, and
also to manifest a high level of moral, spiritual, and/or ascetic skill. Just
as the belief that the text was a medium of divine revelation brought
with it a view of the author or writer as a visionary or prophet, so also
the belief that the intelligible content of the text can and should be
accessed by the application of the νοῦς to it brings with it a view of the
‘mind’ or ‘intellect’). The νοῦς was widely described as a part of the mind
left over from original union with the One which, if rehabilitated from
the effects of its involvement with the material world, the body, and the
disordered psyche, could again achieve knowledge of the intelligibles.
The νοῦς was believed to be able to think without images, concepts, or
language and was thus the appropriate tool for comprehending the
intelligibles, the One, the Trinity, God or anything considered beyond
for our purposes is that διάνοια uses sensible things as images, where as
directly engage with the forms.208 Clearly, both processes are involved
in noetic exegesis, with νόησις being an ideal goal, and διάνοια the greater
207
Pl., r. 6.511 b 1–2. On the νοῦς specifically, see also Pl., Phd. 97–99 for the cosmic
role of νοῦς in Phaedo, Republic 6–7 for in-depth discussion of νοῦς, and Timaeus
for discussion of the role of νοῦς in the creation of the world, which we will meet
again in discussion of Evagrius.
208
I. Mueller, Mathematical Method and Philosophical Truth, in R. Kraut (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Plato, Cambridge 1999, 170–199.
230 Mind, Text, and Commentary
210
Plot., enn. 5.1,11; 5.5,1. See also M. Alfino, Plotinus and the Possibility of Non-
Propositional Thought, in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1989), 273–284, for discussion of
the connection between Plotinus’ quest for perfect noetic knowledge and his
reservations about the capacity of language to serve this quest.
Blossom Stefaniw 231
occurred when the νοῦς fell away from ‘the fervour of the righteous and
its participation in the divine fire’, so that the highest part of what
appears as psyche in the embodied individual was originally νοῦς. What
is key in this passage is that Origen explicitly defines the proper end of
the mind as he sees it, namely to be ‘restored and corrected’ and
returned to perfect ‘participation in the divine fire’. The full
implications of this view for the practice of noetic exegesis are manifold,
since noetic exegesis is performed as part of the larger project of
rehabilitating the νοῦς and ultimately making it capable of returning to
its original state. The view of the νοῦς as the proper organ for perceiving
211
Or., princ. 2.8,3 (G.W. Butterworth [ed.], Origen. On First Principles. Being
Koetschau’s Text of the ‘De Principiis’, Gloucester 1985, 125).
232 Mind, Text, and Commentary
This text brings to light several aspects of Origen’s beliefs about the νοῦς.
simply an additional part of the human among others, but a part which
is superior to the others and the best that a human being has. We can
also note from this text that Origen sees the νοῦς as something non-
212
Or., princ. 1.1,7 (Butterworth, 1985, 12–13). The need to separate the mind from
corporeal things to allow it to perceive divine things is consistent with the
pursuit of advanced mental formation only after at least rudimentary control of
the body, if not ascetic discipline, had been achieved.
234 Mind, Text, and Commentary
belief that there is a need to purify the mind and separate it from bodily
matter will be taken up further below when I address the process of
spiritual formation within which noetic exegesis played a role. Here it
will suffice to make one further note, namely that Origen rhetorically
characterises his position as clear to any right-thinking person: he
introduces the counter-position with ‘does it not then appear absurd’
and then lays down his own position without working through each
point systematically, as one would expect if he had seen himself as
defending a position which he expected his readers to see as unusual or
novel. For Origen, it is obvious and plain that the object of the
intellectual sense cannot be corporeal and there is no need to
demonstrate that point.
In another passage from the Peri Archon, the νοῦς is treated as
The rational mind can attain to a more perfect understanding, but can
do so by ‘advancing from [...] a knowledge of visible to things invisible’.
This process of advancement and progress starting from the physical
and moving on to the incorporeal and intellectual is seen by Origen as a
necessity resulting from the location of the νοῦς in the body. The passage
ends with an example of noetic exegesis which gives a reason for noetic
exegesis: Solomon’s saying is understood as meaning that a non-bodily,
‘divine’ sense (Origen implies this is the νοῦς) is needed to investigate
gap examined in the previous chapter, and also why its application to
the text is considered necessary.
Also in the Peri Archon, Origen engages in debate with those who
believe in the resurrection of the body, instead interpreting references to
the saints eating and drinking as a matter of their souls being nourished
by the ‘food of truth and wisdom’:
Origen’s testimony on his view of the νοῦς and its needs and functions
into the material creation (‘restored to the image and likeness of God’).
Thus the rehabilitation of the νοῦς through nourishment by the word of
God, i. e., among other things, the practice of perceiving the intelligible
content of Scripture through noetic exegesis, is equivalent to the
fulfilment of the larger spiritual project of the return to its original state
of perfect union.
In his Commentary on John, Origen interprets the architectural
structure of the temple as suggesting the manner in which the mind can
‘rise from sensible things to the so-called divine perceptions’, (referring
to the metaphysical gap discussed in Chapter Three), and goes on to
specify that these divine things are seen only by the mind:
238 Mind, Text, and Commentary
about the house was made golden, for a sign that the
mind which is quite made perfect estimates accurately the
things perceived by the intellect (εἰς σύµβολον τοῦ
is the proper means not only for perceiving intelligible things in general,
but also for perceiving them where they are deposited in a text.
A final passage from the Commentary on John also manifests the
view that the νοῦς is the necessary and appropriate organ for
an achievement to which not all are privy, and which is dependent upon
freedom from agitation, or a state of order and tranquillity in the soul.
All of these aspects of the view of the νοῦς current among our
The wise man has a mind (νοῦν) which thinks in the right
man which goes along with insight into intelligible things. This is
opposed to the foolish man whose νοῦς/heart is engaged with material
intelligible things and if the text contains intelligible truths, then the νοῦς
Biblical term ‘heart’, Didymus defines the mind (the pure heart) as the
‘eye’ which is able to see invisible things and which also sees God.
218
Didym., ps. 43.3–4 (M. Gronewald [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar
V zu Ps 40–44.4, PTA 12, Bonn 1970, 113.
Blossom Stefaniw 243
219
Didym., ps. 24.15 (M. Gronewald [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar II
zu Ps 22–26:10, PTA 4, Bonn 1968, 121.
220
D. Emmet, Theoria and the Way of Life, in: JThS 17 (1966), 38–52.
244 Mind, Text, and Commentary
life requiring moral and mental discipline which allowed the individual
to make unencumbered use of the intellect. 222 This aspect also is highly
relevant to all of our commentators, and the use of the term in a moral-
philosophical context goes back as far as Plato and Aristotle. Origen,
Didymus, and Evagrius maintain the visual, mental, moral,
philosophical, and even scientific connotations of the term. Θεωρία may
The next passage from Didymus links his belief in the νοῦς to the
223
J.E. Bamberger, Praktikos and Chapters on Prayer, Cistercian Studies Series 4,
(1970), lxxviii notes discussion of the proper translation of θεωρία in I. Hausherr,
Les versions syriaque et arménienne d’Evagre le Pontique, in: OrChr 22 (1931), 69–
118 (75), and the suggestion that one should translate θεωρία as ‘mystery’ or
‘secret’. I disagree with this view as I think Evagrius considers θεωρία to be an
activity of the νοῦς and that θεωρία is less mystical and more cognitive and
philosophical than a word like ‘mystery’ suggests.
Blossom Stefaniw 245
For Evagrius also the νοῦς is the part of the person first created by
God and capable of knowing God. 225 On his account, the νοῦς has a
separate and distinct origin from the other parts of the person, but must
function in this world using the body and the psyche.226 It is the νοῦς
which is a matter of ultimate concern, while the body and the psyche are
only important inasmuch as they may help or hinder the νοῦς in
performing the function for which it was made. It is the νοῦς which has
the capacity for the final vision of God because it is a survival from the
original vision of God before the creation of the world and human
beings as we know them: ‘The naked νοῦς is that which, by means of the
226
The changes in the capacities of the νοῦς entailed by embodiment are explained
in D.E. Linge, Leading the Life of Angels. Ascetic Practice and Reflection in the
Writings of Evagrius of Pontus, JAAR 68 (2000), 537–568 (545): ‘In its present
situation of embodiment νοῦς has come to have a discursive function (to
logistikon or dianoia) in relation to the world of plurality and change. But its
higher, original nature as direct rational apprehension (theoria) lies hidden and
inoperative because of the influence of the passable soul. True to his Platonic
heritage, Evagrius designates the affective functions of the soul as the desiring,
or appetitve part—to epithymatikon—and the irascible part—to thymatikon.
