Political Change in North India: Interpreting Assembly Election Results

Author(s): Yogendra Yadav

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 51 (Dec. 18, 1993), pp. 2767-2769+2771-
2774
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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 COMMENTARY
Hlimachal Pradesh and Delhi have given a
Political Change in North India clear verdict, though its beneficiaries are
different. In Himachal Pradesh the benefi-
Interpreting Assembly Election Results ciary is the Congress(I) which has managed
to win 52 out of the total 68 assembly seats
Yogendra Yadav
withthehelpof49.2percentvotes(Table 2).
Its vote share would have been well above
The consequences of the state assembly elections in November are so 55 per cent and its dominance over the
clear and in some ways so welcome that it is tempting to read off assembly total, but for the presence of about
meanings from consequences. The real meaning of the election results 15 'rebel' candidates, seven of whom suc-
is, however, a different matter. A preliminary attempt to uncover it, ceeded in defeating the official Congress
nominees. This is significant, for had it been
first, by outlining some of the statewise patterns and, second, by
a pro-Congress wave, the Congress rebels
discussing some of the larger trends in north Indian politics.
would have stood no chance. In more ways
than one, it is not a wave for the Congress(I),
THE outcome of the recently concluded be from consequences to patterns and mean- but a wave against the BJP. Between the
assembly elections in the four north Indian ings. It must be the other way round. 1990 assembly election, when the BJP-JD
states of Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, The consequences of this assembly elec- combine (46 and 11 seats respectively) had
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and the tion are so clear and in some ways so wel- routed the Congress (9 seats), and this elec-
union territory of Delhi has been interpreted come that the temptation to read off mean- tion, the BJP lost as much as 18.3 per cent
variously. The north Indian voter-it is ings from consequences is hard to resist. votes in the constituencies it contested in
always a 'he'-is supposed to have voted The BJP's larger political ambitions have 1990. The swing of votes against the BJP
for secularism and successfully pricked the got a setback and it has been forced to think cuts across the traditional political division
BJP balloon. Those on the other side of the about widening its social and ideological of the 'old' and the 'new' Himachal, of
fence have discovered signs of durable Hindu base. A large number of Muslims have got 'upper' and 'lower' hills, of tribal and non-
consolidation in this verdict. Mandal enthu- back their confidence in the democratic tribal constituencies, of reser"ed and gen-
siasts see it as a vote for social justice. Some process and its ability to redress its own eral seats and of urban and rural areas,
analysts have found it a negative vote against problems. Political stability and moderation though it has done relatively better with the
the incumbents. Others have viewed it as a have got a boost. The preseht central gov- 'new' Himachal (especially Hamirpur and
popular approval of the dismissal of govern- ernment gets a fresh lease of life. It can now Kangra), urban and upper caste voters. It is
ments in these states last year, a vote to take some long awaited domestic initia- significant that while most of the BJP's
strengthen the hands of the present central tives. And above all, it is likely to push sitting MLAs including Shanta Kumar and
government, a support for its policies, a voteeconomic liberalisation and globalisation nearly his .entire cabinet lost, four of the
*for moderation and so on. The activity of more forcefully than before. Not everyoneparty's eight winners this time are newcom-
interpreting politics is never free of politics would like these consequences, especially ers. More than an anti-BJP wave, it is a wave
of interpretation. But this time the dramatic the last one, but few would doubt these. against the former BJP government. The
background to these elections has turned the The meaning of the verdict is, however, a BJP is down, but with 35.6 per cent vote
contestation for ideological appropriation different matter. What follows is a prelimi- share (better than its share in 1982 and 1985)
of the verdict particularly intense and, given nary attempt to uncover the meanings em- spread across all the 12 districts of the state,
the room for interpretative play inherent in bedded in the outcome of these assembly it is not out of the game-unlike all other
this verdict, also more absorbing. elections, first by outlining some of the non-Congress parties. The JD has proved to
In analysing a verdict like this, it is usefulstatfwise patterns and then by talking about be a transient and now a non-existent force
to draw a distinction between three levels of some of the larger trends in the north Indian in Hlimachal withjust 1 per cent vote (and an
analysis. First of all, there is the level of politics. incredible 39.1 per cent drop in the constitu-
indilvidual intentions and meanings embed- encies it contested with BJP's help in 1990).
STATEWISE PATT-ERNS
ded in, the act of voting. The second level The CPM and the CPI have swapped a single
concerns the translation of these actions into An exploration of the statewise pattern in seat but not improved their votes very much.
collective choices, a pattern of electoral this election can begin by noting one of its And the BSP is yet to reach pi take-off point
victories and defeats. It is important to unusual and significant outcomes, namely, with just 2.2 per cent votes concentrated in
remember that the translation of individual the existence of a distinct statewise pattern. areas adjoining Punjab. Electoral politics of
actions into collective choice takes place States of north India have not developed Hirnachal has now fully polarised around
through an impersonal mechanism no one regional political identities of their own in the Congress and the BJP; the waves.of
can design ot control; the final outcome is post-independence India. Their political 1990 and 1993 have levelled the uneven
always an unintended consequence. The patterns and trends have generally reflected electoral terrain in such a way that it
third level involves concrete political con- and shaped the larger political currents in makes rapid rise and faAl of these two
sequences which follow from the aggrega- India. The political turbulence of the last parties very easy.
tion of these micro-collective choices. These two decades has seen several shifts and The reasons for this clear verdict in
relate to the government formation, patterns swings in the politics of this region, but in Himachal lie in the widespread resentrnent
of power sharing and policy-making on every case the whole of north Indian 'Hindi against what was popularly seen as Shanta
which the original actor, the voter, has littleheartland' has swung in the same direction, Kumar government's administrative high-
control. It is possible that in some cases the if not with the same intensity. This is the handedness. Its handling of the goveriment
voters' intentions may completely match first-time in the last two decades that a single employee's strike, the way it dealt with the
the electoral outcome which may, in turn, round of elections has given power to three apple-growers and something as small as
clearly dictate a government formation in different and competing political forma- the ;decision to levy a fee in government
line with the original intentions. But that istions in north India. The question is: what hospitals became popular symbols of the
clearly an exception rather than the rule. accounts for such a fragmented verdict? Or, government's insensitivity. T'hese actions
And even then the logic of reasoning cannot is it really fragmented? went against the moral economy of the

