Yi 1999 Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent

Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent?
Author(s): Byeong-Uk Yi
Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 93, No. 2 (Feb., 1999), pp. 141-160
Published by: Springer
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BYEONG-UK YI
IS MEREOLOGY ONTOLOGICALLY INNOCENT?
(Received 28 March 1997)
In Parts of Classes (1991), David Lewis attempts to draw a sharp

contrast between mereology and set theory by assimilating mere-
ology to logic. Central to the attempt is his defense of the view
that mereology is "ontologically innocent" (ibid., p. 81). Mereology,
according to him, is ontologically innocent just as logic is, whereas
set theory is not so (ibid., p. 87). Suppose, for example, that a cat,
Tom, asserts that there is a cat, Tom himself, and a mouse, Jerry.
Then by accepting set theory, Tom would make a further ontological
commitment, namely, the one to the existence of sets, such as the
set consisting of the two of them; by accepting logic, however, he
would make no ontological commitment beyond the prior commit-
ment to the existence of a cat and a mouse. Now, Lewis argues that
mereology is like logic in this respect: by accepting mereology, Tom
would make no further ontological commitment. In general, on his
view, one who accepts mereology makes no ontological commitment
beyond the one that he has made independently of doing so.
In this paper I shall argue against this view, which I shall call
the Innocence Conception of Mereology. Lewis's argument for the
conception can be seen as a defense against a serious objection to
the conception. I shall first show that the argument fails and then
elaborate the objection to argue directly against the conception.
This is the objection to the Innocence Conception, which I shall
argue is essentially correct. Recall that Tom has asserted that there
are two kinds of things: a cat and a mouse. If Tom now accepts
mereology, he thereby commits himself to the existence of things
of another kind, wholes with both cats and mice as parts, such
as the fusion of Tom and Jerry (Call the fusion Genie). One might
respond that Tom's commitment to the existence of such things is not
necessarily a further commitment because he has not yet committed
Philosophical Studies 93: 141-160, 1999.

? 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
142 BYEONG-UK YI
himself to the truth that the fusion

and Jerry. But this response gives only a short break to defenders
of the conception. Suppose now that Tom has asserted that no cat
is a part of a mouse and vice versa, as well as that there is a cat
and a mouse. Then accepting mereology would commit him to the
additional truth that the fusion is neither a cat nor a mouse. Thus
acceptance of mereology, it seems, can lead to further ontological
commitments.
Lewis responds to this objection by proposing the thesis that he
calls "the Thesis of Composition as Identity" (ibid., p. 82; original
italics), according to which Tom and Jerry, for example, are (in
a sense) identical with their fusion Genie. Tom would make no
commitment by accepting the existence of the fusion beyond the
prior commitment to the existence of the two animals, he argues,
because the fusion is (in a sense) identical with Tom and Jerry.
Proper assessment of this defense of the Innocence Conception
requires clearly distinguishing two versions of the thesis critical to
the defense. I shall explain the difference between the two versions,
which I shall call the Weak and Strong Composition Theses, respec-
tively (section I), and argue that the Strong Composition Thesis is
indefensible (section II) whereas the Weak Composition Thesis fails
to support the Innocence Conception (section III). Then I shall argue
directly against the Innocence Conception (section IV).
Mereology is a theory of part and whole that is given several differ-

ent formulations. Though the difference in the formulations is due
mostly to the difference in the languages in which the theory is
formulated, it is necessary to look at Lewis's own formulation
because his defense of the Innocence Conception appeals to features
of the theory that are made most clear in his formulation.
Lewis (ibid., pp. 72-4) formulates mereology in a language of
plurals, which extends the language suitable for elementary logic to
include plural constructions, as well as the more familiar, singular
constructions.! The language of plurals contains the following as
logical expressions:
IS MEREOLOGY ONTOLOGICALLY INNOCENT? 143
(a) plural terms, such as pronouns (e.g. 'they') or plural vari-

ables (e.g. '6s') as their symbolic counterparts.
(b) plural quantifiers (e.g. 'There are some things ... such
that').
(c) a special two-place predicate 'is one of', the second argu-
ment place of which admits of plural terms (e.g. 'they' or
c6s,).2
If we add the predicate 'is a part of' as the non-logical predicate

that indicates the relation that a part of a whole has to the whole, we
obtain a sufficient basis for formulating mereology.
We can define the predicate 'is a fusion of', which indicates the
relation that the fusion of some things has to the things,' in terms of
the predicate 'is a part of', together with logical expressions of the
language, as follows:
Definition 1: Something a is a fusion of some things 6s

if, and only if, whatever is one of the latter things, 6s, is a
part of the former thing, a, and any part of it, a, overlaps
one of them, 6s,
where 'overlaps' is defined as follows:
Definition 2: Something a overlaps something / if, and

only if, there is something -y that is a part of both the
former, a, and the latter, /.
Then we can formulate mereology using the two predicates 'is a part
of' and 'is a fusion of'. Mereology, on Lewis's formulation, consists
of the logical consequences4 of the following three axioms:
Transitivity: If something a is a part of something /, what-

ever is a part of the former, a, is a part of the latter, /.
Unrestricted Composition: If there are some things 6s,
there is something that is a fusion of them, 6s.
Uniqueness of Composition: If something a is a fusion of
some things 6s and something / is also a fusion of them,
6s, the former thing, a, is identical with the latter thing, /.
144 BYEONG-UK YI
Thus the following, for example,

because they are logical consequences of the axioms:
Theorem 1: If there are two things (e.g. Tom and Jerry),

there is something (e.g. Genie) that is a fusion of them (in
symbols, VaV/3?y[Y is a fusion of (a and )]).5
Theorem 2: If there are two things (e.g. Tom and Jerry)
neither of which is a part of the other, there is something
else (e.g. Genie) that is not identical with either of the two
things.
We can now consider what the Innocence Conception of Mere-

ology amounts to. Suppose that Rachel asserts the following in turn:
(1) There is a cat (viz. Tom).

