CRIMPRO Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-

GENERAL PRINCIPLES determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked
David vs Agbay (2015) jurisdiction over his person.
• David was charged with falsification of a public document in the MTC by the office of the • Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order, the RTC
provincial prosecutor, which was affirmed by the SOJ on petition for review, after finding correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in
of probable cause: denying the said motion for lack of merit.
 Falsified his Miscellaneous Lease Application filed with the DENR where he
indicated that he was a Filipino when in fact he was a naturalized Canadian citizen at
that time
• Hence, an information was filed in court and the court issued a warrant of arrest against
David.
• However, prior to his arrest, he filed an urgent motion for re-determination of probable
cause.
• The motion was denied by the MTC for lack of merit and for lack of jurisdiction over the
accused as the motion was filed prior to his arrest

Issue: Whether a motion for re-determination of probable can be filed prior to arrest?

Held: YES. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an
application for bail.
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person must be distinguished
custody of the law jurisdiction over the person
Being in the custody of the law signifies Power of the court to try a case with binding
restraint on the person, who is thereby effect against the accused
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding
him to become obedient to the will of the
law. Custody of the law is literally custody
over the body of the accused. It includes, but
is not limited to, detention.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
arrest or voluntary surrender acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance
• One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant.
• On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and
yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his
trial has commenced.

Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application
therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in
narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court
even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a
person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself
to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis supplied)

ZabalaCute 1
 RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
A. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS: SECTION 01 OCP Resolution did not terminate proceedings; period remained tolled
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of
People v Bautista – filing w/ brgy tolls the prescriptive period the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The
G.R. No. 168641 April 27, 2007 prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the
Prescriptive period: 60 days Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
Started to run – June 12 (dispute arose) thus til Aug 12 dapat, complaint before prosec filed
Aug 16, Info filed June 20 The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such
HOWEVER, interrupted – Aug 11 – complaint w/ barangay mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended
party. It is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of
Facts: delays that are not under his control.
• June 12, 1999: a dispute arose between Clemente Bautista and his co-accused Leonida
Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other. The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the petitioner in
• August 11, 1999: Goyena, Jr., filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate, the present petition considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary
Manila, but no settlement was reached. Hence, the barangay chairman then issued a investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the Information after the City Prosecutor had
Certification to file action. approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file the information.
• August 16, 1999: Goyena, Jr., filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a
Complaint for slight physical injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. NOTE: by the time that the complaint was filed with the OCP (Aug 16) the offense had already
o After conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong prescribed since it was committed on June 12, hence to prescribe on Aug 12. Thus, according
issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of to Atty. GSA, this case seems to suggest that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the
Barangay on Aug 11 tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
an Information against herein respondent.
o Such recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, but the date of
such approval cannot be found in the records.
• June 20, 2000: Information was filed with the MeTC of Manila.
• Bautista: dismiss! By the time the Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription
had already elapsed.
• The MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed. RTC affirmed.
• CA: Reversed RTC, ruling that:
1. the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint
with the OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999
2. However, although the approval of the Joint Resolution of ACP bears no date, it
effectively terminated the proceedings at the OCP (prescriptive period started to run again).
Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six
(6) months into the next year. Hence, action had already prescribed.

Issue: whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor’s
recommendation to file the proper criminal information against respondent was approved by the
City Prosecutor

Held: NO. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent (accused) is either
convicted or acquitted by the proper court
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philipppine
Archipelago.

ZabalaCute 2
 Panaguiton, Jr v DOJ – for special laws, filing w/ prosec tolls prescriptive
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008 It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
Prescriptive period: 4 years; BP 22 case investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology
Started to run: March 18 1993 – checks were dishonored so til March 1997 lang dapat; case in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the
filed 9 years after prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
HOWEVER, Interrupted – Aug 24 1995 – filed complaint w/ prosec preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to around P1.9M from Panaguiton, Jr. Thus,
Cawili and his business associate, Tongson, jointly issued in favor of Panaguiton, Jr three checks PROCEEDING = EXECUTIVE OR JUDICIAL
in payment of the said loans. With the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of
• March 18, 1993: checks dishonored: insufficiency of funds/closure of account prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings"
• August 24, 1995: Panaguiton, Jr. OCP: complaint against Cawili and Tongson for should now be understood either executive or judicial in character:
violating B.P. Blg. 22 a) executive when it involves the investigation phase and
• After preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable b) judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage.
cause only against Cawili and dismissing the charges against Tongson.
 On appeal by Panaguiton, the Chief State Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). prescription
 15 March 1999: ACP Sampaga dismissed the complaint against Tongson without • Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
referring the matter to the NBI account of delays that are not under his control.
- ACP Sampaga held that the case had already 4-year period already prescribed • A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24
pursuant to Act No. 3326. August 1995, well within the 4-year prescriptive period. However, from the time petitioner
- In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to
dishonored, or on 18 March 1993. the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years
- The filing of the complaint before the Prosec did not interrupt the running of the had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control.
prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative
proceedings.
• Flipflopping decisions from the DOJ, but essentially, DOJ affirmed: prescribed na.
 the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not
provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
 Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense
it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised
Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
 cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., : proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as
amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
• Panaguiton: what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan - “the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the
prescriptive period.”

Issue: WON the filing of the complaint with the QC Prosecutor’s Office on Aug 24 tolled
the running of the prescriptive period

Held: YES. We cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the
running of the prescriptive period.

There is no question that Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which
do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

ZabalaCute 3
 Jadewell Parking Systems Corp v Lidua, Sr. for ordinances, only judicial proceeding
tolls G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
Prescriptive period – 2 months (violation of city ordinance)
Started to run - May 7 2003 (discovered dismantling and theft of clamps) so until June
lang dapat
Interrupted – Oct 2 2003 – filing of info before MTC
- Filing of complaint affidavit on May 23 DID NOT INTERRUPT running of
prescriptive period; judicial only
• Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator in baguio
 May 07 2003: respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does
forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car, belonging to Jeffrey
Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed
parking fee. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away.
 May 17, 2003: respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a
Mitsubishi owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and
left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone.
• May 23 3003: Affidavit Complaints were filed against the respondents for Robbery.
 In a Resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor, it was ruled that the offenses lacked the
elements of Robbery but found probable cause for violation of a Baguio City
Ordinance.
• October 2, 2003: two criminal Informations were filed with the MTC against the
respondents accordingly.
• MTC dismissed: two months lapsed; prescribed na
• Petitioner: OCP tolled the prescription period!
 This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other
chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless
otherwise provided in their charters.
 Thus, the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the
offenses charged against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the
Complaint/Information in court, and not when the Affidavit-Complaint was filed.
• Respondents cite the case of Zaldivia v Reye: “only the institution of judicial proceedings
halts the running of the prescriptive period.” Further, the criminal action can only be
instituted by the filing of Information since the case falls under Summary Procedure.
Issue: whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May
23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged
Held: NO
With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered:
(1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
1) With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months
for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
2) The time the period of prescription starts to run is also governed by statute. Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of
the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of
the prescription period.
3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted:
Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio. (Rules on Summary
Procedure)
Baguio is a chartered city. Consequently, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. The
said case likewise involved the the violation of a municipal ordinance.
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor
who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription
period.
• The recent People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not
controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases
that upheld this principle as well.
• However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to
ordinances.
Thus, when the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of
the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
• It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription
period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the
period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
• The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays
the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that
possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious
intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language.
NOTE: According to Atty. GSA because of this case:
For cases falling under the Rules of Summary Procedure – Zaldivia case governs. Only the
institution of judicial proceedings, ie., Information filed with the court, can toll the running of
prescriptive period.
Exception: BP 22 and all other offenses not falling under Summary Procedure: Panaguiton case
governs.
ZabalaCute 4
 B. WHO MUST PROSECUTE: SECTIONS 05 AND 16
Pinote v Ayco – public prosec must be present in presentation of evid
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944 December 13, 2005
Facts: On two dates, Judge. Ayco of the RTC of South Cotabato allowed the defense in a
Criminal Case for violation of P.D. No. 1866, to present evidence consisting of the testimony of
two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
• State Prosecutor Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center
in Quezon City, hence, his absence during the proceedings on the said dates.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the case, State Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-
examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he maintaining that
the proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence were void.
• State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation to that effect and prayed not to
be coerced to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be
stricken off the record
• Judge Ayco then issued an Order, and considered the prosecution to have waived its right
to cross-examine the two defense witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State Prosecutor Pinote
(complainant) against Judge Ayco (respondent), for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse
of Authority and Serious Misconduct.
Issue: WON a judge can allow the presentation of defense witnesses in the absence of the
public prosecutor and against the latter’s subsequent contentions - NO. Respondents act of
allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public
prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the
Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-
examine the witnesses.
In accordance with Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as a general
rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public
prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public
prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution
Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of
the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until
the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is
revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Respondents intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no
matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due
process, so is the State.
Respondents lament about complainants’ failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the
August 13 and 20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently
file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses
on said dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve respondent of his utter disregard of the
Rules.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
People v Dela Cerna pardon must be made prior to institution of case
G.R. Nos. 136899-904. October 9, 2002
• Six criminal complaints for rape for then filed against Ernesto in 1997.
 Ernesto Dela Cerna started raping his daughter, Irene, when she was only seven years
old. It continued until Irene was 15, when she finally told her classmates about it who
then told their mothers.
 During trial, Ernesto opted not to testify invoking his constitutional right to remain
silent.
• Irene initially testified and recounted her horrifying experience. However, in 1998, the
defense presented Irene to prove that she voluntarily executed an affidavit of desistance.
 Irene explained that she decided to forgive her father for the sake of her mother and
her younger siblings who experienced pain and difficulty in sustaining their daily
needs as their whole family was dependent upon their father for support.
 Note: An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement, executed by a complainant in a
criminal or administrative case, that he or she is discontinuing or disavowing the
action filed upon his or her complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. The
court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an
afterthought.
• RTC: convicted! imposed the penalty of death.
• Ernesto: affidavit of desistance created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt
Issue: WON Ernesto should still be convicted of rape even after the pardon by Irene - YES
In seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, two modes are recognized for
extinguishing criminal liability - pardon and marriage. In all cases, however, the pardon must
come prior to the institution of the criminal action.
• After the case has been filed in court, any pardon made by the private complainant, whether
by sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal liability.
Irene filed her complaint on May 16, 1997 and even testified against accused-
appellant on March 25, 1998. On the other hand, she executed her affidavit of
desistance only on July 3, 1998. Clearly, the pardon extended by the victim to her
father was made after the institution of the criminal action. Consequently, it cannot be
a ground to dismiss the action in these cases.
The complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code is but a condition precedent
to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties in the name
of the People of the Philippines.
• Such condition is imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family
who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of
a public trial.
• Hence, once filed, control of the prosecution is removed from the offended partys hands
and any change of heart by the victim will not affect the states right to vindicate the atrocity
committed against itself.
*It is worthy to note that the rape incidents in this case occurred prior to the effectivity of The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997 on October 22, 1997 and classified the crime of rape as a crime against
persons. Such being the case, we shall apply the old law and treat the acts of rape herein
committed as private crimes.
ZabalaCute 5
 People v Go – Only OSG can appeal
GR No 201644 September 24, 2014
Facts:
• Prusuant to a complaint filed by PDIC, 7 informations were filed before the RTC charging
Go and Dela Rosa, of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents
for allegedly defrauding Oriental Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC)of the
amount of P159, 000, 000. 00.
However, the trial also underwent series of postponements/ cancellations caused
mainly by the prosecution, leading to its failure to present its evidence despite the
lapse of 5 years.
This prompted the respondents to file a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute and
for violation of their right to speedy trial.
• the RTC initially dismissed the case, ruling that the respondents’ right to speedy trial was
violated. However, upon MR, the cases were reinstated
• Thus, Go and Dela Rosa CA: petition for certiorari. Copy of the petition was served
only on the private complainant, PDIC and not the People through the OSG, as it was
not even impleaded as party to the case.
• CA reversed the RTC, resulting in the dismissal of the cases without first ordering
respondents to implead the People.
• PDIC OSG oh! transmitted copies of the CA decision to the OSG resulting to the filing
of the instant petition.
• OSG: the People, who is the petitioner in this case, was neither impleaded nor served a
copy of the petition, thereby violating its right to due process of law, hence, rendering the
CA without authority to promulgate its issuances.

Issue: WON the criminal case against Go and Dela Rosa were properly dismissed by the CA,
without the People, as represented by the OSG, having been impleaded.

Held: No, the petition cannot be resolved without the OSG. The OSG, which represents
the People, is an indispensable party to the case. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions null and void.

The People is an indispensable party to the proceedings.

• indispensable parties - “parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action.
• The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction,
absence of which, renders all subsequent actions of the court null ad void for want of
authority to act, not only to the absent parties but even as to those present.

While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of an
action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court, on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/orsuch times as are just, it remains
essential – as it is jurisdictional – that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings
before the court renders judgment.

In this case, it is evident that the CA proceeded to render judgment without an indispensable
party, i.e., the People, having been impleaded. Thus, in light of the foregoing discussion, these
issuances should be set aside and the case be remanded to the said court.

ZabalaCute 6
 C. COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION (SECTIONS 2-4; 6-13)
People of the Philippines v Bayobos, et al
“Hazing” on its own, is not sufficient or particular enough you need to explain it. If it is not
stated particularly then it is quashable.
• Bayobos et al, the school authorities of the PMMA, were criminally charged before the
Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law for the death of
Balidoy
 Balidoy was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. In order to reach
active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory
"Indoctrination and Orientation Period.”
 On the 2nd day of the Indoctrination and Orientation Period, Balidoy died.
 Informations against Alzarez et al as principals were also filed but were later dismissed
by the RTC
• The Informations against Bayobos et al provided that they failed “fail to take any action to
prevent the occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of psychological and physical
injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. thereby causing the instantaneous death
of the latter.”
• Bayobos et al – Motion to Quash: Information did not contain all the essential elements of
the offense – no allegation that:
a) the purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially
considering that the victim had already been accepted in the academy.
b) they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the
activity.
c) that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental, and psychological testing
and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental
and psychological fitness of prospective regular members."
• Before arraignment, Sandiganbayan: Info quashed
 the Information charged no offense, and that the allegations therein were mere
conclusions of law.
 failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption relating to
the duly recommended and approved "testing and training procedure and practices"
for prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP
- NOTE: this was wrong. SC: This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an
essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that
must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution.
SC: The Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not include all the
material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. There is no allegation that
the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the
organization.
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court
based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is
the claim that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an information
must be quashed on that ground, the basic test is to determine if the facts averred would establish
the presence of the essential elements of the crime as defined in the law. 1
1
Hazing elements: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or
subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a
prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an organization.
• The information is examined without consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims
therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial.
• In the appraisal of the information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.
As can be gleaned from allegations in the Informations, the indictment merely states that
psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation
that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the
organization.
• Plain reference to a technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and
incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a
mere conclusion of law.
• Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must
include, inter alia, both "the designation of the offense given by the statute" and "the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense."
*NO AMENDMENT MADE
We reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the
filing of another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing
the case outright.
• Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is
based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall
give the prosecution a chance to correct the defect by amendment.
• However, the provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, the
motion shall be granted.
• Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to
Quash that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information
after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the eventual dismissal of the
case.
*HOWEVER, INFORMATION CAN BE FILED AGAIN
This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another
information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash
would not bar another prosecution.
 That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.
The Special Prosecutor’s belated argument in his Petition before this Court that the successful
completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite for
continued admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active midshipman status – does not
cure this defect in the Information.
*DISMISSAL OF CASE AGAINST PRINCIPAL DOES NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL OF
CASE AGAINST ACCOMPLICE. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can
proceed independently of that of the principal.
Elements against school authorities: (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred;
(2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to
take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
ZabalaCute 7
 Lasoy, et al v Zenarosa
G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005
Where the Information charged the accused of selling 42.410 a of dried marijuana instead of
42.410 kilos and the accused had been arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge, the
information can no longer be amended
• An Information was filed against accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa charging them
with unlawfully selling or offering for sale total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting
tops in Violation of Section 4, Republic Act 6425.
• Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced to 6 months and
1 day of imprisonment. Both accused then applied for probation.
• However, the People of the Philippines, then filed two separate motions:
a) first, to admit amended Information, and
b) second, to set aside the arraignment of the accused, as well as the decision of the trial
court sentencing the accused.
In its motions, the People alleged that contrary to the Information, the accused sold 42.410
kilos, not grams.
• The RTC denied the motion to amend the Information, but granted the motion to set aside
the arraignment and decision sentencing the accused. The amended Information was then
filed and assigned to another RTC branch.
• Lasoy and Banisa: insists on the validity of the first Information and contending the defense
of double jeopardy.
• Respondents, on the other hand, asserts that the accused were arraigned under an invalid
information. Alleging that there being an alteration on the first information, hence it failed
to reflect the true quantity of drugs caught in possession of the accused, the prosecution
insists that the first information under which accused were arraigned is invalid.
Issue: whether or not the first information is valid - YES. The first information is valid
inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the
purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is
reasonably complied with.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and
the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.
• In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence
may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to
law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid.
SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial courts point of view that the accused cannot
claim their right against double jeopardy because they participated/acquiesced to the tampering,
we hold that while this may not be far-fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof. The
alleged tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the subject of
another inquiry.
Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information amended defies
procedural rules, the decision having attained finality after the accused applied for probation and
the fact that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based
on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie.
People v Puig
G.R. Nos. 173654-765 August 28, 2008
In an Information for Qualified Theft against bank tellers, the allegations that such employees
acted with grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and prejudice of the Bank, without
particularly referring to it as owner of the money deposits, is sufficient
• Informations were filed before the RTC for 112 cases of Qualified Theft against
respondents Puig and Porras who were the Cashier and Bookkeeper, respectively, of
private complainant Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc.
• The pertinent allegations in the Informations provide that: with grave abuse of confidence,
being the Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of Pototan, feloniously take, steal and
carry away the sum of 15,0000
• RTC refused to issue warrants of arrest and dismissed the case:
 Information failed to state facts constituting the qualifying circumstance of grave
abuse of confidence; and
 the element of taking without the consent of the owner, since the owner of the money
is not the Bank, but the depositors therein.
SC: Sufficient allegation. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to
know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly
Grave abuse of confidence – allegation of position sufficient; banks considered owner
• It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of a Bank who
come into possession of the monies deposited therein enjoy the confidence reposed in them
by their employer.
• Banks, on the other hand, where monies are deposited, are considered the owners thereof.
• This is very clear not only from the express provisions of the law, but from established
jurisprudence.
In various cases, where the Informations merely alleged the positions of the respondents; that
the crime was committed with grave abuse of confidence, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the Bank, without necessarily stating the phrase being assiduously
insisted upon by respondents, "of a relation by reason of dependence, guardianship or vigilance,
between the respondents and the offended party that has created a high degree of confidence
between them, which respondents abused," and without employing the word "owner" in lieu of
the "Bank" were considered to have satisfied the test of sufficiency of allegations.
As regards the respondents who were employed as Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Bank in this
case, there is even no reason to quibble on the allegation in the Informations that they acted with
grave abuse of confidence. In fact, the Information which alleged grave abuse of confidence by
accused herein is even more precise, as this is exactly the requirement of the law in qualifying
the crime of Theft.
In summary, the Bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients; and the
employees of the Bank, who are entrusted with the possession of money of the Bank due to the
confidence reposed in them, occupy positions of confidence. The Informations, therefore,
sufficiently allege all the essential elements constituting the crime of Qualified Theft.
ZabalaCute 8
 Ricarze v CA particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes
G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007 of convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was
• Caltex filed a criminal complaint against Ricarze for estafa through falsification of actually PCIB and not Caltex as alleged in the information.
commercial documents.
 Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger. His primary task was to collect RE: substitution; not a substantial amendment – did not alter the basis of the charges
checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
 It was alleged that he collected company checks, forged and endorsed them in favor determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
of one Dante Guttierez, and deposited the checks in an account under the same name
which he opened himself in PCIB the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The
 The checks which were cleared by PCIB, the depositary bank of Caltex. substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any
• In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of ₱581,229.00 to Caltex prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained
-Note: City Prosec was not informed of this development. the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot
• After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
where Caltex was named as the offended party
• After arraignment and during trial, SRMO (law office), representing PCIB, filed a Formal
Offer of Evidence
• Ricarze opposed! Formal Offer of Evidence should be stricken from the records!
a) damage or injury to the offended party is an essential element of estafa.
b) He contended that under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not
PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken from
the records.
- Caltex was represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and Perez
Law Office during trial, and it was only after the prosecution had rested its case
that SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor representing the PCIB.
- Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their
appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as private prosecutor.
c) the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this late stage of the trial
is tantamount to a substantial amendment of the Informations which is prohibited since
he was already arraigned
- He posits that if subrogation was proper, then the charges against him should be
dismissed, the two Informations being "defective and void due to false
allegations" since it failed to name PCIB as true offended party
• PCIB: we re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence,
subrogation! Further, erroneous designation of the name of the offended party is a mere
formal defect which can be cured by inserting the name of the offended party in the
Information.

Issue: WON the charges against Ricarze should be dismissed due to “false” allegations in
the Information

Held: NO. In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended
party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified.

In previous cases it was ruled that when an offense shall have been described in the complaint
with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured
shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice
any substantial right of the defendant.

In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code,
since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such

ZabalaCute 9
 Senador v People
G.R. NO. 201620 March 6, 2013
• An Information for Estafa was filed against Senador before the RTC:
 Rita Jaime (Rita) and her daughter-in-law and business parner, Cynthia Jaime
(Cynthia), were engaged in a jewelry business.
 They delivered several pieces of jewelry worth P705,685.00 to the accused, Senador,
for the latter to sell on a commission basis for which they executed a Trust Receipt
Agreement.
 However, Senador failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold
jewelry within their agreed period.
• Senador refused to testify. Instead, Senador asserted that the person named as the offended
party in the Information is not the same person who made the demand and filed the
complaint.
 According to Senador, the private complainant in the Information went by the name
"Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private complainant turned out to be "Rita
Jaime."
 Thus, she insists on her acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been violated.
 However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, such as a
warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the
designation of the offended party is immaterial.
In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other generic
property. Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense as "various kinds of
jewelry valued in the total amount of P705,685.00." The charge was thereafter sufficiently
fleshed out and proved by the Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Senador and presented during
trial which specifically enumerated the pieces of jewelry.
Thus, the error in the designation of the offended party in the information is immaterial and did
not violate Senador's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her.

Issue: whether or not an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party
violates, as petitioner argues, the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.

Held: NO. At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of the
information and the evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to
an acquittal, more so if the variance relates to the designation of the offended party, a mere
formal defect, which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.

As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador's reliance on Uba is misplaced. In Uba, the
appellant was charged with oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the identity of the
person against whom the defamatory words were directed is a material element. Thus, an
erroneous designation of the person injured is material.
• On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a crime against
property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper designation of the
name of the offended party.
• Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged
in the information. Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended party in
crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction
of the information, not its dismissal.

In offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous designation of the offended party
would depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently described and
identified.
• if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the money
unlawfully, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the
acquittal of the accused.
 Ratio: the only way that it (money) could be described and identified in a complaint
is by connecting it to the offended party or the individual who was robbed as its owner
or possessor.

ZabalaCute 10
 People v. Reyes
G.R. No. 225736, October 15, 2018
Defective information entitles the accused to an acquittal
• An Information was filed against Reyes for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, alleging that he
sold “shabu xxx without any authority to sell the same.”
 He was apprehended in a buy-bust operation
 Reyes defense: he was just in a gasoline station on the way to buy meds for his
grandma when he was suddenly apprehended (denial and alibi)
• RTC convicted Reyes, sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of P500k
• Reyes appealed to the CA
• CA affirmed:
a) the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crimes charged
b) the evidence of the prosecution established an unbroken chain of custody wherein the
integrity and evidentiary value of the specimens were preserved.
SC: At the outset, it bears pointing out that the Information filed against Reyes in this case
was defective, for which reason alone Reyes should be acquitted.
• The importance of sufficiency of the Information cannot be more emphasized; it is an
essential component of the right to due process in criminal proceedings as the accused
possesses the right to be sufficiently informed of the cause of the accusation against him.

Reyes was thus supposedly charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution of which requires that the following elements be proven:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

The Information filed against Reyes, however, makes a conclusion of law – that he "did x x
x sell" dangerous drugs – without specifically stating 1) the identity of the buyer; 2) the amount
of dangerous drugs supposedly traded by Reyes; and 3) the consideration for the sale.

In the case at bar, the Information filed against Reyes failed to sufficiently identify therein all
the components of the first element of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, namely: the identity
of the buyer, the object, and the consideration
To repeat, for this reason alone, Reyes should already be acquitted.

Even assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that the Information in this case sufficiently
informed Reyes of the charge against him, Reyes would still be acquitted on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 Failed to follow Sec 21 and justify such failure.
 The provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed
immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing
must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an
elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from
the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
 In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law

ZabalaCute 11
 D. AMENDMENT/SUBSTITUTION (SECTION 14)
Corpus vs Pamular (leonen, 2018) - conspiracy
• An Information for Murder was filed against Carlito Samonte for the death of
Angelito Espinosa, alleging that:
 treacherously and taking advantage of superior strength, Samonte attacked and shot
Espinosa with an unlicensed firearm
• Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense.
• Later, because of an affidavit filed by a certain Lorenzo, it was found that Corpuz was
the one who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito.
• The Prosec then filed a motion to amend the information to include Corpuz in the Info
filed against Samonte, further alleging that the two acted in conspiracy
• Judge granted the motion and issued a warrant of arrest against Corpuz
• In this case, Petitioners question the inclusion of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase
"conspiring and confederating together" in the amended information.
 They contend that Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
prohibits substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of the
accused after his or her arraignment.To buttress their point, they cited People v.
Montenegro, which provided that an allegation of conspiracy which was not
previously included in the original information, constitutes a substantial amendment.
 Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the amended information,
Samonte will have an additional burden of setting up a new defense particularly on
any acts of his co-accused since "the act of one is the act of all."
Issue: whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he allegedly admitted the
Amended Information in clear defiance of law and jurisprudence, which proscribes
substantial amendment of information prejudicial to the right of the accused;
SC: Essentially, after arraignment, 1) only formal amendments can be done; and 2) it must
not be prejudicial to the rights of the accused. In this case, while the allegation of
conspiracy was only formal, it was still prejudicial to the rights of the accused. Hence, it
was not allowed.
First, Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke this rule. Petitioner
Corpus cannot invoke this argument because he has not yet been arraigned.
1) CONSPIRACY ONLY A FORMAL AMENDMENT (hence can be done after
arraignment)
Formal amendment – amendment that does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence
of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation.
Substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
a) The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of
the original information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte's co-accused and
the insertion of the phrase "conspiring and confederating together."
 The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of the prosecution that
Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelita. Hence, the amendment is merely
formal.
 conspiracy is not an essential or qualifying element of the crime of murder. The
addition of conspiracy would only affect petitioner Corpuz, if together with the crime
of murder leveled against petitioner Samonte, both circumstances are duly proven by
the prosecution.
b) Montenegro inapplicable: the case cited by petitioners in this case rendered the addition of
conspiracy in the amended information substantial because it either alters the defense of
the accused or alters the nature of the crime to which the accused pleaded.
 However, the factual incidents of the cited cases are different from this present case
because the allegation of conspiracy in the amended information did not change the
prosecution's basic theory that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelito.
 In Montenegro, because of the allegation of conspiracy - Robbery under Article 209
became Robbery in an Uninhabited Place under Article 302
2) HOWEVER, formal amendments amendment is prejudicial to the rights of the
accused Samonte
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been
said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available
after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be
equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.
It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information, Samonte admitted the
killing but pleaded self-defense. While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment, Samonte will
be prejudiced if the amendment will be allowed after his plea.
 Applying the test, his defense and corresponding evidence will not be compatible
with the allegation of conspiracy in the new information. Therefore, such formal
amendment after plea is not allowed.
Other issues:
1. whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he conducted further proceedings on the
Amended Information and consequently issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner
Amado Corpus, Jr. despite the pendency of his and petitioner Carlito Samonte's Petition
for Review before the Department of Justice;
- NO, this Court's rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension
counted from the filing of a petition with the reviewing office. Consequently,
therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, "the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment
2. whether or not the arraignment of petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. may proceed after the lapse
of the maximum 60-day period suspension provided for under Rule 116, Section 11(c) of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;
3. whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular has personally determined, through
evaluation of the Prosecutor's report and supporting documents, the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr.
ZabalaCute 12

Pacoy v Hon. Cajigal
G.R. NO. 157472 September 28, 2007
Change in caption: from homicide to murder;
• Not a substantial amendment – change in caption only; Not prejudicial – facts remained
as charged
• No double jeopardy – no new Information was filed. The information was not
dismissed; it was just amended not substituted.
• In 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner SSGT. Jose
M. Pacoy.
 It was alleged therein that he shot his commanding officer, 2Lt. Esquita with his
armalite rifle causing the latter’s instantaneous death.
 It was further alleged that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance
of disregard of rank.
• Upon arraignment, Payco pleaded not guilty to the charge.
• However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued an Order
directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public
respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
 Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the
word Homicide and instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening
paragraph of the Information.
 The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information
for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victims name from Escuita to
Escueta.
• When Pacoy was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder, his counsel objected on the
ground Pacoy would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had
been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case.
• As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public
respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.
Pacoy then, filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the
Resolution of the Instant Motion again on the ground of double jeopardy.
• In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that disregard of rank is merely a generic
mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of
homicide to murder.
In the instant case, Petitioner argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for
Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the
respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the ground of
double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of the
Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he would again
be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
reinstating the Homicide case.
Issues:
1. WON the amendment from homicide to murder is a substantial one
2. WON the reinstatement of the Information for Homicide constituted double jeopardy
Held: NO
Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under Section 14,
Rule 110 with Section 19, Rule 119 (When mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense)
Ruling in determining whether there should be an amendment OR a substitution:
• Amendment sufficient if: the second information involves the same offense, or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information;
• Substitution is in order where: the new information charges an offense which is distinct
and different from that initially charged
• There is identity between the two offenses when:
1. the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other, or;
2. when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or;
3. when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first
information.
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute
the latter.
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a
formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution.
Not a substantial amendment – change in caption only; Not prejudicial – facts remained
as charged
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the
only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of
the Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by the word
Murder.
There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for
Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide,
as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta
without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption
and preamble from Homicide to Murder as purely formal
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the
accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of
the accused.
• The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information.
• Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are
identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any
effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible
prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
ZabalaCute 13
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that disrespect on account of rank qualified the
crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find that
he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after
petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made
was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.

