Log in /

Explore our Research Events News & Comment Membership NextGen About Contact Donate Register

Explore Our Research / Projects / Strategic Hub Organised Crime Research Shoc

STRATEGIC HUB FOR ORGANISED CRIME RESEARCH (SHOC)

Language of Violence: Evolution of

Mexican Cartels
Elijah Glantz and Eduardo Giralt Brun
6 December 2022 7 Minute Read SHARE

As cartels in Mexico have evolved under pressure, so too have their Main Image Credit / Eduardo Giralt |
Professional killers on top of an improvised
presentation, methods and goals. cladded armour vehicle showing off their
rank as ‘masters’ or elites of the turf

Forcing Change
WRITTEN BY
Sharing an over 2,000-mile border with the largest cocaine consumption market in the
world, early Mexican drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) leveraged nearly a century Elijah Glantz
of smaller-scale smuggling experience to streamline trafficking into the United States Research Analyst and Project
Officer
(US). Despite conflict between the dominant Guadalajara Cartel and smaller DTOs, Organised Crime and Policing
Guadalajara maintained control, mitigating full-on war and internal challenges. In this View profile
early period, the cartels’ strict hierarchical structure bore resemblance to even licit
industries, placing enormous value on cartel leaders. The relative ease of business
Eduardo Giralt Brun
characteristic of Mexican cartels in the 1970s and early 80s was bolstered by the Field Researcher, SHOC
Network Member
Mexican government, ruled by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Over the
View profile
course of the PRI’s 71-year reign, cartels exploited endemic corruption and benefited
from tacit agreements with the Mexican state, permitting operations in certain areas and
occasionally brokering peace between groups.
READING OPTIONS

A pivotal shift in scope and intensity of the war on drugs came in 1985 with the murder
of US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique ‘Kiki’ Camarena. Kidnapped, CITE THIS

tortured and killed by suspected cartel enforcers in Guadalajara, the event sparked an
aggressive response from the US and Mexico. The Guadalajara Cartel’s leader, Miguel
PRINT THIS PAGE
Gallardo, was arrested in relation to Kiki’s death and extradited in 1989. Gallardo’s arrest
marked the first high value target (HVT) that later formed the US’s ‘Kingpin Strategy’
aimed entirely around disabling organisations through the arrest of HVTs. Gallardo’s
own Guadalajara Cartel splintered into the Juarez, Tijuana, Sonora and Sinaloa Cartels.
In Michoacan, La Familia Michoacana devolved into 14 competing groups. The highly
centralised intra-cartel hierarchy had begun dissolving, trending towards a form of
hyper-violent drug trafficking franchises in which the new DTO’s value rested in their
ability to defend – and capture – territory. The new cartels, therefore, each vying for
market share, territory and survival, organised and equipped themselves for
competition.

The fierce inter-cartel competition drew more blood, publicity and criticism. By 2006,
Mexico’s long reigning PRI lost power to Michoacan-native Felipe Calderón whose
campaign was propelled by promises of law and order. Calderón wasted no time,
dispatching 6,500 Mexican soldiers to violence plagued Michoacan. Mexico’s cartels,
unwilling to submit, fought back. A relatively safe country in 2006, by 2010, President
Calderón& admitted having witnessed Mexico’s bloodiest year on record. By 2011,
Mexico’s homicides had jumped threefold.

Credit / An altar arranged by a mother with photos of her son, the former commander pf a narco-paramilitary

New and Emboldened Trends

As near-record violence persists in Mexico, videos of armoured caravans, high-calibre,
weapons and uniformed soldiers have been making rounds domestically and abroad.
The sight of military-grade hardware rolling through Mexican streets has for decades
been familiar for residents in the country’s beleaguered, violence-ridden regions.
However, the videos do not show another convoy of Mexican police or Marines like
those sent in by President Calderón in 2006. These soldiers sport a patch marked ‘CJNG’,
the acronym of the ultra-violent Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación. These professionalised
narco-paramilitaries proliferated in Mexico, notably with the arrival of Los Zetas.
Originally a group of 32 defected Mexican commandos recruited by the Gulf Cartel, the
paramilitary outgrew and turned against their parent organisation. Los Zetas’ brutality
would only be matched when a counter-militia, Los Matas Zetas, an early extension of
the CJNG, declared war.

The CJNG – now one of Mexico’s two biggest cartels – have employed their paramilitary
muscle in an historically uncommon way. In Michoacan, their insurgent-like sieges of
towns and extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and drones has analysts
drawing comparisons to militant groups like the Taliban. The CJNG has not limited its
signature violence to rival cartels or the legalised, regional self-defence groups. Rather, it
has escalated attacks against police, the military and government officials evidenced by
an attempted assassination of Mexico City’s Police Chief in 2020 and the high-
profile shooting down of a military helicopter in 2015. Whilst the CJNG’s paramilitary
style represents an extreme relative to other cartels, such as their rival Sinaloa Cartel,
the violence is widespread.

