STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION National.
Atty. Relson P. Moral At the first level, whoever has the closest determinations of the hooded
I. Definition
Statutory Construction – the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application
to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
Justice Martin defines statutory construction as the art of seeking the intention
of the legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a given state of
facts.
A judicial function is required when a statute is invoked and different
interpretations are in contention.
Difference between judicial legislation and statutory construction: Where
legislature attempts to do several things one which is invalid, it may be
discarded if the remainder of the act is workable and in no way depends
upon the invalid portion, but if that portion is an integral part of the act, and its
excision changes the manifest intent of the act by broadening its scope to
include subject matter or territory which was not included therein as enacted,
such excision is “judicial legislation” and not “statutory construction”.
Caltex (Philippines) Inc. vs. Palomar 18 SCRA 247, September 29, 1966
• In 1960, Caltex initiated a promotional scheme to drum up patronage for its
oil products entitled “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”
o where contenders would guess/estimate the actual amount of liters a
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified
period
o Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising
agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open
indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers".
o To join, participants need not purchase any Caltex products but only to
request entry forms from their local Caltex stations where a sealed can will be
provided for the accomplished entry stubs.
o Choosing winners would be of three (3) levels: Dealer, Regional and
pump contents wins along with the other two runners-up with corresponding
prices
• 1st – 3-burner kerosene stove
• 2nd – thermos bottle and a ray-a-vac hunter
• 3rd – everready magnet-lite flashlight and batteries and a screwdriver set
1st prize for Dealer Contest elevates to Regional Contest in 7 different
groups and the same mechanics of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd prizes come into play
• Winning stubs of the qualified contestants in each region will be
deposited in a sealed can from which the 1st prize, 2nd prize and 3rd prize
winners of that region will be drawn
o The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all
expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex
dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest"
o The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of
P500 and P300, respectively
1st prize from Regional goes to National Contest
• At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners will be
placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize,
second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for
winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third;
and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
o Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications
relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view
sections 1954 (a), 1982, 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code
Postal Law enumerates non-mailable matters, authorizes issuances of
fraud order, identifies effect of violating said law
• Some items under non-mailable matters are advertising on lottery, gift
enterprise, or other similar schemes
o The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General,
dated October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of
the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does
not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
o Postmaster Palomar denied Caltex’s plea to grant the requested
clearance saying that its scheme falls under advertising for lottery which
constitute non-mailable matter.
o In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration
of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no consideration
in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling
authorities, condemnable as a lottery.
o Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an
unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the
Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is
equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not
only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as
well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to
be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
o Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present
petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar,
praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to
allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of
the public".
ISSUE:
1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief?
2. Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within
the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?
RULING:
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which
deals with the applicability to invoke declaratory relief which states:
“Declaratory relief is available to person whose rights are affected by a
statute, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
statute and for a declaration of rights thereunder.
In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid
down certain conditions:
1. There must be a justiciable controversy.
2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse.
3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy.
4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
With the appellee’s bent to hold the contest and the appellant’s threat to
issue a fraud order if carried out, the contenders are confronted by an
ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences
are settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of
the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the
appellee’s “desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others”
— which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there
was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it
was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested.
Construction
– Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given
case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of
the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have
herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs.
Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in
promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its
proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and
that if such sales
promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal
prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a
declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the
legality of its sales promotion plan.
II.
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?
Lottery
– Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance
e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as
various forms of gambling.
Three Essential Elements:
1. Consideration
2. Prize
3. 3. Chance
No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery
but it appears to be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules
is any requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any
services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station,
request for the entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and
submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Because of this, the contest fails
to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party
receiving the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance
to draw a prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way
of increased patronage be considered as a consideration and thus violates
the Postal Law?
No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the
benefit derived by the sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether or
not the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning NOSCITTUR- ASSOCIATED WORDS. YOU FIND THE MEANING WITH ASSOCIATED
and not whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of WORDS.
value for the distribution of the prize.
Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there
appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities
that the term is common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods
are sold for their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the
product, the purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar
since there is not sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as
an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee’s products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that
every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of
the Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may not be
denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.
TAKE AWAY:
WHY IS IT FILED?
• PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF; RULES OF COURT PROMULGATED BY THE
COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
• IT MAYBE FILED WHOSE RIGHTS ARE AFFECTED BY A STATUTE TO DETERMINE
ANY QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTION.
A DUTY WHICH IS THE COURT TO DO IS TO DETERMINE THE CONTEST FALLS WITHIN
THE PURVIEW OF THE COURT THROUGH STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
GIFT ENTERPRISE- SINCE KASAMA NIYA ANG LOTTERY. THE INTENTION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE IS SIMILAR TO LOTTERY.
AUTHORS OF THE LAW- LEGILSLATURES “INTENTION OF CONGRESS’
QUESTION: PAANO PAG MALABO ANG BATAS SINO ANG SUSUNDIN? ANG AUTHOR "The time for holding the election of all the elective officers of all cities in this
OR KORTE? state, other than cities of the first class and also in all school cities in the state,
other than school cities of cities of the first class, in which the boards of school
STATUTORY- EXPOUNDING ON THE AUTHORS OF THE LAW. INTENTION AND MEANING commissioners or boards of school trustees are elected by the vote of the
electors of any such city, shall be and the same is hereby changed from the
OF THE LAW-MAKING BODY,
first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, 1942, to the first Tuesday after
the first Monday in November, 1943; and thereafter elections for the elective
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION- NOT ALLOWED. (THE COURT MAKING THE LAW OR OPERATING
officers of all such cities shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first
AT THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW TO INCLUDE SUBJECT MATTER)
Monday of November of every fourth year."
Ettinger vs. Studevent Hole 38 N.E.2d 1000 Sections 2, 3 and 4 provide the mechanics of nominations and
elections. Section 5 repeals all laws in conflict therewith and, as
• Prior to 1933- all city elections were held every four years in the year before stated, specifically repeals ch. 173 of the Acts of 1933.
following presidential elections.
-Chapter 173, Acts 1933, deferred the time of elections to the second year Section 6 (Separability Section)
after the presidential election when there is a general statewide election to "If any one or more sections, sentences, clauses or phrases of this act
fill township, county, state and congressional offices shall be declared unconstitutional, such decision shall in no sense
-1933 Act repealed all prior laws conflicting therewith and provided for the invalidate any other part of this act."
time when city primaries and elections shall be held, and the persons who
shall perform the duties necessary to prepare for and hold the election. As a • 2 trial Judges/Court reached different conclusions. Cause No. 27644 is
part of this election machinery it was prescribed that county officials should an appeal from:
have supervision thereof as a part of the general election -Marion Circuit Court held the whole act unconstitutional
-Montgomery Circuit Court enjoining the holding of a city election in
• Congress passed an act entitled The 1941 Legislature Act also known as Crawfordsville in 1942. In this suit the trial court sustained the whole act
“1941 Skip Election Law” by disregarding the italicized words in section 1, thus making the law
- all city election must be held every 4 years in the same year after the apply to all cities in the state, including Indianapolis.
presidential election
-1941 Legislature by the Act here in question specifically repealed the 1933 Section 22 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Indiana forbids the passage
Act, substituted election machinery supervised by city officials, and of local or special laws on seventeen specified subjects. Section 23
provided that city elections in all except cities of the first class (Indianapolis is adds: "In all the cases enumerated in 1. the preceding Section, and in
the only city in that class) should be held in 1943 and each four years all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws
thereafter shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State."
- if the classification attempted is valid and the repeal of the 1933 Act
effective, no law remains fixing the time or providing the mechanics of an Counsel for appellee Dice base their argument on the separability of the
election in Indianapolis clause excluding cities of the first class. By striking it out, the act is left in
substantially the 4-6. form of the original House Bill No. 394. This obviously
• The Law originated as House Bill No. 394 and as introduced applied to all would have made a valid, sensible, complete, election statute operating
cities in the State. A committee to which it was referred amended the first uniformly as to time, methods and conditions in all cities of the State in
section by inserting language excepting cities of the first class and at the years when such elections would be "free from the variant influences of
same time added a "separability" section. national, state, county and township issue.
ISSUES:
Sec. 1 original form
"An act concerning the holding of elections and primary elections for the A. W/N the Court has jurisdiction in the case
election of the elective officers of the several cities of the state, fixing the
time for holding such elections and primaries, and the procedure in B. W/N the attempted classification of the 1933 Act is unconstitutional
reference thereto, and repealing laws in conflict therewith."

Sec. 1 with the House Committee's amendment italicized

C. W/N the Act must be construed to apply to all cities of the state or TAKE AWAY:

void in toto
INDIANAPOLIS (HELD EVERY 4 YEARS)

RULING: CHANGE OF THE DATE OF ELECTION – FIRST CLASS CITIES

A. If the case questions the construction of the law, it will still fall within RESCHEDULED ALL THE ENTIRE STATE- THERE’S NO PARTICULAR EXEMPTION. EXCLUDED ONE CITY
legislative domain under the doctrine of separation of powers but if an FROM HOLDING AN ELECTION

excision of the integral part of the act changes the scope or subject
matter/
territory of the legislative intent w/c was already enacted will fall under
judicial legislation and not statutory construction. Hence the court has
IT CANNOT BE ARBITRARY- DO NOT CLASSIFY (DISTINCTION GERMANE TO THE LAW)
THE CLASSIFICATION EXCLUDED THE INDIANAPOLIS BUT THERE’S NO CONNECTION BETWEEN HOLDING
A FIRST-CLASS CITY AND ELECTION.

jurisdiction in the case

WHAT ARE THEY GOING TO DO?