(2) There is a mouse (viz. Jerry) that can beat the cat.
By asserting (1), Rachel commits herself to the existence of a cat.

Then by asserting (2) afterwards, she makes a further ontological
commitment; she commits herself to the existence of a mouse that
can beat the cat as well as to the existence of a cat. What if she then
asserts the following?
(3) There is a fusion (viz. Genie) of the cat and the mouse.
Then, it seems, she would make a yet further ontological commit-

ment, just as she has made a further ontological commitment by
asserting (2); she would then be committed to the existence of a
fusion of a cat and a mouse, as well as the existence of a cat and a
mouse. According to the Innocence Conception, however, she would
make no further commitment. Sentence (3) is a logical consequence
of sentences (1) and (2) and mereology (in particular, Theorem 1);
thus, on the conception, she would not make any further commitment
by asserting (3) because she would not do so by accepting mereology.
Thus, while agreeing that Rachel's assertion of (2) incurs a further
commitment, Lewis denies that her assertion of (3) would do so as
well: "given a prior commitment to" the existence of some things,
he maintains, "a commitment to [the existence of their fusion] is
not a further commitment" (1991, p. 81; original italics); to put it
another way, he says, the commitment to the existe

"is redundant, given the old one" (ibid., p. 82).6
What justifies treating (2) and (3) so differently in counting their
ontological commitments? Lewis answers this question by appeal-
ing to the Thesis of Composition as Identity, according to which
Tom and Jerry, for example, are (in a sense) identical with their
fusion Genie. To accept Genie's existence after having accepted the
existence of Tom and Jerry, Lewis argues, is not to make a further
ontological commitment because Genie is Tom and Jerry; to accept
Jerry's existence after having accepted Tom's existence is to do so,
by contrast, because Jerry is not Tom. What does then the critical
thesis hold? What is the sense in which Genie is identical with Tom
and Jerry?
The Thesis of Composition as Identity is a thesis concerning the
nature of the composition relation or the predicate 'compose' that
indicates the relation. Composition is the converse of the relation of
being a fusion of; accordingly, the predicate 'compose', whose first
argument place admits of plural terms, can be defined as the con-
verse of the predicate 'is a fusion of'. Thus, for example, Tom and
Jerry compose Genie.7 Now, Lewis presupposes that the predicate
'are' can be used, in place of 'compose', to indicate the composition
relation and explains that the thesis holds that
The 'are' of composition is, so to speak, the plural form

of the 'is' of identity. (Ibid., p. 82)
But his further discussion suggests two different interpretations of

this statement, which lead to the two versions of the thesis that I call
the Weak and Strong Composition Theses, respectively.
According to the Strong Composition Thesis, the predicate 'are'
used to indicate the composition relation is literally another form
of the 'is' of identity. The predicate 'are', according to the thesis,
is an alternative form (viz. the plural form) of the predicate 'is' of
identity just as the predicates 'am' and 'are' in sentences like 'I am
Rachel' or 'You are Rachel' are alternative forms (viz. the first- and
second-person singular forms) of the predicate 'is' in sentences like
'She is Rachel.' Thus, on this thesis, Tom and Jerry are literally
identical with Genie, though neither of them is so.
146 BYEONG-UK YI
The Weak Composition Thesis, by

there is a predicate that is literally th
or whether the predicate 'are' of composition is such a predicate. So
one who holds the thesis might still grant that the predicate 'are' used
to indicate the composition relation differs from the plural form of
the 'is' used to indicate identity, namely, that Tom and Jerry are not
literally identical with Genie. Nevertheless, according to the thesis,
the composition predicate is so analogous to the identity predicate
that it is appropriate to classify them into the same special group
and say that the former "is, so to speak, the plural form" (ibid.; my
italics) of the latter.
Thus, we can distinguish two versions of the thesis critical to
Lewis's defense of the Innocence Conception. Accordingly, we can
consider two versions of the defense, which appeal to the two ver-
sions of the thesis, respectively. In the next two sections, I shall argue
that both versions of the defense fail.
II
In the next section, I shall argue that the Weak Composition Thesis
fails to support the Innocence Conception. In this section, I shall
argue that the Strong Composition Thesis is false. Thus, I argue,
one cannot appeal to this stronger thesis to defend the Innocence
Conception.
Recall that Tom and Jerry compose Genie. Thus, according to the
Strong Composition thesis,
(4) Tom and Jerry are (viz. are identical with) Genie,
where 'are' is literally another form of the 'is' of identity. If so, Genie
must be one of Tom and Jerry, because Genie is one of Genie. But,
of course, Genie is not one of Tom and Jerry; for Genie is identical
with neither Tom nor Jerry. Thus sentence (4) and so the thesis, too,
must be false.8
Let me discuss some possible objections to this argument against
the Strong Composition Thesis.
First, one might object that 'Genie is one of Genie' is ungram-
matical (or even false) because the predicate 'is one of' should be
followed by a plural term to form a grammatical sentence (or to
yield a truth). But it is easy to reformulate the argument to avoid