No double jeopardy – no new Information was filed. The information was not dismissed;
it was just amended.
there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present:
(1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first

As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only

(a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment;
(d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

The respondent judge's Order was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information
but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as
contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110.

Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 (substitution), applies only when the
offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted
of a crime with which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case,
there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the
proper offense.

Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information.
• In this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely
ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To
repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word
Homicide and writing the word Murder, instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of
the homicide case.

ZabalaCute 14
 Ricarze v CA
G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial
amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor
did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the
forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well
before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
Facts: Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service
Corporation. His primary task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the
cashier.
In 1997, Caltex filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents before the City Prosecutor. It was alleged that he forged 4 company
checks which were cleared by Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB), the depositary
bank of Caltex.
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of ₱581,229.00. However, the City Prosecutor
of Makati City was not informed of this development. Hence, in the 2 Informations filed by the
Prosec against Ricarze, it was alleged that it was Caltex who was defrauded by Ricarze.
Ricarze was arraigned and he pleadednot guilty. During trial, SRMO (law office), representing
PCIB, filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Ricarze. He contended that under
the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex, represented by ACCRA Law and Balgos
and Perez Law, and not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be
stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private
complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that
the Informations can no longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under the
original Informations. He posits that if subrogation was proper, then the charges against him
should be dismissed, the two Informations being "defective and void due to false allegations"
since it failed to name PCIB as true offended party
PCIB, through SRMO, contended that the PCIB had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the
extent of the indemnity; hence, it had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as
private complainant. Further, that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the offended party is a mere formal
defect which can be cured by inserting the name of the offended party in the Information.
The RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the substitution of
PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however denied petitioner’s motion to have the formal
offer of evidence of SRMO expunged from the record. Ricarze appealed to the CA, but the latter
dismissed the same.
In the instant case, Ricarze argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant
at this late stage of the trial is prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is
tantamount to a substantial amendment of the Informations which is prohibited under Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: WON the substitution of Caltex by PCIB is tantamount to a substantial amendment
Held: NO. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under
the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and
whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in
the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature
of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form
and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial
amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did
it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged
checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial.
Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
RE: subrogation
Subrogation was proper. Petitioner’s argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees
with respondent PCIB’s comment that petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and
conventional subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a third
person, who substitutes him in all his rights.28 It may either be legal or conventional. Legal
subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but by operation of law because of
certain acts. Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is that which takes place by agreement
of the parties.31 Thus, petitioner’s acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to take place
because the instant case is one of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without
need of the debtor’s knowledge.
RE: “defective” Information
when an offense shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to
Identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as
the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the
defendant.
In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code,
since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of
convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was
actually PCIB.
Lastly, on petitioner’s claim that he timely objected to the appearance of SRMO as private
prosecutor for PCIB, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA that contrary to his claim,
petitioner did not question the said entry of appearance even as the RTC acknowledged the
same. Thus, petitioner cannot feign ignorance or surprise of the incident, which are "all water
under the bridge for his failure to make a timely objection thereto."
ZabalaCute 15
 E. VENUE (SECTION 15)
Bonifacio v RTC of Makati
G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010
• 13 separate Informations for libel were filed before the Makati RTC against petitioners
Piccio et al, officers and trustees of PEPCI.
 It was alleged therein that in Makati City, a place within the jurisdiction of the Makati
RTC, the accused published an article on pepcoalition.com, attacking the Yuchengco
Family and Malayan Insurance.
• Petitioners then filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on
the Makati RTC.
 Citing Macasaet v. People, petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege
a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was
printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time
the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.
• RTC then quashed the Information.
 Prosec moved to reconsider the quashal: alleged that even assuming that the
Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
 RTC: ok nice amend mo
• The amended Information alleged that the accused published an injurious and defamatory
article, “which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati
City”
Issue: WON the Amended Information was sufficient to vest the Makati RTC with jurisdiction
over the case
Held: NO.
In accordance with Article 360 RPC, the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely:
1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or
2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
Thus, if the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the
offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to
forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its
printing and first publication.
• To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on
petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills
that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent.
• It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where
the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be
sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly
accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts
of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the
floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is
likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially
as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places
of residence, in which situation there isno need to embark on a quest to determine with precision
where the libelous matter was printed and first published.
Thus, the RTC was directed to quash the Amended Information and dismiss the case.

The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the
second. Thus, it stated that the offending article was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City.
• In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of
printing and first publication.

The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction

in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to
Article 360 by RA No. 4363.
• Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be
instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed .
• Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused
in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
• To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific
rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party from
inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints
filed in remote municipal courts

ZabalaCute 16
 Navaja v. People
• A complaint affidavit was filed by DKT Philippines against petitioner Navaja:
 It alleged that the Navaja was the regional sales manager of DKT.
 That Navaja falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses in
the amount of P1810, instead of the actual amount of P810 at Garden Cafe, Jagna,
Bohol
• Navaja was charged with the crime of falsification of a private document before the MCTC
of Jagna, Bohol. Pertinent part of the information states:
 That on or about 2nd day of october 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of
Bohol and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, with intent to prejudice a
juridical person did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously falsify a
commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe Jagna Bohol by making an alteration in
the said receipt…
• Navaja filed a motion to quash on the ground that none of the essential elements of the
crime of falsification of private documents occurred in Jagna, Bohol.
 She claims that the damage was done only when she submitted the receipt for
reimbursement in Cebu City in DKT’s office.
• MCTC denied the MTQ. Rule 65 certiorari to RTC. RTC and CA affirmed
 RTC noted that Jagna Bohol was the proper venue in light of the sworn statement of
Ms. Lavaro, the cashier at the time of the issuance of receipt.
 Lavaro narrated that after issuing the receipt, Navaja borrowed a pen and wrote
something on the receipt..
• Navaja argues that not one of the essential elements (1. Act of falsification; 2. Falsification
committed in a private document; and 3. Falsification caused damage to 3rd party or was
at least committed with intent to cause damage) was shown to have been committed in
Bohol.
o She argues that the complaint affidavit and information only shows that the
receipt was issued in Jagna, Bohol
o Place of issuance of receipt is not an element of a crime.
o The damage to DKT was present only at the time of reimbursement in Cebu
City.
Issue/s: W/N the MCTC in Jagna Bohol had jurisdiction - Yes. It was the proper venue.
Ratio:
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired, the offense or any
one of its essential elements must took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.
● Once shown, the court may take cognizance of the case.
● However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action.
In cases of falsification of a private document, the venue is the place where the document is
actually falsified to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person.
● It is committed even if there was no damage done. Thus, when Navaja wrote something on
the receipt, such alteration was already with intent to prejudice DKT. Thus, the crime was
already committed.
● The allegations in the information and complaint-affidavit make out a prima facie case that
such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol.
Rigor v People
G.R. No. 144887. November 17, 2004
● An Information was filed before RTC of Pasig City against petitioner Rigor for
violation of BP 22.
 It was alleged therein that in the Municipality of San Juan, Rigor issued
postdated checks in the amount of P500,000 in favor of the Rural Bank of
San Juan, Inc, drawn against Associated Bank, Tarlac Branch.
 When the check was deposited with PSBank San Juan Branch, the same was
dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Employees of Rural
Bank advised Rigor of the dishonor in his residence in Tarlac.
• The Pasig RTC convicted Rigor, as affirmed by the CA.
• In the instant case, Rigor contends that the Pasig RTC had no jurisdiction over
this case since no proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered,
dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Issue: WON the Pasig RTC have jurisdiction over the case
Held: YES
Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes.
• In such crimes, some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in
which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other.
• Hence, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the
Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila and subsequently the check was dated February
16, 1990 thereat. The check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro
Manila.
Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac
Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of
issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense,
was also overtly manifested in San Juan.
**There is no question that crimes committed in in San Juan are triable by the RTC
stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest
jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City.
ZabalaCute 17
 AAA vs. BBBB
May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological
violence under the VAWC, committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit
relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country? YES

• BBB was charged before the Pasig RTC with psychological violence under the VAWC
for marital infidelity
 BBB, married to AAA, had an affair with a woman in Singapore where BBB worked
as a chef
 Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation
at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids.
• BBB: Motion to Quash – lack of jurisdiction
 Acts complained of occurred in SG
• RTC granted
• AAA: Venue under Sec 7 of VAWC includes where any of the elements occurred.
 mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged against
BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where
the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can
take cognizance of the case.

SC: PASIG RTC HAS JURISDICTION

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital
infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the
wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks
to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which
psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the
spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing
mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim
is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.

Violence against Women and Chldren may be transitory crimes.

Some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of
the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

It is necessary for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (c) was
committed outside the Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint was filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In
the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig
City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

ZabalaCute 18
 RULE 111 – PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
B. SECTION 04, AM NO. 15-06-10 SC
Dy vs. People
• MCCI, represented by Mandy, filed a case for estafa against Dy in the RTC.
 Dy was the former general manager of MCCI. She facilitated a loan from ICBC for
the purchase of a property.
 Thus, MCCI was granted a loan. As security, MCCI mortgaged certain warehouses
 3 years after, MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the mortgaged properties for
its default in paying the loan.
 To prevent the foreclosure, Mandy (Pres of MCCI) instructed Dy to facilitate the
payment of the loan.
 MCCI, through Mandy, issued 13 Allied Bank checks and 12 Asia Trust Bank checks
in varying amounts and in different dates covering the period from May 18, 1999 to
April 4, 2000. The total amount of the checks, which were all payable to cash, was
P21,706,281.00.
 Mandy delivered the checks to Dy claiming that he delivered the checks with the
instruction that Dy should use the checks to pay the loan. On the other hand, Dy
testified that she encashed the checks and returned the money to Mandy.
 ICBC eventually foreclosed the mortgaged property due to MCCI's failure to
pay. Mandy claims that it was only at this point in time that he discovered that
not a check was paid to ICBC.
RTC decision: Acquitted Dy, prosecution failed to establish an important element of the crime
of estafa—misappropriation or conversion. Still, Dy was order to pay the amount of the checks
• Acquitted: found that while Dy admitted that she received the checks, the prosecution
failed to establish that she was under any obligation to deliver them to ICBC in payment of
MCCFs loan.
 This was based on the strength of Mandy's admission that he gave the checks to Dy
with the agreement that she would encash them and Dy would then pay ICBC using
her own checks. Furthermore, the court found that Mandy and Dy entered into a
contract of loan.
 Basis of acquittal: reasonable doubt
CA: Affirmed. The acquittal of Dy does not necessarily absolve her of civil liability. When an
accused is acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt, courts may still find him or her civilly
liable if the evidence so warrants. In this case, the evidence adequately proves that Dy received
the checks as a loan from MCCI. Thus, preventing the latter from recovering the amount of the
checks would constitute unjust enrichment.
Issue/s: WON the lower courts were correct ion holding Dy civilly liable despite the finding
that there was no estafa? No- there was no crime committed that could be used as the basis
for civil liability ex delicto. A separate civil case should be filed to make her liable under
the contract of loan
Held: The civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if the final judgment in the
criminal action is that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist
or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
In this case, there was no estafa because there was no misappropriation or conversion. There
was no adequate evidence to prove that Mandy gave the checks to Dy with the instruction that
she will use them to pay the ICBC loan. As such, civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded
because there is no act or omission punished by law which can serve as the source of
obligation.
The civil liability arising from the loan takes the nature of a civil liability ex contractu. As such,
it arises from an entirely different source of obligation. It is not the type of civil action deemed
instituted in the criminal case, and consequently must be filed separately. This is because
whenever the court makes a finding that the elements of estafa do not exist, it effectively
says that there is no crime. There is no act or omission that constitutes criminal fraud. Civil
liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it cannot be sourced from something that does not exist.
● When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a contract
of loan, it takes a position completely inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In
estafa, a person parts with his money because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a
contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself to give something or to render
some service. In estafa, the accused's failure to account for the property received
amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to comply with his obligation
is only a contractual breach. Thus, any finding that the source of obligation is a
contract negates estafa. The finding, in turn, means that there is no civil liability ex
delicto. Thus, this is consistent with the concept of fused civil and criminal actions,
and the different sources of obligations under our laws.
Violation of due process
● Since the RTC was focused on establishing estafa, the contract of loan was only
tangentially considered. The terms and conditions of the said contract was never
established. This provides a compelling reason why the civil liability arising from the
loan should be instituted in a separate civil case. A civil action for collection of sum
of money filed before the proper court will provide for a better venue where the terms
of the loan and other relevant details may be received. Actions focused on proving
estafa is not the proper vehicle to thresh out civil liability arising from a contract.
Procedural due process means the right to notice and hearing. Our ROC provides for
a set of procedures through which a person may be notified of the claims against him
or her as well as methods through which he or she may be given the adequate
opportunity to be heard.
● Any person invoking the power of the judiciary to protect or enforce a right or prevent
or redress a wrong must file an initiatory pleading which embodies a cause of action.
The contents of an initiatory pleading alleging a cause of action will vary depending
on the source of the obligation involved. In the case of an obligation arising from a
contract, as in this case, the cause of action in an initiatory pleading will involve the
duties of the parties to the contract, and what particular obligation was breached. On
the other hand, when the obligation arises from an act or omission constituting a
crime, the cause of action must necessarily be different. These rules embody the
fundamental right to notice under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
● Where a court (in a fused action for the enforcement of criminal and civil liability)
may validly order an accused-respondent to pay an obligation arising from a contract,
a person's right to be notified of the complaint, and the right to have the complaint
dismissed if there is no cause of action, are completely defeated. The accused-
respondent is completely unaware of the nature of the liability claimed against him at
the onset of the case. He will not have read any complaint stating the cause of action
of an obligation arising from a contract. All throughout the trial, He is made to believe
that should there be any civil liability awarded against him or her, this liability is
rooted from the act or omission constituting the crime. As such, he is deprived of the
ZabalaCute 19
 remedy of having the complaint dismissed through a motion to dismiss before trial
because he was not even given an opportunity to ascertain what cause of action to look
for in the initiatory pleading. He could not even have prepared the appropriate
defenses and evidence to protect his or her interest. Thus, it would be a clear violation
of a person's right to due process.
Rimando vs. People (2014)
[ESTAFA CASE]
• Information filed against Rimando for estafa through the use of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations.
 Rimando enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business, allegedly Multitel, under the
assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8% monthly interest.
 Hence, Sps Aldaba paid Rimando 500k through a check
 In turn, Rimando gave Sps Aldaba 3 postdated check: one for 500k (principal) and
two for 40k each (interest); made them sign an investment contract w/ Multitel
 Upon maturity, checks dishonored; drawn against insufficient funds
• Rimando defense: acted only as accommodation party while waiting for Multitel checks;
when Multitel issued the check, Sps. Aldaba refused to accept it so she can be held liable
in case their investment fails.
lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and as such, she
may be held directly liable for the value of the issued check
2) Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP 22 cases had no effect in
the estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the same factual circumstances.
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of
facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are
considered “separate, distinct, and independent” from each other. Therefore, both cases can
proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to
the prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the
criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the
criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.
Hence, Rimando is still civilly liable in the estafa case despite her exoneration of her civil
liability in the BP 22 case.
*An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer,
acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending
his name to some other person.

[BP 22 CASE]
• Sps. Aldaba also filed a criminal case against Rimando for BP 22
• However, Rimando acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that
the act or omission from which liability may arise does not exist.

[BACK TO ESTAFA CASE]

• The RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to Sps.
Aldaba in the amount of P500,000.00.
• Acquitted: absence of element of deceit
 Sps. Aldaba were fully aware that they would be investing their money in Multitel and
not in Rimando’s purported business.
 Civil liability: as an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps.
Aldaba on behalf of Multitel, Rimando should be held liable

THUS, in this case, Rimando contends: her acquittal and exoneration from the civil liability in
the BP 22 cases should have barred Sps. Aldaba from claiming civil liability from her in the
estafa case.

ISSUE: Is the civil liability of Rimando in the estafa case extinguished by virtue of her acquittal
and exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases?

HELD:
1) Acquittal in estafa case did not mean she can no longer be civilly liable: civil liability
not based on crime
Rimando’s civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of P500,000.00 does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime she is charged with.

As the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce
them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an
accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In

ZabalaCute 20
 Ferrer, Jr v Sandiganbayan
G.R. NO. 161067 March 14, 2008 RE: Larin case cited by Ferrer, Jr
• An Information for violation of RA 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed The present case differs from Larin because here, the administrative case was filed
against Ferrer, Jr before the Sandiganbayan. independently of the criminal case. The administrative case was not filed on the basis of a
 The information alleged that Ferrer Jr, as the Administrator of the Intramuros criminal conviction, as in fact, the administrative case was dismissed without regard for the
Administration, gave unwarranted benefits to Offshore Construction and results of the criminal case. This is in contrast with Larin, where the administrative case was
Development Company by awarding lease contracts without conduct any public dismissed only after its basis, the criminal conviction, was overturned on appeal.
bidding.
• Before petitioner can be arraigned, he filed a Motion for Re-determination of Probable In Larin, no less than the Supreme Court acquitted the accused of charges of wrongdoing; in the
Cause, invoking the ruling of the Office of the President (OP), which absolved petitioner case at bar, no court of justice has yet declared Ferrer, Jr not guilty of committing illegal or
of administrative liability irregular acts.
 Ferrer Jr contended that the complainants were guilty of forum shopping, due to the
earlier dismissal of the administrative case against him. Under the Rules of Court, Ferrer, Jr's absolution from administrative liability is not even one of
• After several Motions for Reconsideration/Motions to Quash were denied, he filed the the grounds for a Motion to Quash.
instant case essentially reiterating the same argument. He argues that the criminal case
against him requires a higher quantum of proof for conviction – that is, proof beyond * In Larin, the accused was first convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of the National
reasonable doubt – than the administrative case, which needs only substantial evidence. Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On the basis of this
 He claims that from this circumstance, it follows that the dismissal of the conviction, an administrative case was filed against him. On appeal of the criminal conviction
administrative case should carry with it the dismissal of the criminal case. to the Supreme Court, however, he was acquitted upon a finding that the acts he had committed
Issue: WON finding of lack of administrative liability of a respondent government official were neither illegal nor irregular.
bar the filing of a criminal case against him for the same acts?  When the accused sought a similar dismissal of the administrative case, the Supreme
Court sustained him and ruled that since the same acts for which he was
Held: NO. The established rule is that an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to administratively charged had been found neither illegal nor irregular, his acquittal in
an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. the criminal case should entail the dismissal of the administrative case.
The basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability.
• The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on
the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
• On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.
• Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against Ferrer, Jr
is the fact that they were re-elected to office.
o Indeed, a re-elected local official may not be held administratively accountable for
misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding
is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with
full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct.
o If, armed with such knowledge, it still re-elects him, then such re-election is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
o However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but
not the criminal liability incurred by him during his previous term of office

To sustain petitioner’s arguments will be to require the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman to
merely adopt the results of administrative investigations which would not only diminish the
powers and duties of these constitutional offices, but also violate the independent nature of
criminal and administrative cases against public officials. This will also amount to untold delays
in criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman, as every criminal trial and
investigation before these bodies will be made to await the results of pending administrative
investigations. Such is not the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the laws governing
public officers.

There is, thus, no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash the Information against Ferrer, Jrs on
the basis solely of the dismissal of the administrative complaint against them.

ZabalaCute 21
 Corpuz v Siapno
Facts:
• In Criminal Cases filed before the Municipal Trial Court, where the Presiding Judge was
the respondent, Siapno, both the accused pleaded guilty to the charges against them. Judge
Siapno then imposed fines corresponding to the damages alleged in the Informations
therein.
• Thereafter, an administrative case2 was filed by Corpuz, the Clerk of Court against Siapno
for Ignorance of the Law in connection with the said case for failure to award civil damages.
• Judge Siapno contends that he did not award civil damages because the prosecution failed
to present any evidence regarding the civil aspect of the case.
• The OCA accordingly recommended that Judge Sipano be fined in the amount of Php2,000
for Ignorance of the Law.
The methods for indemnifying the private complainant is provided for under the provisions on
civil liability which, under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, includes: restitution;
reparation for the damage caused; and indemnification for consequential damages.
Pursuant to these statutory provisions, it behooves respondent to require the production
of evidence to make a finding on civil liability. This is especially so where the accused has
pleaded guilty and has therefore admitted his liability.
The Court however, found the fine insufficient considering that it was not respondent’s first
administrative case. It increased the fine to P20,000.

Issue: WON Judge Siapno is guilty of Ignorance of the Law

Held: YES. The rule expressly imposes upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with
respect to the civil liability arising from the offense, if no reservation has been made to ventilate
it in a separate action.

Thus, concomitant with his rendition of a guilty verdict, Judge Siapno should likewise make a
finding on the accused’s civil liability because it is basic that every person criminally liable is
also civilly liable.

Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when a complaint or information is filed even
without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim them, it is understood
that the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation
is made, or unless in the meantime, the offended party instituted a separate civil action.

Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to

establish the extent of injuries suffered.

Indeed, even in case of an acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of
the accused in favor of the offended party. Therefore, it was error for respondent not to have
entered judgment with respect to the civil liability.

It is also fundamental that the imposition of the fine imposed in the criminal case is not for the
purpose of indemnifying the aggrieved party but for vindicating the State for the offense
committed by the wrongdoer.

2
Complainant alleged that immediately upon his assumption of office, respondent Judge proposed
to her that they extort money from litigants; that respondent Judge used his chambers as his
residence; that he failed to make the required inventory of cases; that he used his filing cabinet for
storing personal belongings instead of case records; that he allowed his family to use a typewriter
issued by the Supreme Court; that he dismissed five criminal cases against his friend and drinking
companion, Captain Josephus Javonillo; that he falsified his Certificate of Service by stating
therein that he conducted sessions everyday of the week when he was always absent on
Thursdays and Fridays; that he intimidated three police officers who filed complaints for grave
slander against him; that he maligned complainant in the presence of the public; that he sent his
court personnel on personal errands such as marketing chores and washing dishes; that he
dismissed a rape case despite the interest of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
in the case since the victim was a minor; that he returned criminal cases for barangay conciliation
despite the presence of certificates to file action therein but entertained the countercharges
despite the lack of said certifications; that he failed to resolve three criminal cases within the period
prescribed by the Supreme Court; that he failed to award civil damages in Criminal Cases Nos.
12527 and 13482; that he instigated persons to stage a demonstration against complainant; and
that he ordered complainant to drop a case for robbery filed by the latter’s niece.

ZabalaCute 22
 Cruz v CA
G.R. No. 123340. August 29, 2002
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document before the Manila RTC.
• Cruz executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered
owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs.
• Since the offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from
the criminal offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal case.
Cruz was acquitted of Estafa based on reasonable doubt, but the trial court rendered judgment
on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of land
located in Bulacan.
must be served on the other real party in interest. If the offended party appeals or moves for
reconsideration, the accused is necessarily served a copy of the pleading through his counsel.
To fill in this lacuna in the present Rules, we require that henceforth if the accused appeals or
moves for reconsideration, he should serve a copy of his pleading on the offended party himself
if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. This is in addition to service on the public
prosecutor who is the counsel of record of the State.
In the instant case, the Court notes that petitioner did not serve a copy of her motion for
reconsideration on the offended party who was not represented by a private counsel in the trial
court. In the interest of justice, and considering that the present Rules are silent on the matter, it
is only fair to give petitioner a period of five days from receipt of this decision within which to
serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party.

Cruz contested the civil aspect of the case, but her motion for reconsideration was denied, as
affirmed by the CA.

In the instant case, Cruz is contesting that part of the decision of the trial court finding him civilly
liable even as he is acquitted from the criminal charge on reasonable doubt. She also assails the
jurisdiction of the Manila RTC contending that since the property was situated in Bulacan, then
the case should have been filed in Bulacan insofar as the civil aspect is concerned.

Issue: WON the Manila RTC had jurisdiction over the case
Held: YES.
RTC Manila has jurisdiction. Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the
governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which
pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and
the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises
jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve.

One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime.
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable. Article 104 of the same Code states that civil liability includes restitution.

The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless
reserved by the offended party. In the instant case, the offended party did not reserve the civil
action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action. Although the trial court
acquitted Cruz of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded on reasonable doubt, did not
extinguish the civil liability. Thus, the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to decide the civil
aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.

RE: Proof of Service

The present Rules do not require the accused to serve a copy of his motion for reconsideration
on the offended party who may not be represented by a private counsel. The Rules require
service only on the public prosecutor if the offended party is not represented by a private counsel.