B. In Hale v Mc Gettingan (1856), the court struck out one section of a

• DECLARE THE ENTIRE ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
provision as an invalid classification for reason of constitutional • TO SUSTAIN THE WHOLE ACT BY DISREGARDING THE EXEMPTION
prohibition, the section maybe viewed as an independent act if the said
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE- SHOULD ANY PART OF THIS LAW INVALID ALL THE PARTS WITH REMAIN TO BE
section is severable to the integral part of the general act.
VALID. (ALWAYS INCLUDE S.C)

C. In State ex rel. Johnson v C.B.Q. Ry (1906) “the whole amendment

PRESUMPTION; ALL LAWS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
must stand and fall together. It has been demonstrated herein that the
court cannot declare the exception demonstrated herein that it cannot 1. EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTE – ISASAMA ANG INDIANAPOLIS (WILL AGAINST THE

stand together. Hence, it must fall. The whole amendment must be LEGISLATURE PERO BEYOND THE SCOPE AND BEYOND THE INTENTION)

applicable to all parts of the state”

II. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION, DISTINGUISHED CONSTRUCTION SITUS OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION In our system of government:

INTERPRETATION

drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that
are beyond the direct expression of the text.
Interpretation is limited to exploring the written text.
TAKE AWAY:
CONSTRUCTION
process of discovering the true meaning of the
language used. VIII, Sec. 1, Phil. Const.)
Legislative – makes the law
Construction on the other hand is the drawing of Executive - executes the law
conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the
direct expressions of the text. Judicial – interprets the law
• Legislative power is vested in the Congress of the
Simply stated, the situs of construction and
Philippines – the Senate and the House of the
interpretation of written laws belong to the judicial
Representatives
department.
• Executive power is vested in the President of the
Republic of the Philippines (Art. VII, Sec.1, Phil. Const.) It is the duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual
• Judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in controversies involving rights which are legally
such lower courts as may be established by law. (Art demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
• DRAWING CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBJECT BEYOND FROM ELEMENT THAT
ARE KNOWN FROM THE PROVISIONS THAT ARE NOT EXPLICITLY STATED. GO OUTSIDE
THE FOUR CORNERS.
• BEYOND KUNG MAY OPINION
INTERPRETATION
• MEANING OF THE LANGUAGE USED
• PROVISION (CONFINED WITHIN THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE STATUTE.
(NOSCITUR)
JUDICIARY-APPLY AND INTERPRET THE LAWS
QUESTION: STATUTORY COURTS- TRIAL COURT (PWEDE BANG MAG FILE SA RTC NG
DECLARATORY RELIEF *INVALIDATING THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE) CAN THE JUDGE
DO IT? LEGAL BASIS: ARTICLE VIII SECTION 1
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
Supreme Court is the one and only Constitutional Court and all other lower
courts are statutory courts and such lower courts have the power to construe
and interpret written laws.
III. Duty of the Courts
Article VIII, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
DUTY OF THE COURTS TO CONSTRUE AND INTERPRET THE LAW;
REQUISITES 1. There must be an actual case or controversy
2. There is ambiguity in the law involved in the controversy.
Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different meanings in a statute,
document, etc.
A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more possible meanings.
• If the law is clear and unequivocal, the Court has no other alternative
but to apply the law and not to interpret.
• Construction and interpretation of law come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
Hermeneutics – the science or art of construction and interpretation.
Legal hermeneutics – is the systematic body of rules which are recognized
as applicable to the construction and interpretation of legal writings.
Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. vs. IAC, 320 SCRA 279, December 9, 1999
BF Homes filed a “Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of
Suspension of Payments”. RCBC –being one of the creditors of BF Homes –
executed an extra-judicial foreclosure of some of BF Homes properties and
consequently won the bid for those properties.
Chronology of Events
September 28, 1984: BF Homes filed a "Petition for Rehabilitation and for
Declaration of Suspension of Payments.
*One of the creditors listed in its inventory of creditors and liabilities was RCBC.
October 26, 1984: RCBC requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra
judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of BF Homes,
scheduled on November 29, 1984
October 29, 1984: A notice of extra-judicial foreclosure sale was issued by the
Sheriff to BF Homes (mortgagor) and RCBC (mortgagee).
November 28, 1984: On motion of BF Homes, the SEC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), effective for 20 days, enjoining RCBC and the sheriff
 from proceeding with the public auction sale. The sale was rescheduled to
January 29, 1985.
January 25, 1985: the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction upon petitioner's filing of a bond. However, petitioner did not file a
bond until January 29, 1985, the very day of the auction sale, so no writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the SEC. Presumably, unaware of the filing judgment because the petitioner was not impleaded as a party in the
of the bond, the sheriffs proceeded with the public auction sale on January
29, 1985, in which RCBC was the highest bidder for the properties auctioned.
February 5, 1985: BF Homes filed in the SEC a consolidated motion to annul the On April 8, 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favour of BF
auction sale and to cite RCBC and the sheriff for contempt. RCBC opposed
the motion.
*Because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the delivery
to RCBC of a certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties.
February 13, 1985: the SEC belatedly issued a writ of preliminary injunction
stopping the auction sale which had been conducted by the sheriff two weeks
earlier.
March 13, 1985: despite SEC’s writ of preliminary injunction, RCBC filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 140, Rizal (Civil Case 10042) an action for mandamus
against the provincial sheriff of Rizal and his deputy to compel them to
execute in its favor a certificate of sale of the auctioned properties.
In answer, the sheriffs alleged that they proceeded with the auction sale on
January 29, 1985 because no writ of preliminary injunction had been issued by
SEC as of that date, but they informed the SEC that they would suspend the
issuance of a certificate of sale to RCBC.
March 18, 1985: the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF
Homes. RTC Decision
On RCBC's motion in the mandamus case on March 13, 1985, the trial court
issued on May 8, 1985 a judgment granting RCBC’s petition ordering
respondent Sheriff to execute and deliver to petitioner RCBC the Certificate of
the Auction Sale of January 29, 1985.
Court of Appeals Decision
On June 4, 1985, B.F. Homes filed an original complaint with the Intermediate
Appellate Court (Court of Appeals) pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. 129 praying
for the annulment of the judgment, premised on the following:
“even before RCBC asked the sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose its mortgage
on petitioner's properties, the SEC had already assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over those assets, and (2) that there was extrinsic fraud in procuring the
mandamus case, respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over it, and it
was deprived of its right to be heard.”
Homes, dismissing the mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of
new land titles.
Case before the Supreme Court
RCBC appealed from the decision of the CA arguing that:
1) RCBC did not commit extrinsic fraud in excluding BF Homes as party
defendant in the mandamus case as private respondent was not
indispensable party thereto, its participation not being necessary for the full
resolution of the issues raised in said case;
2) SEC writ of preliminary injunction issued on February 13, 1985 cannot be
invoked to suspend the mandamus case and for that matter, the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage in petitioner's favor, as these
do not constitute actions against private respondent contemplated under
Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A.
3) Even assuming arguendo that the extra-judicial sale constitute an action
that may be suspended under Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A,
the basis for the suspension thereof did not exist so as to adversely affect the
validity and regularity thereof.
4) The Regional Trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizable of the
mandamus case.
Issue
BF Homes is challenging the validity of the auction and the actions of RCBC as
premature, alleging that BF Homes have already filed a petition for
rehabilitation and as such all claims of creditors must be suspended.
 SC Ruling
The Court denied the petition "Consolidated Motion to Cite Sheriff and Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation for Contempt and to Annul Proceedings
and Sale," dated February 5, 1985. However, the Court dismissed the
mandamus case and suspended the issuance of new land titles to RCBC.
“whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and
suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such
preference, but . . . stand on equal footing with other creditors. Foreclosure
shall be disallowed so as not to prejudice other creditors, or cause
discrimination among them. If foreclosure is undertaken despite the fact that a Ambiguity as defined by the Court in the case at bar:
petition, for rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate of sale shall not be
delivered pending rehabilitation. Likewise, if this has also been done, no
transfer of title shall be effected also, within the period of rehabilitation.
The rationale behind PD 902-A, as amended to effect a feasible and
viable rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if one creditor is
preferred over the others.”
SC Decision after RCBC Motion for Reconsideration
The Court ruled in favour of RCBC and upheld the decision of the RTC.
The Court asserted the verba legis (plain meaning) rule in
statutory construction pertaining to Section 6 of PD 902-A.
“c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal,
which is the subject of the action pending before the Commission in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such
other cases whenever necessary to preserve the rights of the parties
litigants to and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors;
Provided, however, that the Commission may, in appropriate cases,
appoint a rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships or other
associations not supervised or regulated by other government agencies
who shall have, in addition to the powers of a regular receiver under the
provisions of the Rules of Court, such functions and powers as are
provided for in the succeeding paragraph (d) hereof: Provided, finally,
That upon appointment of a management committee rehabilitation
receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims
against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or
receivership, pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly. (As amended by PDs No. 1673, 1758 and by PD
No. 1799. Emphasis supplied.)
“The holding that suspension of actions for claims against a corporation
under rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a petition
for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC — may, to some, be more logical
and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language
of the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble,
would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom
of the law — plainly judicial legislation.”
1) a condition of admitting two or more meanings
2) of being understood in more than one way, or
3) of referring to two or more things at the same time.
In the case at bar, the law is clear and NOT ambiguous, hence there
is no room for interpretation ONLY application.
TAKE AWAY: Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. vs. IAC, 320 SCRA 279, December 9, 1999
B.F PETITION FOR REHABILITATION INSOLVENT (WALA NG PERA) CREDITORS PINAGKAKAUTANGAN
KAYA MAG UUNAHAN MANINGIL ANG MGA CREDITORS.
THE LAW ALLOWS THE COMPANY TO FILE A PETITION.
REHABILITATOR-MAG MANAGE NG FINANCES NG COMPANY ( TO PREVENT THE CREDITORS TO
COLLECT AGAINTS YOU.
RCBC- MORTGAGED SECURITY. PINAGKUKUHA ANG PROPERTY NG B.F HOMES
FORECLOSED THE AUCTION : SIYA DIN ANG NANALO PARA MAKUHA ANG PROPERTY.
SEC- MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
ISSUE: WHEN DOES SUSPENSION STARTS?
B.F. HOMES WHEN HE FILED A PETITION EVERYTHING STOP.
RCBC UPON THE APPOINTMENT OF THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
RULING: THE SUSPENSION STARTS WHEN THE SEC APPOINTED THE COMMITTEE.
IN THIS CASE THERE’S NO AMBIGUITY. (PRACTICALLY SPEAKING EVERYTHING SHOULD STOP BUT WE
 HAVE TO STICK WITH P.D WHICH EBERYTHING STOP UPON THE APPOINTMENT.
DUTY OF THE COURT: APPLY THE LAW
People vs. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692
of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was
discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22
with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he
owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated
that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed
evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of
People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a
secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to
municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper
defense to illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated
that the law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms
or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it
TAKE AWAY: People vs. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967
for an accused. Dura Lex Sed Lex.
in the list therefore the accused is not exempted.
People vs. Amigo, G.R. No. 116719, January 18, 1996
On December 29, 1989 at around 1:00 Pm, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray
Ford Fiera back home, with his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one
together with his two year old son. An accidental head on collision occurred
between the Fiera and the Tamaraw being driven by one Virgillio Abogado,
with Abogado was the accused, Patricio Amigo alias "Bebot". The collision
caused slight damage to the right bumper of the Tamaraw.
While Abogado and Benito were having a verbal confrontation, Patricio