this objection. One way is to use the predicate 'is-one-of', defined
in terms of the English predicate 'is one of' as follows:
t is-one-of u +X Va[t is one of (u and f)], where 't' can be

replaced with a singular term and 'u' any term, singular or
plural.
Then 'Genie is-one-of Genie' is incontrovertibly grammatical and

true while 'Genie is-one-of Tom and Jerry' is false, which contradicts
the truth of sentence (4). Another way is to replace the underlined
occurrences of 'Tom and Jerry' and 'Genie' in the original argument
with, for example, the plural terms 'Tom and Jerry, and Cicero' (in
short, 'Tom, Jerry, and Cicero') and 'Genie and Cicero', respectively.
Then we can get a contradiction from (4), because 'Genie is one of
Genie and Cicero' is true whereas 'Genie is one of Tom and Jerry,
and Cicero' (in short, 'Genie is one of Tom, Jerry, and Cicero') is
false.
Second, one might attempt to maintain the truth of (4) but explain
the failure of substitutivity of 'Genie' and 'Tom and Jerry' by arguing
that 'and' is used ambiguously in sentence (4), on the one hand, and
some other sentences used in the arguments (e.g. 'Genie is not one
of Tom and Jerry'), on the other. But it is difficult to substantiate
this position. Though it is somewhat plausible to distinguish the use
of 'and' as a device for abbreviating sentential conjunction from its
other uses, the word 'and' does not occur as such a device in any of
the sentences in question. Moreover, the position conflicts with the
Strong Composition Thesis, according to which the predicate 'are' in
(4), as the plural form of the 'is' of identity, indicates the relation of
composition. The predicate indicating the composition relation can
be defined as the converse of 'is a fusion of', which can be defined
using 'is one of' as in Definition 1. Thus the first argument place of
the predicate for composition and the second argument place of 'is
one of' must admit of the same plural term, such as 'Tom and Jerry',
used unambiguously.
Third, one might argue that Genie is one of Tom and Jerry by
challenging the assumption that
148 BYEONG-UK YI
Something is one of Tom and Jerry if, and only if, it is

identical with either Tom or Jerry.
To do so, one might propose the following:
Something is one of Tom and Jerry if, and only if, it is

identical with either Tom or Jerry or else the fusion of
Tom and Jerry.9
But this is an incorrect analysis of the way the predicate 'is one of'
works. The sentence 'Every one of the animals mentioned in this
paragraph is either a cat or a mouse' is true.10 But it would be false
according to the analysis, according to which Genie (as well as Tom
or Jerry) is one of the animals mentioned in this paragraph (namely,
Tom and Jerry).1" Moreover, taking the analysis as correct does not
help defend the Strong Composition Thesis. Suppose that Thomas
is a proper part of Tom, and that Jane is the fusion of Jerry and the
rest of Tom. Then Thomas and Jane are identical with Genie, on the
thesis, because Genie is their fusion; consequently, whatever is one
of Thomas and Jane must be one of Genie and, consequently, one
of Tom and Jerry. But Thomas is not one of Tom and Jerry - even
according to the analysis. To meet this objection, a defender of the
Strong Composition Thesis would have to argue that Thomas is one
of Tom and Jerry. Then he would have to deny the above analysis.
Instead he might propose the following analysis:
Something is one of Tom and Jerry if, and only if, it is a

part of the fusion of Tom and Jerry.
But this analysis, too, yields the wrong result that the sentence 'Every
one of the animals mentioned in this paragraph is either a cat or a
mouse' is false.
Fourth, whereas I argue that sentence (4), for example, and so the
Strong Composition Thesis are false, van Inwagen (1994, p. 210f)
argues that the thesis is unintelligible because sentence (4), for
example, is ungrammatical. The reason he gives for this view is
that the plural form of the 'is' of identity must be followed, as well
as preceded, by a plural term to yield a grammatical sentence. I
do not think this is a correct view about the grammar of the plural
form of the 'is' in English, but even granting the view, we can put
aside the issue of grammatical oddity involved in

define the mixed plural form 'arem' of the identi
van Inwagen's pure plural form 'arep' as follows:
t aren u if, and only if, for anything a, t and a arep u and
ag,
where 'u' can be replaced with any terms, singular or plural."2 Then
there is no reason to interpret the thesis as pertaining to his pure
plural form; we can make sense of the thesis and its consequences
like sentence (4) by formulating them in terms of the mixed plural
form.
I now conclude that the Strong Composition Thesis is false. Lewis
seems to agree. He in the end rejects the Strong Composition Thesis
(1 99 1, pp. 84 and 87) and, accordingly, uses only the Weak Composi-
tion Thesis to defend the Innocence Conception.'3 In the next section,
1 shall argue that this weaker thesis fails to support the conception.
III
According to the Weak Composition Thesis, the composition relation