The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.
Thus, any appeal or motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect of a decision in a criminal case

ZabalaCute 23
 Casupanan v Laroya
G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002
Facts:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Capitulo and
driven by petitioner Casupanan, figured in an accident.
As a result, two cases were filed with the MCTC:
1. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property;
2. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of
forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion
and dismissed the civil case on the ground of forum shopping.
The RTC affirmed the dismissal and hence the instant case.
Issue: WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly
file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.
Held: YES
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on
the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based
on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
• Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes
of action.
• The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code
• While the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code.
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal
action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of
the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the
criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission:
1. a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted;
and
2. a civil case for quasi-delict.
The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement
or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
• In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some
instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission
he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of
the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in
a separate civil action.
This is only fair for two reasons:
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is
deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his
counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for
quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil
action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of
the criminal action.
• To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing
to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access
to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is
proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC on the ground of forum-shopping is
erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal
case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility
has always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in
Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action
separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or
omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-
delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In
any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote
possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000
while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment
of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect
considering the well-settled rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
ZabalaCute 24
 C. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION: SECTIONS 6-7 may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting
the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.
Dreamwork Construction Inc v Janiola
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009 This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Criminal case against Janiola for BP 22 Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the
Civil case: rescission filed by janiola situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation
Not a PQ: gravamen of offense issuance of worthless check or during the trial may be filed.

• Info vs Janiola: violation of BP 22
 The case was filed due to the checks issued by Janiola in consideration of a
construction agreement with Dreamwork.
• 2 years later, Janiola civil complaint for the rescission of the construction agreement
with Dreamwork.
• Janiola criminal complaint - Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case:
prejudicial question!
 if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of
consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere
scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
• Dreamwork: what?! Criminal case instituted prior to the civil case! No PQ!
• Janiola: cites Art 36 of the CC - Art. 36. “Pre-judicial questions which must be decided
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by
rules of court…”
 the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must
be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed
either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the
criminal action.
• MTC: granted suspension; RTC affirmed
 MTC: that the criminal case was filed first was immaterial; motion for suspension of
a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests
 RTC: the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate
delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings; no evidence that it was filed for
purposes of delay
Issues:
1. WON the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a prejudicial
question to exist
2. WON the filing of the civil action for rescission of contract posed a prejudicial question
in the prosecution of the criminal case for BP 22
2. NO, the Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the
Criminal Action. “Valuable consideration” not an element of BP 22
The gravamen of BP 22 charge is the issuance of a bad check.
 The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution
and conviction of petitioner.
The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check
malum prohibitum. Thus, the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks
which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a
prosecution for violation of BP 22.
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between
the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private
respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued
checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject
of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question,
that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action
may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on
it are inapplicable to the case before us.
Thus the Court ordered the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case with
dispatch.
NOTE: The Court likewise noted that the filing of the Civil Case for rescission more than 3
years after the execution of the agreement indicates that it was filed as a mere afterthought and
interposed for delay. It is exactly this scenario that Sec 07 seeks to prevent.

Held:
1. YES, the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a prejudicial
question to exist.
the phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not
susceptible of alternative interpretations.

Art 36 Interpretation
The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the
Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action

ZabalaCute 25
 San Miguel Properties Inc
G.R. No. 166836 September 4, 2013
San Miguel to file a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas
(OCP Las Piñas) for violation of PD 957
it filed a case for specific performance in the HLURB, praying to compel BF Homes to
release the TCTs
PQ: YES
Facts:
• Sale between San Miguel (buyer) and BF Homes (seller) of 130 residential lots
 San Miguel Properties purchased 130 residential lots, contained in three separate
deeds of sale, from BF Homes, as represented by Atty. Orendain, its duly authorized
receiver appointed by the SEC.
 Despite payment having been made by San Miguel, BF Homes refused to deliver 20
TCTS covering 41 parcels of land.
 BF Homes claimed that the deed of sale was invalid because at the time they were
entered into, Atty Orendain was already replaced as BF Homes’ receiver pursuant to
an Order from the SEC.
• This prompted San Miguel to file a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Las Pinas (OCP Las Piñas) for violation of PD 957.3
• Thereafter, it filed a case for specific performance in the HLURB, praying to compel BF
Homes to release the TCTs. San Miguel then filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the
OCP Las Piñas, citing the pendency of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC.
 In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF Homes’ receivership, prompting
San Miguel to file a motion to withdraw the sought suspension.
• The OCP Las Piñas then rendered a resolution dismissing San Miguels properties
complaint in the criminal case, ruling, among others, that:
1) the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively
pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB;
2) that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal
action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB.
• DOJ denied the appeal by San Miguel ruling that:
unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions involving the lands in
question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in the
said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery
of the subject land titles.
• CA likewise dismissed San Miguel’s appeal.
• Note: In the HLURB case, the HLURB arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to
suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendain’s authority to
enter into the transactions in BF Homes’ behalf, because the final resolution by the SEC
was a logical antecedent to the determination of the issue involved in the complaint before
the HLURB.
• On appeal by San Miguel, this was reversed by the Office of the President ruling that
HLURB erred in suspending the proceedings.
3 THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS' PROTECTIVE DECREE.
• BF Homes then appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the OP’s ruling. It decreed that
the HLURB, not the SEC, had jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties’ complaint. It
affirmed the OP’s decision and ordered the remand of the case to the HLURB for further
proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters within the HLURB’s competence
and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the HLURB Case presented a prejudicial question that called for the
suspension of the criminal action for violation of PD No. 597
Held: YES. An action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an
administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Still, the
criminal proceedings for violation of PD 957 must be suspended in view of the case filed with
the HLURB, an administrative agency.
This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but
could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was
exclusive and original.
• An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a
contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed
upon by a party bound to fulfill it.
• On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of
subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing reports of alarming magnitude
of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators.
o Thus, PD No. 597 prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of
violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would
determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of
the remaining 20 TCTs.
On the other hand, the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and
officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs.
The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB
hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty.
Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership
having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of PD
No. 597 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Further, that the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in
the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence at all. This situation
conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction - the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having
ZabalaCute 26
been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory
scheme.
• In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative
body for its view on the matter in dispute.
• A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge
of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or
intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within
the jurisdiction of the courts.
Other submissions of petitioner:
1. San Miguel argued that PD No. 597, being malum prohibitum, the criminal liability attached
to BF Homes’ directors and officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs thereby rendering
the suspension unsustainable.
Factual(?) question! Important:
2. Di naman si BF Homes nagfile ng motion to suspend eh si San Miguel. So ano pinagsasabi
ni San Miguel na dapat sya lang magraise nung motion to suspend eh sya naman talaga? AT,
ang finile nya ay motion to suspend the proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas, citing the pendency
of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC pero winithdraw nya later on. SO ANO NA ANO
BA GUSTO NYA MANGYARI? SINO GUSTO MAGPASUSPEND?! Di ko na alam, pero
logically, si BF Homes ata.
IF ALL ELSE FAILS AT DI MO PA RIN MASAGOT TO BY CRIMPRO THURSDAY,
GAMITIN MO NALANG DIGEST SA BOOK NI RIANO.

SC: The mere fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with the
initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd result by means of rendering a reasonable
interpretation and application of the procedural law. A literal application of the principle
governing prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such application would produce unjust and
absurd results or unreasonable consequences.

2. San Miguel also contended that BF Homes cannot validly raise the prejudicial question so as
to suspend the criminal proceedings since it was not them who initiated neither of the actions. It
contends that the defense of a prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case could
only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said related case.

SC: The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to
who is allowed to raise the defense. When the law makes no distinction, we ought not to
distinguish.

QUESTIONS (from yourself huhu):

1. Criminal Complaint with the OCP Las Piñas preceded the filing of the HLURB Case. Even if
we were to deem the administrative case as a civil case, diba navviolate pa rin nya Sec 07 Rule
111 providing that (as per the elements) civil action must be instituted prior to the criminal
action?

Possible answer: Ok it may violate Sec 07 but this was still justified in view of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. But then, Criminal Complaint would have been suspended, not by virtue
of a prejudicial question as it goes against the elements thereof, but rather because of the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction.

ALSO, OCP did NOT merely suspend the criminal action. It DISMISSED it. So, even if justified
yung violation ng Sec 07 because of doctrine of primary jurisdiction, hindi ba yung dismissal of
the action violate the doctrine itself? Since sabi ng Court, the doctrine does not call for the
dismissal of the case in court, but only its suspension.

Then again, wala pa naman sa court. Sa OCP palang. So ano na?!?! Ewan 3 hrs ka na sa case na
to Zabala yan ka nanaman.

Alternative answer: “A literal application of the principle governing prejudicial questions is to

be eschewed if such application would produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable
consequences.”

ZabalaCute 27
 Gaditano v San Miguel Corp The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
G.R. No. 188767 July 24, 2013 check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The thrust of the law is
, in 2000, Sps Gaditano filed an an action for specific performance and damages against to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.
AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima in connection with the alleged unlawful
garnishment by AsiaTrust Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank liable for the unlawful
garnishment of petitioners’ savings account, petitioners cannot be automatically adjudged free
on 14 March 2001, SMC filed a criminal case for violation BP 22 and estafa against the Sps from criminal liability for violation of BP 22, because the mere issuance of worthless checks
Gaditano. with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself the offense.

PQ? No. Three notices of dishonor were sent to petitioners, who then, should have Furthermore, three notices of dishonor were sent to petitioners, who then, should have
immediately funded the check. When they did not, their liabilities under the bouncing checks immediately funded the check. When they did not, their liabilities under the bouncing checks
law attached. Such liability cannot be affected by the alleged prejudicial question because law attached. Such liability cannot be affected by the alleged prejudicial question because
their failure to fund the check upon notice of dishonour is itself the offense. their failure to fund the check upon notice of dishonour is itself the offense.

As for the estafa case, a prima facie presumption of deceit arises when a check is dishonored for
lack or insufficiency of funds.
Facts:
• Petitioner Spouses Argovan & Florida Gaditano were engaged in the business of buying
Records show that a notice of dishonor as well as demands for payment, were sent to petitioners.
and selling beer and softdrinks products.
The presumption of deceit applies, and petitioners must overcome this presumption through
 On April 7, 2000, they purchased beer products from San Miguel Corporation (SMC) substantial evidence. These issues may only be threshed out in a criminal investigation which
and issued a check drawn against Asia Trust as payment for the products. However, must proceed independently of the civil case.
whe the said check was presented for payment on 13 April 2000, the check was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Based on the foregoing, we rule that the resolution or the issue raised in the civil action is not
• Hence, on 14 March 2001, SMC filed a criminal case for violation BP 22 and estafa against determinative or the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal investigation against them.
the Sps Gaditano. There is no necessity that the civil case be determined firrst before taking up the criminal
 Gaditano defense: their checking account was funded under an automatic transfer complaints.
arrangement, whereby funds from their joint savings account with AsiaTrust Bank
were automatically transferred to their checking account with said bank whenever a
check they issued was presented for payment
 A certain Fatima borrowed money from them, and paid using a check. This check was
deposited in their account. It turns out however, there was a material alteration in the
name of the payee check, leading AsiaTrust to garnish the funds deposited in Sps
Gaditano’s accounts w/o any court order in April 13 2000
 Still, at the time they issued the same, it was still funded.
• Hence, in 2000, Sps Gaditano filed an an action for specific performance and damages
against AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima in connection with the alleged
unlawful garnishment by AsiaTrust.
 Had it not been for the unlawful garnishment, the funds in their savings account would
have been sufficient to cover a check they issued in favor of SMC. Thus, they assert
that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the prosecution of
the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa.
• Office of Prosec: recommended that the criminal proceedings be suspended pending
resolution of Civil Case, as affirmed by DOJ.
• CA reversed and ordered the continuation of the preliminary investigation.
 drew a distinction between the civil case which is an action for specific performance
and damages involving petitioners’ joint savings account, and the criminal case which
is an action for estafa/violation of BP 22 involving Argovan’s current account.

Issue: WON the action for specific performance filed by the Sps Gaditano constituted a
prejudicial question to suspend the Criminal Cases against them for BP 22 and Estafa

Held: NO.

ZabalaCute 28
 Consing vs People (2013)
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not
raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution
of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
• Consing, for himself and for his mother Dela Cruz, obtained a loan from Unicapital
 Loan secured by REM over a Cavite land under the name of Dela Cruz
 In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed
to purchase one-half of the property and offset the amount of the loan.
 Plus Builders bought the other half, formed a joint venture w/ Unicapital for its
development
 It turns out however that Dela Cruz’s title to the land was spurious
 Unicapital demanded the return of their payment from Consing and Dela Cruz
Thus:
1) Pasig Civil Case: TRO
 Filed by Consing; seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the
collection of the money on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
2) Makati Criminal Complaint: falsification of public document
 Filed by Unicapital before the OCP
3) Makati Civil Case: recovery of a sum of money and damages w/ prayer for WPA
 Filed by Unicapital against Consing and Dela Cruz
4) Manila Civil Case: damages and attachment
 Filed by Plus Builders against Consing and Dela Cruz
5) Cavite Criminal case: falsification of public document
• Consing Makati criminal case: defer arraignment!
 existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil
cases
 Makati RTC: ok
 CA affirmed; SC reversed
• Consing Cavite criminal case: defer arraignment!
 existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil
cases
 Cavite RTC: nope
 CA: nope; independent civil action.
 Reversed decision in Makati criminal case
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that
warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
SC: NO PQ
Damages case not PQ
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.
Pasig Injunciton case not PQ
• The issue the Pasig civil case for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing)
merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz;
• while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment,
the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return
the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot.
Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the
sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any
person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents.
• Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public document
Domingo vs Singson (2017)
Forgery = not fraud; not an independent civil action
• Petitioners Domingo et al and respondents Engracia et al are children of the Sps Domingo
• Sps Domingo owned a house and lot in San Juan
• Years after Sps Domingo’s death, Engracia unlawful detainer against Domingo et al:
 Engracia claimed that she is the absolute owner of the subject property, having bought
the same from the Spouses Domingo as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale
• Domingo et al: parents’s signature forged! Thus:
1) Civil Case – complaint for nullity of the sale
2) Criminal Case - falsification of public document, estafa, and use of falsified
documents
• Engracia criminal case: Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to Prejudicial Question
 the validity and genuineness of the Absolute Deed of Sale, which is the subject of
Civil Case, are determinative of their guilt of the crime charged.
• Domingo et al: opposed! Complaint for nullity = independent civil action
 Also, where both a civil and criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in
court, the criminal case takes precedence
• RTC in criminal case: Engracia correct! Suspend civil action
• Later, civil case was dismissed for failure to prosecute
SC: RTC AND ENGRACIA CORRECT. CIVIL CASE PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of Sale are genuine, then there
would be no falsification and the Spouses Singson would be innocent of the offense charged.
• Otherwise stated, a conviction on Criminal Case should it be allowed to proceed ahead,
would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in Civil
Case that indeed the signatures of the Spouses Domingo were authentic
No independent civil action: the main issue raised in Civil Case No. 70898, i.e., the
genuineness of the signature of the Spouses Domingo appearing in the Absolute Deed of Sale,
is intimately related to the charge of estafa through falsification of public document in
Criminal Case No. 137867; the resolution of the main issue in Civil Case No. 70898 would
necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the Spouses Singson.
ZabalaCute 29
 RULE 112: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
SANTOS-CONCIO V. DOJ
GR. NO. 175057, JAN. 29, 2008
CARPIO-MORALES, J.
Facts:
● Feb. 4, 2006- a stampede happened in Ultra, the venue for the first anniversary episode of
“Wowowee”, a noontime show aired by ABS-CBN.
○ hours before the show and minutes after the people were allowed to enter 2
ENTRY POINTS
○ the mad rush of the unruly mob generated much force, triggering a horde to surge
trampled upon by the approaching waves of people right after the gate opened
○ the fatal stampede claimed 71 lives and 69 wounded
● DILG through Sec. Angelo Reyes, immediately created the inter-agency fact finding team
to investigate the circumstances
○ This report was submitted to the DOJ on Feb. 7, 2006
● The DOJ (DO. No. 90) through Sec. Raul Gonzales, then directed an Evaluating Panel, to
evaluate the DILG report and determine whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with
the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the basis of the documents submitted
 The Panel then submitted to Gonzales the report with the conclusion that there
was no sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation in
view of the following considerations:
○ No formal complaint/s filed by any of the victims or law enforcement agencies
○ No documents were submitted to substantiate the alleged casualties
○ The Report did not indicate the names of the persons involved and their specific
participation
○ There was no allegation from the victims of who they think were responsible for
the incident
● The Evaluating Panel then referred the case to the NBI-NCR for further investigation.
● NBI-NCR then submitted an investigation report recommending the conduct of
preliminary investigation for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide
and Multiple Physical Injuries against Petitioners and seven other respondents
● Acting on the recommendation of NBI-NCR, Gonzales, designated a panel of state
prosecutors (DO No. 165) as Investigating Panel to conduct the preliminary investigation
of the case, and if warranted by evidence, to file he appropriate information and prosecute
the same before the appropriate court.
● The following day, the Investigating Panel issued subpoenas directing the petitioners to
appear at the Preliminary Investigation
 At the preliminary investigation, petitioners sought clarification and orally moved for
the inhibition, disqualification or desistance of the Investigating Panel from
conducting the investigation
 Petitioners then applied for a certiorari and prohibition with the CA
○ This was granted thus, the issuance of a TRO
● The investigating panel then issued a Resolution, finding probable cause to indict the
petitioners for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries
○ There was also the recommendation of the conduct of a separate preliminary
investigation against certain public officials
In the instant case, petitioners point out that
1) they cannot be compelled to submit their counter-affidavits because the NBI-NCR Report
was not under oath
• The Affidavits also does not qualify as a complaint within the scope of Rule 110 of
the ROC as the allegations therein are insufficient to initiate a PI there being no
statement of specific and individual acts or omissions constituting Reckless
Imprudence
• Petitioners contend that absent any act or omission ascribed to them, it is unreasonable
to expect them to confirm, deny or explain their side
2) Petitioners also assail the power of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation of their
case. While they concede that the DOJ has the power to conduct criminal investigation and
preliminary investigation, they contend that that is not so in their case, invoking Cojuangco
v PCGG (the entity which conducted the criminal investigation is disqualified from
conducting a preliminary investigation in the same case.)
• They claim that since the Evaluating Panel conducted its own own criminal
investigation by interviewing witnesses, conducting an ocular inspection, and
perusing the evidence.
• They add that the DOJ cannot circumvent the prohibition by simply creating a panel
to conduct the first, and another to conduct the second.
3) Lastly, they assail the impartiality of the DOJ, particularly that of Secretary Gonzales, as
well as of the President, in view of their public declarations that ABS-CBN was negligent.
Issues:
1. WON the DOJ has investigatory powers in this case? YES
2. WON there were defects in the complaint? NO
3. WON there was bias and prejudgment on the part of the respondents? NO
Held:
DOJ Invesitgatory Powers
The petitioners cannot use the Conjaunco ruling since in that case, the PCGG had found a prima
facie case and subsequently conducted a preliminary investigation.
• it is difficult to imagine how in the conduct of such preliminary investigation the PCGG
could even make a turn about and take a position contradictory to its earlier findings of a
prima facie case.
• the law enforcer who conducted the criminal investigation, gathered the evidence and
thereafter filed the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation cannot be
allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation of his own complaint.
In the instant case, the measures taken by the Evaluating Panel do not partake of a criminal
investigation. These were measures done in aid of evaluation in order to relate the incidents to
their proper context.
• Evaluation for purposes of determining whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with
the conduct of a preliminary investigation entails not only reading the report or documents
ZabalaCute 30
 in isolation, but also deems to include resorting to reasonably necessary means such as
ocular inspection and physical evidence examination
Rather, it was the NBI, a constituent unit of the DOJ, which conducted the criminal investigation.
Moreover, the improbability of the DOJ contradicting its prior finding is hardly appreciable. It
bears recalling that the Evaluating Panel found no sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. Since the Evaluating Panels report was not adverse to petitioners,
prejudgment may not be attributed vicariously, so to speak, to the rest of the state prosecutors.
Partiality, if any obtains in this case, in fact weighs heavily in favor of petitioners.
Alleged Defects in the Complaint
A complaint for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation differs from a complaint for
purposes of instituting a criminal prosecution.
• Source of confusion: both are referred to as a complaint, for lack of a better or alternative
term, to refer essentially to a written charge.
• There should be no confusion about the objectives, however, since preliminary
investigation is conducted precisely to elicit further facts or evidence. Being generally
inquisitorial, the preliminary investigation stage is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the preparation of a
complaint or information
NBI-NCR report not under oath
Based from Sec 03 of Rule 112, the complaint is not entirely the affidavit of the complainant,
for the affidavit is treated as a component of the complaint.
• The phraseology of the above-quoted rule recognizes that all necessary allegations need
not be contained in a single document.
• It is unlike a criminal complaint or information where the averments must be contained in
one document charging only one offense, non-compliance with which renders it vulnerable
to a motion to quash.
The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all allegations in one document
denominated as complaint-affidavit. It does not pronounce strict adherence to only one
approach, however, for there are cases where the extent of one’s personal knowledge may not
cover the entire gamut of details material to the alleged offense.
As ruled in a previous case, a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal
need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has been that, unless the offense subject
thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary
investigation purposes, by any competent person
A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any
competent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn
to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise.
After all, what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even
raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage
can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated which may warrant
the eventual prosecution of the case in court.
In the present case, there is no doubt about the existence of affidavits. The appellate court
found that certain complaint-affidavits were already filed by some of the victims, a factual
finding to which this Court, by rule, generally defers.
Insufficiency of Allegations
A complaint for purposes of conducting preliminary investigation is not required to exhibit the
attending structure of a complaint or information laid down in Rule 110 (Prosecution of
Offenses) which already speaks of the People of the Philippines as a party, an accused rather
than a respondent, and a court that shall pronounce judgment.
If a complaint or information filed in court does not comply with a set of constitutive averments,
it is vulnerable to a motion to quash. On the other hand, for a complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation, the investigating officer may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he
finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue
with the inquiry, or proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and
proper form.
• It certainly is not his duty to require a more particular statement of the allegations of the
complaint merely upon the respondents motion, and specially where after an analysis of
the complaint and its supporting statements he finds it sufficiently definite to apprise the
respondents of the offenses which they are charged.
Petitioners claims of vague allegations or insufficient imputations are thus matters that can be
properly raised in their counter-affidavits to negate or belie the existence of probable cause.
Bias and Prejudgment
Fears mere speculations. Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial
officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. The
presumption of regularity stands here and this petitioners failed to discharge.
As for petitioners claim of undue haste indicating bias, proof thereof is wanting. The pace of the
proceedings is anything but a matter of acceleration. Without any objection from the parties,
respondents even accorded petitioners a preliminary investigation even when it was not required
since the case involves an alleged offense where the penalty prescribed by law is below Four
Years, Two Months and One Day.
Neither is there proof showing that Gonzalez exerted undue pressure on his subordinates to tailor
their decision with his public declarations and adhere to a pre-determined result. The Evaluating
Panel in fact even found no sufficient basis, it bears emphatic reiteration, to proceed with the
conduct of a preliminary investigation, and one member of the Investigating Panel even
dissented to its October 9, 2006 Resolution.
To follow petitioner’s theory of institutional bias would logically mean that even the NBI had
prejudged the case in conducting a criminal investigation since it is a constituent agency of the
DOJ. And if the theory is extended to the Presidents declaration, there would be no more arm
of the government credible enough to conduct a criminal investigation and a preliminary
investigation.
ZabalaCute 31
 ESTRADA V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
GR NO. 212140-41 ; JANUARY 21,2015
Facts:
In 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint filed by the NBI and
Atty. Baligod for Plunder. A month after, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada another
complaint filed by the FIO of the Ombudsman for the crime of plunder and violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
• Thereafter, 18 of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
affidavits between December 9 2013 and March 14 2014.
Sen. Estrada then filed his request to be furnished with copies of counter affidavits and all the
filings of his co-respondents.
• He anchored his request based on Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Rule II of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
o Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court: “to examine the evidence submitted
by the complainant which he may not have been furnished”
o Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman: “to
‘have access to the evidence on record’”
The Ombudsman: DENIED. He is not entitled to be furnished of the copy of all the filings of
the respondents.
• It is to be noted that there is no provision under the Office’s Rules of Procedure which
entitles respondent to be furnished with all the filings by other parties.
• Under the Rules of Court and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
respondents are only required to furnish their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence
to the complainant and not the other respondents.
JINGGOY: SC: CERTIORARI 65!
OMBUDSMAN: oh eto na nga! Comment within 5 days leche
In the instant case, Sen Estrada insists on the violation of his due process despite the Joint Order,
considering that there were still other counter-affidavits filed by his co-respondents that were
not furnished to him.
Issues:
1) WON the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and violated his right to constitutional
due process.
2) WON Estrada has no appeal, or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law than to file the petition for certiorari.
3) Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari constitutes forum shopping.
Held: NO.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with
copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to
furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents
at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent.
1. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, "after such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have
been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x."
• At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what
Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits
of the co-respondents.
2. Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
provides that a respondent "shall have access to the evidence on record," this provision should
be construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
• First, Section 4(a) states that "the investigating officer shall require the complainant or
supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint."
o The "supporting witnesses" are the witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer to
the co-respondents.
• Second, Section 4(b) states that "the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the
respondent" to submit his counter-affidavit.
o The affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section4(a).
Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the affidavits of the
complainant and his supporting witnesses.
The provision in the immediately succeeding Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a respondent
shall have "access to the evidence on record" does not stand alone, but should be read in relation
to the provisions of Section 4(a and b) of the same. Thus, a respondent’s "access to evidence on
record" in Section 4(c), Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits
and supporting documents of "the complainant or supporting witnesses" in Section 4(a) of the
same Rule II.
Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
"the respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense." A respondent’s
right to examine refers only to "the evidence submitted by the complainant."
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of
the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits
executed by the corespondents should be furnished to a respondent.
Justice Veloso’s dissent relies on an administrative case in which different set of rules of
procedure and standards apply.
REYES CASE PRESENT CASE
Administrative case Criminal Case
Failure to furnish an affidavit happened Denial of request happened during the
in the administrative proceeding on the preliminary investigation where the only
merits issue is the existence of probable cause
In administrative cases, substantial In criminal actions, proof beyond
evidence is the basis for adjudication reasonable doubt is required for
conviction
ZabalaCute 32
 In administrative proceedings however, In criminal and civil actions, application In the Philippines, there are four instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure where
technical rules of pleading and of Rules of court is called for with more or probable cause is needed to be established:
procedure and of evidence are not less strictness
strictly adhered to (1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer, to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation
determination of probable cause, and "probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
should be determined in a summary manner. prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to the fine;

A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an (2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine whether a warrant of arrest or a
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross- commitment order, if the accused has already been arrested, shall be issued and that there is a
examine his accusers to establish his innocence." necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
● Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those of justice;
granted by procedural law.
● The quantum of evidence now required in the preliminary investigation is such (3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a peace officer or a private person making a warrantless
evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief as to the fact of commission of arrest when an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
● It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no and
right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have (4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether a search warrant shall be issued,
the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the and only upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things
the right to examine or cross-examine. to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

We likewise take exception to Justice Brion’s assertion that “due process standards that at the In all these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based only on the
very least should be considered in the conduct of a preliminary investigation are those that this likelihood, or probability, of guilt.
court first articulated in Ang Tibay v. CIR
- Simply put, Ang Tibay guidelines for administrative cases do not apply to preliminary Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
investigation in criminal cases basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause
in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
ANG TIBAY PRESENT CASES finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
Constitutional requirements Statutory
of due process However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is
Requirement of an impartial Purpose of Office of the Ombudsman in required is "substantial evidence" which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay
tribunal conducting a preliminary investigation, after evidence.
conducting its own finding investigation is to ● Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence
excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence.
determine probable cause for filing an information
and not to make final adjudication to the rights and
HELD #2 :
obligation of parties.
Sen. Estrada’s present petition for certiorari is premature
Prosecutor is hardly the impartial tribunal
● Justice Velasco’s dissent prefers that Sen. Estrada not "be subjected to the rigors of a
Estrada, not yet an accused person and hence
criminal prosecution in court” because there is "a pending question regarding the
cannot demand the full exercise of rights of an Ombudsman’s grave abuse of its discretion preceding the finding of a probable cause
accused person to indict him."
Substantial evidence More than bare suspicion or less than evidence ● Ombudsman issued a Joint Order that furnished Sen. Estrada with the counter-
that would justify conviction affidavits his co-respondents and directed him to comment within a non-extendible
period of five days from receipt of said Order. Sen. Estrada did not file any comment,
The purpose of probable cause is to make sure that the courts is not clogged with weak as noted in the 4 June 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman.
cases that will only be dismissed as well as to spare a person from the travails of a needless ● We underscore Sen. Estrada’s procedural omission. Sen. Estrada did not file any
prosecution. pleading, much less a motion for reconsideration, to the 27 March 2014 Order. Sen.
Estrada immediately proceeded to file this Petition for Certiorari before this Court.