approached Benito asking the latter to leave the incident as it was only a
minor incident. However, Benito said that Patricio should not interfere, which
made Patricio irritated and caused the latter to stab Benito, rendering the
victim into a critical condition which later caused his death due to a sepsis
infection that has already circulated in his body.
Patricio Amigo was charged initially with Frustrated murder, but was modified
to the crime of murder to which he was convicted with a penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. Accused-Appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
too cruel and harsh as a penalty and pleads for sympathy.
Issue:
Whether or Not the penalty imposed upon the accused "Reclusion Perpetua"
be modified or reduced by virtue of Section 19 (1) of Article III of the
Constitution which prohibits the imposition of death penalty.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court hold that Article III, Section 19 (1) does not change the
penalty periods prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except
only in so far as it prohibits the imposition of death penalty. The range of the
medium and minimum penalties remain the same.
Thus, a person originally subject to death penalty and another who committed
the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstances will now
be both punishable with the same medium period although the former is
conceitedly more guilty than the latter. But that is the will of the constitution
and the duty of the court is to apply the law, disregarding the sympathy or pity
 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. HE ADMITTED IN POSSESSION BUT IT IS NOT ILLEGAL
SINCE HE IS A SECRET AGENT.
RULE: SECRET AGENT IS NOT EXEMPTED.
DUTY OF THE COURT: APPLY THE LAW NOT EXPAND THE LAW
TAKE AWAY: People vs. Amigo, G.R. No. 116719, January 18, 1996
RPC: PENALTY IS NOT FIXED IN DETERMINATE SENTENCED LAW.
RANGED OF PENALTIES
RECLUSION PERPETUA – INDIVISIBLE
RECLUSION TEMPORAL- DIVIDE (MINIMUM/MEDIUM)
MITIGATING-LOWERS PENALTY KAPAG 70 YEARS OLD NAAWA.
WHEN DO YOU COUNT?
AGGRAVATING: MATAAS
MITIGATING: PABABA
UPPER LIMIT: DEATH PENALTY
AMIGO: DAPAT MAS MABABA ANG LIMIT NIYA
APPLICATION STATUS QUO: DEATH PENALTY: fcccccccccccccccd65xYES, IT IS
ALREADY ABOLISHED BUT THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT ABOLISH IT. IT IS NOT JUST
IMPOSED. (RECLUSION PERPETUA)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: APPLIED IN THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE AND
CONSTITUTION.
The will of the constitution and the duty of the court is to apply the law,
disregarding the sympathy or pity for an accused.
Dura Lex Sed Lex.
Pascual vs. Pascual Bautista, G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992
1. Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the
full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
2.Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was
survived by Adela Soldevilla de Pascual assurviving spouse, children of
Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, children of
Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, acknowledged
natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased and
te intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased
and represented by his heirs.
3.Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
Pascual, filed for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. all
the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the
vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S.
Pascual.
4.Petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights.
5. Motion were DENIED by RTC so they appealed their Case in CA, and it was
also dismissed, denying the Motion for Reconsideration. So they brought the
case in SC, for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.
RULING:
No. Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but
petitioners are his illegitimate children. Clearly the term “illegitimate” refers to
both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as
to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated
differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law. (DUREX LEX SED
LEX)
TAKE AWAY:
LEGITIMATE: THOSE BORN WITHOUT WEDLOCK,
1.ACKNOWLEGE NATURAL CHILDREN
2.SPURIOUS (BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK) – PARENTS ARE PROHIBITED FROM
MARRYING EACH OTHER.
PROHIBITS ILLEGITIMATE CHILD FROM INHERITING.
TATAY NA KAPARID NIYA NA PATAY NA – PAMANGKIN ANG MAGMAMANA
ARTICLE 992: RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION (STATES THAT ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN WILL HAVE NO RIGHT TO REPRESENT THEIR PARENTS)
YOU DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION (ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
CANNOT REPRESENT THEIR CHILDREN. BUT YOU CAN REPRESENT YOUR
ILLEGITIMATE FATHER)
THE LAW DOES NOT MAKE ANY DISTINCTION
THE LAW IS CLEAR
THEY WILL APPLY THE LAW
Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female”
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as
female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex
from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his
birth certificate.
Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 –
Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding
to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary.
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is
no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts
as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body
and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus,
there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence,
petition is denied.
TAKE AWAY: Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
THERE IS NO LAW (Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate)
COURTS CANNOT CHANGE THE LAW
III. Statutes
Article VI, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
A. LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES
The power to make laws is lodged in the legislative department of
the government.
B. A statute starts with a bill.
C. Bill is the draft of a proposed law from the time of its introduction in a
legislative body through all the various stages in both houses. It is enacted into
law by a vote of the legislative body.
C. An “Act” is the appropriate term for it after it has been acted on and
passed by the legislature. It then becomes a statute, the written will of the
legislature solemnly expressed according to the form necessary to constitute it
as the law of the state.
D. “Statute Law” is a term often used interchangeably with the word “statute”.
Statute Law, however, is broader in meaning since it includes not only statute
but also the judicial interpretation and application of the enactment.
IV. PARTS OF THE STATUTE: (TPEB-RSSE)
a. Title – the heading on the preliminary part, furnishing the name by which the
act is individually known. It is usually prefixed to the statute in the brief
summary of its contents.
b. Preamble – part of statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the
objects sought to be accomplished. Usually, it starts with “whereas”.
(INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE)
c. Enacting clause – part of statute which declares its enactment and serves to
identify it as an act of legislation proceeding from the proper legislative
authority. “Be enacted” is the usual formula used to start this clause.
d. Body – the main and operative part of the statute containing its substantive
and even procedural provisions. Provisons and exceptions may also be found.
e. Repealing Clause - announces the prior statutes or specific provisions which
have been abrogated by reason of the enactment of the new law.(SERVES TO
IDENTIFY LAWS THAT HAVE BEEN ABROGATED)
f. Saving Clause – restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to save rights,
pending proceedings, penalties, etc. from the annihilation which would result
from an unrestricted repeal. (PERSONS HAVE VESTED RIGHTS (HONOR IT)
g. Separability Clause – provides that in the event that one or more provisions
or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall still be in force.
h. Effectivity Clause – announces the effective date of the
law. KINDS OF STATUTES (GSLPPRCPPRAM)
1. General Law – affects the community at large. That which affects all
people of the state or all of a particular class.
2. Special Law – designed for a particular purpose, or limited in range or
confined to a prescribed field of action on operation.
3. Local Law – relates or operates over a particular locality instead of over the
whole territory of the state.
4. Public Law – a general classification of law, consisting generally of
constitutional, administrative, criminal, and international law, concerned with
the organization of the state, the relations between the state and the people
who compose it, the responsibilities of public officers of the state, to each
other, and to private persons, and the relations of state to one another. Public b. In the first reading, the bill is read by its number and title only.
law may be general, local or special law.
5. Private Law – defines, regulates, enforces and administers relationships
among individuals, associations and corporations.
6. Remedial Statute – providing means or method whereby causes of action
may be affectuated, wrongs redressed and relief obtained.
7. Curative Statute – a form of retrospective legislation which reaches back
into the past to operate upon past events, acts or transactions in order to
correct errors and irregularities and to render valid and effective many
attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the purpose
intended.
8. Penal Statute – defines criminal offenses specify corresponding fines and
punishments.
9. Prospective Law – applicable only to cases which shall arise after its
enactment.
10. Retrospective Law – looks backward or contemplates the past; one which
is made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights occurring, before it came
into force.
11. Affirmative Statute – directs the doing of an act, or declares what shall be
done in contrast to a negative statute which is one that prohibits the things
from being done, or declares what shall not be done.
12. Mandatory Statutes – generic term describing statutes which require and
not merely permit a course of action.
V. Procedure in the Enactment of a Statute
HOW DOES A BILL BECOMES A LAW – STEPS
A bill before it becomes a law must pass the strict constitutional requirements
explicit both in the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution.
Passage of a bill in a parliamentary system (unicameral assembly):
a. A member of the National Assembly may introduce the proposed bill to the
Secretary of the National Assembly who will calendar the same for the first
reading.
c. After the first reading, the bill is referred by the Speaker to the appropriate
committee for study. At this stage, the appropriate committee will conduct
public hearings. Then after the public hearings, the committee shall decide
whether or not to report the bill favorably or whether a substitute bill should be
considered. Should there be an unfavorable report of the committee, then the
proposed bill is dead.
d. Upon favorable action by the committee, the bill is returned to the National
Assembly and shall be calendared for the second reading.
e. In the second reading, the bill is read in its entirety.
f. Immediately after the second reading, the bill is set for open debates where
members of the assembly may propose amendments and insertions to the
proposed bill.
g. After the approval of the bill in its second reading and at least three (3)
calendar days before its final passage, the bill is printed in its final form
and copies thereof distributed to each of the members.
h. The bill is then calendared for the third and final reading. At this stage, no
amendment shall be allowed. Only the title of the bill is read and the National
Assembly will then vote on the bill.
Under the present 1987b Constitution, after the third and final reading at one
House where the bill originated, it will go to the other House where it will
undergo the same process.
i. After the bill has been passed, it will be submitted to the Prime Minister
(President) for approval. If he disapproves, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the National Assembly (House where it originated), and if
approved by two-thirds of all its members, shall become a law.
Under the present set-up, if the originating house will agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections to the other house by which it shall
be likewise be considered and must be approved by two-thirds of the votes.
Every bill passed by Congress shall be acted upon by the President within thirty
 (30) days from receipt thereof. Otherwise, it shall become a law
TAKE AWAY:
QUORUM: MEMBERS OF EACH HOUSE. SUFFICIENT NUMEBR OF
PERSONS.NECESSARY TO TRANSACT MAJORITY MEMBERS CONSTITUTING A
QUORUM.
EXAMPLE: CLASS OF 21. 50% + 1= 11 THE MAJORITY IS 6 (QUORUM)
TO OVER RIDE THE VETO OF 2/3 OF ALL THE MEMBERS
1987=14 MEMBERS
Article VI, Secs. 26 & 27, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become
a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where
it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object.
CONSTITUTIONAL TEST IN THE PASSAGE OF A BILL
Three (3) very important constitutional requirements in the enactment of
statute:
1. Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. The purposes of this constitutional requirements
are:
• To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
• To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature; and
• To fairly apprise the people, through such publications of legislative
proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon
by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to each member three days before its passage.
3. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. The executive approval and veto power of the
President is the third important constitutional requirement in the mechanical
passage of a bill
TAKE AWAY:
ENACTMENT : MAJORITY OF ITS MEMBERS AND TO OVERRIDE THE VETO 2/3
OF THE MEMBERS.
1. ONE SUBJECT ONE TITLE RULE
2.THREE READINGS AND NO AMENDMENT RULE
3.EXECUTIVE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS VETO POWER.
Alalayan vs. NAPOCOR, 24 SCRA 172 July 29, 1968
Fact:
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act
Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered
Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was passed. This law amended the charter
of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043 provides
that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit
of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers; We thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision which
requires that any bill enacted into law shall embrace only one subject to be
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise expressed in the title thereof.
holders for the supply of energy.

Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company

TAKE AWAY:
(PPDC) assailed the said provision. They averred that Section 3 is a rider
because first, it was not included in the title of the amending law nor was it BAWAL SA ISANG BATAS IBA-IBA ANG PINAG-UUSAPAN
included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to
increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that AN ACT__EVERY LAW SHALL HAVE ONLY ONE TITLE.
Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.
TO UPRISE THE PEOPLE OF CONTENT OF THE BILL
This statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is
-TO AVOID LOG-ROLLING OR HODGE FODGE LEGISLATION WHERE
violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be
LEGISLATORS CONTAIN DIFFERENET SUBJECT MATTER.
enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be
expressed in its title.
RIDER- PROVISION OF THE LAW WHICH IS NOT GERMANE.

Issue: WON RA 3043 is unconstitutional, for having more than one subject
THE COURT SAYS IT IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE LEGISLATURE TO INCLUDE EVERY
which not expressed in the title
TITLE.

Held: (YES)
WE CANNOT EXPECT MATHEMATICAL EXTITUDE WHEN THEY CREATED THE TITLE.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630, August 25, 1994
To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional
provision as to cripple or impede proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods
which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be deemed sufficient and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to
that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration
object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits
end and means necessary for its accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a
complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
relating to its subject finding expression in its title.18 More specifically, if the law Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is
amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to thein fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No.
legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as
the amendment. required by the Constitution.

It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the
it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the Constitution
public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear
or fraud upon the legislators." analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by
the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist
that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative PETITIONER SUING AS TAXPAYER : HOW DOES IT VIOLATE? NO THREE
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the READINGS.
same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur
with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the COPIES OF THE BILL THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE.
Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills,
IF IT IS CERTIFIED? IF IT IS ONLY WAIVED THE 3 DAY REQUIREMENT. NOT
bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
DISPENSE ON THE THREE READINGS.
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
RULING:
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of IT ID NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTIUTION.
its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body
is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. “UNLESS AND EXCEPT”- THE PROVISIONS INDICATE THAT NO BILL SHALL
PASSED UNLESS WHICH IS A REQUIREMENT.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the THE COURT SAID YOU WOULD HAVE TO CONSTRUE IT IN RELATION TO ENTIRE
second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because UNLESS CLAUSE.
the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
THREE READINGS
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the
DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED COPIES.
bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the
requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution
IS IT ALLOWED? THE INSERTION AS LONG AS IT IS GERMANE.
can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

IS IT TRUE? COMPOSITION IS STILL THE SAME.

TAKE AWAY:

DO THEY REQUIRE? THREE READINGS UPON INTRODUCTION.

BILL IN THE HOUSE AND BILL IN THE SENATE= CONSTITUTING A BICAMERAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE.
WHY IS IT ALLOWED TO MAKE INSERTIONS? TO HARMONIZE.

ISSUE ON BICAMERAL: SHOULD NOT PUT ENTIRE PROVISION

AFTER THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE IS SUBJECT TO A SEPARATE

HARMONIZE CONFLICTING PROVISION VOTATION TO APPROVE REPORTS AND DECISIONS OF THE SENATE AND THE
HOUSE.
VI. Vague Statutes

Statues or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards those men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.

Statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects:

1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of conduct to avoid; and 2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretions.

The Supreme Court held that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld--- not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineate
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law
that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this,
the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

ISSUE: ISSUE: WON the plunder law is unconstitutional or not on the grounds of ambiguity/vagueness?

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice.t must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to
provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.

COURT: PLUNDER LAW IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND PETITION IS DISMISSED

TAKE AWAY:

VAGUE: SUSCEPTIBLE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF MEN OF COMMON INTELLIGENCE.

VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS ARTICLE III SECTION 1

• NOT CLEAR WHAT CONDUCT TO AVOID. WHAT IS PUNISHABLE. WHAT IS BEING PENALIZED.
• RIGHT TO BE FULL INFORMED WITH THE CHARGE AGAINTS YOU. GIVES THE STATUTE UNBRIDDLED DISCRETION.

VAGUE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL

PLUNDER: AMASSING OF ILL GOTTEN WEALTH

50 MILLION MANDARAMBNG

A SERIES OF COMBINATION OF ACTS, RECEIVING, MALVERSTAIN (RPC) ILLEGAL AND CONVEYANCE SEPARATE CRIMES.

PLUNDER LAW: PINAG SAMA SAMAN TAS MAY PATTERN NA GINAGAWA

- SERIES OF COMBINATION (MAGKASABAY KAPAG ANG TOTAL AMOUNT ACCUMULATED TO 50 MILLION)

- NO NEED TO PUNISH THEM COLLECTIVELY
- VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS
- PUNISHES THE SAME ACT TWICE
ESTRADA : PAANO MO MALALAMAN KAPAG MAY PATTERN? (VAGUE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL)

COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL

LEGISLATIVE INTENT: WANTS TO PUNISH SERIES OF COMBINATION OF ACTS. NOTHING IN THE CONSTITUTE IMPLIES MATHEMATICAL EXALTITUDE. DETAILED COMPUTATION

VII. Repeal of Statutes Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
REPEALS OF STATUTE MAY BE EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED

Express repeal – is the abrogation or annulling of a previously existing law by

TAKE AWAY:
the enactment of a subsequent statute which declares that the former law
shall be revoked and abrogated. EXPRESS REPEAL: EXPRESSL BY THE LEGISLATURE

Implied repeal – when a later statute contains provisions so contrary to THIS ACT SHALL REPEAL RA_____________
irreconcilable with those of the earlier law that only one of the two statutes can
stand in force.