Epithymia and thymos depend upon and respond to the world of sense
experience and change. From the perspective of individual fallen nous,
therefore, the task of life in the material-visible world is progressively to free
itself from the influences of soul and body.’
See also J.E. Bamberger, 1970, lxxvii: ‘Not only do bodies arise from
this creation, but souls also result from it. They too are part of the fall. Indeed,
the same intelligence (nous) which was once a pure intelligence, without
becoming another person, or more exactly another being, becomes a soul
(psyche). Now one of the outstanding characteristics of a soul, or psyche, is
affectivity. The psyche is the seat of the passions. It is involved in varying
measures with the body of the fallen intelligence (nous). In the angels it is the
intelligence that predominates; in man and in the demons, the psyche with its
complex of passions. In man it is the passions associated with sensuality
(epithumia) that predominate; in the demons, those arising from irascibility
(thumos) [...].’
227
Evagr. Pont., keph. gnost. 3.6 (L. Dysinger, Psalmody and Prayer in the Writings of
Evagrius Ponticus, Oxford 2005).
Blossom Stefaniw 247
Origen and Didymus, as is Evagrius’ belief that the νοῦς has a natural
appetite for intelligible things. 228 The better a νοῦς functions, the closer it
θεολογική: ‘A pure νοῦς has need of the λόγοι of bodies, a purer (νοῦς needs)
the λόγοι of incorporeals, and a (νοῦς) purer than the latter (needs) the
Blessed Trinity’.229 A νοῦς which is not yet ‘naked’ and which has not
For Evagrius, the object which the νοῦς is able to know reflects the
state the νοῦς is in: ‘The νοῦς which is imperfect is that which again has
separately from the body, so that it can know things beyond what sense
experience can supply: ‘The organs of sense and the νοῦς partake of
sensible (things); but the νοῦς alone has the intellection of the intelligible,
and it thus becomes a viewer of objects and λόγοι’. 231 The νοῦς is able to
cooperate with the bodily senses, and θεωρία φυσική, because it occurs in
perception: ‘The sense, naturally by itself, senses sensory things, but the
mind (νοῦς) always stands and waits (to ascertain) which spiritual
contemplation gives it vision’. 232 When the body and psyche are
subdued, the νοῦς gains distance from the material world and can
confront creation from a different and higher perspective: ‘The νοῦς that
is divested of the passions and sees the λόγοι of beings does not
henceforth truly receive the εἴδωλα that (arrive) through the sense; but it
thought and rejecting far from it the sensitive world’. 233 The embodied
νοῦς which has the body and psyche in order thereby gains distance from
we may conclude that Evagrius believes the mental equipment used for
noetic exegesis is the νοῦς in a semi-functional state, still involved with
the senses but able to make use of sensory perception and material
objects to perceive intelligible reality, while he holds the perfection of the
νοῦς to be the ultimate goal of the spiritual life. These passages also show
same time one must say that God, when he created in the
beginning, made physical criteria unlearnable. No one
has ever taught the face to perceive colour and form nor
hearing to recognise noises or voices, nor smell pleasant
or unpleasant scents, nor taste juices and liquids nor
touch soft or hard, warm or cold. In the same way no one
needs to teach the intellect to turn itself toward
intelligible things. Just as the organs of sense, when they
are sick, just require healing and then easily take up their
proper function, so also the intellect which is bound to
the flesh and filled with the images which arise out of it
requires faith and an upright life, which places it ‘as
hinds feet on high places’.235
Evagrius here uses the same analogy between physical senses and their
appropriate objects and the νοῦς as an organ of sense which also has an
235
Evagr. Pont., ep. 63.38 (G. Bunge [ed.], Evagrios Pontikos. Briefe aus der Wüste,
Trier 1986, 302).
Blossom Stefaniw 251
Similarly, the state of the νοῦς in a person who has been engaging in
‘heal’ it, analogously to the virtues proper to other parts of the person:
‘Knowledge heals the νοῦς, love θυµός, and chastity ἐπιθυµία. And the
cause of the first is the second, and that of the second the third’. 238 Just
as the psyche which is functioning according to nature becomes free of
disturbance, the νοῦς which is practising θεωρία φυσική attains a state of
to intelligible things which are suitable for it. That is, the νοῦς is able to
thing. They are in broad agreement as to the immaterial nature of the νοῦς
and its origin prior to and separate from the creation of the body. Of
further relevance for noetic exegesis is these commentators’
understanding of the proper function of the νοῦς as dependent on a state of
discipline and order in the body and soul and also the lower parts of the
mind. This directs our attention to the appearance of noetic exegesis in
the social context believed to provide just such inner order, namely
asceticism and higher philosophical education, as investigated in Chapter
Five. In completing our treatment of the ‘how’ of noetic exegesis,
however, it remains to set out how noetic skill was embodied or
characterised, and also how that skill could be acquired.
Blossom Stefaniw 253
Embodying Noetic Skill: the Interpreter as Philosopher, Holy Man, or Spiritual Guide
in the broad social context in which noetic exegesis was practised point
to the philosopher, holy man, or spiritual guide. As we have already
seen, there are several components among the interpretive assumptions
driving noetic exegesis which should make the identification of the
reader or interpreter with a philosopher or holy man (i. e. with a person
of exceptional mental and spiritual capacity) unsurprising at this point.
The belief in the object of noetic interpretation as something located in
the realm of the intelligibles, in the need for noetic insight in order to
perceive the intelligible content of the text, and in the need to develop
and appropriately apply the νοῦς, all point in this direction for the
is a logical result of the need for noetic skill in order to perceive the
higher meaning of the text, and the overall moral and mental
development which was understood to be prerequisite to attaining that
skill. Anyone who is fully competent in noetic exegesis has, in order to
become so, also attained control of the body and emotions and so has
earned authority over the moral and spiritual life in general, and in late
antiquity, the figure of the philosopher, holy man, or spiritual guide was
the social bank of that kind of authority. The second idea is less a matter
of internal logic that can be deduced—or induced—by an observer, and
more an additional component of the collection of assumptions on
which noetic exegetes were operating. This idea is expressed
systematically in Plotinus, but assumed in the commentaries. It is the
conviction that the unity of the knower and the object of knowledge is a
condition absolutely necessary for true knowledge, such as noetic
comprehension of the intelligibles. 240 Plotinus expresses this idea by
claiming that true knowledge is self-knowledge, when a thing knows
itself apart from any sort of division or separateness. 241 The reason that
this state of profound unity between knower and known is necessary
has much to do with the priority given to non-discursive forms of
thought examined in Chapter Three: this type of thought can only
successfully be achieved when knowledge coalesces with being, hence
the persistence of the idea in the discussion of the νοῦς above that the νοῦς
241
Plot., enn. 5.3,13,13–17 (M.R. Alfino, Plotinus and the Possibility of Non-
Propositional Thought, in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1989), 273–284 [279]).
Blossom Stefaniw 255
only really functions perfectly when it has overcome the embodied state
and has returned to unity with the One. The νοῦς needs to not just
function as well as possible while still in the embodied state, and so that
he has a capacity for unity with intelligible things and, ultimately, with
the One or the Trinity or God.242 This idea of a need for unity or
harmony works in both directions, in the orientation toward the
ultimate goal of the νοῦς (union with the One) and in the exegetically
242
The need for unity gains further momentum from the fact that the term νοῦς is
also used to indicate meaning, as well as from the association of Christ with a
perfect manifestation of νοῦς deposited in Scripture.
256 Mind, Text, and Commentary
243
Or., comm. in Mt. 14,6 (H.J. Vogt [ed.], Der Kommentar zum Evangelium nach
Mattäus, vol. 2 BGrL 18/30/38, Stuttgart 1983/1990/1993, 40).
Blossom Stefaniw 257
the sacrifices’ described in John 6:32, Origen describes this task as one
appropriate for ‘the perfect man’:
Now to find out all the particulars of these and to state its
relation to them that sacrifice of the spiritual law which
took place in Jesus Christ (a truth greater than human
nature can comprehend) to do this belongs to no other
than the perfect man, who, by reason of use, has his
senses exercised to discern good and evil, and who is
able to say, from a truth-loving disposition, ‘We speak
wisdom among them that are perfect’. 244
Origen characterises the perfect man as some one who has cultivated
moral discernment and is able to ‘speak wisdom’. He also identifies the
interpretation of the laws in terms of the ‘spiritual law which took place
in Jesus Christ’, which I take to indicate the noetic exegesis of the laws
and sacrifices, as ‘a truth greater than human nature can comprehend’,
that is, an object of thought which only a purified νοῦς can cope with. It
should also be noted that Origen associates the state of perfection with
the result of moral exercise, so that it is not only the learnedness of the
interpreter which allows for comprehension of the noetic content of the
text, but his entire moral and spiritual character as well.