ZabalaCute 33
 Sen. Estrada’s resort to a petition for certiorari before this Court stands in stark
contrast to his filing of his 7 April 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March
2014 Joint Resolution finding probable cause.
● It is apparent that Sen. Estrada’s present petition for certiorari is premature for lack of
filing of a motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman

HELD # 3: Forum Shopping

● Sen. Estrada did not wait for the resolution of the Ombudsman and instead proceeded
to file the present Petition for Certiorari. The Ombudsman issued a Joint Order on 4
June 2014 and specifically addressed the issue that Sen. Estrada is raising in this
Petition. Thus, Sen. Estrada's present Petition for Certiorari is not only premature, it
also constitutes forum shopping.

ZabalaCute 34
 Crespo v. Mogul
G.R. No. L-53373 | June 30, 1987
Undersecretary then reversed the Provincial Fiscal’s resolution and directed the fiscal
to move for the immediate dismissal of the information filed. Hence, the provincial
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence, attaching the letter of
Undersecretary Macaraig.
However, Judge Mogul denied the motion and set the arraignment of Mogul.
FACTS:
Assistant Fiscal Proceso de Gala, with the approval of Provincial Fiscal, filed an Estafa case
against Crespo before the Circuit Criminal Court in Lucena City
When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed a motion to defer on the ground that there
was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.
• Judge Mogul denied the motion, and subsequently the motion for reconsideration, though
the arraignment was deferred to afford Crespo time to elevate the matter to the CA.
Crespo appealed before the CA which was granted, ordering Judge Mogul to restrain from
enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused until the DOJ shall have finally
resolved the petition for review
Undersecretary then reversed the Provincial Fiscal’s resolution and directed the fiscal to
move for the immediate dismissal of the information filed. Hence, the provincial fiscal filed
a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence, attaching the letter of Undersecretary
Macaraig.
However, Judge Mogul denied the motion and set the arraignment of Mogul.
• Such motion erodes the independence and integrity of the court by inducing the same court
to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it, but before the
Undersecretary of Justice
The accused then filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA, but the CA dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was
elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial
on the merits
HELD: YES
During the preliminary investigation, the Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion
and control of the criminal prosecution.
• It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a
proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied
upon by him is insufficient for conviction.
• Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within
a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and control
of criminal prosecutions. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for
insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no
error.
• The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the
re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal’s should
normally prevail.
• On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may
be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution except in the extreme case where
it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.
Still, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control.
• The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state
prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice
who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
• Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed
in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.
HOWEVER, the preliminary investigation terminates upon the filing of the information
in the proper court.
• Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the
permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.
While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not
a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to
Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.
• The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights
of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
• Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation
by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was
submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or
deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the
case.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court.
• A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has
the option to grant or deny the same.
• It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.
ZabalaCute 35
 IBP vs. DOJ
The IBP filed a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus and with a petition for
declaratory relief:
a) Habeas corpus: for the release of its client Senin, whose rights were allegedly violated
because he has been detained for at least 8 months without any finding of probable cause
or a case having been filed in court.
- In a buy-bust operation, Jay-ar Senin was arrested by for selling illegal drugs. During
inquest proceedings, he availed of his right to preliminary investigation and executed
a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC.
- After the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor dismissed the case against him.
Pursuant to the then prevailing DOJ Circular, the case was forwarded to the DOJ for
automatic review.
- In the meantime, pursuant to such DOJ Circular, Senin remained detained in custody
pending review by the DOJ of his case.
- Note: later, that the order of dismissal was reversed; that upon filing of the information
with the court, there was judicial determination of probable cause against Senin; and
that following such judicial determination, the court issued a warrant of arrest and a
commitment order.
b) Declaratory relief – declaration of unconstitutionality of the ff:
1) DC 12 – provided for automatic review by DOJ of dismissed cases involving violation
of RA 9165 which involve the maximum penalty of life imprisonment or death.
Review shall be without prejudice to the right of the respondent to be immediately
released from detention pending automatic review, unless respondent is detained for
other causes.
2) DC 22 - The respondents shall remain in custody, pending automatic review of the
dismissal of their cases, in the following instances as provided for under the circular:
i. When during inquest proceedings, respondent elects to avail of a regular
preliminary investigation and waives in writing the provisions of Article 125 of
the RPC;
ii. When an information is filed in court after inquest proceedings and the accused
is placed in the custody of the law, but the court allows the accused to avail of a
regular preliminary investigation, which results in the dismissal of the case, the
handling prosecutor shall insist that the accused shall remain in the custody of
the law pending automatic review by the SOJ, unless the court provides
otherwise, or until the dismissal is affirmed by the SOJ and the corresponding
motion to dismiss or withdraw information is granted by the court;
iii. When an information is filed in court after preliminary investigation proceedings
and the accused is placed in the custody of the law, but the court allows the
accused to avail of reinvestigation, which results in the dismissal of the case, the
accused shall remain in custody of the law pending automatic review by the SOJ,
unless the court provides otherwise, or until the dismissal is affirmed by the SOJ
and the corresponding motion to dismiss or withdraw information is granted by
the court; and
iv. When the case against respondent is dismissed after due reinvestigation, if the
case was commenced as an inquest case but was converted to a regular
preliminary investigation after respondent elected the same and waived the
provisions of Article 125 of the RPC.
3) DC 50 - directing all heads of prosecution offices to immediately issue corresponding
release orders in favor of respondents whose cases are still pending automatic review
before the SOJ beyond the 30-day period prescribed in the subject circular, unless
respondents are detained for some other causes.
Note however DC 003 and 004 – which revoked DC 50 and 22, reinstating DC 12.
The IBP seeks to nullify the DOJ issuances for the alleged violation of the detainee's rights. It
asserts that the DOJ issuances permit the indefinite confinement of a pre-trial detainee who has
waived Article 125 of the RPC in order to undergo preliminary investigation.
• The IBP believes that a person who has requested the conduct of a preliminary
investigation can only be detained for a maximum period of 15 days because the Rules
require that the preliminary investigation be terminated within such period despite waiver
of Article 125.
• It also claims that those persons whose cases were dismissed initially by the investigating
prosecutor should be released even if the dismissal is still subject to re-investigation or to
the SOJ's automatic review.
BJMP: D.C. No. 50 does not vest it unbridled discretion to release prisoners because a court
order is always required
OSG: not lis mota
SC: It is hereby declared, and ruled, that all detainees:
1) whose pending cases have gone beyond the mandated periods for the conduct of
preliminary investigation, or
2) whose cases have already been dismissed on inquest or preliminary investigation,
despite pending appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review by the
Secretary of Justice,
are entitled to be released pursuant to their constitutional right to liberty and their
constitutional right against unreasonable seizures, unless detained for some other lawful
cause.
Art 125 mandates the filing of cases in court within the prescribed periods therein for persons
lawfully arrested without a warrant.
The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the
unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and
caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. .
 Waiver of a detainee's right to be delivered to proper judicial authorities as prescribed by
Article 125 of the RPC does not trump his constitutional right in cases where probable
cause was initially found wanting by reason of the dismissal of the complaint filed before
the prosecutor's office even if such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation
or on automatic review.
 Every person's basic right to liberty is not to be construed as waived by mere operation of
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law provides limits and this
must be all the more followed especially so that detention is proscribed absent probable
cause.
Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly
released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125,
if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No. 91659 ) for
the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses.
 This rule also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the
case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for
reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review. The reason is that such dismissal
automatically results in a prima facie finding of lack of probable cause to file an
information in court and to detain a person.
Not moot and academic: the case is prone to being repeated as a result of constant changes
ZabalaCute 36
 RULE 114: BAIL
4) Lastly, existence of a high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond
San Miguel v Maceda confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749 April 4, 2007 amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted,
existence of a high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon such amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision that excessive bail shall not be
the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an amount as would required.
reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, and NOT to cancel • More so in the instant case where the prosecutor failed to adduce evidence that there
it, when bail is matter of right. exists a high probability of accused's jumping bail that would warrant the cancellation
• Petitioner San Miguel was arrested for selling shabu in violation of The Dangerous Drugs of the recommended bail bond.
Act, punishable by prision correccional. • Respondent's only recourse is to fix a higher amount of bail and not cancel
• He jumped bail. Consequently, Judge Alumbres: the P120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge Alumbres.
1.) Issued a bench warrant; • However, Judge Maceda not guilty of gross ignorance of the law but rather simple
2.) Cancelled his bail bond in the amount of P60,000 and; misconduct only. (No bad faith, dishonesty, etc) Fine of 5k
3.) Fixed a new bail bond in the amount of P120,000.
• San Miguel was then arrested.
• Prosec: cancel bail bond! reasonable belief and indications pointing to the probability that
accused is seriously considering flight from prosecution.
• J Alumbres: hearing pls.
• San Miguel: Two days before the scheduled hearing, San Miguel filed an Opposition
• J Alumbres: ahh ganon, Motion to cancel bail GRANTED
• San Miguel admin case! Gross ignorance of law! Prision correccional lang yan! BAIL
A MATTER OF RIGHT BAT MO CINANCEL
• J Alumbres: Later issued a clarificatory order: ah hehe yung first bail bond mo yung sis
• J Alumbres admin case: 1) clarificatory order; 2) before he issued the Order cancelling
the bail, San Miguel was charged for Murder, a non-bailable offense, and hence the
cancellation was justified.

Issue: WON Judge Maceda’s Order denied San Miguel of his right to due process and
right to bail

Held: YES
1) Violation of Sec 15, Art III of RA 6425 is punishable by prision correccional. Hence, San
Miguel was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
2) Clarificatory order defense no merit:
• The bail in the amount of P60,000.00 was already forfeited as a consequence of
complainant's jumping bail. How then can respondent claim that he merely canceled
the recommended bail of P60,000.00 when the same had already been forfeited?
• The Order of September 17, 2001 effectively deprived complainant of his
constitutional right to bail when it was issued two days before the scheduled hearing
on September 19, 2001.
3) Murder charge: different case
• Respondent failed to consider that what was being prayed for by the prosecutor was
the cancellation of the recommended bail for violation of R.A. No. 6425 and not that
of the crime of murder.
• MORE IMPORTANTLY, MURDER = DISCRETIONARY ONLY. NOT
AUTOMATICALLY NON-BAILABLE
• it is a misconception that when an accused is charged with the crime of murder, he is
not entitled to bail at all or that the crime of murder is non-bailable. accused is still
entitled to bail but no longer "as a matter of right."
• Instead, it is discretionary and calls for a judicial determination that the evidence of
guilt is not strong in order to grant bail.

ZabalaCute 37
 Lavides v CA
G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000
Accused need not be arraigned before he applies for bail
• Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 and a
corresponding Information was filed against him with the RTC.
 Warrantless arrest: entrapment conducted by the police.
 the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16
years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners
room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City.
 When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing
only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him
• Lavides then filed an Omnibus Motion:
• (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause;
(2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and
(3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed
to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged.
• Thereafter, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same
complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children. San Miguel likewise
filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases
• The RTC then granted San Miguel’s Omnibus Motion and granted the right to post
bail in the total amount of P800,000 under the ff conditions:
1) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these
cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;
2) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the
cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
3) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
4) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this
Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused.
San Miguel then filed a motion to quash the Informations against him, and asked the RTC to
suspend the arraignment. He likewise prayed for the reduction of his bail, and that the same be
done prior to his arraignment.
• These were denied by the RTC and accordingly, he was arraigned during which he pleaded
not guilty. He was ordered to be released upon posting of the bail bonds.
San Miguel then filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA.
• CA invalidated the first two conditions (must be present at every stage in the proceeding):
contrary to Art III Sec 14 Consti. Trial may proceed in absentia after arraignment.
• However, it upheld the condition of arraignment before bail and considered the issue moot
and academic since he already posted the cash bonds, had been arraigned, and released.
• With respect to the denial of petitioners motion to quash the informations against him, the
appellate court held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition for certiorari
before it, but what he must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of his motion
to quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to him.
Issue: WON the conditions imposed for the bail of Lavides were valid
Held: The first two are valid, while the fourth one (arraignment) was invalid
Arraignment Condition Invalid
In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court
apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early
arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their
cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioners bail bonds should
be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can
proceed as long as he is notified of the date of hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified,
since under Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized.
This theory is mistaken.
1. In the first place, in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.
• For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need
for the arraignment of the accused.
2. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between
(1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash
can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and
(2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter
be released on bail.
These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put on trial
except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right
to bail.
First two conditions valid
The condition imposed in the trial courts order that the accused cannot waive his appearance at
the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with
Rule 114.
For another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear
at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an
express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial
shall proceed in absentia.”
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent
at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit:
(a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt,
(b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, and
(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused
may appear by counsel or representative.
At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.
Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay the proceedings by absenting
himself from the arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed even in his absence.
So it thought that to ensure petitioners presence at the arraignment, petitioner should be denied
bail in the meantime. The fly in the ointment, however, is that such court strategy violates
petitioners constitutional rights.
Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner
was also invalid. Contrary to petitioners contention, the arraignment did not emanate from the
ZabalaCute 38
invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment."
Even without such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum,
although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the
subsequent proceedings against him are valid.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of condition (d) in the second
paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of bail
to petitioner), which is hereby declared void.
Andres v Beltran
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1597. August 20, 2001
Facts:
• Wilson Andres was charged with the crime of murder before the RTC.
• Upon motion of the accused, bail was granted and Andres was released from detention.
• After presentation of evidence for the prosecution, the court issued a subpoena to accused
Andres informing him that the criminal case is set for initial hearing for reception of
evidence for the accused on January 31, 2000. Accused appeared at the scheduled hearing
but his counsel, Atty Alcacid, was not present. Respondent Judge then issued an order
cancelling the bail bond of accused Andres and ordered his detention.
• Judge Beltran further anchored his decision on the fact that the case had been delayed for
almost one year from the time that the prosecution rested its case and that the accused is
not entitled to bail as a matter of right as the offense charged is Murder.
Accused Andres was detained from January 31, 2000 until February 9, 2000when an order for
his release was issued after the trial court found that no subpoena or notice of hearing was sent
to counsel of accused.
• Hence, the instant administrative case for conduct unbecoming of a judge, serious
misconduct, inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law.
• The OCA recommended that Judge Beltran be found guilty of grave abuse of authority and
be fined in the amount of P2,000
Issue: WON Judge Beltran gravely abused his authority in cancelling the bail bond of the
accused based on the absence of petitioner Andres’ counsel
Held: YES
Herein complainant was charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death and,
under the rules, he was not entitled to bail as a matter of right. However, accused is still entitled
to bail but no longer "as a matter of right". Instead, it is discretionary and calls for a judicial
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong in order to grant bail.
• Accused was granted bail by then Presiding Judge Principe and with such grant we assume
that the trial judge made a judicial determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong.
• Respondent Judge, in his Comment, argues that the order granting bail had specifically
reserved to the court the right to recall the order granting bail if evidence of conspiracy
would be strong. The record is bereft of any copy of such order.
o Nonetheless, respondent Judge, in effect, is of the view that since the prosecution has
rested its case and prosecution evidence had been adduced, he can make his own
determination of whether or not the evidence adduced strongly suggest the guilt of
the accused and if so, he can cancel the bail previously granted to the accused.
o Section 20 of Rule 114 provides that after the accused shall have been admitted to
bail, the court may, upon good cause shown, either increase or decrease the amount
of the same. Needless to state, this would entail a hearing for the purpose of
showing good cause and hence, would require not only the presence of the accused
but also of the latters counsel.
o Neither can the bail of the accused be forfeited pursuant to Section 21, Rule 114
since it is not disputed that accused did not violate the conditions of the bail as he
was present at the scheduled hearing.
The failure of counsel for the accused to appear at the scheduled hearing is not a valid
ground for cancellation of bail. Nowhere in the provisions of Rule 114 does such ground exist.
• Under Section 2 (Conditions of the bail), the presence of counsel is not a condition of the
bail.
• Neither is it a reason for an increase or forfeiture of bail under Sections 20 and 21.
• Section 22, which states the instances when bail may be cancelled, i.e., surrender of the
accused, proof of his death, acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case or execution of
the judgment of conviction is not in point, aside from the fact that it also requires an
application of the bondsmen and due notice to the prosecutor.
The alleged delay in the presentation of evidence by the defense is likewise not
substantiated.
• As pointed out by herein complainant, while there were postponements, the Supreme Court
ordered a change of venue allegedly upon request of the RTC-Judge of Roxas, Isabela and
the criminal case went from one judge to another and finally it was transferred to RTC-
Tuguegarao, Branch 2.
• The alleged delay should not be reckoned from the time the prosecution rested its case
because the motion to dismiss by demurrer to evidence had to be resolved prior to
presentation of evidence for the defense.
In the case at bar, respondent Judge motu proprio cancelled the bail bond in view of the
absence of counsel for the accused during the hearing initially scheduled for the presentation
of evidence for the defense. This is censurable. Accused should not be punished for the
absence of his counsel by the cancellation of his bail and his immediate detention. Respondent
Judges precipitate order cancelling the bail bond of the accused deprived accused of his right
to liberty, even if temporarily. This is not excusable.
GSA: here, bail is a matter of discretion and it was granted – meaning, evidence of guilt is not
strong.
ZabalaCute 39
 Leviste v CA
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
Non-existence of bail negating circumstances does not make bail a matter of right.
Determination of discretion stage
• No bail negating circumstance – exercise sound discretion; consider other
circumstance
• Presence of bail negating circumstance – stringent discretion - primarily focused on
the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances
Exercise of discretion stage
Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted
by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of
bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
• Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or
aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
• Petitioner failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued
confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger.
• CA further considered the fact of petitioners conviction.
In the instant case, Laviste attributes grave abuse of discretion to the CA, contending that since
none of the bail-negating circumstances mentioned in Sec 05 are present in his case, he must be
granted bail.
Issue: WON, absent any of the bail-negating circumstances in Section 05, bail should
automatically be granted
Held: NO.
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed
on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years.:
1.The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated therein are not present.
• In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion.
• This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An
application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating
circumstances are absent.
2. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
• In the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to
carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists.
• If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
• Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will
thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages:
(1) the determination of discretion stage - where the appellate court must determine whether any
of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present;
• this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or
stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and
(2) the exercise of discretion stage:
a. where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of
sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and
justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
b. if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion
requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the
presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so
because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.
Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner’s theory reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is
limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the
checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where
the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six
years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by
requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present.
A threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and
merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue. This must be so; otherwise, the
appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose
of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal.
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. The very language of the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to
be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to the following or other similar
circumstances. Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or
revocation of bail pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation
that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail
ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists.
Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years
of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not
ZabalaCute 40
exceed six years.
PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF
RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive
approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that
is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for
strong reasons (“tough on bail pending appeal rule”)
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending
appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending
bail should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly,
the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial
discretion.
Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending
appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. Furthermore, letting the accused out
on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is
especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the
trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a
certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other
release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.
People v Fitzgerald
G.R. No. 149723 October 27, 2006
Facts:
1. An Information filed was with the RTC charging Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with
Violation of Art. III, Section 5 RA No. 7610
• It was alleged therein that he induced a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostitution
and had carnal knowledge of her using laced drugs (vitasmins)
2. RTC found Fitzgerald guilty, sentenced to imprison ment of 8y1d of prision mayor as
minimum to 17y4m1d of reclusion temporal as maximum
3. Fitzgerald applied for bail which the RTC
• RTC denied: the circumstances of the accused indicate probability of flight and that there
is undue risk that the accused may commit a similar offense if released on bail pending
appeal.
• CA affirmed but modified and increased the penalty to 14y8m1d of reclusion temporal to
20y1d of reclusion perpetua.
4. Fitzgerald filed a Motion for New Trial before the CA on the ground that new and material
evidence not previously available had surfaced.
5. CA granted the said Motion and remanded the case to the RTC to receive evidence.
6. Fitzgerald filed a Motion to Fix Bail
• Denied by CA: penalty imposed as reclusion perpetua and strong evidence of guilt
7. Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the Records and for the Re-
Examination of the Penalty Imposed, and a Motion for Bail
• CA issued the assailed Resolution GRANTING the bail in the amount of P100,000
• Though evidence of guilt is strong, Fitzgerald already of old age and not in the best
of health. Temporary liberty granted premised premised not on the grounds stated in
his Motion for Bail but in the higher interest of substantial justice and considering the
new trial granted in this case.
8. Hence, RTC ordered Fitzgerald’s temporary release.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgeralds Motion for Bail despite
the fact that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. It also questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion,
considering that the case had been remanded to the RTC for new trial.
Issues:
1. WON the CA, after its Resolution granting a new trial, still had jurisdiction to act on
respodnent’s Motion to Post Bail
2. WON the CA erred when it allowed respondent to bail
Held:
1. YES
Unlike the SC, the CA may decide questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and law. Thus,
when it grants a new trial, it may either (a) directly receive the purported newly-discovered
evidence or (b) refer the case to the court of origin for reception of such evidence. In either
case, it does not relinquish to the trial court jurisdiction over the case; it retains sufficient
authority to resolve incidents in the case and decide its merits.
From the foregoing disposition, it is evident that the CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the
case, even as it delegated to the RTC the function of receiving the respondents newly-discovered
evidence. The CA therefore retained its authority to act on respondents bail application. More
so that the the original records of the case had yet to be transmitted to the RTC when respondent
filed his bail application and the CA acted on it.
2. YES. In retaining appellate jurisdiction and when it granted a new trial, it set aside only its
own Decision increasing the penalty, but left the RTC conviction unaltered. Thus, Fitzgerald
stood sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years. Hence, when Fitzgerald then filed
his Motion for Bail, bail was a mere privilege subject to the discretion of the CA to be exercised
in accordance with the stringent requirements of Sec 5.
Both the RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the existence of strong evidence of
the guilt of respondent. These findings were not overturned when the CA granted a new trial.
• the grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly-discovered evidence but maintains
evidence already presented or on record.
• And if there has been a finding that evidence is strong and sufficient to bar bail, that too
subsists unless, upon another motion and hearing, the prosecution fails to prove that the
evidence against the accused has remained strong.
• In the present case, no new evidence had since been introduced, nor hearing
conducted as would diminish the earlier findings of the RTC and CA on the existence
of strong evidence against respondent.
ZabalaCute 41
Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the existence of any of the
circumstances enumerated therein such as those indicating probability of flight if released on
bail or undue risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

The Resolution based on old age and health disregarded substantive and procedural
requirements on bail.
• It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion
filed by respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latters illness.

Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside
the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail.
• It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick.
There may also be an existing proposition for the selective decarceration of older prisoners
based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age increases.

But, in this particular case, the CA made no specific finding that respondent suffers from an
ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair
his health or put his life in danger.
• the only evidence on record as to the latters state of health is an unverified medical
certificate stating that respondents condition required him to be confined in a more sterile
area.
• That medical recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its Resolution,
it held that the physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from seeking medical
attention while confined in prison.

Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar
offense.
• the RTC noted that the circumstances of respondent indicate an undue risk that he would
commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.
• Basis: Dr. Muncada, a highly competent Psychiatrist, testified that phedophilia is a state of
sexual disorder and sexual dysfunction. It is intense and recurrent. The possibility of the
commission of a similar offense for which the accused was convicted is great if the accused
will be exposed to stress and if an opportunity to commit it lurks.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 31, 2001 CA

Resolution ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The bail bond posted by respondent
is CANCELLED. Let an ORDER OF ARREST ISSUE against the person of the accused, Victor
Keith Fitzgerald.

ZabalaCute 42
 Enrile v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
FACTS:
In 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the
basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam.
• Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail should probable cause be found
against him. This was denied by the Sandiganbayan considering that he had not yet been
placed under the custody of the law
• Sandiganbayan then ordered his arrest, and Enrile voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG in
Camp Crame. He was later confined in the PNP General Hospital.
Enrile then filed a Motion to Fix Bail, insisting that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right
since he had not yet been convicted.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion on the following grounds:
1. No application and hearing yet
• It is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have
made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix
the amount of his bail.
• In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can
even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix
his bail.
• For purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration.
These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after
trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged.
• Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the
factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained
above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing
that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
In the instant case, Enrile claims that:
1. before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right;
2. that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile
comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail;
3. that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and
his voluntary surrender;
4. that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and
5. that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the
age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
ISSUES: 
 arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong. 

 This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
2) Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk. 

HELD:
1. YES.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
GENERAL RULE: any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable
EXCEPTION: unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of
the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he
retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
Bail granted as a matter of right:
1. all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court;
• ratio: these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
2. prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment.
3. even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
Bail granted as a matter of discretion:
1. upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or
2. if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong
in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.
• However, such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted
provisional liberty.
• It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the court.
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community
and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing:
(1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
ZabalaCute 43
Enrile not a flight risk:
 the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but,
• social and political standing and voluntary surrender
 more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
• personal disposition his indictment for plunder has demonstrated his utter respect for the
legal processes of this country
 THUS, Bail granted at P1,000,000
• when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he
DISSENTING OPINION: LEONEN, J
already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was
1. His release for medical and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion
granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.
 to Fix Bail filed before the Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer for the grant of bail
in this Petition on his medical condition.
With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service,
and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail. 2. The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical conditions that require very special
treatment is a question of fact. We cannot take judicial notice of the truth contained in a
certification coming from one doctor. This doctor has to be presented as an expert witness who
There exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstance: Enrile, according to the will be subjected to both direct and cross-examination so that he can properly manifest to the
Director of PGH, is a geriatric patient court the physical basis for his inferences as well as the nature of the medical condition of
1. uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including petitioner. Rebutting evidence that may be presented by the prosecution should also be
recurrence of stroke; considered
2. arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially
under stressful conditions; 3. Furthermore, the majoritys opinion, other than the invocation of a general human rights
3. coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate principle, does not provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds
a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and • Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court
4. exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution
excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in
patients with asthma or COPD. 4. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the Motion
5. Chronic Hypertension to Fix Bail for prematurity. It was following entrenched and canonical procedures for bail
based upon the Constitution and the Rules of Court
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required
• The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter of
special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own
right. On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is charged with
instance, was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the internist doctor of
a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount
that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital.
of bail but fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
• A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not filed an application for bail or the
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
prosecutor already recommends an amount for bail.
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite • The prosecution had no opportunity to present rebuttal evidence based on the prematurity
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration of the Motion
during the trial.
At most, the Motion to Fix Bail could be treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition or
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion application for bail as in all cases where the statutorily imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua,
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused death, or life imprisonment.
during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and
advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

Case Not Unprecedented: Dela Rama v. The People’s Court

Unless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it
a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence
the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have
his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in

ZabalaCute 44
 Esteban v Alhambra
G.R. No. 135012 September 7, 2004

Facts:
1. Gerardo Esteban is the accused in four criminal cases. His sister-in-law, Anita Esteban,
petitioner herein, posted cash bail of P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary liberty.

2. While out on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was again
charged with another crime for which he was arrested and detained.

3. Fed up with Gerardos actuation, Anita refused to post another bail. Instead, she filed with the
trial court an application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the four criminal
cases.
• She alleged therein that she is terminating the cash bail by surrendering the accused who is
now in jail as certified to by the City Jail Warden.