(or the predicate 'are' used to indicate the relation) is so analogous
to the identity relation (or the predicate 'is' used to indicate identity)
that it is appropriate to classify them into the same group. To use this
thesis to defend the Innocence Conception, however, it is necessary
to make its content more precise by specifying how much analogy
is claimed to hold between the two relations (or predicates). Lewis
(199 1, p. 85f) lists four respects in which, he claims, the composition
relation is analogous to the identity relation.'4
First, Unrestricted Composition. Tom need not satisfy any special
condition for there to be something identical with him. Likewise,
Tom and Jerry need not satisfy any special conditions for there to be
something composed by them.
Second, Uniqueness of Composition. There cannot be two differ-
ent things both identical with Tom. Likewise, there cannot be two
different things both composed by Tom and Jerry.
Third, Ease of Describing Fusion. You can fully describe the
thing identical with Tom by describing Tom fully (e.g. you can fully
specify the location of the former by specifying that of the latter
150 BYEONG-UK YI
fully). Likewise, you can fully describe the thing composed by Tom
and Jerry by describing Tom and Jerry fully - by way of specifying
their interrelation as well as the character of each.
Fourth, (Limited) Coincidence of Location. If the thing identical
with Tom exists at some place, time or possible world, Tom exists
at the same place, time, or possible world. Likewise, if the thing
composed by Tom and Jerry is wholly present at different places or
times or possible worlds, then Tom and Jerry are also wholly present
at the same multiple places, times, or possible worlds.15
Van Inwagen (1994, p. 217f) argues that the Weak Composition
Thesis, so specified, is false because mereology is false. He argues
that the first point of analogy does not hold because the axiom of
Unrestricted Composition is false. I would agree that mereology is
false, but I think we can still raise the question whether mereology, if
true, is ontologically innocent. Van Inwagen seems to think that the
answer to this question is yes; he grants that the Weak Composition
Thesis is true if mereology is true, and assumes that "if [the thesis]
is true, then Mereology is ontologically innocent" (ibid., p. 218).
I disagree. It is fair to say that the Weak Composition Thesis is
controversial, even granting the truth of mereology. There is not
much sense in which describing Tom and Jerry individually and
stating their interrelation is describing their fusion Genie; describing
them allows one who accepts mereology to draw conclusions about
the character of Genie, but it is one thing to enable someone to make
inferences about something, quite another to describe it.16 I think,
however, that the weakest part of Lewis's defense of the Innocence
Conception is the assumption that the Weak Composition Thesis
supports the view that mereology, if true, is ontologically innocent.
To see this, compare mereology with a theory that I shall call the
Accompaniment Theory. According to the theory,
(A) Anything whatsoever has exactly one thing that accompa-

nies it.
(B) Whatever accompanies something is not accompanied by

it.
(C) The accompaniment of a thing exists at whatever place,

time, or possible world the thing exists at and shares all the
'usual' properties or relations that the thing has (that is, an
accompaniment is, so to speak, a copresent duplicate).17
Notice that the accompaniment relation, indicated by the predicate

'accompanies', is analogous to identity in the four respects in ques-
tion (if the theory is true). Tom need not satisfy any special condition
to have its accompaniment (by Thesis (A)). Two different things
cannot both accompany Tom (by Thesis (B)). You can fully describe
Tom's accompaniment by describing Tom fully - in whatever sense
in which you can fully describe Genie by describing both Tom and
Jerry fully (by Thesis (C)).'8 Finally, Tom's accompaniment is at
whatever place, time, or possible world Tom is at (by Thesis (C)). Is
the theory then ontologically innocent, if only it is true?
The answer is no. The theory is not ontologically innocent, be it
true or false. One who accepts the theory with prior commitment to
the existence of a cat commits herself to the existence of the accom-
paniment of a cat that is different from the cat.19 This commitment
is not redundant even granting the prior commitment. Just as Rachel
makes a further commitment by asserting 'There is a mouse that can
beat the cat' after having asserted 'There is a cat', one would make
a further commitment by asserting 'There is an accompaniment of
the cat that is different from the cat' after having asserted 'There
is a cat.' One cannot avoid incurring the same commitment simply
because she commits herself to the existence of the accompaniment
indirectly by way of accepting the Accompaniment Theory.
Then we can see that the analogy in the four respects between
composition and identity cannot support the view that mereology, if
true, is ontologically innocent. For the Accompaniment Theory, true
or false, cannot be ontologically innocent, though the same analogy
holds between the accompaniment and identity relations if the theory
is true.
One might object to this conclusion on the ground that the Accom-
paniment Theory is somehow unintelligible (or even logically incon-
sistent); for, she argues, two different things could not possibly exist
at the same place, time, and possible world. I certainly agree that
the theory is false, but do not see why it should be unintelligible
(or even logically inconsistent). In any case, the objector's view
does not help support, but undermines, the Innocence Conception.
For the objector would have to conclude that the Accompaniment
Theory fails to be ontologically innocent. Ontological innocence is
supposed to be a positive feature that renders theories with the feature
152 BYEONG-UK YI
rationally acceptable; any theory with the feature should be more

palatable than, for example, set theory, which Lewis (1991, p. 87)
contrasts with mereology as a theory that lacks the feature. But on
the objector's view, the Accompaniment Theory is too preposterous
to be even intelligible.20
At this point, it will be interesting to see how Lewis's argument
from the Weak Composition Thesis to the Innocence Conception
(1991, p. 82) fails. To see this, we need to distinguish the weaker
thesis more sharply from the Strong Composition Thesis than Lewis
does in presenting the argument.
The argument runs as follows. Suppose that Rachel asserts the
following:
(3) There is a fusion (viz. Genie) of the cat and the mouse,
because, she realizes, it is a logical consequence of mereology and

her two previous assertions: 'There is a cat' (sentence (1)) and 'There
is a mouse that can beat the cat' (sentence (2)). Sentence (3) can be
rephrased as follows:
(5) There is something that the cat and the mouse are (viz.
compose),
where 'are' is used to indicate the composition relation. Because th

predicate is, so to speak, the plural form of the 'is' of identity, on th
Weak Composition Thesis, (5) can be put as follows:
(6) There is something that the cat and the mouse are,
where the predicate 'are' is, so to speak, the plural form of the 'i
of identity. Now, Lewis argues, one makes no further commitme
by asserting (6) after having already asserted (1) and (2), just as sh
makes no further commitment by asserting
(7) There is something that the cat is (viz. is identical with)
after having already asserted 'There is a cat' (sentence (1)). Thus,

