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Helmke & Levitsky - Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics - A Research Agenda
Helmke & Levitsky - Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics - A Research Agenda
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Articles
ver the last two decades,institutionalanalysishas that many "rulesof the game" that structurepolitical life
become a central focus in comparative politics. are informal-created, communicated, and enforced out-
Fueled by a wave of institutional change in the side of officially sanctioned channels.6Examples abound.
developingand postcommunistworlds,scholarsfrom diverse For decades, Mexican presidentswere selected not accord-
researchtraditionshave studied how constitutionaldesign, ing to rules in the Constitution, the electorallaw, or party
electoral systems, and other formal institutional arrange- statutes,but rathervia the dedazo("bigfinger")-an unwrit-
ments affectpoliticaland economic outcomes.1These stud- ten code that gave the sitting presidentthe right to choose
ies have produced important theoreticaladvances. his successor,specified the candidatepool, and prohibited
Nevertheless,a growingbody of researchon LatinAmer- potentialcandidatesfrom openly seekingthe job.7 In Japan,
ica,2 postcommunist Eurasia,3Africa,4and Asia5 suggests the "strictbut unwrittenrules"ofAmakudari("descentfrom
heaven"), through which retiring state bureaucrats are
awarded top positions in private corporations, have sur-
GretchenHelmkeis assistantprofessorofpolitical scienceat vived decades of administrativereform.8In Central Asia,
the Universityof Rochester(hlmk@mail. Her
rochester.edu). clan-based norms have "become the rules of the game,"
bookCourts Under Constraints:Judges, Generals,and while the constitutionalstructurescreatedafterthe collapse
Presidentsin Argentina,will bepublishedby CambridgeUni- of the Soviet Union are "increasingly... inconsequen-
versityPress.StevenLevitskyis associateprofessorofgovern- tial."9And in much of the developing and postcommunist
mentat Harvard University(levitsky@wcfia.harvard. edu). world, patternsof clientelism, corruption, and patrimoni-
He is the authorof TransformingLabor-BasedParties alismcoexistwith (and often subvert)new democratic,mar-
in Latin America:Argentine Peronismin Comparative ket, and state institutions.10
Perspectiveand is currentlywritinga bookon competitive Attention to informal institutions is by no means new
authoritarianregimesin thepost-Cold Warera. The to political science. Earlier studies of "prismatic soci-
authorsthank the Weatherhead Centerfor International eties,"11 "moraleconomies,"12"economiesof affection,"13
Affairsat HarvardUniversityand the KelloggInstitutefor legal pluralism,14clientelism,15corruption,16and consoci-
InternationalStudiesat the Universityof Notre Damefor ationalism,17as well as on government-businessrelations
generouslysponsoringconferenceson informalinstitutions.The in Japan,18blat in the Soviet Union,19 and the "folkways"
authorsalsogratefullyacknowledgecommentsrJomJorge of the U.S. Senate20highlightedthe importanceof unwrit-
Dominguez,Anna Grzymala-Busse, Dennis Galvan, Goran ten rules. Nevertheless, informal rules have remained at
Hyden,JackKnight,LisaMartin, Hillel Soifer,Benjamin the marginsof the institutionalistturn in comparativepol-
Smith, SusanStokes,Maria VictoriaMurillo,and Kurt itics. Indeed, much current literatureassumes that actors'
Weyland,as well as threeanonymousreviewersand the incentives and expectations are shaped primarily,if not
editorsof Perspectiveson Politics. exclusively,by formal rules. Such a narrow focus can be
revenueand provide public goods by mobilizing resources words, why, given the existenceof a set of formal rules and
throughtemple and lineageassociations,thereby"substitut- rule-makingmechanisms,do actorschoose to createinfor-
ing the use of these informal institutions for ... formal mal rules?Building on the previous section, we see three
politicalinstitutionalchannelsof publicgoods provisions."97 generalmotivations.
Taken together, these four types suggest that informal First,actorscreateinformalrules becauseformal institu-
institutionscannotbe classifiedin simpledichotomous(func- tions areincomplete.104Formalrulesset generalparameters
tional versus dysfunctional) terms. Although substitutive for behavior,but they cannot cover all contingencies. Con-
informal institutions such as concertacesiones and rondas sequently,actorsoperatingwithin a particularformal insti-
campesinas subvert formal rules and procedures,they may tutional context, such as bureaucraciesand legislatures,
help achieveresults(resolutionof postelectoralconflict,pub- develop norms and proceduresthat expedite their work or
lic security) that the formal rules failed to achieve. And addressproblemsnot anticipatedby formal rules.105
althoughaccommodatinginformalinstitutionssuch as con- Second,informalinstitutionsmaybe a "secondbest"strat-
sociationalism violate the spirit of the formal rules, they egy for actorswho prefer,but cannot achieve,a formalinsti-
may generateoutcomes (democraticstability)thatareviewed tutional solution.106 In some cases, actors simply lack the
as broadlybeneficial.It remainsan open question, however, power to changethe formalrules.Thus post-Pinochetelites
whether accommodating and substitutive institutions can in Chilecreatedinformalpower-sharing arrangementsbecause
contributeto the developmentof moreeffectiveformalstruc- they lacked the political strength to rewritethe 1980 Con-
tures, or whether they "crowdout" such development (by stitution.107Similarly,Soviet workersand managersopted
quelling demands for formal institutional change or creat- for the informalityof blatin partbecausetheywere unableto
ing new actors, skills, and interestslinked to the preserva- reformor do awaywith state socialistinstitutions.