4. Judge Alhambra denied Anita’s application

• Anita did not surrender Gerardo. He was arrested because of another case.

Issue: WON Anita can cancel the bail in cash deposit pursuant to Sec 22, considering that
Gerardo is now in jail

Held: NO.
1. The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation where, among others, the surety
or bondsman surrenders the accused to the court that ordered the latter’s arrest. Thereafter, the
court, upon application by the surety or bondsman, cancels the bail bond.

We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did not surrender the accused, charged
in the four criminal cases, to the trial court. The accused was arrested and detained because he
was charged in a subsequent criminal case.

2. Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in the form of cash deposit which, as
mandated by Section 14 of the same Rule 114, shall be applied to the payment of fine and costs,
and the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to any person who made the deposit.

The Rule thus treats a cash bail differently from other bail bonds. A cash bond may be posted
either by the accused or by any person in his behalf. However, as far as the State is concerned,
the money deposited is regarded as the money of the accused. Consequently, it can be applied
in payment of any fine and costs that may be imposed by the court. The right of the government
is in the nature of a lien on the money deposited.

ZabalaCute 45
 RULE 115 - RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Perez v. People,
G.R. No. 164763, 12 February 2008, 544 SCRA 532
RIGHT INVOLVED: SPEEDY TRIAL
• Perez, municipal treasurer in Bohol was charged of malversation:
 In 1988, he was audited and the report showed that there was a shortage of 72k for his
account.
 Perez admitted that the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another
portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine
• Despite the excuse, an admin case was filed against him. Perez reiterated his honest
admission in his answer. Later, he withdrew the same and filed another answer.
• Perez was also charged before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of funds.
 Perez testified for himself: denied the contents of his first Answer; claimed it was
prepared without the assistance of counsel and that at the time of its preparation and
submission, he was not in peak mental and physical condition, having been stricken
with diabetes mellitus
• Perez rested his case in 1990; Sandiganbayan convicted him of malversation in 2003
• In this case, Perez contends that:
1) His Answer in the admin case should not have been given probative weisince it was
prepared w/o assistance of counsel
2) his right to a speedy disposition of his case violated: Sandiganbyan unduly and
unreasonably delayed the case for 13 years
SC:
1) Answer – admin case.- no need for counsel
There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by
counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying
that assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings.
• The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the
presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or accused during custodial investigation.
It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with
more reason, in an administrative inquiry
• Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service
2) No violation of speedy trial
Balancing test4 – actions of prosec and defendant are weighed; four factors:
a) Length of delay
b) Reason by govt to justify delay
c) Assertion by the defendant of his right
d) Prejudice to the defendant
4 "fixed-time period" which holds the view that "the Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered
a trial within a specified time period."
"demand-waiver rule"which provides that "a defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial
for any period prior to which he has not demanded trial.
Last two factors weigh heavily against the defendant in this case
A) Failed to assert his right
• From the moment his case was deemed submitted for decision up to the time he was found
guilty by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner has not filed a single motion or manifestation
which could be construed even remotely as an indication that he wanted his case to be
dispatched without delay.
• Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different dimension
if during all those twelve years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy
disposition of his case or at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early
resolution, to show that he was not waiving that right.
B) No Real prejudice
Pending his conviction by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner may have truly lived in suspicion and
anxiety for over twelve years. However, any prejudice that may have been caused to him in all
those years was only minimal. The supposed gravity of agony experienced by petitioner is more
imagined than real.
3) The law relied upon in convicting petitioner is not cruel and unusual. It does not
violate Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights.
In his last ditch effort to exculpate himself, petitioner argues that the penalty meted for the crime
of malversation of public funds "that ha[ve] been replenished, remitted and/or returned" to the
government is cruel and therefore unconstitutional, "as government has not suffered any
damage."
• The argument is specious on two grounds
• First. Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may
only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element
of malversation.
• Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It bears stressing that the full restitution of the amount malversed will not in any way exonerate
an accused, as payment is not one of the elements of extinction of criminal liability.
*An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he
has not been able to explain satisfactorily. The law establishes a presumption that mere
failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands
on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of
conversion.
The fixed-time period was rejected because there is "no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy
trial can be quantified into a specific number of days or months."
The demand-waiver rule was likewise rejected because aside from the fact that it is "inconsistent with this
Court’s pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights," "it is insensitive to a right which we have
deemed fundamental.”
ZabalaCute 46
 People vs Cabanada • The investigation was still a general inquiry of the crime and has not focused on a particular
UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION; RIGHT UNDER CUSTODIAL suspect. Also, she admitted to the crime while at the residence of her employer, thus, she
INVESTIGATION was not yet taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom.

• Cabanada charged with qualified theft POLICE CONFESSION INADMISSIBLE

 Worked as a stay-out housemaid for Victoria Tulfo; had access to cars and rooms
inside the house of Victoria
 Family went to Bulacan; when they got home, they discovered missing cash in the
glove compartment of a car. Checked other items, discovered that several pieces of
jewelry in the amount of 154k were missing
 Victoria called police
• 2 confessions:
1) In the house of Victoria, when police came and interviewed Cabanada –
- admitted to PO2 Coton) that she took the money.
- She led them to her room and took a pouch (white envelope) containing
₱16,000.00 cash.
- She also showed a white leather wallet containing the missing master key of
Victor's vehicle.
2) At the police station:
- Cabanada was brought at the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU) for further
investigation.
- Cabanada apologized to Catherine, and admitted that she still had some of the
missing jewelry in her house
- The police went to her house and recovered the Technomarine, Pierre Cardin,
Relic and Santa Barbara watches and a pair of earrings with diamonds placed in
a tool box
• RTC found Cabanada guilty; CA affirmed
• Cabanada: UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSIONS!
 House confession - not done in an ordinary manner, spontaneously, fully and
voluntarily as it was elicited through the questions of PO2 Cotoner.
• OSG: Not under custodial investigation yet; made the said admission in her employer's
residence wherein she was neither deprived of her liberty nor considered a suspect.
Despite the claim that she was not considered as a suspect at that time, the fact remains that she
confessed to having committed the crime and was able to produce the money from her room.
• The investigation, therefore, ceased to be a general inquiry even if they contemplated that
she was covering for someone.
Already under custodial investigation because:
(1) after admitting the crime, Cabanada was brought to the police station for further
investigation;
(2) the alleged confession happened in the office of the chief;
(3) PO2 Cotoner was present during Cabanada's apology and admission to Catherine.
The compelling pressures of custodial setting were present when the accused was brought to the
police station along with Catherine.
any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
• Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even
if it had been voluntarily given.
Cabanada's confession without counsel at the police station, which led to the recovery of the
other items at her house, is inadmissible.
Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of Cabanada's admission made in CIU does not
necessarily entitle her to a verdict of acquittal. Her admission during the general inquiry
is still admissible.

SC: House confession ADMISSIBLE – not under custodial investigation yet; police
confession INADMISSIBLE – already under custodial investigation; confession obtained
w/o counsel. Still, conviction upheld.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
• It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to operate

HOUSE CONFESSION ADMISSIBLE: STILL A GENERAL INQUIRY

Cabanada was not under custodial investigation when she made the confession, without counsel,
to PO2 Cotoner that she took the missing ₱20,000.00.
• The prosecution established that the confession was elicited during the initial interview of
the police after Catherine called to report the missing money and personal effects.

ZabalaCute 47
 Aquino v Paiste
G.R. No. 147782 June 25, 2008
Doctrine: RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Right to counsel attaches in proceedings before the NBI because in such investigations, the
person is already under custodial investigation. HOWEVER, an amicable settlement between
the parties would abort the custodial investigation or inquiry on the crime
• Aquino, along with Garganta and Adeling, persuaded Paiste to buy a gold bar from an
Igorot
 Gold bar turned out to be fake
• Hence, Paiste brought Aquino to the NBI. In the NBI, they entered into an amicable
settlement which stated:
 In view of the acceptance of fault by Aquino, of the case/complaint filed by PAISTE
before the NBI for Swindling, Aquino agreed to pay Paiste half the amount (25k)
swindled from the latter.
 Said P25k was offered as settlement for the case of Estafa
 Settlement also contained a waiver of right to counsel, allegedly made in the present
of Atty Uy
 Part of the agreement was that Aquino would locate Garganta, and upon location of
Garganta, the amicable settlement will be disregarded
• Thereafter, Aquino brought Garganta to the house of Paiste and Garganta was brought to
the police station. Subsequently, an Information for estafa was filed against Garganta,
Aquino, and three others.
• The prosecution presented as evidence the amicable settlement signed in the NBI where
Aquino admitted guilt.
 The RTC then convicted Aquino of estafa, finding that she acted in conspiracy
with the others. This was affirmed by the CA.
• In the instant case, Aquino challenges the admissibility of the amicable settlement. She
claims she executed the agreement under threat and not freely and voluntarily, in violation
of Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution which guarantees her rights under the Miranda Rule.
SC: AMICABLE SETTLEMENT ADMISSIBLE: she was not under custodial
investigation; further what are excluded are extrajudicial confessions and admissions
obtained in violation of rights under custodial investigation.
• Settlement not an admission, but rather, a contract
1) Settlement not a result of custodial investigation. While Aquino was brought to the NBI for
custodial investigation, it was TERMINATED since they entered into a settlement. Hence,
no need for counsel.
2) Aquino’s contention that her constitutional rights were breached and she signed the
document under duress falls flat for the following reasons:
• First, it is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of Atty. Uy.
 The presumption that Atty. Uy is a competent and independent counsel whose
interests are not adverse to petitioner has not been overturned.
• Second, petitioner made much of the fact that Atty. Uy was not presented as witness by the
prosecution and that what petitioner and Atty. Uy supposedly conferred about was likewise
not presented.
 Basic is the principle that consultation and information between counsel and
client is privileged communication and the counsel may not divulge these without
the consent of the client.
 Besides, a party in a case has full discretion to choose whoever it wants as
testimonial witnesses to bolster its case.
 Furthermore, petitioner could have asserted its right "to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses," for which she could have compelled Atty.
Uy to testify. She did not.
Third, petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Uy’s appointment during the time she
was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed the amicable settlement.
• when "the accused never raised any objection against the lawyer’s appointment during the
course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer" the accused is deemed to have engaged such lawyer.
Fourth, an amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial
confession or admission but is a contract between the parties within the parameters of
their mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of Atty.
Uy safeguarded petitioner’s rights even if the custodial investigation did not push through and
precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or intimidation.
Moreover, while we hold in this case that petitioner’s Miranda rights were not violated,
still, even if they were violated, the amicable settlement will still be admissible.
• Infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible "only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.
• The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation.
o An admission is an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact;
o while confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein.
Fifth, even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an admission, the
document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her constitutional rights were
violated. Petitioner’s allegations of threat, violence, and intimidation remain but bare
allegations. Allegations are not proof.
Telling the accused that it would be better for him to speak or tell the truth does not furnish any
inducement, or a sufficient inducement, to render objectionable a confession thereby obtained,
unless threats or promises are applied. These threats or promises which the accused must
successfully prove in order to make his confession inadmissible, must take the form of
violence, intimidation, a promise of reward or leniency.
In fine, we agree with the courts a quo that even assuming arguendo that the amicable
settlement is not admissible, still the conviction of petitioner would be affirmed as conspiracy
was duly proven by other pieces of evidence.
ZabalaCute 48
 Dela Cruz v People
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014
Police Dela Cruz arrested for extortion; underwent drug test and was charged w/ use of illegal
drugs.
While urine test is not a testimonial compulsion within the prohibition against self-
incrimination, still inadmissible because he was ARRESTED for extortion not for drug use;
NOT MATERIAL.
Facts:
PNP Officer Jaime Dela Cruz was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Information was filed because of a drug test Dela Cruz was required to undergo pursuant to
his arrest in an entrapment operation for extortion.
The entrapment operation was conducted due to the complaint of Corazon, partner of Ariel who
was allegedly picked up by unknown persons believed to be police officers. In exchange for
Ariel’s liberty, Corazon was asked for P100,000 by “James”. Thus, an entrapment operation was
set up in Jollibee Cebu where Dela Cruz was apprehended. Dela Cruz was then brought to the
forensic laboratory of the NBI.
• According to Dela Cruz, when he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine
for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however,
denied.
• He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to
no avail.
Dela Cruz was then convicted by the RTC based on the positive drug test and imposed the
penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a period not less than 6 months.
In the instant case, he assails the admissibility of the drug test contending that it was conducted
despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of is constitutional right.
Issue: WON the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal
Held: NO.
First, the RTC ruled on the admissibility of the drug test based on Sec 15 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act (Use of Dangerous Drugs) which authorizes the drug test of “persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Art II of the law.”
• However, it must be noted that the accused was arrested for extortion, not commission of
acts listed under Art II.
To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed
under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Further, it would run counter to
the Court’s previous pronouncement in SJS v PDEA to the effect that:
• “When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy.
• To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.”
HOWEVER, The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion
What the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be
material.
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby
speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The
essence of the right against self incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
• Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit
to physical examination to determine her pregnancy;
• an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance
taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;
• to expel morphine from his mouth;
• to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints;
• and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to
move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
In Gutang v People, a urine sample was considered admissible. However, the circumstances of
such case are different from the case at bar.
• First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case.
• Second, he volunteered to give his urine.
• Third, there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes
charged.
In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine
sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as
basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test being inadmissible, the accused Dela Cruz was acquitted by the Court.
ZabalaCute 49
 People vs. Endaya
Signature in a receipt of property seized = confession

• Endaya was arrested in a buybust in Batangas.

 Endaya was brought to the Police Station where police officers again searched his
body to look for an identification card. This body search yielded another eight (8)
plastic sachets of shabu, found in his wallet and was marked by writing a figure "8"
on each plastic sachet.
 After his arrest, he signed a “Receipt of Property Seized,” which contains several
statements that the police retrieved sachets of shabu from the accused.
• Endaya now contends that he was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed the “Receipt for
Property Seized;” therefore, the document cannot be admitted in evidence against him as
his act of signing the same is a form of confession or admission the same is a form of
confession or admission.

SC: Receipt for Property Seized – INADMISSIBLE – UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION

The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and a tacit
admission of the crime charged; hence, the constitutional safeguard must be observed.

NOTE: Nevertheless, as aptly found by the CA, while it is true that Endaya signed the receipt
of property seized without the assistance of a counsel, the same only renders inadmissible the
receipt itself.
● The evidentiary value of the “Receipt of Property Seized” in the present circumstances
is irrelevant in light of the ample evidence proving the accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
● As we have earlier stated, the prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-bust
operation was conducted to entrap him. The testimonies of the arresting police officers
clearly established the illegal possession and that the sale of shabu by appellant was
consummated.
● The corpus delicti, which is the shabu, were presented in court and confirmed by the
other members of the buy-bust team and they have acknowledged that they were the
same drugs subject of that particular buy-bust operation and subsequent body search
on appellant.

ZabalaCute 50
 RULE 116: ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
PEOPLE VS MAGAT
Facts:
• Antonio charged w/ raping his daughter
• First arraignment: Antonio pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case.
• mother, Ofelia, and the public prosecutor, Espiritu, agreed with the plea bargain.
• Consequently, the RTC convicted; sentenced to 10 yrs of imprisonment each
• After 3 months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the ground
that the penalty imposed was “too light.”
• Thus, Second arraignment: Antonio was re-arraigned on both informations where he
entered a plea of not guilty.
• Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting Dr. Daniel, medico-
legal officer of the NBI and complainant’s mother.
• Third plea: Antonio entered anew a plea of guilty.
 The court read to him the Informations in English and Tagalog and repeatedly
asked whether he understood his change of plea and propounded questions as to
his understanding of the consequences of his plea.
• Convinced of Antonio’s voluntariness of his plea of guilty, the court required the taking of
complainant’s testimony. Antonio did not present any evidence.
• RTC convicted: sentenced to death; hence automatic review
• According to the accused:
(1) RTC erred in re-arraigning and proceeding to trial despite the fact that he was
already convicted per Order of the RTC dated Jan. 10, 1997 based on his plea
of guilty;
(2) When RTC rendered judgment convicting him, the prosecution didn’t appeal
nor [filed an MR] or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the
conviction having attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified even
if the prosecution later realizes that the penalty imposed was too light.
(3) His re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against
double jeopardy.
Issue/s:
1. W/N RTC erred in re-arraigning and proceeding into trial despite the trial court’s Jan.
10, 1997 order convicting Antonio based on his plea of guilty [NO]
2. W/N RTC erred in not finding that Antonio made an improvident plea of guilty [NO]
Ratio:
1. The Jan 10, 1997 (first plea) is void.
The Jan. 10, 1997 order of the RTC convicting Antonio on his own plea of guilt is void ab anitio
on the ground that Antonio’s plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law
and the rules of procedure. The only instance when a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules
is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense.
A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for
purposes of double jeopardy.”
● It must be emphasized that Antonio did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty
to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, [he did not plea
bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed.] This is erroneous because
by pleading guilty to the offense charged, Antonio should be sentenced to the penalty
to which he pleaded.
● It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and
unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. Hence, an
accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt
provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him.
Antonio’s plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial court should have
vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of guilty, or one subject
to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty
and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered.
● In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be considered to have attained finality for
the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since
the judgment of conviction rendered against Antonio is void, double jeopardy will not
lie.
Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of Antonio was rectified when
he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea. Antonio did not question the procedural errors in
the first arraignment and having failed to do so, he is deemed to have abandoned his right to
question the same and waived the errors in procedure.
(2) Trial court conducted searching inquiry in accordance with the rules.
Antonio also maintains that assuming there was proper basis for setting aside the Order of Jan.
10, 1997, the trial court erred in not finding that he made an improvident plea of guilty. He faults
the trial court in not complying with the procedure laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the ROC.
He claims that the record of the case fails to support the trial court’s assertion that it conducted
a searching inquiry to determine that Antonio voluntarily entered his plea of guilty with full
understanding of the consequences of his plea. He claims that there’s no evidence that the trial
court conducted searching inquiry in accordance with the rules.
[After reviewing records of the case, SC is convinced] that the trial judge has faithfully
discharged his bounden duty as minister of the law to determine the voluntariness and full
understanding of Antonio’s plea of guilty. The absence of the transcript of stenographic notes
of the proceedings during the arraignment do not make the procedure flawed. The minutes of
the proceedings indubitably show that the judge read the Informations to Antonio asked him
questions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea, his educational attainment
and occupation. Antonio could have known of the consequence of his plea having pleaded twice
to the charges against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters sent to the trial court judge, Antonio not
only admitted his "sins" but also asked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform.
● Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus, even assuming
that there was an improvident plea of guilt, the evidence on record can sustain the
conviction of Antonio [See Annex].
● Surprisingly, Antonio did not present any evidence to rebut the prosecution's
evidence nor testified in his behalf to deny the inculpatory testimony of the
complainant, giving us the impression that he acknowledges the charges against him.
● While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in
capital offenses because of the improvidence of the plea, we did so only when such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment of the condemnatory judgment. Thus, when the
trial court in obedience to this Court's injunction, receives evidence to determine
precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in
which the plea of guilty is made loses legal significance, for the simple reason that
the conviction is predicated not on the plea but on the evidence proving the
commission by the accused of the offense charged. In such case, it cannot be claimed
that defendant was sentenced to death without having been previously informed of the
nature of the charges against him and of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
ZabalaCute 51
 recited in the information, as he is fully apprised not only of the allegations in the
information but of the entire evidence of the prosecution.
● Additionally, Antonio’s second plea of guilty validated his first plea of guilt. It
removed any reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
PEOPLE VS ULIT
• Ulit was charged with 2 counts of qualified rape and 2 counts of acts of lasciviousness
committed against his niece, who was a minor.
• He pleaded NOT GUILTY during arraignment.
• After the prosecution rested its case, Ulit’s counsel manifested that Ulit wanted to change
his plea to “guilty” in the rape cases.
 The trial court suspended the proceedings and gave Ulit 45 minutes to confer
with his counsel.
 When trial resumed, Ulit reiterated his earlier manifestation.
• RTC found Ulit GUILTY
 even prescinding from the Ulit’s plea of guilty, the prosecutor adduced proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant. Case went on automatic review to SC.
Whether the trial court performed its duty to conduct searching inquiry after appellant changed
his plea-- NO. Nevertheless, Ulit was convicted because the prosecution adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim.
The plea of guilty was improvidently made. The following duties of the trial court in inquiring
into the voluntariness of plea:
● The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea
● The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and precise degree of his culpability
● The court must require the prosecution to present evidence in his behalf and allow him
to do so if he desires.
1997. The trial court did not even inquire from the appellant who prepared
and typed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and if the contents of his statement
were explained to him before he signed the same.
○ The trial court did not explain the following to the appellant, in plain and
simple terms so as to be understood by him: (a) the elements of the crime
of qualified rape; (b) the circumstances of relationship and the minority of
the victim; and (c) that his plea of guilty to qualified rape would not mitigate
the penalty for the crime in light of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
○ It was not explained to the appellant that if convicted of qualified rape, he
would be civilly liable to the victim in the amount of P50,000 as moral
damages and P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
○ Neither did the trial court inquire from the appellant’s counsel whether the
meaning and the consequences of a guilty plea were explained to the
appellant in a language or dialect known to and understood by him.
○ The trial court failed to delve into and ascertain from the appellant his age,
educational attainment and socio-economic status.
○ The trial court failed to ask the appellant to narrate the facts and
circumstances surrounding the incident of a qualified rape as charged in
Criminal Case No. 97- 385.
○ The appellant was not asked if he desired to adduce evidence in Criminal
Case No. 97-385 in spite of his plea of guilty.

● The trial court failed to make a searching inquiry into the appellant’s voluntariness
and full comprehension of his plea of guilty.
○ The trial court did not ask the appellant his reasons for changing his plea,
from not guilty to that of guilty, and the circumstances that led him to decide
to do so.
○ Trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel
when he was brought to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for inquest
investigation. Neither did the court a quo inquire about the circumstances
and the appellant’s reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.
○ The trial court also failed to ascertain from the appellant whether he was
assisted by counsel when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay while
detained at the barangay hall; and, if he was not so assisted by counsel,
whether he had waived his right thereto, before and when he signed his
Sinumpaang Salaysay.
○ The trial court failed to ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a
rape committed in November 1996, when in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, he
confessed to having raped the victim only in February 1997 and March 2,

ZabalaCute 52
 Daan vs Sandiganbayan
When a plea of guilty to a lesser offense may be made - even after the
prosecution has finished presenting evidence and rested its case (See Daan v.
Sandiganbayan)
Accused, together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged for:
● 3 counts of malversation of public funds, which they purportedly tried to conceal by
falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some
laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building in Leyte.
● 3 counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute
the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of
guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such
proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty"
to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of
"guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual.
in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with
a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal
of the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a
private individual.
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution, denied petitioner's Motion to Plea
Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no
cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.
The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not commit GADALEJ
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and
2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at
the pre-trial conference.
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution
already presented several witnesses.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea
bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor,10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included
in the offense charged.
 The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make
such plea
 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than
that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.1
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial
court's exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a
capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that
petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the
benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only
serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to
potential grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than
what their criminal acts would have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to
derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus,
setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in
government.’
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer.
However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's
plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's
equity jurisdiction
In Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, in approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan
took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement
complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan
noted that:
● the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of "not guilty"; and
● that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and
● the lesser offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect
Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is Plunder
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should
not be applied to the present case.
 Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain since he reinstitued the
amounts
 There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant
cases. Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which
to our mind, merits consideration.
 Will strengthen the cases against the Mayor
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter.
And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.28
LESSER offense
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold
petitioner liable for the lesser offenses.
 Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty
to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not
appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying
the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.
 In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while the
Informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation against
petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner
may still be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it
ZabalaCute 53
 is shown that the failure to render account was in violation of a law or regulation that
requires him to render such an accounting within the prescribed period.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.

Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the

nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody
of local government funds,29 not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount
of P18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death,30 and a whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers,
this case tremendously pales in comparison.