IMPLIED REPEAL; ALL ACTS “SAFETY CLAUSE”

• The repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish
persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its
A. THERE IS IRRECONCILLABLE DIFFERENCE
repeal.
• Only a law can repeal a law. • IRRECONCILABLE – ‘INCONSISTENT THAT ONE CANNOT BE IMPOSED
AT THE ___ WHERE THE LEGISLATURE HAS CHANGED ITS MIND ON
The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest, otherwise, at least, as a
THE PARTICULAR MATTER.
general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a
substitute for, the first act. B. IF THE LATER ACT COVERS THE TWO SUBJECTS

Two (2) categories of repeal by implication: • NO INCONSISTENCY BUT THE INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE TO
ENACT THE WHOLE SUBJECT.
1. Where provision in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict; IMPLIED REPEAL IS NOT FAVORED;

2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly • PRIMARY CONSIDERATION. LEGISLATIVE INTENT REPEAL A
intended as a substitute – to be a complete and perfect system in itself. PARTICULAR LAW THAT SHOULD HAVE SAID SO.
• THE COURT WOULD PRESUME THAT LEGISLATIVE KNOWS WHAT IT IS
Article 7, Civil Code
DOING.
• THE LEGISLATIVE WOULD NOT PASS INCONSISTENT LAWS
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
RECONCILE THE LAWS = GIVE EFFECT TO BOTH LEGISLATIVE
contrary.

Palanca, vs. CA, G.R. No. 106685, December 2, 1994

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Petitioner Simplicio Palanca and Jose Sanicas entered into a Contract to Sell
on Installment of a subdivision lot. The terms of their contract provides the
amount of the initial downpayment and vendee’s total balance to be paid in
120 monthly installments. The dispute in this case originated from one of the
conditions in the said contract in which the respondent agreed that in the
event of a monetary fluctuation, his unpaid balance account shall be
increased in proportion to the exchange rate between the value of PH peso
and the US dollar.
When Edgardo Sanicas, the brother of Jose and assumed over the payment
of the property, the petitioner demanded for the account to be updated in
pursuant to the condition in paragraph 11 of the contract. Sanicas hired an
accountant to compute his obligations under the contract and tendered the
amount to the Palanca but the petitioner refuses to accept the amount
tendered.
Sanicas (respondent) filed a complaint for reconveyance with the trial court
praying that the petitioner will be enjoined from cancelling his rights under
the contract and from rejecting him from the property.
The trial court ruled in favor of Sanicas based on Article 1250 of New Civil Code
which provides that an agreement wherein the purchase price will be
adjusted in case the value of the peso changes can only come into an effect
once there is “extraordinary inflation or deflation.” Since there is no such
change, paragraph 11 shall not be taken into account in computing the
amount that the respondent needs to pay. The deed of conveyance was
granted to the respondent.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but they
only affirmed it and modified the amount that the respondent is due
to pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the increase in payment
pursuant to the agreed terms of their contract specifically to the paragraph 11
of the contract
Ruling:
The Court also ruled in favor of the respondent but because of a different
legal basis. Article 1250 of the New Civil Code does not apply to the case at
bench because it was agreed between the parties that the purchase price
will
increase the moment that the value of the Philippine peso changes in
proportion to the US Dollar. The monetary fluctuation stipulated in the
paragraph refers to the exchange rate between the two currencies and not
about an inflation or deflation.
According to them, they cannot grant the petition because the agreement of
the parties is in violation of Republic Act no. 529 which is titled the Act to Assure
Uniform Value to Philippine Coin and Currency”
Section 1 of the said act explicitly states that every provision contained in any
obligation contracted in the Philippines has to use the Philippine currency or
be measured according the value of our currency, because otherwise will be
struck null, void and without any effect. In other words, the money or payment
to be stipulated in all contracts entered into the Philippines shall be in
Philippine currency.
That is exactly what paragraph 11 violates.
The Court explained that despite the resolutions and circulars issued that
liberalized foreign exchange regulations on both trade and non-trade
transactions, they did not repeal or amend RA 529. Central Bank circulars
cannot repeal a law as Article 7 of the Civil Code provides. They only provided
foreign exchange tools to maintain the value of Philippine currency but those
are not the only means of doing so. The requirement under RA 529 is also a
tool for that purpose.
TAKE AWAY:
RA 8529: UNIFORM VALUE OF CURRENCY. CURRENCY MUST BE IN
THE PHILIPPINES. OTHERWISE IT IS NULL AND VOID.
LIBERALIZATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE CURRENCY
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR ALLOWING FOREIGN CURRENCY IN THE
PHILIPPINES.
THE COURT SAID RA 529 WAS NOT REPEALED BY CENTRAL BANK CIRCULAR
SINCE CIRCULAR CANNOT REPEAL A LAW. (IT CANNOT SUPERSEDE A
STATUTE)
 “ONLY A LAW CAN REPEAL ANOTHER LAW. ART 7 OF THE CIBIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPHINES PROVIDES THAT “ Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary”
People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225, March 19, 1935
The appellant of this case was convicted for the violation of Section 2 of the
Municipal Ordinance no. 5 of Magsingal, Province of Ilocos Sur. His appeal
was affirmed by the Court of First Instance and a fine was even imposed, so
the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court.
But while the case was pending, the municipal council repealed Section 2
of the ordinance which petitioner violated. So in effect, the act complained
of was made legal by the repealing law.
On that ground, the appellant moved for the dismissal of his case. ISSUE:
Whether or not the effect of the repeal absolves him of criminal liability
HELD:
The repeal here was absolute and not only a reenactment of the repealed
ordinance. Moreover, there was no saving clause which shows that the
legislative intent is to decriminalize the conduct formerly prohibited. For that
reason, the petitioner cannot be liable for a crime that no longer exists. The
proceedings against appellant is dismissed.
TAKE AWAY:
WAS THERE AN EXPRESS OR IMPLIED REPEAL?
IN CRIMINAL LAW. IF THE NEW LAW FAILS TO PENALIZE AN ACT
PUNISHABLE UNDER THE OLD LAW. THE OLD LAW WILL APPLY.
AN ACT COMMITTED REPEALED BY LEGISLATURE- BE BENEFICIAL TO THE
ACCUSED.
PENAL AND CRIMINAL= INTERPRET IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
People vs. Sindiong De Pastor and Pastor, 77 Phil 1000, February 12, 1947
The accused Geronima Sindiong de Pastor and Santos T. Pastor were, on June
4, 1941, charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Oriental Negros in an information
filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Dumaguete, capital of the
province, with a violation of sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised
Administrative Code, in relation with Act No. 3243, and section 2723 of the
same Code.
The accused filed for a Motion to quash which was granted by the lower court.
The Government appealed before the Supreme Court contending that:
The business of the accused in connection with which they are thus being
prosecuted was that of owners, managers or administrators of the
"Magazine Center", an establishment devoted to the selling of newspapers,
magazines and stationery, according to the information.
The information alleges that these defendants during the period comprised
between January, 1936, and March 31, 1938, being such owners, managers
and administrators of said "Magazine Center", with the deliberate purpose to
evade the payment of the percentage tax union their receipts, voluntarily,
illegally, and criminally neglected to make a return of their sales within the
time prescribed by law.
ISSUE: WON the accused can be charged by a law that has been
repealed. RULING:
No, because the enactment of the National Internal Revenue Code
defendants herein ceased to be bound to make a return of their sales in
question or to pay the percentage tax under consideration. And not only
could this, but even after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503, such
obligation not in any sense be considered as revived.
Where the repealing law wholly fails to penalize the acts which constituted the
offense defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repeal carries with it
deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons
charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal. This is our case, since,
as already seen, ever the National Internal Revenue Code, and for that matter
even Commonwealth Act No. 503, wholly fails to penalize the acts imputed
upon herein defendants.
TAKE AWAY: People vs. Sindiong De Pastor and Pastor, 77 Phil 1000,
February 12, 1947
 KINDLY ADD COMMENT – SORRY I WAS NOT ABLE TO TAKE DOWN NOTES
Mecano vs. COA, 216 SCRA 500, December 11, 1992
Antonio A. Mecano is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on
account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total
amount of which he is claiming from the COA. Petitioner requested
reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC).
Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied
petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for
the reason that the same provision was not restated nor re-enacted in the
latter. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the
Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director
Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991
of Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did
not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative
Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of
the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety
the RAC. He further maintains that in the event that a claim is filed with the
Employees' Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent, he
would still not be barred from filing a claim under the subject section.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or
supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The COA
claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new Administrative Code, it can
be gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
RULING : NO. What must be questionned is the nature of this repealing clause?
In the case at bar it is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails
to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. 5
Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion
No. 73, S.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later
date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a
prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before
there can be a repeal, there must be a clear indication on the part of the
lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old
one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as
a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a
substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same
from the time of the first enactment.
Petition granted. Respondent ordered
TAKE AWAY: Mecano vs. COA, 216 SCRA 500, December 11, 1992
• ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987- REPEALING CLAUSE •
IMPLIED- THE COURT REITERATED TWO KINDS OF REPEAL •
REPEAL BY ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE COVERING THE SAME
SUBJECT MATTER.
• EVENTHOUGH THEY ARE BOTH IT DOESN’T MEAN THAT THEY
ARE THE SAME
ACCUMULATION OF THE FIRST ADMINISTRATIVE
• THERE ARE CERTAIN SUBJECT MATTERS THAT ARE
COVERED BY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
• LEGISLATIVE INTENT: THE NEW LAW COULD NOT HAVE SEEM
INTENDED TO COVER THE LAW.
BOOK: those of equivalent rank as may be determined by the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) while in the actual performance of their
We come now to the second category of repeal — the enactment of a respective functions are hereby granted monthly commutable
statute revising or codifying the former laws on the whole subject representation and
matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended
to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated January 1, 1992, of
itself. It is the the Department of Budget and Management
rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the
former revises the whole subject matter of the former statute. When both
intent and scope clearly evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts
4. Funding Source: In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be
and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act are
paid from the amount appropriated for the purpose and other personal
deemed repealed. Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal
services savings of the agency or project from where the officials and
under this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the
employees covered under this Circular draw their salaries. No one shall be
later act be the substitute to the prior act
allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.6 (emphasis supplied)
Leynes vs. COA 418 SCRA 180, December 11, 2003
Petitioner judge appealed the matter to COA Regional Director Gregoria S.
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes, is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Ong who, however, upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay.
Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40. His salary and
representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn from the IT FAILED TO COMPLY with Section 3 of Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated

budget of the Supreme Court. Besides that, petitioner also received a monthly September 1, 1993 outlining the conditions for the grant of allowances to judges
allowance of P944 from the local funds of the Municipality of Naujan starting and other national officials or employees by the local government units (LGUs).
1984.
e. That similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the