Economic and Political Weekly Special Number December 18, 1993 2767

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Hlimachal voters, against their shared notion
of justice in the public arena. The BJP still
claims that these decisions were 'principled'.
But what the results go to show, minimally,
is the distance between administrative ratio-unauthorised colonies of east Delhi or
nality and popular consciousness which
made the BJP lose legitimacy with everyone
except its core traditional supporter.
In Delhi it is a vote against the inability of The fresh delimitation of assembly Oon-
the ruling elite to respond to-the demands ofstituencies had posed a challenge to the BJP, two went to Congress and three to Janata
this rapidly expanding metropolis and the
fast-changing composition of its electorate.
In more concrete terms, it is a vote against
the Congress style of 'managing' Delhi
through manipulative games at the centre
and mafia-like tactics at the local level. The
Congress's refusal to let local politics evolve
in Delhi meant that a host of local develop-
mental problems especially of the trans-
Yamuna and Outer Delhi remained unat-
tended. For those who live in slums and
unauthorised colonies of Delhi, this election
was not a routine exercise; most of them
could see it intimately connected to their
struggle for survival, for their struggle to
retain the piece of land they have acquired or
for their dreams to acquire one. The BJP,
which has consistently championed the cause
of a democratic set-up in Delhi and which
appears better organised and more willing to
respond to people's demands than the Cop-
gress, was the natural beneficiary. It is a
comment on the nature of Indian society that reserved seats, and three out of the five seats
the vastly contrasting and vertically split dominated by the Sikhs. Survey results also
confirm this picture of cross community/
elcctorate, whether it resides in posh south
Delhi colonies or in the slums and class voting forBJP. The only exception are
of course
in the the Muslims who preferred the JD,
fast urbanising villages of outer Delhi, butshared
where its candidate was weak, opted for
a common verdict for a more responsive and Congress to defeat the BJP. The BJP could
better governance. win only three of the eight constituencies
with a significant numberof Muslim voters;
for now 41 out of a total of 70 constituencies Dal. In all the JD won four seats but was
fell in east and outer Delhi, the traditional instrumental in depriving the Congress of
Congress strongholds. The BJP's final tally 22 seats. With 12.8 per cent vote share
of 49 out of 70 seats and a vote share of 43.5 concentrated among the Muslims, dalits,
per cent show that it was an uneven contest slum dwellers and villager*, it has regis-
in all the seven parliamentary constituen- tered a significant presence as the third force
cies of Delhi (Table 1). It has gained 3.3 per in Delhi politics.
cent votes over its 1991 Lok Sabha election In Rajasthan it is an unclear verdict, and
performance, while the Congress bas lost not just because it has resulted in a hung
4.9 per cent. Ihe BJP has imprb*ed its vote assembly. More importantly, the trend of
share considerably in New Delhi and Delhi votes does not show a clear preference for
Sadar; it has consolidated and improved either the Congress or the BJP both of which
upon its stunning victory of 1991 in the east have secured between 38 and 39 per cent
Delhi parliamentary constituency repre- votes in this election (Table 3). The BJP
sented earlier by H K L Bhagat; and, most claims a decisive 12 per cent swing from
important of all, it tumed a defeat of 11 .4 per
1990 but conveniently forgets that it is an
artificial comparison because BJP had con-
cent in 1991 into a lead of 4.7 per cent in the
semi-rural outer Delhi constituency. The tested only 132 seats then. The 1991 parlia-
BJP has done well in all the sections of mentary election is a better point of com-
society: it has won 10 out of the 15 rural parison (but not perfect, for the 'assassina-
seats, 20 out of the 30 seats dominated by tion factor' had favoured the Congress by
unauthorised colonies, eight out of the 13 about 7 per cent in the second phase con-

TABLE 1: DELHI ASSEMBLY ELECTION, 1993-PARTY PERFORMANCE AND TuRNoutr

Seats Won Votes Secured Turnout

Parliamentary (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Constituency Seats INC BJP JD 0TH INC BJP JD SP BSP CPI CPM OTH
+IND +IND

1 New Delhi 5 2 3 0 0 38.6 49.4 8.5 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.7 53.0
2 South Delhi 10 1 8 1 0 36.6 49.3 7.8 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.4 59.3
3 Outer Delhi 21 6 12 1 2 33.4 38.1 14.7 0.3 2.8 0.2 0.5 5.7 60.5
4 East Delhi 20 3 15 1 1 31.8 44.4 15.3 1.0 2.0 0.3 0.0 4.7 65.4
5 Chandni Chowk 4 1 2 1 0 31.9 37.0 24.6 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2 66.5
6 Delhi Sadar 5 0 5 0 0 41.0 49.4 5.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.9 67.0
7 Karol Bagh 5 1 4 0 0 39.6 46.2 6.5 0.0 1.9 0.0 2.7 0.6 63.1
Total 70 14 49 4 3 34.7 43.5 12.8 0.5 1.8 0.2 0.3 3.3 62.0

Source: CSDS Data unit, provisional results.