ZabalaCute 54
 RULE 117: MOTION TO QUASH
Antone v Beronilla
G.R. No. 183824 December 8, 2010
Summary:
Antone filed a case for bigamy against Beronilla. Beronilla filed a motion to quash.
Ground invoked - facts charged do not constitute an offense, lack of first element of
subsistence of valid marriage since marriage had been declared void ab initio. RTC quashed
Info.
SC ruled RTC acted in GADLEJ, since the decision declaring the first marriage void ab initio
is a matter outside the Information. Matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
See General Rule and Exceptions.
GSA: is the fact that there was really no marriage material to the information? You’re saying
“no that’s not true!” This cannot be a ground to quash. They alleged here the ground of facts
charged do not constitute an offense. But that is only with respect to the elements!
• Saying there is no actual marriage is a matter of DEFENSE. Accept it as true, and prove
the contrary during trial!
• In 2007, an Information was filed against Beronilla for Bigamy
 for having contracted another marriage in 1991 with Maguillo, during the subsistence
of his marriage with Antone.
• Before arraignment, Beronilla MTQ: the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
 He alleged that his marriage with Antone had been declared void ab initio in 2007 and
thus, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid marriage, the
facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.
 NOTE, just in case: Meanwhile, Antone questioned the validity of the proceedings in
the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The court set aside its decision
declaring the nullity of the marriage. Since he failed to submit his pre-trial brief, the
court dismissed the petition for nullity of marriage. Beronilla challenged the dismissal
before the CA and the matter is still pending resolution.
• The RTC quashed the Information.
• Antone CA: certiorari! RTC GADLEJ
• CA dismissed, ruling that:
1) Petition not filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by OSG;
2) Violation of the rule on double jeopardy since the earlier dismissal was tantamount to an
acquittal, being grounded on the lack of the first element of the crime;
3) Antone was able to file her opposition to the motion to quash. No denial of due process =
no grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: WON the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it sustained respondents motion
to quash - YES
GENERAL RULE: a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
Information, for which reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing
on the face of the information.
EXCEPTIONS:
1) 5 that the offender has been legally married;
2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
1) when the new allegations are admitted by the prosecution;
2) when the Rules so permit, such as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability and
double jeopardy; and
3) when facts have been established by evidence presented by both parties which destroyed
the prima facie truth of the allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion
to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and it
would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due
course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible
conviction.
Here, the general rule applies. There is no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information
in the case at bar. The accusatory portion of the Information clearly charges all the elements of
bigamy.5
 The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become
final and executory are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that
alleged in the Information ˗ that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the
respondent contracted a subsequent marriage. This should not have been considered at all
because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
XPNS not applicable: belated dissolution of the first marriage would NOT serve to prevent the
impracticability of proceeding with the trial since under the Family Code, a subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then,
the crime had already been consummated
• Further, in subsequent cases it has been ruled that there is a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy
All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so
quashing the Information, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged
thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the
facts stated in the information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under
exceptional circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant petition.
No double jeopardy: not yet arraigned; case was dismissed not merely with his consent but in
fact at his instance.
Case xpn to the OSG Rule - if the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the
plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground
Here, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant petition even
absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After all, for justice to prevail, the scales must
balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.
4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
ZabalaCute 55
 People vs Gomez
GR. No 216824 November 10, 2020
• Complaint was filed against Gomez for corruption of public officials:
 Bribed 2 policemen for the release of her companion Reynaldo
• ACP issued a Resolution finding probable cause against Gomez and recommending the
filing of Info against her
 NOTE: corresponding Info was attached with the Resolution submitted to the City
Prosec
 City Prosec then approved and signed the RESOLUTION
• Info was filed against Gomez (info signed by ACP only)
• Trial on the merits ensued, case submitted for RTC decision
• RTC, MOTU PROPIO, dismissed the case for lack of authority of ACP to file the Info:
 Info does not contain signature/indication of approval from City Prosec
 Following jurisprudence, lack of authority of ACP is a JURISDICTIONAL defect.
Therefore, cannot be cured; can be raised anytime; court may dismiss motu propio
 Villa v. Ibanez: It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which among
others, confers jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of
the accusation.
 Quisay v. PP: the filing of an information by an officer without the requisite
authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured
by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent
• Prosec: but ACP WAS authorized! Reso was approved by City Prosec
Issue: whether, in a criminal case, a trial court is divested of its jurisdiction over the person
of the accused and over the offense charged if the Information filed by the investigating
prosecutor does not bear the imprimatur because of the absence on its face of both the
word "approved" and the signature of the authorized officer such as the provincial, city
or chief state prosecutor – NO
SC: overturned previous cases and ruled:
The handling prosecutor's authority, particularly as it does not appear on the face of the
Information, has no connection to the trial court's power to hear and decide a case. Hence,
Sec. 3(d), Rule 117, requiring a handling prosecutor to secure a prior written authority or
approval from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor before filing an Information
with the courts, may be waived by the accused through silence, acquiescence, or failure to
raise such ground during arraignment or before entering a plea. If at all, such deficiency
is merely formal and can be cured at any stage of the proceedings in a criminal case.
It is sufficient for the validity of the Information or Complaint, as the case may be, that
the Resolution of the investigating prosecutor recommending for the filing of the same in
court bears the imprimatur of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor whose approval
is required under Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
No Effect on Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law. It is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.
• The authority of the officer an filing and information has nothing to do with the ultimate
facts which describe the charges against the accused.
• The nature and cause of the application remains the same with or without such required
authority.
• In fact, existing jurisprudence even allows the Prosecution to amend an Information
alleging facts which do not constitute an offense just to make it line up with the nature of
the accusation. As such, it is with more reason that the handling prosecutor shall also be
afforded with the chance to first secure the necessary authority from the provincial, city or
chief state prosecutor.
No Effect on Jurisdiction over the Accused
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon a person’s (1) arrest or
apprehension, (2) voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of court. It may even
be waived by silence or inaction before entering of plea during the arraignment.
• the authority of an officer or handling prosecutor in the filing of an Information also has
nothing to do with the voluntary appearance or validity of the arrest of the accused
• Voluntary appearance entirely depends on the volition of the accused,
• while the validity of an arrest strictly depends on the apprehending officers' compliance
with constitutional and statutory safeguards in its execution.
• Moreover, if a serious ground such as jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
waived, so can the authority of the handling prosecutor which does not have any
constitutional underpinning.
Waiver
In criminal cases, the filing of a Complaint or Information in court initiates a criminal action.
Such act of filing signifies that the handling prosecutor has entered his or her appearance on
behalf of the People of the Philippines.
• In effect, the operative consequence of filing of an Information without a prior written
authority or approval from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor is that the handling
prosecutor's representation as counsel for the State may not be recognized by the trial court
as sanctioned by the procedural rules enforced by this Court pursuant to its constitutional
power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure.
• However, a handling prosecutor who files an Information despite lack of authority but
without any indicia of bad faith or criminal intent will be considered as a mere de facto
officer clothed with the color of authority and exercising valid official acts. In other words,
the lack of authority on the part of the handling prosecutor may either result in a valid filing
of an Information if not objected to by the accused or subject the former to a possible
criminal or administrative liability-but it does not prevent the trial court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the person of the accused.
Motu Propio
Nutafan Ruling: there is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio
initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. Otherwise, if the judge
initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also
takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before an independent and
impartial tribunal.
• However, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, the Court deems it imperative to
clarify that Nitfaan does not apply to paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i), Sec. 3 of Rule 117.
Since, as comprehensively explained in the previous discussions, lack of authority of the
handling prosecutor to file an Information does not affect the trial court's jurisdiction or
authority to take cognizance of a criminal case, it is not among the exceptions of Nita/an where
the RTC may sua sponte quash the Information and dismiss the case.
ZabalaCute 56
 Heirs of Jane Honrales v Honrales
• First case: Parricide RTC
• Prosec issued a resolution recommending withdrawal of Info for parricide, and instead
file an Info for RIRI in Homicide
• Accordingly, prosec RTC: motion to withdraw info; WHILE motion still pending,
info for RIRI filed in MeTC
• Accused to MeTC: motion to quash! Double jeopardy
SC: NO double jeopardy. But case before MeTC should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
and RTC case should be reinstated.
• RTC committed GADLEJ in abdicating its judicial power by relying solely on prosec,
and later SOJ’s recommendation to withdraw.
• Reinstatement of the RTC case will not amount to DJ because MeTC lacked jurisdiction
when the Info was filed before it. This is because one of the requisites of DJ is that the
judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
• In this case, motion to withdraw still pending in the RTC while Info was filed before
the MeTC. The MeTC could not have taken cognizance of the 2nd case since under the
exclusionary rule, once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is
filed, it is there retained
ACP Camba recommended the filing of an Information for Parricide against Jonathan Honrales
for the shooting of his wife, Jane Honrales. Accordingly, the said Information was filed before
the RTC.
• Jonathan moved to reconsider the Resolution of the Assistance City Prosecutor
recommending the filing of the Information against him. In view of such motion, RTC
Judge Soriaso deferred the proceedings.
• Thereafter, ACP Biglang-Awa filed a motion for leave to conduct reinvestigation (in view
of the affidavit of a witness which allegedly will show that the shooting was not
intentional). The RTC granted the said motion.
• Thereafter, petitioner heirs of Jane moved before the Office of the Prosec for the inhibition
of ACP Biglang-Awa and prayed that the case be remanded to the court for trial. This was
granted in Office Order 1640 and the case was reassigned to City Prosec Rebagay, and the
hearings were accordingly scheduled.
• The petitioner heirs moved to reconsider Office Order 1640 and moved that the hearing be
suspended on the ground that they filed a petition for review before the DOJ to assail the
order denying their motion for reconsideration of Office Order 1640.
ACP Rebagay then issued a Reso recommending the withdrawal of the information for parricide
and the filing of the information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide.
• while the Motion to Withdraw Information was still pending, an Information for Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed against respondent before the MeTC.
• Determined to have respondent prosecuted for parricide, petitioner heirs filed a petition for
review with the DOJ questioning the downgrading of the offense.
• The DOJ however dismissed the petition. Petitioner heirs appealed to the Office of the
President. Judge Soriaso then held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to withdraw in
deference to the appeal taking its course before the OP.
In the meantime, Jonathan was arraigned before the MeTC and pleaded guilty to the charge of
reckless imprudence resulting in parricide. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty
of prision correccional.
• Jonathan then filed with the RTC a motion seeking to dismiss the parricide charges against
him. He cited his arraignment and conviction by the MeTC as grounds for the dismissal of
the case against him which was granted.
Petitioner heirs appealed before the CA but the CA dismissed the same. Though it found that
Judge Barrios failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the case and thus
abdicated his judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice, it ruled
that the remand of the case to the RTC would serve no useful purpose since it may result in the
reopening of the parricide case which would violate respondents constitutional right against
double jeopardy.
Issue: whether the remand of the parricide case to the trial court will violate respondents
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Held: NO.
It is beyond cavil that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the withdrawal
of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest without making an
independent assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor that it is abiding by the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law.
What remains for our resolution is whether the case may be remanded to the RTC without
violating respondents right against double jeopardy. On this question, we find the answer to be
in the affirmative.
Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy
is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence resulting in
parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still pending before the RTC.
once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is filed, it is there
retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide was included in
the charge for intentional parricide pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no
jurisdiction over the criminal case filed before it, the RTC having retained jurisdiction over the
offense to the exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.
A decision rendered without jurisdiction is not a decision in contemplation of law and can never
become executory.
WHEREFORE, the present petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated October 1,
2007 and Resolution dated April 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92755 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the September 26, 2005 and November
3, 2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54 are hereby NULLIFIEDand
said trial court is hereby DIRECTED to REINSTATE Criminal Case No. 02-207976 for
parricide for appropriate criminal proceedings
ZabalaCute 57
 Villalon v Chan
G.R. No. 196508 September 24, 2014
Summary:
Villalon charged with bigamy, moved for disqualification of wife Chan’s counsel which RTC
granted. Wife Chan challenged it before the CA, CA issued TRO. Still, RTC proceeded with
the case and dismissed it. CA then issued an order to re-raffle the case to another RTC branch
for continuation of proceedings. Petitioners Villalon then invoked their right against double
jeopardy.
SC affirmed CA ruling. RTC dismissal was made in defiance of the TRO, thus order of
dismissal null and void. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
Facts:
The respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua in a civil ceremony in 1954.
Respondent Chan claimed that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and the present petitioner,
Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same person.
• During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua, this time under the
name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a second marriage (civil ceremony
also) with Erlinda Talde in 1993.
Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not personally file a case for bigamy
in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners. Thus, a verified complaint-affidavit alleging the commission
of the crime of bigamy was filed with the OCP. Consequently, an Informatio was filed with the
RTC.
• On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty.
During the pre-trial, Atty. Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia and later filed his entry of
appearance as private prosecutor, with the conformity and under the control and supervision of
ACP Barot
• Leonardo filed an omnibus motion with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty. Atencia.
o He argued that Amelia could not be represented in the bigamy case because she was
not a party to the case, as she did not file the complaint-affidavit.
o He also argued that Amelia had already waived her right to file a civil and criminal
case against him and his co-defendant Erlinda.
• Amelia opposed the omnibus motion, while the public prosecutor joined the petitioners in
disqualifying Atty. Atencia from appearing in the case.
• The RTC in a resolution, granted Leonardo’s omnibus motion. Trial of the case ensued
thereafter.
Amelia challenged the RTC resolution before the CA. The CA then issued a TRO enjoining
further proceedings on the case.
• However, despite the TRO, trial of the bigamy case proceeded with the presentation of
the prosecution’s evidence, to which Leonardo filed a demurrer to evidence.
• The RTC then dismissed the bigamy case for failure of the prosecution to prove the
petitioner’s guilt.
In her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, Amelia alleged grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued the resolution (granting Leonardo’s omnibus
motion) and proceeded with the bigamy case without permitting the participation of Atty.
Atencia as private prosecutor.
The CA granted Amelia’s petition and annulled the RTC’s resolution disqualifying Atty.
Atencia from participation in the case, and its order that dismissed the bigamy case against the
petitioners.
• the CA concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not
allow Atty. Atencia to intervene and represent Amelia in the bigamy case and that the trial
court denied Amelia her right to due process.
• The CA thus ordered the remand of the case to the RTC and its re-raffle to another branch
for further proceedings.
In the instant case, petitioners invoke their right against double jeopardy. They further argue
that the petitioners argue that the RTC’s order dismissing the bigamy case against them had
already become final because it was not assailed by the respondent in her petition for certiorari
before the CA. The petitioners point out that the respondent only particularly assailed the
RTC’s resolution and failed to file a separate or amended petition for certiorari to include RTC
order.
Issue: WON the re-raffle of the case violates petitioners’ right against double jeopardy
Held: NO.
The review by the CA on whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion encompassed,
not only the issuance of RTC resolution, but all proceedings in the bigamy case thereafter. This
is apparent from the words used by the respondent in her certiorari petition before the CA where
she assailed the hearings of the bigamy case as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Evidently, the CA’s review is not limited to the RTC’s resolution but also included the order
that was issued by the RTC in the course of the proceedings on the bigamy case. Thus, the
RTC’s order, which is still the subject of review by this Court, has not attained finality and the
CA’s assailed order of remanding and re-raffling the bigamy case to another trial court would
not violate the petitioners’ right against double jeopardy.
Also, we emphasize that the RTC issued its order in defiance of the TRO issued by the CA.
Under this circumstance, the RTC’s order was actually without force and effect and would
not serve as basis for the petitioners to claim that their right against double jeopardy had
been violated. The RTC, clearly, acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its order in
view of the earlier TRO issued by the CA.
Atty Atencia’s Disqualification
The RTC should have allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening
in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to
participate through counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of
the case.
Lastly, the petitioners argue that the respondent’s certiorari petition before the CA should have
been dismissed outright because it failed to implead the "People of the Philippines" as a party-
respondent.
The respondent’s failure to implead the "People of the Philippines" as a party-respondent is not
a fatal defect warranting the outright dismissal of her petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the CA because: (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is directed
against any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions alleged to
have acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) the petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by the respondent is a special civil action separate and independent from the bigamy case
ZabalaCute 58
filed against the petitioners. For these reasons, the "People of the Philippines" need not be
impleaded as a party in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we DENY the present petition for review on certiorari
due to lack of merit, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated July 30, 2010 and resolution dated
April 8, 2011 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93807.

ZabalaCute 59
 People v De Grano
G.R. No. 167710 June 5, 2009
Summary:
The RTC then convicted Joven, Armando, Domingo, and Estanislao of murder but only
Estanislao was present at the promulgation of judgment. Because of an MR by respondents,
Joven and Armando were acquitted and as to Domingo and Estanislao, the crime was
downgraded to homicide. Petitioner appealed before the CA, CA dismissed due to double
jeopardy.
RTC shouldn’t have granted the MR since they were not present the promulgation. Thus, they
lost any relief or remedy. Consequently, judgment as to them was void and appeal does not
violate their right against double jeopardy.
Facts:
An Information for the murder of Mendoza was filed with RTC against respondents Joven,
Armando, Estanislao, together with their co-accused Leonides, Domingo and Leonardo who
were then at large.
• Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged;
while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large.
• Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecutions evidence
was not strong.
Before the transfer of the case to the RTC of Manila (since one of the accused was a Mayor of
Batangas) and after hearing and determination that the evidence against the accused was not
strong, the RTC granted bail.
• The CA denied the challenge to the grant, but the SC set aside the order granting bail.
Accordingly, a warrant of arrest was issued for the respondents but only Estanislao was re-
arrested.
The RTC then convicted Joven, Armando, Domingo, and Estanislao of murder. Only
Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.
Respondents then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC then modified its
decision by acquitting Joven and Armando and downgrading the conviction of Domingo
and Estanislao from murder to homicide.
People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. However, the CA denied
the same ruling that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state from appealing or filing a
petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case.
• Also based on other technical matters such as lack of proper verification and certificate
against forum shopping, lack of participation of OSG
Issue: WON the petition for certiorari before the CA violates the respondents’ right
against double jeopardy
Held: NO.
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors
of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to
a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy.
Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal existed
where the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a defendant before such a court
was not actually placed in jeopardy. Hence, any acquittal or conviction before a court having
no jurisdiction would not violate the principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach
in the first place.
Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or
confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.
When the Decision of conviction was promulgated, only Estanislao was present. Subsequently
thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando,
and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard
of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large,
it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered
the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at
large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court.
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from
the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling
issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not
exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it
entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the
promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person.
Consequently, the RTCs ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide
stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy applies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 25,
2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The pertinent portions of the Order dated April 15,
2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court, convicting Domingo Landicho of the crime of
Homicide and acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano, are ANNULLED and
DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order stands.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision dated April 25,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.
ZabalaCute 60
 People v Torres In other words, when appellant appealed the RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder, he is
G.R. No. 189850 September 22, 2014 deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it
became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed
Summary: judgment.
Bobby charged with Robbery with Homicide. Convicted by RTC of Murder instead, and
acquitted on robbery. He appealed to the CA, CA convicted him of original charge of Robbery Thus, appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling
with Homicide. Now contends that the RTC already acquitted him of robbery. Thus, double of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information instead
jeopardy. of murder.

SC: No double jeopardy. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the 02925 that affirmed with modifications the December 5, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial
review of the appellate court Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 02-200171 is AFFIRMED with further
MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Bobby Torres@ Roberto Torres y Nava is ordered to pay the
Facts: heirs of the victim, Jaime M. Espino, ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱100,000.00 as moral
An Amended Information for robbery with homicide was filed against respondent Bobbie Torres damages, and Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages. The interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed
and his brothers, Ronnie, Jay and Reynaldo. on all damages awarded from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
• The Information alleged that while the victim, Espino, was driving along recto, Ronnie
blocked his car. When he alighted, the brothers tried to get his belt bag. Since Espino
resisted, they stabbed him several times thereby causing his death. Afterwhich, they
were able to carry away a belt-bag, wallet, necklace, watch and ring of undetermined
amount

Only Bobbie was arrested while his brothers remained at large. He pleaded not guilty and trial
ensued.

After trial, the RTC held that due to the absence of showing that the primary intent was to rob,
Bobbie can not be convicted of robbery. Instead, he was convicted of Murder due to the presence
of abuse of superior strength.

Bobbie then appealed his conviction of murder before the CA.

The CA modified the ruling of the RTC and found Bobbie guilty of robbery with homicide
instead of murder.
• found that the primary intention of appellant and his co-accusedwas to rob Espino and
his killing was only incidental to the robbery, as shown by the blocking of Espino’s
car and the struggle for possession of his belt-bag after he alighted

In the instant case Bobbie argues that CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with homicide
as charged in the Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to the CA was limited to his
conviction for murder and excluded his acquittal for robbery. And by appealing his conviction
for murder, he does not waive his constitutional right not to be subject to double jeopardy for
the crime of robbery.

Issue: WON the conviction of Bobbie for robbery with homicide violated his right against
double jeopardy

Held: NO.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not
raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant."

ZabalaCute 61
 Los Banos v Pedro
G.R. No. 173588 April 22, 2009
Facts:
An Information for violation of the Omnibus Election Code was filed against Pedro for carrying
a gun (Revolver Cal 357) a day before the 2001 national and local elections.
Pedro then filed a Motion to Quash arguing that the Information contains averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification and/or that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification that he was
exempted from the gun ban
is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions
required by Section 8 obtain.
3. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 (order sustaining motion to quash not a bar
to prosec for the same offense) that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further
prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a
provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own
separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to
dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant
to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.

The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to return the seized 3. Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that a motion
articles to Pedro. to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused with
other dismissals:
The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Banos (Los Bnaos), representing the checkpoint
team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedros Comelec Certification was a falsification. a motion to quash is invariably filed by the in contrast, a case may be provisionally
accused to question the efficacy of the dismissed at the instance of either the
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los Bnaos motion. complaint or information filed against him or prosecution or the accused, or both, subject
her; to the conditions enumerated under Section
Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of 8, Rule 117.
Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. He likewise cited the public the form and content of a motion to quash these requirements do not apply to a
prosecutors lack of express approval of the motion to reopen the case. are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; provisional dismissal.
a motion to quash assails the validity of a provisional dismissal may be grounded
RTC denied the MR. The CA, while initially saying that there was an error of law but no grave the criminal complaint or the criminal on reasons other than the defects found in
abuse of discretion that would call for the issuance of a writ, reversed itself on motion for information for defects or defenses apparent the information.
reconsideration; it then ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed on face of the information
to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision.
a motion to quash is allowed before the there may be a provisional dismissal of the
An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a arraignment case even when the trial proper of the case
provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal is already underway provided that the
consequences. required consents are present.

Issue: WON the quashal of the Information barred the re-opening of the case based on the an information that is quashed stays quashed a provisional dismissal is, by its own
time-bar rule under Section 08 Rule 117 until revived; the grant of a motion to terms, impermanent until the time-bar
quash does not per se carry any applies, at which time it becomes a
Held: NO. connotation of impermanence, and permanent dismissal
1. A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly state what a provisional becomes so only as provided by law or by
dismissal is. The modifier provisional directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 the Rules
essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are In re-filing the case, what is important is the In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-
without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., question of whether the action can still be filing after the time-bar, and prescription is
those that bar the re-filing of the case). brought, i.e., whether the prescription of not an immediate consideration.
• Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by action or of the offense has set in.
1. the principle of double jeopardy,
2. by the previous extinction of criminal liability, If the problem relates to an intrinsic or All other reasons for seeking the dismissal
3. by the rule on speedy trial, and extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or of the complaint or information, before
4. the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused.. information, as shown on its face, the arraignment and under the circumstances
remedy is a motion to quash under the outlined in Section 8, fall under
2. A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional terms of Section 3, Rule 117. provisional dismissal.
dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under
Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion
to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of
Court. Conversely, where a ground does not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash

ZabalaCute 62
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments
which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification and that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. The Information duly charged a specific offense and provides the details
on how the offense was committed. Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit.
On the other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information any legal
excuse or justification. The cited basis, in fact, for Pedros motion to quash was a
Comelec Certification that Pedro attached to his motion to quash.
• This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to raise
in, and cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on legal excuse or justification found
on the face of the Information.
Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information was in
order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true nature, function, and utility of a
motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro
should now be arraigned and stand trial.
Ivler vs San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716 | 17 November 2010
• Following a vehicular collision, Ivler was charged was charged with two separate
offenses:
1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367)
for injuries sustained by respondent Ponce; and
2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case
No. 82366) for the death of Ponce's husband and damage to the spouses Ponce's
vehicle. Petitioner
• Ivler pleaded guilty to RIRI in SPI; was meted out the penalty of public censure
• Ivler: MTQ on RIRI in Homicide and Damage to Prop! Double jeopardy, public censure
na nga eh
• MeTC: huh no. Different offenses
Issue: whether a conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries will bar
a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
on the basis of double jeopardy – Yes
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are
Material Only to Determine the Penalty
• reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely
a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi- offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts
• Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different
crimes and prosecutions. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
● Hence, we find merit in petitioner's submission that the lower courts erred in refusing
to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
(from urself: in Art 48, there’s multiple crimes BUT only one penalty; in Art 365, there is
only one crime, regardless of the results, HENCE only one penalty)
• Thus, prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless
of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do
no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.
Navaja vs De Castro
G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017
• Two infos were filed against Noel Navaja, both under PD 1829, in diff courts:
a) Obstruction of justice - preventing a witness from testifying – MCTC-Jagna
b) Obstruction of justice - act of presentation of a falsified document – MCTC -
Tagbiliran
• Committed as follows:
 A prelim investigation was initiated by DKT, charging its regional sales manager,
Navaja, of falsification of private documents
 In the course of the said proceeding, a certain Ms. Magsigay, a material witness for
DKT, was subpoenaed to appear in a hearing.
 However, Noel (Ana’s husband) went to Ms Magsigay and told her that as per
instructions of Ana’s lawyer, Atty Bonghanoy, her attendance in the hearing is no
longer required
 Thus Ms Magsigay didn’t appear in the hearing. Still, Noel and Atty Bonghanoy
presented at the said hearing an affidavit purportedly executed by Ms. Magsigay,
supporting Ana’s counteraffidavit
• Noel MTQ in the MCTC-Jagna: double jeopardy! Preventing a witness from testifying
should have been absorbed by falsification, considering that:
 Presentation of falsified doc before the MCTC of Tagbiliran was filed first;
 the criminal cases filed before the MCTC-Jagna and MTCC-Tagbilaran arose from a
single preliminary investigation proceeding, involving the same set of facts and
circumstances, and flowed from a single alleged criminal intent, which is to obstruct
the investigation
 to allow separate prosecutions of the foregoing cases would be tantamount to a
violation of his right to double jeopardy
• MCTC-Jagna: Denied; different offenses; can be prosecuted independently
• RTC and CA affirmed
SC: While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in different locations,
the Court holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of
PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal
impulse - that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding.
• The foregoing conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which
envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent
or resolution.
ZabalaCute 63
Thus, applying the principle of delito continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one
(1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay
was allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, OR in
Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same case.

However, since he was already charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgment in the MTCC-
Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events that transpired in Jagna,
Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner's single criminal design.

Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise, petitioner will
be unduly exposed to double jeopardy, which the Court cannot countenance.

NOTE: IVLER AND NAVAJA GSA DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS

In Ivler, it was clear because the first one was terminated. He was imposed the penalty of
public censure so he can invoke that in the second case and contend double jeopardy.

However, what about in Navaja where both cases are pending? Are you supposed to wait til
either one is terminated for you to invoke double jeopardy? Can you quash that? There’s no
termination of one yet eh. This is very important because if I can’t quash that on the onset,
then the prosecutor can file 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 cases immediately in different courts then the accused
would have to wait first for the resolution of one case before he can invoke double jeopardy

Ans: you can still file a motion to quash, grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the offense,
following Honrales. Because youre saying now that when one court takes cognizance of a
case, it does to the exclusion of others. Maybe. If you can think of other solution ok lang,
because in this case it’s not quite double jeopardy yet, you can’t say dismiss for future double
jeopardy. At the same time it feels counterintuitive. Para namang ang helpless nya diba kasi
forum shopping is a civil procedure concept not a criminal procedure concept.

ZabalaCute 64
 Rule 118: Pre-Trial
Bayas v Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 143689-91. November 12, 2002
Facts:
Three Informations were filed before the SANDIGANBAYAN, charging Petitioners Matuday
and Bayas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, and two counts of malversation
through falsification under the RPC.
● They were charged in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer,
respectively, of the Municipality of Kabayan, Province of Benguet.
● During their arraignment, petitioners pled not guilty.
The pretrial conference scheduled was cancelled and reset because the counsel for the accused,
Atty. Molintas, was not prepared.
• on the rescheduled pre-trial conference, the pretrial was again cancelled because of the
absence of Atty. Molintas, who was allegedly suffering from the flu.
o Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the
stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor Lucero.
o They were asked to do so, so that at the resumption of the pretrial, they could
expeditiously pass upon all other matters that still remained to be resolved.
Thereafter, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents, which had been
duly signed by the two accused (herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero.
• Based on the stipulation of facts, the accused practically admitted all the documentary
evidence against them, specifically the disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00 and
P55,000.00.
• It was further stipulated that the Defense shall present at least four witness while the
Prosecution opts not to present any witness considering that Defense admitted all the
documentary evidence of the Prosecution.
The pretrial conference was again scuttled due to the absence of Atty. Molintas. On the
rescheduled hearing, he moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused.
Thereafter, the accused, represented by their new counsel, Atty. Cinco, moved to withdraw the
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents.
• Specifically, they sought to withdraw, first, Stipulation 1(b) which states that Both the
accused admit the disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00; and second,
Exhibits 1 to 8-a. They invoked their constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty.
The motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
• The fact that the stipulation of facts leaves less or no room for the accused to defend himself
is not a ground for setting aside a pre-trial order; in fact, an accused can plead guilty if he
so desires or make admissions as he deems appropriate and truthful, even if in the mind of
the new counsel, it gave very few opportunities to present contesting evidence
In the instant case, petitioners contend that pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally
withdrawn by the accused because allegedly, they are not binding until after the trial court
has issued a pretrial order approving them.
Issue: WON they may be allowed to withdraw unilaterally from the Joint Stipulation of
Facts and Documents.
Held: NO
Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should
be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound
public policy.
• When made before the court, they are conclusive.
• And the party who validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of
collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a
showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case.
• Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the courts
sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.
Validity of the Joint Stipulations
While petitioners wish to be relieved from the stipulations, they, however, do not allege that
these were false or misleading or were obtained through force or fraud. On the contrary, they do
not dispute the finding of the anti-graft court that no fraud or serious mistake vitiated their and
their counsels consent to the signing of these stipulations. They even admitted, in answer to its
query, that they had freely given their consent.
Nonetheless, in a desperate bid to strengthen their position, petitioners lay the blame on the
alleged incompetence of their former counsel. They claim that, in agreeing to the Joint
Stipulation, he failed to consider their legal interests.
To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake must be one of fact -- not, as in this
case, a mere lack of full knowledge of fact because of failure to exercise due diligence in
ascertaining it.
Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that parties are bound by the action or the inaction of their
counsel. To all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a
case are the acts of the client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and the simple negligence
committed by the counsel.
Presumption of Innocence
Other than by generalized argumentation, petitioners have not convinced us that the
aforementioned constitutional rights would be violated. True, the old Rules of Court frowned
upon stipulations of facts in criminal cases because of a perceived danger -- that by the mere
expedient of stipulating with the defense counsel the elements of the crime charged, the
prosecution would relieve itself of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. However, the Rules were amended in 1985, precisely to enable parties to stipulate
facts. The amendment was carried over to the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The acceptability of stipulating facts has long been established in our jurisprudence. There is
nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The policy encouraging it is
consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that x x x everyone has a right to waive
and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of
the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at large.
ZabalaCute 65
In the present case, the Joint Stipulation made by the prosecution and petitioners was a waiver
of the right to present evidence on the facts and the documents freely admitted by them. There
could have been no impairment of petitioners right to be presumed innocent, right to due process
or right against self-incrimination because the waiver was voluntary, made with the assistance
of counsel and is sanctioned by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Necessity of a Pretrial Order

Petitioners further contend that the law on pretrial requires the issuance of a pretrial order to
make pretrial stipulations binding. We do not agree.

