RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

2nd Semester 2022-2023

AVL

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A. Remedial Law

Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

Topic: this case distinguished substantive law from remedial law

FACTS:
A warrant of arrest was issued for petitioner Bustos on the strength of the
testimony of the complainant and certain witnesses. In the preliminary
investigation, his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence
so that she and her witnesses could be examined and crossexamined. The
fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking Sec 11 of Rule 108, and
the objection was sustained. Said Sec 11 denies the defendant the right to
cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation. Bustos now contends
that said Sec 11 infringes [the now Art VIII, Sec 5(5) of the Constitution]. It is
argued that the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs
substantive rights, to wit, his statutory and fundamental right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution.

ISSUE:
Does the rule in question impair substantive rights thereby violating the
constitutional limitation on the rule-making power of the Court?

RULING:
No. The rule in question is an adjective law and not a substantive law which
creates substantive rights.¹ Preliminary investigation is eminently and
essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
Therefore, it is not an essential part of due process of law. It may be
suppressed entirely, and thus, mere restriction of the privilege formerly
enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional
prohibition. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the
guarantee of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the
right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. As
a rule of evidence,² said Sec 11 is also procedural. The entire rules of
evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We cannot tear
down Sec 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the
whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules. The distinction between
“remedy” and “substantive right” is incapable of exact definition. This being
so, it is inevitable that the SC in making rules should step on substantive
rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate, if not to expect,
such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner
or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial
manner to his disadvantage.
 ¹ Substantive law and adjective law, distinguished. – Substantive law
creates, defines and regulates rights, or that which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action. Adjective or remedial law
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares
what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as
distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps
by which one who commits a crime is to be punished .

² Evidence—the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and

circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in
judicial proceedings. It is identified with and forms part of the method by
which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in
criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. (Criminal procedure refers to
pleading, evidence and practice.)

Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953

Distinguished Substantive law to procedural law

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts
are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as
distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps
by which one who commits a crime is to be punished Preliminary
investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in
a criminal prosecution. (Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953)

Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory
offenses, namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, in that he knowingly
chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of the President of
the Philippines and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the
Revised Administrative Code in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the
manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to
obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said
vessel for a foreign port.
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying
that assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved
in said cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 which provides that "the
aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court
of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal.

On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with
the promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on
July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the
Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly repealed. The
Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the
portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court. Believing
that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing abuse of discretion
to the respondent Judge.
Issues:
Whether or not the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute
substantive right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

Ruling:
Yes, a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right. The trial with the aid of
assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the
old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court. The aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure, and this right has been declared absolute and substantial by this
Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked. The intervention of the
assessors is not an empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the
letter or the spirit of the law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as
such, it is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all the
proceedings.

The contention of respondents we reckon is predicated on the assumption that the

provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed. Such is
not the case. We have already pointed out that the basic provisions on the matter partake of
the nature of substantive law and as such they were left intact by the Supreme Court.

It is therefore the opinion that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now
pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005

Neypes vs CA G.R. No. 141524

FACTS:
– Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before
the RTC Roxas, Oriental Mindoro

-Both petitioners and respondents filed various motions with the trial court.
Petitioners – Motion to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and
the Bureau of Forest Development in default
Respondents: Motion to dismiss

RTC’s order dated May 16, 1997:

1. Granted the petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands
and Bureau of Forest Development in default for their failure to file an
answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the
substituted service of summons on them was improper;
2. Denied Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action because
there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined
only after trial, and
3. Denied the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo based
on prescription, and because there were factual matters that could be
determined only after trial.

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare
allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

RTC’s order dated February 12, 1998: Dismissed petitioners complaint on

the ground that the action had already prescribed.

March 3, 1998 – Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of

dismissal
March 18, 1998 – Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (15 days
after receipt of the order)
July 1, 1998 – the RTC issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
July 27, 1998 – petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal
fees on August 3, 1998.
August 4, 1998 – the RTC denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was
filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in
an order dated September 3, 1998.

Petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure was filed before the Court of Appeals assailing the dismissal of the
notice of appeal.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner seasonably filed their notice of appeal.

Petitioner’s argument: The 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to

run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order
of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they
were well within the reglementary period for appeal.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition ruling that the 15-day
period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day
they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.

RULING: The petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of
notice denying their motion for reconsideration). There is a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15
days from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt
of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
 reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22,
1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of
15 days, as already discussed.

NOTE:

The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments

and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is
likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.

THE FRESH PERIOD RULE WAS ENUNCIATED IN THE NEYPES CASE. WHAT DOES THIS
CASE SAYS:
 
The “fresh period rule” in Neypes declares:
 
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
 
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the [CA]; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the [CA]; and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

Notes:

Remedial Law – Appeals —- The right to appeal is neither a natural right

nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. Thus, one who seeks to avail the right to appeal must comply with
the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of
the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and
procedural rules.

An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment

or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment
that dismisses an action.

Alvero v. de la Rosa, G.R. No. L-286, March 29, 1946

In this case, was January 8, 1946, or which date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero should
have filed his (1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond.
But the P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946. (Alvero v. dela
Rosa)

Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court,
will cause the judgment to become final, and the certification of the record on
appeal thereafter, cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost. The
period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be
perfected and filed may, however, be extended by order of the court, upon
application made, prior to the expiration of the original period.

No showing having been made that there had been merely excusable
negligence, on the part of the attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero,
and that there had been gave abuse of sound judicial discretion, on the part of
the respondent judge, the petition for certiorari filed in this case, is, therefore,
dismissed.

Doctrine:
 Rules of court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of
law; and rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable
to the prevention, of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge
of judicial business.
 Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and
imperative, so that failure to pay the docket fee in the Supreme Court, within
the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of the appeal. In the
same manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil case to serve his brief,
within the time prescribed by said rules, on motion of the appellee and notice
to the appellant, or on its own motion the court may dismiss the appeal.

Facts:

 On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint, in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, against petitioner Fredesvindo S.
Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action: (1) to
declare in force the contract of sale, between said Jose R. Victoriano and
Margarita Villarica, of two parcels of land in the Manotoc subdivision,
Balintawak, in the barrio of Calaanan, municipality of Caloocan, Province of
Rizal, which land was subsequently sold by said Villarica, in favor of
petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December 31, 1944, for the sum of
P100,000 in Japanese military notes; and (2) to declare said subsequent sale
null and void.
 On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint,
expressly admitting having sold said land to Fresdesvindo S. Alvero, for
P100,000, in December, 1944, due to the necessity of raising funds with
which to provide for herself and family, and that she did not remember the
previous sale; at the same time, offering to repurchase said land from
Fredesvindo S. Alvero in the sum of P5,000, but that the latter refused to
accept the offer.

 Jose R. Victoriano filed an answer to said counterclaim, denying

Fredesvindo S. Alvero's alleged ownership over said land, and the other
allegations contained in Alvero's answer. On July 13, 1945, Fredesvindo S.
Alvero, in answering said complaint, denied the allegations and claimed
exclusive ownership of the land in question.

 Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila, one of the respondents in this case, rendered his decision, in which it
was declared that the two parcels of land in question had been sold by
Margarita Villarica to Jose R. Victoriano and that Victoriano continued making
monthly payments until December, 1941, but that owing to the war-time
conditions then existing, Margarita Villarica agreed verbally to suspend such
payments until the restoration of peace and that Margarita Villarica, having
forgotten the sale of said land to Jose R. Victoriano, sold the same for
P100,000 in Japanese military notes, on December 31, 1944, to Fredesvindo
S. Alvero, but afterwards offered to repurchase said property from him, for
the sum of P8,000 in genuine Philippine currency, after liberation.

 Jose R. Victoriano had presented the deed of sale which was older than that
of Fredesvindo S. Alvero, the respondent judge rendered his decision in favor
of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title over the property in question,
including all the improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the
counterclaim.

 On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified of said decision;

and on December 27, 1945, he filed a petition for reconsideration and new
trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946.

 On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and

record on appeal simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-
appeal bond. Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal,
Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss, alleging
that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60 had
been actually filed, and allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond,
in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife.
 The respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal of
the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal
had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.

Issue: Whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent judge and of the CA in not relaxing the rules.
HELD:

No, the petition is untenable. 1) Said petition is defective in form as well as in

substance; (2) There has been no excusable negligence, on the part of the
petitioner, or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge, in
the instant case.

Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of
law; and rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable
to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge
of judicial business. Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held
mandatory and imperative, so that failure to failure to perfect and file his
appeal, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of
the appeal.

As already stated, the decision rendered by the respondent judge, Hon.

Mariano L. de la Rosa, was dated November 16, 1945, of which counsel for
Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified on November 28, 1945; that his motion
for reconsideration and new trial was filed on December 27, 1945, and
denied on January 3, 1946, and that said counsel for Alvero was notified of
said order on January 7, 1946; and that he filed his notice of appeal and
record on appeal the following day, to wit, January 8, 1946, and that the P60-
appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946. Counsel for the petitioner
Fredesvindo Alvero alleges as an excuse, for his failure to perfect and file his
appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife, which ended in her death on
January 10, 1946, and by which he was greatly affected. The attorney for
petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked for an extension of time,
within which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court below; but he had
failed to do so, and he must bear the consequences of his act. A strict
observance of the rules of court, which have been considered indispensable
to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy dispatch
of judicial business, is an imperative necessity.

It may not be amiss to state in this connection that no irreparable damage has
been caused to the petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, as Margarita Villarica,
the vendor to the two, of the land in question, has shown readiness to repair
the damage done.

According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the last day for
filing and perfecting the appeal, in this case, was January 8, 1946, or which
date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero should have filed his (1) notice of appeal, (2)
record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But the P60-appeal bond was filed
only on January 15, 1946.

Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court,
will cause the judgment to become final, and the certification of the record on
appeal thereafter, cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost. The
 period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be
perfected and filed may, however, be extended by order of the court, upon
application made, prior to the expiration of the original period.

No showing having been made that there had been merely excusable
negligence, on the part of the attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero,
and that there had been gave abuse of sound judicial discretion, on the part of
the respondent judge, the petition for certiorari filed in this case, is, therefore,
dismissed.

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the

adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from
notice of order or judgment,:
1. a notice of appeal,
2. an appeal bond, and
3. a record on appeal

Basic Concepts

i. Meaning of procedural law

Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012

Distinction between a FINAL ORDER and an INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.

Final Order disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a

particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but Interlocutory Order does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet
to be held and the judgment rendered.

NOTE:

A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule

enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. But the remedy from an
interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.

Facts:

Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of

₱160,000.00 to respondent by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land. They
agreed that Javellana would pay ₱80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the
balance of ₱80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens
System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period
of time); After Margarita died the vendor’s undertaking fell on the shoulders of
Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with
the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System,
and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein
with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial
subdivision. Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced an action
for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the RTC.

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already
barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss. However, upon her
motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to
dismiss.

Javellana moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb the order. Accordingly, Javellana
filed a notice of appeal and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA promulgated its decision in reversing and setting aside the dismissal
of Civil Case  and remanding the records to the RTC “for further proceedings in
accordance with law.” CA explained that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
action; The CA denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that it decided to give
due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention
to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an extension of time to file
his appellant’s brief; that current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest
opportunity to present their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such
that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was given the
discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.

Issue:

Whether the Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of

dismissal was a final order and appealable?

Held:

Yes, The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well
known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose
of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order
deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in
the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment
is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. A final order is appealable, to accord with the
final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect
that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable;” but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special
civil action for certiorari.
 ii. Nature and purpose of procedural law

The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or

final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.

Samahan v. Hon. Magsalin, G.R. No. 172303, June 6, 2011

FACTS:
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the dismissal was valid. However, 
due to humanitarian considerations, it ordered financial assistance. Pe
titioner assailed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator before the CA 
in a petition for certiorari which was dismissed outright for being the 
wrong remedy. The CA explained that Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 R
ules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that the proper mode of app
eal from judgments, final orders or resolution of voluntary arbitrators 
is through a Petition for Review which should be filed within fifteen (1
5) days from the receipt of notice of judgment, order or resolution of t
he voluntary arbitrator. Considering that petitioner intended the petiti
on to be a Petition for Certiorari, the Court hereby resolves to dismiss t
he petition outright for being an improper mode of appeal.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy for assailing the decision of Volunt
ary Arbitrator is a petition for certiorari.
 
RULING:
No. Decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA 
via petition for review under Rule 43. Hence, upon receipt of the Volun
tary Arbitrator’s Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsider
ation, petitioner should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-
day reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for certio
rari.
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no 
cogent reason in this case to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules 
of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in t
he guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Proce
dural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may no
t be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures t
he effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and 
speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper liti
gants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system 
of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and 
in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well se
rved by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural ru
les.
Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)

The “fresh period rule” is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh

period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event
that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court.
Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the “fresh
period rule” should be applied to pending actions, such as the present
case.
FACTS:
Marquez Alma Jose sold for consideration of ₱160,000.00 to
respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of
land. They agreed that Javellana would pay ₱80,000.00 upon the
execution of the deed and the balance of ₱80,000.00 upon the
registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System; and that
should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney- in-fact,
Juvenal M. Alma Jose, and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma
Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the
application for registration.