tion of the informalrules).98The following two sections lay A broader statement of this motivation, elaboratedby
a foundation for addressingsuch questions. Carol Mershon, is that actors create informal institutions
when they deem it less costly than creatingformal institu-
tions to their liking.108In postwar Italy,Christian Demo-
Origins of InformalInstitutions cratic leaders who sought to keep the communist and
To date, much empiricalliteratureon informalinstitutions
neofascistpartiesout of power found it easierto develop an
has neglected questions of why and how such institutions
informal"formula"to excludethose partiesfrom governing
emerge.99Analysesof entrenchedcompeting informalinsti- coalitions than to push through parliamenta majoritarian
tutions such as custom law,clientelism,and patrimonialism
electoralsystemaimed at strengtheninglargemoderatepar-
frequentlytake them as historicalgivens, or part of a static ties.109Similarly,Costa Rican partyleaders'use of informal
cultural landscape, rarelyasking why they emerged in the
devices to induce legislatorsto engage in constituency ser-
first place. As a result, they often understatethe degree to
vice may have been easier than overturning the ban on
which informal institutions are modified, adapted,or even
reinventedover time.100Meanwhile, many existing expla- legislativereelection.1l0
nations (particularly studies of complementary institu- Inventing informal institutions may also be a second-
best strategywhere formal institutions exist on paper but
tions) confronta majorpitfallof earlyfunctionalistaccounts are ineffectivein practice.In the case of substitutiveinfor-
of formal institutions:they explain the emergenceof infor-
mal institutions, for example, actors create informal struc-
mal institutionsprimarilyin termsof theirpurportedeffects
tures not becausethey dislike the formal rules, but because
(e.g., the efficiency gains they yield), without identifying the existing rules-and rule-makingprocesses-lack credi-
the mechanismsby which they arecreated.101For example,
bility.Thus Mexican opposition leadersengagedin concert-
many earlyrational-choiceanalysestreatedinformalnorms acesionesduring the 1990s because they did not view the
as efficient solutions to problems of cycling, information,
formal electoral courts as credible, and Peruvianvillagers
or collectiveaction.102Although such explanationsmay par-
created rondascampesinasbecause the state judicial system
tially explain the persistenceof informal institutions once failed to enforce the rule of law.
established,they areinsufficient,if not misleading,for gen- A third motivation for creating informal institutions is
erating theories about institutional emergence. In this sec- the pursuit of goals not considered publicly acceptable.
tion we seek to move beyond static and functionalist
Becausethey are relativelyinconspicuous,"1informalinsti-
accounts, arguingthat compelling explanationsof informal tutions allow actors to pursueactivities-ranging from the
institutions must not only ask why actors create informal
rules, but also examinehow actorscreateand communicate unpopular to the illegal-that are unlikely to stand the
test of public scrutiny. Even where bribery,patrimonial-
those rules.
ism, and vote-buyingarewidely accepted,prevailingnorms
of universalismprevent their legalization. Norms of lax
Why Informal Institutions? enforcement-what the Dutch call gedogen-provide
We focus our discussion here on informal institutions that anotherexample.112Prostitution,soft drug use, and eutha-
areendogenousto formalinstitutionalstructures.103 In other nasia (or abortion in predominantly Catholic countries)
When change occurs, it is expected to be slow and incre- electoral courts over the course of the 1990s reduced the
mental.130Lauth, for example, argues that because infor- incentive of opposition leaders to work through informal
mal rules "do not possess a center which directs and concertacesiones, 138and the increasedeffectivenessof Peru's
co-ordinatestheir actions,"informalinstitutionalchange is public security and judicial systems led to the collapse of
likely to be an "extremelylengthy"process.131Yet informal many rondascampesinasand rondaassemblies.139
institutions do change-and often quite quickly. The Other sources of informal institutional change lie out-
centuries-oldChinese practiceof foot-binding disappeared side the formalinstitutionalcontext. For scholarswho view
within a generation,132and many of the informalrulesthat informalinstitutionsprimarilyas a productof culture,infor-
structuredMexican elite politics for much of the twentieth mal institutional change is rooted primarilyin the evolu-
century (includingthe dedazo)collapsedquicklyduringthe tion of societal values.l40 Because such shifts tend to be
late 1990s.133 glacialin pace, this patternof informalinstitutionalchange
Severalsources may generate the impetus for informal will be slow and incremental.We might understand the
institutional change. One important source is formal insti- erosionof traditionalor kinship-basedpatternsof authority
tutional change.The impact of formal rule changesshould in Europe in these terms.
