Code One Magazine Enduring Freedom Afganistan

Code One Magazine: F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan
Code One Magazine
Third Quarter 2002 - Vol. 17, No. 3
Enduring Freedom
Debrief
F-16 Operations
Over Afghanistan
Introduction
419th Fighter Wing
944th Fighter Wing
366th Air Expeditionary Wing
301st Fighter Wing
354th Fighter Wing
169th Fighter Wing
379th Air Expeditionary Wing
332nd Air Expeditionary Group
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Enduring Freedom Debrief

F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan
American aircraft and cruise missiles simultaneously attacked Taliban air defenses, airfields, command
and control facilities, and troop garrisons throughout Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. The success of
the operation, called Enduring Freedom, came rapidly. The Taliban controlled more than eighty percent
of Afghanistan when the operation began. Al-Qaeda forces were entrenched in camps and safe houses
throughout the country, which was little more than a terrorist-sponsored state. US and coalition forces
had destroyed almost all Taliban air defenses by 20 October, less than two weeks after the start of the
war. US Special Forces linked up with anti-Taliban leaders on several fronts. Twenty days into the
conflict, the provincial capital of Mazar-e Sharif fell. The cities of Herat, Kabul, and Jalalabad quickly
followed. By mid-December, anti-Taliban forces controlled the capital city of Kandahar. An Afghan
interim government was inaugurated just seventy-eight days after the beginning of the war. Today,
Taliban and al-Qaeda forces remaining in the country are cut off and isolated, mostly in the
mountainous regions in the southern part of the country.
The success and speed of operations in Afghanistan can be attributed to technology. Small, light, and
highly mobile Special Forces units used lasers to designate targets for aircraft flying high above them.
These targets were hit almost immediately with accuracies measured in feet. Precision-guided
munitions multiplied the effectiveness of every sortie. In Desert Storm, US forces launched ten aircraft
to hit one target on average. In Enduring Freedom, one aircraft hit two targets. The targeting cycle itself
was reduced from days to minutes. Night vision systems formed rules instead of exceptions. The use of
unmanned aerial vehicles permitted around-the-clock surveillance of enemy locations and movements.
Tankers and airlifters played critical roles in getting fuel and supplies to the region. Every service and
almost every platform in the US military participated in the operation. US fighter pilots flew missions
lasting more than fifteen hours, some of the longest missions in the history of aerial combat.
Surveillance missions of twenty-six hours also set records. And though they were not readily apparent
in the news coverage of operations over Afghanistan, F-16 units were involved in the earliest mission.
The first occurred on 22 October from a deployed location originally intended to support Operation
Southern Watch missions over Iraq. F-16s began operating from a second location in early November.
While Fighting Falcons constituted only a small percentage of the military aircraft in the region, they
played a significant role in the overall operation. What follows are excerpts from more than twenty
hours of interviews with pilots, maintenance personnel, and weapon loaders from several F-16 units
that took part in the operation. The excerpts don’t provide a complete picture of air operations over
Afghanistan. They do, however, provide a first-hand account of the ingenuity, sacrifice, and resolve of
some of those who contributed to the success of Enduring Freedom.
Eric Hehs, Editor of Code One
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F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 419th Fighter Wing

First F-16 Mission
The first mission was a mid-day launch. By the time we got there, it was close to sunset. We had
update points to correct the INS drift. But the longer we were airborne, the more the INS drifts. We had
update points planned all over the country, but they wanted pinpoint targeting in a cluster of buildings.
We didn’t have updates within fifty miles of that target so we could not provide pinpoint targeting.
We had preplanned targets, but they canceled them when we got there. So we went to real-time
targeting, or time-sensitive targeting, working with US forces on the ground. We were in a new target
area with no idea of the terrain. We had seven hours worth of INS drift before we started getting
targeting assignments. The INS alone wasn’t hacking it. INS had to be tight for these targets.
We couldn’t use NVGs because the sun was still up. The infrared picture was bad, and the CCD image
was poor as well. The GFACs couldn’t target safely what they wanted to target. Force protection issues
prevented us from dropping. They gave us coordinates to targets we could drop on, but we weren’t sure
exactly what targets they wanted us to hit at those coordinates. So, we flew back with our bombs.
We were all over the country on that mission, in the northwest, in the northeast, in the center of
Afghanistan. We toured the whole country looking for targets. Command and control at the time was
pretty archaic as far as getting real-time targeting through the various command and control stations
and back to us. By the time the lighting conditions improved, we faced a tanker issue and had to go
back for fuel. After that mission, we adjusted our scheduling to do full-day or full-night sorties. We
launched out of our base either in the middle of the night to get there in the middle of the day or later in
the day to make sure we arrived at night. The issues related to our INS subsequently went away when
they installed our GPS and SCU 4 packages.
– Maj. Knuckles, 419th FW
Update points – known locations used to calibrate the INS

INS drift – inertial navigation system, which tells the airplane where it is, becomes less accurate over
time and distance
CCD – charge coupled device; electro-optical sensor used in the Litening targeting pod
GFAC – ground forward air controller; person on the ground who locates targets for aircraft
SCU 4 – software capability upgrade; software that allows Block 30 F-16s to use GPS coordinates for
navigation and targeting
SCU 4 Upgrade
The maintenance guys were the heroes. They modified the jets almost seamlessly with our operations.
The upgrade enhanced our warfighting capability tenfold.
Learning Process
OEF was a learning process for everyone. The GFACs didn’t know our F-16s had certain capabilities,
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and we didn’t know the GFACs had certain capabilities. We had no way to coordinate or prebrief
capabilities. The GFACs loaded their equipment on horses and rode into the country. We didn’t know
what they had until we checked in with them, and they didn’t offer up what they had until we started
asking them. We learned to ask the right questions to begin using the full potential of the systems.
F-15E Coordination
My second mission lasted about ten hours. One of our new pilots was flying on my wing. Weather was
a factor in the target area, so our initial planned target did not work. We subsequently worked with a
GFAC and some F-15Es. We used the F-15’s GPS to find the target to drop an accurate bomb. We
dropped a laser-guided bomb through the weather, and the GFAC lased it into the target. Our unit was
the first to drop bombs this way during OEF. Our relationship with F-15Es was a give and take
arrangement. We had some capability with our targeting pod that they could use, and they had GPS that
could get us to the target area more accurately when we had only INS.
– Lt. Col. Bam Bam, 419th FW
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
Accurate Systems
The learning curve was at its highest slant when we were there. The conflict was very dynamic as well.
We deployed to perform one mission, and another mission popped up. In other words, we were staffed
and tasked for OSW, not OEF. We had people working twenty-four hours a day in the mission
planning area. Ninety-nine percent of the time, we didn’t drop on those planned targets. We got to the
theater and they tasked us to go somewhere else. The dynamic situation emphasized the importance of
having accurate guidance systems.
OSW – Operation Southern Watch
Human Factors
The jet had no problem with ten- or eleven-hour missions. People were the limiting factor. A ten-hour
mission interferes with Circadian rhythm and sleep cycles. One day we were going out in the morning.
The next day we were briefing at one a.m. and taking off at five p.m. We had to balance crew rest with
missions.
Lessons Learned
One lesson learned is that AFRC is a capable force. We can jump into the fray at any time. Having
reserve forces should be transparent to a commander. A commander shouldn’t be concerned about
whether he has a reserve unit or an active duty unit working for him. I think OEF proved that AFRC
forces are indeed transparent. We were able to get the Litening pod and SADL. We had NVIS before
that. We were smart enough to see that if a force doesn’t have night capability and precision, it isn’t
going to participate. A larger lesson is that we need to make these capability decisions and purchases as
a total force. When we make a buy, we should buy it for everyone. Retrofitting airplanes to address
inequities requires a lot more money. We should provide the capability to everybody. Commonality is
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very important. The level of technology needs to be consistent across the fleet. Commonality is also
important for command and control. Gen. John Jumper [AF Chief of Staff] wants machines that can
talk to each other. Not only that, he wants information to flow from nodes that have it to every node
that needs it without having to go through six other nodes to get there. We need to move in that
direction with future upgrades.
– Brig. Gen. Pink Williams, 419th FW
● AFRC – Air Force Reserve Command

● Litening II pod –- targeting pod used by some Guard and Reserve F-16 units
● SADL – situation awareness datalink; a system that provides location information of friendly
air and ground forces; information appears in the F-16’s head-up display
● NVIS – night vision imaging system; cockpit and external lighting compatible with night vision
goggles
Frustrations
My only OEF mission was a two-ship mixed formation with two F-15Es. We took off about midday.
We were in the target area from late afternoon to dusk. It was turning to dark when we left. We were
having some problems with FLIR and night vision at that time of day. We air refueled once on the way
and then again when we arrived over the country. We flew to northwest Afghanistan initially and
worked with a GFAC. The Strike Eagles got called to another target area. We didn’t have GPS at the
time, so we had to work with our INS. The systems were pretty loose.
We couldn’t find the target area. We flew back to a tanker, refueled and returned. My wingman
dropped a bomb to mark a target area, but it wasn’t the target area that the GFAC wanted. An F-14
came through. We trailed it. He dropped and missed, too. Basically, all the fighters were not seeing
what the GFAC wanted us to see. The terrain had lots of mountains and high ridges and valleys and it
all looked the same. We were out of gas at that point and had to go. We lost our first tanker and found
another one about 100 miles to the northeast. It was the same one our Strike Eagle buddies were using.
We were in the northeast portion of Afghanistan near the borders with Uzbekistan and Pakistan. We
worked with a second GFAC and dropped ordnance using his ground laser designator. The Eagles flew
a couple of passes before we arrived. This time, we found the GFAC’s target area, but then clouds
began rolling in. The GFAC asked us to drop through the clouds on a heading over the friendlies, a
very dicey maneuver even when we have everything lined up. We made sure we were looking in the
right target area. I flew in trail of my flight lead. He dropped the first bomb. It fell short about 700
meters. It didn’t fall in the friendly lines but short enough that we decided not to drop again. Even 700
meters was not precise enough for GFACs in this situation.
It was getting dark. We came off the GFAC and headed south. We got a call from the tanker as we
were trying to make a second pass with the ground controller: our tanker was running out of gas. So we
left the area and headed back to base. Our tanker had to swing back around and refuel a second tanker,
which we picked up to drag us back home. The sortie duration took 11.5 hours, and included eight
refuelings. It was very frustrating. Our units longest mission lasted 12.8 hours. GPS is hugely important
for providing the accuracy required for laser-guided bombs and for precision targeting. Had we had
GPS, we would have been right in the target area. Having only INS was definitely a limiting factor for
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us before we received the SCU 4 upgrade.