This is consistent with Origen’s thought as reflected in Peri
Archon IV.2.4 where, when he speaks of gathering the meaning of
This brings us back to the material of Chapter Two on the belief in the
revelatory nature of the text. Given the assumed need for unity or
harmony between the knower and the known, it is not surprising that
thinkers who believe the mind of Christ to have been deposited into the
text consider a mind conforming to the mind of Christ necessary to
extract it again.
The basic requirement of the conformity of the interpreter’s mind
with that of the divine author or divine content of the text is set out also
in Didymus the Blind’s prologue to his Commentary On Zechariah, where
he states that since Scripture contains spiritual wisdom, it must be
interpreted spiritually, but such an interpretation can only be given by
245
E.A. Dively Lauro, The Soul and Spirit of Scripture Within Origen’s Exegesis,
Leiden 2005, 51.
246
Or., princ. 4.2,3 (G.W. Butterworth [ed.], On First Principles. Being Koetschau’s
Text of the ‘De Principiis’, Gloucester 1985, 274).
Blossom Stefaniw 259
exegetes who have the divine spirit to lead them, and can only be
understood by those who are spiritually prepared. For these reasons
Didymus considers prayer the proper preparation for study of the
Scriptures. 247 Similarly, referring to the same commentary, Didymus
claims that ‘the person who understands it is a seer’ and in his
interpretation of Proverbs also describes the individual capable of
understanding Scripture as one possessing divine wisdom (ὁ κατὰ θεῶν
247
See for further discussion on this point W. Bienert, Allegoria und Anagoge bei
Didymos dem Blinden von Alexandria, Berlin 1972, 73, and R.C. Hill [ed.], Didymus
the Blind. Commentary on Zechariah, FaCh 111, Washington 2006.
248 Didym., Zach. 3.8–9 (Hill, 2006, 23). See also Bienert, 1972, 76.
249
Didym., ps. 35.13 (M. Gronewald [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar IV
zu Ps 35–39, PTA 6, Bonn 1969, 65): ‘One must interpret Scripture according to
its deeper meaning. This is done by the man who is truly wise in the things of
God. When (Scripture) is not interpreted thus, but insufficiently, neither its
greatness nor that of its author is manifest.’
260 Mind, Text, and Commentary
Godly insight is required if one is to read the things of God, just as one
must know one’s letters in order to read words. Didymus characterises
Scripture, or those passages of Scripture requiring special interpretation,
as ‘philosophical words’ which can only be understood by those who
have knowledge of the relevant theory. The interpreter must be working
within the same system of signification as the author of Scripture.
In Evagrius, the process by which the interpreter can achieve the
necessary conformity of his mind to the intelligible content of Scripture
is set out as part of his ascetic and spiritual curriculum. As we have seen
above, Evagrius describes the act of perceiving the divine wisdom, both
251
Didym., ps. 31 (M. Gronewald [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar III zu
Ps 29–34, PTA 8, Bonn 1969, 145–147).
262 Mind, Text, and Commentary
divine wisdom is also νοῦς. The interpreter conforms his mind to what
sabotages the campaign of the νοῦς to become pure and attached to and
Since ascetic discipline counteracts the enflamed state of the psyche, the
person’s desires and impulses and temptations and attachments recede from
consciousness so that consciousness can concern itself with contemplation:
The spirit that is actively leading the ascetic life with God’s
help and which draws near to contemplative knowledge
ceases to perceive the irrational part of the soul almost
completely, perhaps altogether. For this knowledge bears
it aloft and separates it from the senses.253
Virtue is not pursued for its own sake, but inasmuch as it serves to
facilitate contemplation, and θεωρία φυσική is not an end in itself:
252
Evagr. Pont., praktikos 61 (J.E. Bamberger [ed.], Evagrius. The Praktikos and
Chapters on Prayer, CistSS 4, Spencer 1970, 33).
knowledge, but the glory and light of the soul is impassibility’.255 This
ordered state is expressed through the virtues appropriate to each part
of the person. Of particular interest here is the fact that though the
rational part of the soul is part of the psyche, when ἀπάθεια is achieved, it
The details of this connection are not clearly explained in the texts, but
the fact that the rational part of the soul acts as a mechanical link
between the embodied νοῦς and the psyche explains why the psyche
must be brought into order to avoid disrupting the function of the νοῦς.
257
This view of the necessity of the purification of the interpreter and the
conformity of his mind to intelligible realities also appears outside of our
corpus and seems to have been a generally accepted idea. For example, the
persistent arrangement of the educational curriculum in the philosophical
schools in advancing steps of virtue implies that the individual who has
advanced through the entire course of Platonic exegesis has thereby cultivated a
high level of virtue, so that the teacher of exegesis will have achieved his
expertise in interpretation on the basis of advanced moral and spiritual
development. Also, this understanding can be observed in the theory of literary
interpretation used in the traditional treatment of Homer and Plato. Lamberton
explains this thus ‘That is, each of their imitations has a surface meaning
masking a hidden meaning intimately related to it. This structure of meaning is
itself explained as an imitation of divine goodness, which functions on two
levels. The gods provide benefits on the sense plane to all, but restirct the
benefits on the level of nous to the wise (tois emphrosin); in imitation of them, the
myths reveal the existence of the gods to everyone but restrict information
regarding their true identities to those equipped for such knowledge.’ (R.D.
Lamberton, Homer the Theologian. Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth
of the Epic Tradition, The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 9,
Berkeley 1986, 141, based on Sallustius, de diis 3.2, lines 22–23 ed. Nock).
Blossom Stefaniw 267
are finally fully internalized. Not only the evidence of the commentaries
and the settings in which they were produced, but also what we know
of higher philosophical curricula in the same period, suggest that the
attainment of noetic skill, including the ability to fully engage with the
noetic aspect of a text, is a process more closely analogous to language
acquisition than to language learning. While formal instruction in
preparatory and complementary disciplines played a large role, and
knowledge of grammar and issues of textual criticism were highly
valued, the actual ability to perform noetic exegesis independently was
acquired through a process of immersion and practice in a given milieu
dedicated to noetic skill. An individual undergoing this process could
not simply imitate the steps in the technique of an Origen or a Didymus
but was expected to become a certain sort of person, as discussed in the
preceding section, and to enable a special part of his or her mind
through constant practice and discipline. This characterisation of noetic
exegesis as an acquired rather than a learned skill is also supported by
the absence of any explanation of proper exegetical procedure or list of
rules which are to be learned and applied. John Dillon refers in this
connection to learning exegetical skills as a process of internalisation.258
Dillon concludes that the ‘rules’ by which noetic exegesis was
performed were not taught or recorded systematically, but were instead
a matter of practice internalised by ‘sitting at the feet of one’s master’.259
258
J. Dillon, Image, Symbol and Analogy. Three Basic Concepts of Neoplatonic Allegorical
Exegesis, in The Golden Chain. Studies in the Development of Platonism and
Christianity, Vermont 1990, 247–248.
This state of affairs further confirms my theory that noetic exegesis was
governed by interpretive assumptions rather than a set technique, as
one would expect a technique to be reducible to rules and teachable.
Instead, by initiation into the educational culture presented to them
through the higher school curriculum, and by sharing the same
assumptions about the nature of the text and the purpose of reading it,
individuals acquired a sense for what constituted an appropriate
interpretation, so that through internalising the interpretive practice of
their teachers, they themselves could also generate acceptable
interpretations and perceive themselves thereby as extracting divine
revelation from the text. Thus the curriculum was not primarily
focussed on imparting to the student a catalogue of facts, rules or
methods, but rather on developing his mind in a particular direction. As
a result, this section examines the process of the acquisition of noetic
skill in terms of a curriculum of moral and mental formation, rather than
pursuing the question of how procedural rules may have been
imparted. That is, having established what sort of person one was
expected to be in order to legitimately and reliably perform noetic
exegesis, we now ask how one could become that sort of person.