TABLE 2: HIMACHAL PRADESH ASSEMBLY ELECTION 1993-DisTRICrwIsE PARTY PERFORMANCE AND TURNOUrr

Seats Won Votes Secured Turnout

District/ (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Region Seats INC BJP CPM OTh INC BJP JD SP BSP CPI CPM OTH
+IND +IND

I Kinnaur 1 1 0 0 0 51.0 47.7 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.6
2 Shimla 8 5 1 1 1 56.1 30.5 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 4.4 0.0 69.4
3 Solan 5 5 0 0 0 52.4 23.0 0.6 0.0 4.7 0.5 0.0 6.9 72.7
4 Simuur 5 5 0 0 0 53.1 34.5 9.5 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.2 56.8
5 Bilaspur 4 3 1 0 0 53.5 36.9 0.1 0.0 0.9 7.7 0.0 0.2 74.8
6 Hamirpur 5 2 2. 0 1 42.8 44.8 0.6 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.2 67.5
7 Una 5 3 1 0 1 37.3 30.7 1.8 0.0 10.4 0.0 0.7 3.0 67.1
8 Kangra 16 12 3 0 1 48.0 38.7 0.5 0.0 2.0 0.4 0.0 5.3 74.7
9 Chamba 5 3 0 0 2 43.6 36.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 68.7
10 Lahul and Spiti 1 1 0 0 0 54.9 42.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.1
11 Kullu 3 3 0 0 0 52.8 43.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 72.6
12 Mandi 10 9 0 0 1 51.1 33.8 0.2 0.0 2.3 0.1 0.7 0.8 72.7
Total 68 52 8 1 7 49.2 35.6 1.0 0.0 2.2 1.0 0.7 2.2 70.4

Source: CSDS Data unit, provisional results.

2768 Economic and Political Weekly Special Number December 18, 1993

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stituencies). Then the Congress had led in base in rural areas of western Rajasthan, The BJP has continued its dominance in
99 assembly segments with 43.3 per cent Jaipur division and Kota division, was de- the 14 urban constituencies by winning 12
votes and the BJP in 95 with 41.1 per cent pendent on the JD to fight the Congress. The of these and securing over 50 per cent votes.
votes. If the 'assassination factor' were to be results of this election show that the BJP There is clearly a negative correlation be-
taken out, the tally would have read 122 for support base has expanded. For the first time tween the BJP' s votes and the proportion of
BJP and 70 for Congress. The BJP's perfor- since independence, the Jan Sangh-BJP for- scheduled caste population in a constitu-
mance is much below that level. The Con- mation has emerged as a state-wide force in ency, yet the party won as many as 24 out of
gress has stopped in-between its dismal Rajasthan. It has secured more than 32 per the 31 reserved seats. The BSPtoomakes its
performance in 1990, when its 33.4 per centcent votes in all the four regions of the state. presence felt in constituencies with high
votes could give it only 50 seats out of 200, Despite the failure of Shekhawat's gamble scheduled caste population by securing over
and its performance in 1991. It could have in contesting the Sri Ganganagar seat in 3 per cent votes, but it is nothing as com-
certainly picked up more than the 5 per cent north Rajasthan, his party has succeeded in pared to its performance in UP or even MP.
votes and 26 seats that it has, but for a winning 11 seats and creating a base in the The BJP has also made serious inroads into
suicidal ticket distribution-bad even by the tribal constituencies hitherto dominated
five districts of this region for the first time.
Congress standards-resulting in a large It has expanded its hitherto nominal pres- by the Congress. Although it has won only
number of rebel candidates (a total of 55 ence in the tribal-dominated Udaipur divi- eight of the 23 reserved (ST) constituencies
according to some reports, of which at least sion. It has also retained its hold over Kota (Congress has won 1), its vote share in
12 have won), and poor campaigning. division and thus won 34 seats to Congress's these constituencies is 2 per cent more than
This intense contest between the Con- 17 in south Rajasthan. But it has been unable that of the Congress. There are only five
gress and the BJP has squeezed out the JDto hold on to some of the gains it made in the constituencies in Rajasthan with more than
from the position it had come to occupy in eastern region in the 1991 Lok Sabha elec- 20 per cent Muslim population but-their
the post-1977 politics of this state. The JD tion: here the score reads 31 to 25 in BJP's voting pattern is interesting. The turnout in
had developed a base in the rural jat belt of favour (it was 51 to 17 in 1991). The42 seats these constituencies was 11.5 percent above
the north and the east Rajasthan, especially of west Rajasthan have been equally split the state average, and the BJP won three of
in the Shekhawati region. The BJP, which between the Congress and the BJP (17 and these. It seems that despite or perhaps be-
was primarily an urban party with some 19 respectively). cause of Muslim vote for the Congress

TABLE 3: RAJASTHAN ASSEMBLY ELECrION 1993-DiSTRICT/REGION WISE PARTY PERFORMANCE AND TURNOUT

Seats Won Votets Secured Turnout

District/ (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Region Seats INC BJP JD CPM OTH INC BJP JD SP BSP CPI CPM OTH
+IND +IND