– Maj. Jake, 419th FW
● FLIR – forward-looking infrared; a heat-detecting sensor in the targeting pod

● Strike Eagle buddies – F-15Es from Mountain Home were operating from the same location
with the 419th
Rare Mission
My only mission was a day mission that lasted about ten hours and involved four aerial refuelings. The
situation would usually change when we showed up in theater. But I got lucky: my wingman and I
dropped on a planned target. We were the first ones in our unit to do that. I can’t describe my target,
but I can say that I dropped two 2,000-pound bombs. After the drop, my lead asked me, “How’d it go?”
I told him my first drop was for Hollywood and my second one was a little short—by about two meters.
Our last tanker did not show up. My wingman and I got gas in Afghanistan and flew all the way home
without another sip. It was a clear day with 200-mile visibility. We had 1,200 pounds of gas when we
landed. The jet has some legs. The mission didn’t seem like ten hours. Daylight made it easier. I
enjoyed a panoramic view of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran from the best vantage point in the world
—an F-16 at 30,000 feet.
When I got back, I showed the video from my targeting pod to all the weapons troops. They got fired
up. I pulled alert the next night. At three a.m. local time, I watched CNN show my bomb video. I’m
pleased that our efforts got that recognition. My mission was rewarding. Very rewarding. Less than a
month after watching the destruction of 11 September to hands-on immediate satisfaction with
American airpower is a beautiful thing. I would still be in theater flying all day and all night if someone
asked me. That’s my job. I’m pleased to do it. No one would have left if given the option to stay.
– Maj. Elrod, 419th FW
● pulled alert – some F-16s maintained an alert assignment as part of an OSW commitment; two
jets and pilots were always prepared for short-notice launches over Iraq
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Slow-Moving Blip
My wingman and I were taking fuel from a tanker on our way to the target area. AWACS provided
target coordinates and asked us to contact a forward air controller on a particular frequency. The radio
signal from the controller was strong and clear. The controller confirmed that we had a laser spot
search capability and then passed me the laser code. Once in the target area, the controller called,
“Laser on.” I dialed in the laser code and my targeting pod locked in on a building. The controller
asked me to tell him what I saw. I described the shape of the building and the automobiles around it.
“That’s your target,” he said. I dropped two laser-guided bombs and guided them in with my targeting
pod. Both were direct hits. We headed south and waited for further tasking. On the turn back north
towards the target area, my radar picked up a slow-moving blip. I locked on it with my targeting pod
and then realized that the blip was a small prop-driven aircraft—a Predator. I believe this was the first
time in combat that an unmanned air vehicle laser-designated a target for another aircraft.
– Maj. Ross, 944th FW
OPS Tempo
We had to be creative with the spare aircraft we had on strip alert for Operation Southern Watch. We
often put bombs on the spares because we used them as backups for Afghanistan missions. Sometimes
we would have a two-ship to OSW, a four-ship to OEF, and another two-ship on strip alert. That’s
eight jets committed out of the ten deployed. One or two of the remaining aircraft were usually in phase
inspections. Several times when I walked out to preflight my jet for another twelve-hour mission, the
tail feathers of the engine were still hot from the previous flight. Often, the airplanes were on the
ground only two hours between two twelve-hour flights. We sustained this pace the whole time we
were in Southwest Asia. The deployment didn’t impact our training mission. While we were flying
combat sorties, we had pilots back at Luke flying RTU sorties.
– Lt. Col. Dion, 944th FW
● phase inspections – thorough aircraft inspections required
● at 300 – flight hour intervals
● RTU – replacement training unit; training for pilots new or returning to the F-16
Unique Capability
The capability of our Block 30 F-16s became known as the OEF missions evolved. Even before SCU 4,
the mission planners had to learn that we had a laser spot search capability. A Predator or forward air
controller would lase a target. We would put our pod in a search mode and, boom, our pod would lock
onto that target. No one else in the theater could do that, not even the F-15Es. Neither could the Navy.
All Over The Map
My first mission was more than twelve hours long. It took over three hours for my two-ship to get to
the theater. Once there, we were sent from one target area to another. We went all the way from Kabul
in the east, to Mazar-e Sharif in the north, and then all the way out to Herat in the west. Typically we
spent five hours running around the country, then another three-plus hours flying back to our operating
location. Sometimes we came back with all of our weapons. Sometimes we came back with some of
our weapons. Sometimes, we came back empty. Some pilots even came back with no bullets in their
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Gatling guns. To deal with these extended periods in the cockpit, we had to watch total crew rest, eat
low-residue meals, and use go pills at the tail end of the mission if needed. We’d take three or four
water bottles and protein bars with us. For night missions, we would normally launch an hour or two
before sunset, fly into the darkness, and land at sunrise. The missions were like flying across an ocean,
performing a lengthy close air support mission, and then flying back across the ocean again. Time
usually went by real fast the first two-thirds of the mission.
Female Predator
My fourth mission was a Predator mission over Kandahar. The Predator controller, a female, put a spot
down and directed me to a building. It was about one a.m. My wingman and I orbited the building for
the next three hours waiting for people to show. She had me look around the roads to see if anyone was
coming. I didn’t see anyone. At the end of the third hour, we were cancelled and directed back to base.
Just as we were departing Southern Afghanistan, the controller called us back. We returned to the area
and dropped on the building. I think the controller knew who was in the building, but she never told us.
– Lt. Col. Leonard, 944th FW
Morale
We faced no air threat and conducted no sweeps. Nothing. I don’t know why we even carried air-to-air
missiles. A couple of pilots saw some anti-aircraft artillery. This operation was nothing like Desert
Storm or Allied Force where we faced air threats. It was also different because of what happened on 11
September. We felt like we were making an active contribution. Morale was very high over there.
Desert Storm Comparisons
We took off in Desert Storm with a set of targets that we subsequently struck ninety percent of the
time. We were retasked during a mission only on rare occasions. At the beginning of Desert Storm, we
took off in large packages and attacked complexes. Near the end, we took off in smaller packages and
attacked more mobile targets. In Enduring Freedom, we were assigned targets, but they were rarely the
targets we struck. We almost always received new tasking. Only two missions out of sixty struck the
targets they were originally tasked to strike. Everyone else was retasked in the air. Normally, the
retasking involved being assigned to a GFAC. We were talking to GFACs early in this war when no
friendly territory existed. A GFAC would often sound like some guy from South Dakota or Texas. He
might be hiding in the hills near Bagram Airport with his binoculars, night vision goggles, and radio.
He might have ridden into the country on a mule. He might not have eaten familiar food in weeks.
Occasionally, GFACs lased our bombs in on targets after we dropped them on GPS coordinates. Those
guys are talented. And tough.
Right Place
I’ve flown every F-16 that flies. Right now, we have the most lethal F-16 for the mission. With the
targeting pod and the datalink, no one can touch our capability. I wish we had a Block 50 radar and an
interrogator. But our GPS is really nice, and our datalink is superb. The technology came together for
us right when OEF kicked off. We were in the right place at the right time.
● interrogator – device used to identify friendly and threat aircraft
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Laser Search
My most interesting mission was one I didn’t drop bombs. I was getting ready to leave the airspace
over Bagram Air Base when a GFAC with a southern accent told me he was going to have some
paratroopers in thirty minutes. The GFAC, who was called Texaco, asked me to make sure the area to
their west was clear. It was night so I used my night vision goggles and targeting pod to check the area.
My wingman was flying in trail formation. We saw nothing. I watched the C-130 fly in. Then a bunch
of lights appeared on the ground. I didn’t know what the lights were so I asked the FAC if he was okay.
He told me the paratroopers had just turned on their flashlights. He asked me to look west again. The
GFAC had an infrared pointer and a laser pointer. He pointed the infrared beam on a hill to the west so
I could follow it with my night vision goggles. Then he gave me a code for his laser pointer so I could
do a laser spot search with the targeting pod. The targeting pod and my eyes were immediately drawn
to the hill. That was the first time I used the laser spot search in combat. It was pretty cool.
– Maj. Jeff, 944th FW
Kandahar Airport: Perspective One
My most interesting mission was my last mission, a day mission that helped friendly ground forces take
the Kandahar airport. I was number two in my two-ship. Lt. Col. Mark, my lead, was the airborne FAC
for the mission. The airborne FAC owns the target area and clears other aircraft to drop ordnance. The
GFACs and all the friendly forces were about six or eight miles south of the airport. Our job was to
bomb enemy troops, vehicles, and tanks in and around the airport. Mark directed a bunch of flights,
including F-14 Tomcats, F-18 Hornets, B-52 Stratofortresses, and F-16 Block 52 jets from Mountain
Home. He used rockets to mark targets for the Block 52 guys since they didn’t have targeting pods. He
assigned me an area to search for targets. I found a tank in a revetment and passed the coordinates to
Mark, who directed the Hornets against the tank. We worked the area for about three hours, going back
to the tanker every hour or so. Some of the aircraft had targeting pods; others had FLIRs and lased in
their own bombs. Mark gave some B-52s GPS coordinates and they dropped JDAMs. After the B-52s,
F-14s, F-18s, and other F-16s left the area, we dropped our bombs. Some targets remained, so both of
us strafed. We flew back completely empty. Friendly forces took the airport that day.
– Col. Roger, 944th FW
Awesome Capability
SCU 4 was awesome. Targeting with GPS coordinates was a huge capability for a GFAC. He didn’t
have to talk people onto targets. He simply passed along a set of coordinates and the target was
destroyed. The commanders wanted to keep our AFRES airplanes over there because they don’t have
the same capability in the active duty. The capability we’ve added to our Block 30 jets paid off in
combat. The airplanes were awesome.
– Col. Roger, 944th FW
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F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 366th Air Expeditionary

