Cayetano vs.

Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

FACTS:

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25,
1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity
of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner filed a
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did
not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.

HELD:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.”Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the
Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsod’s past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378

FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease
and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of
said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to
the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of
by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.

ANNULMENT. VISA.

Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL5217232, 5222041

CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm

7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday
to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.

Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.

Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign

Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy

CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:

Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law. The
definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:Black defines
"practice of law" as:"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing
in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and
all actions taken for them in matters connected with thelaw." The contention of respondent that it
merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition
is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services
being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as
the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not
be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice,
as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs
paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the
practice of law by virtueof the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit
of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are
now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that
the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is rightand proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA AC NO. 99-634. JUNE 10, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a
creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the
former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and
included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his
case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that
the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the
status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer
allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner
with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see
for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was
being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has
not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and
to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1
and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.
Issue:

Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows:
“It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing
fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a
corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill
complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this
obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up
this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.”

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

FACTS:

Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1960. He migrated to Canada to seek
medical attention for his ailments. He renounced his Philippine citizenship and applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail its free medical program. Two years after, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003) petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship
and intended to resume his law practice. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he
gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.

HELD:

No. Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2.
Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of
the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character,
and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of
law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The
exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country
but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the
legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions
"(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

FALLO
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance
with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after
which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES
B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012

Facts:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant praying
that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the IBP on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege
to practice law when he became a citizen of the USA on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006,
he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted,
to resume the practice of law.

Issue:

Whether or not to grant the petition to resume the privilege to practice law in the Philippines

Ruling:

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s
membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and
later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.
R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required
the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in
relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all
the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that
the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

JULIETA B. NARAG VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG

A. C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998

TOPIC:

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct,
he may be suspended or disbarred.

FACTS:
Mrs. Julieta Narag, spouse of Atty. Dominador Narag, filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against her husband alleging that the latter courted one of his students named Gina Espita and they
then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community.

Her husband abandoned his family to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous circumstances. The case
was referred to the IBP for investigation. Later on, the complainant sought for the dismissal of the
administrative complaint and retracted all her previous allegations.

The case took an unexpected turn when, the Court received another letter from the complainant, with
her seven children as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained
that she had earlier dropped the case against him because of his husband’s continuous threats against
her.

The investigating officer submitted his report, recommending the indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag
from the practice of law. However, the IBP imposed the penalty of disbarment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Narag should be disbarred from practice of law.

HELD:

The Court found that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct,
he may be suspended or disbarred.

Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina
Espita. On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to establish that
respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Further, the complainant presented as
evidence the love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly
manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his own.

In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity
and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner, B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation,
and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries
to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications,
as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached
to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its
face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same
parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-
disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

Issue:
Whether or Not the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and shall
subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys

Held:

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in
the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to
take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the
Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Rationale:

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence
of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded
of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even
if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral
character of the applicant.