Cayetano vs.

Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

FACTS:

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on
April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess
the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having
practiced law for the last ten years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.

HELD:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered
to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law.”Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsod’s past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378

FACTS:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.

ANNULMENT. VISA.

Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL5217232, 5222041

CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm

7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.

Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.

Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign

Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy

CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:

Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of
the advertisements herein complained of.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of
law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as
defined:Black defines "practice of law" as:"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with thelaw." The contention of respondent that it merely offers
legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While some of the
services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know
-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management
of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-
advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example,
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that
all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise
him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients
in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court
appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtueof the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. (SEE
CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or
skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate
that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
rightand proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service
and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA AC NO. 99-634. JUNE 10, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against
a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful
and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the
lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status
of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer,
to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the
Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the
prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the
case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent
that day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court
to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay
was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit
that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for
his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing
two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and
P8,000.00, respectively.

Issue:

Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as
follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office
was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for
the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and
that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The
failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the
respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate
the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.”
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

FACTS:

Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1960. He migrated to Canada to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He renounced his Philippine citizenship and applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail its free medical program. Two years after, pursuant to Republic
Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003) petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship and intended to resume his law practice. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar
when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.

HELD:

No. Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2.
Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of
the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume
the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind
him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited
to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. Under RA 9225, if a
person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this
Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
bar.

FALLO

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to

compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to
the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B.

MUNESES B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012

Facts:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant
praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the IBP on March 21, 1966; that he lost his
privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the USA on August 28, 1981; that on
September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 or the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends
to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.

Issue:

Whether or not to grant the petition to resume the privilege to practice law in the Philippines

Ruling:

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the
right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who
intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following
documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE.
After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has
met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
JULIETA B. NARAG VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG

A. C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998

TOPIC:

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral
conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.

FACTS:

Mrs. Julieta Narag, spouse of Atty. Dominador Narag, filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against her husband alleging that the latter courted one of his students named Gina
Espita and they then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community.

Her husband abandoned his family to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous circumstances.
The case was referred to the IBP for investigation. Later on, the complainant sought for the
dismissal of the administrative complaint and retracted all her previous allegations.

The case took an unexpected turn when, the Court received another letter from the complainant,
with her seven children as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband.
She explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him because of his husband’s
continuous threats against her.

The investigating officer submitted his report, recommending the indefinite suspension of Atty.
Narag from the practice of law. However, the IBP imposed the penalty of disbarment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Narag should be disbarred from practice of law.

HELD:

The Court found that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of
disbarment.

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral
conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.

Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with
Gina Espita. On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to
establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Further, the
complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In these
letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he
acknowledged as his own.
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence,
that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the
law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, "a lawyer may be disbarred for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court."

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE

2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner, B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004

Facts:

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002
Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave
Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’
wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling
used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the
OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle
his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled
because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the
College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and
involving the same parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges
and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of
non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to
take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the
cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases
were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his
good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should
not be taken lightly by an applicant.

Issue:

Whether or Not the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and
shall subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys

Held:

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon
Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron
S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Rationale:

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely
a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then
flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.