Wing
Circumstances
We deployed specifically for Enduring Freedom. Other F-16 units just happened to be in Southwest
Asia. The 366th Fighter Wing falls outside normal AEF rotation, which prepares for twelve months and
deploys for three months. We are four months on and four months off. On 11 September, we had the
on-call F-16 unit. We left as soon as we had access to a base. When we got there, the base did not have
much more than a runway and a couple of buildings. So the support group guys had their work cut out
for them. We hit the ground and put out a security force. Then we got the engineers in and prepared the
site. We assembled structures for a tent city and an oper-ations compound. We built about 470
temporary structures in a very short time. Essentially, we created a base from scratch.
– Col. Bill, 366th AEW Commander
Block 52 Sans HARM
Close air support was not a role our pilots anticipated. The suppression of enemy air defense mission
figures prominently for any Block 50 or Block 52 F-16 pilot, but not CAS. We don’t even do much
CAS training. But we adapted once we got over there. Our aircraft and our pilots are extremely capable
and flexible. We got spun up on CAS in the new age — JDAM and WCMD CAS and through-the-
weather CAS. Weather was irrelevant. We dropped a lot of the JDAMs right through clouds on caves
in Tora Bora. We talked to a GFAC who passed GPS coordinates to us while we loitered overhead in
bad weather and dropped the bombs right where they needed to go.
- Col. Bill, 366th AEW Commander
● JDAM – joint direct attack munition; GPS-guided bomb
● WCMD – wind-corrected munition dispenser; GPS-guided cluster bomb
Learning Lessons
I think we learned exactly the right lesson from Afghanistan—that air superiority is Job One. You
create a permissive environment and anything is possible from the air after that.
My first mission in Desert Storm involved forty F-16s with two 2,000-pound bombs each. We dropped
80,000 pounds of bombs on Talil in two minutes. Ten years ago, getting a direct hit on a target took a
lot more airplanes. You need a direct hit to take out a tank with a 2,000-pound bomb. And a direct hit is
not very probable when you are dropping a dumb bomb from 10,000 feet or higher. In Enduring
Freedom, we had fewer airplanes in the sky at one time. But we didn’t need as many. We flew to
Afghanistan in two airplanes with two bombs apiece and we shacked four targets. Whatever the GFAC
could see and identify as a target was being blown up.
- Col. Bill, 366th AEW Commander
● shack – direct hit
Tanker And Information War
I know we are talking F-16s here. But Enduring Freedom was just as much a tanker war and an
information battle. We could reach that far into Asia only with aerial refueling. Tankers made
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everything possible. Information was just as critical. When you have two airplanes with two bombs
apiece, you want to make sure you know what they want you to hit. We were going to hit whatever
coordinates they gave us.
Typical Missions
We flew with F-15Es and F-16 Block 30 aircraft. We coordinated on the phone and joined them on the
same tanker on the way to the theater. Sometimes six F-16s shared a tanker up to Afghanistan. We
worked with the other fighters in the same target area. We sometimes worked with the same GFAC.
But most of the time, they split up our six-ship package and moved us around the country. We
wandered for two to three hours then spent another two hours going home. Our average mission was
about 7.2 hours. Our longest mission was 9.3 hours. If we got a quick target in Southern Afghanistan,
we could be back in just over six hours.
– Lt. Col. Tom, 366th Wing
Maverick Road Recce
We were often tasked to check out the roads around our ground forces. Half of these missions occurred
at night. One of our limiting factors was a minimum operating altitude that made it tough to identify
vehicles. We loaded up Mavericks to see if they would give us a better sensor capability. The flight
leads would have one Maverick and a WCMD. The wingman would carry two JDAMs or two
WCMDs. We flew with Mavericks a better part of a week, and even shot one of them against an ammo
bunker just outside of Kandahar airport. Maverick is not the greatest sensor for road recce. We would
much rather use a targeting pod.
OPS Tempo
We were flying a two turn two. Typically, the day goes and the night goes would pass each other over
the Indian Ocean. We had four different jets on the schedule because four to six jets were typically
flying during the day. We did three phase inspections while we were over there, so one of our jets
would be in phase. This schedule allowed for only one broken or cannibalized jet at a time. Our
maintainers did an awesome job. Our jets performed great.
● two turn two – launching a flight of two jets in the morning, recovering them, and launching
another two jets in the evening
First Us Fighters To Qatar
F-16s from Mountain Home were the first US fighters ever to land at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. We
landed on 7 November, two days before our maintainers showed up. (Their transport aircraft was
delayed.) I set my parking brake and jumped down out from my jet. I walked down the row of F-16s
and pinned everyone’s jet and shut them down. We used our data transfer cartridges as wheel chocks.
These are nonstandard operations. Guys get this experience when they fly cross-country and when they
are forced to divert.
Texas 11
Before we started dropping near Kandahar, and long before Tora Bora, our first missions in early
November were with Texas 11 up in the northeast part of Afghanistan in and around Konduz, a city
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east of Mazar-e Sharif. When Mazar-e Sharif fell, Taliban and al-Qaeda forces ran to Konduz to
strengthen it, much like they retreated to Kandahar later on. One of our longest sorties in this northern
part of Afghanistan began in the southern part of the country. When we got there in the afternoon,
AWACS told us to contact Texas 11 on a particular frequency. We tuned the radio to that frequency
but didn’t pick him up. We contacted AWACS again and they gave us the coordinates for Texas 11.
The location was 300 miles to our north, well out of radio range and far enough away to require tanker
support. AWACS assigned us a KC-10. We flew north, left the tanker just east of Mazar-e Sharif, and
headed to Konduz.
When we arrived, Texas 11 had his team in the hills. From his voice, I could tell the situation was
tense. He was on a hill with a road through an east-west valley on one side. Texas 11 had holed himself
up with his team because he commanded a view of this valley south of Konduz. He could see a lot of
Taliban troops moving towards Konduz. Some enemy forces had discovered his location. They set up
some mortar positions on a nearby hill. Taliban vehicles were surrounding his position. Some Taliban
troops started up the hill towards the group. Texas 11 had an immediate target for us. We spun around.
My wingman dropped a WCMD, which hit just at the tail end of the convoy of vehicles and caught
them on fire. We spun back around, and it was my turn. Texas 11 wanted me to move the next drop up
the hill a bit. The second WCMD hit right where he wanted it. “Awesome. Awesome,” he said. “Direct
hit. Standby for another target.” My wingman dropped the next bomb on the vehicles. My final drop
was on the mortar positions—another direct hit. We dropped four weapons on the bad guys in about
twenty minutes. The sun had set. Our bombs and the cover of darkness gave the GFAC a way out of the
area. Texas 11 came back on the radio one last time and said, “Thanks. We’re outta here.”
– Capt. Paul, 366th Wing
GPS CAS
The new GPS-guided weapons, JDAM and the WCMD, certainly made the CAS job much easier.
Dropping iron bombs with a nine-line and a ground controller or forward air controller actually talking
your eyes onto a target area is tricky. It requires a lot of practice. In a more traditional CAS role, the
first bomb is often used as a positioning device for subsequent bombs. With these weapons, GFACs
give us GPS coordinates so the first bomb hits exactly what they want it to hit. The technology makes
the communication of exact coordinates critical for the run-ins on the target. We had GFACs repeat the
coordinates four or five times before we would drop. Even when everyone has the best of intentions,
the stress of battle can cause mistakes.
- Capt. Paul, 366th Wing
● nine-line – a nine-item checklist used for CAS missions
AC-130 Airborne FAC
I checked in with AWACS, expecting a standard mission. I was assigned to a GFAC who was working
a Special Forces extraction. It took a while to get the situation together. Some Tomcats were on the
scene, but they needed to get some gas and get back to the boat. A C-130 and a helicopter extraction
package were coming, but they were not going to show up for an hour. So, I was the only relay
between the guys on the ground surrounded by Taliban forces and the extraction package. My wingman
and I alternated trips to the tanker. One of us would go to the tanker while the other monitored the area.
Our job was to coordinate the time and the location of the extraction. An AC-130 showed up and took
over the situation. He assigned targets to the aircraft in the area, one of the few times I got target
coordinates from an airborne asset. We usually received targets from ground forces. The helicopter
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extraction team picked up the guys and got out of town fast. Once they left, the whole area became a
target-rich environment. The AC-130 started passing target coordinates to us with its laser rangefinder.
The area was thick with tanks, military vehicles, and troops. Some Strike Eagles showed up. When the
shooting started, the whole area was on fire. We dropped four cans of WCMD and even unloaded our
Gatling guns that night.
– Capt. Mark, 366th Wing
First Mission Nerves?
I wasn’t nervous on my first mission in theater, but the mission was taxing. Dealing with the unknown
of traveling more than 1,500 miles over different air traffic control centers was hard. The
administrative portion of flying through various air spaces, doing the check-ins, coordinating with
tankers, paging through frequency lists, and dealing with all of those sorts of tasks was tough. Actually
dropping the weapons was the easiest part of the mission. That’s why we train. But getting to the
theater was a new process. After a mission or two, the process became familiar. But nothing was ever
routine.
– Capt. Mark, 366th Wing
Secondary Explosions
One of my most memorable missions was a day mission over a bunker complex south of Kandahar. We
were being controlled by an airborne FAC flying an F-16 flying from another base. The F-16 was
controlling bombs dropped from a B-52. The Stratofortress flew over and dropped a dozen WCMDs
and completely covered the whole bunker area. The secondary explosions indicated that he hit an
ammunition dump. Almost every platform in the theater was coming through and dropping bombs.
Stuff down there was on fire for the next half hour. The F-16 FACs searched for more targets and
directed us to some bunkers south of the airfield. We hit the bunkers with our WCMDs. By the time I
went to the tanker and came back, the fires had subsided somewhat. For the second half of the mission,
I stayed over a GFAC, Texas 17, in case he needed any assistance, in case someone started shooting at
him.
– Capt. Brett, 366th Wing
Artillery Piece
My best mission was a day mission near Kandahar. We were softening up the airfield so Texas 17
could go in there. A B-52 came through and dropped six JDAMs on some of the bunkers. I shot a
Maverick at one of the other bunkers. We went to the tanker and came back. By this time, people were
shooting at us out of the airfield near the terminal building. An F-14 rolled in and dropped a couple of
bombs. He looked down at one of the buildings on the airfield and saw anti-aircraft artillery coming out
of a building. He talked my eyes onto the building. I dropped a CBU-103 that destroyed the AAA.
– Capt. Brett, 366th Wing
Kandahar Airport: Perspective Two
My wingman and I were flying on our sixth mission, a daytime sortie. We were initially tasked with
road recce, but were then redirected. A GFAC, Texas 17, outside of Kandahar called us to help out with
taking the Kandahar airport. Some of our special forces were working with Northern Alliance troops
doing just that. We met up with two Block 30 Reserve jets on the tanker; one was an airborne FAC.
They had GBUs and marker rockets.
We had run out of CBU-103 that day, so we were carrying CBU-87. We each had four canisters of
CBU-87. These are not precision-guided munitions. They’re more of a dumb bomb. Texas 17 was
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getting mortar fire from al-Qaeda forces hiding in some aqueducts that surrounded the city. A lot of
military airplanes were stacked up over the airport. The F-16s were working the area, and a B-52 was
orbiting overhead. Two F-14s and two F-18s were also on the scene, all orbiting as well. When we
arrived, the F-16s were running low on their rockets, so they used GBUs to mark targets. Texas 17
gave them a talk-on to pinpoint the al-Qaeda troops in the trenches. The airborne FACs dropped a GBU
into the trenches to mark the spot. My flight lead and I saw the explosion.
Friendly forces were located to the east, al-Qaeda to the west. A strong wind blew out of the west. We
had to make sure that our bombs didn’t go long because, being dumb munitions, they could be carried
by the wind. My wingman rolled in on the first pass and dropped his first canisters of CBU. He
dropped two at 150-foot spacing. The FAC said the bombs were pretty good but asked us to drop the
next ones 100 meters to the east. My wingman rolled in on his second pass and dropped them right
where the FAC asked. Perfect hit. The GFAC wanted more CBU dropped another 100 meters east of
the last drop. So they cleared me in for the re-attack. I went down the chute and put the bombs where
they marked them. The FAC was excited. As I rolled down the shoot, I saw some 23mm AAA coming
at me. The exploding shells looked like popcorn. I saw even more AAA on my second pass. That was
the only AAA we saw that day. The B-52 followed us and laid down a bunch of Mk-82s. The FAC
asked us to stick around, even though we had no more bombs left, in case we were needed to strafe.
– Lt. Dave, 366th Wing
● CBU-87 – cluster bomb
Lights Below Clouds
In early December, we were dropping CBU-103 in the mountain ranges in Tora Bora. We were
working with a GFAC at night. We could see the snow on top of the mountains, which were mostly
covered by a light cloud layer. We dropped on some GPS coordinates. We could see the lights from our
bombs going off below the clouds. We never got feedback from the ground on those drops. In that
timeframe, our forces were letting the enemy know that we knew where they were. But we rarely
received formal bomb damage assessments because most of our missions were close air support. BDA
is not usually associated with CAS. Our BDA came in the form of a radio call from a GFAC
immediately after a drop.
– Lt. Col. Monty, 366th Wing
Wish List
We would have loved to have the BRU-57 bomb rack, which allows us to carry four CBU-103 per
aircraft instead of two. That capability will come with the CCIP mod. I would have given anything to
have a targeting pod. We had the HARM targeting system pod, but I didn’t see a thing on HTS the
entire three months we were flying over Afghanistan. A helmet-mounted cueing system would have
been great. We could have designated the ground target while looking out of the airplane and then have
rolled in on it. The ability to see a laser pointer would have been useful as well.
– Lt. Col. Monty, 366th Wing
● BRU-57 – an existing bomb rack that will soon be available for Block 50/52 F-16s
● CCIP – Common Configuration Implementation Program; program for upgrading USAF F-16s
to a single standard
Convoy
I was leading a two-ship on a night mission south of Kandahar. We checked in with the GFAC, Texas
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17. Two F-15Es were flying road recce to the north. The GFAC asked us to stay south of the road. “We
are going to take over this road,” he said. “But right now, we have to patch up our wounded.” Wounded
on the ground immediately gave the mission a heightened sense of urgency. We searched the roads for
a while and saw nothing. We were running low on gas, so we left to meet the tanker. As we turned to
go, we noticed some vehicles, eight to ten cars, parked on the side of the road about forty miles to the
west of the GFAC’s position. When we came back from getting fuel, I saw some vehicles going
towards Texas 17 from the same direction of the parked cars I saw earlier. They were traveling on a
road that angled south from Kandahar. I checked back in with Texas 17. Over the radio, the situation
on the ground sounded chaotic. They had about 1,000 fighters, sixteen Americans, and two translators
spread over about a mile.
The GFAC was unsure of the location of all of his forces. I told him about the convoy of vehicles
traveling towards them. It took us a good fifteen minutes to get the directions straightened out. He was
trying to figure out if the convoy could be his own troops. I was watching our fuel flow and the
headlights of the approaching vehicles on the ground. As the smaller convoy got within a mile, their
headlights went out. That was not a good sign. I checked fuel. I didn’t want our jets to run out of gas
right when we might be needed, so I sent my wingman to the tanker. The tanker was about ten minutes
away.
My wingman checked back with me after filling up. At that moment, the lead truck in the GFAC’s
convoy was blown up by a rocket-propelled grenade. An awkward radio silence followed the next few
minutes. I learned later that the first radio Texas 17 picked up had a dead battery. He found another
battery, but it was also dead. He wanted to call in a clearance for us to drop.
I was very low on fuel, so I handed off the situation to my wingman and rushed to the tanker. When I
came back, the firefight was still on. My wingman had dropped two bombs, and the F-15Es were
dropping bombs. The GFAC asked for more firepower, a bomb 1,000 meters to the west of the last
impact. I worked the calculation as I rolled in and asked my wingman if he had any idea what 1,000
meters was. He answered, “Yes, one kilometer.” I wanted the answer in mils. We had a little discussion
about the math. I made a first pass but didn’t drop because I didn’t have clearance. I came in for the
second pass and put the bomb right where they wanted it. We dropped all of our bombs. Then we stuck
around with our guns to make sure everything had quieted down. We either got the last of the enemy
forces, or they decided to run away.
– Capt. Craig, 366th Wing
● mils - unit of the target designator in the head-up display
15
F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 301st Fighter Wing