I Ganganagar 10 4 3 1 0 2 31.9 30.9 11.9 0.0 4.7 0.0 7.1 11.1 64.4
2 Bikaner 4 1 3 0 0 0 36.2 38.3 10.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 11.4 53.1
3 Churu 8 4 4 0 0 0 40.1 41.8 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 6.5 64.2
4 Jhunjhunu 7 4 0 0 0 3 36.5 22.6 12.3 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 24.0 62.7
5 Sikar 8 5 1 0 1 1 42.8 30.2 8.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 6.5 9.6 67.2
6 Jaipur 1l 2 9 0 0 0 32.3 50.0 6.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.9 5.9 58.1
7 Dausa 9 6 3 0 0 0 37.0 33.3 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 61.7
8 Alwar 11 3 4 1 0 3 32.3 30.0 13.3 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.8 16.7 64.3
9 Bharatpur 9 4 3 1 0 1 36.8 23.7 19.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.5 64.1
10 Dholpur 2 2 0 0 0 0 34.3 30.5 14.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 10.0 73.4
11 Sawai Madhopur 9 3 3 0 0 3 33.8 31.9 8.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 30.6 57.3
1Q Tonk 5 1 4 0 0 0 42.8 50.1 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 62.4
13 Ajmer 9 4 5 0 0 0 39.5 44.6 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 9.5 61.4
14 Bundi 4 2 2 0 0 0 42.3 48.6 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 58.9
15 Kota 5 2 3 0 0 0 40.9 48.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.0 4.8 54.3
16 Baran 4 0 3 0 0 1 33.5 49.3 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.8 59.1
17 Jhalawar 5 1 4 0 0 0 41.1 49.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 60.0
18 Chittorgarh. 7 1 6 0 0 0 44.7 49.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.1 63.9
19 Banswara 5 2 0 3 0 0 37.6 20.3 31.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 58.9
20'Dungarpur 4 3 1 0 0 0 51.6 42.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 4.9 75.0
21 Udaipur 10 4 6 0 0 0 42.8 45.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.2 6.3 55.9
22 Rajsamaund 4 1 3 0 0 0 44.3 42.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 60.8
23 Bhilwara 8 1 6 0 0 1 37.5 45.6 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.9 66.1
24 Pali 8 3 4 0 0 1 40.3 45.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 55.0
25 Sirohi 3 0 3 0 0 0 35.9 47.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 52.6
26 Jalore 5 2 3 0 0 0 40.5 46.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 58.5
27 Barmer 6 1 2 0 0 3 37.5 27.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.3 58.1
28 Jaisalmer 1 0 1 0 0 0 2.0 58.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.7 71.0
29 Jodhpur 9 5 4 0 0 0 49.9 43.3 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 57.6
30 Nagapr 9 5 2 0 0 2 38.4 31.1 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 61.9

1 North 37 17 11 1 1 7 36.6 32.2 10.4 0.0 1.9 0.0 3.4 13.2 63.2
2 East 64 25 31 2 0 6 35.7 37.3 9.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 13.3 61.2
3 South 56 17 34 3 0 2 41.5 44.3 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 7.2 61.0
4 West 42 17 19 0 0 6 40.1 39.6 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 58.4
Total 199* 76 95 6 1 21 38.3 38.4 6.8 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.9 11.5 61.0
* Polling in one seat countermanded.
Sources: CSDS Data Unit, final results.

Economic and Political Weekly Special Number December 18, 19 2769

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 TABiLE 4: UrrAR. PRADESH AsstmBLY ELECTION. 1993-DisTticrIREGIONWiSE PARTY PERFORMiANCE AND TuRNouTr