Similarly, having established that the νοῦς had to be applied to the text in
order to perceive its deeper meaning, we now ask how one set about
enabling the νοῦς in order to be able to use it to interpret noetically.
intelligibles was to develop the capacity for clear reasoning and the
perception of abstract principles through (to us) academic disciplines
Blossom Stefaniw 269
thought which are not perfectly noetic are necessary and worthwhile in
the overall rehabilitation of the νοῦς, which is why we see a large
exegesis and the curricula than the pure νοῦς. After all, the process of
As with the interpretive assumptions set out in each chapter, this more
practical or social aspect of noetic exegesis was also current in the larger
cultural context. The curriculum, engagement with and interest in
which is often reflected in the commentaries, was not exclusive to the
pedagogical work of the commentators represented in our sample. The
general consensus, with a high degree of flexibility and variation, was
that a three-step process was necessary to fully form the individual who
had committed to higher intellectual goals. The first step was one of
basic ordering, referred to as ethics (πρακτική), and intended to establish
basic moral behaviour in the student. On other accounts, the first step
was logic, intended to establish basic rational order in the thought
processes of the students. There was debate about which was the most
basic requirement, but the fundamental idea is that a person enters upon
the process of formation in a state of greater or lesser disarray and
initially needs be be brought into order by mastering basic rules of how
to behave, or how to think. The second step was generally that of
physics (φυσική) and made up the bulk of actual educational practice,
260
Plot., enn. 1.2; cf. D.J. O’Meara, Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late
Antiquity, Oxford 2003, 40; 51.
also demonstrates a belief that the mind can and should be trained to
think without reference to material bodies, which also is evidenced in
Origen, Didymus, and Evagrius. In fact, for Hermeias, exactly that sort
of training is the purpose of the curriculum:
reading of Aristotle’s treatises such that the students begin with ethics,
because: ‘One must first set in order one’s own ethical character, and
then begin the other studies’ and ‘one must put ethics before the rest
because it gives us the right rhythm and sets our ethical character in
order’.268 Thus we can observe assumptions about what is normal and
effective in pursuing the goal of the cultivation of the person in the
larger educational milieu in the form of a curriculum including moral
and mental discipline on its lower levels and aiming ultimately at the
facilitation of optimal noetic skill.
Origen’s Curriculum
269
Or., comm. in cant. prol. 3 (R.P. Lawson [ed.], The Song of Songs, Commentary and
Homilies, ACW 26, New York 1957, 39–40).
272
Origen has another description of this pedagogical scheme consisting of the
mystical, physical, ethical and logical as described in fragment 14 of his
Commentary on Lamentations (E. Klostermann [ed.], Origenes, Werke, vol. 3, GCS 6,
Leipzig 1901, 241).
273
Two valuable but untranslated contributions to clarifying this question are
M. Hornschuh, Das Leben des Origenes und die Entstehung der alexandrinischen
Schule, in ZKG 71 (1960), 1–25, and 193–214, and C. Scholten, Die Alexandrinische
Katechetenschule, in JAC 38 (1989), 25–46.
274
Eus., h. e. 6.18,3–4 (Ch.F. Cruse [ed.], Eusebius. Ecclesiastical History. Complete and
Unabridged, Peabody 1998, 207–208).
Blossom Stefaniw 279
275
Richard Sorabji documents this usage in Simp., in cat. 5.23–6.5 (6th century) in
The Philosophy of the Commentators 200–600 AD. A Sourcebook, vol. 1,
London 2005, 322. Other usages of the term in this sense can be outlined as
follows from Liddell and Scott: def. ‘instruction by word of mouth: generally,
instruction’: Hp., praec. 13 (5th century BC); Cic., Att. 15.12,2; D. H., Dem. 50;
Chrysipp. Stoic. 3.54; Gal. 5.463; κατηχέω def. ‘teach by word of mouth: hence
generally, instruct’: Agrippa II, ap. J. vit. 65; Lucanius, asin. 48; 1Cor 14:19; Lk
1:4; Gal 6:6; ὁ κατηχούµεος τὸν λόγον Acts 18:25, κατηχήµενος τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ κυρίου
Porph., chr. 26.
280 Mind, Text, and Commentary
fits in with the second step of Origen’s stated curriculum. 276 Gregory also
holds forth about how Origen conveyed to his students ‘the divine virtues
concerning how to act, which bring the soul’s impulses to a calm and steady
condition’ which sounds like the first step of the curriculum, the attainment of
inner order and the practical virtues.277 Gregroy also describes Origen
engaging in noetic exegesis of the Scriptures as part of his lectures, and how
‘he himself expounded and clarified the dark and enigmatic places, of which
there are many in the sacred words,’ so that we see the actual practice of
noetic exegesis used in teaching advanced students.278
Origen’s understanding of the goal of this curriculum, which is
at the same time the goal of the spiritual life, namely union with God
through perfect noetic apprehension, is fairly familiar. One passage
from the Peri Archon uses a metaphor from education to describe what
Origen thinks happens to the souls of the saints after death. He thinks
‘paradise’ is:
276
Gr. Thaum., pan. Or. 8.109–114 (M. Slussser [ed.], St. Gregory Thaumaturgus. Life
and Works, FaCh 98, Washington 1998, 110).
278
Closer examination of this source, particularly as evidence for the practice of
noetic exegesis within this curriculum, is made in the following chapter.
Blossom Stefaniw 281
After outlining the steps in this upward progress and the posthumous
curriculum which the souls work through to achieve it, Origen describes
the end of the journey thus:
life which is the true one, the life which is said to be ‘hid
with Christ in God,’ that is, in the eternal life, there will
be for us any such order or condition of existence.281
It is essential to note here that Origen holds the leap from sensualism or
practical ethics to a higher and better form of life to be a result of ‘efforts
towards studies of this sort’. This is nothing new. However, in the
following discussion, Origen associates fleshly persons, ‘those who
reject the labour of thinking’ and ‘give way to their own desires and
lusts’ with those who interpret the prophecies in the Bible literally,282
and goes on to associate those dedicated to searching out the deeper
significance of these texts with the philosophical man who is
characterised by ‘devotion to studies and learning’. 283 In doing so,
Origen is implicitly supplying an affirmative answer to the question he
posed in the introduction to this section quoted above: Does the
differentiation of the sensual, statesmanlike, and philosophical man
obtain for Christians as well? Yes, and this can be observed in
individuals who make sensual, statesmanlike, or philosophical
interpretations of the Bible. Becoming a person capable of perceiving
the deeper significance of the Bible is, for Origen, the result of
committing to a programme of mental and moral formation.
284
R.A. Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria. Virtue
and Narrative in Biblical Scholarship, Chicago 2004, 3.
Blossom Stefaniw 285
texts forms the framework for mediating the process of moral and
mental formation in which Didymus’ students are engaged.
Didymus’ interpretation of biblical texts manifests examples of
instruction on all levels of the spiritual curriculum we saw in Origen
and which Origen claims were traditional. Numerous interpretations
which generate teachings on the attainment of virtue or what, on
Origen’s scheme, would be called ‘moral philosophy’, can be found and
have already been discussed in Chapter Two, since the life of virtue was
one of the intelligible referents to which a revelatory text was expected to
refer.285 While specific lessons on natural philosophy, if this is understood,
as in Origen, to indicate subjects like astronomy and mathematics, are not
typical of Didymus’ commentaries, his exegesis does include numerous
references to non-theological and, modern scholars would say, non-
biblical subjects. These could constitute points belonging to natural
philosophy or to a second step in the curriculum if Didymus understands
this as something like ‘secular learning’ or ‘general education’. For
example, in the Commentary on Psalms, Didymus reviews conceptual
categorisation of attributes and terminology based on Euclid and
Aristotle,286 and also teaches informal logic and the proper use of
285
Since a large proportion of the examples from Didymus already discussed in
this chapter, as well as the previous two, could be located in this category, we
will refrain from repeating them here.
286
Didym., ps. 21.2 (Doutreleau / Gesché / Gronewald, 1969, 103). Didymus here
refers to Gel. 1.20,9; Arist., top. 143 b 11; S. E., geom. 3.37.
286 Mind, Text, and Commentary
287
Didym., ps. 21.27 (Doutreleau / Gesché / Gronewald, 1969, 207). Here we see
Didymus referring to Arist., s. e. 169 b 20 ff.; 171 b 6 ff.; top. 100 b 6 ff.;
100 b 23 ff.; 100 a 27 ff.; top. 100 a 30 ff. See also Didym., ps. 38.12
(M. Gronewald, 1969, vol. 3, 247) for discussion of how to prove contraries.
289
Incidentally, Didymus is not the only Christian commentator who repeats this
legend while interpreting the Psalms.
Blossom Stefaniw 287
290
Didym., ps. 26.6 (M. Gronewald [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar II
zu Ps 22–26:10, PTA 4, Bonn 1968, 215).
292
Didym., eccl. 5.19 (J. Kramer [ed.], Didymos der Blinde. Kommentar zum
Ekklesiastes III. Kap. 5–6, PTA 13, Bonn 1970, 45).