After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita

without issue, the vendor’s undertaking fell on the shoulders of
Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did
not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the
properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve
the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention
of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial
subdivision. Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana
commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and
damages against her in the RTC Malolos, Bulacan.

Javellana averred that upon the execution of the deed of conditional

sale, he had paid the initial amount of ₱80,000.00 and had taken
possession of the parcels of land; that he had paid the balance of the
purchase price to Juvenal on different dates upon Juvenal’s
representation that Margarita had needed funds for the expenses of
registration and payment of real estate tax; and that in 1996, Priscilla
had called to inquire about the mortgage constituted on the parcels of
land; and that he had told her then that the parcels of land had not
been mortgaged but had been sold to him.

Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or

writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling
materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to
institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of
sale in his favor.
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was
already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a
cause of action.

The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss on February 4,

1998. However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC
reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss,

Javellana moved for reconsideration. On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied
the motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of
appeal from the June 21, 2000 order. He also filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA to assail the orders dismissing his. On August 6,
2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding
that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
orders, and holding that it only committed, at most, an error of
judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged orders.

On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision reversing and

setting aside the dismissal of the case and remanding the records to
the RTC “for further proceedings in accordance with law.”

On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, stating

that it decided to give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time
because Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact
he did not even seek an extension of time to file his appellant’s brief;
that current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity
to present their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such
that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was
given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable
reasons.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the appeal was made on time

RULING:
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA.

Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She
points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9,
1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or
after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for
reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he
received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from July 13,
2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and
that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal
should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the
expiration of the reglementary period.

Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. —
The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July
13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due
to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration interrupting the
running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of
appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as
Priscilla insists.

The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld,

however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh
period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an aggrieved party
desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It

has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules
for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for
parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or
more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford

litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
 The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has
already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to “actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.”

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and
forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer
justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch
as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
The “fresh period rule” is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh
period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event
that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court.
Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the “fresh
period rule” should be applied to pending actions, such as the present
case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the “fresh period rule”
will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of
judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year
2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes
which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that
parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the
year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the “fresh period rule” while those
later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.

Consequently, the SC ruled that Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely

filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

iii. Retroactive application of procedural rules

To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public
office, there must be:
(a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term;
(b) an act of relinquishment; and
(c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
NOTE: The final or conclusive act of a resignation's acceptance is
the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in a
position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he
had been duly notified therefor

Light Railway Transit Authority v. Salvaña, G.R. No. 192074, June 10,
2014

G.R. No. 192074               June 10, 2014

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A.
ROBLES, Petitioner, vs. AURORA A. SALVAÑA, Respondent.
Summary : An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil Service Commission's
repeal or modification of its original decision. In such instances, it is included in the concept
of a "party adversely affected" by a decision of the Civil Service Commission granted the
statutory right to appeal.

FACTS : Then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles, issued
Office Order No. 119, series of 2006. The order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvañ a’s
designation as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. It directed
her instead to handle special projects and perform such other duties and functions as may
be assigned to her by the Administrator.

Atty. Salvañ a was directed to comply with this office order through a memorandum issued
on May 22, 2006 by Atty. Elmo Stephen P. Triste, the newly designated OIC of the
administrative department. Instead of complying, Salvañ a questioned the order with the
Office of the President. In the interim, Salvañ a applied for sick leave of absence from May 15
to May 31, 2006. In support of her application, she submitted a medical certificate issued by
Dr. Grace Marie Blanco who denied having issued said certificate and having seen or treated
Salvañ a on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical certificate. On June 23, 2006,
Administrator Robles issued a notice of preliminary investigation directing Salvañ a to
explain in writing within 72 hours from receipt "why no disciplinary action should be taken
against her" for not complying with Office Order No. 119 and for submitting a falsified
medical certificate.
Salvañ a filed her explanation on June 30, 2006. She alleged that as a member of the Bids and
Awards Committee, she "refused to sign a resolution" favoring a particular bidder. She
alleged that Office Order No. 119 was issued by Administrator Robles to express his "ire and
vindictiveness" over her refusal to sign.

The LRTA’s Fact-finding Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory. On July 26, 2006,
it issued a formal charge against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document,
Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service. On October 31, 2006, such Committee issued a resolution "finding Salvañ a
guilty of all the charges against her and imposed on her the penalty of dismissal from . . .
service with all the accessory penalties." The LRTA Board of Directors approved the
findings.

On July 18, 2007, the Civil Service Commission found that Salvañ a was guilty only of simple
dishonesty. LRTA moved for reconsideration and subsequently denied. It filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals but the same dismissed the petition. The appellate court
also ruled that Administrator Robles had no standing to file a motion for reconsideration
before the Civil Service Commission because that right only belonged to respondent in an
administrative case.

ISSUE : Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal
the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision.
HELD : During the pendency of this decision, or on November 18, 2011, the Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service or RACCS was promulgated. The Civil Service
Commission modified the definition of a "party adversely affected" for purposes of appeal.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. – . . . . k. PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the
respondent against whom a decision in an administrative case has been rendered or to the
disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original
decision.

Procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express
provision to that effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the
time of their enactment. In fact, statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
applied on actions undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
Remedial rights are those rights granted by remedial or procedural laws. These are rights
that only operate to further the rules of procedure or to confirm vested rights. As such, the
retroactive application of remedial rights will not adversely affect the vested rights of any
person. Considering that the right to appeal is a right remedial in nature, we find that
Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RACCS applies in this case. Petitioner, therefore, had
the right to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission that modified its original
decision of dismissal.

Recent decisions implied the retroactive application of this rule. While the right of
government parties to appeal was not an issue, this court gave due course to the appeals
filed by government agencies before the promulgation of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

In Civil Service Commission v. Clave, the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS)
found one of its employees, Aurora M. Clave, guilty of simple neglect of duty. The Civil
Service Commission affirmed the GSIS’s findings. The Court of Appeals, however, while
affirming the Civil Service Commission, reduced the penalty. Both the GSIS and the Civil
Service Commission were given standing to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In GSIS v. Chua, the GSIS dismissed Heidi R. Chua for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the
GSIS, but the Court of Appeals, while affirming the findings of the Commission, modified the
penalty to simple misconduct. The GSIS was then allowed to bring an appeal of the
modification of the penalty with this court.

Thus, we now hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an administrative
case who may appeal shall include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the
employee was either overturned or modified by the Civil Service Commission.

Panay Railways, Inc. v. Heva Management, G.R. No. 154061, January 25,
2012

Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a
litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a
person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable.
The reason is that, as a general rule, “no vested right may attach to or
arise from procedural laws and rules.” It has been held that a person
has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure. More so
when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the
docket fees on time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak
of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal.

Procedural laws applicable to actions pending at the time of

promulgation

Facts: Traders Royal Bank extrajudicially foreclosed several parcels of

land owned by Panay Railways which were the subject of a The
petitioner Panay Railways (Panay) entered into a Real Estate Mortgage
Contract with the Traders Royal Bank (TRB) to secure 20M Php worth
of loan and credit accommodations. Panay failed to pay its obligations,
and the covered parcels of lands were extrajudicially foreclosed by
TRB, among of which was Lot No. 6153 except the excluded in the REM
contract since they were already sold to Shell. January 1986, the bank
acquired a certificate of sale being the highest bidder for the
properties foreclosed, thus caused the registration of the Deed of Sale
after the Panay failed to exercise its right of redemption. The
corresponding TCTs were issued in the name of the bank. February
1990, TRB filed a petition for writ of possession against Panay, during
the proceedings the latter thru its authorized manager, and OIC
assisted by counsel filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw
motion for suspension of the petition for the issuance of a wire of
possession. The manifestation expressed that Panay surrenders
physical possession, and have not nor will oppose the grant. In 19994,
Panay realized that the extrajudicial foreclosure included the excluded
properties in the mortgage contract, thus they filed for a complaint for
partial annulment of contract to sell and deed of absolute sale with
addendum cancellation of title concerned herein and declaration of
ownership of real property with reconveyance plus damages. The
complaint was amended twice till 1995. The respondents filed their
respective motions to dismiss arguing that Panay had no legal capacity
to sue, that there was a waiver, abandonment and an extinguishment
of Panay’s claim or demand; that Panay failed to state a cause of action
and also failed to implead TRB which was an indispensable party. The
RTC granted respondents motion to dismiss, explaining that the
manifestation operated as a waiver. Panay filed a notice of appeal
without paying the docket fees, and the respondents filed a motion to
dismiss for its nonpayment. The RTC dismissed the appeal citing
section 4 of rule 41 of the ROC. The MR was denied, Panay then filed a
petition for certiorari and Mandamus under rule 65 alleging that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to dismiss the notice of appeal and acted with
 grave abuse of discretion in strictly applying the procedural rules.
November 2000, The CA ruled that the RTC exercised grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the appeal when the jurisdiction to do so
belonged to the CA. The assailed order was set aside, and the
respondents filed an MR. The CA upheld the questioned orders of the
RTC and granted the respondents MR following the circular issued by
the SC amending rule 41 among others. The circular stated that the
Page 5 of 30 trial courts may moot proprietary or upon motion,
dismiss an appeal for being filed out of time or for non payment of
docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. Panay’s
MR was denied, hence this petition arguing that the CA had the
exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the notice of appeal at the time of
filing, that substantial justice demands that the procedural rules be
relaxed notwithstanding the dismissibility of the appeal for non
payment of the docket fees.

Issue: Whether AM No. 00-2-10-SC may apply retroactively to an

appeal pending at the time of its passage. YES

Ruling: Petition denied for lack of merit. The CA did no reversible error
when it sustained the dismissal of the RTC pursuant to AM no.00-2-10-
SC which amended sec. 13 of Rule 41, taking note that the decision
upon the cited circular’s passage had not been promulgated yet. The
Court explained that statutes and rules regarding the procedure of
courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at
the time of their passage, and thus retroactive only to that extent.

This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person

adversely affected, because as a general rule no vested right may
attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. Procedural rules are
required to be followed, except only for the most persuasive reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of their thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Moreover:

1. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees, a rule established early as 1932
in Lazaro v. Endencia;

2. The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
process, it is merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only
in accordance with the law;

3. The Court could not consider the counsel’s failure to familiarize

himself with the RROC since the negligence of the counsel binds the
client.

iv. Exceptions to the retroactive application of procedural rules

 The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule
on finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39
EXCEPTION TO RETROACTIVE
(a) where the statute itself or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation;
(b) if applying the rule to pending proceedings would
impair vested rights;
(c) when to do so would not be feasible or would work
injustice; or
(d) if doing so would involve intricate problems of due
process or impair the independence of the courts (Tan v. Court
of Appeals, 373 SCRA 524, 537).

Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002

Topic: Retroactive application

Jaime Tan Jr. vs Court of Appeals, et al.

GR No. 136368; 16 January 2002
Puno, J.

Facts:
 The case involves a 34,829 sqm of land in Bunawan, Davao City registered in the name of Jaime
Tan.
 Tan executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of spouses Magdangal for P59,200. With an
agreement giving Tan 1 year to redeem or repurchase the property.
 Tan’s heirs filed a suit against Magdangals for reformation of instrument because the real
intention of parties was to conclude an equitable mortgage not deed of sale.
 RTC Davao rendered in favor of plaintiff Tan, Jr.
 Sps. Magdangal appealed to CA, which affirmed RTC decision.
 Sps. Magdangal filed a motion for consolidation and writ of possession claiming that 120 days
redemption period commenced on 20 Oct and has already expired.
 Tan, Jr. filed a writ of execution and thereafter filed a manifestation and motion of its intention to
redeem the property along with a deposit of repurchase price.
 RTC denied Sps. Magdangal’s motion for consolidation and writ of possession, and considered
P116k deposit by plaintiff as full payment of redemption price.
- Cueto v Collantes. 120 days period to pay amount plus interest should be reckoned from date
of Entry of Judgment, which was 13 March 1996. Plaintiff made a deposit on 17 April 1996,
within the 120-day period.

Issue:
WON the revised rules on finality of judgment shall be retroactively applied

Held:
No

Ratio:
 Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect
in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
o Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a
substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the
decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he
redeemed the subject lot.
 o It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule
of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he
faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the
redemption.
 Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the
date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the right
cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of
redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.

v. Fresh-Period Rule
FRESH PERIOD RULE (Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524,
September 14, 2005)

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of

judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the
15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did
not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted
the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period
to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford

litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005

Yu v. Hon. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011

FACTS:

An Information for Estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. The RTC convicted
the petitioner as charged.

Fourteen (14) days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging
that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for
which she was convicted.

Respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial for lack of merit.
The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a “fresh period” of 15 days from the receipt of the denial
of her motion for new trial within which to file a notice of appeal.

The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing
that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.

ISSUE:

Whether the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases.

RULING:

The “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal
cases.