On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved a resolution national government to the officials/employees assigned to the LGU.7
increasing petitioner judge’s monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an
ISSUE : Whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly
increase of P656) starting May 1993. This supplemental budget was approved
provide RATA to its Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the
by the municipal government (the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang
Supreme Court.
Bayan) and was also likewise approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
and the Office of Provincial Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro.
RULING :

On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to

In construing NCC No. 67, we apply the principle in statutory construction that
the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them
force and effect should not be narrowly given to isolated and disjoined
to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to petitioner
clauses of the law but to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together in
judge and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to
one rational view. A provision or section which is unclear by itself may be
the latter. She reasoned that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA
clarified by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute.
to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving
from the Supreme Court. Applying that to the case at bar, what the provision seeks to prevent is the dual
collection of RATA by a national official from the budgets of "more than one
Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993
national agency." The Court emphasized that the other source referred to in
the prohibition is another national agency. This can be gleaned from the fact
Representation and Transportation Allowances. The following officials and
that the sentence "no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than
one source" immediately followed the sentence that RATA shall be paid from
the budget of the national agency where the concerned national officials and
employees draw their salaries.
National agency of course refers to the different offices, bureaus and
departments comprising the national government. The budgets of these
departments or offices are fixed annually by Congress in the General
Appropriations Act. An LGU is obviously not a national agency. Its annual
budget is fixed by its own legislative council (Sangguniang Bayan, Panlungsod
or Panlalawigan), not by Congress. The Court concluded that NCC No.67 does
not apply to LGUs.
TAKE AWAY: Mecano vs. COA, 216 SCRA 500, December 11, 1992
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991
NCC FROM DBM
GAA OF 19993 – IT STATES DIFFERENT AMOUNT OF RATA
ADMINISTRATIVE-MERELY INTERPRETATIVE IN NATURE
AGENTS CREATED BY LAW- CANNOT SUPERSEDE
• A STATUTE IS ENACTED BY CONGRESS
• ADMINISTERED BY AGENCY WHICH WAS CREATED BY CONGRESS
RULEMAKING – CONGRESS TO ISSUE ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES AND THEY
ARE ACTING BASED ON DELEGATED POWER.
DUAL COLLECTION OF RATA IS PROHIBITED FROM OTHER SOURCES.
NCC 67 – DID NOT AMEND LGC WHICH IS A SPECIAL LAW.
• IMPLIED IS NOT FAVORED
• -HARMONISED THE STATUTE
• IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES
PRESUMED THAT THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
CONGRESS DID NOT PASS THE CONFLICTING STATUTE
• PRESUMPTION: THE LAWMAKERS IS PRESUMED TO KNOW ALL
EXISTING STATUTES.
• IT WILL NOT CONTRADICT ITSELF.
SPECIAL LAW- CONTAINS SPECIFIC PROVISION
• LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (EXCLUSIVELY DEALS WITH LGC
GENERAL LAW- ALL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
• GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT
A GENERAL LAW CANNOT REPEAL A SPECIAL LAW. CONGRESS MAKE THOSE
PROVISIONS DEALS WITH PARTICULAR ISSUANCES.
U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil 241, December 15, 1908
FACTS
On August 12,1907, the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Isabela, charging the defendant Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco)
for the violation of section 5 of Act No. 1461 “Opium Law” of the Philippine
Commission.
On June 30, 1907 defendant sold for tents a small quantity of opium to
Apolinario Gumpal, a Filipino woman who was neither a doctor, pharmacist,
vender of opium with license nor an inveterate user of opium.
The defendant demurred to the information on the ground that the said act
was repealed by Act. No 1761 which took effect on October 17,1907, and
since it was repealed there is no law in force which penalizes the offense.
The trial court dismissed the case since no law in force, in accordance with the
accused, if he be tried and convicted, can be punished for the offense
committed in June 1907. “The time when the defendant alleged committed
the offense, the Opium Law was in force and continue to be in force until
October 17, 1907 , when it was superseded by a new Act, No. 1761, which, in
section 33 thereof, repeals Act No. 1461, without excepting from the provisions
of the repealing clause cases pending at the time of its enactment, for the
infraction of Act No. 1461, and without prescribing what disposition should be
made of such cases.”
The Government appealed from the judgment sustaining the demurrer and
dismissing the information.
ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant should be convicted even when the law was
repealed?
RULING
The court held that , the doctrine of English and American common law relied
upon by counsel for defendant is not and has not been the accepted
doctrine in this jurisdiction, and that, in accordance with the accepted
doctrine, the courts in these Islands are not deprived of jurisdiction to try,
convict, and sentence offenders who have violated the provisions of Act No.
1461 prior to the date when Act No. 1761 went into effect, notwithstanding the REASON WHY AN ORDINANCE SHOULD NOT CONTRAVENE A STATUTE
provision of the latter Act repealing Act No. 1461; and that the penalty
prescribed by the repealing Act for the violation charged in the information
not being more favorable to the accused than that prescribed in the old law, by Congress as the national law making body.
the penalty to be imposed is that prescribed by the old law.
TAKE AWAY: U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil 241, December 15, 1908
I WAS NOT ABLE TO TAKE DOWN NOTES SORRRY
VIII. ORDINANCE
Ordinance – an act passed by the local legislative body in the exercise of its
law-making authority.
TEST OF VALID ORDINANCE
1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. Must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6. Must not be unreasonable
IN CASE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN AN ORDINANCE AND STATUTE, THE ORDINANCE
MUST GIVE AWAY.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991. The legislative branches of the
local government are;
1. Sangguniang Baranggay “barangay”
2. Sangguniang Bayan “municipality”
3. Sangguniang Panlungsod “city”
4. Sangguniang Panlalawigan “province”
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal.
ROLE OF FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE
Philippine laws must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention
of its own law makers and such intent may be deduced from the language of
each law and the context of other local legislation related thereof.
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., G.R.111097, July 20, 1994
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in
several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No.
3353.
ORDINANCE NO. 3353 : AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF
BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY
ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR
PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-
 93. AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their
challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared
the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize
and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within
the territorial jurisdiction of the
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to
enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code.
It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the
General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. — General Welfare. Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation -
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos
because they involve games of chance which are detrimental to
the people.
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the
local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other
prohibited games of chance. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly
excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of
gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done.
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the
effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a
later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of
inconsistencies.
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful
and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions
of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of
the vice.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed
must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories
except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception
reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the
Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of
gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized
gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal
gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the
Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the
distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear
indication that this is the will of the legislature
THE COURT HELD find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has
the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy
expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of
chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to
prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited
games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The rationale of the
requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them
by Congress as the national lawmaking body .
TAKE AWAY: Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., G.R.111097, July 20, 1994
• It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
• Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body.
POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
• POWER TO TAX
 • POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
• POLICE POWER
FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE: INCORPORATION LAW – WE MODEL THEM FROM
• CRIMINAL AW= SPANISH TEXT NOT ENGLISH TEXT
• SOURCES BASED ON SPANISH LAWS
• CIVIL CODE= NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
IF NOT BINDING WHAT WILL HAPPEN?
JUDICIAL NOTICE – THE COURT WILL TAKE DUE NOTICE OR COGNIZANCE ON
CERTAIN MATTERS.
CERTAIN FACTS YOU DO NOT NEED TO PROVE.
EXISTING OF POLITICAL SUB UNITS = VENUE JURISDICTIONAL
FOREIGN LAWS= DO OUR COURTS TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE? NO. (PAG MAY
PAPATUNAYAN KA NA BATAS)
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION – IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF TO THE CONTRARY,
THERE IS A PRESUMPTION THAT FOREIGN LAW IS SIMILAR TO PHILIPPINE LAW.
IX. Basic Guidelines in Statutory Construction
The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the
meaning and intention of the legislature, to the end that the same may be
enforced.
A. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the
statute. Article 10, Civil Code
Article 10: In case of doubt in the interpretation, or application of Laws, it is
presumed that the law making body intended right and justice to prevail.
Padilla, et. al. vs. Congress, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a
state of martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao
group of islands on the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public safety.
Within 48 hours after the proclamation and while the Congress was in session,
President Duterte transmitted his Report to the Senate and House of
Representatives.
After a briefing before the Senate (May 29) and the House (May 31), the
former adopted Senate Resolution No. 49 and the latter House Resolution No.
1050, which expressed support for President Duterte’s Proclamation No. 216
and both of the Houses of the Congress voted against calling for a joint
session.
A petition for Mandamus was filed by Padilla et al. (Padilla Petition) which seek
to direct the Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate on
Proclamation No. 216 and to vote thereon.
The petition for Certiorari and Mandamus of former Senator Tanada et al.
(Tanada Petition) seeks to (a) declare the refusal of the Congress to convene
in joint session to be in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and (b) to direct the Congress to convene in joint session.
Subsequently, the petitioners in the Padilla Petition filed a Manifestation, due to
the imminent expiration of the 60-day period of the validity of Proclamation
No. 216, to still resolve the instant cases for the guidance of the Congress, State
actors, and all Filipinos.
Consequently, the Congress convened in joint session and approved by virtue
of a majority vote the extension of the proclamation and suspension in
Mindanao until December 31, 2017.
ISSUE/S:
WON the Congress has the mandatory duty under Article 7, section 18 of 1987
Constitution to convene jointly upon the President’s proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
RULING:
> NO. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session
EXCEPT to vote jointly to revoke or extend the President’s declaration or
suspension.
 (1) There is no constitutional provision governing concurrence by the Before the present constitution the appointment of members of the Judiciary is
Congress in the President’s proclamation and/or suspension, and absent a from the executive and legislative branch of the government. Prompted by the
specific mandate for the Congress to hold a joint session in the event of clamor to rid the process of appointments to Judiciary from political pressure
concurrence, then WON to hold a joint session under such circumstances is the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
completely within the discretion of the Congress separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President.
Art. VII, Sec. 18: “The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of
all its members in a regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President” only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as
two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the
According to the SC, applying the plain-meaning rule or verba legis, the use of House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half
the word “may” in the provision is to be construed as permissive and operating (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in
to confer discretion on the Congress on WON to revoke. Moreover, the Court 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
stated that the provision does not actually refer to a “joint session.” The House of Representatives one full vote each.8 present, Senator Francis Joseph
requirement that the Congress “voting jointly” explicitly applies only to the G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously
situation when the Congress revokes the President’s proclamation and/or sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.
suspension.
RESPONDENT - theory that the two houses, are permanent and mandatory
The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom reveal the framer’s specific intentions to components of "Congress," such that the absence of either divests the term of
(a) remove the requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress for the its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Thus, when
effectivity of the President’s proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of "a representative from
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) to grant to the Congress the Congress," it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
discretionary power to revoke the President’s proclamation or suspension by a comprise the entire Congress. The respondents urge the Court to look beyond
vote of at least a majority of its Members, voting jointly. the letter of the disputed provision because the literal adherence to its
Therefore, the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House to language would produce absurdity and incongruity to the bicameral nature
convene in joint session absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so of Congress.
under the Constitution and in complete disregard of the separate actions (2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
already undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216, including their eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to
respective decisions to no longer hold a joint session, considering their the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution
respective resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.
RULING:

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Because of the departure of CJ Corona and the nomination of Solgen Chavez
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
triggered the filing of this case.
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sect

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be

discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph
calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of
 the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress,
enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This
retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually
the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached.
officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the
be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and "a representative of Congress. precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created. While it would
be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in Hence, the term "Congress" must be taken to mean the entirelegislative
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical department. A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the
terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should more pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid with firmness, that
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according is, that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of Congress, as one
to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates of the co-equal branches of government.
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another
Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against
no departure that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing
Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit.
word "Congress" used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
TAKE AWAY: Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The WHY WAS IT ALTERED? THEY ALLOWED A REPRESENTATIVE
foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed
former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his WHY DID THEY FILE THE CASE? QUESTIONING THE PRACTICE OF THE JBC RULING;

memorandum, "from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC,

HOW DID THE COURT COME UP WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single
individual only.
CONSTITUTION? Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution, viz:

Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where
a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of

defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.42 Not any of these the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the

instances, however, is present in the case at bench. Considering that Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a

the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the

unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

the Constitutional Commission.

CHAVEZ: JBC SHOULD CONSIST OF 7 MEMBERS. SINGULAR WORD A “ONE

This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may REPRESENTATIVE” . ½ BOTH EACH. ONLY THE PROBLEM WILL EXIST.
TUPAS/ESCUDERO: 8 MEMBERS. BICAMERAL. 2 HOUSES OF CONGRESS
Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no
departure
WHO’S INTENT ARE WE GOING TO ASCERTAIN? INTENT PEOPLE. SINCE IT IS A
CONSTITUTION. (THE DOCUMENT WAS RATIFIED BY THE PEOPLE)
YOU TRY TO INTERPRET AS LITERALLY SINCE IT WAS RATIFIED BY THE PEOPLE.
PEOPLE HAS EXPRESS ITS WILL INTENT. USING THE WORDS THAT ARE INCLUDED
IN THE CONSTITUTION.
IF IT WILLED=IT SHOULD HAVE DONE SO.
“A” SINGULAR ONE REPRESENTATIVE
BICAMERAL;- HOW WAS IT ADDRESSED BY THE COURT?
BECAUSE WE HAVE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. THERE SHOULD
ONLY BE ONE REPRESENTATIVE.
-COMMA AFTER CONGRESS. REFERS ONLY TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
CONGRESS. NOSCITUR ASOCIIS- THE DOCTRINE OF ASOCIATED WORDS
IF THERE IS AMBIGUITY. YOU CAN RESORT TO OTHER WORDS WITH EACH
ASSOCIATED OR WORDS ACCOMPANYING IT.
WHICH WORDS ASSOCIATED ANG CONGRESS? “A REPRESENTATIVE = ENTIRE
LEGISLATIVE IN ITS GENERIC SENSE.
CONSTITUTION- SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
Mecano vs. COA, 216 SCRA 500, December 11, 1992
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or
abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on
petitioner’s claim for benefits.
RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of
later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to
abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
Hence, before
there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the
lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old
one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as
a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not
a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the
same from the time of the first enactment.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two
Codes should be read in pari materia.
TAKE AWAY:
ISSUE: W/N THE LAW HAS BEEN REPEALED?
REPEAL OF STATUTES- NOT FAVORED
LEGISLATIVE INTENT- THE CLEAR INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE
CLEAR, CONCISE,UNAMBIGUOUS = BEFORE A COURT CAN DECIDE
B. VERBA LEGIS
If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses
a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively
presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to convey.
In other words the statute must be interpreted literally. Even Though the
court should convinced that some other meaning was really intended by
the law making power, and even though the literal interpretation should
defeat the
very purposed of the enactment, still the explicit declaration of the legislature,
and the courts must not depart from it.
TAKE AWAY:
 VERBA LEGIS: LITERAL MEANING – LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
STATUTE STRICT ADHERENCE=CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION
1.IF IT IS CLEAR,PLAIN AND FREE FROM UNAMBIGUITY THEN IT MUST BE GIVEN
ITS LITERAL MEANING.
WHY IS THERE A VERBA LEGIS?
• ASSURED NA ANG MEANING
• HINDI NA KAILANGAN NG INTERPRETATION
• CLEAR WORDS PRESUMED TO BE INTENTION
Basbacio vs, Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 109445, November 7, 1994
Felicito Basbacio and Wilfredo Balderrama, his son-in-law were convicted of
frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and for the injuries sustained
by his family on the night of June 26, 1988. According to the information, the
motive of the accused is a land dispute between the Boyons and the
petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and
ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.
The accused appealed the decision and was acquitted due to the
prosecution’s failure to prove a conspiracy between him and his son-in-law.
During the commission of the crime, the accused had apparently did
nothing more but be present.
The petitioner filed a claim under Republic Act no. 7309, stating that any
person who was UNJUSTLY ACCUSED, CONVICTED, IMPRISONED BUT
SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED by virtue of a judgment of acquittal shall be entitled
for the payment of compensation. However, the Board of Claims of the
Department of Justice denied his claim on the ground that he may be
acquitted but only because the evidence was not sufficient to find him guilty
BEYOND reasonable doubt. Considering that there was bad blood between
the petitioner and the deceased, there was basis for his original conviction
finding him guilty.
The Secretary of Justice affirms this in his resolution stating that Basbacio
cannot be deemed as an individual who was wrongly accused and
imprisoned under Section 3 of the said law, since his exculpation is not
based on his innocence, but upon a finding of a reasonable doubt
ISSUE: WON RA 7309 entitles compensation to those acquitted but not
declared innocent of their crimes
In a petition for certiorari, the petitioner questions the basis of the Secretary of
Justice in ruling that only those found innocent of the crimes they were
convicted of, after appeal shall be the ones entitled to recover compensation
under RA 7309. He contends that the language of section 3 is clear and does
not call for interpretation. Therefore, the mere fact that a claimant was
imprisoned for a crime but was later on acquitted should be considered unjust
in itself. There is only one requirement for conviction in criminal cases, and
failure to present such proof means the presumption of innocence stands
Sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and]
imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is
acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An
accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the
trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside.
Petitioner’s theory leaves out the provision in question qualifying the word
“unjustly”. Liability for compensation does not depend entirely on the
innocence of the accused. In addition to an unjust conviction is an unjust
accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence
of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note
this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been
wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful.
Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though
based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be
erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's
conviction by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or
gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to
believe that petitioner and his co accused were in league, because petitioner
is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the
victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his
co-accused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into
it.
In view of the circumstances, the Court held that the Secretary of Justice
and the board of claims did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
disallowing petitioner’s claim for compensation. Under Rep. Act no. 7309
 TAKE AWAY:
HE WAS ACQUITTED.
WHAT REQUIRES FOR A PAYMENT? “UNJUSTLY” ACQUITTED
HOW WAS VERBA LEGIS APPLIED? NATURAL MEANING OF THE FACT THAT
ONE WAS EXENORATED OR UNJUSTLY ACQUITTED. SO HE IS NOT ENTITLED.
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Communications vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
82511, March 3, 1992
Private Respondent, "Imelda Salazar" was employed as general systems
analyst of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. (GMRC) While Delfin
Saldivar, her close friend, was employed as technical operations' support
manager in May 1982.
Petitioner GMRC investigated Saldivar's activities due to the reports indicating
that the company equipment and spare parts were in custody of Saldivar.
The internal audit report also indicated that Saldivar entered into a
partnership with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Eledon
Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier often recommended by Saldivar to
the petitioner. It also appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that
Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in
transactions with conflict of interest with the company. Evidence showed that
she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and
Saldivar, and that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the
missing air conditioner but she failed to inform her employer.
The Company placed Salazar under 1 month preventive suspension, allowing
her 30 days within which to explain her side. However, Salazar instead filed a
complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which was later modified
to illegal dismissal.
The Labor arbiter ordered the company to reinstate Salazar to her former
and equivalent position and to pay her full back wages and benefits, plus
moral damages. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the
labor arbiter's decision but limited back wages for only two years and
deleted the award of moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or Not the action of dismissal would constitute a violation of Art. 279
of the Labor Code, which protects the security of tenure of an employee.
Held:
Positive. The Court did not agree on the petitioner's action of suspension and
eventual dismissal of Salazar due to lack of evidence to show that Salazar
was involved with the malicious activities of Saldivar.
The wordings of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous "An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and full
back wages." Under the principle of Statutory Construction, if a statute is
clear, plain
and free from ambiguity. It must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. The plain meaning rule or Verba Legis
derived from the maxim "Speech is the index of intention" should be applied
in this case.
Since there is no evidence to show an authorized or legal dismissal, and