The intensification of violence against the state marks another trend. Apart from law
enforcement, cartels have systematically targeted politicians and candidates across the
country. In the 2018 elections, a minimum of 128 candidates and campaign workers were
assassinated by cartels, a stark increase to the less-than 20 candidates killed in 2012.
Recent elections in 2021 saw over 88 politicians and candidates murdered, largely at the
local level.

Hybrid Warfare: Nearing ‘State Capture’

These shocking trends of cartel violence are not random nor nonpurposive. In fact,
comparisons with Colombian cartel trends in the 1980s and 90s indicate these
escalations to be signs of emboldened, risk-taking cartels seeking to significantly
weaken, co-opt or capture the state. Cartel hybrid warfare in Colombia featured
massively destabilising assassinations against presidential candidates, the taking down of
a commercial airliner and a suspected conspiracy to storm the Colombian Palace of Justice.
These acts formed part of the cartels’ political messaging – a critical element of hybrid
warfare – to force policy reversal, cancel extraditions or warn against encroachment by
authorities. The recent trends of violence in Mexico can thus be understood as political
discourse through violence. The CJNG’s paramilitary posture, beyond its tactical value,
can be framed as a means of deterring Mexican state intervention. By promising high-
intensity and high-casualty conflict, the paramilitarised DTOs have at times succeeded
in establishing narcostates. The mass political killings have attained equal effect, likely
stoking fear and apathy in officials and candidates.

Credit / Codes used by cartel lookouts or spotters to identify the different law enforcement agencies

Such hybrid warfare has seen success in controlling or installing favourable officials.
Malleable officials allow cartels to ward off investigation and turn the state against
competition. Such was the case in Veracruz in 2016, where the CJNG gained control over
the local government and forced Los Zetas out – a blow from which they were never
able to recover. There also exist incentives to topple or weaken the state that have been
bolstered by the cartel’s recent diversification, potentially accelerated by the COVID19
pandemic. Whereas in the Gallardo era of the 1970s and 80s, cocaine and marijuana
production and trafficking represented the lion’s share of revenue, cartels today have
expanded extortion rackets, as well as diversified their activities to include human
trafficking and synthetic drugs such as Meth and Fentanyl. Cartels have further ventured
into new markets, evidenced by the Sinaloa Cartel’s emergent control over Mexican
fisheries.

As the violence persists, it may be important to recast the assaults – and their purpose –
as a form of paramilitarised, necessarily political, hybrid warfare rather than
traditional criminal gang turf wars. In doing so, analysis of shifting tactics cannot be
made independent of the history from which they spawned. This becomes particularly
valuable as counterinsurgency campaigns are proposed as a solution, particularly by
Mexico’s northern neighbour. Such strategies run the risk of further accelerating
cartel’s adherence to hybrid warfare and deepening Mexico’s violent spiral.

This blog is the second in a three-part series in partnership with photographer and
director Eduardo Giralt. The series is intended to shine line on the realities and trends
of drug cartels through a combination of images and analysis.

All images and captions provided by Eduardo Giralt.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of RUSI, Focused Conservation, or any other institution.

Supported by

ECPR-SGOC

We collaborate with the European Consortium for Political Research’s Standing Group on Organised Crime
(ECPR-SGOC), one of the standing groups of the ECPR. The editorial board includes representatives from the
University of Bath, Oxford University, the Institute of Advanced Studies of the University of Sao Paulo, Sofia
University and Flinders University.

KEYWORDS
Topics Illicit Trade, Trafficking, and Illicit Financial Flows

Regions and Country Groups Americas Latin America

Research Groups Organised Crime and Policing

Projects Organised Crime and Corruption Programme

Strategic Hub for Organised Crime Research (SHOC)

WRITTEN BY

Elijah Glantz
Research Analyst and Project Officer
Organised Crime and Policing

View profile

Eduardo Giralt Brun

Field Researcher, SHOC Network Member

View profile

SHARE THIS PAGE

Explore our related content

RUSI NEWSBRIEF MEMBERS ONLY EMERGING INSIGHTS GLOBAL SECURITY BRIEFING PODCASTS

Deterrence is Not Enough in Virtual Asset Mining: Episode 57: The Counter-West
Northeast Asia Typologies, Risks and Challenge in Africa, Latin
Responses America and the Middl...

September 1, 2023 4 Minute Read August 24, 2023 Long Read August 23, 2023 54 Minute Listen

Stay up to date with RUSI

Receive updates on publications and events from RUSI

Sign up
straight into your inbox.

CO N N E CT W I T H U S

Explore RUSI Popular Links As an independent institution, we

produce evidence-based research,
Topics Events Contact Us publications and events on defence,
Regions News & Comment Report a problem security and international affairs to
Research Groups & Experts Membership help build a safer UK and a more
Publications About secure, equitable and stable world.

Cookie Policy Privacy Policy Ethics Statement Terms and conditions Legal DEI Policy Copyright 2023 | The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security
Studies | RUSI is registered as a charity in England and Wales - Charity number:
210639 | VAT number: GB752275038