Lewis concludes, Rachel makes no further commitment by asserti
(3).
The gist of the argument is this: because the composition predicate
in sentence (5) is analogous to the identity predicate in sentence (7)
in the four respects mentioned above, it is analogous in yet another

respect in question.21 This is, to be sure, a non-sequitur. Otherwise,
one could as legitimately draw the conclusion that sentence (5) is a
logical consequence of sentences (1) and (2) just as sentence (7) is a
logical consequence of sentence (1).22 Does the argument avoid the
flagrant fallacy by relating sentence (5) to sentence (7) indirectly by
way of sentence (6)? No, it does not. The detour through sentence
(6) can only put off the need for the fallacious appeal to the same
analogy. Recall the reason that sentence (5) can be rephrased by
sentence (6): to say that the predicate of sentence (6) is, so to speak,
the plural form of the identity predicate is simply to say that it is
analogous to the identity predicate in the four respects. This is all that
is meant by the talk of the plural form in the argument. Then Lewis's
argument commits the same fallacy that one would have committed
by appealing directly to the analogy between sentences (5) and (7):
because the predicates of sentences (6) and (7) are analogous in the
four respects, they must be analogous in the additional respect in
question as well.
And we can see that there is no avoiding a similar fallacy while
relying only on the Weak Composition Thesis. Otherwise, one could
argue, with equal success, that asserting 'There is something that is
(viz. accompanies) the cat' is redundant given the prior assertion of
'There is a cat' (if only the Accompaniment Theory is true).
A defender of Lewis might attempt to reformulate the argument
using a plausible thesis stronger than the Weak Composition Thesis.
But adding more points of analogy between composition and identity
cannot help to avoid the fallacy in the original argument - unless it
begs the question by including the truth of the Innocence Concep-
tion itself as an additional point of analogy. Moreover, even the
argument so modified as to rely on the Strong Composition Thesis
is objectionable (even granting the thesis). The reason that Rachel's
assertion of sentence (7) is redundant given her prior assertion of
sentence (1) is that (7) is a logical consequence of (1). But it is
one thing to say that the predicate 'are' of the sentence 'There is
something that the cat and the mouse are' is literally a form of the
predicate 'is' of sentence (7), quite another to say that the former
sentence is a logical consequence of 'There is a cat' and 'There is a
mouse that can beat the cat.'
154 BYEONG-UK YI
IV
I now argue that mereology, be it true or false, is not ontologically

innocent. Suppose that Tom asserts the following:
(1) There is a cat (viz. Tom himself).

(2) There is a mouse (viz. Jerry) that can beat the cat.
(8) No cat is a part of a mouse, and no mouse is a part of a cat.
Can he then accept mereology without incurring any further onto-

logical commitment? The answer, I argue, is no.
So far, Tom has committed himself to the existence of only a cat
and a mouse. Accepting mereology would commit him to the exis-
tence of something else (viz. Genie), of another kind. Mereology,
together with sentences (1), (2), and (8), implies the following, which
are logical consequences of the sentences and Theorem 2:
(9) There is something that is not identical with either the cat
or the mouse.
(10) There is something that is neither a cat nor a mouse.
If someone asserts (9) or (10) after having asserted (1), (2), and
(8), surely she makes a further ontological commitment; she has not
committed herself to the truth of (9) or (10) by asserting (1), (2),
and (8), any more than Rachel has committed herself to the truth of
(2) by asserting (1). If so, Tom would not avoid incurring the same
commitment simply because he would be committed to the truth
of (9) and (10) indirectly by way of accepting mereology. Thus,
Tom's acceptance of mereology would lead to further ontological
commitments.
To see this, notice, it is useful to focus attention on sentences like
(9) or (10) rather than sentences like the following, which is a logical
consequence of sentences (1) and (2) and Theorem 1:
(3) There is a fusion (viz. Genie) of the cat and the mouse.
By doing so, we can put aside objections that one might raise by
diverting attention to issues about the content of sentences like this.
One might argue that the commitment to the truth of (3) does not
necessarily incur a further ontological commitment: for example,
Rachel, who has asserted only (1) and (2) before getting committed
the truth of (3), has not made a further ontological commitment.
position has some plausibility because of some indeterminateness in
the notion of ontological commitment. Even after accepting (3), one
might argue, Rachel has yet to see that the fusion in question is neither
a cat nor a mouse to be fully committed to the existence of things of
another kind; otherwise, she might consistently assert that the fusion
is in fact the same thing as the cat.23 (Then she must accept that the
mouse is a part of the cat, which is false, but this does not matter in
counting her ontological commitment.) Even granting this point, it
still seems right to say that Rachel incurs a further commitment by
committing herself to the existence of a fusion of a cat and a mouse
by asserting (3), but it seems arguable that the further commitment
in this case falls short of a further ontological commitment just as
asserting 'There is a vertebrate' after having asserted 'There is a
whale' would perhaps fall short of incurring a further ontological
commitment (although the former is not a logical consequence of the
latter). Borderline cases like Rachel's, however, should not obscure
the issue at hand any more than the case of a monist, who accepts
the existence of only one thing (e.g. herself) and, therefore, can
accept mereology without any further ontological commitment.24
What is here in question is not whether one can sometimes accept
mereology with no further ontological commitment, but whether
one can always do so. In addressing this issue, it suffices to consider
cases like Tom's, in which accepting mereology would clearly lead
to a further ontological commitment.
One who accepts the Strong Composition Thesis has a natural
response to the argument against the Innocence Conception that
focuses on the commitment to the truth of sentences like (9) and
(10). Tom's commitment to the truth of (9), she would argue, would
be redundant given his prior commitment to the existence of the
cat and the mouse (viz. Tom and Jerry), which are identical with
something (viz. Genie) that is neither the cat nor the mouse. But this
response fails because, as we have seen, the thesis critical to it is
false.
One who, like Lewis, balks at the stronger thesis and accepts only
the Weak Composition Thesis, by contrast, cannot directly attempt
to meet the argument against the conception. Accordingly, Lewis's
156 BYEONG-UK YI
defense of the conception diverts a