The raison d’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the appeal period provided in
the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves
with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a
“fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases
under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

San Lorenzo Builders v. Bayang, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015

G.R. No. 194702               April 20, 2015

SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. and OSCAR
VIOLAGO, Petitioners, 
vs.
MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG, Respondent.

TOPIC: Delegation of Powers

DOCTRINE/PROVISIONS:
  The "fresh period rule"—which allows a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration—applies only to
judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.

FACTS:

 April 15, 2000: Petitioner SLR Builders as seller, and respondent Cristina, as buyer,
entered into a "contract to sell" of a sixty (60)-square meter lot in Violago Homes
Parkwoods Subdivision, located in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City.
 Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina
demanded from SLR Builders the execution of the deed of absolute sale and the lot’s
certificate of title but the latter failed to deliver. Cristina filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against the petitioners before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

 February 16, 2004: The Housing and Land Use Arbiter ruled in Cristina’s favor.

 The petitioners appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The Board

dismissed and denied the petitioners’ appeal and their subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

 April 27, 2006: The petitioners filed an appeal to the Office of the President (OP).

 November 17, 2006: The OP dismissed the petitioners’ appeal for having been filed
out of time. The HLURB Decision affirming the Arbiter’s decision was received by
them on July 27, 2005. On that date, the 15-day prescriptive period within which to
file an appeal began to run. Instead of preparing an appeal, SLR Builders opted to
file a Motion for Reconsideration on August 10, 2005. Their filing of the said
motion interrupted the period of appeal by that time, however, 14 days had already
elapsed. April 18, 2006 was their last day left to appeal. When they filed on April
27, 2006, they were already 9 days late.

 The petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that the "fresh period rule" in
Domingo Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. should be applied to their case.

 July 26, 2007: The OP denied the petitioners’ motion with finality, stating that the
"fresh period rule" applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals.

 The CA denied the petitioners’ petition for review and denied the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration; hence, the filing of the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to administrative appeals, such as
an appeal filed from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the
President.
HELD: The "fresh period rule" applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals. The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford

litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40…, Rule 42…,
Rule 43…, Rule 45…The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.

Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In this case, the appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP is
administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.

As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions
of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB
Resolution No. 765-20041 in relation to Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No.
18-1987.2

RULING: DENY the present petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision dated
July 23, 2010 and resolution dated December 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100332.

Fortune Life v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015

FACTS:
Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the
petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life
insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and
tanod, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement
voucher to COA- Antique for pre-audit. COA disallowed the payment
for lack of legal basis under the Local Government Code. Consequently,
petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA which denied

1
Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765-2004, Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice to the
Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the
President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18
Series of 1987. The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period of
appeal to the Office of the President.

2
Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18-1987 provides that in case the aggrieved party
files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of any agency/office, the said party has the only
remaining balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the
decision denying his/her motion for reconsideration.
its petition.

Petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012,

and filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However,
the COA denied the motion, the denial being received by the petitioner
on July 14, 2014.Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari on August 12,
2014, but petition was dismissed for (a) late filing of the petition; (b)
the nonsubmission of proof of service and verified declaration; and (c)
the failure to show graver abuse of discretion on the part of COA.

Petitioner contended that it has substantially complied with the rule

despite the fact that its petition only bore the cut print-outs of what
appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters,
not the registry receipts themselves. It also averred that the petition
was filed on time since the fresh period rule also applies to petitions
brought under Rule 64.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner complied with the rule on proof of
service.

2. Whether or not Fresh Period Rule under Neypes applied to petition

for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

1. Petitioner did not comply with the rule on proof of service.

The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit
and the registry receipt. The Rule requires that if the service is done by
registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the
person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which
must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the
rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or
both are not submitted. The rules requires to be appended the registry
receipt, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not
substantially comply with the rule.

2. Fresh Period Rule under Neypes did not apply to the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are

different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to
file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or
final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the
Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the
motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within
the remaining period, which shall not be less than 5 days in any
event, reckoned from the notice of denial.

Considering that it received the notice of denial on July 14m 2014,

it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed
the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.

Jocson v. San Miguel, G.R. No. 206941, March 9, 2016

FACTS: On September 10, 2008, Milagrosa C. Jocson (Jocson) filed with

the DARAB-PARAD, Region III of San Fernando City, Pampanga, a
Complaint for ejectment with damages against respondent Nelson San
Miguel and all persons claiming rights under him. T She asserted that
56,000 sq m thereof became the subject of an Agricultural Leasehold
Contrac t (Contract) between her and San Miguel, with the latter as
tenant-lessee. As part of the contract, they agreed that the subject
landholding shall be devoted to sugar and rice production. According
to Jocson, San Miguel, however, occupied the entire landholding and
refused to vacate the portion not covered by their Contract despite
repeated demands. On December 15, 2009, Jocson filed a
Supplemental Complaint alleging that, during the pendency of the
present suit, San Miguel commenced to plant corn on the subject
landholding which violated their Contract. In his Answer, San Miguel
maintained that he had religiously complied with all the terms and
conditions of their Contract and that Jocson has no valid ground to
eject him from the disputed landholding. On January 26, 2011, PARAD
Provincial Adjudicator Vicente Aselo S. Sicat (PA Sicat) rendered a
Decision: 1. TERMINATING the existing leasehold contract of the
parties as well as their tenancy relationship; 2. ORDERING [San
Miguel] and all persons claiming rights under him to peacefully vacate
and surrender the land to Jocson; 3. DISMISSING all other claims for
want of evidence. San Miguel filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it
was denied and thus San Miguel filed his notice of appeal to the CA.
The CA granted the petition applying the Neypes rule and remanding
the case to the DARAB-PARAD for further proceedings. Jocson filed her
MR but it was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the application of the

FRESH PERIOD RULE provided under the 2009 DARAB rules of
procedure which took effect during the pendency of this suit before
the PARAD.
 RULING: Section 1, Rule XXIV of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure
explicitly states that: Sec. 1. Transitory Provisions. These Rules shall
govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity. All cases pending with
the Board and the Adjudicators, prior to the date of effectivity of these
Rules, shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of
their filing. In the present case, the Complaint was filed on September
10, 2008 prior to the date of effectivity of the 2009 DARAB Rules of
Procedure on September 1, 2009. Thus, pursuant to the above-cited
rule, the applicable rule in the counting of the period for filing a Notice
of Appeal with the Board is governed by Section 12, Rule X of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure, which states that: The filing of the Motion
for Reconsideration shall interrupt the period to perfect an appeal. If
the motion is denied, the aggrieved party shall have the remaining
period within which to perfect his appeal. Said period shall not be less
than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from the receipt of the notice
of denial.

This Court likewise finds no merit to San Miguel's contention that the
"fresh period rule" laid down in Neypes is applicable in the instant
case. The "fresh period rule" shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals
from the Regional Trial Courts to the [CA] or Supreme Court); Rule 42
(appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the [CA]); Rule 43 (appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the [CA]); and Rule 45 (appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial
proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner's
present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the
decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary.
Such appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order
No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides
that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall
perfect his appeal "during the remainder of the period of appeal,
reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial;" whereas if the
decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to
perfect his appeal. As correctly observed by PA Sicat, San Miguel
should perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period of appeal,
but not less than five (5) days, reckoned from receipt of the resolution
of denial of his MR or until June 7, 2011.

NO. THE PRESENT CASE IS ADMINISTRATIVE. THE NEYPES RULING APPLIES ONLY TO
JUDICIAL APPEALS AND NOT TO ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS.

“Petitioner’s present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision
or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed
by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1
clearly provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his
appeal “during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the
resolution of denial;” whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-
day period to perfect his appeal.34 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)”

“The same principle was applied in the recent case of San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and
Developers Group, Inc. and Oscar Violago v. Ma. Cristina F. Bayang,35 wherein this Court
reiterated that the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals.”

B. Philippine Courts

1. Judicial Power

Article VIII, Sec. 1, Secs. 1, 5 par. 5, 1987 Constitution

2. Nature

Phil. Carpet Manufacturing v. Tagyamon, G.R. No. 191475, December

11, 2013
See: U.S. v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321 (1915)

3. Classification

a) Constitutional and Statutory

b) Civil and Criminal
c) Inferior and Superior

4. Hierarchy of Courts

Rayos v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 196063, December 14, 2011

United Claimants Assoc. v. NEA, G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012

A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy indicates that petitions for

the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
Such reasons exist in the instant case, involving as it does the employment of
the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were
effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke.

FACTS: The case is an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or

prevent the implementation of Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10,
 2003 and September 3, 2003, respectively, otherwise known as the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by
respondent NEA Board of Administrators (NEA Board). Petitioners are
former employees of NEA who were terminated from their employment
with the implementation of the assailed resolutions. Respondent essentially
argues that petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts,
pursuant to which the instant petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court first rather than with the Supreme Court directly.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case.
(YES)

RULING: A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly

indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.

Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC.
However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of
courts may be set aside for special and important reasons. Such reason
exists in the instant case involving as it does the employment of the entire
plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were effectively
dismissed from employment in one swift stroke.

Ernesto Dy v. Hon. Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013

Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

                On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of
the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH
Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark,
or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the
RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

                Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for
 the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

                The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..

                The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.

                Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

                A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence
of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the
scrutiny and review of this court.

                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall
squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

C. Jurisdiction of Different Courts

A. Key Principles

i. Jurisdiction- Definition

Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011
ii. Jurisdiction v. Venue

Davao Light v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001

For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms
the proposition that writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte
provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites
therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its
discretion, require prior hearing on the application with notice to the
defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued
may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the
complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the
application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted
separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the
plaintiff's attachment bond.

Facts:

Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. (hereafter, simply Davao Light) filed
a verified complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages
against Queensland Hotel, etc. and Teodorico Adarna (docketed as
Civil Case No. 19513-89).

The complaint contained an ex parte application for a writ of

preliminary attachment. Judge Nartatez, issued an Order granting the
ex parte application and fixing the attachment bond at
P4,600,513.37. The attachment bond having been submitted by
Davao Light, the writ of attachment issued.

The summons and a copy of the complaint, as well as the writ of

attachment and a copy of the attachment bond, were served on
defendants Queensland and Adarna; and pursuant to the writ, the
sheriff seized properties belonging to the latter.

Defendants Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the

attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because at the
time the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the
attachment writ issued (May 11, 1989), the Trial Court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of the
defendants.

Issue:

Whether a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a

defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's person by
service of summons or his voluntary submission to the Court's
authority. (YES)

Ruling:

The events that follow the filing of the complaint as a matter of

routine are well known. After the complaint is filed, summons issues
to the defendant, the summons is then transmitted to the sheriff, and
finally, service of the summons is effected on the defendant in any of
the ways authorized by the Rules of Court. There is thus ordinarily
some appreciable interval of time between the day of the filing of the
complaint and the day of service of summons of the defendant.
During this period, different acts may be done by the plaintiff or by
the Court, which are unquestionable validity and propriety. Among
these, for example, are the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the
grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper
litigant, the amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter
of right without leave of court, authorization by the Court of service
of summons by publication, the dismissal of the action by the
plaintiff on mere notice.

This, too, is true with regard to the provisional remedies of

preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership or
replevin. They may be validly and properly applied for and granted
even before the defendant is summoned or is heard from.

Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the

commencement of the action or at any time thereafter." The phase,
"at the commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of
the filing of the complaint — which, as above pointed out, is the date
that marks "the commencement of the action;" and the reference
plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or
even before summons issues.

What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly
commenced — by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all
requisite docket and other fees — the plaintiff may apply for and
obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the
pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at any
time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant.
And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the
courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the
application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate
pleading (counter-claim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the
Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement of the
action if it finds the application otherwise sufficient in form and
substance.
 Court declared that "(n)othing in the Rules of Court makes notice
and hearing indispensable and mandatory requisites for the issuance
of a writ of attachment." Court had occasion to emphasize the
postulate that no hearing is required on an application for
preliminary attachment, with notice to the defendant, for the reason
that this "would defeat the objective of the remedy . . . (since the)
time which such a hearing would take, could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of
attachment issues."

For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms
the proposition that writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte
provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites
therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its
discretion, require prior hearing on the application with notice to the
defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued
may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the
complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the
application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted
separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the
plaintiff's attachment bond.