Seats Won Votes Secured Turnout

_________________________________________ ~~~~(Per Cent) (Per Cent)
District/Region Seats INC BJP JD SP BSP CPI CPM 0TH IND INC BIP JD SP BSP CPI CPM 0TH IND
1 Uttaranchal 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 15.6 25.9 7.1 33.3 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 55.0
2 Tehri Garhwal 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24.3 30.1 11.9 15.4 0.0 3.6 0.0 10.0 0.0 44.1
3 Garhwal 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 29.1 32.8 1.1 8.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 19.4 51.9
4 Chamoli 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33.2 39.2 13.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 3.4 0.0 65.1
S Pithoragarh 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42.4 33.8 0.3 1.8 0AOr 0.0 0.0 18.8 0.0 41.4
6 Alnora 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38.7 40.3 0.8 1.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 11.2 0.0 40.7
7 Nainital 4 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33.8 38.5 9.7 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 60.5
B Bijnor 7 0 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 6.5 35.3 19.9 4.4 10.8 0.0 4.7 0.6 9.4 -
9 Moradabad 12 0 8 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 8.3 36.6 20.9 22.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 49.7
10 Rampur 4 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 11.1 30.1 13.4 23.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 64.2
1 1 Badaun 8 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 17.1 31.0 15.4 30.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 60.2
12 Barelli 9 0 2 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 12.3 35.7 3.0 39.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 60.7
13 Pilibfiit 4 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.1 35.0 9.5 10.0 10.1 0.0 0.0 19.1 0.0 55.6
14 Shahjanpur 6 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 24.6 26.5 13.1 23.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 56.3
15 Khcri 7 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 15.0 34.7 8.3 23.2 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 68.6
16 Sitapur 8 0 2 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 19.5 29.2 9.7 28.1 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 49.4
17 Hardoi 9 1 1 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 19.4 24.6 6.4 27.5 3.1 0.0 0.0 6.1 1.2 56.8
1 8 Unnao 7 0 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 14.6 35.6 8.6 29.2 5.3 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 58.3
19 Lucknow- 8 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 12.6 38.9 4.0 34.6 0.0 4.9 0.0 1.6 0.0 -
20 Rae Bareli 7 1 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 20.4 31.6 7.7 32.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 57.0
21 Pratapgarh 7 1 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 15.6 24.5 8.0 21.8 .10.3 1.2 0.0 2.0 11.1 52.5
22 Sultanpur 8 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 10.5 34.2 3.0 21.0 13.5 1.4 2.9 0.3 5.3 58.4
23 Faizabad 9 0 1 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 10.5 28.1 4.8 8.4 32.6 3.2 0.8 4.3 0.0 -
24 Bara Banki 8 0 3 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 13.3 33.9 6.8 40.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.0 60.3
25' Bahraich 8 0 3 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 7.3 40.7 0.2 36.5 6.9 0.5 0.0 1.2 0.0 52.9
26 Gonda 11 1 7 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 21.5 40.2 2.5 22.9 2.7 0.2 0.0 1.8 0.0 54.4
27 Basti 8 1 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 6.8 32.7 11.8 17.6 22.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 47.1
28 Sidharthnagar 6 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20.6 39.7 0.0 10.6 14.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 998.2
29 Gorakhpur 9 1 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 11.5 26.7 11.3 5.4 17.2 0.0 0.0 6.1 15.9 51.9
30 Maharajganj 6 0 4. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 22.9 58.2 32.2 0.0 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.0
31 Deoria 13 1 4 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 13.5 30.7 14.9 16.5 7.7 0.8 0.0 3.7 0.0 55.4
32 Mau 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0:028.4 0.0 0.0 39.6 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.5
33 Azamngarh '10 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 4.8 26.7 8.9 20.'6 24.8 0.0 0.0 6.6 0.0 56.7
34 Ballia 8 2 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 14.4 26.0 17.7 26.4 9.7 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.0 56.6
35 Ghazipur 6 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 .0 5.6 28.6 6.2 18.4 27.2 6.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 54.8
36 Varanasi 14 0 8 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 8.5 36.0 7.4 5.4 25.9 2.5 2.5 5.3 0.0 52.2
37 Jaunpur 10 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 10.2 27.2 9.1 9.8 35.1 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0' 51.2
38 Sonbhadra 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0? ??? ??0.0
39 Mirzapur 5 0 2, 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 10.4 29.2 13.1 0.0 36.3 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.1 56.5
40 Allahabad .13 0 3 0 9 0 0 0 0 1 9.4 26.8 9.4 8.4 28.4 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 55.3
41 Fatehpur 6 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 8.1 32.1 21.6 18.3 13.8 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 53.2
42 Kanpur Nagar 7 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 18.4 45.4 2.6 21.4 7.9 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 55.9
43 Kanpur Dehat 7 1 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 13.1 31.6 9.8 23.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 10.2 0.0 57.4
44 Etawah. 7 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 20.9 28.6 0.2 39.4 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 59.6
45 Farrukhabad 7 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 14.1 37.2 8.5 30.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 60.3
46 Barida 7 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 9.6 38.3 0.2 10.3 28.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.5
47 Hamirpur 5 0 .0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0' 12.4 19.5 21.7 0.0 32.3 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.7 -
48 Lalitpur 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29.0 43.9 9.3 0.0 8.6 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 63.9
49TIhansi 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.0 35.5 3.5 0.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 9.9 0.0 56.9
50 Jalaun 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 .0 0 0 11.1 25.4 13.7 0.0 35.3 0.0 0.0 3.7 4.7 59.6
51 Mainpurn 5 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 18.6 28.8 4.8 40.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 55.3
52 Firozabad 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 12.3 28.7 3.4 39.3 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 -
53 Etah . 9 0 5 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 14.4 34.6 11.6 26.4' 4.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.-6 -
54 Agra 8 1 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 15.8 40.6 16.1 17.9 3.7 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 -
55 Mathura 6 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7.5 31.9 24.3 9.1 4.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.2 54.8
56 Aligarh 10 1 6 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 17.4 36.3 14.7 9.4 14.8 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 59.3
57 Bulandshar 9 0 7 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 13.8 40.3 20.0 7.3 10.5 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.4 56.7
58 Ghaziabad 6 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 27.3 35.4 24.1 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 49.9
59 Meerut 10 1 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 15.1 37.3 31.0 10.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 61.6
60 Muzaffamnagar 9 0 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 14.1 40.4 23.8 6.5 7.6 0.0 0.0 0.9 3.6 58.1
61 Saharanpur 7 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24.5 34.9 28.1 5.5 . 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.7
62 Hardwar 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17.0 41.0 19.9 0.0 21.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.9
63 Dehradun 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 00??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ??
1 Uttar Khand 14 4 7 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 34.5 37.4 6.4 2.7 4.2 0.0 0.3 6.5 2.6 52.7
2 Ruhel Khand 50 3 24 4 16 0 0 1 0 1 12.5 33.3 14.2 23.1 2.7 0.0 0.8 3.6 1.6 69.0
3 Upper Doab 73 9 48 11 5 0 0 0 0 0 17.6 37.4 22.3 8.9 6.1 0.2 0.0 1.5 0.8 62.1
40Oudh 98 4 37 2 52 0 1 0 0 2 16.0 33.6 5.7 28.4 5.6 0.8 0.2 1.6 1.4 61.7
S Lower Doab 65 1 23 3 37 0 0 0- 0 1 14.1 1,32.6 8.2 24.7 9.9 0.1 0.0 4.5 0.1 69.6
6 BundelXKhand 21 2 7 2 10 0 0 0o 0 0 17.4,/ 31.3 10.0 1.4 26.1 0.0 0.0 3.6 2.6 69.0