288 Mind, Text, and Commentary
These passages reflect a picture of the goal of education and the spiritual
life which is usually considered typically Neoplatonic. For Didymus, the
prize of virtue, the virtue which is developed through the advanced
curriculum of which noetic exegesis is a part, is knowledge of the good
and of the truth. True life is life according to virtue and philosophy, a
statement which any late antique Stoic or Platonist teacher could also
have subscribed to. And the saints are superior to the philosophers not
because the Holy Spirit identifies them as Christians, but because the
Holy Spirit provides privileged access to the same goal as the
philosophers, namely knowledge of that which is. The extemporaneous
commentaries as a whole contain strikingly infrequent teaching on
Christian doctrine, focussing instead on a standard ascetical and
means for him the contemplation of the natural world and of the
Scriptures, by means of which the monk was to apply his νοῦς, which
294
Evagr. Pont., schol. in prov. 22.20 (247) (P. Géhin, Evagrius Ponticus. Scholies aux
Proverbes. Introduction, texte critique, traduction, notes, appendices et index, SC 340,
Paris 1987, 343).
Blossom Stefaniw 291
Who can know the structure of the world and the activity
of the elements? And who can understand the
composition of this organ of the soul? And who can
investigate how one is joined to the other, in what their
empire consists, and how they participate with one
another in such a way that the πρακτική becomes a chariot
Egypt signifies vice, the desert the πρακτική, the land of Juda
Vice, the state of the soul before engaging in this course of development, is
followed by ascetic discipline represented by the desert. The promised land
and its capitol represent natural contemplation (of bodies and the
incorporeal), while Zion is the ultimate goal of the soul, union with the Trinity.
As far as Evagrius’ teaching practice is concerned, it would be an
abuse of words to claim that he led a school analogous to that of Origen
or Didymus, but to a certain degree monastic formation did take place
in social structures similar to those of philosophical schools, with an
abba teaching a group of novice monks, and the monks being expected
to learn by imitation and internalisation the way of life demonstrated by
the abba. We have no evidence for monks learning geometry and
astronomy as in Origen’s school or being put through basic rhetorical
and logical exercises as with Didymus: the second phase of the
curriculum for Evagrius is still natural philosophy, but to him that
means contemplation which is within the natural capacities of the
human mind and is concerned with perceiving revelation within the
natural world and the Scriptures. This is an effective accommodation of
students who, unlike the majority of those attending Didymus’ or
Origen’s lessons, may have included the illiterate or those who had
received only very limited previous education.
So once again, the ultimate goal, the contemplation of that which is, is a
goal that any number of other teachers of advanced spiritual philosophy
would also have subscribed to. While there is variation among these
three Fathers, the same pattern of mental and moral purification
culminating in perfect knowledge can be observed consistently.
For Evagrius and the desert monks, the contemplation of
Scripture was a daily ascetic discipline: the monk was to repeat a verse
or passage of Scripture and meditate upon it until he was able to
perceive the divine wisdom within it.298 In the desert, striving to
comprehend the deeper content of Scripture became more a part of
spiritual formation than ever, being given a specific role in Evagrius’
three-step ‘curriculum’, of spiritual progress, under the name of θεωρία
297
Evagr. Pont., ep. 58.2 (G. Bunge, Evagrios Pontikos. Briefe aus der Wüste,
Trier 1986, 276).
mind, that is, one distracted neither by physical needs nor emotional
disorder. The monastic practice of chanting Psalms was a discipline
used to develop the special perception of Scripture’s spiritual
significance, as described in Evagrius’ Commentary on the Psalms:
τῶν ψαλµῶν).299
Here the actual act of chanting the Psalms is associated with a state of
mind which reflects the achievement of the moral and mental
curriculum we have just examined. The mind apprehends meaning, is
imprinted solely by the realities which the Psalm symbolises, or is even
so advanced as not to be imprinted at all.
Finally, it remains to clarify what exactly the relationship between
this curriculum and noetic exegesis is. The various aspects of the
curriculum (ascetic discipline, mental discipline, knowledge of abstract
principles of astronomy or geometry, etc.) serve the same overall goal as
Conclusions
In their own descriptions of how to find the noetic meaning of the text,
the sample commentators do not focus so much on procedure or
technique as on characterising and illustrating the sort of activity that is
necessary and the sort of person able to engage in it, besides specifying,
although with very moderate consistency and limited detail, the mental
equipment appropriate to the task. How can noetic exegesis be
performed? By applying an organ capable of perceiving the intelligibles
to a text whose contents are intelligible, and, consequently, by meeting
the requirements for the proper functioning of that organ, the νοῦς. Due
Introduction
300
For our purposes, debate in Eastern Block countries in the Soviet era about
where legitimate interpretation of Marx and Engels could be located would be
just as adequate an example.
300 Mind, Text, and Commentary
to the text, and it must either provide for or assume the attainment of
the overall mental and moral prerequisites for noetic skill just examined
in the previous chapter.
In the historical period with which we are concerned, the first
place to go for cultivation of the νοῦς was a school of advanced
in a school rather than, for example, some manner of magical rite, has to
do with the overall psychological structures assumed at the time within
this milieu—the νοῦς, in its pure form, was linked to the lower functions
of the νοῦς or higher functions of the psyche, and those profited from
moral and mental education, thus laying bare the ability of the νοῦς to
301
This psychology is discussed in more detail in Chapters Three and Four.
Blossom Stefaniw 301
also clear systemic and conceptual grounds for the social location of
noetic exegesis within the framework of higher philosophical and
spiritual formation. These are rooted primarily in the following chain of
beliefs: that the νοῦς is the appropriate organ for the comprehension of
must function well, that in order to function well the individual’s νοῦς
302
Gregory Thaumaturgus, despite having studied with Origen for several
years, in his farewell speech quotes Plato as much or more than the Bible,
and never mentions an explicitly Christian God or makes an unambiguous
reference to Christ.
Blossom Stefaniw 305
student body involved, and the actual praxis of noetic exegesis as it can
be observed from outside the commentaries.
the one teacher with optimal access to the truth, as we see in the
accounts of both Plotinus and Justin Martyr. Porphyry attached himself
to several teachers in the course of his life, while Amelius, another
student of Plotinus, stayed with Plotinus for twenty-four years. 304
The frequency of meetings and the degree to which they were
formally scheduled at all could vary, as could the level of pedagogical
orientation provided by the teacher, with some working systematically
toward their goal and others exercising very little authority in setting the
direction of discussion. Porphyry complains that Plotinus was of the
latter persuasion, allowing the students, or whoever turned up, to raise
questions for discussion as they pleased, which the more strait-laced
Porphyry described as resulting in a lot of pointless chatter.305 In
Alexandria, the Serapeum included lecture rooms whose use would
have had to be routinised in some manner, giving a more formal
structure to teaching there, assuming that rooms were shared by more
than one teacher and their use had to be scheduled. 306 That type of
regulated school-to-property arrangement was more the exception than
the rule, however. Meetings could also be held in the teacher’s home,
depending on the social and economic standing of the teacher, or in the
305
Porph., vit. Plot. 4.35–38. For a full account of the practical workings of
philosophical schools, see G. Clark, Philosophic Lives and the Philosophic Life, in:
T. Hägg / Ph. Rousseau (eds.), Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity,
Transformation of the Classical Heritage 31, Berkeley 2000, 29–51, and J. Dillon,
Philosophy as a Profession in Late Antiquity, in: A. Smith (ed.), The Philosopher and
Society in Late Antiquity. Essays in honour of Peter Brown, Swansea 2005, 1–18.
306
E. Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria, Transformation
of the Classical Heritage 41, Berkeley 2006, 145.
Blossom Stefaniw 307
308
Porph., vit. Plot. 5.3–5. See also R. Lamberton, Homer the Theologian,
Transformation of the Classical Heritage 9, Berkeley 1986, 446.
309
Watts, 2006, 234–235. The entire subject of fees could cause awkwardness for
the teacher, since philosophers, unlike teachers of rhetoric, were promoting a
way of life above material concerns, so that any frank and direct payment
system would appear to contradict their ideals.
308 Mind, Text, and Commentary
seems to have resulted more from his mother’s lobbying than to have
represented a typical arrangement.310 If both the teacher and the
students were of a very high social class, fee payment would have been
culturally inappropriate, and instead a bond of social obligations and
patronage would have been established and its analogy to exchanging
money for services politely ignored. Such bonds could be very
influential in both the private and public futures of the students and
often also included strong emotional attachments between teachers and
students, and among students and their fellows.
Given the highly social nature of late antique advanced
education, the composition of the student body as well as the
relationships between students and teachers and within groups of
students played a large role. While becoming part of a philosophical
teacher’s inner circle of students usually included a certain degree of
personal attachment and corresponding investment of time and loyalty,
those students who remained part of the less intensely attached outer
circle could conceivably visit the lectures of multiple teachers.311
311
Plotinus terms those belonging to the broader category of students who
attended more casually or with a lesser degree of commitment ἀκροαταί (Porph.,
vit. Plot. 7.1–3), and refers to those in the inner circle as ζηλωταί. This structure
was typical and is also recognisable in our commentators. One may be
reminded of present-day structures around individual charismatic professors,
with their circle of favourite graduate students and a larger group of students
who attend their classes, but Western mores tend to encounter such structures
with a degree of anxiety about nepotism and the potential for impropriety.