O-Dark-Thirty
My most satisfying mission took place at o-dark-thirty in the early part of the war. When we showed up
for the mission, we checked in with our GFAC, who was south of Kandahar. His forces, about twenty
vehicles and a lot of people, were on the run after being shot at all day. He couldn’t tell us where the
good guys were because not everyone in his group had checked in. We decided to go to the tanker. By
the time we got back, the GFAC had located all his guys and had scrambled on top of a peak
overlooking a valley. The bad guys, who were rapidly approaching the GFAC’s position, were within
900 meters of the peak. That’s close. Really close. Within bullet range close. That night, the GFAC
couldn’t point targets out for us because his laser marker did not have enough power. Our marker is
very easy for friendly forces to see. So we started working a FAC wheel with the Litening pod and our
laser marker. We put the laser marker on the ground in the general area of the bad guys so our friendly
forces could call in adjustments over the radio. We then started bombing the leading edge of the
approaching enemy forces. As our bombs fell, the bad guys ran to their vehicles to leave. When they
put on their lights, we spotted them immediately with our goggles. As the vehicles began driving away,
we shacked them. The GFAC was thrilled.
– Maj. Chris, 301st FW
● FAC wheel – orbiting route as a forward air controller
Kandahar Airport: Perspective Three
We would save our bombs for last when we performed as airborne FACs. Right in the middle of the
battle for Kandahar Airport, AWACS sent us north to contact one of the UAV controllers who had
found a target in the middle of Kandahar. The controller wanted us to hit the target at a specific time so
certain people would be there. He gave us coordinates and then lased the target. We used our targeting
pod to find the spot and get a positive identification. We waited for another ten minutes until the UAV
controller verified what he wanted to hit was at the target. Then we shacked the target. The mission
showed the versatility of the Viper. We flexed from a FAC role to an urban target, working in concert
with a UAV to strike a target verified with real-time intelligence.
- Maj. Chris, 301st FW
● UAV – uninhabited air vehicle
Improvements
The F-16 needs the ability to take information from external sources and use it without requiring
manual input. We need a gateway. AWACS should be able to put targets on a datalinked network. I
should be able to see the targets on a digital map, move my cursor over to one of them, and designate it.
Then I have coordinates for a weaponeering solution. That would be a huge advance. Today, we check
in on the radio, copy down coordinates with a pencil, type in the coordinates, and verify the coordinates
on a paper map.
Multitasking
I was working as an airborne FAC mission when I ran low on gas. I had several aircraft in the queue
waiting to bomb, including a B-52. The tanker tracks were very close to the target area so I saddled up
next to the tanker. I was on the boom getting gas and giving targeting coordinates to a B-52 dropping
16
CBU-103s at the same time.

Digging Out Targets
My second mission was a road recce mission in the mountains north of Kandahar. We were sent to
work with a GFAC deep in bad guy land. He was whispering on the radio to prevent enemy troops
from hearing him. He wanted us to clear his avenue. Nothing was happening on the ground that I could
see. My wingman and I stayed with him for three hours. During that time, I spotted some dim lights in
a ravine about four or five miles from his position. The lights were visible only through my NVGs. My
wingman and I slewed our targeting pods to them. After some time, we figured out that the light came
from a lantern or a small fire under a tarp. We also figured out that the tarp covered an artillery piece, a
big gun. Its barrel stuck out from under the tarp. We talked with the GFAC and ensured no friendlies
were in the area. Then we destroyed the artillery piece. Later that night, we found two other guns. We
hit them, too. The mission was gratifying because these targets were hard to dig out. We went back to
the same area a few nights later and destroyed more guns. Apparently, al-Qaeda and Taliban forces
were trying to move these guns through the mountains south to Kandahar.
– Maj. Bruce, 301st FW
Quantifying Improvements
The biggest improvement in the F-16 is hard to quantify. Goggles allow us to see things at night we
can’t see with the naked eye. Dropping a single bomb and getting a kill is a lot better than dropping six
bombs to bracket a target. Flying a ten-hour mission as a wingman at night on goggles without SADL
to help keep station would have been nearly impossible in Afghanistan. Without GPS, our INS would
have drifted off so substantially that we would not have been able to find the target. I can’t identify one
single improvement that makes the F-16 more lethal. Each builds on the other.
Nose Calluses
Road recce missions were painful. They involved a lot of time on the goggles. Three hours of looking
through those tubes can cause some big headaches. Our datalink allowed us to flip up the goggles on
the way to and from the operating theater, but I put them on for refueling. In the AOR, we wore
goggles the entire time. The oxygen mask rubbed the bridge of my nose. A lot of guys put moleskin on
their noses to cushion their masks. I wore moleskin and still got blisters on my nose.
● AOR – area of responsibility; target area
● moleskin – thick felt material with adhesive on one side; normally used on feet to treat or
prevent blisters
Laser Marker
Our targeting pod has a marker capability. I can put a little dot on the ground with my laser. I can
watch the beam as it leaves my airplane and find the dot on the ground. I used the marker one night
with a GFAC and an AC-130 gunship. The GFAC asked us to hold for the gunship, which fired one
round of 105mm artillery. The round hit the ground and made a cloud. I put my marker over the impact
and found the target immediately. I marked the exact point with my targeting pod and stored the
location in my system. A minute later, the AC-130 was shot at by a surface-to-air missile and left the
area soon after. We came in right after that and hit a bunch of tanks and armored personnel carriers. In
the old days, I would have spent a lot of time communicating with the GFAC to relocate the target area.
17
– Lt. Col. Jeff, 301st FW