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(India Today-MARG exit poll estimated it fallen a little further. A preliminary more than 30 percent vote in every region of
to be as high as 70 percent), the BJP succeededregionwise analysis shows that the the state. Paradoxically, that is precisely
in polarising theMindu votes in its favour. Congress's maximum gains are from the why it has lost a large number of seats to the
Despite this detailed statistical informa- Mahakaushal region which used to be its SP and BSP which put together have 28.7
tion, the verdict from Rajasthan remains stronghold but where it suffered a humiliat- percent votes, 4.7 percent less than the BJP.
unclear. It is not clear, for instance, if the ing defeat in 1990. It has also come to split While the BJP vote has got spread thinly, the
voters have approved of Bhairon Singh the seats evenly with the BJP in the latter's SP-BSP vote is concenRtrated and thereby in
Shekhawat's government which was in no own area of influence, Malwa, where again a better position to yietd seats.
way significantly different from any Con- the Congress was routed in the previous Though the BJP has had the consolation
gress government. Or perhaps it was pre- election. The only place where the Congress of emerging as the largest single party, its
cisely because there was so little to choose could save its face in the 1990 election was seats have gone down from 221 in 1991 to
from that despite a record turnout of 61 per the tribal-dominant region of Chhattisgarh; 177 this time. The SP-BSP alliance lhas got
cent, the voters went by their traditional this time the party has consolidated its posi- 176 seats (109 and 67 respectively), nearly
loyalties or caste/community or other local tion further though the BJP has also pickedfour times the 46 seats they jointly held in
considerations. But there seems to be a up about one-third seats. Only 15 of the 64 the dissolved assembly. The biggest loser is
political logic at work even in these consid- seats reserved for the Scheduled Tribes have the Janata Dal, down from 92 to 27 followed
erations. More than half of the sitting MLAs gone to the BJP, most of the remaining by the Congress, from 46 to 28. An analysis
who contested from their earlier constituen- going to the Congress. It is also significant of the pattern of how seats changed hands
cies got defeated, the rate of success being that BJP has improved upon its previous shows that the BJP has retained 116 of its
lower for the Congress than for the BJP (21 performance in urban constituencies, espe- seats, while gaining 33 from JD, mostly
out of 42 Congress MLAs, 38 out of 65 BJP cially those with a significant Muslim pres- from western UP, and 17 from Congress.
MLAs, five out of 27 defectors of the JD to ence. Despite a setback and its inability to The SP-BSP alliance has retained most of its
BJP or Congress). The people have been make inroads into new areas or sections of seats held (39 out of 46), and has gained 75
particularly severe on the defectors and the society, the BJP has secured higher votes from BJP, 37 from JD and 18 from Congress.
imposed 'relatives' of Congress leaders. than the Jan Sangh-BJP formation could The UP outcome is best seen in terms of
The verdict in Madhya Pradesh stands ever get in M P except in 1990. To that its regions. It was the BJP vs the Congress
somewhere between that of Rajasthan and extent, the BJP is a stronger political force in the hills of Uttarakhand. Here the BJP has
Himachal Pradesh. Congress has secured a today than it was before the 1989 elections. lost 1.8 percentvotes and has had to splitthe
comfortable majority of 174 out of 319 seats Themost significantelection in this round seats this time. In Upper Doab, the 'Jatland'
for which elections were held, leaving BJP of assembly polls was no doubt that of Uttar once dominated by the late Chaudhary
far behind at 113. The detailed constitu- Pradesh. It is here that the BJP government Charan Singh, the BJP has improved its
encywise results have not been processed had presided over the demolition of Babri position both in terms of votes (2.7 per cent)
yet, but from preliminary estimates it seems masjid; it is here that the BJP had asked for and seats (13) mainly at the cost of the Ajit
the gap between Congress and the BJP votes a clear mandate; and it is in UP that the Singh-led JD which has lost 7.1 per cent
is about 8 per cent. The Congress has gained outcome is most significant from the point votes and 17 seats in this region. In Lower
about 9 per cent votes over its disastrous of view of long-term political trends. The Doab also the BJP has gained 5.6 per cent
performance in the 1990 election (56 seats, BJPhas suffered a majorpolitical defeat, for votes but lost four seats mainly due to the
34.6 per cent votes). The BJP appears to it was the BJP which declared this election consolidation of non-BJP votes by SP-BSP.
have lost about 2 per cent of its vote share to ofbe a referendum. During the election In Bundelkhand the voting pattern has not
38.4 per cent in 1990 but only because it campaign, the dismissed chief minister change significantly but SP-BSP have
contested only 266 out of 320 seats in that Kalyan Singh repeatedly declared that a picked up five seats by combining their
election. In real terms, it has lost about 6 to single seat less than the 221 the BJP won in votes. In Rohilkhand, the region with high-
8 per cent of its popular support. The drop 1991 would mean its defeat. In that sense, est Muslim population in UP, the BJP has
was expected in view of the widespread the BJP stands defeated. The claim that the lost 2.8 per cent votes and 10 seats. The SP-
resentment against the Patwa regime which BJPhas secured more votes and lost outjust BSP alliance did not have much base to
was believed to be even more corrupt, re- because of the kind of electoral system we begin with here as the Muslim voters tended
pressive and inefficient than the previous have is besides the point here, for it was the to vote for the JD. But this time the Muslims
Congress regimes. Like the rest of north BJP which chose this ground to figh)t its turned out in large numbers (leading to
India, MP shows signs of rising politicisationbattle: The BJP's challenge was based pre- counter mobilisation and resulting in 7 per
which has not been matched by the rise of cisely on the calculation that these electoral cent higher turnout than the state average) to
alternative political formations. In this con- rules would work to its advantage. support Mulayam Singh whose alliance
text, it is significant to note that the BSP has Having said that, it is equally important togained 7.9 per cent votes and 13 seats.
won 11 seats and has doubled its popular note what this defeat does not mean. While Avadh saw a neck-and-neck fight between
vote share to about 7 per cent. It seems to be the voters have not overwhelmingly come the BJP and SP-BSP with both polling
reaching close to the stage from where it out to give BJP the kind of mandate it roughly the same share of votes. A better
took off in UP this time. It is also important wanted, they have not rejected it either. Thestrategy and tactical voting has got SP-BSP
that the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha and the BJP's vote share has gone up from 31.6 per 52 seats to BJP's 37 (a net loss of 19 seats).
Krantikari Samajvadi Party have opened cent to 33.4 per cent, a net gain of 1.8 per In this region the Congress lost 17 seats
their account with one seat each. cent. Seen in the context of a significant rise mainly in the districts dominated till re-
The growing unpopularity of the BJP in turnout as well, it definitely indicates a cently by Indira Gandhi and her family. In
government in MP had become clear by the rise in BJP's support base. More impor- Poorvanchal, the biggest and most densely
1991 Lok Sabha election in whiclh the Con- tantly, its support has expanded ratherevenly populated region of the state, the BJP has
gress had led in 180 assembly segments and across all the seven politico-cultural regions gained 3 per cent votes but lost 16 seats,
the BJP in 131 (167 and 142 respectively, of UP. In 1991 the BJP's vote was more thanks to a remarkable surge by the SP-BSP
after excluding the 'assassination factor'). unevenly spread and there were two regions, (9.2 per cent swing over 1991) which united
The present verdict seems to be a replay of namely, Lower Doab and Poorvanchal, where the non-BJP votes and enabled the alliance
the 1991 verdict, except that the BJP has it fell short of 30 per cent. Now the party has to capture 55 seats, a net gain of 43 over tlhe