not, of course, be overstated;many informal institutions Informal institutions may also change as the status quo
have proved resilienteven in the face of large-scalelegal or conditions that sustain them change. 1 Developments in
administrativereform.134Nevertheless, to the extent that the external environment may change the distribution of
formal institutional change alters the costs and benefits of power and resourceswithin a community,weakeningthose
adhering to particularinformal rules, it can serve as an actors who benefit from a particularinformal institution
important catalystfor informal institutional change. and strengtheningthosewho seekto changeit. Thus Mexico's
Two typesof formalinstitutionalchangearerelevanthere. increasinglycompetitive electoral environment during the
The first is change in formal institutional design. Particu- 1990s strengthenedlocal PRI leadersand activistsvis-a-vis
larly for informal institutions that are endogenous to for- the nationalleadership,which allowed them to contest and
mal structures,a change in the design of the formal rules eventuallydismantle the dedazosystem.'42In the Nether-
may affectthe costs and benefitsof adheringto relatedinfor- lands, a long-term decline in class and religious identities
mal rules, which can produce rapid informal institutional strengthened new parties that challenged the consocia-
change. In the case of complementary informal institu- tional rules of the game and induced establishedpartiesto
tions, for example,modifying the relevantformalrulesmay abandon them.143The growth of middle-classelectorates
change the natureof the gaps that the informal institution erodes the bases of clientelism by reducing voters' depen-
had been designed to address,which may createincentives dence on the distributionof selectivematerialgoods.144In
for actors to modify or abandon the informal rule. The these cases,informalinstitutionalchange tends to be incre-
1974 Bill of Rights of Subcommitteesin the House of Rep- mental, as actors graduallyreorient their expectations to
resentatives"produceda sharp change in formal rules that reflect underlying changes in their and others' bargaining
overrodepreviousinformal committee structures."135 power.
Informal institutional change may also be a product of Other analytictools may be needed to explainsome rapid
changes in formal institutionalstrengthor effectiveness.In informal institutional change or collapse. Tipping models
such cases, changes in the level of enforcement of formal offer one such tool.145These models suggest that if a suffi-
rulesalter the costs and benefitsadheringto informalinsti- ciently large enough number of actors become convinced
tutions that compete with or substitutefor those rules. For that a new and betteralternativeexists, and if a mechanism
example, compliancewith competing informalinstitutions exists through which to coordinate actors'expectations, a
becomes more costly with increased enforcement of the shift from one set of norms to another may occur quite
formal rules, and at some point, these costs will induce rapidly. Gerry Mackie argues that the move to end foot
actors to abandon the informal institution. Thus the binding in China hinged on creating an alternativemar-
increasedjudicialenforcementtriggeredby the Mani Pulite riagemarketthat allowedsons to marrydaughterswho had
investigations weakened corruption networks in Italy;136 naturalfeet, therebyescapingconventional inferiority.'46
the tight controls imposed by the postrevolutionarystate Figure 2 summarizesthese sources of informal institu-
weakenedtraditionalgift-givingnorms in Maoist China;137 tional change. As the figure suggests, informal institutions
and federalenforcementof civil rightslegislationweakened vary considerablywith respect to both the source and the
Jim Crow practicesin the South. pace of change.Whereassome (complementary,accommo-
Increased formal institutional effectiveness may also dating) are highly susceptibleto changes in formal institu-
weaken substitutiveinformalinstitutions. When the credi- tional design, others (substitutive, competing) are more
bility of previouslyineffectiveformalstructuresis enhanced, likely to be affected by changes in formal institutional
the benefits associatedwith the use of substitutiveinstitu- strength.With respectto the pace of change, culturalevo-
tions may diminish,potentiallyto the point of theirdispens- lution is likely to produce incrementalchange, but formal
ability. For example, the increasedcredibility of Mexico's institutional change or coordination around an alternative
studies of informal institutions take the form of either islative rules?156In comparativepolitics, the issue of how
abstracttheory (N=0) or inductive case studies (N= 1).150 informal institutions sustain or reinforce-as opposed to
Case studies provide essentialbuilding blocks for compari- undermine or distort-formal ones has not been well
son and theory building. However,a more generalbody of researched.When institutionsfunction effectively,we often
theorywill requirescholarsto incorporateother methods as assume that the formal rules are driving actors' behavior.