No Surprises
Nothing surprised us in Afghanistan. Every situation we put ourselves into was one we trained for in
the United States. The long durations and the live weapons made the missions more stressful. A
mistake could kill somebody. I told our guys to take their time. Nothing needed to be bombed right
away to save American lives. If they have to make two or three passes, make two or three passes.
Check coordinates twice. Know where the friendlies are. Kill the right people.
Fatigue
Fatigue was much more an issue than I thought it would be. I had to work harder when I was tired. It
was harder to think. I flew five all-nighters. I took off about six or seven as the sun was going down. I
arrived in Afghanistan at midnight or at one in the morning. The first couple of times, flying every third
day, fatigue is not a big issue. But the third time I flew one of these missions, I was very tired. By the
end of the mission, I had used up all of my stored sleep. Like most pilots, I was on an adrenaline high
in the AOR. Coming down from that high on the flight back could be dangerous. My body had been
surging adrenaline for three or four hours. Afterwards, the fatigue hit at one time. The most scared I
have ever been in a fighter was coming back from one of these long missions. I could not stay awake. I
almost fell asleep in the cockpit, even on the tanker.
Marshalling Sheep
We were working with a GFAC one night when he asked us to look at a fenced-in compound. We
found the site. My wingman saw a lot of movement in a big open plaza and called out, “They’re
marshalling forces. They’re falling in.” I slewed my targeting pod to the area and said, “You’re right.
Holy cow! Hundreds of enemy forces are gathering inside that fort.” We received clearance from the
GFAC to drop. As we came back around, my wingman looked more closely at the target area. “Hey,”
he said, “I think they’re sheep. They have to be sheep because nothing can run that fast for that long.”
We didn’t drop on the target. We would have caught hell from our fellow pilots if we had.
GFACs
The GFACs were awesome. I can’t say enough good things about them. They were professional. They
were always very calm and very meticulous. I never heard fear in their voices. We worked with them
quite a bit. I also worked with an AC-130 gunship a couple of nights. It was tremendous. A great
capability.
B-1 Coordination
We never knew if we were going to drop until we checked in with a FAC. On my first mission, no one
in my flight dropped. On my second mission, only my flight lead dropped. We flew against a Quonset
hut area south of Kandahar. We showed up and checked in. We were working with a UAV. The UAV
controller lased the target, and we used our laser tracking capability to find the spot. We described what
we saw and the controller confirmed the target. The controller asked if we wanted him to lase the
bombs in. We said we would lase our own bombs. He then asked us to coordinate our attack with an
incoming B-1. We held and waited for the B-1 to show. We circled back, joined with the B-1, and
away we went. We used our NVGs to deconflict with the bomber. We had two separate targets about
18
700 meters apart. The controller wanted the bombs to hit at the same time. The B-1 dropped a JDAM,
and my flight lead dropped a GBU-12. I flew in trail formation and captured both hits through my
targeting pod. Just after the drop, the controller driving the UAV came over the radio and said that the
Secretary of Defense was watching. Rumsfeld saw the bombs hit the targets in real-time. We walked
into the chow hall the next day for breakfast and our video was playing on CNN.
– Capt. David, 301st FW
• deconflict – measures taken to avoid air-to-air collisions
Maintenance Kudos
We were flying planned missions for OSW, sitting alert for twenty-four hours for OSW, and flying
regular OEF sorties into Afghanistan. All of these taskings were twenty-four-hour commitments for the
pilots. The alert assignments covered twenty-four hours. The fragged missions into Iraq had both day
and night takeoffs. And the OEF missions lasted as long as twelve hours, which doesn’t include time
spent briefing and debriefing. So our ten F-16s were spread pretty thin. Our maintenance team did a
great job. We didn’t lose one sortie over there because of maintenance. We sent jets over thinking the
average sortie would be two to two and one-half hours. Many ended up lasting five times longer than
that. Our maintenance crews performed about six phase inspections in our four weeks in theater.
– Lt. Col. Chris, 301st FW
● fragged – planned
19

Air Cover
Our wing didn’t do a lot the first two months we were there. We were one of the only units carrying
air-to-air weapons. Every so often, a couple of our pilots got sent to visually identify an aircraft flying
around the country. They were usually aircraft that weren’t squawking the right codes or were not
flying the procedures correctly. We never saw an air threat, but we were always on station ready for
anything that might crop up.
– Capt. Chris, 354th FW
Coming Back Slick
Seeing the jet come back without the bombs we loaded on it gave us a sense of accomplishment.
Sometimes the pilots would show us the video from the targeting pod.
Whenever the jets came back slick, without bombs, we knew we did our job right and that we were
making a difference over there. We watched the news and saw that NATO forces were taking out
certain targets. Even though we didn’t always know for what targets our bombs were intended, we still
had a sense of accomplishment.
– SSgt. Jason, 354th FW
Circadian Rhythms
A pilot’s body clock was messed up for a couple of days after a long night mission. We had a
significant Circadian rhythm problem. But we had no choice. We were at war. We have a normal
peacetime restriction of ten hours. That means we have to be out of the airplane ten hours after showing
up to work. In OEF, we were flying for over ten hours.
– Lt. Col. Burt, 354th FW
Soothing Noise
Many times we gave incentive rides to bombs. We’d take them to the theater and bring them home
again. Just before Operation Anaconda kicked off, we went out on several night missions in which a
GFAC wanted to hear aircraft flying overhead. I relieved an AC-130 gunship one night, spent three
hours on station, and was relieved by another AC-130 gunship. The GFAC requested the air support so
he and his team could get some sleep. The enemy was less likely to create problems for the GFAC
forces if airplanes were heard above.
Simultaneous Employment
One of our night missions was the simultaneous employment of JDAMs from a B-1 and GBU-12s from
a four-ship of F-16s onto a military complex. We were targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership our
surveillance forces had observed and tracked. Our job was to destroy them. My two-ship was given the
tasking in flight at the end of a long mission. The other two-ship of F-16s was just arriving in theater.
We were running low on fuel. The tanker, our ride home, was out of gas and leaving. So we had to
coordinate the drop among the three flight leads in short order. The other F-16 two-ship rushed to catch
up. The B-1 made sure it had the exact coordinates so it could target the right building. Each F-16
dropped two bombs. Then we came back around for a re-attack to drop the remaining ordnance. Out of
four airplanes, we dropped sixteen GBU-12s. The mission was our largest multiship target tasking of
the war.
20