2772 Economic and Political Weekly Special Number December 18, 1993

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last election. In this traditional stronghold, BROADER TREND Dal of Laloo Yadav which is by now and for
the votes of JD have dropped by 8.6 per cent all practical purposes a distinct entity, like
and the total v?tes of Congress could not This quick survey of the statewise pat- the Samajwadi Party of Mulayam Singh.)
even touch the 10 per cent mark. In overall terns of the electoral outcome suggests that The BSP does show the signs of a party on
terms, the SP-BSP alliance has gained 6.9 the verdict of the north Indian voters is not the rise, but it suffers from the disadvan-
percent votes in tJttar Pradesh while the JDas fragmentary as it might appear in the first tages of a 1imited, sectional appeal.
has lost about the same, 7.5 per cent. The instance. It is not that the different states of The trend indicates the possibility of the
Congress has lost 2.9 per cent votes over its north India are on their way to developing emergence of the BJP as the successor to the
already disastrous performance in 1991, distinct regional politics, each with a differ- Congress. Notwithstanding the political set-
making Uttar Pradesh the only state where ent flavour and autonomous trends as is the back in this round of elections, the BJP has
the Congress has got less than 20 per cent case with state politics in south India. The consolidated the major gains made during
votes in two consecutive elections. outcome is better read as the verdict of an its two major 'united fronts' with the non-
The meaning of this landmark verdict electorate with similar inclinations and a Congress forces in 1977-1980 and 1989-
would become clearer if we look at caste/ shared political vision but responding to 1990. As this election shows, even in its
community voting pattern as revealed by differently-structured political options. worst defeats, as in Himachal Pradesh, the
the Inda Today-MARG exit poll. It shows Hence the apparently contradictory out- party has succeeded in retaining a substan-
that while there is some substance in the comes. A closer look at the patterns dis- tial support base. It is expanding into new
Muslim-Yadav-dalit alliance theory to ac- cussed above also show some larger trends regions (e g north Rajasthan, outer Delhi) or
count for the rise of the SP-BSP, the case is at work in the north Indian Hindi heartland. new sections (e g the Sikhs, the tribals and
often overstated. It is only among the Mus- These trends can be summed up under three dalits). In that sense much of the secular
lims that a-majority of the community (55 heads. First, the outcome indicates some euphoria about the BJP defeat is misplaced.
percent) voted for SP-BSP; its mobilisation long-term trends about the fate of different But this is not to suggest that it is going tote
of dalits and the OBCs has been much less political formations in north India. Second, a cakewalk for BJP, or that its march to
successful at 36 and 33 per cent respec- these elections tell us something about the victory is inevitable. Like the BSP it also
tively, though it is still higher than the dalit larger changes in the ideological field of suffers from the structural disadvantage of
vote for Congress (22 per cent) and the OBC Indian politics or at least about contempo- excluding a significant section of society,
vote for BJP (28 per cent) or JD (13 per rary political discourse in north India. Third,namely, the Muslims from its potential sup-
cent). On the other hand, the upper castes the verdict also contains some hints and port base. And it has not yet succeeded in
have voted almost en-bloc(63 per cent) for suggestions about popular political con- forging the right ideological instrument for
the BJP. If we compare it with the previous sciousness: its reception of the high dis- cross-sectional mobilisation.
survey data on community voting pattern in course of ideologies and changes therein. This brings us to the second set of
Indian elections, this picture shows a high The most significant trend is the steady trends-thepolitico-ideological-seen dur-
degree ofpolarisation. A preliminary analy- decline of Congress power in north India. ing this election. These ideological trends
sis shows that the BJP vote does not change The outcome of the UP election shows it in are intimately connected to the political
significantly in constituencies with a high a very dramatic fashion. The 1991 verdict trends discussed above. At the contreof the
Muslim population, the SP-BSP have made and later trends suggest that the situation is Congress's mobilisation and interest-aggre-
marginal gains while the Congress suffers not very different in Bihar either. But more gation capacity was the nationalist ideology
serious losses. It seems the BJP loss due to significantly, there are indications even from (with due accommodation of 'socialism')
Muslim voters have been made up by Hindu those states where Congress has apparently which bound the different groups it brought
consolidation, and vice versa for the SP- done well that the party might be on its way together and extended its appeal to all the
BSP. The SP-BSP alliance has succeeded in out. The volatility of Congress seats (its sections of society. It is both a sign and
winning 42 of the 88 seats reserved for the inability to hold on to a seat won in the consequences of the decline of the Congress
Scheduled Castes, while the BJP has cap- previous election) is higher than in the case that the old ideological package has lost its
tured 34 and the Congress only six. Both theof its main rival, and higher than before. appeal in the ideological market. ne na-
SP-BSP and the BJP secured about 3 per Surveys show that the Congress voters back tionalist currency has not lost its value alto-
cent more votes than their respective state their party positions less strongly than oth- gether, but its old Congress formulation
averages in the reserved constituencies; the ers (e g, India Today-MARG Exit Poll). cannot work any more. The challenge of
Congress vote in these constituencies is Field experience also suggests that the Con- succeeding the Congress jolitically there-
about 2 per cent less than its average. But if gress voters aremuch less enthusiastic about fore gets translated into a challenge of evolv-
we classify the constituencies according to and sure of their vote; in that sense even if ing a new ideological package, perhaps a
the percentage of Scheduled Caste popula- the Congress gets a large number of votes, new reworking of the nationalist ideology
tion, a different pattern emerges. In the 99 these are more 'shallow' and less durable. on more inclusivist lines.
constituencies with more than 25 per cent And even the number is going down. If we This round of assembly elections did not
Scheduled Caste population, the SP-BSP merge the votes of all these four states andshow any major discursive shift in north
has secured 33.9 per cent votes and won 59 Delhi, the Congress gets about 28 per cent,Indian politics, but there were some signifi-
of these. The BJP vote share goes down as against 36 percent for the BJP. Perhaps itcant subtle changes. First, all the major non-
steadily as the per cent of Scheduled Caste is time to take seriously the hypothesis that BJP parties (including the Congress and
population goes up. Clearly, the SP-BSP, in the Congress is in for a steady decline in even the Samajwadi Party) made attempts
particular, has appealed to the imagination north Indian politics. to absorb at least a minimal element of
of the lower castes and minorities, enabling If there is any substance in this hypotlh- llindutva in their rhetorical practice. Sec-
them to exercise the vote as the 'weapon of esis, thequestion is: Whocan fill the vacuum ond, the BJP made an attempt to tone down
the weak'. While this constitutes a signifi- left by the Congress? By now at least one the Ilindutva ideological stance by
cant step in the political struggle for social thing is clear: It cannot be the Janata Dal. emphasising the political and the gover-
justice, it does not by itself mean a vote for The 1991 parliamentary verdict had shown nance component of theirprogramme. Third,
social justice. It is better seen as a recogni- a sharp erosion of Janata Dal sulpport base; social justice ceased to be an ideological
tion and assertion of political self-identity these assembly elections have confirmed monopoly of the Janata Dal-a sister
by the subalterns. that trend. (Thlis excludes the Bihlar Janataorganisation successfully appropriated it.