GMRC only relied to an internal audit findings, Salazar, according to the
Labor Code, is entitled to reinstatement and full back wages allowed by the
Court.
TAKE AWAY:
An employee who is unjustly dismissed.
Wording of the labor code= entitled backwages. Re-instatement and
pending appeal.
Executory- THIS IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE UNTIL JUDGMENT IS FINAL
AND EXECUTORY.
CLEAR,PLAIN, FREE FROM AMBIGUITY.
BASED ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LEGISLATIVE KNOWS THE MEANING
OF ITS USES. JUST WITH THE LETTER.
PLAIN MEANING RULE OR VERBA LEGIS
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
 This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words
as are found in the statute.
Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any
qualification.
C. STATUTES AS A WHOLE
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not merely of
a particular provision. A word or phrase might easily convey a meaning which
is different from the one actually intended.
A statute should be construed as a whole because it is not to be presumed
that the legislature has used any useless words, and because it is dangerous
practice to base the construction upon only a part of it, since one portion may
be qualified by other portions.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113, August
17, 1975
Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and
operates a petroleum refining plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of
Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the five years following the
granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs
duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and
accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax
(which it paid under protest).
The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was
subject to the payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No.
1394, as amended by R.A. No. 2352, and dismissed the protest.
On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs
to the Commissioner of Customs who, on March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision
of said Collector of Customs.
On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals
for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. The Court of Tax
Appeals, on September 30, 1967, reversed the decision of herein petitioner
Commissioner of Customs and ordered refund of the amount of P775.62 to
respondent ESSO which the latter had paid under protest
Statutes subject of construction:
a. R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) – title, Art. 103, Art. 102, Art. 104;
b. R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW), as amended by R.A. No. 2352 - title
ISSUE/S:
WON the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO from custom
duties granted by R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) should embrace or
include the special import tax imposed by R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW).
RULING:
Yes. Petition denied.
IT IS A WELL ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT WERE A STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS, COURTS
MAY EXAMINE BOTH THE PRINTED PAGES OF THE PUBLISHED ACT AS WELL AS
THOSE EXTRINSIC MATTERS THAT MAY AID IN CONSTRUING THE MEANING OF THE
STATUTE, SUCH AS THE HISTORY OF ITS ENACTMENT, THE REASONS FOR THE
PASSAGE OF THE BILL AND PURPOSES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MEASURE.
Thus:
o The title of R.A. No. 1394 (Special Tax Law) indicates unmistakably that it is
repealing six prior statutes (all these laws dealt with the imposition of a special
excise tax on foreign exchange or other form of levy on importation of goods
into the country).
o On the other hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. 387 (The Petroleum Act), has
not been repealed (although this law had granted more concessions and tax
exemption privileges than any of the statutes that were amended, repealed
or revoked by R.A. No. 1394.
o The CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES saw fit to preserve the privileges
granted under the Petroleum Law of 1949 in order to keep the door open to
exploitation and development of the petroleum resources of the country.
 o The SC is convinced that R.A. No. 387 or the Petroleum Act of 1949 was
intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration and development of the
petroleum resources of the country by giving it the necessary incentive in the
form of tax exemptions. This is the raison d’ etre for the generous grant of tax
exemptions to those who would invest their financial resources towards the
achievement of this national economic goal.
TAKE AWAY:
WHAT STATUTORY PRINCIPLE WAS APPLIED?
1. STATUTE AS A WHOLE
EXEMPTIONS
1. YOU JUST DON’T INTERPRET IT USING THE ENTIRE PART. IT MUST ALSO BE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING BODY OF LAWS SO IT MUST BE HARMONIOUS
WITH OTHER LAWS/.
CONSTRUED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
1. PRESUMED THAT ALL WORDS ARE RELEVANT (MEANING)
2. WORDS MAYBE MODIFIES BY OTHER WORDS IN WHICH THEY ARE
ASSOCIATED WITH.
GENERIC-SUBSEQUENT CLAUSED FOR APPLICATION
MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY PROVISION- EXCEPTIONS IF YOU LOOK
DEEPER.
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of
rules), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge
podge of conflicting provisions.
JMM Promotions and Management, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 109835, November
cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be
22, 1993
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a
On October 30, 1992 the respondent National Labor Relations Commission
statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision
issued an order, dismissing the petitioner’s appeal from a decision of Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the
required appeal bond.
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code,
as amended, providing that:
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission
in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed
from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as
amended, reading as follows:
Section 6. Bond. -- In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting
of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent
to the monetary award.
Petitioner contends that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
applying the rules rendered by POEA. That the appeal bond is not applicable
in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are
paying a license fee of P 30,000 and a post cash bond of P100, 000 plus a
surety bond of Php. 50, 000 under Section 4, Rule III, Book II of the POEA. Plus, it
has placed in escrow the sum of P 200,000 with the PNB in compliance with
Section 17, Rule II , Book II of the same rule.
The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond requirement but said that the
rules are only applicable to the decisions of Labor arbiters not of POEA and
that the appeal from POEA are governed from the provisions of Rule V, Book
VII of the POEA.
Section 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. -- The appeal shall be filed within
the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under
oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a
and/or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites a
forestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Section 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting
of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award.
ISSUE: WHTHER OR NOT THE petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to
perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
RULING :
YES. The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition
to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal
from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further
insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of
rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as
a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of
the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier
bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify
Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the
contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should
be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
THE COURT HELD THAT in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the Bayan be elected not at large, but by district, and that respondent COMELEC
escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post
the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules,
as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class,
conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than
annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee,
this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interests of labor
D. SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import
of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or would
thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or
modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of the law.
• When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
De Guia vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992
Congress passed R.A. 7166 “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and
Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms”.
Respondent COMELEC issued a resolution holding that all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166,
be applied to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11,
1992 synchronized elections.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the
aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election of Sanggunian
members be “at large” instead of “by district”.
SC . petition for certiorari and prohibition
ISSUE/S:
W/N the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing
the aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions (No)
RULING:
The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is to Reduce the number of
positions to be voted for by providing therein that the members of the
is cognizant of its legislative intent.
Paragraph (d) Section 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod which are single district cities and Sangguniang SPIRIT OF THE LAW: LIBERAL INTERPRETATION
Bayan for Municipalities outside Metro Manila, which will remain to be elected
at large in the May 11, 1992 election. Paragraph (d) should be interpreted in THE COURT EXTENDS EXTRA CARE SINCE IT DWELLS DEEPER.

line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner
- NOT STICK WITH LETTERS
would make the act of the statute in singling out the single district provinces as
- WHAT’S REALLY THE OBJECTIVE OF THE LAW TO ACCOMPLISH IT. -
useless or meaningless. The key to open the door to what the legislature
NOT FAITHFUL
intended in the language of a statute is its purpose or reason which induced it
to enact the statute.
WHY?

Statutes should be construed in light of the object to be achieved. A - LEGISLATIVE INTENT SHALL PREVAIL. THE COURT IS NOT DOING ANY
Construction should be rejected that gives the language used in a statute a JUDICIA; LOGS.
meaning that does not accomplish its purpose for which it is enacted.
- ABSURD OR INUTILE CONSEQUENCES ( IF CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE)

HOWEVER, WE MUST BE CAREFUL BASED ON ITS SPIRIT.

TAKE AWAY:

THE COURT CANNOT JUST INVENT

INTENDED THE MEANING OF THE LAW WHEN IT WAS PASSED.

“STATUTE ITSELF”- EXPLANATORY NOTE

LEGISLATIVE INTENT MAY BE DTERMINED FROM THE BILL. “WHEREAS CLAUSE’

THE SAME NOSCITUUR ASOCIIS

PURPOSE OF THE LAW: CONDUCT HONEST,CREDIBLE,PEACEFUL ELECTION. BY
REDUCING THE NUMBER OF POSITIONS TO BE VOTED FOR.
E. Doctrine of necessary implications.

What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as

that which is expressed.

F. CASUS OMISSUS

When a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several

enumerated cases or objects, but omits to make any provision for
a case or object which is analogous to those enumerated, or
which stands upon the same reason, and is therefore within the
general scope of the statute, and it appears that such case or
object was omitted by inadvertence or because it was overlooked
or unforeseen, it is called a “casus omissus”. Such omissions or
defects cannot be supplied by the courts.

The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate
and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established.
G. STARE DECISIS

It is the doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle,
and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the
same, regardless of whether the parties and properties are the
same.

Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what

has been settled. Matters already decided on the merits
cannot be relitigated again and again.

“Stare decisis et non quieta movere” (follow past precedents

and do not disturb what has been settled.