beside the point to concentrate on whether we can use the word 'are'
to indicate the composition relation and so rephrase (3) as follows:
(5) There is something that the cat and the mouse are (viz.
compose).
Whether or not we in fact do so, someone, such as Lewis, can

certainly decide to do so and draw some analogy between the 'are'
so used and the predicate for identity (and accordingly, between
sentences (5) and (7)). Nevertheless, there remains a critical differ-
ence between Tom's accepting mereology and someone's accepting
the logic of identity after asserting (1). The logic accepter does
not commit herself to the truth of the counterparts of (9) and (10),
namely,
(1 1) There is something that is not identical with the cat.

(12) There is something that is not a cat.
This is why she is immune to the charge of making a further ontolog

ical commitment by accepting the logic of identity. The same plea
would not be available to Tom, who would be committed to the truth
of (9) and (10). Because it is not the exotic nature of (7) that absolves
the logic accepter from the charge of ontological guilt, it misses the
point if Tom draws an analogy between sentences (5) and (7) and
harps on the exotic nature of sentence (5).
In this respect, too, mereology is comparable to the Accompani-
ment Theory. The one who accepts this theory after having asserted
(1) would have to accept the truth of sentence (1 1), as well as that of
the sentence 'There is something that the cat accompanies.' Then it
is beside the point to use 'is' as a quasi-identity predicate indicating
the accompaniment relation and put the latter sentence as follows:
'There is something that the cat is (viz. accompanies).' No matter
what analogy one might draw between this sentence and sentence
(7), it cannot explain away the commitment to the truth of sentence
(11). Because accepting the Accompaniment Theory gives rise to
commitments like this, the theory cannot be ontologically innocent
be it true or false. The same argument applies to mereology, and
justifies the same verdict.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Allen Hazen, Robert Kermode, William

Lycan, Bernard Linsky, Mohan Matthen, Jay F. Rosenberg, Peter
van Inwagen, and an anonymous referee of Philosophical Studies for
discussions, comments, and criticisms. This paper was written while
I was a Killam Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Alberta.
NOTES
The formulation results from modifying Tarski's in his (1956) using plu
quantification instead of singular quantification over classes. See also Leonard
Goodman (1940), who give an alternative formulation equivalent with Tarski's.
2 I assume that the second argument place of 'is one of' admits of singular terms
as well. If it does not (as some people might object), we can replace the predicate
with a related predicate, 'is-one-of', so defined in terms of 'is one of' as to have
its second argument place admit of singular as well as plural terms (See the fourth
paragraph of section II.). By the way, the plural variables result from improv-
ing the plural pronouns to facilitate definite cross-reference, just as the singular
variables result from improving the singular pronouns. Thus, I use singular and
plural variables (e.g. 'a' and '6s') in the axioms and definitions stated below in
order to clarify cross-reference, but one can read them as straightforward English
sentences by simply deleting all the variables in them. For more on the language
of plurals, see Lewis (ibid., pp. 62-71), van Inwagen (1990, pp. 23-7), and my
(1995, chapter II).
3 This predicate is not available in the more familiar language suitable for elemen-
tary logic; its second argument place admits of plural (as well as singular) terms.
4 The talk of logical consequence of the axioms presupposes the logic appropriate
for sentences of the language of plurals, though Lewis does not explain what the
logic is like. I have developed a system of logic appropriate for them as a conser-
vative extension of elementary logic in my (1995, chapter II).
5 As is clearer in the symbolic formulation, this is meant to be stronger than 'If
there are two different things, there is something that is a fusion of them.' In the
symbolic formulation, I use the word 'and' as a two-place term connective that
yields a complex (plural) term by operating on two terms. Though I have not listed
it as a logical expression in the language of plurals, it can be defined in context in
terms of the other logical expressions mentioned above.
6 One can distinguish (further) commitments from (further) ontological commit-
ments and argue that Rachel does not make a further ontological commitment by
accepting (3) though she might make a further commitment. This distinction calls
for considering a case more refined than Rachel's (e.g. Tom's) to argue against the
conception, but it does not help support Lewis's view, which contrasts Rachel's
assertions of (2) and (3). See the third paragraph of section IV.
7 But neither Tom nor Jerry composes Genie. Thus the composition relation
should be distinguished from the part-whole relation, because Tom (as well as
Jerry) is a part of Genie.
158 BYEONG-UK YI
8 Notice that this argument against the