Roberts Ridge
Lt. Col. Burt and his wingman were flying over northern Afghanistan when they heard an F-15E crew
saying some troops on the ground in southeastern Afghanistan needed help. A US MH-47E Chinook
helicopter had been brought down atop a snow-covered ridge by enemy fire in the predawn hours of 4
March as Operation Anaconda unfolded in the Shah-i-Kot valley. Burt copied down the helicopter’s
location then contacted the aerial command post, an E-3 AWACS, to get permission to help. Burt and
his wingman topped off their tanks from a circling refueling tanker and gunned their F-16s toward the
fight 200 miles away.
“When we heard that casualties were on the ground, we felt the urgency to get there as fast as we
could,” Burt recalled. What ensued was the battle for Roberts Ridge, a battle in which Burt and his
wingman expended their entire load of 20mm ammunition, 500 rounds apiece, and dropped three 500-
pound laser-guided bombs to keep the enemy at bay.
Roberts Ridge was named for Petty Officer 1st Class Neil Roberts, a member of the Navy Seals who
had fallen from the helicopter. That morning, the Chinook that he and several other Seals were riding
aboard came under heavy fire from small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. As the helicopter took
evasive action, Roberts, the rear gunner, fell out.
When Burt and his wingman arrived, the first words they heard from Slick 01, the ground controller on
the scene, were “Danger close, seventy-five meters.” The words sent a chill down Burt’s spine. The
ground controller relayed they had two casualties and two critically wounded. Burt made two passes
over the enemy position and emptied all 500 rounds. His wingman then came in and emptied all his
500 rounds.
“We realized how close we were firing to the helicopter on the ground when we reviewed the cockpit
tapes,” Burt said. Though the F-16 pilots couldn’t see exactly where their rounds were hitting, the
troops on the ground indicated that they were getting good results. With their ammunition spent and the
soldiers on the ground still coming under enemy fire, Burt talked to Slick 01 about bringing in some
heavy ordnance. The enemy’s close proximity, however, made a strike dangerous, even with laser-
guided munitions. Burt had to be extremely careful not to drop his 500-pound bombs too close to the
ground troops.
The enemy was on the northwest side of the ridge with the crest protecting friendly forces from the
ordnance. Burt guided his weapons just below the crest of the hill in three separate attacks, marching
them along the ridgeline. After the first bomb, Slick 01 said, “Whoa! You almost got us with that one.
Can you bring the next one a little closer to the tree?”
Burt thinks Slick 01 deserves the Medal of Honor for his actions that day. “I’d love to go to the
ceremony when they pin it on his chest,” he said. Burt and his wingman spent nearly three hours flying
cover near the downed helicopter, refueling twice while constantly coordinating their attacks with the
AWACS and the ground controller. The Americans were recovered after midnight.
(Adapted from article in base newspaper of the 354th FW)
NVG Fatigue
We have to be concerned with the health of our minds and bodies on a long mission. We train every
day to put bombs on target, but we can’t train to fly eleven-hour missions. On night missions, we tried
21
to get pilots to spend some time off the goggles. We would typically not wear the goggles en route to
the AOR. Once we were over the threat area, we’d wear them for several hours, using refueling periods
to give our eyes a break. High-illumination nights were less fatiguing to the eyes because we didn’t
have to strain to make out details. Low-illumination nights and high-workload missions were much
more fatiguing. If the fit of the goggles changed, the image went out of focus. Lack of focus can really
be fatiguing and cause bad headaches. The extra weight on the helmet put pressure on our oxygen
masks and noses. Over time, the pressure produced a callus. Most guys wore moleskin on their noses.
My nose got beat up over there.
– Maj. Greg, 354th FW
Transition Advice
The Reserve pilots from Texas gave us some good advice on how to deal with the long missions. They
recommended what food to take and how to organize the cockpit. We had to carry NVGs, extra food, a
lot of maps, and other mission planning material. We also wore combat survival vests to carry more
items, like a gun. We were there in the colder months so we had to wear an extra layer of clothing as
well. The cockpit was very tight for our larger pilots. The Reserve pilots also helped us with the
administration tasks we faced going to and coming from the AOR.
Coordination
Every mission required a lot of coordination. Each mission involved a variety of aircraft from several
service branches, all working together and sharing responsibilities. Our coordination is policy-driven.
However, we were doing things that we had never done before, so we were making new policy as the
missions evolved.
– 1st Lt. Erica, 354th FW
Intel Briefings
We gave a current intel briefing once a week to the maintainers. We kept them in the loop as to what
the pilots were doing. They saw pilots coming back without weapons, but they didn’t know how those
weapons were being applied. We gave them a larger picture of the conflict so they would know more
than what they saw on CNN. The briefings showed them how they fit into the puzzle and gave them a
sense of the teamwork involved. Everyone worked long hours. The maintainers turned the jets quickly.
The weapon loaders prepped the jets for two different theaters. The briefings helped morale. They were
a nice change of pace for the intel officers, too.
– 1st Lt. Erica, 354th FW
New Pilot
I was the second youngest F-16 pilot our unit took to OEF. I was mission-ready in the F-16 for about
six months with about 200 hours of F-16 time before we left. I came back with more than 400 hours.
Some pilots who graduated from my RTU at Luke three months before I did have fewer F-16 hours.
– Capt. Mark, 354th FW
Mortar Position
I dropped on one mission at the very beginning of Operation Anaconda. My flight lead and I flew all
night and showed up in Afghanistan in the morning as the sun was coming up. The previous two days
had been cloudy and raining, which prevented fighters from dropping laser-guided bombs. We showed
up on a clear and beautiful day. They sent us to talk to some Army guys who had been pinned down in
a valley taking mortar and sniper fire for forty-eight hours. The Army guys told us they were taking fire
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from a nearby peak. We used our targeting pods to make out some man-made installations on the peak.
We dropped one bomb on the peak and the Army guys confirmed that we had the right area. We found
two separate targets on top of the mountain—a mortar position and a weapons storage area. The mortar
position controlled the entire valley.
My flight lead dropped the first two bombs. I dropped the next two. My second bomb hit the mortar
right on. My flight lead rolled in for his final two bombs. The bombs hit the weapon cache. The
secondary explosion was huge and sent a mushroom cloud into the air. The cache burned for the next
thirty minutes. The heat was so intense that it blanked out the imagery on our targeting pods. Army
guys from a couple of valleys over saw the fire on top of the mountain. I dropped two more bombs in
the general vicinity. Then we strafed the top of the mountain. Strafing from my flight lead set off even
more secondary explosions.
– Capt. Mark, 354th FW
Cold To Warm
The temperature was twenty below zero Fahrenheit when we left Alaska. We landed at our operating
location in a nice sixty degrees. The day our F-16s arrived, we removed the travel pods and configured
airplanes for strip alert for OSW. The next morning, we flew operational missions.
– Capt. Robert, 354th FW
Bombs, Bullets, And Gas
We were working with a GFAC during Operation Anaconda trying to target a couple of enemy vehicles
in the mountains. We still had not found his target when we got a call on the big picture frequency
requesting immediate CAS for troops in contact. That call meant that US troops were under fire from
close range. We got to the second location as fast as we could. Fortunately, the whole area for
Operation Anaconda was within five minutes F-16 flight time. We checked in with the GFAC who
explained they were receiving fire from a mortar position. They tried to talk our eyes onto the position,
but we couldn’t find it. In the meantime, we were getting low on gas. The GFAC asked us to drop a
bomb as a reference point to talk us onto the target, but we had to get back to the tanker. Other assets
were available in theater to work with that GFAC.
We stayed with the tanker. Minutes went by, then an hour. We really wanted to get back and help the
GFAC we’d left. We couldn’t hear everything that was happening. We knew the enemy was shooting
at our troops. We had about thirty minutes left in our window to provide support when we got a
standby for tasking call. AWACS snapped us to a new location and GFAC for immediate CAS support.
This GFAC was a lot calmer than the last one. He wanted to get our eyes on the target without
dropping a bomb for reference. He and his troops were getting shot at from a couple of machine gun
nests on the mountain above.
I dropped down and made two visual identification passes on the target. I saw one of the machine gun
nests. I made a request to come in hot for the next pass. The GFAC wasn’t wasting time—he cleared
me right away. I rolled down the chute, dropped my last two LGBs, and took it out. Soon after, my
wingman dropped on a nearby bunker that the GFAC had highlighted. He then dropped his last two
bombs on the second machine gun nest south of my first drop. The GFAC still wanted support even
though we had dropped all of our bombs. They had to deal with a lot more caves and enemy positions
than they had anticipated. He cleared us in hot to strafe. I rolled down the chute and expended all of my
ammunition in two separate passes. By that time, my wingman and I were both bingo fuel. The GFAC
was still asking for support. We wanted to stay there and help, but we couldn’t. We were out of bombs,
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bullets, and gas. Luckily, some more fighters behind us showed up and checked in with the same
GFAC.
● LGB – laser-guided bomb
● bingo fuel – enough fuel to get back to base or tanker
Tanker Support
I’ve kept in touch with some of the tanker crews we used over there. We’ve exchanged patches and
photos. I can’t say enough about those guys and what they did for us. We would tell the boom
operators what was happening on the ground when we were taking fuel. They understood that they
were working for the guys on the ground. Instead of simply sticking to their schedules, they would stay
in theater as long as they could and do whatever they needed to do to keep us in the air.
CAS Improvements
We train for a more conventional approach to CAS. We faced a much more chaotic situation in
Afghanistan. We’re not used to a FAC giving clearance to drop as quickly as they did. That speed is
attributable to their experience. We discussed better ways of conducting CAS after Operation
Anaconda. We are implementing those changes Air Force-wide now. We won’t forget the lessons we
learned over there.
Ground Perspective
My goal has always been to lead men in combat. I always assumed it would be with a four-ship of F-
16s at 20,000 feet with 2,000-pound LGBs. The reality would be twelve guys on the ground with
rucksacks and M-16 rifles. This is a story of close air support, i.e., from the ground looking up instead
of the air looking down. Let me begin by telling you the end of the story. We are all back at Kandahar,
refitting and preparing for the next operation. No one killed in action and only one Purple Heart
(nothing serious), a fact of which I am most proud.
I am the air liaison officer to the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division that provided the bulk of
the conventional forces as well as the command and control for Operation Anaconda. The Rakkasans,
as the 101st is nicknamed, is an air assault division that uses helos as the primary means of delivering
themselves to the battlefield. As their air liaison officer, I commanded the tactical air control party that
provided all the GFACs, also known as ETACs, or enlisted terminal air controllers.
Operation Anaconda was the largest tactical ground battle since Desert Storm. The Army participated
with no artillery and only a few mortars. CAS, then, was the only means of indirect fire support.
Forward air control was critical to success. Simply put, we jumped off the birds right into the middle of
a hornet’s nest: the quintessential hot landing zone. Almost immediately, everyone came under small
arms and mortar fire. Within the first thirty minutes, five of the six AH-64 Apaches were hit. Although
none were shot down, all were non-mission capable for the next few days. Their absence put even more
pressure on my guys to save the day and keep the enemy off us until the Army could take cover and
return fire.
I’ll never forget one particular situation. One of my guys was pinned down for eighteen hours in
roughly the same place, 500 meters within the original landing zone. I went in with the brigade
commander and a small security detachment on the top of a small sliver of mountain we thought would
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be secure. From that vantage point, I could overlook my guy’s position to see from where he was
drawing fire. The next eight hours, the two of us controlled the ridgelines with our bombs. In the
middle of the fray, one soldier made a desperate call when he thought he might be overrun: “B-52, I
want you to put every f-ing bomb you have on that f-ing ridgeline. Right f-ing now.”
I jokingly reminded him that someone was probably taping his call. “Sir, if I survive this, they can
court martial me for poor radio discipline,” he said. “Roger that,” I responded, “B-52 you heard the
man. Bomb the f-ing ridgeline with everything you got right f-ing now,” A hell of a show ensued.
Back to that sliver of rock on top of the mountain: We started taking fire and mortars from a concealed
position below us, so I called in asking for some laser-guided bombs. Little did I know that I would get
an F-16 flown by none other than Chris, a lieutenant I flew with in Osan, Korea. I talked him onto the
target that was about 425 meters away, well inside danger-close proximity. After he shacked the target,
we never took fire from that location again. My friend from Osan stuck around even though AWACS
yelled at him twice, warning they had no gas for his return to base. I never heard if he had to divert into
Pakistan or somewhere else, but I do know he drinks for free the next time I meet him. His last words
before checking off were, “Dino, no s - - t. Keep your head down.” Chris always was the master of the
obvious.
I could go on and on with stories about how great my guys were. But I’ll just say that, by the end of
day two, no Army soldiers would stray more than fifty meters from an ETAC and none would fall
asleep until they heard the sound of fighters or AC-130s overhead. The ETACs controlled hundreds of
deliveries from everything in the inventory: fighters, bombers, AC-130s, Navy, even a few allied
aircraft. They did all this over twelve days with no fratricide and no friendly losses in Task Force
Rakkasan—a truly incredible testament to the dedication and bravery of twelve enlisted professionals.
I’m proud for the chance to lead them. I thought everyone, especially the pilots, should know what a
difference CAS can make to a few grunts on the ground. I know I will never look at CAS the same
again.
– Maj. Dino, 101st Airborne Division
Air Perspective (Same Mission)
We checked into the controlling frequencies and heard from the F-15E Strike Eagles as they flew
home. They hit a cave complex. Before they flew home, they ended up strafing to support
crewmembers of a downed MH-47 Chinook helicopter on what became known as Roberts Ridge
during Operation Anaconda.
We were immediately tasked for close air support and sent north to support a GFAC called White
Lightning 01. He was under fire and calling for close air support. We couldn’t pick him up on the radio,
so we were retasked to Dragon 10, another GFAC under fire requesting CAS. We established
communication with Dragon 10, who was calling for strikes against enemy troops roughly 600 meters
from his position. Surprisingly, the GFAC was talking F-16. He was asking me to do specific
operations with my targeting pod. He knew what buttons I was pushing in my jet. This level of detailed
knowledge is not something we normally heard from a GFAC. I didn’t recognize his voice, but I was
pleased that I was working with a good FAC.
We spent some time getting a target area talk on. From our initial altitude, we could not see troops on
the ground. We started wheeling down, getting lower and lower. I was trying to get my eyeballs onto
the enemy troops. More importantly, I wanted to know the location of the GFAC and his forces. This
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was not a typical CAS mission for an F-16. We were doing CAS at fairly low altitude, getting down in
the weeds with these guys.
I knew that friendly forces were within the blast pattern of a GBU-12, so I had to drop on the right spot.
We set up a track to deconflict in case the bomb fell long or short. In my first pass in, I didn’t get a
cleared hot call from Dragon 10 because he was too busy taking fire. He saw me, though, and knew I
had the right nose position. I went hot on the second attack. My first bomb was effective. I rolled in for
another pass. The bomb didn’t guide correctly, and it hit 100 meters farther north than it should have.
By then, my wingman and I were getting low on gas.
On my way out, I said, “We are going to hit the tanker, but we’ll be back in about ten minutes. You
guys keep your heads down.” The GFAC responded, “Roger, Dino out.” Right then, I knew it was my
buddy from Osan. I broke radio discipline and said, “Is that Dino M—?” He replied, “Say, again?” I
repeated, “Is that Dino M—?” He said, “Yes, Dino M—.” I said, “Hey dude. This is Chris from the
36th back at Osan.” He said, “Holy cow. Fancy meeting you here.”
We took off and hit the tanker. AWACS cleared us back to the area again, but we had silenced the
threats. Dino didn’t need us any more. We stayed over his position for another half hour, but he was
closing up shop and going somewhere else. We had done what we needed to do.
I was on station almost three hours at this point. Choppers were taking fire throughout the whole
operation. The radios were going nuts with guys pinned down by enemy fire. AWACS was doling out
CAS assignments left and right. My wingman and I had another six bombs, so we weren’t anxious to
go home. We stayed with the tanker as the bombers came in, did their magic with JDAMs, and left. We
talked with about six different GFAC parties that day. I ended up dropping my remaining bombs on a
mortar position on the side of a mountain. That 12.7-hour mission was the most challenging I have ever
flown in the F-16.
● cleared hot – clearance given for dropping weapons
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High-Altitude GPS
GPS-guided bombs are precision weapons only if we have precise target coordinates. We learned a lot
from Mountain Home’s experience with the JDAM and WCMD. But we still had a steep learning
curve. The designers of GPS-guided weapons, for example, never anticipated that we would be
dropping on targets at the elevations we dropped them. Targets in the mountains present a unique
challenge.
– Lt. Col. Mike, 169th FW
Making Noise
We flew a lot of missions that didn’t require dropping bombs. On one such mission, a ground controller
in a town said the al-Qaeda was trying to incite a riot among the local people. He asked us to fly low
over the town to make some noise, to let them know we were there. We dropped down, blasted over the
town, and put out a couple of flares. Sure enough, the flyover broke up the gathering. The al-Qaeda
jumped in their trucks and left town.
High Density
We had a lot of threats in Iraq during Desert Storm. So the heavies would not get near the country. The
fighters and bombers would go in there, do their business, and fly out. In OEF, we had to dodge
heavies in the target area. Once our forces corralled al-Qaeda in the mountains for Operation
Anaconda, we ended up with a target area about six miles in diameter. That’s the size of a postage
stamp for a 500-knot fighter. Tankers, AWACs, B-52s, Rivet Joint, JSTARs, B-52s, B-1s, and
Predators all piled up in this small target area. We tried to deconflict by altitude, and we had airplanes
stacked up at all altitudes. They were further compressed by the height of the floor created by the
mountainous area. Given the long distances and untried techniques for dealing with the detailed
coordination required to bring all those air and ground assets together, the air operation was hugely
successful. Our unit contributed greatly to the apparent goal of having assets with ordnance airborne
over the AOR around the clock.
Special Forces
The Special Forces guys took over Afghanistan. We didn’t march in there with a big army. A handful
of Special Ops guys went from Mazar-e Sharif down to Kandahar. The bombers and fighters acted as
their artillery.
Purpose
I was tired and just a little irritable after a long night mission. I got out of the airplane with my combat
vest, helmet bag, full piddle packs, lunch box, and all of the other accoutrements we had to carry. I
couldn’t carry one more thing and I couldn’t be any more tired. I walked into the maintenance debrief
area and looked at photos of the destruction of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Above the
shots, our maintenance personnel had posted, “In case you’re wondering why you are here.” I could not
complain. I remember that night better than I remember the details of any specific OEF mission.
– Lt. Col. Jay, 169th FW
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Frustrations
Almost every mission was extremely frustrating. A GFAC would ask us to do something for him, but
someone sitting miles away in air-conditioned comfort would tell us we couldn’t do that. I remember a
guy on the ground with a British accent, whispering into his radio because people were very close to
him. We were told we couldn’t help him. We stayed anyway until some other aircraft could get there
and give us a positive handoff so that the guy on the ground had someone overhead. We didn’t want to
leave him without air cover. We got in trouble that night because we overstayed our vulnerability time
by more than an hour.
Jupiter Light
We were flying one cloudless night with NVGs. The moon had set with the sun, so the night was as
black as pitch. The day before, a snowstorm had covered Afghanistan from its center to its northern
reaches. Jupiter provided the only light. But we could still make out details and see the huge mountains,
which reach to about 16,000 feet in the central part of the country and to about 26,000 feet in the north.
Satisfaction
I dropped a JDAM through the clouds on a building in the mountains during Operation Anaconda. The
GFAC said that I shacked the building, but I didn’t even see a flash in the clouds. In the Gulf War, my
unit dropped visually from our steam-driven 1979-vintage F-16s. We got the satisfaction of pickling on
a target, rolling up, and watching the targets blow up. The JDAM mission in OEF seemed sterile and
detached compared to missions I flew in Desert Storm.
Special Ops Appreciation
The Navy Seal guys were huge. The Special Forces guys, on the other hand, looked like college
students. Each had his own specialty, but all were expert marksmen. One guy had been in Afghanistan
for two months. He had a beard and long hair. He didn’t bathe because his water was for drinking only.
He slept on the dirt. Those guys had to make one MRE last a whole day. They loved life in our tent city
when they visited us in Qatar. They thought it was great to have hot water. We complained about
sleeping on cots in tents with sleeping bags. The Special Ops forces gave me a different perspective of
hardship.
● MRE – meals ready to eat; portable meal packets used by the military
Terminal Recliners
Imagine being strapped into your favorite chair for nine hours. You can do whatever you want—read,
watch television, and eat. But you can’t get out of the chair. And you can’t fall asleep. See how sore
your bottom gets. It will get sore no matter how comfortable the chair.
Not Your Mamma’s F-16
A lot of people say the F-16 was never designed for long missions. But we flew long missions. The F-
16 can do a lot of things it wasn’t designed to do. It’s a day, VFR fighter. Yeah, right. Not anymore.
● VFR – visual flight rules
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Perspective
I always remembered why I was there. The events of 11 September were always in the back of my
mind. I was glad I had the opportunity to contribute to the operation. No one ever complained. We
knew we had troops over there who had it a lot worse than we did.
– Maj. Scott, 169th FW
Tight Fit
First missions are more of a pain because we have to double-check everything. On my first OEF
mission, a day mission, someone put the wrong helmet in my helmet bag. I realized the mistake when I
was putting the gear into my airplane. Going back to get my helmet would have taken another twenty
or thirty minutes. We were already running a little late for a takeoff time, so I decided to fly with the
wrong helmet. The helmet was way too small. It was tight and uncomfortable. Tight helmets for
extended periods can cause hotspots and bad headaches. I got a little sinus blockage. Then I got a
splitting headache above my right eye. I was not feeling good. I got my g-suit knife out and cut the
straps out of the helmet and loosened everything else to make it fit better. Two hours into the flight, my
sinus blockage went away and I felt fine.
– Maj. Scott, 169th FW
Accuracy Improvements
My second time to fly with a JDAM was in a combat mission with a live bomb. We had zero practice
with these inertially aided munitions, so our learning curve was almost straight up. After we dropped a
couple of them, we began looking for alternatives to simply typing in coordinates from the GFAC,
dropping the bomb, and saying have a nice day. We combined visual information from our radar with
GPS coordinates to make our drops even more accurate.
I flew Block 30 F-16s in the Gulf War. No F-16 had targeting pods in Desert Storm. A couple of units
had navigation pods. But the technology made some huge advances since then. In many ways, OEF
missions were more stressful than Desert Storm missions. They were much longer and every drop was
in close proximity to Americans. So we were essentially dropping bombs in a friendly country. In Iraq,
we usually crossed a line that divided friendly from unfriendly forces.
Instantaneous Support
Some guys came back from missions frustrated that they couldn’t drop. I didn’t care if I dropped or not.
If my government wanted me to go out there and fly circles for three hours, that was what I was going
to do. We were there to provide near instantaneous support for our guys on the ground when they
needed it. Providing that support made the missions worthwhile.
Open For CAS Business
We’re a Block 50 F-16 unit dealing almost exclusively
with SEAD missions. We thought before going over to Afghanistan that we were out of the CAS
business. We got over there and started flying classic CAS missions right away. It wasn’t up-close-and-
personal CAS as we trained ten years ago when we had the Army guys on the ground during the day
talking us onto a target based on terrain features and roads. We were often flying at night with NVGs.
The terrain was almost featureless. And we were dropping on GPS coordinates.
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– Capt. Allen, 169th FW