Nocum v. Lucio Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005

iii. Determined by the allegations in the complaint

Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013

iv. Residual power/jurisdiction

Gonzales v. Quirico Pe, G.R. No. 167398, August 9, 2011

v. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

Bagunu v. Spouses Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011

Omictin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007

Euro-Med Laboratories v. Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July

17, 2006

Summary:
Petitioner sold medical supplies to respondent province’s public
hospitals. Petitioner filed a civil suit for collection of unpaid balance
against respondent at the RTC. At trial, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that it is the commission on audit (COA) w/c
has primary jurisdiction over money claims involving gov’t. This was
 granted by the RTC. Petitioner assails this dismissal w/ the SC. The SC
held that even though the collection case was w/n the jurisdiction of
RTC, it is the COA w/c has primary jurisdiction.
Doctrine:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and
knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in
an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if
the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.
Facts:
 Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing, on pure questions of
law, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City in Civil Case No. 5300.
 Civil Case No. 5300 was a complaint for sum of money filed by petitioner Euro-Med
Laboratories, Phil., Inc. against respondent Province of Batangas.
 Respondent thru its various authorized representatives of the government hospitals
purchased various Intravenous Fluids (IVF) products from the petitioner.
 Respondent admitted most of the allegations in the complaint, denying only those
relating to the unpaid balance supposedly still due petitioner. Pre-trial and trial
followed.
 At the conclusion of petitioner’s presentation of evidence, respondent filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over
petitioner’s money claim was lodged with the Commission on Audit (COA).
 Respondent pointed out that petitioner’s claim, arising as it did from a series of
procurement transactions with the province, was governed by the Local
Government Code provisions and COA rules and regulations on supply and property
management in local governments.
 Respondent argued that the case called for a determination of whether these
provisions and rules were complied with, and that was within the exclusive domain
of COA to make.
 Finding the motion to be well-taken, the RTC issued an order dismissing petitioner’s
complaint without prejudice to the filing of the proper money claim with the COA.
Issues Ratio:
1. WON it is the COA and not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass
upon petitioner’s money claim against the Province of Batangas. – YES.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such
that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training
and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the
courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper
jurisdiction.
 
It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In
such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may
suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
 
 This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly
held sway for although petitioner’s collection suit was within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s
claim brought it clearly within the ambit of the COA’s jurisdiction.
 
First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a certain
amount of money against a local government unit. This brought the
case within the COA’s domain to pass upon money claims against the
government or any subdivision thereof under Section 26 of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
 
Second, petitioner’s money claim was founded on a series of purchases
for the medical supplies of respondent’s public hospitals. Both parties
agreed that these transactions were governed by the Local
Government Code provisions on supply and property management and
their implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the COA
pursuant to Section 383 of said Code. Petitioner’s claim therefore
involved compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on
procurement. Such matters are not within the usual area of knowledge,
experience and expertise of most judges but within the special
competence of COA auditors and accountants. Thus, it was but proper,
out of fidelity to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, for the RTC to
dismiss petitioner’s complaint.

Agra, et al v. COA, G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011

Spouses Fajardo v. Flores, G.R. No. 167891, January 15, 2010

Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction, G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262,
November 27, 2013

AKLAN PROVINCE v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION

Doctrines:
The COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities.

Facts:
The Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp.
(respondent) entered into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty
Port and Terminal (Phase I) and Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) in Malay, Aklan. In
the course of construction, petitioner issued variation/change orders for additional works.
Jody King demanded for the payment of Aklan’s balance, but to no avail. Jody King filed a
case in the RTC of Marikina City to collect the said balance. The Province of Aklan denied
any unpaid balance and interest. The RTC favored Jody King, and issued a writ of execution
against petitioner. Sheriff Gamboa served notices of garnishment on Land Bank of the
Philippines, Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines at their
branches in Kalibo, Aklan for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds deposited
under the account of petitioner. Said banks, however, refused to give due course to the court
order, citing the relevant provisions of statutes, circulars and jurisprudence on the
determination of government monetary liabilities, their enforcement and satisfaction.

Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution. It was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 111754, which was dismissed as it found no grave abuse of discretion in the
lower court's issuance of the writ of execution.

The trial court denied petitioner's notice of appeal and motion for reconsideration. Thus,
petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the aforesaid orders
denying due course to its notice of appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114073, which was
also dismissed because petitioner failed to provide valid justification for its failure to file a
timely motion for reconsideration

Issues:
The applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this case.

Held/Ratio:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is
supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In
such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial
process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the
parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the
proceeding before the court.

As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed
by petitioner, a local government unit.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No.
1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities.

Remedial law; Doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of

primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts
even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
 issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the
court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the
judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged,
dismiss the case without prejudice. The objective of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect
of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.

Exceptions to the rule on primary jurisdiction. There are

established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so
as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its
application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j)
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when
strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings. However, none of the foregoing circumstances is
applicable in the present case. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of the
court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered
thereby are null and void.

Administrative law; The Commission on Audit (COA) has primary

jursidiction over money claims against the government. It is the COA
and not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon
petitioner’s money claim against respondent local government unit.
Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties’ failure to argue the
issue nor active participation in the proceedings. Respondent’s
collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such
money claim should have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the
RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the
claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from
raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of
appeal and before the CA.

vi. Adherence of jurisdiction

Aruego v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112193, March 13, 1996

 Barrameda v. Rural Bank of Canaman, G.R. No. 176260, November 24,
2010

vii. Doctrine of non-interference or judicial stability

Tan v. Cinco et al, G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016

Del Rosario v. Ocampo-Ferrer, G.R. No. 215348, June 20, 2016
Cabili v. Hon. Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-10-22252, September 6, 2011
Villamor v. Salas, G.R. No. 101041, November 13, 1991

viii.Lack of jurisdiction- raised at earliest possible opportunity

Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 156078, March 14, 2008

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question by laches,

which is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier. Here, the Surety could have raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court, but it only did so
after receiving the appellate court's adverse decision. Hence, it is
barred by laches.

Facts;

After trial upon the issues thus joined, the CFI rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and
executory, upon motion of the latter, the CFI issued a writ of
execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Surety's bond against which the Surety filed a
written opposition. The CFI denied this motion on the ground solely
that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter, the necessary demand was
made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the
plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter-
bond. Upon the Surety’s failure to file an answer to the motion, the
CFI granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was
issued.

Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that
the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided
for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the CFI denied
the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) from
such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for
reconsideration. Not one of the assignment of errors raises the
question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly

The CA decided the case affirming the orders appealed from. After
the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a pleading entitled
MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees' action
was filed in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the
sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act
No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already
become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the
value of the subject matter or the amount of the demand does not
exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the CFI
therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

Issue: Whether the Surety is barred from raising the jurisdictional

issue by laches. (YES)

Ruling:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in

different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel
in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the
lack of jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several
stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the CA, it
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only
after an adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke
up to raise the question of jurisdiction. If such conduct is to be
sanctioned, the SC would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July
19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary
once more.
Villagracia v. Fifth Shari-a District Court, G.R. No. 188832, April 23,
2014

FACTS: On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-

meterparcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, from
one Ceres Cañ ete. On March 3, 1996, a TCT No. T-15633 covering the
parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name. At the time of the
purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land. By 2002,
Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued
by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel
of land. It was only on October 30, 2006, when Roldan had the parcel
of land surveyed, found out that Vivencio occupied the said parcel of
land. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed
an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. In its decision dated June 11,
2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as
registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It
ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and
pay damages as well as attorney’s fees. A notice of writ of execution
was sent to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to
comply with the decision. Meanwhile, Vivencio filed a petition for relief
from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction.

He cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal

Laws of the Philippines and argued that Shari’a District Courts may
only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims.
Considering that he is a Christian, hence the respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action
for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. However, respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief from
judgment for lack of merit. Hence this petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order to enjoin the
implementation of the writ of execution issued against Vivencio.
Roldan argued that since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had
jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of possession, he argued
that the proceedings before it were valid. Respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio upon
service on him of summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he
“effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings [before
the Fifth Shari’a District Court]” and he cannot argue that his rights
were prejudiced.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real

action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
 2. Whether or not proceedings before respondent Shari’a District
Court were valid since the latter acquired jurisdiction over the person
of Vivencio.

RULING:

1. The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the

Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article
143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction with “existing civil courts” over real actions not
arising from customary contracts wherein the parties involved are
Muslims. When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the
owner has the right to possess and enjoy it. If the owner is
dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has a right of action to
recover its possession from the dispossessor. When the property
involved is real, such as land, the action to recover it is a real action;
otherwise, the action is a personal action. In such actions, the parties
involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly take
cognizance of them. In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for
recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When
Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a
Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim. When it became apparent
that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
should have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the
evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim. Respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to decide
Roldan’s action because not all of the parties involved in the action are
Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special
Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.

2. In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on

Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him the possession of his
property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his property.
Thus, Roldan’s action for recovery of possession is an action in
personam. This action being in personam, service of summons on
Vivencio was necessary for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court to
acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person. However, as discussed,
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim.
Therefore, all the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District
Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.

ix. Lack of jurisdiction over subject matter may be raised at any stage

Republic v. Bantigue Point Development, G.R. No. 162322, March 14,

2012
 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968
De Herrera v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 170251, June 1, 2011

x. Objection to jurisdiction over a party; holding out theory or doctrine of

ostensible agency

Megan Sugar Corp. v. RTC of Iloilo, G.R. No. 170352, June 1, 2011

xi. Payment of filing/docket fees- jurisdictional

Phil. Women’s Chrisitian Temperance Union v. Yangco, G.R. No. 199595,

April 2, 2014

PHILIPPINE WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, INC.,v TEODORO R. YANGCO

2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRS FOUNDATION, INC
GR NO. 199595 2 APRIL 2014
REYES, J.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking the issuance of an order commanding the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the
Court Sheriff of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, to cease and desist from implementing
the Court Resolutions denying with finality Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance
Union, Inc.'s (PWCTUI) petition for review of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 4 which
affirmed the Decision5 of the RTC in LRC Case which orders the RD to cancel TCT No. 20970
T-22702 and issue in lieu thereof a new title in the name of Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd
Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc. free from all liens and encumbrances. PWCTUI also prays,
as ancillary remedy, for the re-opening of LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) and as provisional
remedy, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction.

Respondent Teodoro R. Yangco (2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs) Foundation, Inc.
(TRY Foundation) filed before the RTC of Quezon City, acting as a Land Registration Court, a
Petition for the Issuance of New Title in Lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 20970
T-22702 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City docketed as LRC Case No. Q-
18126(04).7

TRY Foundation alleged that it is composed of the 2nd and 3rd generation heirs and
successors-in-interest to the first generation testamentary heirs of the late philanthropist
Teodoro R. Yangco (Yangco) who donated a parcel of land subject to two conditions.

The property was then registered in the name of PWCTUI by virtue of TCT No.
20970 at the back of which the above-quoted conditions of the donation were annotated.
PWCTUI’s corporate term expired. Five years thereafter, using the same corporate name,
PWCTUI obtained SEC Registration and forthwith applied for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970 over the subject property thru LRC Case No. 22702 (a new
LRC Case). The application was granted and PWCTUI was issued a new TCT No. 20970 T-
22702 which, however, bore only the first condition imposed on the donation.
 TRY Foundation claimed that the expiration of PWCTUI’s corporate term effectively
rescinded the donation pursuant to the "unwritten resolutory condition" deemed written by
Article 1315 of the Civil Code14 prescribing that the Corporation Code, specifically Section
122 thereof, be read into the donation. Interestingly the latter provision mandates dissolved
corporation to wind up their affairs and dispose of their assets within three years from the
expiration of their term. Being comprised of the heirs of the donor, TRY Foundation claimed
that it is entitled to petition for the issuance of a new title in their name pursuant to Section
108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. TRY Foundation prayed for the issuance of a new
title in its name after the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702.

PWCTUI opposed the petition arguing that: (1) TRY Foundation has no legal
personality to bring the action because the donation has never been revoked and any right
to demand for its revocation already prescribed; (2) although PCWTUI’s corporate term was
not extended upon its expiration in 1979, it nonetheless registered anew and continued the
operations, affairs and social work of the corporation; it also continued to possess the
property and exercised rights of ownership over it; (3) only the appropriate government
agency and not TRY Foundation or any other private individual can challenge the corporate
life and existence of PCWTUI; (4) TRY Foundation and its counsel are guilty of forum
shopping because they have already questioned PWCTUI’s corporate personality in a
different forum but failed to obtain a favorable relief; (5) TRY Foundation is guilty of fraud
for failing to include PWCTUI as an indispensable party and to furnish it with a copy of the
petition; and (6) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition because PWCTUI is unaware
of its publication

The RTC granted TRY Foundation’s petition by ordering the cancellation of

PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and the issuance of a new title in the name of TRY
Foundation.

PWCTUI appealed to the CA, arguing, among others, that it must be determined
whether the condition imposed in the donation has already occurred or deemed fulfilled.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s findings.

PWCTUI no longer raised the jurisdiction issue before the CA and limited its appeal
to the factual findings and legal conclusions of the RTC on its corporate existence and
capacity as the subject property’s uninterrupted owner. The matter reached the Court thru
a petition for review under Rule 45, but with the question of jurisdiction absent in the
appellate pleadings, the Court was constrained to review only mistakes of judgment.

PWCTUI sought recourse with the Court thru a petition for review on certiorari. The
petition was denied for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA
decision. PWCTUI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied with finality. The
court Resolution became final and executory.

ISSUE: 1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the petition of TRY Foundation?
RULING:

NO. The RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition of TRY Foundation.
The RTC judgment in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) and all proceedings taken in relation
thereto were void because the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the fundamental
subject matter of TRY Foundation’s petition for the issuance of a title which was in reality, a
complaint for revocation of donation, an ordinary civil action outside the ambit of Section
108 of P.D. No. 1529.