mutatis mutandis to the indisputable the
Tom and Jerry are Jamie,
where 'Jamie' is used merely as an abbreviation of 'Tom and Jerry' (and 'are' as
the plural form of the 'is' of identity). If 'Jamie' is a plural term, 'Jamie is one of
Jamie' is grammatically incorrect; so one might stipulate that 'Jamie' is a singular
term though used to abbreviate 'Tom and Jerry', but in that case, 'Jamie is one of
Jamie' is false just as 'Tom and Jerry are one of Tom and Jerry' is false (though
'Jamie is some of Jamie' and 'Tom and Jerry are some of Tom and Jerry' are true).
But the correct thesis, which should not be confused with the Strong Composition
Thesis, does not justify this incorrect thesis without the illegitimate assumption
that Genie, the unique object that is a fusion of Tom and Jerry, is Jamie. This
assumption, I argue, is false; Genie is not one of Jamie, while Genie is one of
Genie.
9 Jay F. Rosenberg (1997) raises this objection.
1o Here I take it for granted that Genie, for example, is not an animal (so that only
two animals, viz. Tom and Jerry, are mentioned in this paragraph), but it is easy
to modify the example even granting that Genie is an animal.
l l Thus on the analysis, the sentence is not logically equivalent with 'Every animal
mentioned in this paragraph is either a cat or a mouse.'
12 Alternatively, we can define the mixed plural form using 'is-one-of':
t arem u if, and only if, for anything a, a is-one-of t X? a is-one-of u.
13 My argument against the Strong Composition Thesis is related to one of

Lewis's: the number of Tom and Jerry is two, but the number of their fusion Genie
is one (1991, p. 87). But this argument relies on some challenged assumptions,
such as the assumption that if Tom and Jerry are two things, they are not one
thing. I think the argument can be strengthened, because the talk of number can be
clarified in terms of the predicate 'is one of' and other expressions in the language
of plurals: for example, some things are two things if, and only if, there is some
one of them and another one of them such that any one of them is either the former
or the latter. But even the argument so strengthened must rely on assumptions
not necessary in my argument. Though, by the way, Lewis attributes the Strong
Composition Thesis or "something very like it" (1991, p. 84) to Donald Baxter,
Baxter, it seems to me, holds a very different view in his (1988a) and (1988b):
number, identity, and even existence are relative to a standard of counting. He
rejects mereology by denying that if there are two non-overlapping things, there is
the whole comprising them and so there are at least three different things (1988a,
p. 578f), and argues against the Strong Composition Thesis, which he formulates
as follows: "if there are six things then a seventh thing ... exists, and the six things
collectively are the seventh thing" (ibid., p. 579f). His positive view relies on the
idea of different standards of counting: the same things (e.g. Tom and Jerry) can
be two things on one standard of counting but one thing on another (ibid., p. 582),
though, he says, "[w]ithin a count it is never the case that many things are one
thing" (1988b, p. 193). Thus, though I do not agree with his view, it must be
compatible with the rejection of the Strong Composition Thesis.
14 Lewis (ibid.) in fact lists five respects. The additio

alleged ontological innocence of mereology. Because this makes his defense of
the Innocence Conception beg the question, I here ignore the additional respect.
15 Lewis (ibid., p. 86f) admits that this particular conditional is true only because
its antecedent is false, but argues that its (plural) universal generalization has
non-trivial instances.
16 See also note 18 below.
17 I add the qualification 'usual' because the accompaniment does not share
all the properties or relations: for example, Tom's accompaniment is not its
own accompaniment; and a part of something is not necessarily a part of its
accompaniment.
18 One might object to this on the ground that Tom's accompaniment shares
only the 'usual' properties and relations that Tom has. But the thesis of Ease of
Describing Fusion is subject to the same objection. It is hard to see that one can
automatically tell when or at what possible worlds Genie wholly exists even after
being told when or at what possible worlds Tom and Jerry wholly exist. (When
does Genie wholly exist if there is no time when both Tom and Jerry wholly exist?
Is Genie an object (probably, a physical object) that may exist without existing
at any time?) Though one might well be able to give a consistent and plausible
account of when and where, for example, Genie exists on the basis of when and
where Tom and Jerry exist, such an account is not a direct consequence of mere-
ology, and it is not clear that our current understanding of the part-whole relation,
together with mereology, supports one such account against all the others. In any
case, a defender of the thesis would have to argue that the thesis holds because we
can extend mereology to a theory that makes it easy to describe fusions. But then,
one can reply that the corresponding thesis about accompaniments holds as well
because we can extend the Accompaniment Theory to a theory that makes it easy
to describe accompaniments.
19 It follows from Thesis (B) that Tom is not his own accompaniment (Call it
Tomac). It also follows that Tom is not Tomac's accompaniment, but not that
Tom is not the accompaniment of Tomac's accompaniment. We can modify the
thesis to yield a stronger theory (the Strong Accompaniment Theory), according
to which Tom, Tomac, Tomac's accompaniment, the accompaniment of Tomac's
accompaniment, and so on are all different from one another. Though I might have
used the stronger theory as a more striking example, I do not think it is necessary
to do so for the present purpose. For the dividing line between the original and
strong accompaniment theories cannot be that between ontological innocence and
guilt, but at most that between ontological misdemeanor and felony.
20 Or one might argue that the theory has unacceptable empirical consequences:
for example, the scale under Tom, who weighs 20 kilograms, would register 40
(or more) kilograms because of the additional weight(s) of his accompaniment
(and its accompaniment, and so on). This conclusion does not follow, because the
scale, too, must have its accompaniment that shares the weights with it. In any
case, again, I do not see how the view that the theory is empirically false can help
defend the innocence conception; if the theory is empirically false, it cannot be a
rationally acceptable theory.
21 That is, asserting (5) is redundant given the prior assertion of the existence of
the cat and the mouse, just as asserting (7) is so given the prior assertion of the
existence of the cat.
160 BYEONG-UK YI
22 And that in general, the axioms of