Threats
The biggest threat was doing something stupid. The second biggest threat, which was remote, was
having an aircraft malfunction. The third biggest threat was al-Qaeda.
Confirmations
My toughest mission was dropping WCMD at night. I was on station for three hours. My wingman and
I were already six hours into the mission. The radios weren’t that good, so coordinating with the guys
on the ground was tough. With our inertially guided munitions, we had to confirm everything multiple
times over the radios. We couldn’t confirm target coordinates enough. We’d confirm information with
guys on the ground and with our wingmen. We had to make sure everyone had the same information
and knew exactly where the bombs were going to hit. The GFAC was very close to where the bombs
were going to impact, about two kilometers. We were also concerned about the location of other units
out there, friendly units we didn’t know about.
Mission-Ready
We had an all-hands maintenance meeting every day. We’d present aircraft status and discuss
maintenance issues at these meetings. When we got to our slides, everyone would say boring because
we almost always had an eighty-six percent mission-capable rate, which is the highest rate we could
have with one of our F-16s in a phase inspection. We normally had at least five of our six jets ready to
go at any given time. The availability of other aircraft at our location was five out of ten or one out of
three. Our jets performed great. Our crew chiefs were top notch.
CNN Knowledge
We had CNN and Internet access. Before Operation Anaconda kicked off, we knew what was going to
happen before it happened. We actually knew more than CNN.
Fire Ant Inspections
I was most impressed with our phase inspections. We were completing them in two and one-half days.
Normally, a phase takes about three to four weeks to complete at our home base. We had all the people
we needed in one place, and they were all working on the airplane at the same time in a twenty-four-
hour operation. They were working like fire ants.
– Maj. Allen, 169th FW
Volunteers
We didn’t have to ask for volunteers to deploy to Qatar for Enduring Freedom. Everyone wanted to go.
A lot of people were disappointed that they didn’t get to go.
Combinations
The jets performed well. We fly the newest Block 52 F-16s. They work as advertised. When you
combine good jets and good people, you get high FMC rates.
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● FMC – full mission capable; a statistic used to track the availability of aircraft over time
Sympathetic Cramps
In thirty-two years of aircraft maintenance, I’ve never felt sorry for a pilot. But I almost felt sorry for
them over there. When they got out of the airplanes after flying one of those long missions, they looked
like someone had beat them bad. They must have been wearing forty pounds of stuff in the cockpit. I
don’t think they could move around that much to stretch. I couldn’t do that. Some of our pilots had
trouble getting out of the airplane they were so cramped.
– Chief MSgt. Charles, 169th FW
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F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 379th Air Expeditionary