. Observably, TRY Foundation is actually seeking to recover the possession and

ownership of the subject property from PWCTUI and not merely the cancellation of
PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702. The propriety of pronouncing TRY Foundation as the
absolute owner of the subject property rests on the resolution of whether or not the
donation made to PWCTUI has been effectively revoked when its corporate term expired in
1979.

While PWCTUI could have still challenged the RTC’s jurisdiction even on appeal, its
failure to do so cannot work to its disadvantage. The issue of jurisdiction is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel; no laches will even attach to a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction.51

Hence, since the Court Resolutions dated July 21, 2010 and September 15, 2010 in
G.R. No. 190193 disposed the case only insofar as the factual and legal questions brought
before the CA were concerned, they cannot operate as a procedural impediment to the
present ruling which deals with mistake of jurisdiction.1âwphi1

This is not to say, however, that a certiorari before the Court is a remedy against its
own final and executory judgment. As made known in certain cases, the Court is invested
with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a necessary
complement of its power to promulgate the same.

Manchester Development v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7,

1987
Nestle Phils. v. FY Sons, G.R. No. 150780, May 5, 2006
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989
Phil. First Insurance v. Paramount Gen. Insurance, G.R. No. 165147, July
9, 2008
Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R.
No. 192649, March 9, 2011 (Supra)
Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013

Ramones v. Spouses Guimoc, G.R.No. 226645, August 13, 2018

SUMMARY
: SC restored the award of damages in favor of Ramones, ruling that she did not intend
todefraud the government from the correct docket fees.
DOCTRINE
: Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "[e]xcept as otherwise providedin
these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages." Among these exceptions,
Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.04-2-04-SC - which
guidelines were reflected in SC Circular No. 35-2004 and was already in effect atthe time the
Information was filed - states that the payment of filing fees is required in
estafa
 cases.Subsequent decisions now uniformly hold that "when insufficient filing fees are
initially paid bythe plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rule does not apply."In line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law
demonstrates that "[t]he non- payment of theprescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the
trial court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing feesassessed by the clerk of
court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction
over the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment."
"Thereason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not fair if the
party has actedin good faith."

FACTS
: This case stemmed from an Information filed on June 30, 2006 before the Municipal
TrialCourt of Mariveles, Bataan (MTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-8539, charging
respondentswith the crime of Other Forms of Swindling under Article 316 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). After the said Information was filed by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bataan to theMTC, the latter's Clerk of Court wrote a letter to
petitioner requiring her to pay the amount of P500.00as docket fees. After petitioner's
payment thereof, a certification was later issued by the MTC Clerk ofCourt reflecting the
same.

 
 Eventually, the case proceeded to trial, and thereafter, the MTC, in a Judgment dated Septe
mber 21,2011, acquitted Teodorico but found Elenita guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Other Forms ofSwindling under Article 316 (2) of the RPC, and accordingly,
sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonmentof one (1) month and one (1) day to
four (4) months of
arresto mayor
in its minimum and medium periods, andordered her to pay a fine of P567,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment, as the case may be. In addition, Elenitawas ordered to pay the
amount of P507,000.00, and despite his acquittal, Teodorico was also directed to paythe
amount of P60,000.00, which amounts reflect their respective civil liabilities, both with legal
interest fromDecember 13, 2006 until fully
paid. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the RTC. Respondents argued that the MTC did no
t acquire jurisdiction to award damages in favor of petitioner for failure of the latter to pay
the correct amount of docketfees pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
35-2004 (SC Circular No. 35-2004), which providesthat the filing fees must be paid for
money claims in
estafa
cases. They claimed that due to petitioner's failure tomake an express reservation to
separately institute a civil action, her payment of filing fees in the amount ofP500.00 was
deficient. The damages sought was worth P663,000.00; thus, the correct filing fees should
haveallegedly been around P9,960.00.RTC affirmed the MTC ruling with modification,
acquitting Elenita on the ground of reasonable doubt, butstill maintaining respondents' civil
liabilities.CA affirmed the RTC judgment and order. Unperturbed, respondents moved for
reconsideration. In an Amended Decision, the CA granted respondents' motion for
reconsideration and set aside its earlier decision. Itheld that SC Circular No. 35-2004 was in
effect at the time petitioner filed the case against respondents, andtherefore, the court a quo
erred when it awarded damages in her favor. Consequently, the CA deleted the
orderdirecting respondents to pay their respective civil liabilities.
ISSUES
:

 WoN the CA correctly deleted the award of damages
 
o
 NO. In this case, it is undisputed that the amount of P500.00 paid by petitioner
was insufficient tocover the required filing fees for her
estafa
case under the premises of Section 21, Rule 141 ofthe Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 04-2-04-SC. Nonetheless, it is equally undisputedthat she paid the
full amount of docket fees
as assessed by the Clerk of Court of the MTC
,which is evidenced by a certification dated April 11, 2016 issued therefor. In addition,
petitionerconsistently manifested her willingness to pay additional docket fees when
required. In herpetition, she claims that she is "very much willing to pay the correct docket
fees which is thereason why she immediately went to the clerks of court[,] and records
show that she paid the[MTC] of the amount assessed from her." Indeed, the foregoing
actuations negate any bad faithon petitioner's part, much more belie any intent to defraud
the government. As such, applying theprinciples above-discussed, the Court holds that the
court
a quo
properly acquired jurisdictionover the case. However, petitioner should pay the deficiency
that shall be considered as a lien onthe monetary awards in her favor pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
 
o
 Besides, the Court observes that if respondents believed that the assessment of filing fees
wasincorrect, then it was incumbent upon them to have raised the same before the MTC.
Instead,contrary to the CA's assertion, records show that respondents actively participated
in theproceedings before the MTC and belatedly questioned the alleged underpayment of
docket feesonly for the first time on appeal before the RTC, or five (5) years later after the
institution of theinstant case.

 
 
NOTES
: Petition
GRANTE
B. Kinds of Jurisdiction

B.P. 129 as amended, R.A. 7691, R.A. 7902

a. General Jurisdiction

Regional Trial Court

Durisol Phil. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121106, February
20, 2002

b. Special or Limited Jurisdiction

Sandiganbayan
Court of Tax Appeals
Shari’ah District Court
Also: Regional Trial Court- Family Courts, Probate Court-
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Court

c. Original Jurisdiction

i. Supreme Court

Sec. 5, par. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Petition for writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
Petition for writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
Petition for writ of continuing Mandamus
(Sec. 2, Rule 8, Part III of Rules of Procedure in
Environmental Cases, A.M. 09-6-8-SC)
Petition for writ of Kalikasan
(Sec. 12, Rule 7, Part III of Rules of Procedure in
Environmental Cases, A.M. 09-6-8-SC)

ii. Court of Appeals

Sec. 9, B.P. 129

Petition for writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
Petition for writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
Petition for writ of continuing Mandamus
(Sec. 2, Rule 8, Part III of Rules of Procedure in
Environmental Cases, A.M. 09-6-8-SC)
Petition for writ of Kalikasan
(Sec. 12, Rule 7, Part III of Rules of Procedure in
Environmental Cases, A.M. 09-6-8-SC)
Actions for Annulment of RTC judgment
Petition for freeze order on monetary instrument, etc.
relating to unlawful activity under Anti-Money
 Laundering Act of 2001 or R.A. 9160 as amended
by R.A.9194 (Sec. 44 of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC)

iii. Regional Trial Court

Sec. 21, B.P. 129

R.A. 11576
Petition for writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
Petition for writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
Petition for writ of continuing Mandamus
(Sec. 2, Rule 8, Part III of Rules of Procedure in
Environmental Cases, A.M. 09-6-8-SC)

iv. Shari’ah Distric Court

Art. 413, par. 2, P.D. 1083

d. Appellate Jurisdiction

i. Supreme Court

Sec. 5., par. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Rule 45, Sec. 1, 1997 Rules of Court (“Rules of Court”)
See: Sec. 7, P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A.’s 7975,
8249,
Sec. 19, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Writ of
Amparo)
Sec. 19, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (Writ of Habeas
Data)

ii. Court of Appeals

Secs. 9, 34, B.P. 129

Rule 41, Sec. 2, a, Rules of Court
Rule 42, Rules of Court
Rule 43, Rules of Court

iii. Regional Trial Court

Sec. 22, B.P. 129

Rule 40, Rules of Court

iv. Shari’ah Distric Court

Art. 144 P.D. 1083

e. Exclusive Jurisdiction

f. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction

i. Supreme Court

Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus against

judgment, final order and resolutions of:

a) Court of Appeals
b) Sandiganbayan
c) Court of Tax Appeals
d) COMELEC
e) Commission on Audit
f) Ombudsman (criminal cases)

ii. Court of Appeals

Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus against:

a) Regional Trial Court- decisions, final orders,

resolution
b) National Labor Relations Commission-
decisions, final orders, resolution
c) Secretary of Labor and Employment in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction on
decisions, final orders of:
1) POEA Administrator
2) National Wage Productivity Commission
3) Bureau of Labor Relations

Sec. 9 (2), B.P. 129- Actions for Annulment of RTC

judgment

iii. Regional Trial Court

Sec. 19, B.P. 129 as amended by R.A. 7691

Sec. 5.2, Securities Regulations Code or R.A. 8799
As Special Agrarian Court in the determination of just
compensation
Annulment of MTC Judgment
Civil Cases for Copyright Infringement/Unfair
Competition
Family Law cases
Civil Forfeiture of Proceeds of Money Laundering
offenses

iv. Shari’ah District Court

Art. 413, P.D. 1083

Settlement of Estate of Deceased Muslims
Montaner v. Shari’ah District Court, G.R. No.
174975, January 20, 2009
 v. Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court

Sec. 33, B.P. 129 as amended

R.A. 11576

g. Concurrent/Confluent/Coordinate

i. Supreme Court and Regional Trial Court

Civil actions involving ambassadors, public ministers,

consuls
Cases on the constitutionality of treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction (Sec. 5, 2, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Vera v. Hon. Arca, G.R. No. L-25721, May 26, 1969

ii. Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, (Sandiganbayan),

Regional Trial Court

Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, Quo

Warranto, Habeas Corpus, writs of Amparo,
Habeas Data, Kalikasan, injunctions

Mendoza v. Mayor Villas, G.R. No. 187256,

February 23, 2011
CREBA v. DAR Secretary, G.R. 183409, June 18,
2010
Also- Hierarchy of Court doctrine (Supra.)

h. Territorial Jurisdiction

C. Manner of Acquiring Jurisdiction

a. Over Subject Matter

Allied Domecq Phil. v. Hon. Villon, G.R. No. 156264, September 30,
2004
Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013
Guy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165849, December 10, 2007
Barayuga v. Adventist University, G.R. No. 168008, August 17, 2011
City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973,
August 24, 2011
Republic v. Bantigue Point Development, G.R. No. 162322, March
14, 2012

b. Over the Case

 People of the Philippines v. Hon. Garfin, G.R. No. 153176, March 29,
2004

c. Over the Issues

Rule 10, Sec. 5, Rules of Court

Rule 18, Sec. 7, Rules of Court

Lazo v. Republic Surety, G.R. No. L-27365, January 30, 1970

Buce v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136913, May 12, 2000
Mercader v. DBP, G.R. No. 130699, May 12, 2000

d. Over the Person or Party

Plaintiff

Cesar v. Hon. Ricafort-Bautista, G.R. No. 136415, October

31, 2006

Defendant

1. by service of summons- Rule 14, Secs. 1-3, Rules of

Court

i. personal service- Sec. 6

ii. substituted service- Sec. 7
iii. service by publication- Sec. 14
iv. extra-territorial service- Sec. 15

2. by voluntary appearance- Rule 14, Sec. 23, Rules of

Court

3. by voluntary submission

Rodriguez vs. Alikpala, G.R. No. L-38314, June 25,

1974

e. Over the Res

Rule 14, Sec. 15, Rules of Court

Midgely v. Hon. Fernando, G.R. No. L-34314, May 13, 1975

Perkins v. Dizon, G.R. No. 46631, November 16, 1939
Macahilig v. Heis of Magalit, G.R. No. 141423, November 15, 2000
See: Joya v. Judge Marquez, G.R. No. 162416, January 31,
2006

II. CIVIL PROCEDURE

Brief History

Code of Civil Procedure or Act No. 190- August 7, 1901

(Old) Rules of Court- July 1, 1940
Revised Rules of Court- January 1, 1964
(New) Rules of Court- July 1, 1997
Rules 1-71

RULE 1- GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 1. Title of the Rules of Court

Alvero v. de la Rosa, G.R. No. L-286, March 29, 1946 (Supra.)

Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953

Sec. 2. In what courts applicable

Sec. 4. In what case not applicable

GSIS v. Villaviza, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010

Reyes v. Barrios, G.R. No. 172841, December 15, 2010

Sec. 3. Cases governed

A. Kinds of Actions in the Rules of Court

a) Civil Action
b) Criminal Action
c) Special Proceedings

B. Kinds of Civil Actions in the Rules of Court

a) Ordinary Civil Action

b) Special Civil Action

DBM v. Manila’s Finest Retirees, G.R. No. 169466, May 9, 2007

Amberti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79981, 2 April 1991

C. Kinds of Civil Actions as to Cause

a) Real Actions

Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76431, October

16, 1989
See Rule 4, Sec. 1

b) Personal Actions
 Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013 (?)
Chua v. Total Office Products, G.R. No. 152808, September 30,
2005
Paderanga v. Hon. Buissan, G.R. No. L-49475, September 28,
1993
See Rule 4, Sec. 2

c) Mixed Actions

De la Cruz v. El Seminario, G.R. No. L-5402, January 28, 1911

Emergency Loan Pawnshop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129184,
February 28, 2001

D. Kinds of Civil Actions as to Object

a) Action in Personam

Spouses Yu v. Pacleb, G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009

Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59731, January 11, 1990

b) Action in Rem

Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003

Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

c) Action Quasi in Rem

Spouses Yu v. Pacleb, G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009

(Supra.)
Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September
25, 1998

d) Mixed Action

BA Finance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102998, July 5, 1996

E. Kinds of Actions as to Place of Filing of Complaint

a) Local Action
b) Transitory Action

Sec. 5. Commencement of action

Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, G.R. No. L-30738, July 30, 1982

See: Sotelo vs. Dizon, 67 Phil. 537; Cabrera vs. Tianco, 8 SCRA 582
Manchester Development v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987
(Supra.)
Nestle Phils. v. FY Sons, G.R. No. 150780, May 5, 2006 (Supra.)
 Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989
(Supra.)
Phil. First Insurance v. Paramount Gen. Insurance, G.R. No. 165147, July 9,
2008 (Supra.)
Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R.
No. 192649, March 9, 2011 (Supra.)
Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013
(Supra.)

Sec. 6. Construction

Anama v. Phil. Savings Bank, G.R. No. 187021, January 25, 2012
Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998
Baylon v. Fact-finding Intelligence, G.R. No. 150870, December 11, 2002
Republic v. Kenrick Development, G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006
Building Care Corp. v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, December 10, 2012
Uy v. Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009
Llamas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149588, August 16, 2010

RULE 2- CAUSE OF ACTION

Sec. 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of

Turner v. Lorenzo Shipping, G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010

Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined

Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte, G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013

Swagman Hotels v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161135, April 8, 2005

Sec. 3. One suit for a single cause of action

Joseph v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-41423, February 23, 1989

Phil. Bank of Comm. v. Lim, G.R. No. 158138, April 12, 2005

Sec. 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

Chua v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009

Chu v. Spouses Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011
Pantranco v. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005
Umale v. Canoga Park, G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011
Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5, 2014
Bayang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-53564, February 27, 1987
De Larena v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-29155, November 5, 1928
Blossom & Company v. Manila Gas Corp., G.R. No. L-32958, November 8,
1930
Danfoss v. Continental Cement, G.R. No. 143788, September 9, 2005
Bank of America v. American Realty, G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999
 Allandale Sportsline v. Good Development Corp, G.R. No. 164521,
December 18, 2008
Enriquez v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-16797, February 27, 1963
Tarnate v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-26266, December 29, 1972

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action

See: Sec. 6, Rule 3

Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012

Pantranco v. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005
(Supra.)
Union Glass Corp. v. SEC, G.R. No. 64013, November 28, 1983
Flores v. Hon. Mallare-Philipps, G.R. No. L-66620, September 24, 1986
Genesis Investment v. Heirs of Ebarasabal, G.R. No. 181622, November 20,
2013
Uniwide Holdings v. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007
Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013
Iniego v. Hon. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006
Sec. 6, Rules of Procedure on Small Claims (A.M. 08-8-7-SC, October 27,
2009)

Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action

Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012 (Supra.)

RULE 3- PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

Sec. 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant

Art. 44, Civil Code

Arts. 1772 & 1768, Civil Code
Secs. 21 & 122, Corporation Code
Art. 242 (5), Labor Code
Sec. 15, Rule 2
-Estate of deceased (See: Limjoco v. Instestate Estate, G.R. No. L-770,
April 27, 1948)
-Roman Catholic church (See: Barlin vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-2832,
Nov. 24, 1906)
Ventanilla Enterprises v. Hon. Lazaro, G.R. No. L-53856, August 21, 1980
Chiang Kai Shek School v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58028, April 18, 1989
Sec. 1 (d) & (g), Rule 16

Sec. 2. Parties in interest

Stronghold Insurance v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013

Mayor Dagdag v. Tongnawa, G.R. Nos. 161166-67, February 3, 2005
Spouses Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006
Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120465, September 9, 1999
 Goco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010
Tampico v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 76225, March 31, 1992
Salonga v. Warner, Barnes, G.R. No. L-2246, January 31, 1951
Sec. 1 (g), Rules of Court

Sec. 3. Representatives as parties

Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012

Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59731, January 11, 1990 (Supra.)
MIA v. Rivera Village, G.R. No. 143870, September 30, 2005

Sec. 4. Spouses as parties

Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006

Sec. 5. Minor or incompetent persons

Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties

Flores v. Hon. Mallare-Philipps, G.R. No. L-66620, September 24, 1986

(Supra.)

Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

Boston Equity v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013
Malazarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009
Quilatan v. Heirs of Quilatan, G.R. No. 183059, August 28, 2009
Metrobank v. Hon. Alejo, G.R. No. 141970, September 10, 2001
Guy v. Guy, G.R. No. 189486, September 5, 2012
Monis v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169276, June 16, 2009

Sec. 8. Necessary party

Chua v. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005

Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. 44339, December 2, 1987
Wee v. Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008
Mayor of Parañaque v. Ebio, G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010

Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded

Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006

(Supra.)

Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff

Emata v. IAC, G.R. No. L-72714, June 29, 1989

Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

Boston Equity v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013 (Supra.)
 Leonis Navigation v. Villamater, G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010
Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013

Sec. 12. Class suit

Juana Complex v. Fil-Estate Land, G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012

Newsweek, Inc. v. IAC, G.R. No. L-63559, May 30, 1986
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank, G.R. No. L-23136, August 26, 1974
Borlasa v. Polistico, G.R. No. L-22909, January 28, 1925

Note: No class suit if interest of those who filed the action

conflicts with those sought to be represented. (See: Ibañez v.
Roman Catholic Church, 12 Phil. 227)

Llana v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111014, May 31, 1996

Sec. 13. Alternative Defendants

Insurance Company v. US Lines, G.R. No. L-21839 April 30, 1968

Sec. 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant

See: Sec. 14, Rule 14

Sec. 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant

See: Sec. 8, Rule 14

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel

Saligumba v. Palanog, G.R. No. 143365, December 4, 2008

Hon. Sumaliag v. Spouses Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008
Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006
(Supra.)

Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer

Commissioner v. Jardin, G.R. No. 141834, July 30, 2007

Sec. 18. Incompetency or incapacity

Sec. 19. Transfer of Interest

Associated Bank v. Spouses Pronstroller, G.R. No. 148444, September 3,

2009

Sec. 20. Action on contractual and money claims

See: Sec. 5, Rule 86; Sec. 7, Rule 39

 Gabriel v. Pagaygay, G.R. No. 146989, February 7, 2007

Sec. 21. Indigent party

Sec. 22. Notice to the Solicitor General

RULE 4- VENUE OF ACTIONS

Sec. 1. Venue of real actions

Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76431, October 16, 1989
(Supra.)
Paglaum Management v. Union Bank, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012
Ochoa v. China Bank, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011

Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions

Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012 (Supra.)

Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, August 22. 2008
Emergency Loan Pawnshop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129184, February
28, 2001
Hyatt Elevators v. Goldstar, G.R. No. 161026, October 24, 2005

Sec. 3. Venue of actions against non-residents

Time, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-28882, May 31, 1971

Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable

Union Bank v. Maunlad Homes, G.R. No. 190071, August 5, 2012

Pilipino Telephone v. Tecson, G.R. No. 156966, May 7, 2004
Ochoa v. China Bank, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011 (Supra.)
Republic v. Glasgow Credit, G.R. No. 170281, January 18, 2008
i. Except cases under the Rules on Summary Procedure
ii. Without prejudice of refilling in case of dismissal

RULE 5- UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS

Sec. 1. Uniform procedure

Sec. 2. Meaning of terms

Revised Rule on Summary Procedure

Sec. De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013

Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases

A.L. Ang v. Mondejar, G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014

RULE 6- KINDS OF PLEADINGS

Sec. 1. Pleadings defined

Sec. 2. Pleadings allowed

Sec. 3. Complaint

Sec. 4. Answer

See: Rule 8, Sec. 10

Rule 16, Sec. 6

PBCom v. Spouses Go, G.R. No. 175514, February 14, 2011

Sec. 5. Defenses

See: Rule 8, Sec. 10

Rule 16, Sec. 6

PBCom v. Spouses Go, G.R. No. 175514, February 14, 2011 (Supra.)
BPI v. Spouses Royeca, G.R. No. 176664, July 21, 2008

Prescription/Statute of Limitations

Marquez v. Baldoz, G.R. No. 143779, April 4, 2003

Paid, Waived, Abandoned, Extinguished

Star Two v. Ko, G.R. No. 185454, March 23, 2011

Urethane v. Ong, G.R. No. 164632, October 29, 2008
Fernando v. Acuna, G.R. No. 161030, September 14, 2011

Unenforceable

See: Art. 1403, Civil Code

Lack of Jurisdiction over Subject Matter

Litis Pendentia

Spouses Marasigan v. Chevron, G.R. No. 184015, February 8, 2012

Quito v. Stop & Save Corp., G.R. No. 186657, June 11, 2014
Benavidez v. Salvador, G.R. No. 173331, December 11, 2013

Res Judicata

Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013

Spouses Antonio v. Sayman, G.R. No. 149624, September 29, 2010
 Sec. 6. Counterclaim

Lafarge Cement v. Continental, G.R. No. 155173, November 23, 2004

Yulienco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131692, June 10, 1999

Sec. 7. Compulsory Counterclaim

See: Rule 11, Sec. 8

Rule 9, Sec. 2

Lafarge Cement v. Continental, G.R. No. 155173, November 23, 2004

(Supra.)
Mercado v. Court of Appeals, Gb.R. No. 169576, October 17, 2008
Calibre Traders v. Bayer, G.R. No. 161431, October 13, 2010
Dio v. Subic Bay, G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014
Cabaero v. Hon. Cantos, G.R. No. 102942, April 18, 1997

Sec. 8. Cross-claim

See: Rule 9, Sec. 2

Hon. Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101566, August 17, 1992

Sec. 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims

Sec. 10. Reply

See: Rule 8, Sec. 8

Casent Realty v. Philbank, G.R. No. 150731, September 14, 2007

Sec. 11. Third (fourth, etc.)- party complaint

Capayas v. CFI, 43 Off. Gaz., 2071, 2074; 77 Phil., 181

Allied Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123871, August 31, 1998
Philtranco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012

Sec. 12. Bringing new parties

Sec. 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)- party complaint

RULE 7- PARTS OF A PLEADING

Sec. 1. Caption

Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139884, February 15, 2000

 Sec. 2. The body

Phil. Charter v. PNC Corp., G.R. No. 185066, October 2, 2009

Diona v. Balangue, G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013

Sec. 3. Signature and address

Navarro v. Jarson Development, G.R. No. 142627, January 28, 2008

Sec. 4. Verification

Jacinto v. Gumaru, G.R. No. 191906, June 2, 2014

Mahinay v. Gako, G.R. No. 165338, November 28, 2011
Vallacar v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2012
Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012
Estel v. Diego, G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012
Spouses Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 192615, January 30, 2013
Swedish Match v. Treasurer, v. G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping

Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5, 2014 (Supra.)

Mediserv v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010
Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)
Barba v. Liceo de Cagayan, G.R. No. 193857, November 28, 2012
Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128550, March 16,
2000
Spouses Wee v. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11, 2004
COA v. Paler, G.R. No. 172623, March 10, 2010

Sec. 6. Contents

RULE 8- MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS

Sec. 1. In general

See: Sec. 7, Rule 8

Salita v. Hon. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994

Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, July 6, 2001
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

Sec. 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses

Sec. 3. Conditions precedent

Sec. 4. Capacity

Lorenzo Shipping v. Chubb, G.R. No. 147724, June 8, 2004

Sec. 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind

Sec. 6. Judgment

Sec. 7. Action or defense based on document

Ledda v. BPI, G.R. No. 200868, November 21, 2012

Sec. 8. How to contest such documents

Hibberd v. Rhode, G.R. No. L-8418, December 9, 1915

Equitable Card v. Capistrano, G.R. No. 180157, February 8, 2012

Sec. 9. Official document or act

Sec. 10. Specific denial

Asian Construction v. Sannaedle, G.R. No. 181676, June 11, 2014

Camitan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128099, December 20, 2006

Sec. 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted

Worcester v. Lorenzana, G.R. No. L-9435, July 31, 1958

Agaton v. Hon. Perez, G.R. No. L-19548, December 22, 1966
GSIS v. Villaviza, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010 (Supra.)
Liam Law v. Olympic Sawmill, L-30771, May 26, 1984

Sec. 12. Affirmative defenses

No jurisdiction over defendant

See: Sec. 20, Rule 14

Planters Development Bank v. Chandumal, G.R. No. 195619,

September 5, 2012 (Supra.)
Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29,
2006 (Supra.)