Blossom Stefaniw 309
312
All of these variations are described in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus as well as
Gregory of Thaumaturgus’ Panegyric for Origen.
316
Synes., ep. 140. See also the letters ep. 139 and ep. 146 for the link of the
intensity of this relationship to the common pursuit of philosophy.
Blossom Stefaniw 311
318
For further kin relationships between philosophical dynasties, see Proclus,
theol. Plat. 1.26–35.
325
Gr. Thaum., pan. Or. 5.48–9 (M. Slusser [ed.], St. Gregory Thaumaturgus. Life and
Works, FaCh 98, Washington 1998, 99).
316 Mind, Text, and Commentary
on how to educate her sons, and the aim of studying law in Beirut was
set. When Gregory’s brother-in-law was summoned to Palestine to serve
the governor as assistant, he soon sent for his wife, Gregory’s sister. This
involved free transport to Caesarea for Gregory and his brother as well,
who were to look after their sister on the journey. It was assumed they
would then go on to Beirut, taking advantage of the opportunity to make
a large part of the trip for free. In fact they remained in Caesarea, having
been persuaded to study philosophy with Origen instead.326 This
biography locates Gregory in a well-to-do social class, not only with
proximity to public officials and governors, but also with the family
resources to allow for advanced education.
Gregory describes how he came to study with Origen, an event
which he characterises as a providential meeting, since Origen had
recently arrived in the city, and Gregory and his brother had also
travelled there as escorts for their sister who had been sent for to join her
husband. Gregory gives a characteristically dramatic account of how he
was persuaded to stop in Caesarea and study with Origen, with Origen
in the role of a hunter or fisherman and he and his brother cast as ‘wild
animals or fish or birds’. 327 Origen’s argument for engaging in
philosophical study involved
[...] saying that the only ones truly to live the life which
befits rational beings are those who strive to live uprightly,
who know themselves first for who they are, and next
what the genuine goods are which a person ought to
pursue, and the truly bad things one must avoid. 328
330
Gr. Thaum., pan. Or. 2.10 (Slusser, 1998, 93): Περὶ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς διανοοῦµαί τι λέγειν,
φαινοµένου µὲν καὶ δοκοῦντος ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ πολὺ τῆς ἕξεως τοῖς καθορᾶν δυναµένοις
ἀπεσκευασµένου ἤδε µείζονι παρασκευῇ µεταναστάσεως τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον.
318 Mind, Text, and Commentary
the love (ἔρως) for the most attractive Word of all, holy (ἱερόν)
and most desirable in its ineffable beauty, and for this man
who is his friend and confidant (φίλον καὶ προήγορον), was
The location of Didymus’ school and the frequency of his lessons are
both uncertain. In most cases his place of work and residence is given as
Alexandria without further specification, and the historiographic
sources portray him as an ascetic. However, this does not provide any
conclusive indication that Didymus was part of a monastery, since it
was quite possible for ascetics to live independently within the city, and
it is not clear whether the historiographers providing this description
336
See Didym., eccl. 11:9 (G. Binder / L. Liesenborghs [eds.], Didymos der Blinde.
Kommentar zum Ekklesiastes VI. Kap. 11–12, PTA 9, Bonn 1969, 95) where
Didymus is addressing the question of which moral laws are valid for men and
women both. His argument is that where a masculine plural is used, it can be
assumed women are included, as a sort of compliment to the women. He gives
his own reference to the student body using a masculine plural form, despite
the fact that women are present, as substantiation of this point.
337
A.B. Nelson, The Classroom of Didymus the Blind, Ph. D. Dissertation, University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor 1995, 25.
Blossom Stefaniw 323
that the students seem to be reading along in their own (or shared)
copies of the text being discussed (they interrupt if Didymus skips a
phrase or passage), suggests that the student body was economically
similar to that of other advanced schools.339 Students or their families
would have had to have sufficient means at least to allow them to opt
out of employment for an extended period of time, since the
commentaries reflect regular attendance, and also to supply the
necessary materials and sustenance while the student remained
involved with Didymus. That is, the group attending Didymus’ lectures
included people with this level of socio-economic status, but may not
have been limited to them. The rising trend toward asceticism, if taken
up by the student, would have minimised any socio-economic limits on
who could afford to participate in Didymus’ school, and indeed the
priorities reflected in his interpretation suggest a decisive degree of
support for the ascetic life on Didymus’ part.
338
Nelson, 1995, 26, referring to ZaT 354.18; GenT 139.12; ZaT 391.11; GenT
119.3; etc.
344 Nelson, 1995, 30. Cf. EcclT 152.9; PsT 62.2; EcclT 62.29; PsT 62.1.
Evagrius was a spiritual teacher of monks, but his social setting is not
quite as logistically distinct from that of the urban schools as it initially
appears. Recent scholarship has revised the picture of early
monasticism to emphasise the presence of educated Greek-speaking
individuals and the close interaction between monastic communities
and the social and economic structures around them. 346 It is necessary
to keep this firmly in mind when engaged with early historiographers’
picture of monasticism, which constructed a more severe break with the
outside world and a more absolute rejection of status and education
346
See for example J.E. Goehring, Ascetics, Society, and the Desert. Studies in Early
Egyptian Monasticism, Harrisburg 1999.
326 Mind, Text, and Commentary
than was really the case. The monastic communities were, at least in
part, demographically analogous to the urban schools, and persons
educated in either were candidates for becoming bishops or taking up
other high offices. Also, archaeological findings reveal substantial
libraries, and further suggest that the purportedly illiterate rural
population from which some monk-converts were drawn were
frequently mixed with a demographic competent both in reading and
writing and fluent in Greek.347 While Evagrius was already well-
educated before he became a monk, he was also initially a student of the
spiritual tradition he entered in the desert, and only then progressed to
becoming a teacher.348 Those aspects of his work connected to the
higher degree to which the interpretive community in which Evagrius
worked was also a close community in economic and social terms, are
what make his situation slightly distinct from that of Origen and
Didymus. It is a difference of degree rather than kind, as Origen and
Didymus were also advocates of asceticism, for example, and in the case
of Didymus, we do not know how or where he was educated, so that a
training within the same tradition in which he later taught cannot
necessarily be excluded. The exegetical works of Evagrius themselves
do not include descriptive information about where and how they were
produced or used and, because of their elliptical style, there is an
unfortunate dearth of incidental comments which would reveal this sort
347
S. Rubenson, Evagrios Pontikos und die Theologie der Wüste, in: H.Ch. Brennecke /
E.L. Grasmück / Ch. Markschies (eds.), Logos. Festschrift für Luise Abramowski,
BZNW 67, Berlin 1993, 384–401 (386–387).
349
Apophth. Patr., olympus 1 (B. Ward [ed.], The Sayings of the Desert Fathers. The
Alphabetical Collection, CistSS 59, Kalamazoo 1975, 160) mentions a pagan priest
who ‘came down from Scetis one day and came to my cell and slept there.’
328 Mind, Text, and Commentary
350
Palladius’ account of Evagrius is in h. Laus. 38. See also Socr., h. e. 3.7, 4.23;
and 7.17.
Blossom Stefaniw 329
351 My thanks to Joel Kalvesmaki for help in deciphering the meaning of this phrase.
physical world of creation and the written Scripture to serve as the basis
of contemplation, so that those monks who were unable to read could
instead ‘read’ the world around them and interpret that noetically, so to
speak, in order to perceive intelligible realities through it.
object of study not only replaces the vague and unwieldy traditional
terminology with a term that can be attached to a specific meaning, but
also points up the importance of the role of social context in the
interpretive project. In the third and fourth centuries, co-existing with
noetic exegesis, there is a wide variety of other non-figurative interpretive
practices driven by their own agenda. These non-noetic interpretive
practices include allegorical readings which, for example, are located in an
adversarial communal context and motivated by the aim of successfully
competing for the authority that can be drawn from claiming interpretive
rights over a certain text. Not all non-literal readings in late antiquity are
noetic. They can also be competitive, polemical, or esoteric. The aspect of
what defines noetic exegesis as noetic which we aim to investigate in this
section is the use to which it is put, and that use is located in the context of
advanced spiritual, mental, and moral (in late antique terms,
philosophical) formation.
The interpretation of texts for moral guidance and to provide
examples for young people is well known from the use of Homer in the
rhetorical schools, so that those who proceeded to philosophical
education would already have been introduced to this type of reading of
traditional texts. Philosophical studies built on the techniques learnt in
the rhetorical schools. The student was to apply them to philosophical
texts and their exposition, and needed rhetorical skill to discuss and
332 Mind, Text, and Commentary
355
R.D. Lamberton, The Schools of Platonic Philosophy of the Roman Empire. The
Evidence of the Biographies, in: Yun L.T. (ed.), Education in Greek and Roman
Antiquity, Leiden 2001, 433–458 (442).