well. Yet in some cases, underlyinginformal norms do much of
One such method is rigoroussmall-n comparison.With- the enabling and constrainingthat we attributeto the for-
out losing the sensitivity to context that characterizescase mal rules.
studies, small-n analysescan begin to identify patterns of Second, we need to theorize more rigorouslyabout the
informal institutional effects, formal-informalinstitutional emergence of informal institutions and particularlyabout
interaction, and informal institutional change. For exam- the mechanismsthrough which informal rules are created,
ple, Kathleen Collins'scomparativestudy of three Central communicated,and learned.Some seeminglyage-old infor-
Asian statesenabledher to examinethe interactionbetween mal institutions are in realityrelativelyrecent reconfigura-
clan networks and different formal regime types.'51 Simi- tions (or reinventions);this fact makes the issues of origins
larly, Scott Desposato's analysis of legislative behavior in all the more compelling.157
five Brazilian states with varying degrees of clientelism Third, we need to betterunderstandthe sourcesof infor-
allowed him to consider how clientelism affects the func- mal institutional stability and change. One question not
tioning of legislatureswith similarformal structures.152 addressedin this article is that of codification of informal
Large-nsurveysmay alsoproveusefulin researchon infor- rules.In some instances,state actorsopt to legalizeinformal
mal institutions. Surveyresearchmay captureactors'expec- institutions that are perceived to compete with or under-
tations and beliefs about the "actual"rules of the game. mine formalrules.SeveralLatinAmericangovernments"con-
Here it is important to distinguish between conventional stitutionalized"aspects of indigenous law (granting them
surveys that capture values or attitudes toward particular constitutional status) during the 1990s in an effort to
institutions (e.g., the World Values Survey) and those enhance compliance with state law.158Similarly,in Argen-
designedto capturesociallysharedbeliefsabout constraints tina, in an effort to regulatePresidentCarlos Menem'suse
thatindividualsface.An exampleof the latteris SusanStokes's of extraconstitutionaldecree authority,legislatorsincluded
analysisof informalinstitutions of accountabilityin Argen- a provision for executive decrees in the 1994 Constitu-
tina, which uses surveydata to demonstratethe existencein tion.159We need to know more about what induces state
some parts of the country of shared citizen expectations actorsto formalizeratherthan oppose informalinstitutions.
that voters will punish politicians who behave dishonest- Comparativepolitics researchon informalinstitutions is
ly.153Although expectations-basedsurveysmay initially be still at an incipient stage. Advances are likely on several
limited to identifying of informal institutions, they might fronts, ranging from abstractformal modeling to ethno-
eventuallybe used to generateand test causalclaims. graphicstudies to survey research.New insights will come
from a varietyof disciplines, including anthropology,eco-
nomics, law, sociology, and political psychology.Hence, it
Conclusion is essentialto promotea broadand pluralisticresearchagenda
SinceJamesMarchand Johan P.Olsen declaredthat "anew that encouragesfertilizationacrossdisciplines,methods, and
institutionalismhas appearedin politicalscience,"154research regions. Given the range of areasin which informal rules
on political institutions has advanced considerably. Yet and organizationsmatterpolitically,it is essentialthat polit-
because the comparativepolitics literaturehas focused pri- ical scientists take the real rules of the game seriously-
marily on formal institutions, it risks missing many of the whether they arewritten into parchmentor not.
"real"incentivesand constraintsthatunderliepoliticalbehav-
ior.Indeed,rational-choiceanalysesof institutionshavebeen Notes
criticized for an "excessiveattention to formal rules"and 1 For an excellent surveyof this literature,see Carey
"insufficientattention to firmly establishedinformal prac- 2000.
tices and 'institutions.'"'55 2 Taylor 1992; Hartlyn 1994; O'Donnell 1996; Siave-
We have sought to provide a frameworkfor incorporat- lis 1997; Starn 1999; Van Cott 2000; Levitsky2001;
ing informal rules into mainstreaminstitutional analysis. Levitsky2003; Helmke 2002; Brinks2003a; Eisen-
Farfrom rejectingthe literatureon institutions, we seek to stadt 2003.
broaden and extend it, with the goal of refining, and ulti- 3 Clarke 1995; Ledeneva1998; Borocz2000; Easter
matelystrengthening,its theoreticalframework.We see sev- 2000; Sil 2001; Collins 2002a, 2003; Grzymala-
eral areasfor future research.First,we must posit and test Busseand Jones Luong 2002; Way 2002; Gel'man
hypotheses about how informal rules shape formal institu- 2003.
tional outcomes. For example, how do clientelism and 4 Dia 1996; Sandbrookand Oelbaum 1999; Hyden
patronagenetworksmediate the effectsof electoraland leg- 2002; Lindberg2003; Galvan2004.
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