Improper Venue

See: Rule 4
Sec. 4, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003

Universal Robina v. Lim, G.R. No. 154338, October 5, 2007

No legal capacity to sue

Lorenzo Shipping v. Chubb, G.R. No. 147724, June 8, 2004

Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, April 29, 2005
 B. Van Zuiden v. GTVL Manufacturing, G.R. No. 147905, May 28, 2007

States no cause of action

Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011 (Supra.)

Lazaro v. Brewmaster, G.R. No. 182779, August 23, 2010
NM Rothschild v. Lepanto, G.R. No. 175799, November 28, 2011
(Supra.)
Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, April 29, 2005 (Supra.)

Failure to comply with condition precedent

a) Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

b) Earnest Efforts toward amicable settlement- Art. 151, Family
Code
c) Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
d) Payment of Docket Fee
e) Demand to vacate/payment of rental- Sec. 2, Rule 70
f) Alternative Dispute Resolution
g) Referral to Katarungang Pambarangay

Secs. 399-422, 15, Local Government Code

SC Admin. Circular 1493

Morata v. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983)

Uy v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167 (1994)
Wingarts v. Mejia, A.M. No. MTJ-94-1012 March 20, 1995
Mendova v. Afable, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1402, 4 December 2002
Aquino v. Aure, 546 SCRA 71 (2008)
Pang-et v. Manacnes-dao-as, G.R. No. 167261, March 2, 2007
Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183623, June 25, 2012

Sec. 13. Striking out of pleading or matter contained therein

RULE 9- EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded

Boston Equity v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013 (Supra.)
GSIS v. Villaviza, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010 (Supra.)

Litis Pendentia

Spouses Marasigan v. Chevron, G.R. No. 184015, February 8, 2012

Quito v. Stop & Save Corp., G.R. No. 186657, June 11, 2014
Benavidez v. Salvador, G.R. No. 173331, December 11, 2013

Res Judicata
 Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013
Spouses Antonio v. Sayman, G.R. No. 149624, September 29, 2010

Sec. 2. Compulsory counterclaim, cross-claim, not set up barred

Sec. 3. Default; declaration of

See: Sec. 1, Rule 11

Mediserv v. Chinabank, G.R. No. 140755, April 17, 2001

Spouses de los Santos v. Hon. Carpio, G.R. No. 153696, September 11,
2006
Martinez v. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, October 30, 2006
Heirs of Medrano v. De Vera, G.R. No. 165770, August 9, 2010

RULE 10- AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

Sec. 1. Amendments in general

See: Sec. 5, Rule 1

Wallem v. S.R. Farms, G.R. No. 161849, July 9, 2010

Spouses Dionisio v. Linsangan, G.R. No. 178159, March 2, 2011

Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right

Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, August 22. 2008 (Supra.)
Sante v. Hon. Claravall, G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010

Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court

Tiu v. PBCOm, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009

Philippine Ports Authority v. WGA, G.R. No. 158401, January 28, 2008

Sec. 4. Formal amendments

Sec. 5. No amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence

Azolla Farms v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138085, November 11, 2004
Spouses Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 172825, October 11, 2012

Sec. 6. Supplemental pleadings

Delbros Hotel v. IAC, G.R. No. L-72566, April 12, 1988

Barba v. Liceo de Cagayan, G.R. No. 193857, November 28, 2012

Sec. 7. Filing of amended pleadings

Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleadings

 Air Ads v. TADECO, G.R. No. 160736, March 23, 2011

RULE 11- WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

Sec. 1. Answer to complaint

See: Secs. 1-2, Rule 22

Atty. Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131094, May 16, 2005
Victoria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147550, January 26, 2005

Sec. 2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity

Sec. 3. Answer to amended complaint

Sec. 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross-claim

Sec. 5. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint

Sec. 6. Reply

Sec. 7. Answer to supplemental complaint

Sec. 8. Existing counterclaim or cross-claim

Sec. 9. Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer

Sec. 10. Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim

Sec. 11. Extension of time to file an answer

RULE 12- BILL OF PARTICULARS

Sec. 1. When applied for purpose

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148154, December 17, 2007

Salita v. Hon. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994 (Supra.)

Sec. 2. Action by the court

Sec. 3. Compliance with order

Sec. 4. Effect of non-compliance

Sec. 5. Stay of period to file responsive pleading

Sec. 6. Bill a part of pleading

 RULE 13- FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
PAPERS

Sec. 1. Coverage

Sec. 2. Filing and service, defined

Garrucho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143791, January 14, 2005

Phil. Radiant Products v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 163569, December 9, 2005
Grand v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142358, January 31, 2006
Salting v. Velez, G.R. No. 181930, January 10, 2011

Sec. 3. Manner of filing

Russel v. Austria, G.R. No. 184542, April 23, 2010

Sec. 4. Papers required to be filed and served

See: Sec. 1, Rule 36

Sec. 5. Modes of service

Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 166216, March 14, 2012

Sec. 6. Personal service

Garrucho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143791, January 14, 2005 (Supra.)

Sec. 7. Service by mail

Sec. 8. Substituted service

Thermochem v. Naval, G.R. No. 131541, October 20, 2000

Cubar v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 55035, February 23, 1983
Garrucho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143791, January 14, 2005 (Supra.)
Mojar v. Agro Commercial Security, G.R. No. 187188, June 27, 2012

Sec. 9. Service by electronic means and facsimile

Sec. 10. Presumptive Service

Sec. 11. Change of electronic mail address or facsimile number

Sec. 12. Electronic mail and facsimile subject and title of pleading and other
documents

Sec. 13. Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions

Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 166216, March 14, 2012 (Supra.)

 Sec. 14. Conventional service or filing of orders, pleadings and other
documents

Sec. 15. Completeness of service

Bernarte v. PBA, G.R. No. 192084, September 14, 2011

Sec. 16. Proof of filing

Sec. 17. Proof of service

Spouses Dela Cruz v. Ramiscal, G.R. No. 137882, February 4, 2005

Po v. DOJ, G.R. No. 195198, February 11, 2013
PNB v. CIR, G.R. No. 172458, December 14, 2011 (Supra.)
Sec. 18. Court-issued orders and other documents

Sec. 19. Notice of lis pendens

Cunanan v. Jumping Jap, G.R. No. 173834, April 24, 2009

Gagoomal v. Spouses Villacorta, G.R. No. 192813, January 18, 2012

RULE 14- SUMMONS

Sec. 1. Clerk to issue summons

Optima Realty v. Hertz Phils., G.R. No. 183035, January 9, 2013

Sec. 2. Contents

Sec. 3. By whom served

Sec. 4. Validity of summons and issuance of alias summons

Sec. 5. Service in person of defendant

Planters Development Bank v. Chandumal, G.R. No. 195619, September 5,

2012
Oaminal v. Castillo, G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003
Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013

Sec. 6. Substituted service

Planters Development Bank v. Chandumal, G.R. No. 195619, September 5,

2012 (Supra.)
Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013 (Supra.)
Gentle Supreme v. Consulta, G.R. No. 183182, September 1, 2010
 Leah Palma v. Hon. Galvez, G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
Sagana v. Francisco, G.R. No. 161952, October 2, 2009
Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006
Chu v. Mach Asia, G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013

Sec. 7. Service upon entity without juridical personality

Sec. 8. Service upon prisoners

Sec. 9. Service consistent with international conventions

Sec. 10. Service upon minors and incompetents

Sec. 11. Service upon spouses

Sec. 12. Service upon domestic private juridical entity

B.D. Long-Span Builders v. R.S. Ampeloquio, G.R. No. 169919, September

11, 2009
Tung Ho Steel v. Ting Guan, G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014
Cathay Metal v. Laguna West, G.R. No. 172204, July 2, 2014

Sec. 13. Duty of counsel of record

Sec. 14. Service upon foreign private juridical entities

See: A.M. No. 11-3-6, March 15, 2011

Atiko Trans v. Prudential Guarantee, G.R. No. 167545, August 17, 2011
NM Rothschild v. Lepanto, G.R. No. 175799, November 28, 2011

Sec. 15. Service upon public corporations

Sec. 16. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown

Pua v. Deyto, G.R. No. 173336, November 26, 2012

Cathay Metal v. Laguna West, G.R. No. 172204, July 2, 2014 (Supra.)

Sec. 17. Extraterritorial service

NM Rothschild v. Lepanto, G.R. No. 175799, November 28, 2011 (Supra.)

Acance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699, March 16, 2005
Spouses Jose v. Spouses Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003

Sec. 18. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines

Leah Palma v. Hon. Galvez, G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010 (Supra.)
Montefalcon v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008
Belen v. Belen, G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008
 Sec. 19. Leave of court

Sec. 20. Return

Sec. 21. Proof of service

Sec. 22. Proof of service by publication

Acance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699, March 16, 2005

Sec. 23. Voluntary appearance

RULE 15- MOTIONS

Sec. 1. Motion defined

Sec. 2. Motions must be in writing

Sec. 3. Contents

Sec. 4. Non-litigious motions

Sec. 5. Litigious motions

Sec. 6. Notice of hearing on litigious motions; discretionary

Sec. 7. Proof of service necessary

Sec. 8. Motion day

Sec. 9. Omnibus motion

Tung Ho Steel v. Ting Guan, G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014 (Supra.)

Sec. 10. Motion for leave

Sec. 11. Form

Sec. 12. Prohibited motions

Sec. 13. Dismissal with prejudice

[RULE 16- Deleted]

RULE 17- DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS

 Sec. 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff

Dael v. Spouses Beltran, G.R. No. 156470, April 30, 2008

Go v. Curz, G.R. No. L-58986, April 17, 1989

Sec. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff

Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff

AFPRSBS v. Republic, G.R. No. 188956, March 20, 2013

Phil. Charter v. Explorer Machine, G.R. No. 175409, September 7, 2011
Republic v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 181458, March 20, 2013
Shimizu Philippines v. Magasalin, G.R. No. 170026, June 2012
Quintos v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014

Sec. 4. Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complainant

RULE 18- PRE-TRIAL

Sec. 1. When conducted

See: A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC

Sarmiento v. Juan, G.R. No. 56605, January 28, 1983

Espiritu v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 181020, November 25, 2009
Paranque Kings v. Santos, G.R. No. 194638, July 2, 2014
Corpus v. Hon. Ochotorena, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861, July 30, 2004

Sec. 2. Nature and Purpose

Article 2030, Civil Code

Suico Industrial Corp., v. Hon. Yap, G.R. No. 177711, September 5, 2012

Sec. 3. Notice of pre-trial

Sec. 4. Appearance of parties

Absolute Management v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 190277, July 23, 2014

Suico Industrial Corp., v. Hon. Yap, G.R. No. 177711, September 5, 2012
(Supra.)

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear

Chingkoe v. Republic, G.R. No. 183608, July 31, 2013

Durban Apartments v. Pioneer, G.R. No. 179419, January 12, 2011

Sec. 6. Pre-trial brief

BPI v. Dando, G.R. No. 177456, September 4, 2009

 Benavidez v. Salvador, G.R. No. 173331, December 11, 2013

Sec. 7. Record of pre-trial

See: Rule 10, Sec. 5, Rules of Court

Rule 18, Sec. 7, Rules of Court

Lazo v. Republic Surety, G.R. No. L-27365, January 30, 1970 (Supra.)
Buce v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136913, May 12, 2000 (Supra.)
Mercader v. DBP, G.R. No. 130699, May 12, 2000 (Supra.)