Based on Sec 02 of Rule 118, for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must
satisfy the following conditions:
(1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and
(2) it must be signed by both the accused and their counsel.

The courts approval, mentioned in the last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed
to make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize
the supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they
become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or
facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to
rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. If the accused
are allowed to plead guilty under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they should
likewise be allowed to enter into a fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate
circumstances.

There is another cogent reason why the Joint Stipulation should be binding. It must be noted that
the SANDIGANBAYAN could not fully act on the matter, not through its fault, but because of
the continued absence of petitioners counsel. Verily, the records reveal that at the intended
completion of the pretrial on January 14, 2000, it could not pass upon the Joint Stipulation
because he was absent. Also, the pretrial conference had to be re-scheduled six times, just to
ensure the attendance of the parties and their counsels and to prepare them for the conference.

Therefore, under these circumstances, the SANDIGANBAYAN cannot be faulted for its failure
to approve expressly the stipulations. It had the opportunity to rule on the matter only when the
accused, through their new counsel, Atty. Cecilia L. Cinco, moved to withdraw their
stipulations. In its first assailed Order, the SANDIGANBAYAN upheld their validity, thereby
effectively approving the submitted Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. The assent of the
court to agreements of the parties, assisted by their counsel, is assumed until they indicate a
dissent. Thus, the stipulations freely made by the latter are to be respected as their true will and
intention with regard to the facts and evidence of the case, especially if the anti-graft court has
not struck them down for being violative of the law.

If we allow parties to renege on stipulations they validly entered into during the course of pretrial
proceedings, there would be no end to litigations. Lawyers can wiggle in and out of agreements
the moment they are disadvantaged.

ZabalaCute 66
 Rule 119: Trial
Visbal v Maceda
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1651 April 7, 2009
Summary:
It is wrong for the judge to archive a case after the accused has already entered his plea,
subject to certain exceptions. He should instead proceed with trial in abstentia
Judge Vanilla archived a criminal case on the same day that he issued a warrant of arrest
for the accused and after the accused has already entered his plea.
Held: respondent judge showed gross ignorance of the law when he archived Criminal Case
immediately after the warrant of arrest was issued against the accused. He violated
Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, which allows the archiving of a criminal case if, after
the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from
delivery of the warrant to the proper peace officer.
• Admin Complaint by Prosec Visbal against Judge Vanilla: grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law for ordering a Criminal Case (People v Benter) archived.
 Visbal alleged that at the time the respondent judge ordered the criminal case archived
the witnesses for the Prosecution were able, ready, and willing to testify, with due
notice to the accused after he had been arrainged. The first witness, the complainant
Vibal himself, had already testified.
 The archiving of the case violated Sections 14 and 16 (speedy disposition) Article III
of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
• Attached to the complaint were:
(1) Order of Arraignment setting the case for pre-trial;
(2) Certificate of Arraignment;
(3) Transcript of stenographic notes and
(4) Order dated October 9, 2003 to archive the case.
• On the other hand, Judge Vanilla explained that:
 the court reset the hearing on motion of the public prosecutor because of the absence
of the second witness and of the accused himself;
 at the rescheduled hearing, the return of the subpoena served on the accused showed
that he had not been properly notified;
 the prosecution did not present another witness or inform the court of its desire to
summon other witnesses;
 upon motion of the prosecution, hearing was again reset and another subpoena was
sent to the accused; at the rescheduled hearing, the return of the subpoena indicated
that the accused changed address without informing the court;
• this time the court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused for his failure to appear;
thus, there was no setting of the hearing in the meantime, for it was not known when the
accused would be arrested and, for practical purposes, he ordered that the case be archived
to be revived upon the arrest of the accused.
Issue: WON Judge Vanilla violated Sec 02 Rule 119 in archiving the criminal case- YES.
Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 provides that a criminal case can be archived if after the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from delivery
of the warrant to the proper peace officer. However, the court may motu propio or upon motion
of any party, archive a criminal case when proceedings therein are ordered suspended for an
indefinite period because of the following reasons:
a) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently, or
to undergo trial, and he has to be committed to a mental hospital;
b) a valid prejudicial question in a civil action is invoked during the pendency of the
criminal case unless the civil and criminal cases are consolidated;
c) an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is elevated to and is pending
resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which has issued a
temporary restraining or a writ of preliminary injunction; and
d) when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment and cannot be arrested by his
bondsman.
The Order of October 9, 2003 directing the case to be archived was issued on the same day
respondent ordered the issuance of the warrant of arrest in violation of the 6-month period
required under the Circular. Neither does the case fall under the circumstances where the court
may archive the case motu propio.
Respondent should have proceeded with the trial pursuant to Article III, Section 14 (2) of the
Constitution which authorizes trials in absentia provided the following requisites are present:
(a) that accused has been arraigned;
(b) that he has been notified; and
(c)that his failure to appear is unjustified.
All the requisites are present in the case. Accused was arraigned on January 28, 2003. He is
deemed to have received notice of the hearings considering that he has not notified the court of
a change in address. The inability of the court to notify him did not prevent it from continuing
with the trial because accused has waived his right to present evidence and to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses who testify against him.
However, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only found to be erroneous;
more importantly, it must be established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred
or some other similar motive.
In this case, considering that no malice or bad faith has been established and that this is the
respondent judge's first administrative offense, we deem it just and reasonable to impose upon
him a fine of P10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby FINE Judge WENCESLAO B.
VANILLA, MTCC, Branch 2, Tacloban City, TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), with
the STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
ZabalaCute 67
 People v De Grano
G.R. No. 167710 June 5, 2009
Facts:
An Information for the murder of Mendoza was filed with RTC against respondents Joven,
Armando, Estanislao, together with their co-accused Leonides, Domingo and Leonardo who
were then at large.
• Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged;
while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large.
• Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecutions evidence
was not strong.
Before the transfer of the case to the RTC of Manila (since one of the accused was a Mayor of
Batangas) and after hearing and determination that the evidence against the accused was not
strong, the RTC granted bail.
• The CA denied the challenge to the grant, but the SC set aside the order granting bail.
Accordingly, a warrant of arrest was issued for the respondents but only Estanislao was re-
arrested.
The RTC then convicted Joven, Armando, Domingo, and Estanislao of murder. Only
Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.
Respondents then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC then modified its
decision by acquitting Joven and Armando and downgrading the conviction of Domingo
and Estanislao from murder to homicide.
People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. However, the CA denied
the same ruling that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state from appealing or filing a
petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case.
• Also based on other technical matters such as lack of proper verification and certificate
against forum shopping, lack of participation of OSG
Issue: WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration
Held: YES
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors
of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to
a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In which event, the accused
cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy.
Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to
be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit:
(a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt;
(b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and
(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused
may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is
required and cannot be waived.
Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules applicable at
the time the Decision was promulgated:
“the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in
the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves
that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
15 days from notice.”
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was
present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their
absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest
of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered
the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at
large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court.
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from
the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling
issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not
exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it
entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the
promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person.
Consequently, the RTCs ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide
stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy applies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 25,
2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The pertinent portions of the Order dated April 15,
2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court, convicting Domingo Landicho of the crime of
Homicide and acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano, are ANNULLED and
DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order stands.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision dated April 25,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE Judge Teresa P.
Soriaso for possible violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial Conduct in issuing the
Order dated April 15, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-129988.
SO ORDERED.
ZabalaCute 68
 Cabador v People
G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009
to determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to
dismiss, the Court must consider
(1) the allegations in it made in good faith;
(2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and
(3) the primary objective of the party filing it.
Facts:
• In 2000, CABADOR was charged with the murder of Atty Valerio
• In 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC
declared at an end the prosecutions presentation of evidence and required the prosecution
to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice.
• However the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time. Still, the prosecution did
not make the required written offer.
• Hence, petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, complaining of a turtle-paced
proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a
speedy trial.
 Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not consider any
evidence against him that had not been formally offered.
 He also pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge of his
alleged part in the crime charged.
• Unknown to Cabador, however, four days earlier the prosecution asked the RTC for another
extension of the period for its formal offer, which offer it eventually made the day Cabador
filed his motion to dismiss.
• The RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss as a
demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC
declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court
deemed the case submitted for decision insofar as he was concerned.
• Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it. CA
affirmed.
Issue: WON Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to
evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he effectively waived his right to
present evidence in his defense and submitted the case for decision insofar as he was concerned.
Held: NO.
Because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case,
the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered
submitted for judgment.
In Enojas v COMELEC, the Court held that to determine whether the pleading filed is a
demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider
(1) the allegations in it made in good faith;
(2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and
(3) the primary objective of the party filing it.
Allegations: invoked his right to speedy trial
Petitioner Cabador took pains to point out in several paragraphs of his motion to dismiss how
trial in the case had painfully dragged on for years. The gaps between proceedings were long,
with hearings often postponed because of the prosecutor’s absence. This was further
compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecutions repeated motions for extension of time to file
its formal offer and its failure to file it within such time. Cabador then invoked in paragraph 13
above his right to speedy trial.
Primary Objective
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s right
to speedy trial.
• This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without
fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.
• This was the main thrust of Cabadors motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring
this up for a ruling by the trial court.
Other allegations
Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs 11 (sic) and 12,
saying that the trial court has no evidence to consider, the charge has no leg to stand on, and that
the witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the accused
in the incident.
• But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial had accomplished.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any
demurrer. He did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to
show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged.
• His so-called demurrer did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He
cited no documentary exhibit.
• Indeed, he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its
formal offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss.
• To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man,
touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
Stage of the Proceeding
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case.
Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits, the same day Cabador filed his
motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the
admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a
ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case.
Since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecutions formal
offer, before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case,
it could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.
In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer
to evidence. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
Salazar v People
G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003
Doctrine:
ZabalaCute 69
 If the trial court grants the demurrer to evidence, he should issue an order or partial judgment
granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for
continuation of trial for the petitioner (accused-defendant) to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal
after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal.
• An Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Salazar and co-accused
Timario with the RTC.
 The complaint alleged that Salazar indorsed a check, acting in conspiracy with the
drawer Timario, in favor of JY Brothers Marketing as payment for 300 cavans of rice,
knowing that the check was unfunded.
• Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued.
• After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave
of Court alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following
reasons:
a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser
thereof;
b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of
the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant;
c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second
one. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency of funds,
but for DAUD, which in banking parlance means drawn against uncollected deposit
• RTC: ok acquit Salazar, but civilly liable for the 300 cavans of rice
• Salazar: after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due
process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not
civilly liable to the private respondent.
Issue: WON Salazar was denied due process when the RTC adjudged her civilly liable
after the court granted her demurrer to evidence - YES
If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence
of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private
offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason
that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated.
• This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet
adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on
record is the evidence for the prosecution.
What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner
(accused-defendant) to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private
complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-
rebuttal.
• Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of
the evidence of the prosecution and the accused.
Go v People
GR 185527 July 18, 2012 – CONDITIONAL EXAMINAITON OF LI PUEN PING
Doctrine:
For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be
made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the
clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 23 (deposition before Philippine consular official) is inapplicable considering that Rule
119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason
to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
Facts:
Petitioners Harry go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the MeTC of
Manila for ESTAFA
• For mortgaging in favor of ML Resources and Highdone Company certain encumbered
and foreclosed chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials.
• Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos,
Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing
held on September 9, 2004.
• However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping,
alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos,
Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines
by reason of ill health.
• MeTC granted. RTC reversed, CA reinstated MeTC ruling.
Issue: WON the MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to take
Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping
Held: YES
The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a
witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction
of the rules.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in
civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary
public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or
before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer
oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in
writing to the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a
prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case
is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place
than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting
ZabalaCute 70
the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos,
Cambodia.
The language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present
testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be
evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where
in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is
sick or not.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right
to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the Instant Case
The ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the factual settings are not
similar. The accused in the Webb case had sought to take the oral deposition of five defense
witnesses before a Philippine consular agent in lieu of presenting them as live witnesses,
alleging that they were all residents of the United States who could not be compelled by
subpoena to testify in court. When the matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the trial
court's disallowance of the deposition-taking on the limited ground that there was no
necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be proved by way of deposition was
considered merely corroborative of the evidence for the defense.
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against
the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without
violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.

Rule 23
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases,
both civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine
consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of
civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we
find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the
initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen
Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the
prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken
before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it
should have been imperative for the prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen
Ping's testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a non-resident alien who
can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution
allowed its main witness to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure
intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no
other party

The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the
Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses
In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the deprivation of their constitutional rights
to a public trial and confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners would still be accorded the
right to cross-examine the deponent witness and raise their objections during the deposition-
taking in the same manner as in a regular court trial.

We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a
public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness
in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge.
• "The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial
is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination.
• There is also the advantage of the witness before the judge,– it enables the judge as trier of
facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. Certainly, the
physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and
memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can
only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court.

The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal
proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the
deportment of witnesses. It is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of unreliable
testimony in criminal trials.

ZabalaCute 71
 Jimenez v People
G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2014
Doctrine: In resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness, actual hearing is
not required provided that the parties have both presented their sides on the merits of the
motion.
Other doctrines:S
a) That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of Montero without his
discharge as a state witness is not an important and relevant consideration. To the
prosecution belongs the control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on its choice in
the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements have not been
complied with
b) the Rules only require that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be
substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points
c) For determining if the accused is the most guilty, what are controlling are the specific
acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed.
• Montero (a former employee of the BSJ Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed
sworn statements confessing his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda, and
naming petitioner Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (petitioner’s younger brother), Lennard alias
“Spyke,” Robert Ponce, alias “Obet,” and Eric Fernandez, as his co-conspirators.
• The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged steel casing
containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver, encased
in a drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that Montero pointed to.
• Thus, the People, through the state prosecutors, filed an Information before the RTC,
charging Jimenez, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and Montero of murder for the killing of
Ruby Rose.
• Montero filed a motion for his discharge entitled “Motion for the Discharge of the Witness
as Accused Pursuant to the Witness Protection Program” pursuant to Republic Act No.
6981. The People also filed a motion to discharge Montero as a state witness for the
prosecution. Jimenez opposed both motions.
• Initially denied by the RTC, but was later granted by the new RTC Judge Docena.
Jimenez raises the following errors (7 talaga pero ito relevant):
1) there is no necessity to discharge Montero as a state witness because:
a) the voluntary sworn extrajudicial confessions of Montero are all in the possession of
the prosecution which they could readily present in court without discharging
Montero; and
b) there was unjust favoritism in the discharge of Montero because all the other
conspirators are equally knowledgeable of the crime.
2) Montero’s testimony cannot be substantially corroborated in its material points as the
prosecution’s own evidence contradicts his declarations
3) Montero appears to be the most guilty.
 He was the architect who designed and actively participated in all phases of the alleged
crime.
4) the discharge of Montero was irregular because Judge Docena failed to conduct a prior
hearing.
5) Montero already executed a notice of withdrawal of consent and testimony which was
submitted to the CA
Issue: WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in discharging Montero as a
state witness - NO
Absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero: only Montero willing to testify
Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged when he or
she alone has knowledge of the crime.
• In more concrete terms, necessity is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate
or otherwise strengthen the prosecution’s evidence.
• The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a state witness depends on the
circumstances of each case regardless of the number of the participating conspirators.
In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was willing to testify
on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her killing. He alone is available
to provide direct evidence of the crime.
That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of Montero without his discharge
as a state witness is not an important and relevant consideration. To the prosecution
belongs the control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge
of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements have not been complied with.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is given the
power to discharge a state witness only after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime
and the accused.
Montero’s testimony can be substantially corroborated
As the trial court properly found, the evidence consisting of the steel casing where the cadaver
was found; the drum containing the cadaver which the prosecution successfully identified (and
which even the acting Judge Almeyda believed) to be Ruby Rose; the spot in the sea that
Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was retrieved); the apparel worn by the victim when she
was killed as well as her burned personal effects, all partly corroborate some of the material
points in the sworn statements of Montero.
Jimenez points to the discrepancies in Montero’s statements and the physical evidence, such as
the absence of “busal” in the mouth of the retrieved cadaver; his failure to mention that they
used packaging tape wrapped around the head down to the neck of the victim; and his declaration
that the victim was killed through strangulation using a rope (lubid).
• However, the corroborated statements of Montero discussed above are far more material
than the inconsistencies pointed out by Jimenez, at least for purposes of the motion to
discharge.
• The alleged discrepancies in the physical evidence, particularly on the height and dental
records of Ruby Rose, are matters that should properly be dealt with during the trial proper.
We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require that that the testimony of the
accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all
points.
This rule is based on jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion to discharge under Section
17, Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the trial, to inform
himself with absolute certainty of everything that may develop in the course of the trial with
respect to the guilty participation of the accused. If that were practicable or possible, there would
be little need for the formality of a trial.48cralawlawlibrary
Montero is not the most guilty
ZabalaCute 72
By jurisprudence, “most guilty” refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the
penalty imposed.
• While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may
be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into account his degree of participation
in the commission of the offense.
• Contrary to the CA’s findings, a principal by inducement is not automatically the most
guilty in a conspiracy.
To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the principal by
inducement as the most guilty based on the specific acts done by the two accused and bearing
in mind the elements constitutive of the crime of falsification of private documents where the
element of “damage” arose through the principal by inducement’s encashment of the
falsified check. This led the Court to declare that the principal by inducement is the “most
guilty” (or properly, the more guilty) between the two accused.
Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state
witness, what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime
committed.
We cannot also agree with Jimenez’ argument that a principal by direct participation is more
guilty than the principal by inducement as the Revised Penal Code penalizes the principal by
inducement only when the principal by direct participation has executed the crime.
We note that the severity of the penalty imposed is part of the substantive criminal law which
should not be equated with the procedural rule on the discharge of the particeps criminis.
From the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to discharge Montero,
it appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most
of his co-accused had been, he had no direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby Rose.
• While Lope allegedly assigned to him the execution of the killing, the records do not
indicate that he had active participation in hatching the plan to kill Ruby Rose, which
allegedly came from accused Lope and Jimenez, and in the actual killing of Ruby Rose
which was executed by accused Lennard.
• Montero’s participation was limited to providing the steel box where the drum containing
the victim’s body was placed, welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating
the skip or tug boat, and, together with his co-accused, dropping the steel box containing
the cadaver into the sea.
At any rate, the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not
appear to be the most guilty is highly factual in nature as it largely depends on the appreciation
of who had the most participation in the commission of the crime.
The discharge of Montero as a state witness was procedurally sound
We agree with the People that Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack of hearing prior
to the discharge of Montero as a state witness. Jimenez did not raise this issue when Acting
Judge Almeyda denied the motion to discharge. This denial, of course, was favorable to Jimenez.
If he found no reason to complain then, why should we entertain his hearing-related complaint
now?
The People even supported its argument that Jimenez actively participated in the proceedings of
the motion to discharge such as his filing of a 20-page opposition to the motion; filing a reply
to the People’s comment; submitting his memorandum of authorities on the qualification of
Montero as state witness; and filing a consolidated opposition on the People’s and Montero’s
motion for reconsideration of Judge Almeyda’s order.
In these lights, Jimenez cannot impute grave abuse of discretion on Judge Docena for not
conducting a hearing prior to his grant of the motion to discharge. In People v. CA and Pring, the
Court ruled that with both litigants able to present their sides, the lack of actual hearing is
not sufficiently fatal to undermine the court's ability to determine whether the conditions
prescribed for the discharge of an accused as a state witness have been satisfied.
Montero’s Notice of Withdrawal of Consent is not material in the resolution
of the present case
Montero already testified on direct examination. He attested and affirmed his statements in his
affidavits; he not only narrated the grisly murder of Ruby Rose, but also revealed Jimenez’
participation in the murder.
With this development, the notice may partake of the nature of a recantation, which is usually
taken ex parte and is considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. It would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness
who gave it later changed his/her mind.
Interplay between the judge and prosecutor in the motion to discharge an accused to
become a state witness
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at the
very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in
regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the
complaint. If that were practicable or possible there would be little need for the formality of a
trial. He must rely in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the
prosecuting officer in coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested"; as to the availability or non-availability of other direct
or corroborative evidence; as to which of the accused is “most guilty,” and the like.
We deem it important to place this ruling in its proper context lest we create the wrong
impression that the trial court is a mere “rubber stamp” of the prosecution, in the manner that
Jimenez now argues.
It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the
accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This
relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the
administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and
evaluation.
Thus, we ruled in People v. Pring that in requiring a hearing in support of the discharge, the
essential objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence for or against the discharge,
which evidence shall serve as the court’s tangible and concrete basis – independently of the
fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions – in granting or denying the motion for discharge. We
emphasize, in saying this, that actual hearing is not required provided that the parties have
both presented their sides on the merits of the motion.
People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, 9 October 2019
• Sergio and Julius were charged with Qualified Trafficking:
ZabalaCute 73
 o Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao
(Julius) were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija.
o Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius
offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia.
o Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her trip.
She then asked Cristina why the luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied
that because it was new. The luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to
Indonesia.
o It was only after she was apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that
it contained prohibited drugs.
• The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the
scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian Government that the
recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her testimony is
vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.
• The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to the taking
of Mary Jane's testimony:
a) she remain in Yogyakarta, no cameras allowed, lawyers shall not be present, and
questions propounded should be in writing.
• Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of
Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories. "
 It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon
written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because
she is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due
to her imprisonment.
• Cristina and Julius: objection!!!
 the deposition should be made before and not during the trial.
 The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 and the use thereof is confined only in civil
cases.
 method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane,
or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
 Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced because the
affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.
• The RTC granted the motion. CA reversed the RTC.
 CA - Section 15, Rule 119 which applies to the taking of depositions of prosecution
witnesses in criminal cases. Following the case of Go, Section 23 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure should not be given any suppletory application
SC reversed CA and said Rule 23 on interrogatories allowed and CA erred in granting
certiorari. The Rules are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to
testify in open court because he is imprisoned in another country.
1) Rule 119 Sec 15 Inapplicable
Under Rule 119, Sec. 15 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in order for the testimony
of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be
shown that the said prosecution witness is either:
(a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or;
(b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.
Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category.
She is neither too sick nor infirm to appear at the trial nor has to leave the Philippines
indefinitely. In fact, Mary Jane’s predicament does not in any way pertain to a restriction in
movement from one place to another but a deprivation of liberty thru detention in a foreign
country with little or no hope of being saved from the extreme penalty of death by firing squad.
It thus necessarily follows that the cases of Go v. People and Cuenca vda. De Manguera v. Risos
are not on all fours with the present case. The circumstances of the prosecution witnesses in the
cases of Go and Cuenca demanded and justified the strict adherence to Rule 119 The witnesses
in bothcases anchored their allowance to testify by way of deposition on their claims that they
were too sick or infirm to testify before the court. In the case of Go, Li Luen Pen who returned
to Cambodia claimed that he was undergoing treatment for lung infection and could not travel
back to the Philippines due
to his illness.
The extraordinary factual circumstances surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant the
resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
Depositions, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although the rule
on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it
may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling reason.
● Mary Jane’s testimony, being the victim, is vital in the prosecution of the
pending criminal cases that were filed against Cristina and Julius. This has been
recognized by no less than Pres. Widodo, who granted the reprieve precisely to
afford Mary Jane the opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings
obtaining in the Philippines.
● The ASEAN MLAT is enforced precisely to be applied in circumstances like
in the case of Mary Jane. It recognizes the significance of cooperation and
coordination among the states to prevent, investigate and prosecute criminal
offenses especially if perpetuated not only in a single state just like in the case
of drug and human trafficking, and illegal recruitment.
Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional
right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.
• The parameters laid down by the trial court are sufficient in detail ensuring that
Mary Jane will give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury
charge. She is still subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the presence of
any falsehood in her testimony.
The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also
in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-
judicial powers. It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily,
to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.
1) TEST TESTIMONY
Accused are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written
interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right.
To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file their
comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories
submitted by the prosecution.
ZabalaCute 74
 The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the objections. The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will
Thereafter, only the final questions would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state
Indonesia or his designated representative. witness.
The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a However, the motion hearing in this case had already concluded and the motion
transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in for discharge, approved. Thus, whatever transpired during the hearing is already
turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. automatically deemed part of the records of Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431 and
Should the prosecution raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule
rule on the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane
will then be conducted. a) Respondent raised that Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court makes it mandatory
Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a that the state witness be presented during trial proper and that, otherwise, his failure to do
transcribed copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution. so would render his testimony inadmissible.
SC: True, the provision requires the accused to testify again during trial proper after he
2) OBSERVE DEMEANOR qualifies as a state witness.
As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will However, non-compliance therewith would only prevent the order of discharge
be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give her ample from operating as an acquittal; it does not speak of any penalty to the effect of
opportunity to observe and to examine the demeanor of the witness closely. rendering all the testimonies of the state witness during the discharge proceeding
Although the deposition is in writing, the trial court judge can still carefully perceive the inadmissible.
reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she answers each question propounded to her both On the contrary, the testimonies and admissions of a state witness during the
by the prosecution and the defense. discharge proceedings may be admitted as evidence to impute criminal liability
against him should he fail or refuse to testify in accordance with his sworn
People v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 229420, 19 February 2018, 856 SCRA 109 statement constituting the basis for the discharge, militating against the claim of
• The Dominguez brothers and Mendiola were charged with Carnapping with Homicide inadmissibility.
for the abduction and killing of Evangelista:
− Evangelista's charred remains were discovered the following day in Cabanatuan City, b) That the testimony of Mendiola was offered for the limited purpose of qualifying
Nueva Ecija. In connection with the incident, Mendiola and Ferdinand Parulan him as a state witness does not automatically render his statements as to the specifics
(Parulan) voluntarily surrendered to the PNP and executed extrajudicial confessions on the commission of the offense inadmissible
identifying respondents Dominguez Brothers as the masterminds behind the killing. Pursuant to the requirement that the witness must not appear to be the most guilty,
• Upon motion of the prosecution, Mendiola was sought to be discharged as a state witness. Mendiola narrated in graphic detail his entire knowledge of the crime and the
• Hearing was conducted where Mendiola gave his testimony and was cross- examined by extent of the participation of each of the accused
the counsel for the defense. Accused failed to object to the detailed narration; barred.
− Nevertheless, the defense manifested that the cross-examination was limited only to
the incident of discharge, and that their party reserved the right to a more lengthy
cross- examination during the prosecution's presentation of the evidence in chief.
• RTC granted motion to discharge Mendiola as state witness. However, by a surprise turn
of events, Mendiola was found dead.
• RTC then ordered Mendiola’s testimony to be stricken off the records:
− when Mendiola was cross-examined, such cross-examination was limited by the
purpose of the hearing, that is, whether the court would be satisfied of the absolute
necessity of his testimony; that "there is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution"; that his "testimony could be substantially corroborated in its
material points"; that he "does not appear to be the most guilty"; and he "has not been
convicted, at any time, of any offense involving moral turpitude".
• Prosec: huh WAIVER NA!
− the right afforded to an accused to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him is not an absolute right. Hence, when respondents failed to avail themselves of
the constitutional guarantee when Mendiola gave his testimony they have effectively
forfeited their right thereto.