Blossom Stefaniw 333
356
Herm., Phdr. 241 e 8 (H. Bernard [ed.], Hermeias von Alexandria. Kommentar zu
Platons ‘Phaidros’, Philosophische Untersuchungen 1, Tübingen 1997, 63).
Parenthetical statements are from Bernard’s German.
334 Mind, Text, and Commentary
the entire universe and each of its parts, and the endless
alteration and transformation of the things in the world.
In the end he brought us, by his clear teaching and the
arguments which he had either learned or discovered
about the sacred arrangement of the universe and the
unsullied nature, to the point where a rational wonder
(λογικὸν θαῦµα) replaced the irrational one in our souls. It
soul. 360 Gregory also refers to Origen’s teaching of theology proper, the
highest level in the curriculum. He locates this type of study squarely as
something whose mastery depends on having attained virtue, and
characterises it as aimed at coming to God and being conformed to the
divine ‘in purity of mind (καθαρῷ τῷ νῷ)’. 361
there are many in the sacred words (ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς φωναῖς).’362 Gregory
This is much in line with assumptions about the type of person who is
fully capable of noetic exegesis which were discussed in Chapter Four.
Gregory also postulates a special relationship between Origen and the
ἀρχηγός (possibly Christ):
In the same way, Origen has clear knowledge of things which others are
only able to perceive vaguely. Gregory also expresses the assumption,
noted in Chapter Four and Chapter Two, that the same mental state
which is the ultimate aim of the curriculum with which his students are
involved. The function of noetic exegesis in the curriculum is thus
twofold. Firstly, it allows for interpretations aimed at the mental and
moral cultivation of the students. Secondly, it constitutes a performance
of full noetic skill on the part of the teacher, which both substantiates his
authority and indicates the exceptional status which the fully committed
student could potentially attain.
submission (εὐταθείας) to the shepherd. The soul does not want because
is like grass is appropriate for sheep, and consists of hearing the voice of
Christ (as in Jn 10:27). The ‘sheep’ can progress from having Christ as
shepherd to having him as a teacher (as in Jn 13:13). After yet another
metaphor, contrasting resting beside quiet waters (Didymus’ text has
κατεσκήνωσεν) with actually residing in a place in terms of the analogous
specifically. When the verse says ‘for his name’s sake’, Didymus
presents a theory of language according to which the association
between the phonetic units by which a thing is referred to and the
nature of the thing itself is non-arbitrary. He quotes a definition of
‘name’ as something which indicates the ἰδίας ποιότητος of what is named.
παίδεθσιν) and (τὰ δόγµατα τῆς εὐσεβείας), to which the individual still
and mercy will follow me all the days of my life, and I will dwell in the
house of the Lord forever.’ To Didymus, this is indicative of the final
permanent illumination of the soul.368
In the interpretation of this six-verse Psalm, Didymus constructs,
apparently on an impromptu basis, an explanation of progress in the
spiritual life, from the basic level of immaturity and dependence, to final
illumination and perfection. The attachment of this explanation to a
passage of Scripture is completely gratuitous from a practical standpoint,
as it would be both possible and easy to present that sketch of spiritual
progress independently of the text. Also, the interpretation, apart from a
few minor diversions, is coherent internally and constitutes a unified
lecture on development in virtue, challenges to virtue, and its ultimate
goal. This example of noetic exegesis in practice reflects the interpretive
assumptions observed thus far, not least in the claim that this teaching
about spiritual progress is revealed by the text. The concern for
explaining the life of virtue, how it develops, where its goal is, the
368
Didym., ps. 22.1–6 (M. Gronewald [ed.], Didymos der Blinde: Psalmenkommentar II
zu Ps 22–26:10, PTA 4, Bonn 1968, 2–37).
Blossom Stefaniw 345
369
Apophth. Patr., Antonius 18. (Ward, 1975, 5), and Apophth. Patr., Agathon 22
(Ward, 1975, 23).
346 Mind, Text, and Commentary
370
R.D. Young, Evagrius the Iconographer. Monastic Pedagogy in the ‘Gnostikos’, in:
Journal of Early Christian Studies 9 (2001), 45–71 (53).
371
Ibid.
Blossom Stefaniw 347
Only then can the interpreter set out what the particular noetic reading
of the verse is. It should be noted that not only does this structure for
interpretation map interpretations directly onto the key elements of
spiritual development according to Evagrius, but it also presupposes the
ability of the interpreter to apply discernment and his own ability to
perceive noetic things to understand along which lines the verse should
be read. The mental process required is not mathematical or deductive,
but rather inductive and noetic.
Evagrius also provides instructions for the differentiation of
whether a text of a certain character can also be seen as a contemplation
of the same type, explaining how, once a categorisation of particular
passages is achieved, they can be applied to specific types of tasks in the
process of spiritual formation:
physics. Now the first text relates to ethics and the two
others to physics.373
Words recorded in the text by morally corrupt individuals are not, for
Evagrius, acceptable objects of noetic exegesis, because they do not
contain anything spiritual. While noting certain exceptions, Evagrius
maintains the attitude linking the quality of the human source of the text
with the capacity of the text to mediate noetic knowledge which we
observed in Chapters Two and Four. Evagrius also encourages
discretion in the application of allegorical readings generally:
377
See for example Evagr. Pont., gnostikos 24: ‘Take care that you never, for the
sake of profit, well-being, or fleeting glory, talk about those things which should
not be revealed, and [thus] be cast out of the sacred precincts, like those selling
the pigeon chicks in the temple. (cf. Mt 21:12–13).’ and Evagr. Pont., gnostikos
27: ‘Do not, without [careful] consideration, speak about God [in Himself]; nor
should you ever define the Deity: for it is only of [things which are made or] are
composite that there can be definitions.’
352 Mind, Text, and Commentary
anything, nor to let them touch books of this sort, for they
are not able to resist the falls that this θεωρίας entails. That is
379
Apophth. patr., Poemen 16 (Ward, 1975, 169). The reference is to 2Kgs 24:8–9.
354 Mind, Text, and Commentary
each person being asked to explain a certain passage, 381 and in many
cases the request by the visitor for ‘a word’ was treated as equivalent to
a request for interpretation. One saying suggests that not only was the
belief about the analogy between the mental processes of the writer and
reader of Scripture held in practice, but also that some interpreters were
so certain that reaching a noetic interpretation of a passage was a matter
requiring advanced spiritual powers that it was appropriate and
effective to directly request divine assistance:
The brethren came to Abba Anthony and laid before him
a passage from Leviticus. The old man went out into the
desert, secretly followed by Abba Ammonas, who knew
that this was his custom. Abba Anthony went a long way
off and stood there praying, crying in a loud voice, ‘God,
send Moses, to make me understand this saying’. Then
there came a voice speaking with him. Abba Ammonas
said that although he heard the voice speaking with him
he could not understand what it said. 382
383
Ch. Haas, Alexandria in Late Antiquity. Topography and Social Conflict,
Baltimore 1997, 62.
384
E.J. Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria, Transformation
of the Classical Heritage 41, Berkeley 2006, 161; and Eus., h. e. 6.3.
385
For discussion of the relevant sources and reasons for confusion, see M.J.
Edwards, Ammonius, Teacher of Origen, in: JEH 44 (1993), 169–181.
386
E.J. Watts, The Student Self in Late Antiquity, in: D. Brakke / M.L. Satlow /
S. Weitzman (eds.), Religion and the Self in Antiquity, Bloomington 2005, 234–251
(251, note 55): Eus., h. e. 6.19.5 describes how Porphyry was interested in
Origen due to his reputation as a scholar and attended (at least) one of his
public lectures. Watts, 2005, 246 notes that Gregory, the writer of In Origenem
oratio panegyrica, was originally a pagan when he joined Origen’s circle in
Caesarea. Cf. Eus., h. e. 6.3 on Heraclas, who joined Origen’s school in
Alexandria as a pagan, converted, became a Christian presbyter, but continued
attending philosophical lectures with Ammonius. See also Haas, 1997, 154–155.
Cf. Aphthonius; Zach. Mit., v. Sev.
Blossom Stefaniw 359
388
Watts, 2006, 211. Cf. Zach. Schol., Sev. (M.A. Kugener [ed.], Vie de Sévère par
Zacharie le Scolastique. Textes syriaques, PO 2.1, Paris 1907 Pro. 1–7). Watts,
2005, 235.