RULE 19- INTERVENTION

Sec. 1. Who may intervene

Ongco v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 190810, July 18, 2012

Sec. 2. Time to intervene

Big Country Ranch v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102927, October 12, 1993
Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

Sec. 3. Pleadings-in-intervention

Sec. 4. Answer to complaint-in-intervention

Lim v. Napocor, G.R. No. 178789, November 14, 2012

Big Country Ranch v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102927, October 12, 1993
(Supra.)
Metrobank v. Raycor Aircontrol, G.R. No. 89909, September 21, 1990

RULE 20- CALENDAR OF CASES

Sec. 1. Calendar of cases

Sec. 2. Assignment of cases

RULE 21- SUBPOENA

Sec. 1. Subpoena and subpoena duces tecum

Sec. 2. By whom issued

Sec. 3. Form and contents

H.C. Liebnow v. Phil. Vegetable Oil Co., G.R. No. L-13463, November 9,
1918
Lozada v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012
 Sec. 4. Quashing of subpoena

Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010

Sec. 5. Subpoena for depositions

Sec. 6. Service

Sec. 7. Personal appearance in court

Sec. 8. Compelling attendance

Sec. 9. Contempt

Sec. 10. Exceptions

RULE 22- COMPUTATION OF TIME

Sec. 1. How to compute time

Sec. 2. Effect of interruption

RULE 23- DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION

Sec. 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken

Dasmarinas Garment v. Reyes, G.R. No. 108229, August 24, 1993

San Luis v. Hon. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008

Sec. 2. Scope of examination

Fortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108119, January 19, 1994

Sec. 3. Examination and cross-examination

Sec. 4. Use of depositions

San Luis v. Hon. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008 (Supra.)
Sales v. Sabino, G.R. No. 133154, December 9, 2005
Landoil v. Spouses Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 155010, August 16, 2004
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011

Sec. 5. Effect of substitution of parties

Sec. 6. Objections to admissibility

Sec. 7. Effect of taking depositions

Sec. 8. Effect of using depositions

 Sec. 9. Rebutting deposition

Sec. 10. Persons before whom deposition may be taken within the Philippines

Sec. 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries

Sec. 12. Commission or letters rogatory

Dulay v. Dulay, G.R. No. 158857, November 11, 2005

Sec. 13. Disqualification by interest

Sec. 14. Stipulations regarding taking of depositions

Sec. 15. Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place

Sec. 16. Orders for the protection of parties and deponents

Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, G.R. No. 137136, November 3, 1999

Sec. 17. Record of examination, oath; objections

Isabela Sugar Co. v. Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-5924. October 28, 1953

Sec. 18. Motion to terminate or limit examination

Isabela Sugar Co. v. Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-5924. October 28, 1953

Sec. 19. Submission to witness; changes; signing

Ayala Land v. Tagle, G.R. No. 153667, August 11, 2005

Sec. 20. Certification, and filing by officer

Sec. 21. Notice of filing

Sec. 22. Furnishing copies

Sec. 23. Failure to attend of party giving notice

Sec. 24. Failure of party giving notice to serve subpoena

Sec. 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of

interrogatories

San Luis v. Hon. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008 (Supra.)

Sec. 26. Officers to take responses and prepare record

 Sec. 27. Notice of filing and furnishing copies

Sec. 28. Order for the protection of parties and deponents

Sec. 29. Effect of errors and irregularities in depositions

Sales v. Sabino, G.R. No. 133154, December 9, 2005 (Supra.)

RULE 24- DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR PENDING APPEAL

Sec. 1. Depositions before action; petition

Sec. 2. Contents of petition

Sec. 3. Notice and service

Sec. 4. Order and examination

Sec. 5. Reference to court

Sec. 6. Use of deposition

Sec. 7. Depositions pending appeal

RULE 25- INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES

Sec. 1. Interrogatories to parties, service thereof

Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101682, December 14, 1992

Sec. 2. Answer to interrogatories

Sec. 3. Objections to interrogatories

Sec. 4. Number of interrogatories

Sec. 5. Scope and use of interrogatories

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories

Spouses Afulugencia v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 185145, February 5, 2014

RULE 26- ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY

Sec. 1. Request for admission

Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101682, December 14, 1992

 PSCFC Financial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106094, December 28,
1992
Lanada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102390, February 1, 2002
Sec. 2. Implied admission

Metro Manila Shopping v. Toledo, G.R. No. 190818, June 5, 2013

Limos v. Spouses Odones, G.R. No. 186979, August 11, 2010

Sec. 3. Effect of admission

Sec. 4. Withdrawal

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to file and serve request for admission

RULE 27- PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS

Sec. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order

Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135874, January

25, 2000
Solidbank v. Gateway Electronics, G.R. No. 164805, April 30, 2008
Capitol Hills v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014
Eagleridge Dev. Corp. v. Cameron Granville, G.R. No. 204700, April 10,
2013

RULE 28- PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS

Sec. 1. When examination may be ordered

Sec. 2. Order for examination

Sec. 3. Report of findings

Sec. 4. Waiver of privilege

RULE 29- REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH MODES OF DISCOVERY

Sec. 1. Refusal to answer

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 188881, April 21, 2014

Jaravata v. Kuhail, G.R. No. 154988, June 21, 2007
Capitol Hills v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014 (Supra.)

Sec. 2. Contempt of court

Sec. 3. Other consequences

Spouses Zepeda v. Chinabank, G.R. No. 172175, October 9, 2006

 Solidbank v. Gateway Electronics, G.R. No. 164805, April 30, 2008
(Supra.)
Capitol Hills v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014 (Supra.)

Sec. 4. Expenses on refusal to admit

Sec. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers

Insular Life v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97654, November 14, 1994
Jaravata v. Kuhail, G.R. No. 154988, June 21, 2007 (Supra.)
Spouses Zepeda v. Chinabank, G.R. No. 172175, October 9, 2006 (Supra.)
Arellano v. CIR, G.R. No. L-34897, July 15, 1975

Sec. 6. Expenses against the Republic of the Philippines

RULE 30- TRIAL

Sec. 1. Schedule of Trial

Acosta v. People, L-17427, July 31, 1962

Sec. 2. Adjournments and postponements

See: Sec. 16, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

Mari v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123997, January 20, 1999
Acuzar v. Hon. Ocampo, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1396, March 15, 2004

Sec. 3. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for illness of party or counsel

Sec. 4. Hearing days and calendar call

Sec. 5. Order of Trial

See: Sec. 2, Rule 31; Sec. 5, Rule 10; Sec. 7, Rule 18

A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC or Judicial Affidavit Rule

OCA Circula No. 05-2013,

Sec. 6. Oral offer of exhibits

Sec. 7. Agreed statement of facts

Sec. 8. Suspension of actions

See: Art. 2030, Civil Code

 Goldloop Properties v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99431, August 11, 1992

Sec. 9. Judge to receive evidence; delegation to the clerk of court

RULE 31- CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE

Sec. 1. Consolidation

See: Sec. 6, Rule 3

Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013
(Supra.)
Phil. Savings Bank v. Mañalac, G.R. No. 145441, April 26, 2005
Yu v. Basilio, G.R. No. 138701-02, October 17, 2006

Sec. 2. Separate Trial

RULE 32- TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER

Sec. 1. Reference by consent

See: Provisions of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases
Rule 3, Sec. 2 (e), Sec. 6 (k); Rule 5, Sec. 4; Rule 8, Sec. 7;

Sec. 2. Reference ordered on motion

Heirs of Pabaus v. Heirs of Yutiamco, G.R. No. 164356, July 27, 2011

Sec. 3. Order of reference; powers of the commissioner

Sec. 4. Oath of commissioner

Sec. 5. Proceedings before commissioner

Sec. 6. Failure of parties to appear before commissioner

Sec. 7. Refusal of witness

Sec. 8. Commissioner shall avoid delays

Sec. 9. Report of commissioner

Sec. 10. Notice to parties of the filing of the report

Sec. 11. Hearing upon report

Sec. 12. Stipulations as to findings

 Sec. 13. Compensation of commissioner

RULE 33- DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

Sec. 1. Demurrer to Evidence

Gonzales v. Bugaay, G.R. No. 173008, February 22, 2012

Uy v. Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009
Enjoas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 129938, December 12, 1997
Capitol Sawmill v. Chua Gaw, G.R. No. 187843, June 9, 2014

Sec. 2. Action on demurrer to evidence

RULE 34- JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings

Asian Construction v. Sannaedle, G.R. No. 181676, June 11, 2014

PNB v. Aznar, G.R. No. 171805, May 30, 2011
Municipality of Tiwi v. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010

Sec. 2. Action on motion for judgment on the pleadings

RULE 35- SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

Sec. 1. Summary judgment for claimant

Nocom v. Camerino, G.R. No. 182984, February 10, 2009

Spouses Villuga v. Kelly Hardware, G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012
Phil. Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010
Bungcayao v. Fort Ilocandia, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010

Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party

Smart v. Aldecoa, G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013

Sec. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon

Sec. 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion

Phil. Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010 (Supra.)

Sec. 5. Form of affidavits and supporting papers

Sec. 6. Affidavits in bad faith

RULE 36- JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY THEREOF

 Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders

See: Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Gotamco v. Chan Seng, G.R. No. L-22737, November 28, 1924

Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)
Calderon v. Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, January 9, 2013
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111610, February 27, 2002
Re: Hon. Suan, A.M. RTJ-04-1849, September 20, 2004
UP v. Hon. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2010
Amovit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154559, October 5, 2011

Sec. 2. Entry of judgments and final orders

Abrigo v. Flores, G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013

Sec. 3. Judgment for or against one or more several parties

Sec. 4. Several judgments

Fernando v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 160730, December 10, 2004

Heirs of Bang v. Sy, G.R. No. 114217, October 13, 2009

Sec. 5. Separate judgments

Marcos v. Republic, G.R. No. 189434, March 12, 2014

Associated Anglo-American v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167237, April 23,
2010

Sec. 6. Judgment against entity without juridical personality

RULE 37- NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATIONS

Sec. 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration

Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169005, January 28, 2013

See: Section 3 (b), Rule 9

Fraud

Samonte v. Samonte, G.R. No. L-40683, June 27, 1975

Palanca v. American Food, G.R. No. L-22822, August 30, 1968

Accident

NFD International v. Illescas, G.R. No. 183054, September 29, 2010

Soloria v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-20738, January 31, 1966
 Mistake

Viking Industrial v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143794, July 13, 2004
Building Care v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, December 10, 2012
(Supra.)

Excusable Negligence

Multi-Trans Agency v. Oriental Assurance, G.R. no. 180817, June 23,

2009
Spouses Que v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150739, August 18, 2005

Newly Discovered Evidence

Ybiernas v. Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011

Sec. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice

thereof

Pangasinan Five Star Bus v. Spouses Barredo, G.R. No. 152714, August 10,
2006
Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998 (Supra.)

Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration

Sec. 4. Resolution of motion

Sec. 5. Second motion for new trial

See: Sec. 8, Rule 15

Cleofas v. St. Peter Memorial Park, G.R. No. 84905, February 1, 2000
Casalla v. People, G.R. No. 138855, October 29, 2002
University of the East v. UE Employees’ Assoc., G.R. No. 179593, September
14, 2011
McBurnie v. Guanzon, G.R. Nos. 178034, 178117, 186984-85, October 17,
2013

Sec. 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial

Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration

See: Rule 31, Sec. 2

Sec. 8. Effect of order for partial new trial

See: Rule 36, Sec. 5

 Sec. 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration

Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)

RULE 38- RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS

Sec. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings

Samonte v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 165544, October 2, 2009

Ex. of “other proceedings”- order of writ of execution, order dismissing

an appeal

Francisco v. Puno, G.R. No. L-55694, October 23, 1981

Redeña v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007 (Supra.)
Spouses Dela Cruz v. Spouses Andres, G.R. No. 161864, April 27, 2007

Sec. 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal

Redeña v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007

See: Section 7, Rule 38

Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification

Madarang v. Spouses Morales, G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

Sec. 4. Order to file an answer

Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction pending proceedings

Mayuga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123899, August 30, 1996

Sec. 6. Proceedings after answer is filed

Miraflor v. Hon. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. L-77568, December 14, 1988

Sec. 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set aside

RULE 39- EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS

Sec. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders

Sec. 2. Discretionary execution

Sec. 3. Stay of discretionary execution

 Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal

Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action

Sec. 7. Execution in case of death of party

Sec. 8. Issuance, form and contents of a writ of execution

Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced

Sec. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act

Sec. 11. Execution of special judgments

Sec. 12. Effect of levy on execution as to third person

Sec. 13. Property exempt from execution

Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution

Sec. 15. Notice of sale or property on execution

Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person

Sec. 17. Penalty for selling without notice, or removing or defacing notice

Sec. 18. No sale if judgment and costs paid

Sec. 19. How property sold on execution; who may direct manner and order
of sale

Sec. 20. Refusal of purchases to pay

Sec. 21. Judgment obligee as purchaser

Sec. 22. Adjournment of sale

Sec. 23. Conveyance to purchaser of personal property capable of manual

delivery

Sec. 24. Conveyance to purchaser of personal property not capable of

manual delivery

Sec. 25. Conveyance of real property; certificate thereof given to purchaser

and filed with registry of deeds

Sec. 26. Certificate of sale where property claimed by third person

Sec. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold

Sec. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive
redemptions; notice to be given and filed

Sec. 29. Effect of redemption by judgment obligor, and certificate to be

delivered and recorded thereupon; to whom payments on
redemption made

Sec. 30. Proof required of redemptioner

Sec. 31. Manner of using pending redemption, waste restrained

Sec. 32. Rents, earning and income of property pending redemption

Sec. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period;

by whom executed or given

Sec. 34. Recovery of price if sale not effective; revival of judgment

Sec. 35. Right to contribution or reimbursement

Sec. 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied

Sec. 37. Examination of obligor of judgment obligor

Sec. 38. Enforcement of attendance and conduct of examination

Sec. 39. Obligor may pay execution against oblige

Sec. 40. Order for application of property and income to satisfaction of

judgment

Sec. 41. Appointment of receiver

Sec. 42. Sale of ascertainable interest of judgment obligor in real estate

Sec. 43. Proceedings when indebtedness denied or another person claims

the property

Sec. 44. Entry of satisfaction of judgment by clerk of court

Sec. 45. Entry of satisfaction with or without admission

Sec. 46. When principal bound by judgment against surety

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders

(To follow…)