Wing
CAS Training
The war on terrorism may take us to many places around the world, some of which may require us to
perform CAS again. We have a unique capability with our Block 50/52 F-16s to carry JDAM, JSOW,
and WCMD—the inertially aided munitions. In OEF, we were dropping those weapons on visible
targets and on planned coordinates. We have geared our training to use these weapons as part of our
more standard training to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses. We need to reexamine our training
and make sure our pilots can use those same weapons for a variety of missions, including for CAS
missions.
– Col. Kanga, 379th AEW Commander
Limitations And Strengths
We could carry only two inertially aided munitions per F-16, either two WCMDs or two JDAMs,
which was one limitation to the Block 52 F-16s in OEF. We could have used BRU-57 over there,
which would have allowed us to carry four WCMDs. The bombers orbiting with us had twenty
munitions or more. One advantage we had over both the bombers and the Navy aircraft, however, was
our ability to deliver the GPS-guided weapons visually and to make visual corrections to GPS
coordinates on the fly. This advantage improved the flexibility of our attacks, which was especially
important for CAS missions.
Strafe First
The first time I expended munitions in support of OEF was with the gun. My flight lead and I were
talked onto a target area by a UAV. The UAV controller was acting as our FAC. My wingman and I
were both cleared down below the hard deck and strafed a high-value target, a vehicle. We were then
asked to expend our WCMD in the surrounding area. The first delivery was on preplanned coordinates.
We dropped the next three bombs visually based on corrections off the first drop. A week or so later,
my wingman and I dropped JDAMs on some cave entrances in the mountains. The British AWACs
controller called the caves portals. We adjusted the impact angle of our bombs from ninety degrees to
something much less than ninety degrees so we could send the bomb into the cave openings. We
dropped at night and through the weather. All of our bombs were direct hits.
● hard deck – minimum altitude prescribed by rules of engagement
Adapting
We train for multiple missions in the F-16, but performing CAS and dropping bombs into caves are
types of missions that Block 50 pilots don’t expect to encounter. We adapted quite well.
Training Issues
We learn lessons from every conflict. No conflict is exactly what we think it will be or what we think it
should be. We should base our training, in part, on what the F-16 has been asked to do for the Air Force
for the last twenty-five years, and we should make sure our training reflects potential war plans as well.
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Several factors complicate our training decisions. We have a limited amount of time to train. We also
have a relatively inexperienced pilot force right now. Furthermore, commitments to Southern Watch,
Northern Watch, and, more recently, to Noble Eagle impact our training time. Because the F-16 can
perform so many roles so well, we also have to determine where to focus our training. We should take
some lessons from OEF because the war on terrorism is going to go on for a long time. It is going to be
a different kind of war. It may not be a classic force-on-force battle. It will involve using our airplane
in ways we did not expect to use it. We need to be prepared.
33
F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 332 Air Expeditionary

Group
Hair On Fire
Some nights, the missions were tranquil. Others were three-to-four-hours, hair-on-fire hell raising. The
three largest factors for me were getting gas to get there and get back many times, peeing in the Viper,
and staying alert enough to come back and land after a ten-hour mission at night.
– Lt. Col. Mark, 332nd AEG
Winchester
Texas 17 was one of the real heroes of the war. He was King Kong and left his mark on the Kandahar
control tower before the Marines blew in and claimed they conquered it. I worked with Texas 17 on
two of my AFAC missions. On both missions, I came back to base totally Winchester, without rockets,
bombs, bullets, flares, or fuel. A big grease smudge covered the side of the aircraft from firing the gun
so much.
Nice View
I’ve flown many night missions and have seen some awesome desert sunrises and sunsets. I watched a
huge meteor storm in November. I almost watched it too much, since we had some AAA detonating at
our altitude at that time. I listened to a Walkman to and from the AOR. The tanker guys occasionally
amused us on the long flights to and from Afghanistan by placing interesting photos on the boomer’s
window.
● boomer – operator of the refueling boom on a tanker
Divert-N-Go
I was flying in a four-ship of F-16s in early December when we all ran low on fuel. Since our tanker
arrived twenty-five minutes late for the first aerial refueling, each of the four Vipers cycled through the
boom for a quick sip of gas. The tanker developed pump difficulties and began delivering a very slow
off-load. I took on about 3,000 pounds of fuel and got off the boom so my wingman could take his turn.
While he was refueling, I got a trapped fuel warning, which is normal for a partial or slow fuel
offloads. I cycled my aerial refueling door and monitored my fuel levels. My external fuel tanks, which
were not feeding, read 1,500 pounds each. My wingman experienced the same problems with a very
slow offload. My trapped fuel state continued. The closest divert base was 120 miles away. With
approximately 2,000 pounds of usable fuel showing, we got the tanker turned toward the divert base.
The tanker continued to work its pump malfunctions. As the tanker made a series of turns toward the
base, I got a low fuel warning on my aft tank.
En route to the base, the other members of my four-ship tried to refuel without success. We finally
determined the entire flight would have to divert. While trying to coordinate the divert through the
tanker, I asked for the position of the runway. The base was hard to see at night from our altitude.
Spotting the runway about two miles behind the flight and calculating less than 600 pounds of usable
fuel, I sliced back and informed my wingmen that I was an emergency. I headed for the runway,
dissipating energy and maintaining a one-to-one glide ratio while S-turning to final. I called the tower
34
frequency, landed, taxied, and shut down with less than 400 pounds of fuel indicated.
With a big OEF mission planned, our flight lead decided to get the jets turned to get us back on our
way. We called for a British fuel truck, refueled the jets ourselves, and turned all four Vipers. We
briefed some British crew chiefs on how to launch an F-16 and took off an hour after landing. Once in
the AOR, we searched a designated area for an hour before locating an enemy convoy. My two-ship
destroyed four large tracked troop carriers, one tank, one BMP, two trucks, one towed artillery piece,
and dozens of military personnel—all at night with the awesome targeting pod and SADL of the
Reserves Vipers.
● divert – unplanned landing at a nearby friendly air baseone-to-one glide ratio - distance/altitude
slope for an approach to landing; a steep approach in this case
● BMP – Russian designation for infantry fighting vehicle
F-16 Participation
We put the F-16s in the fight because they used less gas. We ran some numbers on fuel requirements
for a Strike Eagle mission from our operating location. We figured out that we could send four F-16s
twice a day for less fuel than it would take to send four F-15Es once a day. Since tankers were a
limiting factor, the F-16 was a force multiplier. We here at the OSW base made it happen. Viper
drivers in the CAOC kept F-16s in the fight.
– Col. Dave, 332nd AEG Commander
● CAOC - combined air operations center; central control authority for air operations
Area Brief
One of my first missions was way up north around the Mazar-e Sharif area. I checked in as an airborne
FAC and talked to the GFAC, or someone I thought was a GFAC. I asked the GFAC to authenticate.
He replied, “We don’t do that.” I then asked for an area brief. I got the same reply. Finally, the GFAC
came up on the radio and said, “I’ll make it real easy for you. The good guys are on horses. The bad
guys are in tanks. And they’re all around us.”
– Col. Dave, 332nd AEG Commander
● authentication – radio procedure combatants use to ensure they are communicating with
friendly forces
35

Code One Magazine Enduring Freedom Afganistan

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Code One Magazine Enduring Freedom Afganistan

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Code One Magazine: F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan

Code One Magazine

Third Quarter 2002 - Vol. 17, No. 3

Enduring Freedom Debrief

F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 419th Fighter Wing

Update points – known locations used to calibrate the INS

OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom

OSW – Operation Southern Watch

● AFRC – Air Force Reserve Command

us before we received the SCU 4 upgrade.

● FLIR – forward-looking infrared; a heat-detecting sensor in the targeting pod

F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 944th Fighter Wing

F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 366th Air Expeditionary

F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 301st Fighter Wing

CBU-103s at the same time.

– Lt. Col. Jeff, 301st FW

F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 354th Fighter Wing

– Lt. Col. Burt, 354th FW

F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 169th Fighter Wing

– Capt. Allen, 169th FW

F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 379th Air Expeditionary

F-16 Operations Over Afghanistan — 332 Air Expeditionary

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