of Composition are logical truths.
23 Taking this position, however, fails to help to draw a contrast between Rachel's
assertions of (2) and (3), because one who takes the position would have to con-
clude that Rachel does not make a further ontological commitment by asserting
(2), either, because she has yet to see that the mouse is not the cat.
24 Accepting mereology would lead the monist to accept that the one thing is a
part of itself, but the commitment to the truth of this claim, one might argue, is
not a further ontological commitment.
REFERENCES
Baxter, D.L.M. (1988a): 'Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense', Mind 97,
575-582.
Baxter, D.L.M. (1988b): 'Many-One Identity', Philosophical Papers 17,193-216.
Leonard, H.S. and N. Goodman (1940): 'The Calculus of Individuals and Its Uses',
Journal of Symbolic Logic 5, 45-55.
Lewis, D. (1991): Parts of Classes, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Rosenberg, J.F. (1997): 'Comments on Byeong-uk Yi: "Is Mereology Ontological-
ly Innocent?"', presented in The American Philosophical Association, Pacific
Division Meeting (March, 1997).
Tarski, A. (1956): 'Foundations of the Geometry of Solids', in his Logic, Seman-
tics, Metamathematics, pp. 24-29, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. (1983),
2nd edition.
van Inwagen, P. (1990): Material Beings, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
van Inwagen, P. (1994): 'Composition as identity', in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philo-
sophical Perspectives, 8, Logic and Language, pp. 207-220, Atascadero, CA:
Ridgeview.
Yi, Byeong-uk (1995): Understanding the Many, UCLA Ph.D. Dissertation,
Michigan: UMI.
Department of Philosophy
University of Queensland
Brisbane QLD 4072
Australia

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Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent?

IS MEREOLOGY ONTOLOGICALLY INNOCENT?

(Received 28 March 1997)

In Parts of Classes (1991), David Lewis attempts to draw a sharp

Philosophical Studies 93: 141-160, 1999.

himself to the truth that the fusion

Mereology is a theory of part and whole that is given several differ-

(a) plural terms, such as pronouns (e.g. 'they') or plural vari-

If we add the predicate 'is a part of' as the non-logical predicate

Definition 1: Something a is a fusion of some things 6s

where 'overlaps' is defined as follows:

Definition 2: Something a overlaps something / if, and

Transitivity: If something a is a part of something /, what-

Thus the following, for example,

Theorem 1: If there are two things (e.g. Tom and Jerry),

We can now consider what the Innocence Conception of Mere-

(1) There is a cat (viz. Tom).

By asserting (1), Rachel commits herself to the existence of a cat.

Then, it seems, she would make a yet further ontological commit-

another way, he says, the commitment to the existe

The 'are' of composition is, so to speak, the plural form

But his further discussion suggests two different interpretations of

The Weak Composition Thesis, by

yield a truth). But it is easy to reformulate the argument to avoid

t is-one-of u +X Va[t is one of (u and f)], where 't' can be

Then 'Genie is-one-of Genie' is incontrovertibly grammatical and

Something is one of Tom and Jerry if, and only if, it is

To do so, one might propose the following:

Something is one of Tom and Jerry if, and only if, it is

Something is one of Tom and Jerry if, and only if, it is a

aside the issue of grammatical oddity involved in

According to the Weak Composition Thesis, the composition relation

(A) Anything whatsoever has exactly one thing that accompa-

(B) Whatever accompanies something is not accompanied by

(C) The accompaniment of a thing exists at whatever place,

Notice that the accompaniment relation, indicated by the predicate

rationally acceptable; any theory with the feature should be more

because, she realizes, it is a logical consequence of mereology and

where 'are' is used to indicate the composition relation. Because th

(7) There is something that the cat is (viz. is identical with)

after having already asserted 'There is a cat' (sentence (1)). Thus,

in the four respects mentioned above, it is analogous in yet another

I now argue that mereology, be it true or false, is not ontologically

(1) There is a cat (viz. Tom himself).

Can he then accept mereology without incurring any further onto-

(10) There is something that is neither a cat nor a mouse.

defense of the conception diverts a

Whether or not we in fact do so, someone, such as Lewis, can

(1 1) There is something that is not identical with the cat.

This is why she is immune to the charge of making a further ontolog

I would like to thank Allen Hazen, Robert Kermode, William

8 Notice that this argument against the

Tom and Jerry are Jamie,

t arem u if, and only if, for anything a, a is-one-of t X? a is-one-of u.

13 My argument against the Strong Composition Thesis is related to one of

14 Lewis (ibid.) in fact lists five respects. The additio

22 And that in general, the axioms of

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