391
A lot of discussion has arisen about Gregory’s religious persuasion, since the
text of his address has been perceived as reflecting a rather odd and incomplete
knowledge of Christian doctrine. However, as both Slusser and Trigg have
pointed out, this may be just as well explained by differences between third
century Christianity and twentieth-century Christianity than by positing that
Gregory was a pagan. Efforts have also been made to describe Origen’s school
as a missionary project aimed at persuading educated pagans to join the church
(See A. Knauber, Das Anliegen der Schule des Origenes zu Cäsarea, in: MThZ
19 (1961), 182-203). This view rests on the assumption that there was a cleaner
break between paganism and Christianity than can really be substantiated for
the third century, and on the assumption that Christianity in that period did or
should exactly reflect modern perceptions of Christianity. Gregory’s own
account of himself portrays him as having been brought up with traditional
religion, but by the time he wrote the Address he was certainly conversant with
Christianity and given that he later became bishop it seems he was baptised at
some point in his life. It is not clear whether that point was before, after, or
during his stay with Origen. Given third-century attitudes toward confession
in quasi-philosophical circles, however, any of those alternatives may have been
the case. Neither the fact that Gregory studied with Origen, that he has read at
least parts of the Bible, that he never mentions Christ by name, or that he
alludes to Plato just as much as he does to the Bible, are decisive in indicating
whether he fully identified himself as a Christian at the time.
Blossom Stefaniw 361
392
Soz., h. e. 6.30,11 even describes Evagrius’ move to Sketis as going to see the
philosophers: ἐπὶ Θέαν τῶν ἐν Σκήτει φιλοσοφούντων.
Blossom Stefaniw 363
Conclusions
At this point we can orient the findings of this chapter to the rest of this
study. We have already established that knowledge of intelligible
realities was the ultimate goal of advanced philosophical education, and
that the commentators under consideration here held that just such
higher truths could be discovered in traditional texts. Since engaging
with noetic exegesis of these texts could serve to train the mind to
become able to access intelligible truths, noetic exegesis served the
overall pedagogical goals of higher education. It thus functioned as part
of a curriculum intended to order the passions and cultivate the mind.
Our commentators provide explicit statements on their view of the
comprehension of intelligible reality as the ultimate purpose of the νοῦς
activated his νοῦς and will be read better the more advanced in noetic
development the reader is. The reader advances in the adequate use of
his νοῦς the more he advances in his overall moral and mental education
Introduction
At the outset of this study, engagement with the exegetical work of three
early Christian thinkers was oriented to two ideas, one from the
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, and one from the literary theorist Stanley
Fish. Geertz’ concept of thick description required an account of
exegesis which included the commentators’ own concerns and
preoccupations, as well as attention to the reasoning behind their
interpretive work which they themselves provide or manifest. Fish’s
literary criticism was drawn upon for the concept of interpretive
assumptions, as well as the hypothesis that the interpretive assumptions
of the community reading a text are what determines the meaning which
is found in that text. As a result, not only the identification of the relevant
interpretive assumptions, but also attention to the larger cultural and
intellectual context of those assumptions have been programmatic in the
preceding pages. This study has, on the basis of the application of these
two concepts from Geertz and Fish, been structured with each chapter
representing a question about the interpretive project which was
answered on the basis of the commentaries. The answers thus reached
represent clusters of interpretive assumptions, and each chapter has
included explanation and exemplification of how each interpretive
366 Mind, Text, and Commentary
itself if and only if the interpretive assumptions set out in this study are
not only held, but truly assumed, by the commentators and their
students and if the entire set of ideas and behaviours involved in it draw
their value, validity, and significance from the cultural context within
which they indeed did so. Noetic exegesis is not simply the product of
the application of certain exegetical rules or logic or of a given
hermeneutical technique. It is a complex interpretive project which
depended on the particularities of culture and social relationships to
develop and function.
i. The divine reveals things through the text which pertain to the
intelligible realm and which are constructive in moral and
spiritual development.
ii. The divine does not reveal things through the text which are
banal or inappropriate to the divine nature.
iii. Where the text is composed by a writer, beyond the divine author,
that writer functions in the role of a visionary or prophet, conveying
a vision of higher realities by means of human language.
2.) The text has a surface narrative with a sensible referent and also, in many
passages, an intelligible referent.
i. The text cannot have always and only an ordinary referent since
it is divine revelation and as such must contain intelligible truths.
ii. Intelligible truths are worthwhile and important objects of study
for the human mind.
iii. Intelligible truths cannot be expressed in ordinary language read
as such.
iv. Intelligible truths cannot be perceived using propositional
thought or mental concepts.
v. The intelligible truths in the text must be perceived non-
propositionally and in some manner that circumvents
ordinary language.
376 Mind, Text, and Commentary
4.) The νοῦς can be cultivated and used in its most cultivated form in the context
These assumptions are the answers to the questions posed at the outset
of this study as to what the text is, why it requires special interpretation,
and how and where that interpretation may properly be performed.
They are indeed assumptions since their appearance in the
Blossom Stefaniw 377
One might ask whether there is a real difference between the conclusion
of some scholars of patristic exegesis that non-literal Christian exegesis
was as it was largely because of Neoplatonist ‘influence’, and the
conclusion of this study that noetic exegesis in these particular three
378 Mind, Text, and Commentary
perceiving the intelligibles and its valuation as the part of the human
person which should most urgently be cultivated, as well as the
tradition of education as overall moral and mental formation, are all
familiar aspects of Neoplatonism. Given this close similarity, it is
necessary to grapple with the problem of what sort of relationship in
fact obtains between Neoplatonism and noetic exegesis, and what
grounds this study has provided, if any, for shifting away from simply
describing our sample exegetes as Christian Neoplatonists.
A very common way of explaining the observable similarity
between supposedly Christian practices or ideas and those of other
groups within the larger culture in which they are observed (such as
Neoplatonism) is to postulate a relationship of influence. On this model,
Christian thinkers are portrayed either as adopting and adapting certain
non-Christian ideas and practices for the purpose of articulating the
Gospel to their contemporaries, or as having been influenced, in a
negative sense, by foreign ideas without being sufficiently conscious of
the incursion of these ideas to prevent them from corrupting a clear and
correct expression of Christianity. In either case, the basic idea is that the
reason for the similarity between familiar Neoplatonist ideas and the
exegetical practices of commentators like Origen, Didymus, and
Evagrius is that the ideas concerned were transferred from one paradigm
Blossom Stefaniw 379
intelligibles, are we to conclude that Origen got this idea from Plotinus,
his younger contemporary? Why would one not conclude exactly the
opposite, namely that Plotinus got his idea from Origen, the elder and
more established scholar at the time? And why would either of these
thinkers need to borrow the idea from each other at all, when any
380 Mind, Text, and Commentary
the νοῦς requires rehabilitation through moral and mental formation. At the
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Clement (Clem.)
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Blossom Stefaniw 389
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Academic Publishers, 2001.
Blossom Stefaniw 413
Note on Translations:
like to thank Elizabeth Depalma Digeser for her decisive, sure-handed, and
generous guidance. Joel Kalvesmaki of Dumbarton Oaks Institute also
contributed the attention of his meticulous and patient mind to solving a key
problem in a passage on the scribal work of Evagrius.
Ivo Gottwald spent three years with this project in the house,
steadfastly providing me with the time and logistics to invest in it. In the
final stages of preparing this manuscript, he has performed marathons of
heroic thoroughness in setting the text and adjusting all of the scholarly
apparatus to the ECCA style sheet. His dependability, constancy, and
perpetually disgruntled charm have been and continue to be a treasured
anchor. It is to him that this book is dedicated.
Blossom Stefaniw
Leipzig, September 2009
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Vol. 1 David Brakke / Anders-Christian Jacobsen / Jörg Ulrich (eds.): Beyond Reception. Mutual
Influences between Antique Religion, Judaism, and Early Christianity. 2006.
Vol. 2 Jakob Engberg: Impulsore Chresto. Opposition to Christianity in the Roman Empire c.
50-250 AD. 2007.
Vol. 3 Anders-Christian Jacobsen / Jörg Ulrich (eds./Hrsg.): Three Greek Apologists. Drei griechi-
sche Apologeten. Origen, Eusebius, and Athanasius. Origenes, Eusebius und Athanasius.
2007.
Vol. 4 Anders-Christian Jacobsen / Jörg Ulrich / David Brakke (eds.): Critique and Apologetics.
Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity. 2009.
Vol. 5 Jörg Ulrich / Anders-Christian Jacobsen / Maijastina Kahlos (eds.): Continuity and Disconti-
nuity in Early Christian Apologetics. 2009.
Vol. 6 Blossom Stefaniw: Mind, Text, and Commentary. Noetic Exegesis in Origen of Alexandria,
Didymus the Blind, and Evagrius Ponticus. 2010.
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