SC: The death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically render his
testimony during the discharge proceeding inadmissible

ZabalaCute 75
 Rule 120: Judgment
People v De Grano
G.R. No. 167710 June 5, 2009
Summary:
The RTC then convicted Joven, Armando, Domingo, and Estanislao of murder but only
Estanislao was present at the promulgation of judgment. Because of an MR by respondents,
Joven and Armando were acquitted and as to Domingo and Estanislao, the crime was
downgraded to homicide. Petitioner appealed before the CA, CA dismissed due to double
jeopardy.
RTC shouldn’t have granted the MR since they were not present the promulgation. Thus, they
lost any relief or remedy. Consequently, judgment as to them was void and appeal does not
violate their right against double jeopardy.
Facts:
An Information for the murder of Mendoza was filed with RTC against respondents Joven,
Armando, Estanislao, together with their co-accused Leonides, Domingo and Leonardo who
were then at large.
• Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged;
while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large.
• Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecutions evidence
was not strong.
Before the transfer of the case to the RTC of Manila (since one of the accused was a Mayor of
Batangas) and after hearing and determination that the evidence against the accused was not
strong, the RTC granted bail.
• The CA denied the challenge to the grant, but the SC set aside the order granting bail.
Accordingly, a warrant of arrest was issued for the respondents but only Estanislao was re-
arrested.
The RTC then convicted Joven, Armando, Domingo, and Estanislao of murder. Only
Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.
Respondents then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC then modified its
decision by acquitting Joven and Armando and downgrading the conviction of Domingo
and Estanislao from murder to homicide.
People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. However, the CA denied
the same ruling that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state from appealing or filing a
petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case.
• Also based on other technical matters such as lack of proper verification and certificate
against forum shopping, lack of participation of OSG
Issue: WON the petition for certiorari before the CA violates the respondents’ right
against double jeopardy
Held: NO.
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors
of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to
a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy.
Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused
to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit:
(a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt;
(b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and
(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused
may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is
required and cannot be waived.
Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules applicable at
the time the Decision was promulgated:
“the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in
the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves
that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
15 days from notice.”
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was
present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their
absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest
of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered
the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao.
Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses
his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court,
he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from
the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling
issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not
exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it
entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the
promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person.
ZabalaCute 76
Consequently, the RTCs ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide
stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy applies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 25, 2005 and April
5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The pertinent portions of the Order dated April 15, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial
Court, convicting Domingo Landicho of the crime of Homicide and acquitting Armando de
Grano and Joven de Grano, are ANNULLED and DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order
stands.

To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision dated April 25,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.

The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE Judge Teresa P.

Soriaso for possible violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial Conduct in issuing the
Order dated April 15, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-129988.

SO ORDERED.

ZabalaCute 77
 Rimando v Sps Aldaba
G.R. No. 203583 October 13, 2014
[ESTAFA CASE]
• Information filed against Rimando for estafa through the use of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations.
 Rimando enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business, allegedly Multitel, under the
assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8% monthly interest.
 Hence, Sps Aldaba paid Rimando 500k through a check
 In turn, Rimando gave Sps Aldaba 3 postdated check: one for 500k (principal) and
two for 40k each (interest); made them sign an investment contract w/ Multitel
 Upon maturity, checks dishonored; drawn against insufficient funds
• Rimando defense: acted only as accommodation party while waiting for Multitel checks;
when Multitel issued the check, Sps. Aldaba refused to accept it so she can be held liable
in case their investment fails.
[BP 22 CASE]
• Sps. Aldaba also filed a criminal case against Rimando for BP 22
• However, Rimando acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that
the act or omission from which liability may arise does not exist.
[BACK TO ESTAFA CASE]
• The RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to Sps.
Aldaba in the amount of P500,000.00.
• Acquitted: absence of element of deceit
 Sps. Aldaba were fully aware that they would be investing their money in Multitel and
not in Rimando’s purported business.
 Civil liability: as an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps.
Aldaba on behalf of Multitel, Rimando should be held liable
THUS, in this case, Rimando contends: her acquittal and exoneration from the civil liability in
the BP 22 cases should have barred Sps. Aldaba from claiming civil liability from her in the
estafa case.
ISSUE: Is the civil liability of Rimando in the estafa case extinguished by virtue of her acquittal
and exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases?
HELD:
Acquittal in estafa case did not mean she can no longer be civilly liable: civil liability not
based on crime
Rimando’s civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of P500,000.00 does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime she is charged with.
As the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce
them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an
accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In
lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and as such, she
may be held directly liable for the value of the issued check
Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP 22 cases had no effect in the
estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the same factual circumstances. Essentially,
while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they
nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered “separate,
distinct, and independent” from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final
adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double
recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the
accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related
estafa case, as in this instance.
• deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are
not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
• Under BP 22, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of
knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and
hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.
• Other differences between the two also include the following:
(1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if
he had issued the same for a preexisting obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised
Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability;
(2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses;
(3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system;
(4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.
Hence, Rimando is still civilly liable in the estafa case despite her exoneration of her civil
liability in the BP 22 case.
*An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer,
acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending
his name to some other person.
No double jeopardy
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to
identical acts committed by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one
offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where
there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense is one law and another
law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double
jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated,
prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same
offense.
ZabalaCute 78
 Sevilla v People
G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014
• Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification
of public document.
 The prosecution alleged that he made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet
(PDS).
 That in answer to the question of whether there is a pending criminalcase against him,
Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a
criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a person in authority before the
MeTC
 Sevilla defense: no intent to falsify! It was my staff who prepared it; I just signed
• Sandiganbayan: CONVICT OF falsification of public document THROUGH RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE
 Indeed, no intent
 However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which
resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification
of public document through reckless imprudence
 Further, it was also found that he also answered in the question of whether he had been
previously a candidate when in fact, he already served a term as councilor.
• Sevilla: violation of right to be informed of the cause of the accusation!!!!
 He claims that the Information that was filed against him specifically charged him
with the commission of an intentional felony, i.e.falsification of public documents
under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
 Thus, he could not be convicted of falsification of public document through reckless
imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC, which is a culpable felony, lest his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him be violated.
Issue: whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for the
intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC. - YES
Held: YES.
First, “falsification of public document through reckless imprudence" is wrong. It should
be RIRI in falsification of a public document
• Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a
mere modality in the commission of a crime.
• Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere
quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence
or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.
Second, can still be convicted: GREATER OFFENSE INCLUDES THE LESSER ONE
under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, in case of variance between the allegation
and proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved when the offense charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a wilful crime but a distinct crime
in itself, designated as a quasi offense, in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a
conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that
is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the
greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification
of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of
falsification of public documents.
People vs Lagos
• An Information dated was filed against Dy et al for the sale of dangerous drugs, in
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
 Upon a tip from a confidential informant (Cl), the police officers together with the Cl
proceeded to conduct a buy-bust operation in which one of the police officers acted
as the poseur-buyer.
 The police team arrested the accused after he was caught in flagrante selling to the
police officers.
• During the trial the accused filed with leave of court a demurrer to evidence
• Judge Lagos: ok granted. Prosecution's failure to present the testimony of the Cl was fatal
to its case since the Cl's testimony is indispensable.
• Prosec SC: petition for certiorari! GADLEJ! clear proof of the elements of the illegal
sale, the existence of the corpus delicti, and the arrest in flagrante delicto.
• Dy et al: demurrer = acquittal! Double jeopardy plus hierarchy of courts!
SC: No double jeopardy!
It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. However, the
rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 The SC is endowed with the power to determine whether or not there has been
GADLEJ on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
 Here, the party asking for the review must show an exercise of power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority
to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice.
 In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy
In this case, Judge Lagos acted w/ GADLEJ
It is settled that the testimony of an informant is not indispensable if there is other independent
evidence proving the guilt of the accused. Here, the other police officers had personal knowledge
of the accused's guilt as they were the ones who caught the accused in flagrante.
● Due to the investigative work of the AIDSOTF members, the illegal sale was
consummated in their presence, and the elements of the sale – the identity of the
sellers, the delivery of the drugs, and the payment therefor – were confirmed.
● That the CI initially provided this information or "tip" does not negate the subsequent
consummation of the illegal sale. The testimony of the CI is not indispensable, since
it would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who
was presented in court, and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale
and delivery of the prohibited drug
ZabalaCute 79
 People vs Caoili of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided
• Caoili, alias "BOY TAGALOG", was charged w/ rape thru sexual intercourse for raping the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
his minor daughter. give bail for their appearance at the trial.
• During trial, what was proved was rape by sexual assault (insertion of finger in the vagina). • Sec. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. — When it becomes
• RTC convicted Caoili for rape by sexual assault.
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
• On appeal, CA remanded the case for further proceedings, saying that what the RTC should
have done was to order the state prosecutor to file the proper information and then dismiss offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
the original case. necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good
• Both Caoili and OSG filed separate petitions assailing the CA’s decision. cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the
proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
On whether applying the variance doctrine, Caoili can be convicted of rape by sexual
assault— NO, because rape by sexual assault is not necessarily included in rape through sexual On whether CA’s decision amounted to an acquittal— NO. The CA’s directive clearly shows
intercourse. However, SC convicted Caoili of the lesser crime of lascivious conduct under Sec. that the CA still had cause to detain Caoili and did not discharge him; in fact, the CA would
5b of RA 7610 since lascivious conduct is necessarily included in the crime of rape through have Caoili answer for the proper Information which it directed the prosecution to file. These
sexual intercourse are not consistent with the concept of acquittal which denotes a discharge, a formal certification
• The variance doctrine allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is of innocence, a release or an absolution.
different from but necessarily included in or necessarily includes the crime charged.
• Jurisprudence, however, provides that an accused charged with rape by sexual intercourse
cannot be convicted of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime was proven
during trial because of the substantial distinctions between these two modes of rape:
 In the first mode (rape by sexual intercourse): (1) the offender is always a man; (2)
the offended party is always a woman; (3) rape is committed through penile
penetration of the vagina; and (4) the penalty is reclusion perpertua.
 In the second mode (rape by sexual assault): (1) the offender may be a man or a
woman; (2) the offended party may be a man or a woman; (3) rape is committed by
inserting the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and (4) the penalty is prision
mayor

Nevertheless, Caoili can be convicted of lascivious conduct under Sec. 5b of RA 7610 since
lascivious conduct is necessarily included in the crime of rape through sexual intercourse.
● The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation through the criminal complaint or information is decisive of
whether his prosecution for a crime stands or not.
● Nonetheless, the right is not transgressed if the information sufficiently alleges facts and
omissions constituting an offense that includes the offense established to have been
committed by the accused, which, in this case, is lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610.

On whether the CA was correct in remanding the case for the purpose of filing the proper
information on the basis of Sec. 14, Rule 110 and Sec. 19, Rule 119— NO. The procedure
applied by the CA is proper only before judgment is made, which is not the case here since the
RTC already convicted Caoili

Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, state:
Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. — x x x xxx xxx xxx
• If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing

ZabalaCute 80
 Rule 113: Arrest
AAA v Carbonell
G.R. No. 171465 June 8, 2007
Summary:
Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed info for rape for lack of probable cause on the ground
that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to take the witness stand.
Doctrine:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
• In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses.
• Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence
of probable cause.
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judges personal examination of
the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is
not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show
the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he
should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, but also the affidavit
and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his
witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing
of the Information. If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to
sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses be conducted.
In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case without taking into
consideration the Resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the Resolution of the panel of
prosecutors, and Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of
probable cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in support
thereof. Respondent judges finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the
complainants and her witnesses absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge
for the judicial determination of probable cause
GSA: How do we reconcile the doctrine that the court has the prerogative to dismiss the case
once filed it finds no probable cause? There’s no inconsistency. Here’s the judge dismissed
solely on the fact that the complainant and the witnesses did not appear.
People v Alunday
GR 181546 3 September 2008
Summary:
Alunday caught in flagrante delicto in a police operation pursuant to a confidential information
of the existence of a marijuana plantation. When police officers went to the plantation, they saw
Alunday uprooting marijuana leaves and was thus arrested. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not
guilty.
Alunday questions the lack of warrant of arrest, considering the tip was given in May and he
was arrested in August, thus the police could have secured a warrant of arrest.
SC: When a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a
warrant on the basis of Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the offense is
deemed committed in his presence or within his view.
Thus, accused-appellants arrest on 3 August 2000 was legal, because he was
caught in flagrante delicto; that is, the persons arrested were committing a crime in the
presence of the arresting officers.
Court further held that accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, he actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of
irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to
have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his
counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not
raising the objection before his arraignment.
People v Del Rosario
G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999
Summary:
Tricycle driver arrested while he was accompanying the police in arresting his alleged co-
accused for robbery with homicide. Court held that it was an invalid arrest since he wasn’t
committing a crime, thus not in flagrante delicto, and neither had a crime just been committed
since the arrest took place a day after its commission and thus not a hot pursuit exception.
Still, it did not affect the jurisdiction of the court because he failed to timely object thereto.
ZabalaCute 81
 People v Jayson
G.R. No. 120330 November 18, 1997
Facts:
• Jayson works as a bouncer at the Ihaw-Ihaw nightclub in Davao. Around 10pm one
evening, police received a radio message ordering them to go to Ihaw-Ihaw for a shooting
incident.
• Upon arrival, they saw the victim, Nelson Jordan. The bystanders pointed at Jayson for
being responsible of the incident, which prompted the police to arrest him. Incidental to the
arrest, a .38 caliber was recovered from his, covered by a memorandum receipt and mission
order
• Jayson was initially charged with murder but after plea-bargaining he was allowed to plead
guilty to homicide. Thereafter, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms. RTC
found him guilty and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, CA affirmed, increased penalty
to reclusion perpetua and hence the case was certified to the SC for review.

Jayson did not raise the issue of the validity of his arrest and the seizure of the firearm,
but the Court nevertheless deemed it pertinent to consider such issue considering that the
arrest and seizure were made without a warrant.

Issues: WoN the warrantless arrest is valid -- YES

Warrantless arrest valid: hot pursuit

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP) provides that, a peace officer or private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when: an offence has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the crime found
the victim. Accused-appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. In fact accused-appellant had not gone very far (only ten meters away from the Ihaw-
Ihaw), although he was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal
knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the
assailant.

The SC in several cases upheld warrantless arrests with similar situations.

• People v. Tonog – SC upheld the warrantless arrest, the accused being someone found with
blood-stained (blood matched victim’s) pants and being pointed at by the informer.
Arrested within the same afternoon of the commission
• People v. Gerente – SC upheld the warrantless arrest, it being made 3hrs after the incident
happened, when, upon arrival of the police, the neighbors who saw the entire thing pointed
to the accused.
• People v. Acol – SC upheld the warrantless arrest, where the victims of a hold up scenario
in a passenger jeepney pointed to the accused, the same time they ran away from the
authorities.

Subsequent search after arrest is likewise lawful, as provided by law.

People v. Lua is also one case where a warrantless arrest (performed after a buy-bust operation)
is upheld by the court, as the accused are caught in flagrante delicto. This situation necessarily
allows warrantless searches, too.

ZabalaCute 82
 People v Edano without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for
GR 188133 July 7, 2014 flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses,
Doctrine: and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.
Trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be
evidence of guilt. Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline
Facts: substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having comefrom an invalid search and
• An information was filed against Edano and Siochi for violation of RA 9165 (Dangerous seizure.
Drugs Act)
• The evidence for the prosecution established that members of the Drugs Enforcement In sum, we hold that the appellant’s acquittal is in order since the shabu purportedly seized from
Group, with a female informant, went to the parking of Mcdo West Ave. To conduct an him is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily,
entrapment operation against Nato. the prosecution's failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the
 Accused Edano arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi. The informant chain of custody requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, leading
approached the vehicle and talked to him inside the car. to the failure to adequately prove the corpus delictiof the crime charged.
 She then waved to PO3 Corbe, and as PO3 was approaching, Edano went out of the
vehicle and ran away.
 PO3 chased him and recovered in his hand a plastic bag of shabu, and seized a gun
tucked in his waist. The other members of the police arrested Siochi,
• RTC found him guilty of illegal possession of shabu under RA 9165 and sentenced him to
life imprisonment. RTC acquitted Siochi.
• CA affirmed and found that the warrantless arrest valid, and that the act of him running
when PO3 was approaching reinforced the latter’s suspicion that something was amiss,
• In the instant case, Edano argues that his warrantless arrest was illegal since he was not
committing any crime when the police arrested him.

Issue: WON the arrest and seizure were valid

Held: NO. Warrantless arrest invalid; seized items inadmissible. Consequently, Edano
must be acquitted.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictoto be valid, two requisites must
concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be
properly attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he
(appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime.
• In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with
each other when he approached them.
• There was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. PO3 Corbe also
admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge on whether there was a
prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it.

That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant
and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal
knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting
to engage in criminal activity.

As the Court explained in People v. Villareal, flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and
must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt

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 Pestilos vs. Generoso
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
Facts:
On February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the
petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Batasan Hills Police District
Station to report the incident.
The policemen arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation
and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as
those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to the
Police Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers.
At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso
with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack and the petitioners were
indicted for attempted murder.
The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that
they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place
since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime.
They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding
was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed
pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
RTC denied the motion. The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA. The CA likewise dismissed
petitioners’ motion, ruling that the word “invited” in the Affidavit of arrest carried the meaning
of command and the arrest made was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest.
Issues:
1. whether or not the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.
2. whether or not the petitioners were lawfully arrested when they were merely invited to the
police precinct.
Held: YES. Court upheld RTC’s decision and thus, the criminal proceedings should now
proceed.
Validly arrested: hot pursuit under Section 5(b) of Rule 113
First element: probable cause
Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest:
1. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime
and should be held for trial.
2. probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
• Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the
evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.
3. In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
• These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his
determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge
must base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the
officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of
arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable
cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by
the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers
use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or
circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or
available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Second and third elements: the crime has just been committed + personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
1.“an offense has just been committed” - means that there must be a large measure of immediacy
between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an
appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest
must be secured.
• personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision,
does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police officer
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that
the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
• In a previous case, the court invalidated the warrantless arrest purportedly made pursuant
to Section 5(b) because the arrest was made only a day after the commission of the crime
not immediately after
2. “personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it”
• The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances.
• Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime.
• In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered.
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 o This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have
gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame.
o This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable
cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make
a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the
crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of
facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order
to comply with the element of immediacy
part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have
the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did
not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow
him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual
force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of
the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become
contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay.
• On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable
cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances,
gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.

From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a
warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
• The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso
of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one
(1) hour after the alleged mauling;
• the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners
reside;
• Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling
and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood;
• more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did
not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
different version of what transpired.

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the
police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'
warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation,
perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting
them to make the warrantless arrests.

Second Issue: petitioners were arrested

Arrest - the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense.
• An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission
to the custody of the person making the arrest.
• Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a
formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the

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 Rule 126: Search and Seizure
WORLDWIDE WEB CORP v. YU
GR 161106 Jan. 13, 2014
Facts:
Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the PNP filed for applications for warrants before the RTC of
QC to search the office of Worldwide Web Corp (WWC) located at Eastwood, QC, as well as
the office of Plant Internet Corp (Planet) at San Antonio, Pasig.
• The applications alleged that the petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations
which amounted to theft and violation of PD 401 (unauthorized installation of water,
electrical or telephone connections), to the damage of PLDT.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the application for search warrants.
• One of PLDT witnesses’, Rivera, conducted an ocular inspection of WWC’s office
occupied by Planet and testified on the unauthorized use of telephone connections.
• During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to
be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and
servers that would be taken.
RTC then granted the application for search warrants.
• 1st warrant: for violation of theft against WWC: “computers or any equipment or device
capable of accepting info; software diskettes, tapes, used for recording or storing info; and
manuals, forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts relating to securing and using
telephone lines or equipment.”
• 2nd warrant: for violation of PD 401 against Planet: “modems or routers or equipment that
enables data terminal equipments such as computers to communicate with other
equipments; computers or device capable of accepting information; lines, cables, antennas
capable of transmitting airwaves or frequency; multiplexers to enablepassing through cable
or transmission lines; PABX or switching equipment; software, diskettes; manuals, forms,
access codes.”
• 3rd warrant: for theft against Planet: items same as 2nd warrant.
The search warrant was served on the same day and over hundred items were seized, including
15 CPUs, 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes, and filed, and a laptop.
Planet claims that even personal diskettes of employees were confiscated; areas like President’s
Office and Info Desk were searched; and voltage regulators and broken computers also seaized.
Petitioners filed a motion to quash the warrants on the grounds of (1) without probable cause;
(2) acts did not constitute theft, (3) general warrants, (4) fruits of poisonous tree.
RTC granted the quashal on the ground of general warrants. CA reversed and upheld validity.
Issues and Held:
W/N an application for search warrant is a criminal action? NO.
• It was contended that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal; without the
conformity of the public prosecutor as required in Rule 110.
Held: An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants
An application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. Such
warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise
of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to
its original jurisdiction.
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have
consistently recognized the right of parties to question orders quashing those warrants.
Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not
necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to
quash search warrants.
W/N the order quashing the warrant is a final order, which can be appealed? YES.
• It was contended that the motion to quash was interlocutory, and PLDT should have filed
under Rule 65 instead.
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined; on the other hand. an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits.
Where the warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, the quashal is merely
interlocutory since there is something more to be done in the criminal case. Where a warrant
is issued in anticipation of a criminal case, the quashal ENDS the juridical process.
Here, the application was instituted as principal proceedings and NOT as incidents to
pending criminal actions. Hence, when they were quashed by the RTC, they were final
orders. PLDT correct in appealing.
W/N the finding of probable cause of trial judge should be accorded respect by reviewing
courts? YES.
Probable cause requires “such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the object sought in connection with the
offense are in the place to be searched.”
• It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to
the contrary.
The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing showed that judge asked searching
questions and sought clarification on the alleged illegal toll bypass operation.
A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him
based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued presents
clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they
committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are
essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause.
ZabalaCute 86
• In that case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was
intentionally misled by the witnesses.
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not
cause the quashal of a search warrant.
• In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not
pass through PLDT’s IGF are true.
• They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed
through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly what happened.
• Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood. Even Planet Internet
stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was made
"carelessly and haphazardly.”
In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to pursue
an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to secure
a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision.
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as
identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to
the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of
petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications
equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers,
PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes,
manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations."

W/N illegal toll bypass operations is punishable? YES. The warrants were NOT general warrants. The Court has been mindful of the difficulty in
Petitioners insist that the determination of probable cause necessitates the prior determination of describing the items to be searched, especially when they are technical in nature, and when
whether a crime is committed; and since there is not crime punishing toll bypass, there is no the illegal operation is largely unknown to them
justification for the warrants.

In the application the crime was not toll bypass per se, but of theft committed by means of
toll bypass. There is theft in the use of PLDT’s communication facilities without consent.

Furthermore, it could not have been accomplished without the installation of telecom
equipments, hence, PD 401.

W/N the requirement of particularity was fulfilled? YES.

Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general warrants because
the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so broad and all-encompassing as to give
the implementing officers wide discretion over which articles to seize.
• In fact, the CA observed that the targets of the search warrants were not illegal per se,
and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the police officers were given blanket
authority to determine whether the objects were legal or not, as in fact even pieces of
computer equipment not involved in telecommunications or Internet service were
confiscated.

A general warrant is that which is not particular as to the person/property to be seized. It allows
the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing the other, and gives the officer the discretion
over which items to take.
• Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued,
vulnerable to abuses

HOWEVER, technical precision of description is not required. Any description of the place or
thing to be searched that will enable the officer with reasonable certainty to locate it is sufficient.

A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail. The
warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be
seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.
• A search warrant fulfills the requirement when the things described are limited to those
that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued

ZabalaCute 87
 People v Cogaed
G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014
Facts:
At about 6am of Nov 25, Police Senior Inspector Bayan (PSI Bayan) received a text message
from an unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana
within La Union.
Accordingly, the police set up checkpoints in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel
bound for San Fernando City.
A passenger jeepney arrived in the checkpoint.
• The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to to the police, indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana. T
• he police approached the two male passengers who were later identified as petitioner
Cogaed and Dayao, a fourteen year old minor.
• Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
When asked as to the contents of the bag, Cogaed said that he did not know as he was merely
transporting it as a favor for his barriomate, Marvin. When he opened the bag, it revealed three
bricks of what looked like marijuana. They were then arrested and brought to the police station,
and asked to empty their bags, revealing more marijuana.
The RTC found Cogaed guilty for violation of RA 9165.
• Initially ruled that the search was illegal since he was not doing anything suspicious to
justify a stop and frisk search, let alone caught in flagrante delicto to justify a search
incidental to lawful arrest.
• However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed
"waived his right to object to such irregularity" when "he did not protest when SPO1
Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."
• CA affirmed
Issues:
(1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant;
(2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and
(3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
Held: NO.
Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest v Stop and Frisk
Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto,
and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to
ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.
On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a
crime. A ‘stop and frisk’ situation’s object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious
individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain
more information. This court stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be used when dealing
with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably
there is no time to secure a search warrant.
No stop and frisk
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply
with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of
citizens.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in.
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him.
Further, police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be
"presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for
the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the
person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the
person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that
he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This
should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search
warrant
In past cases of validated warrantless search, the police officers using their senses observed facts
that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner,
based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk
civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
In the instant case however, Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or
carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would not have been identified by the police
officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably
searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of
one’s person and effects.
No waiver
CRIMPRO ZABALA 2D
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did
not object when the police asked him to open his bags.

The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive

environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The
prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right
is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are
not to be presumed.

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the
police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The police officer
must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount
to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable
search.
• The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person
who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given
to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The
fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires no less.

Exclusionary Rule
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures."

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his
bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to
convict Cogaed.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La
Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand
SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
from confinement unless he is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.

CRIMPRO ZABALA 2D
 People v Calantiao
G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014
Facts:
Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of RA 9165
• Based from the evidence of the prosecution it was established that while the police who
arrested Calantiao were on duty, Lojera arrived at their office and asked for police
assistance regarding a shooting incident.
• According to Lojera, he was driving along EDSA when he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan)
with a white taxi cab boarded by Calantiao and 1 other person. He followed the cab until
Caloocan. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them Calantiao, alighted and
fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving until he
reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.
• The police officers on duty then immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding
to Caloocan where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed
men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away.
• When they were caught, the police recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two
(2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos,
while recovered from Calantiao’s companion was a .38 revolver.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained
in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and
premises under his immediate control. This is so because objects in the ‘plain view’ of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented as evidence.
The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because the police
officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come
across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part
of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.

The RTC convicted Calantiao of violation of RA 9165, CA affirmed.

Calantiao’s contends that the marijuana in his possession cannot be admitted as evidence
against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been within the
apprehending officers’ "plain view."

Issue: WON the marijuana is admissible

Held: YES. Search was valid as a search incidental to lawful arrest.

In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct
a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within
the latter’s reach.
• Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either
on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.
• The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table
or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as
one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within
his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to
destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s
possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly
conduct a warrantless search.

Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its
discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.

CRIMPRO ZABALA 2D
 Luz v People
G. R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
Facts:
A traffic enforcer flagged down petitioner Luz for violation of a municipal ordinance for driving
a motorcycle without a helmet. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the
place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station. While issuing
the ticket, the traffic enforcer noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something
from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it.
Luz took out a pair of scissors, swiss knife, and a metal can. Inside the metal can was shabu.
Thus, he was arrested and a charge was filed against him for egal possession of dangerous drugs.
RTC convicted petitioner. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been
lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. WON Luz was arrested when he violated the ordinance
2. WON the shabu is admissible
Held: NO.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or
by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not
be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest
him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting
time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that
place.
Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no
intention to take petitioner into custody.
First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and
brief. Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the
motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop
than to a formal arrest.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a
crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be
made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when
there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the
latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility
of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon
being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then
the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
If it were true that he was arrested after he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he
waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second
time after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was
likewise illegal.
the search does not qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when
a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a
criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons.
In Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for
speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does
not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was
no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead,
police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from
the car or doing a patdown
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic
stop. It plainly is not. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the
minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not
by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to
the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest
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CRIMPRO ZABALA 2D