Dnomic and Political Weekly Spocial Number December 18, 1993 2773

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And four, the SP-BSP alliance, especially surveys have shown that the demolition of lic opinion and we halve a long way to gQ
the BSP, put forward an identity-based ide- Babri masjid was approved of by a major- in reading the mind of the voter. But even
ology as a serioms contender for democratic ity of north Indians. The India Today- if they are seen as crude signals, the mes-
space (its slogan 'vote hamara, raj tumhara, MARG poll estimated it then to be 54.2 sage is clear. Some recent academic stud-
nahin chalega' captured it so well). per cent. Subsequently, the idea of re- ies have drawn attention to the distance
It does not seem that any of these ideo- building the masjid at the same site has between remote ideologies like national-
logical modifi--ations or innovations come been overwhelmingly rejected by the vot- ism on the one hand and subaltern con-
anywhere close to meeting the ideological ers in various opinion polls. The India sciousness on the other. It seems some-
challenge mentioned above. If the Congress Today-MARG poll showed that 82 per thing of that distance exists today between
discourse of national unity and secularism cent of the people wanted Ram mandir in the elite political ideologies of secular-
sounds too false or too distant, the ideologi- Ayodhya and of them 51 per cent wanted ism/communalism and the ordinary Indian
cal alternatives (BJP's Hindutva, JD's so- it on that very site. It is also important to voter.
cial justice or BSP's Bahujan Raj) are too remember that surveys show a popular Or so it seems on a preliminary view.
thin. These 'thin ideologies' are too trans- disapproval of the dismissal of the BJP Understanding the modes of popular con-
parent a cover for particular political ag- governments, even in the state where BJP scious.ness and the way they relate to con-
gregations to have long-term staying was defeated. Moreover, it is quite evident tempo1firy Indian politics is a major intel-
power. Any serious alternative has to havethat a large number of Hindus and Mus- lectual challenge students of Indian elec-
the 'thickness', the depth and the complex lims followed community voting patterns tions have not even begun taking seriously.
mediations of the nationalist ideology. in a politics of 'tactical voting' and Only by entering into a dialogue witlh
Finally, to move on to the third set of 'counter mobilisation'. To call it a vote for peoples' beliefs and their own concepts and
conclusions, the verdict of this election secularism is therefore clearly a case of categories, instead of imposing on them
tells us something about the way the ordi- over-(enthusiastic) reading. English-speaking 'rationality', can we un-
nary voters of this region think. And it is Nor is it a vote for Hindutva. It is true thatderstand the true meaning :.of an election
at this level that the tendency to read off the aggressive politics of Hindutva in the verdict. And that mightialso be a more
people's mind from the consequences of last few years has affected popular con- democratic way of relating to democracy.
the verdict is most damaging. Since the sciousness. But this election result does not
[I am grateful to Ashis Banerjee for sharing many
results of this election are likely to benefitreally confirm or reject that trend. When the
of his insights into Indian politics with me and
the politics of secularism, many have fallenvoters were asked in exit polls the reasons allowing me to use these in this paper. I also wish
to the temptation of interpreting it as a for their vote, Ayodhya hardly figured any- to thank Javeed Alam, Rob Jenkins, Harsh Sethi,
vote for secularism. An attribution of such where in their list of reasons. It is true that V B Singh and other colleagues at the Centre for
aii alien idea to a common Indian is rather pre-structured opinion surveys do not suc- the Study of Developing Society forseveral stimu-
problematic. Besides, reliable opinion poll ceed in capturing the complexities of pub- lating discussions.]

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2774 Economic and Political Weekly Special Number December 18, 1993

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